Quotes of the Day:

"We will never have true civilization until we have learned to recognize the rights of others."

- WIll Rogers

"Only during hard times do people come to understand how difficult it is to be the master of their feelings and thoughts."

-Anton Chekhov

"I hope our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be." 

- Thomas Jefferson

This Day in History: September 18

UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash that generated much speculation; a 2017 investigation found that “it appears plausible that an external attack or threat may have been a cause of the crash.”

1. Ukraine’s Operations in Bakhmut Have Kept Russian Reserves Away from the South

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2023

3. New Orleans DA Fights ‘Terrorism’ on Streets With AI Spycraft

4. The spy tactics China are using to shape the world in their favour

5. When did we start making deals with other nations to release Americans? We always did, now we're just being honest about it.

6. China flies 103 military planes toward Taiwan in a new high in activity the island calls harassment

7. In U.S. Visit, Zelensky to Make a Case for More Aid, and Say Thank You

8. Special Operations News - September 18, 2023 | SOF News

9. Anti-drone system that fits in backpack now allows soldiers to hack hostile targets

10. Ukraine's Unwavering Commitment: Personal Insights and the Urgent Need for Continued Support by Frank Helmick

11. Search on for missing Marine Corps F-35 jet after pilot ejects

12. Pentagon orders new interviews on deadly 2021 Afghan airport attack

13. Milley says military is not woke: ‘I’m not even sure what that word truly means’

14. Production of key munition years ahead of schedule, Pentagon says

15. Biden's national security adviser holds two days of talks in Malta with China's foreign minister

16. How two SATCOM companies are responding to Starlink’s dominance

17. Readers react to op-ed on honoring Vietnam War’s most secret warriors

18. Six reasons the Pentagon should retire ‘deterrence by denial’

19. Because I was a woman who served, I was stereotyped by a stranger

20. A veteran started a gun shop. When a struggling soldier asked him to store his firearms – he started saving lives.

21. The paranoia behind China's spy war

22. Co-Opting Clausewitz: Using On War to Explain Success and Failure in the War in Ukraine

23. From Non-Alignment to Realignment

24. Balancing Space Superiority and Space Services to Better Sustain the Joint Force

25. Taiwan’s Path Between Extremes

26. Ukraine Just Dismissed All Its Deputy Defense Ministers – Here’s Why

1. Ukraine’s Operations in Bakhmut Have Kept Russian Reserves Away from the South

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operations-bakhmut-have-kept-russian-reserves-away-south

UKRAINE’S OPERATIONS IN BAKHMUT HAVE KEPT RUSSIAN RESERVES AWAY FROM THE SOUTH

Sep 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukraine’s Operations in Bakhmut Have Kept Russian Reserves Away from the South

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Special Edition

By Daniel Mealie, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaway: Ukrainian forces are celebrating the liberation of two small towns south of Bakhmut, but Ukraine’s entire effort first to defend and now to conduct counter-offensive operations around Bakhmut has been the subject of much unwarranted criticism. Ukraine's defensive and counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area since summer 2022 are an operationally sound undertaking that has fixed a large amount of Russian combat power that would otherwise have been available to reinforce Russian defenses in southern Ukraine. Elements of two of Russia’s four Airborne (VDV) divisions and three of Russia’s four VDV separate brigades are currently defending the Bakhmut area. This significant Ukrainian achievement has helped prevent Russia from creating a large mobile VDV operational reserve that could have been used to stop the main Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in Zaporizhia Oblast. Continued large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut are necessary to keep Russian forces fixed in that area, as the likely recent redeployment of a detachment of one VDV separate brigade from near Bakhmut to southern Ukraine shows how eager the Russians are to recoup the combat power that the Ukrainian counteroffensive around Bakhmut is fixing there.

Ukraine’s defensive operations in Bakhmut drew elements of at least one Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division and fixed them near Bakhmut in summer 2022. Elements of the 106th Airborne Division were reportedly operating in Bakhmut as early as June 2022. Former Russian officer Igor Girkin reported that the 137th Airborne Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division had been operating in Bakhmut alongside Wagner forces since the “beginning” of Wagner’s assault on Bakhmut, presumably in June 2022 when Wagner’s participation in major attacks to capture the town began.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 137th Airborne Regiment were already operating near Bakhmut as of September 14, 2022.[2]

The Russian military committed elements of the 106th Airborne Division to augment the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut no later than December 2022. Combat footage posted in December 2022 and January 2023 shows likely elements of the 106th Airborne Division engaged in combat in Bakhmut.[3] A Russian milblogger reported that unspecified VDV forces conducted joint operations with the Wagner Group in the Bakhmut area on December 27, 2022.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed Russian Airborne Forces’ participation in the battle of Bakhmut – very likely including elements of the 106th Airborne Division – in January 2023.[5]

The Russian military deployed additional VDV units to Bakhmut in early- and mid-May 2023 shortly before Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s announcement that Wagner forces would withdraw from Bakhmut. The tempo of combat in Bakhmut decreased in April and early May 2023 as Russian forces completed their capture of the city. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20 and announced his intent to withdraw Wagner forces from the town on May 25.[6] Prigozhin announced on May 25 that the Wagner Group began handing over its positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense and claimed that Wagner would entirely withdraw from the town on June 1, 2023.[7]

Additional VDV forces deployed to Bakhmut before and during this transitional period. Senior Ukrainian defense officials reported that the Russian military deployed several unspecified VDV units to Bakhmut in mid-May 2023.[8] A Russian soldier’s obituary confirms that elements of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade deployed to Bakhmut – likely from the Svatove-Kreminna line - no later than May 14, 2023.[9] Ukrainian sources reported that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division deployed to Bakhmut in late March and mid-April.[10] Scattered small elements of the 98th Airborne Division were reportedly operating near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, and Dibrova, Luhansk Oblast, as of May 2023.[11] Combat footage and Russian reports confirmed that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division redeployed to Bakhmut no later than June 2023.[12] Elements of the 11th and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades likely deployed to Bakhmut around this time, and their participation in combat in Bakhmut was confirmed in June and July 2023.[13]

Ukrainian forces began counteroffensive operations against Bakhmut almost immediately following Wagner’s withdrawal, causing the Russians to maintain VDV forces already there and to deploy additional VDV reinforcements to Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces conducted sustained tactical counterattacks in Bakhmut and around its flanks following Wagner’s capture of the city around May 20.[14] Ukraine launched a significant counteroffensive against Bakhmut on June 4, the same day it began its major counteroffensive in Zaporizhia, and conducted sustained and reinvigorated offensive actions near Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks throughout June, July, and August.[15]

These sustained Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut fixed considerable VDV forces in Bakhmut. The Russian military had committed elements of the 11th, 31st, and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades to the defense of the town by July 2023.[16] The only VDV separate brigade not committed to Bakhmut was the 45th Guards SPETSNAZ Brigade, which is a special forces unit directly controlled by the Russian General Staff.[17] The Russian military would not have deployed and retained this large quantity of VDV forces in Bakhmut had Ukrainian forces not launched large-scale and effective counteroffensive operations that threatened to retake the town that Russian forces had seized at enormous cost. Russian sources credited elements of the 98th Airborne Division - likely elements of the 217th Airborne Regiment - with defeating Ukrainian attacks on Bakhmut’s northern flank in July 2023.[18] Elements of the 106th Airborne Division's 137th Airborne Regiment remained in Bakhmut from September 2022 to September 2023 without any observed evidence of a rotation.[19]  

Ukraine's continued counteroffensive actions in Bakhmut since June 2023 have fixed elements of two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the VDV’s four separate brigades, dramatically reducing the VDV’s ability to redeploy more forces laterally to reinforce the southern front. The fact that the Russian command redeployed these VDV forces to hold Bakhmut shows that they would have been available to shift to Zaporizhia Oblast to defend against the main Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts there had Ukrainian operations not fixed them in the Bakhmut area.

Ukraine’s sustained operations near Bakhmut have fixed the following VDV elements near Bakhmut:

• Both of the 106th Airborne Division’s maneuver regiments likely remain near Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[20]
• Elements of the 137th Regiment were reported near Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[21]
• Elements of the 51st Regiment reportedly remained near Bakhmut as of late August 2023. [22]
• One of the 98th Airborne Division’s two maneuver regiments likely remains fixed in Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[23]
• The 217th Regiment’s last reported whereabouts are in Bakhmut as of early August.[24] ISW has not observed evidence of the 217th Regiment redeploying as of this publication.
• Elements of the 11th Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[25]
• Elements of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[26]
• Elements of the 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[27]

The Russian military redeployed elements of two VDV units that the Russian command had not committed to Bakhmut to support Russian defenses in Zaporizhia Oblast. The only VDV forces not engaged in Bakhmut by June-July 2023 were elements of the 76th Air Assault Division operating near Kreminna, the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division also operating near Kreminna, the 7th Air Assault Division operating on left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, and the 45th Guards SPETSNAZ Brigade, which had already been committed to defending southern Ukraine near Mala Tokmachka in early June 2023.[28] (The 45th Brigade’s last known location before appearing in Zaporizhia Oblast in June 2023 was in Kherson Oblast in October 2022).[29]

Russia redeployed the 7th Air Assault Division and elements of the 76th Air Assault Division to Robotyne in August.[30] The 7th Air Assault Division’s subordinate 56th, 108th, and 247th Air Assault Regiments remain active along the southern front as of early September 2023.[31] The 76th Air Assault Division’s subordinate 104th and 234th regiments were never committed to Bakhmut and had held positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line into July 2023.[32] The 76th Air Assault Division’s third regiment, the 237th Regiment, was reportedly destroyed in Kherson Oblast in September 2022 and a likely reconstituted 237th Regiment deployed to the Luhansk line no later than January 2023.[33] The 104th and 234th Regiments redeployed to Zaporizhia Oblast in late August 2023 while the 237th Regiment reportedly continued to hold positions near Kreminna as of early July 2023.[34] ISW has not observed evidence of the 237th Regiment redeploying from Kreminna as of this publication.

Russia’s most recent reported lateral redeployment to reinforce the southern front is reportedly being undertaken by the 41st Combined Arms Army - notably not a VDV formation. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov reported on August 31 that elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army began a “slow” redeployment from the Luhansk line to an unspecified area in southern Ukraine.[35] This lateral redeployment of regular motorized rifle units likely reflects the fact that Russian forces are running out of VDV units to move. All of Russia’s VDV regiments and brigades not already deployed to the south are committed to the Bakhmut area with the exception of the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division and the reconstituted 237th Air Assault Regiment of the 76th Air Assault Division, both of which are reportedly still operating on the Kreminna-Svatove line as of late August and July, respectively.[36] Reports of elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne Brigade operating near Nesteryanka, on the western shoulder of the Ukrainian drive to Robotyne in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely demonstrate how eager the Russians are to get additional VDV reinforcements to the Robotyne salient.[37]

Ukrainian forces’ sustained operations in Bakhmut since spring 2023 have successfully fixed a large portion of Russia’s VDV forces and have thus increased Ukraine’s chances of operational success on the southern frontline by preventing the creation of a VDV reserve there. Sustained Ukrainian combat operations near Bakhmut since December 2022 have fixed elements of two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the VDV’s four independent brigades. This is a significant achievement. The VDV is Russia’s principal expeditionary force and Russia’s highest mobility combat force. Ukrainian activity near Bakhmut has attritted these VDV elements, deprived them of opportunities to regroup and refit, and have prevented the Russian command from using them to form a high mobility operational reserve to defend the southern front. The concentration of any significant proportion of these VDV units in the Robotyne area would likely have made Ukrainian penetration of the lines there impossible.

The Ukrainian defense of and counteroffensive around Bakhmut thus reflects sound campaign design principles.  The Ukrainians took advantage of Russia’s fixation with the operationally insignificant town of Bakhmut to draw the highest-quality mobile Russian reserves there first to complete the Russian seizure of the town and then to hold it against Ukrainian counter-offensive operations that began almost as soon as Wagner forces pulled back.

A Russian redeployment of all or most of these VDV elements to defend in southern Ukraine would likely have benefited Russia far more than the deployment of Ukrainian counter-offensive forces from Bakhmut to Zaporizhia. Russian forces in Zaporizhia lack the manpower necessary to defend the entirety of the field fortifications they have prepared. The redeployment of elements of multiple VDV divisions and separate brigades would have allowed them to man those defenses in depth, thus forcing Ukrainian troops attempting to penetrate the lines to confront fresh defenders repeatedly. Ukrainian forces would not have benefited as much by concentrating more of their own combat power on their breakthrough efforts. Lack of mine-clearing equipment and the challenges of conducting mine-clearing operations in the face of Russian fixed and rotary-wing attacks supporting extensive Russian artillery and anti-tank systems operating from heavily prepared field fortifications and tree lines were the main obstacles to a rapid Ukrainian penetration. Ukrainian difficulties in coordinating combined arms operations on which Ukrainian counter-offensive forces had been hastily trained compounded these obstacles. More Ukrainian forces wrestling with such difficulties would not have improved Ukraine’s chances materially. The Russian defensive positions around Bakhmut were not initially heavily mined, moreover, and therefore likely did not draw many of Ukraine’s limited mine-clearing capabilities to that area at least initially. More Ukrainian forces pushing south into Russia’s well-defended minebelts in Zaporizhia were thus very unlikely to make a decisive difference in the effectiveness of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area whereas the unavailability of so much of Russia’s potential reserve forces has likely given Ukraine its chance to make significant gains in the south.

This product’s purpose is not to offer a full evaluation of Ukraine’s campaign design or to comment on the effectiveness of Ukrainian tactics and operations on the Zaporizhia axis. It is meant simply to demonstrate that Ukrainian defensive and then counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut had the operationally sound effect of using the irrational Russian fixation on that town to draw a disproportionate amount of Russia’s limited mobile combat reserve there in a way that set much more favorable conditions for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the south than Ukraine could otherwise have expected to face. Ukrainian forces will likely have to continue to press hard around Bakhmut to keep Russian VDV forces pinned there, but that pressure will likely be worth the advantage of preventing those Russian forces from flowing quickly into southern Zaporizhia Oblast to refit and prepare to stop the decisive Ukrainian effort in that direction.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued successful offensive operations elsewhere in the Bakhmut direction.
• Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night of September 16-17.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his trip to Russia on September 17 and received several pieces of military technical equipment from the governor of Primorsky Krai.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officials to more openly back military juntas in West Africa.
• Prolonged concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s health in the Russian information space highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on September 17 and advanced in some areas.
• Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Recent Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to fight in Ukraine do not indicate that a fully reconstituted Wagner fighting force will return to Ukraine anytime soon if ever.
• Russian occupation administrations continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural identity.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 17, 2023

Sep 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 17, 2023, 5:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued successful offensive operations elsewhere in the Bakhmut direction. Geolocated footage posted on September 17 shows Ukrainian forces holding up flags in Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash later confirmed that Ukraine has liberated Klishchiivka, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade, 5th Assault Brigade, 95th Air Assault Brigade, and National Police “Lyut” Assault Brigade for their role in liberating the settlement.[2] Further geolocated footage posted on September 16 shows that Ukrainian forces have captured positions east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[3] The liberation of Klishchiivka, as well as continued Ukrainian tactical gains northwest of Bakhmut, are tactical gains of strategic significance because they are allowing Ukrainian forces to fix a considerable portion of Russian airborne (VDV) elements in the Bakhmut area, as ISW’s Daniel Mealie discusses in the September 17, 2023 special edition.

Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night of September 16-17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched six Shahed drones from the southeastern and southern directions and 10 Kh-101/555/55 air-launched cruise missiles from nine Tu-95MS strategic bombers that took off from Engels Airbase, Saratov Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces mainly targeted grain infrastructure in southern Odesa Oblast, and Ukrainian military sources stated that Ukrainian forces shot down six Shaheds and six cruise missiles.[5] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command posted images of the aftermath of one Russian strike in an unspecified part of Odesa Oblast.[6] Russian forces additionally struck civilian enterprises in Kharkiv City with four S-300 missiles.[7]

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his trip to Russia on September 17 and received several pieces of military technical equipment from the governor of Primorsky Krai. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kim visited the Far Eastern Federal University on September 17, where he met with Russian military engineers.[8] TASS and other Russian sources additionally noted that Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako gifted Kim a military vest, an unspecified loitering munition, and an unspecified long-range reconnaissance drone.[9] ISW previously reported that Russia may be open to forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea but is unlikely to provide physical systems due to Russian fears that providing the North Korean regime with such systems may trigger further sanctions against Russia.[10] It is therefore notable that a Russian official gifted Kim with pieces of military technology that will presumably return to North Korea with Kim. United Nations sanctions specify that ”All Member States are required to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons...”[11]

South Korean President Yoon Suuk-Yeol stated that Russian and North Korean military technical agreements may violate sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council.[12] Yoon stated that if information about these agreements is confirmed then this will be a violation of the sanctions and illegal.[13] The war in Ukraine has reportedly generated a rapid growth in South Korean arms exports as South Korea replenishes Western stocks of ammunition and systems that the West has sent to Ukraine.[14] South Korea has not yet directly supplied lethal security assistance to Ukraine.[15]

The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officials to more openly back military juntas in West Africa. A Russian military delegation, including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) General Andrei Averyanov, arrived in Bamako, Mali on September 16.[16] Yevkurov reportedly met with the Burkinabe, Nigerien, and Malian defense ministers; Malian junta head Assimi Goita; and Burkinabe junta head Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.[17] Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a security pact on September 16 promising to come to each other's aid in the case of any rebellion or external aggression.[18] The Russian military delegation’s meeting with the political and military leadership of the three junta governments before the signing of the agreement likely indicates that Russian officials are prepared to more explicitly support these juntas. Russia has previously used the Wagner Group to forge relationships with the junta governments, but the Russian MoD’s efforts to subsume Wagner’s assets and operations in West Africa have eliminated the implausible deniability that Wagner previously afforded the Russia government. Yevkurov and Averyanov appear to be heavily involved in the efforts to subsume Wagner, and their participation in the delegation suggests that they are likely using to the seizure of Wagner assets and operations to forge new agreements and partnerships with the junta governments.[19]

Prolonged concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s health in the Russian information space highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly confirmed that Kadyrov was in a coma on September 15, prompting rumors about Kadyrov’s poor health among Russian milbloggers and insider sources.[20] Kadyrov denied the rumors about his health in a video posted on September 17.[21] The destabilization of Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya would be a major blow to Putin’s regime, in part because of how central the establishment of stability in Chechnya through a brutal and bloody war was to Putin’s early popularity in Russia. Kadyrov and other Russian officials may be concerned that continued rumors about his health will affect the long-term stability of his, and by extension Putin’s, control of Chechnya.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued successful offensive operations elsewhere in the Bakhmut direction.
• Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night of September 16-17.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his trip to Russia on September 17 and received several pieces of military technical equipment from the governor of Primorsky Krai.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officials to more openly back military juntas in West Africa.
• Prolonged concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s health in the Russian information space highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on September 17 and advanced in some areas.
• Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Recent Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to fight in Ukraine do not indicate that a fully reconstituted Wagner fighting force will return to Ukraine anytime soon if ever.
• Russian occupation administrations continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural identity.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting diversionary activities near the international border to fix Ukrainian forces in border areas and prevent them from deploying to other directions.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are increasing the density of the mine-explosive barrier along the border in Belgorod Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that artillery and occasional combat engagements occur near Strilecha (25km northeast of Kharkiv City) on the international border.[23]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline on September 17 and made limited territorial gains southwest of Kreminna.[24] Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicated that Russian forces made slight advances south of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are trying to regroup along the Kupyansk-Svatove line following failures near Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), which has led to a decrease in Russian activity on this line.[26] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attacked near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[27]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna on September 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops of the Central Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova, Torske (13km west of Kreminna), and in the Serebryanske forest area.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and made advances elsewhere in the Bakhmut direction on September 17. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, and Ukrainian forces released several videos from Klishchiivka during the day wherein they stated that they had liberated the settlement.[29] The Ukrainian announcements of the liberation show Ukrainian forces operating freely in the settlement.[30] Russian milbloggers denied that Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka and claimed that Ukrainian forces only control the southern and central parts of the settlement.[31] Another milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces have entrenched themselves near the railway east and northeast of Klishchiivka but that they do not maintain positions in the settlement itself.[32] Footage published on September 17 shows Ukrainian forces firing on Russian forces on the outskirts of Klishchiivka and forcing them to retreat.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern flank, and that fighting is ongoing near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), which they claimed is a contested ”gray zone.”[35]

Russian forces counterattacked in the Bakhmut area on September 17 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults near Klishchiivka and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and repelled Russian counterattacks near Andriivka and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking near Klishchiivka and unsuccessfully tried to push Ukrainian forces out of positions near Bohdanivka (7km northwest of Bakhmut).[37] Yevlash stated that Russian forces currently have 52,000 personnel deployed to the Bakhmut direction.[38]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on September 17 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces had made further gains east of Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on September 17 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Sieverne (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[41] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces usually conduct 10 to 15 assaults near Marinka every day with motorized rifle units as well as combined ”Storm” and ”Storm-Z” units.[42] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked south of Avdiivka and near Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) on September 16.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on September 17 but did not advance. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks along the Novodonetske-Novomayorske line (13-19km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), near Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka), and near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] Several Russian sources reported that fighting in this sector has largely assumed a positional nature and claimed that some Ukrainian units are rotating in this area.[45]

Russian forces conducted counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on September 17 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked towards Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka), and another Russian source claimed that Russian forces knocked Ukrainian troops out of unspecified positions near Pryyutne.[47] One Russian milblogger noted that elements of the “Vostok” Battalion and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” formation are defending against Ukrainian attacks in this sector and inflicting high losses on Ukrainian troops.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District), Aerospace Forces (VKS), 36th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are engaged in the area.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17 and did not make any confirmed gains. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and were successful in unspecified areas.[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting continued along the Robotyne-Verbove line, particularly in the direction of Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne).[52] One Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are using groups of two to three people to try and advance south of Robotyne.[53]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking near Robotyne and from positions near Novoprokopivka and Kopani (12km southwest of Orikhiv).[54] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division, particularly the 247th VDV Regiment, are defending south of Orikhiv.[55]

Russian sources claimed that Ukraine targeted occupied Crimea with drones on September 17. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses downed four Ukrainian drones over the northwestern and eastern coasts of Crimea early in the morning on September 17.[56] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukraine launched a total of six drones at Crimea and that the Russian "Medvedi“ (Bears) Private Military Company (PMC) detected the drones while the 31st Air Defense Division (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District) shot down three drones near Portove and Cape Tarkhankut.[57] One Russian source posted an image reportedly of a downed drone near an oil depot in the area of Feodosia.[58]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Recent Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to fight in Ukraine do not indicate that a fully reconstituted Wagner fighting force will return to Ukraine anytime soon if ever. Russian milbloggers, including a Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger, claimed on September 17 that a small number of fighters from the 3rd Platoon of Wagner’s 1st Assault Detachment assembled an independent group and returned to the front in Ukraine.[59] A Russian milblogger claiming to be affiliated with Wagner claimed that the fighters likely signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[60] It is possible that a small number of Wagner personnel have signed Russian MoD contracts as part of the Russian MoD's efforts to integrate Wagner personnel into conventional Russian formations amid the continued uncertainty of Wagner’s future domestically and abroad.[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 16 that ”Wagner veterans” are fighting near Klishchiivka in Donetsk Oblast.[62] ISW continues to assess that it is unlikely that the Kremlin will restore Wagner as a large-scale quasi-independent organization under a unified command independent of the Kremlin or Russian MoD, which is the only likely form in which Wagner personnel would present a significant threat to the Ukrainian military again.[63]

Forbes estimated on September 16 that the Russian government has spent around $167.3 billion on the war in Ukraine from February 2022 to August 2023, based on data from the Ukrainian General Staff.[64]  Forbes reported that the Russian government has spent $51.3 billion on materiel for military operations, $35.1 billion on military salaries, $46.6 billion on compensation for the families of deceased or wounded Russian servicemen, and $34 billion on destroyed equipment.[65] Forbes estimated that the Russian government spends $300 million per day on the war in Ukraine.[66]

Russian authorities reportedly continue efforts to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on September 17 that Russian authorities presented military summonses to men living in Starobilsk Raion, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[67] Lysohor stated that Russian authorities even gave summonses to men who do not have Russian passports in Pidhorivka, Starobilsk Raion.[68]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation administrations continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural identity. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on September 17 that occupation officials sent schoolchildren between the ages of nine and 17 to Moscow for the “Culture Map 4+85” all-Russian cultural and education exchange program.[69] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reportedly plans to send thousands of local children to Moscow and St. Petersburg for similar programs by the end of 2023.[70] Occupation authorities in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts will also send an unspecified number of local children to Russia for these programs.[71] Russian Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova reportedly stated that at least 10,000 school children from the occupied territories will take part in the “Culture Map 4+85” program in 2023 and get “acquainted with the rich cultural history of our [Russia].”[72] These programs are likely part of Russia’s wider campaign to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and forcibly assimilate them into the Russian sociocultural sphere.

The Russian Republic of Mordovia continues to expand its patronage network in occupied Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo stated on September 17 that he met with Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov to discuss Mordovia’s recent infrastructure projects in occupied Kherson Oblast, including the renovation and construction of public infrastructure and housing.[73] Saldo claimed that Zdunov also agreed to build a resort in occupied Kherson Oblast.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian and Russian milbloggers posted footage on September 17 reportedly showing Wagner Group instructors conducting joint drills with the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs.[75]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3.  New Orleans DA Fights ‘Terrorism’ on Streets With AI Spycraft

1. WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE

New Orleans DA Fights ‘Terrorism’ on Streets With AI Spycraft

Prosecutors work with former intelligence officers and artificial-intelligence tools to gather and analyze evidence

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/new-orleans-da-fights-terrorism-on-streets-with-ai-spycraft-87f74055?utm

By Kate O’KeeffeFollow

 and Cameron McWhirterFollow

 | Photographs by Emily Kask for The Wall Street Journal

Sept. 17, 2023 5:30 am ET

NEW ORLEANS—The case against Dijon Dixon, accused of killing Cornelius Smith in 2019, looked to be falling apart after a key witness backed out following an online death threat.

Then prosecutors presented the defense team with a detailed and dramatic timeline featuring some of Dixon’s social-media posts—including one in which the serial numbers of the Glock he was holding were partially visible.

Dixon took a plea deal.

The timeline was assembled by a team of people who once tracked international terrorists online and now are working for first-term New Orleans District Attorney Jason Williams. The newly created task force is working to use machine-learning to autogenerate subpoenas for social-media and wireless companies, analyze the reams of data obtained and create vivid, detail-packed timelines.

Williams hired the team of 11 to take a 21st-century approach to tackling a surge in violent crime, exacerbated by an understaffed police department and an enormous backlog of cases. 

The arrangement, which hasn’t previously been publicly announced, is unusual for U.S. law enforcement. Legal experts say the harnessing of such data to help prosecute crimes shouldn’t run afoul of constitutional protections, although one said it could prompt privacy concerns from the public. A group tracking the New Orleans crime problem raised concerns about outsourcing the state’s investigative authority to a private company.  

A sampling of the evidence against Dijon Dixon laid out in a timeline assembled by Tranquility AI, a subcontractor for the New Orleans District Attorney’s office. PHOTO: TRANQUILITY AI

Williams, a Democrat facing an election in 2026, is under pressure to make New Orleans safer. His decision to bring in the former intelligence agents, who tracked Osama bin Laden and trained the Somali military, to help prosecute homicides in the Big Easy has been praised by his staff in the homicide unit.

The New Orleans Police Department and the office of Mayor LaToya Cantrell didn’t respond to requests for comment.

John Fuller, a lawyer for Mr. Dixon, said that “any effective tool that law enforcement has is a concern of mine.” He said he expects there will be opportunities for defense attorneys to challenge the task force’s findings in future cases that go to trial. “I’m certainly looking forward to challenging it. It should be fun.”

So far, Williams has dedicated $250,000 to the pilot project and says he is impressed with how the task force has made a difference in investigations in a few months. In the Dixon case, prosecutors were able to identify a second suspect in the continuing investigation from information gathered by the task force. Williams said he plans to expand the effort.

One part of the team is Bancroft Global Development, a nonprofit that manages projects in war-torn countries in Africa and the Middle East. The group has gotten funding from entities such as the U.S. State Department and the United Nations. The other is Tranquility AI, a startup founded by a Trump appointee that is stacked with former U.S. intelligence analysts expert at tracking terrorist cells online.

For five months, employees of Bancroft and Tranquility, which together make up the district attorney’s OSINT Task Force, have been working hand-in-hand with prosecutors. OSINT refers to intelligence collection analyzing “open source,” or publicly available, information as opposed to gathering information through personal relationships or by intercepting electronic communications.

Williams told the Journal that using people trained in hunting international terrorists to help prosecute suspects in violent crimes in New Orleans made sense, because shootings at neighborhood gatherings and well-known New Orleans restaurants had terrorized the city.

“Someone unloading an AK-47 on a group of people in a city street, whether it’s a street in America or a street somewhere else, is terrorism,” Williams said.

Judson Mitchell, a defense lawyer and professor at Loyola University New Orleans who focuses on law and technology, said that as long as evidence used by the task force was legally obtained, there shouldn’t be constitutional issues. Nonetheless, he said he expects some citizens will have privacy concerns. “It puts a lot of power in the hands of the state, and a lot of folks are uncomfortable with that.” 

Williams said judges vet for admissibility every single piece of evidence the task force contributes, as they do with all evidence. 

Some have argued that more funding for police investigators and prosecutors is needed, rather than spending money on outside companies. Rafael Goyeneche, president of the nonprofit Metropolitan Crime Commission, a watchdog group in New Orleans, said he had concerns that the district attorney’s office was trying to outsource investigation duties that police should be handling.

Task-force officials said their goal is to train local law enforcement to use these tactics themselves and that they don’t plan to stay in the city longer than needed.

Several New Orleans residents interviewed for this story said they welcomed any new strategy to tackle the violence.

Indy, who didn’t want her last name used for fear of reprisal, was pregnant and eating an apple in her kitchen in May 2021 when gunfire erupted at a graduation party next door to her New Orleans home. As she hunkered down, the shooters fired more than 60 rounds, killing a 12-year-old girl, Todriana Peters, and injuring two men. Since then, Indy, now 33, said she has worried about her little girl’s safety and is thinking about moving away. 

“It’s never been this bad,” she said of the violence. “I used to walk down the street here at night, no problem. Now I don’t walk outside, if I can help it, day or night.”

Told about Williams’s idea to bring in former international intelligence officers to go after New Orleans violent criminals, Indy said, “ASAP. We definitely need the help. We need something.”

New Orleans had 265 murders last year, according to New Orleans Police Department data; this year the department has reported 150 as of Sept. 12. Compared with 2019, homicides for the same period are up 95%. Shootings are up 64% and carjackings are up 68%, according to the Metropolitan Crime Commission. 

The New Orleans Police Department has been understaffed for years. Prosecutors are juggling roughly 300 open homicide cases.

Arthur Williamson, walking in the city’s Audubon Park, said he worried about crime, which these days “could happen anywhere, anytime and [to] any one of us.” He liked the idea of the new approach, but wanted to make sure the district attorney provided transparency about the cost and how the information was being collected and held. He wasn’t concerned about whether the team were former national security analysts.

New Orleans resident Arthur Williamson

“What do I care about who does the job if they do it?” he said.

The idea for the pilot program began when Williams talked with an old friend, Aaron Greenstone. The two met as undergraduates at Tulane University, and both went on to work in the New Orleans criminal-justice system. Williams was a defense attorney who became the City Council president before being elected district attorney. Greenstone was a prosecutor who went on to a career with the Central Intelligence Agency with postings in the Middle East and elsewhere, before retiring last year and joining the Bancroft nonprofit.

Williams said he and Greenstone decided to team up again after discussing the parallels between child soldiers in conflict zones abroad and the young criminals they were now seeing on the streets of New Orleans. 

Alongside that surreal reality was a more mundane one: an under-resourced team of police and prosecutors collapsing under the overwhelming amount of data that needs to be analyzed in criminal cases, including voluminous surveillance and body-camera footage and social-media posts. Artificial intelligence can process and organize that information. 

“Ten years from now, there won’t be a DA’s office or a police department that does not have some team like this or some partnership or arrangement like this,” Williams said.

Greenstone brought in Dave Harvilicz, a former Trump administration Energy Department official with cyber expertise who founded Tranquility AI. 

Harvilicz said that his team is doing much of the laborious analysis by hand right now and he hopes to have the AI up and running in a year. He said he thinks he can ultimately make money on the technology by selling licenses to law-enforcement units to use the software.

Aaron Greenstone, a former prosecutor and CIA professional, is now with Bancroft Global Development and part of the OSINT Task Force in New Orleans.

Mitchell, the law professor, said much of the program’s effectiveness could come down to the implementation of the AI under development. He noted that earlier efforts by the city to use cutting-edge technology to help with crime—such as an experiment with data-analytics company 

Palantir Technologies—were discontinued. Palantir had no comment.  Williams said methods the former terrorist hunters are using are particularly effective for chasing young criminals, whom the city is increasingly struggling to apprehend. 

“A guy might drop his burner but they’re going to keep their Instagram,” Greenstone said.

Write to Kate O’Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com and Cameron McWhirter at Cameron.McWhirter@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

New Orleans District Attorney Jason Williams is up for re-election in 2026. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he faced re-election in 2024. (Corrected on Sept. 17)

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the September 18, 2023, print edition as 'AI Tools, Terrorism Hunters Tapped for New Orleans Cases'.

4. The spy tactics China are using to shape the world in their favour

The spy tactics China are using to shape the world in their favour

As Rishi Sunak says the CCP poses a threat to the UK’s ‘way of life’, we profile the agencies Beijing uses to gain knowledge and influence

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/09/16/china-spies-beijing-xi-jinping-security-services/#:~:text=Cyber%20and%20corporate%20espionage,or%20broader%20Chinese%20commercial%20interests.

By Sophia Yan 16 September 2023 • 7:00am

Just seven years ago, China’s leader Xi Jinping was riding in a gilded, horse-drawn carriage along the Mall, lined with British and Chinese flags, en route to Buckingham Palace, accompanied by the late Queen Elizabeth.

The subject of lavish diplomatic courting, he spent two nights at the Palace, and even enjoyed a pint at a pub with then prime minister David Cameron. It was the beginning of what then chancellor George Osborne insisted would be a “golden decade” of UK-China relations, one that both sides described as rich with immense promise.

Fast forward to this week, when it came to light that two men – one of them a British parliamentary researcher – had been arrested for spying, prompting Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to say that he is “acutely aware” that China posed a threat to the UK’s “open and democratic way of life”.

The researcher denies the allegations. The arrests followed a rare “parliamentary interference alert on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party” issued last year by the domestic security service MI5 about the activities of a UK-based lawyer, Christine Lee, who was publicly named as an “agent of influence”.

Lee, who arrived in Britain in 1974 aged just 11, and became legal adviser to the Chinese embassy in 2008, had donated almost half a million pounds to the office of Labour MP Barry Gardiner, with her son working for his office.

Gardiner, for his part, always said he had been “totally transparent” with the security services, and says the payments were legitimate and declared at the time. Lee has vigorously denied the allegations and any wrongdoing and is suing MI5.

Seven years ago, Xi Jinping spent two nights at Buckingham Palace, and even enjoyed a pint at a pub with then prime minister David Cameron Credit: Dominic Lipinski/PA Wire

The incidents mark a dramatic souring of that once-promising relationship. Gone are the gilded carriages and compliments. Now it is mutual hostility and suspicion that reigns. These days, insiders remark, close links between Beijing and Britain are talked of not as a golden era but as a “golden error”.

Longtime sceptics like Conservative MP Iain Duncan Smith say it is “time for us to recognise the deepening threat that the Chinese Communist Party under Xi now poses”. And finally such words may not be falling on deaf ears.

At last, say experts, the UK is being forced radically to redraw its approach in order to protect itself against a sharper, more assertive China, just as more wary countries like America, Canada and Australia have done for years.

It has been a long time coming. Only this July, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) issued a report detailing the foot-dragging and flimsy response to China’s ever-more assertive influence operations.

“It appears that China has a high level of intent to interfere with the UK Government, targeting officials and bodies at a range of levels to influence UK political thinking and decision-making relevant to China,” the report noted, adding that while “the Government says its response is ‘robust’ and ‘clear-eyed’, the external experts we spoke to were rather less complimentary. They felt very strongly that the Government did not have any strategy on China, let alone an effective one.”

At that time the ISC pointed out that it was not even a criminal offence to be an agent of a foreign intelligence service. But this week, Cabinet Office minister Oliver Dowden said the Government was considering forcing anyone working in this country “at the direction” of China to register on a “foreign influence scheme” or face up to five years in jail.

Conservative MP Iain Duncan Smith believes it is ‘time for us to recognise the deepening threat’ Credit: Laurel Chor/Getty

But such a proposal raises a critical question: precisely who is working “at the direction” of China? The answer is potentially many thousands. Because what is tough about dealing with Beijing is that it does not mirror how the West operates, making it harder to understand and pin down.

The reality is that China’s approach to espionage is far more holistic than our own – not confined to a particular agency, not necessarily focused on illegal activity, and not even particularly organised at times. Rather it operates as an opaque spectrum of institutions and activities from soft power lobbying to ruthless, hard-nosed, well-armed spy games.  

Everything, however, points toward the same end: procuring knowledge and influence in order to shape the world in China’s favour, allowing it to become the pre-eminent power of the 21st century. And that serves the ultimate goal: to keep the ruling Communist Party on top, with leader Xi Jinping at its peak.

Influence work, after all, runs through Mr Xi’s family history. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was key in such work involving Tibet, seeking to influence figures like the Dalai Lama. Two of his siblings were also involved in political warfare work on behalf of the military, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

And Mr Xi himself spent much of his political career in Fujian province – just across the ocean from Taiwan – which is perhaps the epicentre of China’s intelligence efforts given its proximity to the island nation that China claims as its own territory.

“The goal is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” said Peter Mattis, president of the Jamestown Foundation, a US defence policy think tank, and former CIA analyst. “For them, it’s about ‘how do we shape the world in ways that moves the Party closer to its objectives?’ ”

And those objectives are many and varied: from culling pesky votes on the UN Security Council; pushing nations away from Taiwan; silencing criticism over human rights abuses in Xinjiang; to encouraging greater global trade dependency on China.

To China, policies conducted abroad are all about supporting internal interests – preserving its own national security and domestic stability.

Here’s a look at how different parts of the Chinese government approach espionage and influence operations.

Ministry of State Security

China’s MSS is the most fearsome and secretive agency of all – the principal organisation overseeing domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

On the street, they’re the secret police who appear to have limitless reach. They seem to operate with impunity, and with the idea that might makes right. MSS agents would have been the ones, for instance, to have snatched Canadian citizens Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in China in late 2018 – tit-for-tat hostage diplomacy after Ottawa arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a US extradition request.

The “two Michaels”, as they came to be known, were arbitrarily detained for nearly three years – a way to punish Canada for acting in concert with the US.

The agency has always operated in the shadows, though has recently taken the unusual step of opening a social media account – part of a growing emphasis on counter-espionage work.

The MSS has used the account to call on Chinese citizens to participate in forming a “line of defence” to assist in counter-espionage, and to publicise cases of caught spies.

The current minister, Chen Yixin, comes from a political background, rather than intelligence and security, which may indicate Mr Xi’s interest in maintaining political control over every part of government.

United Front Work Department

As China’s “magic weapon” – so-called by Mr Xi – this is the Chinese agency the general public in countries around the world is most likely to have encountered. Broadly speaking, a core part of the United Front’s work is exerting influence abroad – efforts to shape what’s known and understood of China and to promote the Beijing narrative.

United Front has infiltrated foreign parliaments and governments. In 2017, senior Australian politician Sam Dastyari quit after a scandal over Chinese-linked political donations. In March of this year, Canadian MP Han Dong stepped down from his party amid allegations that he had advised Chinese diplomats and assisted with election interference. Both Dastyari and Han denied wrongdoing. A week ago, Canada announced a public inquiry into how China and Russia may have interfered in federal elections in 2019 and 2021.

UFW officials and agents are known to develop long-term relationships with key players to influence, subvert or circumvent local government laws and policies in favour of the Party.

People acting on behalf of the UFW conduct a range of activities – whispering in the right ears, suggesting talking points favourable to China, making campaign donations. None of that necessarily crosses the line into criminality, though it is one part of the continuum, maintaining China’s power and influence, and gaining knowledge to cement the upper hand.

Such activity is believed to have reached into the UK. Christine Lee, for example, was alleged to have “acted covertly in co-ordination” with the United Front, and was “judged to be involved in political interference activities in the UK.”

She has since gone to court to force British intelligence to reveal why it issued that warning; her claim is that her human rights were breached. Lee denies being an agent of the communist state.

Christine Lee was ‘judged to be involved in political interference activities in the UK’ Credit: Nigel Howard Media

Confucius Institutes, attached to universities in the UK and elsewhere, also fall under UFW. China says these are simply language and cultural centres – a benign, soft power effort.

While the institutes do offer Mandarin classes, they are administered directly by Beijing and impart the “Chinese view” – for instance, a whitewashing of hot-button topics such as 1989’s Tiananmen Square massacre, and the sovereignty of Taiwan, which China claims as its own.

Other groups that form the public face of UFW include the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Chinese Students and Scholars Association; the latter, like Confucius Institutes, are attached to universities, and have been linked to pro-China demonstrations on school campuses.

The monitoring and intimidation of Chinese dissidents overseas, or anyone deemed to pose a threat to the ruling Party, can fall under the jurisdiction of MSS over national security concerns, the UFW over interests in neutralising opposition, or even the Ministry of Public Security, given its responsibility for policing Chinese citizens, both at home and abroad.

People’s Liberation Army

China’s military – the largest in the world at 2.8 million strong – has a strong interest in gathering foreign military secrets, backed by technological and practical know-how.

A Chinese spy balloon programme – potentially run by military contractors – was discovered this year after one such vessel was spotted floating across the US, hovering above sensitive military installations. The balloons were reportedly gathering information – data similar to what satellites can glean – and then bringing everything collected back to China.

Chinese People's Liberation Army personnel participate in a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in October 2019, to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples Republic of ChinaCredit: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images

China is also trying to improve its military prowess, hiring former foreign military pilots to train Chinese pilots. On the face of it, this may not fit the standard definition of espionage, but it is a piece of China’s so-called “whole-of-state” efforts to serve its broader interests – to advance its technological and practical capabilities.

Earlier this year the Royal Air Force’s chief, Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston, said recruiting ex-RAF pilots was “unacceptable … it’s something that we were prepared to call China out publicly.”

Spying activities have stretched even into the US military. Just last month, two US Navy officers with security clearances were arrested for transmitting sensitive military information to China.

Jinchao Wei, an active-duty sailor on the USS Essex in San Diego, allegedly sent to Chinese intelligence photos and videos about Navy ships, as well as technical and mechanical manuals that detailed various systems aboard the USS Essex, an amphibious assault ship that resembles a small aircraft carrier.

Another US Navy officer, Wenheng Zhao, was charged with receiving bribes in exchange for sending information about major US military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region to someone posing as a maritime economic researcher, who was in fact a Chinese intelligence officer, according to the US Department of Justice.

Both have pleaded not guilty in the ongoing case, and could face up to 20 years in prison.

Cyber and corporate espionage

Much of China’s military spying comes in the form of cyber-espionage, with military hackers seeking to purloin secret information that could help its own military operations or broader Chinese commercial interests.

For example, when the nuclear power firm Westinghouse was building four power plants in China and negotiating terms of construction with a Chinese firm – including technology transfers – hackers instead took a shortcut: stealing the company’s proprietary technical and design specifications.

China-backed hackers have also targeted foreign government agencies, as well as officials’ email and social media accounts, trying to glean a sense of what’s said behind closed doors to help shape its own approach.

In the months leading up to her official trip to Beijing last month, for example, Gina Raimondo, US secretary of commerce, was among a number of US officials whose emails were hacked and stolen. It has been reported that the emails of both the US ambassador to China and Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, were also breached.

Other hacks, at times conducted by MSS, have been directed at top defence and technology companies, seeking to steal sensitive military and commercial specs.

China is reportedly recruiting British nationals from key positions Credit: Andy Rain/Shutterstock

One group, known as APT10, has been accused of stealing aviation, space and satellite technology, even targeting a Nasa lab. But APT10’s activities have hit an astonishingly wide range of companies, from biotech to mining, and in at least 12 countries, including the UK and US. And that’s just a single group.

Chinese companies themselves have also been known to engage in corporate espionage – stealing agricultural trade secrets, the specs for gas and steam turbines, or advanced chip designs.

Take the case of Chinese national Mo Hailong, who was spotted, in 2012, crouched in the Iowa cornfields digging up seeds potentially worth millions. Four years later, he pleaded guilty in a US court for stealing the patent-protected seed from Monsanto and DuPont to send back to China for commercial use. Even today, American farmers worry about this.

“In my opinion, it’s part of a much larger, country-wide, slow-motion heist of American intellectual property,” Mike Gallagher, a Republican congressman, said a few days ago. “We have a duty to protect all our technology, whether it’s in Silicon Valley or in a cornfield here in Iowa.”

Everything, everyone, everywhere

The biggest challenge with China’s espionage efforts is that they are ubiquitous, and can include activities that are perfectly legal. Even ordinary Chinese citizens abroad are being co-opted into acting on behalf of the state.

Some do so of their own volition, having grown up in a propaganda-heavy environment promoting nationalist tendencies. Others are forced to do so after Chinese authorities hold their family at home hostage.

“The CCP believes that ethnic Chinese everywhere should serve the motherland, meaning the Party,” said Ivan Kanapathy, who served as the White House National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia from 2018 to 2021.

“The influence and coercion is so pervasive it could implicate nearly anybody from China, unfortunately,” said Mr Kanapathy. “We should point the finger at the CCP and hold them accountable.” 

5. When did we start making deals with other nations to release Americans? We always did, now we're just being honest about it.

Excerpts:

“When it comes to getting Americans out of jail and back home, and unjustly detained anywhere in the world, I’m happy to take any criticism that comes my way. for that,” Blinken told reporters. “I view it as job one to do everything I can to bring Americans home.”

The United States and other Western governments have few points of leverage when a terrorist organization or an authoritarian government imprisons their citizens as bargaining chips. Negotiations often revolve around prisoner swaps, policy changes or releasing frozen assets.

“Iran is not going to release these American citizens out of the goodness of their heart. That is not real life. That is not how this works,” State Department spokesperson Matt Miller said earlier this week in defense of the prisoner swap terms with Iran. “We have to make tough choices and engage in tough negotiations to bring these American citizens home.”

​...

However, a new report released Wednesday showed the number of Americans held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad has fallen for the first time in over 10 years. At least 59 Americans are currently held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.

Since August last year, 25 wrongfully detained Americans have been released, the largest number of American prisoners freed in one year, according to the report by the Foley Foundation, a nonprofit organization that advocates for the freedom of journalists and Americans held hostage abroad.

Families of former hostages and other advocates believe the trend reflects a change in how the U.S. government now approaches cases of detained Americans after new legislation was adopted and new offices and policies crafted. The murder of several American captives by ISIS militants in 2014 prompted President Obama to launch a review and an overhaul of how hostage cases were handled.

The U.S. government now has a special envoy who oversees cases of Americans held overseas. That office, along with the adoption of the Levinson Act, has given hostage cases a higher priority and more senior-level government attention, according to Nadjibulla of The Soufan Center.

But what is still missing is a concerted strategy to deter regimes from taking hostages in the first place, she and other experts said.

When did we start making deals with other nations to release Americans? We always did, now we're just being honest about it.

Joe Biden faced a dilemma that has confounded his predecessors in the White House — how to bring Americans home without inviting more hostage-taking.

NBC News · by Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams

President Joe Biden is coming under fierce criticism from Republicans in Congress for a prisoner exchange deal with Iran that will grant Tehran access to billions of dollars in oil revenues previously frozen by U.S. sanctions.

But Biden is not the first U.S. president to make concessions to hostage takers, and to face political heat back home over his decision.

What’s different this time is that Biden and his team are making no secret of the link between the funds unblocked for Iran and the freedom of five imprisoned Americans, explicitly acknowledging the trade-off.

Some of the officials involved in the planned prisoner swap, due to take place any day, were involved in a similar agreement with Iran during the Obama presidency, but this time the rhetoric is less evasive.

“The reality is that hostages come home in negotiated settlements,” said Washington Post columnist Jason Rezaian, who spent 544 days imprisoned by Iran until his release in January 2016. “There is always some sort of concession.”

Jason Rezaian, former Tehran bureau chief for the Washington Post, in 2019. Brendan Smialowski / AFP via Getty Images file

Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, agreed to prisoner swaps with Iran involving Iranian nationals prosecuted in U.S. courts, and held a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018 after three detained Americans were released.

In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s administration secretly sold weapons to Iran to try to win the release of Americans held by Iranian-backed proxies in Lebanon, a scheme that Reagan initially denied but later apologized for. Other U.S. administrations have faced accusations of giving a green light to third parties to deliver ransom payments to secure the freedom of American hostages.

U.S. law prohibits paying ransom to terrorist groups seizing American hostages, part of a “no concessions” policy that dates back to the early 1970s. But Americans unjustly imprisoned by other governments are defined as “wrongfully detained,” and U.S. law does not prohibit the executive branch from offering concessions to another state to get them out.

In Rezaian’s case in 2016, the Obama administration transferred $400 million in cash to Iran at the same time Rezaian and other imprisoned Americans were freed, followed by another $1.3 billion. The money stemmed from a decades-old dispute between the U.S. and Iran over funds set aside for U.S. arms sales that were aborted after the 1979 revolution that toppled the pro-American monarchy in Tehran. The Obama White House said negotiations with Iran over the $1.7 billion settlement were separate from discussions about the prisoner release.

The payments and prisoner release coincided with the January 2016 implementation of a nuclear deal the Obama administration and other world powers reached with Iran. The White House at the time announced it had reached a settlement with Tehran on the decades-old arms deal but did not disclose the timing of the payments.

When the details about how the administration made the payments became public months later, White House officials insisted it was merely a coincidence that wooden pallets of cash were flown to Iran just as the American prisoners were released. President Barack Obama defended the decision when asked about it at a news conference, saying the money was not payment for the Americans’ release.

President Donald Trump meets with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un at the start of their summit in 2018.Saul Loeb / AFP - Getty Images file

The State Department spokesperson at the time, John Kirby, later conceded that the administration had used the $1.7 billion as “leverage” to obtain the American prisoners’ release and refused to hand over the money until they had taken off on a flight from Tehran.

This time, the Biden administration, which includes Kirby and many other officials who were involved in the 2016 episode or worked for the Obama administration, made no effort to play down the link between the money being released and the planned release of prisoners.

“The Biden administration has been much more open about some of these difficult choices” in negotiating the release of detainees, including the latest agreement, said Vina Nadjibulla, a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, an independent organization for research and policy on global security issues.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken made no apologies for the prisoner swap deal when asked about the agreement on Friday.

“When it comes to getting Americans out of jail and back home, and unjustly detained anywhere in the world, I’m happy to take any criticism that comes my way. for that,” Blinken told reporters. “I view it as job one to do everything I can to bring Americans home.”

The United States and other Western governments have few points of leverage when a terrorist organization or an authoritarian government imprisons their citizens as bargaining chips. Negotiations often revolve around prisoner swaps, policy changes or releasing frozen assets.

“Iran is not going to release these American citizens out of the goodness of their heart. That is not real life. That is not how this works,” State Department spokesperson Matt Miller said earlier this week in defense of the prisoner swap terms with Iran. “We have to make tough choices and engage in tough negotiations to bring these American citizens home.”

State Department Spokesman John Kirby in 2016.Mandel Ngan / AFP via Getty Images file

The Biden administration has also been criticized for not including detained U.S. legal residents in the prisoner swap deal, given that Washington agreed to give Iran access to such a large sum of frozen oil revenues.

The prisoner exchange only applies to five American citizens, but not detainees like Shahab Dalili, who holds a green card and whose children and wife are all U.S. citizens. His son, Darian, recently held a sit-in for days outside the State Department, demanding his father be included in the swap and accusing the administration of betraying his father.

Dalili and other green card holders, including Jamshid Sharmahd, a software developer living in California who was kidnapped during a 2020 stopover in the United Arab Emirates and taken to Iran, have not been officially designated by the U.S. government as “wrongfully detained,” which would oblige the administration to take more decisive action.

When asked about prisoners with green cards, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel told reporters recently that the department is “not going to get into the specifics of specific cases.”

Previous presidents from both parties have made uncomfortable trade-offs to get Americans out of captivity. During Trump’s tenure, an American and an Australian held by the Taliban were released in 2019 as part of a deal that saw the release of three Taliban leaders from Afghan jails. The move came as U.S. officials were trying to get peace talks moving with the Taliban.

But skeptics say Biden’s prisoner exchange deal with Iran goes too far and rewards Tehran for imprisoning Americans.

“Iran took full advantage of President Biden’s appeasement strategy,” said Republican Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa, saying the prisoner exchange agreement would put more Americans at risk and put money into the hands of “the number one state sponsor of terrorism.”

“This should serve as a reminder that Iran is not to be trusted, especially as this administration pursues a flawed nuclear agreement with Tehran,” Ernst said in an email to NBC News.

Darian Dalili protests outside the White House on Aug. 14 as he calls for the release of his father, Shahab Dalili.Andrew Cabalerro-Reynolds / AFP via Getty Images file

A former senior Trump administration official called the deal “bad policy” that encourages further hostage taking.

“We proved repeatedly that America can rescue hostages without paying ransom. In the case of Iran alone, we negotiated the release of two Americans without sanctions relief, cash payments or a change in the policy of maximum pressure,” said the former Trump official.

The official added, “After this latest Biden hostage deal, there is no question Iran will jail more Americans who are currently enjoying their freedom, because of this policy of paying for hostages.”

Since the 1970s, researchers examining whether ransom payments result in more seizures of hostages have found a mixed picture with contradictory trends. The Biden administration says the term “ransom” does not apply to the prisoner exchange with Iran, as it involves lifting a freeze on oil revenues that belong to Iran.

Hostage taking by terrorist organizations has gradually declined in recent years, but the number of Americans wrongfully imprisoned by foreign governments has been rising for more than a decade. Most of the detentions are carried out by a handful of countries, China, Iran, Russia and Venezuela, with great power rivalries fueling the “hostage diplomacy.”

However, a new report released Wednesday showed the number of Americans held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad has fallen for the first time in over 10 years. At least 59 Americans are currently held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.

Since August last year, 25 wrongfully detained Americans have been released, the largest number of American prisoners freed in one year, according to the report by the Foley Foundation, a nonprofit organization that advocates for the freedom of journalists and Americans held hostage abroad.

Families of former hostages and other advocates believe the trend reflects a change in how the U.S. government now approaches cases of detained Americans after new legislation was adopted and new offices and policies crafted. The murder of several American captives by ISIS militants in 2014 prompted President Obama to launch a review and an overhaul of how hostage cases were handled.

The U.S. government now has a special envoy who oversees cases of Americans held overseas. That office, along with the adoption of the Levinson Act, has given hostage cases a higher priority and more senior-level government attention, according to Nadjibulla of The Soufan Center.

But what is still missing is a concerted strategy to deter regimes from taking hostages in the first place, she and other experts said.

The U.S. and its allies need to collectively impose serious penalties on “abductor states,” including financial sanctions, travel bans or asset freezes, experts said.

“The reality is that governments like Iran’s, but also Russia, China and others are incentivized by the lack of anything credible deterring this behavior,” former prisoner Rezaian said.

At the U.N. next week, Canada and the U.S. plan to renew their effort for governments to back a declaration against arbitrary detention. Dozens of countries have already signed on, promising to take collective action.

Given the long history of wrongful detentions in Iran, some former officials have floated the idea of banning Americans from traveling to Iran, just as the U.S. has with North Korea. U.S. passports are invalid for travel to North Korea without special exceptions granted by the secretary of state.

Hostage taking presents painful dilemmas for American presidents, with high stakes for U.S. national security and domestic politics. The Iran hostage crisis in 1979, in which 52 Americans at the U.S. embassy were held captive for more than a year, arguably cost Jimmy Carter the White House. For the victims and their families, the toll of indefinite incarceration is excruciating.

Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich has been imprisoned in Russia since March, and at a press conference in New York on Wednesday, his mother spoke of the agony of her son’s plight.

“Evan has now been wrongfully detained by Russia for nearly six months for doing his job as a journalist,” said his mother, Ella Gershkovich. “We are still in shock. Every day is a day too long. I miss him every day.”

NBC News · by Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams

6. China flies 103 military planes toward Taiwan in a new high in activity the island calls harassment

China flies 103 military planes toward Taiwan in a new high in activity the island calls harassment

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · September 18, 2023

FILE - Soldiers pose for group photos with a Taiwan flag after a preparedness enhancement drill simulating the defense against Beijing’s military intrusions, ahead of the Lunar New Year in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan on Jan. 11, 2023. Taiwan says 103 Chinese warplanes flew toward the island in new daily high in recent times. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said that it detected the planes in the 24 hours ending at 6 a.m. Monday, Sept. 18, 2023. (AP Photo/Daniel Ceng, File)

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TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — China’s military sent 103 warplanes toward Taiwan in a 24-hour period in what the island’s defense ministry called a recent new high.

The planes were detected between 6 a.m. on Sunday and 6 a.m. on Monday, the ministry said. As is customary, they turned back before reaching Taiwan. Chinese warplanes fly toward the self-governing island on a near-daily basis but typically in smaller numbers. The Taiwan ministry didn’t explain what time period it meant by a “recent” high.

China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, has conducted increasingly large military drills in the air and waters around Taiwan as tensions have grown between the two and with the United States. The U.S. is Taiwan’s main supplier of arms and opposes any attempt to change Taiwan’s status by force.

The Chinese government would prefer that Taiwan come under its control voluntarily and last week unveiled a plan for an integrated development demonstration zone in Fujian province, trying to entice Taiwanese even as it threatens the island militarily in what experts say is China’s long-running carrot and stick approach.

The recent actions may be an attempt to sway Taiwan’s presidential election in January. The governing Democratic Progressive Party, which leans toward formal independence for the island, is anathema to the Chinese leadership. China favors opposition candidates who advocate working with the mainland.

The presidential candidates had no immediate comment Monday on the latest Chinese military activity.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said 40 of the planes crossed the symbolic median line between mainland China and the island. They included more than 30 fighter jets as well as midair refueling tanker planes. Taiwan also reported nine Chinese naval vessels in area waters in the previous 24 hours.

The ministry called the Chinese military action “harassment” that it warned could escalate in the current tense atmosphere. “We urge the Beijing authorities to bear responsibility and immediately stop such kind of destructive military activities,” it said in a statement.’

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, asked about the reported military activity, said there is no such thing as a “median line” because Taiwan is part of Chinese territory.

China last week sent a flotilla of ships including the aircraft carrier Shandong into waters near Taiwan. The drills came shortly after the U.S. and Canada sailed warships through the Taiwan Strait, the waters that separate the island from the mainland.

Taiwan and China split in 1949 when the Communists took control of China during a civil war. The losing Nationalists fled to Taiwan and set up their own government on the island.

Only a few foreign nations give the island official diplomatic recognition. The U.S. among others has formal ties with China while maintaining a representative office in Taiwan.

___

Find more of AP’s Asia-Pacific coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/asia-pacific

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · September 18, 2023

7. In U.S. Visit, Zelensky to Make a Case for More Aid, and Say Thank You

Excerpts:

At a NATO summit in July, Ben Wallace, then Britain’s defense minister, said, “Like it or not, people want to see a bit more gratitude.” He said he was offering advice for Ukraine to win over those who have been skeptical of aid.

At the same summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania, Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration’s national security adviser, said that “the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” for ammunition, air-defense systems, armored vehicles and mine-clearing equipment.

Mr. Zelensky appeared to get the message.

“Thank you so much,” he said in a brief comment during Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s visit to Kyiv this month, in which Mr. Zelensky said thank you eight times.

“We are really thankful. We are very thankful,” he said.

In U.S. Visit, Zelensky to Make a Case for More Aid, and Say Thank You

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · September 18, 2023

The Ukrainian leader’s second trip to America comes at a more delicate diplomatic moment, as he tries to navigate political currents while expressing gratitude for Western support.

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, after he addressed Congress in December.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

By

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Sept. 18, 2023, 5:02 a.m. ET

A hero’s welcome awaited President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine on his first trip to the United States after Russia’s full-scale invasion, which came on the heels of two back-to-back military advances that showcased Ukrainian momentum to the West. Mr. Zelensky spoke to a joint session of Congress last December, highlighting the successes and appealing for continued aid.

Mr. Zelensky’s second visit, beginning on Tuesday, is a more delicate political mission, coming in the face of skepticism over assistance to Ukraine from some Republican lawmakers and amid a slow-moving and so far inconclusive counteroffensive on which many hopes in the war had been pinned.

Mr. Zelensky will attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York, where he is expected to continue an effort to win support among developing nations that have wavered or leaned toward Russia. Then he will travel to Washington to meet with congressional leaders and visit the White House.

The Ukrainian president is approaching his appearances with a more balanced message. He remains a tireless advocate for military assistance for the Ukrainian Army, but has infused his pleas with deep expressions of gratitude for what the West has already provided.

It’s a shift in tone and approach for Mr. Zelensky after criticism that he was scolding his allies and appearing ungrateful as he pressed them for weapons.

At a NATO summit in July, Ben Wallace, then Britain’s defense minister, said, “Like it or not, people want to see a bit more gratitude.” He said he was offering advice for Ukraine to win over those who have been skeptical of aid.

Soldiers firing at Russian positions in the Bakhmut region of Ukraine last month.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

At the same summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania, Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration’s national security adviser, said that “the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” for ammunition, air-defense systems, armored vehicles and mine-clearing equipment.

Mr. Zelensky appeared to get the message.

“Thank you so much,” he said in a brief comment during Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s visit to Kyiv this month, in which Mr. Zelensky said thank you eight times.

“We are really thankful. We are very thankful,” he said.

Last December, Mr. Zelensky arrived in Washington just weeks after Ukraine’s military had defeated Russian forces in the only provincial capital they had seized in the full-scale invasion, Kherson, in the country’s south. Earlier in the fall, Ukraine had sprung a successful surprise attack on Russian forces in the Kharkiv region in the northeast, recapturing towns and villages across a wide swath of territory.

The gains meant that Ukraine had reclaimed about half the territory Russia seized in the invasion that began in February 2022.

Ukrainian forces at the time were also fiercely holding off the Russians in Bakhmut. (The Russians eventually captured the city in May). In his appearance before Congress, which drew a standing ovation, Mr. Zelensky presented the Democratic congresswoman Nancy Pelosi and Vice President Kamala Harris with a Ukrainian flag signed by soldiers fighting in Bakhmut.

At the time, preparations were already underway for the military operation that began in southern Ukraine this June, after a monthslong wait for American and European weaponry, including tanks and armored vehicles. Mr. Zelensky has complained that the delay gave Russia time to dig in and lay vast minefields, thwarting any fast advance.

Ukrainian marines unloading ammunition at a training ground for new recruits in the Zaporizhzhia region in July. America provides about a third of direct weapons donations to Ukraine’s army.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Other factors added to the delay, including late spring rains, but the Ukrainian government’s evolving argument was that the West’s hesitation over sending more powerful and sophisticated weapons was costly in terms of the counteroffensive’s effectiveness.

Ukraine’s army is now locked in a plodding but vicious and bloody fight along two main lines of attack through farm fields and tiny villages.

Military analysts have not written off the operation, but even Mr. Zelensky has said it is moving slower than hoped. This month, Ukraine pierced a main line of Russian defenses near the village of Robotyne and is fighting to widen the breach sufficiently to send through armored vehicles.

At home, Mr. Zelensky remains politically popular though he has hit some speed bumps, including corruption in military recruitment offices and procurement that led to the firing of his defense minister.

After nearly 19 months of war, the vast majority of Ukrainians remain enraged at Russia for the invasion and deeply opposed to any settlement that would leave President Vladimir V. Putin with any gains from the assault.

In addition to lobbying the United States and Europe for military aid, Ukraine has been seeking diplomatic backing from developing countries in Africa and South America, arguing that disruptions in grain shipments are raising food prices. He also wants to shore up support from military allies, of which the United States is most pivotal.

World leaders with Mr. Zelensky at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

America provides about a third of direct weapons donations to Ukraine’s army. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Congress has approved approximately $43 billion in security assistance.

Now, the White House has requested from Congress an additional $24 billion in Ukraine aid that seems likely to become entangled in partisan spending fights this fall. Mr. Zelensky will have an opportunity to try to unite Democrats and Republicans on the need for continued military assistance.

Looming over Mr. Zelensky’s visit is the American presidential election, just over a year away. The prospect of a second Trump administration, and a less enthusiastic commitment to aiding Ukraine, is a concern to leaders in Kyiv.

“It’s a different kind of conversation” for the Ukrainian leader in Washington as the United States moves into an election year, Igor Novikov, a former U.S. policy adviser to Mr. Zelensky, said in an interview. The president will try “to keep the substance of the war on the agenda and not alow it to become domestic political pingpong, because it’s a matter of life and death.”

With Ukraine bubbling up as a domestic political issue in the United States and European nations, Kyiv will need to engage politicians opposed to Ukraine spending, Mr. Novikov said.

Ukrainian politicians of all viewpoints have said the country’s national interest lies in maintaining bipartisan support for U.S. aid. Mr. Zelensky met in Kyiv over the summer with former Vice President Mike Pence and has regularly hosted Republican members of Congress.

In Washington, Mr. Zelensky also intends to argue that America’s interests are served in defending Europe’s borders in Ukraine, according to an official in the president’s office. Otherwise, the war could spread, destabilizing the European Union, which is the United States’ largest trading partner.

In the run-up to the invasion, Russia stated claims to security influence in Eastern Europe more broadly, demanding that countries admitted to NATO after the breakup of the Soviet Union leave the alliance.

A soldier of the Ukrainian Army’s 71st Brigade with a U.S.-made mine resistant ambush protected vehicle in the Donetsk region in March.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

“If Ukraine were to fail, Putin would be emboldened with profound security and economic effects for the United States and average Americans,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about Mr. Zelensky’s visit. “We will reiterate that Americans should never have to fight Russians in Europe, and the best way to secure that is Ukrainian victory.”

Mr. Zelensky also intends to lay out in private conversations Ukraine’s plans in the war, the official said, to assuage worries that the fighting could bog down in the back-and-forth battles of recent months along the front. Ukraine has scored some success in long-range strikes on Russian air and naval bases and this month damaged a landing ship and submarine in the port of Sevastopol, in occupied Crimea.

Still, a key goal, the official said, is to deliver “a huge message of gratitude to the president, Congress and the American people.”

Andrew E. Kramer is the Times bureau chief in Kyiv. He was part of a team that won the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for a series on Russia’s covert projection of power. More about Andrew E. Kramer

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · September 18, 2023

8. Special Operations News - September 18, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News - September 18, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · September 18, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A Navy combatant craft returns to the USS John P. Murtha, not pictured, during Operation Polar Dagger in the Bering Sea, Aug. 28, 2023. The operation is designed to sharpen joint special operations integration and provides the forces the opportunity to test new capabilities and advance response options. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Joshua Samoluk.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

SOF Pop Culture and Politics. Edward Salo, an associate professor of history at Arkansas State University, is worried about the effect of credibility of special operations amongst the public and the adverse effects on civil-military relations. The days of the “Quiet Professional” seem to be in the past with the emergence of books, movies, podcasts, and more about special operations. This has found its way into the American political arena as well. “Politicization and Pop Culture: How Public Perception of Special Operations Units Intersects with Civil-Military Relations”, Modern War Institute at West Point, September 11, 2023.

Pararescue Competition. The Kentucky Air National Guard’s 123rd Special Tactics Squadron hosted the 2023 PJ Rodeo. This event saw 30 pararesecuemen from around the world compete in two-person teams to demonstrate skills in precision parachuting, marksmanship, technical rescue, and tactical medicine. The PJ Rodeo is facilitated by the Pararescue Association, a non-profit veterans group comprised of Special Warfare Airmen. The rodeo takes place every two years. “Special Warfare Operators Compete for Title as Top Pararescuemen”, 123rd Airlift Wing, September 8, 2023.

24th RDS. The 24th Special Operations Wing redesignated Detachment 1, also known as Deployment Cell or “D-Cell,” to the Rapid Deployment Squadron during a ceremony at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., Sept. 6, 2023. A geographically separated unit from the 24 SOW at Hurlburt Field, Fla., the Rapid Deployment Squadron consists of members across 15 career fields, forming four agile teams. These teams of multi-capable Airmen are trained in 49 cross-functional tasks including survival, evasion, resistance and escape training, advanced shooting and advanced combat casualty care. “D-Cell Redesignated 24th Rapid Deployment Squadron”, 24th Special Operations Wing, September 11, 2023.

SF Mortar Training and Interaction with Cadre. George Hand writes of his experience in attending Special Forces weapons training during Phase II (when there were 3 phases) of the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). “Incredible Mortar-Assembly Challenges with the Green Berets”, SANDBOXX, September 15, 2023.

U.S. Secret Service SOD. Learn about employment opportunities with the Special Operations Division. The Counter Assault Team (CAT) is a specialized unit within the U.S. Secret Service that provides full-time, global tactical support to the Presidential Protective Division. On order, CAT will also provide tactical support to designated protectees, protected venues, and National Special Security Events. https://www.secretservice.gov/careers/special-agent/CAT

New 25th ID Cdr Has SOF Background. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Marcus S. Evans is the incoming 25th Infantry Division. He has a deep background in the special operations community with time spent in Airborne, Ranger, Light Infantry and Mechanized formations. He has previously commanded the NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the forward deployed Joint Special Operations Task Force. “SOF General Takes Command of 25th ID”, SOF News, August 25, 2023.

26th MEU(SOC) JTACs Train in Kuwait. “This Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) element consisted of Marines from the MEU(SOC)’s Air, Naval, Gunfire, Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Firepower Control Team, Alpha Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6 Fire Support Team, and Direct Air Support Center (DASC). The detachment traveled to Kuwait in support of bilateral training between a detachment of Kuwait armed forces and Marines a part of the 26th MEU(SOC).” “26th MEU(SOC) ANGLICO Marines showcase warfighting expertise during Kuwait training”, DVIDS, September 15, 2023.

International SOF

Swedish Amphibious Raiders. Combat divers assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Swedish Amphibious Raiders (SAR) partnered together to conduct an annual dive requalification, Aug. 11 – Sep. 1, 2023. The joint training was conducted primarily on Camp Pendleton and the surrounding oceanic area. “10th SFG(A) teams up with Swedish partners for bilateral maritime exercise”, DVIDS, September 12, 2023.

Philippines SFR-A Establishes Maritime Training Center. the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) and the Philippines Army’s Special Forces Regiment – Airborne (SFR-A) recently signed a letter of intent (LOI) to collaborate on the establishment of a maritime training center in the Philippines province of Bohol. the Philippines army’s training center in areas to include maritime security, curriculum management, and instructor and training center development. (DVIDS, Sep 15, 2023)

FFL Jaguar Course. A Marine Raider with Marine Forces Special Operations Command participated in the French Foreign Legion’s Jaguar Course earlier this year. The Jaguar Course is an international, eight-week jungle warfare course held in the French Guiana rainforest. This course was taught exclusively in French, testing participants’ language skills on top of the physical demands of intense training in a jungle environment. “Marine Raider Participates in the French Foreign Legion’s Jaguar Course”, SOF News, August 24, 2023.

SOCKOR and ROKSOC Training. U.S. special operations personnel regularly conduct combined jump training with their ROK counterparts, ensuring proficiency in special operations forces-related skills and their ability to meet mutual defense priorities. What’s more, as a part of its role as the UN Special Operations Command, SOCKOR regularly conducts exchanges with other member states’ SOF personnel. “SOCKOR and ROKSOC Promote SOF Truth #1”, SOF News, August 27, 2023.

SOF History

Horse Soldiers of Afghanistan. In 2001, shortly after 9/11, a group of U.S. Green Beret soldiers began a mission that used some special horsepower to succeed. On the night of October 19, 2001, an MH-47G Chinook flew from Uzbekistan to Dehi, Afghanistan (Google Maps) and inserted Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 595. The men soon found they would be moving on the battlefield on Afghan horses. “The Role Horses Played in 12 Green Berets’ Historic Mission”, Horse Illustrated, September 11, 2023.

10th SFG(A) Celebrates past at Devens. Fort Devens, Massachusetts served as the home of the 10th SFG(A) starting in 1968 and then most of the Group moved to Fort Carson, Colorado between 1994 and 1995. Currently, 10th SFG(A) operates out of Fort Carson housing three battalions including a Group Support Battalion. 1st Battalion continues to operate as a permanently stationed battalion in Germany. 10th SFG(A) still maintains its historical connection to the Fort Devens installation after decades of their departure from the New England area. Some of the current 10th SFG(A) operators attended a recent festival at Fort Devens, providing a link to their heritage at the installation and interacting with community members and retired Special Forces veterans. “10th Special Forces Group Celebrates Their Past at Fort Devens”, SOF News, August 26, 2023.

Operation Market Garden. On September 17, 1944, Operation Market Garden began. The intention of the ambitious operation was to secure key bridges over a series of rivers and canals in Holland that would lead to a rapid strike into the North German plain. It would be featured in two films: ‘A Bridge Too Far” and ‘Theirs is the Glory’. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaiOLrzO9X8

SOF C2 in Early OEF. A paper by a SF officer who served with 3rd SFG(A) in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) examines the nature of the command and control (C2) relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces. His thesis provides an analysis of the complex issues arising from the necessity to fight jointly. Special Forces Command and Control in Afghanistan, by Richard Rhyne, U.S. CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, PDF, 70 pages. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA429053.pdf

Ukraine Conflict

Report – Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects, Congressional Research Service, CRS R47068, updated September 14, 2023, PDF, 36 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068

Taiwan Learns from Ukraine Conflict. The aggressiveness of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan has the island nation looking to increase its defensive posture. It has closely looked at the Ukraine conflict for lessons to apply to its own defensive capabilities. “In defense report, Taiwan highlights lessons learned from Ukraine”, The Japan Times, September 14, 2023.

Video – Ukraine’s Sea Drones. The Ukrainian Self Made Kamakazi drone works by sucking in water from a hatch and flushing out a jet of water that propels the Naval drone at a speed of 50 miles per hour. All this at a cost of $250,000 while its high-value targets are worth more than $650 million. They usually work like a wolf pack hunting its target, while they are being controlled through Starlink Video link, destroying bridges, and recently managed to penetrate an important harbor and damage two vessels. “Naval Kamikaze Sea Drone How it works using Starlink Satellite”, AiTelly, September 7, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFhADRYXi_8

Ukraine’s Commandos. The news from Ukraine has its government touting the daring successes of its special operations forces. Certainly, the commandos are having an impact on the overall campaign; but only after the war is over will there be an opportunity to assess exactly how impactful the country’s commandos have been. “Zelenskyy’s secret ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare'”, Politico.eu, September 18, 2023.

National Security

NSW Needs a Robin Sage. Kevin Bilms identifies a gap within the Joint Force for campaigning in the maritime domain. There is a gap within the Naval Special Warfare community that prevents it from operating effectively with the human aspects of maritime operations. He believes a Robin Sage approach to training could fill this gap. “Solving for the Missing Element of Maritime Campaigning”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, September 14, 2023.

SF Officer on National Defense (Interview). A retired Special Forces Officer, career public servant, and principal architect of the historic Abraham Accords, Robert Greenway, joins Kevin to discuss conservative national defense priorities. Now serving as director of Heritage’s Center for National Defense, Robert lays out his vision to ensure military readiness and promote American strength on the world stage and security here at home. “Keeping America Safe: Conservative National Defense Priorities”, The Heritage Foundation, September 14, 2023.

SDF – Losing Support of Arabs. The coalition between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor is fracturing amid clashes over long-standing grievances. This is not a good turn of events for the U.S. effort in Syria. The SDF’s response to the clashes very likely will undermine its ability to maintain control in the province for at least the next several months. The SDF and the Deir ez Zor Military Council (DMC) began fighting after the SDF arrested the DMC commander on August 27. The conflict rapidly expanded after August 30, as other tribes joined the fighting driven by long-running grievances against the SDF. “The Syrian Democratic Forces’ Arab Coalition is Crumbling, Creating Opportunities for ISIS, Iran, and Turkey”, Institute for the Study of War, September 15, 2023.

Armenian Christian Enclave at Risk. The beleaguered Armenian Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh (map by Wikipedia), also known as Artsakh, are being subjected to death by starvation by the government of Azerbaijan. The President of Azerbaijan has the intention of displacing the Armenian Christians with Azeri Muslims. “Ilham Aliyev: The Face of Crimes against Armenians”, by Lela Gilbert, The Washington Stand.

Medevacs. There are changing approaches to air medical evacuations. There is new craft and technology but there is also the potential need for considerably more resources. This is where military air medical evacuation, often referred to as ‘medevac’, plays a crucial role in ensuring that wounded or sick service members receive the necessary medical attention in a timely and efficient manner. “The Future of Military Medevac”, by Dr. Joetey Attariwala, Air Med & Rescue, August 31, 2023.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Great Power Competition

SOF and China. As the U.S. shifts from CT/COIN missions to ‘strategic competition’ it will need to focus on its core competencies. A new set of missions will need to be taken on by special operations forces – and senior US leaders should remember that SOF operators are suitable for ‘all’ tasks. “In a US showdown with China, there are some missions with no special-operations ‘easy button'”, Business Insider, September 11, 2023.

SOF, the Arctic and GPC. Both Russia and China have been stepping up their presence in the Arctic region for several years. The U.S. is attempting to extend its military capabilities in the ‘High North’ as well. Special operations units have increased their training in the region – one recent exercise was Operation Polar Dagger. The intent was to showcase how well special operator air, land, and sea teams work together in harsh, long-distance environments like the Bering Sea. “With eye toward Russia and China, NORTHCOM concludes special mission in the Arctic”, Defense One, September 14, 2023.

China, Hearts, and Minds. China’s influence operations have evolved to employ “information laundering” to shape global narratives. Information laundering—the process of introducing disinformation into the Internet ecosystem and legitimizing it through transitions from fringe sites to public discourse—is the next generation of information operations. “Countering China’s Use of Information Laundering Via Minds and Media”, The Strategy Bridge, September 7, 2023.

China, Disinformation, and Maui Wildfires. China has been using the wildfires that swept across Maui last month to spread disinformation and sow distrust in the United States. Social media posts said a U.S. “weather weapon caused the wildfires” and were accompanied by images that appeared to be generated by artificial intelligence. “China Sows Disinformation About Wildfires”, The New York Times, September 11, 2023. (subscription)

Report – China-Russia Relations. The Congressional Research Service has updated a publication that describes the two countries relationship as one ” . . . resembling a non-binding alignment based on shared opposition to what they describe as the U.S.-led international order.” Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s reliance on China for economic and political support has increased. China-Russia Relations, CRS IF12100, updated September 13, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12100

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Afghanistan

Former Afghan SOF Soldier Wins U.S. Asylum. A former intelligence officer with the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) fled Afghanistan in August 2021 after the collapse of the Afghan government. He traveled a dangerous route through several countries over a period of months before crossing the U.S. southern border and asking for asylum. Instead, the U.S. government interned him for several months. After intense public pressure and Congressional inquiries, he was finally released. He has now been granted asylum and, in time, can apply for a Green Card to be a lawful permanent resident. “Afghan soldier Abdul Wasi Safi, once detained at border, wins asylum”, Military Times, September 12, 2023.

U.S. Envoy – No Support for NRF. In an interview with RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi, Karen Decker, the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, dismissed any support for anti-Taliban armed factions such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), saying Afghans themselves have been adamantly against the launch of any new conflict. (Editorial note: one wonders if this is the official DoS stance or just Karen with another gaffe). It is surprising the Decker still has a job with the Department of State; especially in dealing with Afghanistan. “‘They Deserve Some Peace’: U.S. Envoy Rejects Support for Anti-Taliban Factions in Afghanistan”, Radio Free Europe, September 15, 2023.

Review of August 2021 Airport Attack in Afghanistan. The U.S. military has ordered new interviews on the deadly 2021 terrorist attack at Abbey Gate of the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) during the Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation. Critics continue to say the deadly assault could have been stopped. The interviews are meant to see if service members who were not included in the original investigation, have new or different information. (AP News, Sep 15, 2023).

Africa

Security Sector Governance. Weak security sector oversight institutions inhibit security sector professionalism in Africa. Stronger internal and external oversight is an essential element of enhancing security sector effectiveness. Security organs should construct institutional frameworks that nurture professionalism and a consistent apolitical posture. When security actors allow themselves to become politicized, they erode the credibility of security institutions among the population and can themselves become a security threat to citizens. “Oversight and Accountability to Improve Security Sector Governance in Africa”, by Dan Kuwali, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 11, 2023.

Niger Update. The U.S. military has resumed ISR flight operations in Niger. The flying of drones and other aircraft out of air bases in the country has resumed after a temporary halt at the time of the military coup. Most of the U.S. military located near the capital at Niamey have been moved to an airbase near Agadez, Niger. “US Military resumes counterterrorism missions out of Niger bases”, Air Force Times, September 13, 2023. See also “U.S. Resumes ISR Flight Operations in Niger”, DoD News, September 14, 2023.

Upcoming Events

September 18-23, 2023

5th Special Forces Group Reunion

September 24-28, 2023

Combat Diver Competition

Special Forces Underwater Operations School

October 3, 2023

2023 Virtual MOG Mile

Three Rangers Foundation

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

October 21, 2023

OSS Award Dinner

OSS Society

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Books, Reports, and Pubs

Books about Resistance. Sandor Fabian, a former Hungarian Special Forces officer, presents six books that would help unconventional warriors understand the concept of resistance. “War Books: Resistance”, Modern War Institute at West Point, September 15, 2023.

IWC Newsletter. The September 2023 issue of the Irregular Warfare Center’s newsletter is now posted online. (PDF, 2 pages) https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/news/newsletter/september-2023-iwc-newsletter/

Book Review – The Centurions. One of the novels that most heavily influenced the US military’s approach to its post-9/11 wars did not focus on the Middle East. It did not feature American service members. And it was published four decades before the terrorist attacks that precipitated America’s long involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Jean Larteguy’s The Centurions is a tale of captive French paratroopers in Indochina who later to go on to ascend to the zenith of their profession in Algeria during the 1950s. “The Complicated Legacy of Jean Larteguy’s “The Centurions” and America’s Post-9/11 Wars”, by Benjamin Van Horrick, Modern War Institute at West Point, August 30, 2023.

Pub – NATO Wargaming Handbook. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has published a ” . . . simple, easy-to-use reference for conducting wargames. The handbook serves as a starting point for standardizing the vocabulary and processes used to deliver professional wargames.” (PDF, 64 pages) https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2023/09/nato-wargaming-handbook-202309.pdf

Videos and Podcasts

Podcast – A Twenty-Year Retrospective on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, Modern War Institute at West Point, August 11, 2023. This episode features David Kilcullen and John Nagl. They delve into issues of defining the overlapping terms “irregular warfare” and “counterinsurgency,” and continue by discussing some of the struggles encountered in seeking to measuring success and failure over the past twenty years. They then discuss how challenges in understanding the human domain affected the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They wrap up the episode with their thoughts and suggestions for irregular warfare practitioners and thinkers who may not have significant direct experience in the wars of the last twenty years. Listen to Podcast here.

Podcast – Transformation Ain’t Easy. The United States Army Special Warfare Center and School Command Team sits down with the Pineland Underground Podcast to discuss their vision for Army Special Operations training and education geared towards the future. The highlight the current state of the schoolhouse and the pathway forward to achieve the ARSOF of 2030. Pineland Underground Podcast, SWCS, September 12, 2023, one hour.

Video – The War at Home. Three episodes feature retired Green Beret Matt Docchio. He talks about deployments in Afghanistan, the brutal truths of war, the loss of innocence, the personal struggles once home, and his path to resilience. Team Trek Podcast, YouTube, July 2023. https://www.youtube.com/@TeamTrekPodcast

Video – Army OSINT: Defining a New Course. The Army is defining Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) as a foundational intelligence discipline that will play an increasingly central role in supporting operations. Watch this video to find out how they are defining OSINT and creating a rigorous approach to open source. Features OSINT Defense Intelligence Senior Leader, Shawn Nilius, Director, Army OSINT Office, and Emily Harding, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program at CSIS. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), September 12, 2023, one hour.

https://www.csis.org/events/army-osint-defining-new-course

Video – Youngest 9/11 Ground Zero volunteer turned Green Beret Commander shares experience, CBS8, September 11, 2023, 2 minutes. John Paluska’s new path led him to earn his Green Beret with military deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations across the globe. View video here.

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · September 18, 2023

9. Anti-drone system that fits in backpack now allows soldiers to hack hostile targets

How much more stuff can we pack into a soldier's rucksack? Previous systems were heavy? Just remember the adage: A hundred pounds of lightweight sh*t is still a hundred pounds.

 But seriously, this could be a critical capability.

Excerpts:

Previously, counter-drone systems were heavy, cumbersome and expensive, and tended to be made by repurposing old equipment such as jammers, radars and cameras.

“EnforceAir can detect and if needed mitigate by taking control over the rogue drone without interfering with other authorised friendly drones and communications,” Mr Starr said.

“Continuity prevails as communications, commerce, transportation and everyday life smoothly proceed while the hostile drone incident is managed with a paramount focus on achieving a safe landing and a safe outcome.”

The Telegraph

Anti-drone system that fits in backpack now allows soldiers to hack hostile targets

Compact EnforceAir devices differ from previous technology that has typically relied on jamming

By

Danielle Sheridan,

 DEFENCE EDITOR

15 September 2023 • 7:00pm

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/09/15/soldiers-anti-drone-system-enforceair-fits-in-backpack/#:~:text=Soldiers%20are%20now%20able%20to,to%20hack%20into%20enemy%20equipment.

Story by Danielle Sheridan •20h

EnforceAir tracks nefarious drones by sending short data signals to hack into enemy equipment - D-Fend Solutions© Provided by The Telegraph

Soldiers are now able to take down hostile targets with anti-drone technology that fits in a backpack.

The compact device, EnforceAir, discreetly tracks nefarious drones by sending short data signals to hack into enemy equipment.

The stealth system identifies a protected airspace then neutralises the threat by assuming control of the hostile drone and landing it safely in a predefined zone.

Counter-drone devices typically rely on jamming – sending signals or energy to interfere with enemy devices and block communication between the drone and its controller. However, this risks impacting other operations in the area and only provides temporary control, leaving the potential for an enemy drone pilot to regain control when jamming stops.

But EnforceAir, created by D-Fend Solutions, employs radio-frequency cyber detection and takeover mitigation to detect, locate and identify rogue drones without jamming. It is already in use by the Met Police and Ministry of Defence.

Speaking to the Telegraph at the Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition in London, Jeffrey Starr, the CMO at D-Fend Solutions, said that a “very deep understanding of the drone’s communication protocols” allows the operator to ensure that the “rogue pilot loses control of the drone and cannot regain it”.

Using a hand-held device and without the need for a line of sight, the operator selects a protection zone, such as a military base, that is issued with alerts if any unmanned aerial vehicle enters the designated area.

The system works in three stages by transmitting short data signals that hack the device.

Initially it sends a message to the user’s screen in a grey colour if a drone enters the area of interest. The message also contains data on the drone, including height and size.

Previously, counter-drone systems were heavy, cumbersome and expensive, and tended to be made by repurposing old equipment - D-Fend Solutions© Provided by The Telegraph

The user can then assess the information and choose to press “mitigate”, which turns the message orange, if it believes the drone is potentially suspicious.

Related video: How drones are shaping the war for Ukraine and Russia (Dailymotion)

The final move is to action EnforceAir to take control of the drone, which turns the message red. The drone is then hacked by the system, which reprogrammes it with new coordinates so that it lands in another predefined safe zone.

Previously, counter-drone systems were heavy, cumbersome and expensive, and tended to be made by repurposing old equipment such as jammers, radars and cameras.

“EnforceAir can detect and if needed mitigate by taking control over the rogue drone without interfering with other authorised friendly drones and communications,” Mr Starr said.

“Continuity prevails as communications, commerce, transportation and everyday life smoothly proceed while the hostile drone incident is managed with a paramount focus on achieving a safe landing and a safe outcome.”

The company behind the compact system said that it was already in use by the Met Police, Ministry of Defence and at major London airports - D-Fend Solutions© Provided by The Telegraph

Because of its small size and light weight, the device allows troops to deploy at speed – it can be set up to secure an area as soon as troops hit the ground and be running within 10 minutes. It can be mounted on a pole or a tripod and operate in noisy environments without any interference.

Martin Broomhead, of D-Fend Solutions, who served in the Army Air Corps for 20 years, said that there has been “a big uptick in interest” in the EnforceAir product since the war in Ukraine began. “The rest of the world has woken up to the awful potential of nefarious individuals with drones,” he said.

Mr Broomhead said that the system was also being used at major London airports.

“Ukraine showed how quickly and easily drones can be brought online and put to use,” Mr Broomhead added.

“Russia has led the way in developing this equipment, which brought into sharp focus the need to defend against such capabilities.”

10. Ukraine's Unwavering Commitment: Personal Insights and the Urgent Need for Continued Support by Frank Helmick

Ukraine's Unwavering Commitment: Personal Insights and the Urgent Need for Continued Support

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ukraines-unwavering-commitment-personal-insights-urgent-frank-helmick/?utm

Frank Helmick

Senior Vice President, Mission Operations

September 17, 2023

Each time in Kyiv I was fortunate to meet with several senior military leaders, government and intelligence officials, and everyday Ukrainian citizens who described their absolute commitment to the cause and their struggles on the ground and in the information campaign. Just back from my third trip to Kyiv, in as many months, and I wanted to share some observations on Ukrainian successes and challenges and pass on their expressions of thanks to the American people and to the Western Coalition for the amazing support to the defense of Ukraine.

Ukraine Government & Society

Ukraine's national commitment is unwavering – there are no gaps – EVERYONE is focused on winning the current conflict – “Ukrainians have no way out, we will continue to fight,” is what many said.

Military, parliamentarians, local population are exhausted, physically, and mentally – there is no rest after 18 months of combat.

Current War Fight

Ukraine’s Military has adapted quickly which enhances their chances for success but so have the Russians, we MUST not underestimate Russian Military capability.

Despite all the modern technology – success in trench warfare is where progress is measured – enhanced technology in the close fight is needed.

Ukraine is the current world's leader in drone warfare – could and will be a global center of excellence for drone warfare.

The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are fighting on the battlefield in two styles one NATO/western and the Soviet style – – this is a problem (Ukraine veterans) and select senior officers have previously trained in Soviet style – they know of no other way.

Ukraine battlefield is an invaluable laboratory – the U.S. must have a process to capture these valuable lessons in Ukraine … not from a distance.

F-16s are not a silver bullet to a victory - but they can provide an edge, interdict Russian Close Air Support, and defend Ukraine territorial boundaries.

Manning

Recruiting around the country continues to be a challenge while maintaining the initial, intermediate, and advanced base of education for their military.

Veterans who were discharged from Ukraine military many years ago, have been pressed into service for the current fight and are serving on the front lines.

When your life depends on adaptability, learning quickly, and innovation much is accomplished – that is why Ukraine’s training on NATO donated equipment can be accelerated.

Maintain & Sustain

There is little progress, no success, to maintain the donated equipment forward on the battlefield. — fixing damaged equipment forward today is a concept not a reality

Institutional military training capacity building is needed NOW – if this is not addressed the future capability is questionable.

Ukraine's current capabilities to take care of their wounded military service members are overwhelmed – this will have severe internal (Ukraine Government/Military/Medical Organizations etc) implications in the future.

Hold the Line

Ukrainians are sensing that support from United States is waning -- Ukraine is concerned that if the United States support stops then so would support from the rest of the world. Success on the battlefield and seas means continued support.

Small pick-up Teams of non-supported, non-sanctioned U.S. and volunteers from other Nations are providing limited training support -- ZERO standardization.

There is a U.S. policy mismatch -- our words do not match our actions -- changes in U.S. policy must be considered to allow U.S. funded contractors to support the Ukrainian Military on the ground.

Overall Impressions

Ukraine is not going to give up on this fight, no matter how long it takes. Ukraine has mobilized its entire society and is completely committed to this fight. Ukrainian military efforts along the front and in the trenches are clearly making progress but all the ammunition and new equipment in the world will not win this war alone.

Finding those decisive advantages over Russian efforts is the task at hand – without underestimating the Russians. Western assistance to help build enduring institutions, integrate old with new systems, train the force, and care for the wounded veterans is what is needed desperately. 

Learning from this battlefield is also essential as we see both sides adjusting their tactics to gain advantage. We must seek ways to capture these adjustments and draw lessons from the changing conduct of war, emerging technologies and employment, the integration of varied weapon systems across the spectrum, to name a few. Military advisors and observers have done this in every conflict since of American War of Independence. Seasoned veteran advisors and observers can do the same today.

Helping Ukraine not only win the current fight but plan for the post conflict environment is our duty – we must continue our support, the U.S. and NATO's reputations are in question, and our biggest challenge is not allowing Ukraine to lose.

11. Search on for missing Marine Corps F-35 jet after pilot ejects

Search on for missing Marine Corps F-35 jet after pilot ejects

militarytimes.com · by AP Staff · September 18, 2023

NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. (AP) — A Marine Corps pilot safely ejected from a fighter jet over North Charleston on Sunday afternoon and the search for his missing aircraft was focused on two lakes north of North Charleston, military officials said.

The pilot ejected and parachuted safely into a North Charleston neighborhood at about 2 p.m. He was taken to a local hospital, where he was in stable condition, said Maj. Melanie Salinas. The pilot’s name has not been released.

Based on the missing plane’s location and trajectory, the search for the F-35 Lightning II jet was focused on Lake Moultrie and Lake Marion, said Senior Master Sgt. Heather Stanton at Joint Base Charleston. Both lakes are north of North Charleston.

A South Carolina Law Enforcement Division helicopter joined the search for the F-35 after some bad weather cleared in the area, Stanton said. Military officials appealed in online posts Sunday for any help from the public in locating the aircraft.

Officials are still investigating why the pilot ejected, authorities said.

The pilot of a second F-35 returned safely to Joint Base Charleston, Salinas said.

The planes and pilots were with the Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 based in Beaufort, not far from South Carolina’s Atlantic coast.

12. Pentagon orders new interviews on deadly 2021 Afghan airport attack

​Excerpts:

In emotional testimony during a congressional hearing in March, former Marine Sgt. Tyler Vargas-Andrews told lawmakers that he was thwarted in an attempt to stop the suicide bombing . He said Marines and others aiding in the evacuation operation were given descriptions of men believed to be plotting an attack before it occurred.

He said he and others spotted two men matching the descriptions and behaving suspiciously, and eventually had them in their rifle scopes, but never received a response about whether to take action.

“No one was held accountable,” Vargas-Andrews told Rep. Mike McCaul, R-Texas, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “No one was, and no one is, to this day.”

The March hearing was set up to examine the Biden administration’s handling of the withdrawal. Taliban forces seized the Afghan capital, Kabul, far more rapidly than U.S. intelligence had foreseen as American forces pulled out. Kabul’s fall turned the West’s withdrawal into a frenzy, putting the airport at the center of a desperate air evacuation by U.S. troops.

In April, President Joe Biden’s administration laid blame on his predecessor, President Donald Trump, for the deadly withdrawal. A 12-page summary of the results of the " hotwash " of U.S. policies around the ending of the nation’s longest war asserts that Biden was “severely constrained” by Trump’s decisions.

It acknowledges that the evacuation of Americans and allies from Afghanistan should have started sooner, but blames the delays on the Afghan government and military, and on U.S. military and intelligence community assessments.

Pentagon orders new interviews on deadly 2021 Afghan airport attack

militarytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · September 15, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Pentagon’s Central Command has ordered interviews of roughly two dozen more service members who were at the Kabul airport when suicide bombers attacked during U.S. forces’ chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal, as criticism persists that the deadly assault could have been stopped.

The interviews, ordered by Gen. Erik Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, were triggered in part by assertions by at least one service member injured in the blast who said he was never interviewed about it and that he might have been able to stop the attackers.

The interviews are meant to see if service members who were not included in the original investigation, have new or different information.

The decision, according to officials, does not reopen the administration’s investigation into the deadly bombing and the withdrawal two years ago. But the additional interviews will likely be seized on by congressional critics, mostly Republican, as proof that the administration bungled the probe into the attack, in addition to mishandling the withdrawal.

Some families of those killed and injured have complained that the Pentagon hasn’t been transparent enough about the bombing that killed 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. servicemen and women.

U.S. Central Command’s investigation concluded in November 2021 that given the worsening security situation at the airport’s Abbey Gate as Afghans became increasingly desperate to flee, “the attack was not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the number of evacuees.” And, the Pentagon has said that the review of the suicide attack had turned up neither any advance identification of a possible attacker nor any requests for “an escalation to existing rules of engagement” governing use of force by U.S. troops.

Central Command plans to speak with a number of service members who were severely wounded in the bombing at the Abbey Gate and had to be quickly evacuated from the country for medical care. They represent the bulk of the planned interviews, but a few others who weren’t wounded are also included. Officials also did not rule out that the number of interviews could grow as a result of those initial conversations.

“The purpose of these interviews is to ensure we do our due diligence with the new information that has come to light, that the relevant voices are fully heard and that we take those accounts and examine them seriously and thoroughly so the facts are laid bare,” Central Command spokesperson Michael Lawhorn said in a statement.

Officials on Friday began informing family members of those killed in the bombing as well as members of Congress about the latest plan. Lt. Gen. Patrick Frank, head of Army Central Command, is overseeing the team conducting the interviews, which is led by Army Brig. Gen. Lance Curtis. Gen. Kurilla has asked Frank to provide an update in 90 days.

In emotional testimony during a congressional hearing in March, former Marine Sgt. Tyler Vargas-Andrews told lawmakers that he was thwarted in an attempt to stop the suicide bombing . He said Marines and others aiding in the evacuation operation were given descriptions of men believed to be plotting an attack before it occurred.

He said he and others spotted two men matching the descriptions and behaving suspiciously, and eventually had them in their rifle scopes, but never received a response about whether to take action.

“No one was held accountable,” Vargas-Andrews told Rep. Mike McCaul, R-Texas, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “No one was, and no one is, to this day.”

The March hearing was set up to examine the Biden administration’s handling of the withdrawal. Taliban forces seized the Afghan capital, Kabul, far more rapidly than U.S. intelligence had foreseen as American forces pulled out. Kabul’s fall turned the West’s withdrawal into a frenzy, putting the airport at the center of a desperate air evacuation by U.S. troops.

In April, President Joe Biden’s administration laid blame on his predecessor, President Donald Trump, for the deadly withdrawal. A 12-page summary of the results of the " hotwash " of U.S. policies around the ending of the nation’s longest war asserts that Biden was “severely constrained” by Trump’s decisions.

It acknowledges that the evacuation of Americans and allies from Afghanistan should have started sooner, but blames the delays on the Afghan government and military, and on U.S. military and intelligence community assessments.

The administration has refused to release detailed reviews conducted by the State Department and the Pentagon, saying they are highly classified.

The White House summary says that when Biden entered office, “the Taliban were in the strongest military position that they had been in since 2001, controlling or contesting nearly half of the country.”

A review by U.S. Inspector-General for Afghanistan John Sopko concluded that actions taken by both the Trump and Biden administrations were key to the sudden collapse of the Afghan government and military, before U.S. forces completed their withdrawal in August 2021.

That includes Trump’s one-sided withdrawal deal with the Taliban, and the abruptness of Biden’s pullout of both U.S. contractors and troops from Afghanistan, stranding an Afghan air force that previous administrations had failed to make self-supporting, the review concluded.

13.​Milley says military is not woke: ‘I’m not even sure what that word truly means’

Unfortunately this woke issue will persist for as long as it is perceived as politically beneficial.

Milley says military is not woke: ‘I’m not even sure what that word truly means’

BY NICK ROBERTSON - 09/17/23 12:36 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4208910-milley-says-military-is-not-woke-im-not-even-sure-what-that-word-truly-means/?utm

Army Gen. Mark Milley pushed back on claims from Republicans that the military is “woke” and as a result not prepared to take on modern threats, saying he’s “not even sure what that word truly means.”

“What I see is a military that’s exceptionally strong. It’s powerful; it’s ready. In fact, our readiness rates, the way we measure readiness, is better now than they’ve been in years,” Milley said in a CNN interview Sunday.

Republican politicians and candidates have blasted the Pentagon for so-called woke policies, pointing to efforts to recruit a diverse group of military service members and be inclusive to transgender soldiers.

Those claims have also headlined efforts to reduce military spending.

“We’re going to cut money that’s being spent on wokeism; we’re going to cut legacy programs; we’re going to cut a lot of waste,” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said earlier this year.

Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who announced he will retire at the end of this month, said the U.S. military is actually in better shape now than in years past.

“This is a military that’s dedicated to maintaining our readiness, our capabilities, our lethality. And the thing that we also need to focus on is the modernization for the future character of war that I see fundamentally changing,” Milley said.

“This military is a lot of things, but woke, it’s not. So I take exception to that. I think that people say those things for reasons that are their own reasons, but it’s not true. It’s not accurate,” he continued. “It’s not a broad-brush description of the U.S. military as it exists today.”

Presidential candidate and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) argued that the military is being ordered around by a civilian “political ideology” and is “being infected by the woke mind virus.”

“This is changing the character of the military, it’s changing the culture of our services, and it’s creating a situation in which great warriors have been driven away and recruiting is at an all time low,” he said on the campaign trail in July.

Those criticisms from Republicans have created “a real crisis” of confidence in military institutions, according to defense analysts. A poll conducted in June found that confidence in the military is at a 25-year low — at 60 percent.

14. Production of key munition years ahead of schedule, Pentagon says

Iron mountain? Under construction. But construction appears to be coming along and improving (according to this report).

Excerpts:

The Pentagon’s original goal was to build 85,000 of the rounds per month by fiscal 2028. It’s currently on pace to reach 100,000 per month by FY25, LaPlante said, and at least 57,000 a month by spring 2024.

The current rate, he noted, is 28,000 per month — about double the rate from half a year ago.

This pace is welcome news for a Defense Department intent on bulking up its industrial base. The 155mm rounds have been a case study of sorts for surging production to meet an evolving wartime need, in this case Ukraine’s defense against a Russian invasion.

Production of key munition years ahead of schedule, Pentagon says

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · September 15, 2023

Correction: A previous version of this story erroneously described the number of shells fired by Ukraine. The country reportedly fired 6,000-8,000 shells per day.

WASHINGTON — Production of 155mm artillery rounds crucial to the war in Ukraine is years ahead of schedule, according to Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante.

The Pentagon’s original goal was to build 85,000 of the rounds per month by fiscal 2028. It’s currently on pace to reach 100,000 per month by FY25, LaPlante said, and at least 57,000 a month by spring 2024.

The current rate, he noted, is 28,000 per month — about double the rate from half a year ago.

This pace is welcome news for a Defense Department intent on bulking up its industrial base. The 155mm rounds have been a case study of sorts for surging production to meet an evolving wartime need, in this case Ukraine’s defense against a Russian invasion.

In his remarks at an event hosted by the Center for New American Security think tank, LaPlante showed a graph of peaks and valleys in the Pentagon’s demand for weapons over time. Starting with the Gulf War about 30 years ago, it displayed a trend: A crisis breaks out, the industrial base rushes to meet increased orders and later those orders plummet. In each instance, procurement and deliveries reached their peak at least two years after each crisis began, according to a visual shown during the event.

“If we want to not have this,” LaPlante said, referencing the boom-and-bust cycle, “then we need to change our behavior.”

Such a shift, he explained, would involve sending a more consistent demand signal to industry. The industrial base shrank after the end of the Cold War, when demand for arms fell. It can expand today, LaPlante argued, as the U.S. supports Ukraine and attempts to deter — or potentially fight — China.

Last year’s Pentagon funding bill included almost $1.5 billion to increase the Army’s production capacity for the 155mm shell. Another $18 billion will be spent over the next 15 years to grow the service’s organic industrial base.

Ukraine will likely welcome the news, as the war there is exhausting the stockpiles of the countries supporting its defense efforts. The Associated Press in April reported Ukraine is firing 6,000-8,000 shells per day, more than suppliers are churning out in that same time frame.

To sustain Ukraine’s counteroffensive, the United States in July began sending the European nation cluster munitions, controversial for the risk they pose for civilians.

Next week, LaPlante will travel to Ramstein Air Base in Germany, along with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, for a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group — a collection of countries supporting Ukraine’s defense. Among other items, LaPlante said, he will discuss how quickly U.S. allies and partners are increasing the production of the artillery round.

This spring, the European Union said, it plans to procure 1 million 155mm shells for Ukraine within a year. LaPlante mentioned the plan, sounding somewhat skeptical.

“Great news,” he said. But “where are your contracts?”

“Nothing happens until you get the contracts going,” he added.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

15. Biden's national security adviser holds two days of talks in Malta with China's foreign minister

I missed any previous reporting on this meeting.

Biden's national security adviser holds two days of talks in Malta with China's foreign minister

BY AAMER MADHANI AND JOSH BOAK

Updated 11:59 PM EDT, September 17, 2023

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · September 17, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden’s national security adviser met with China’s foreign minister over the past two days on the Mediterranean island nation of Malta in an effort that the White House said Sunday was intended to “responsibly maintain the relationship” at a time of strained ties and mutual suspicion between the rival powers.

The White House said in a statement that Jake Sullivan and Chinese envoy Wang Yi had “candid, substantive and constructive discussions” as the world’s two largest economies try “to maintain open lines of communication.” Sullivan and Wang last met in May in Vienna f or talks. The two officials spent about 12 hours together over two days in Malta.

Washington and Beijing see themselves as competitors despite an extensive trade partnership. President Joe Biden recently spoke with Chinese Premier Li Qiang while in India at the Group of 20 summit and told reporters afterward that they had talked about “stability” and “it wasn’t confrontational at all.”

Biden has worked to strengthen relations with Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam and others to counterbalance China’s influence across the Pacific Region. Yet Biden said last Sunday at a news conference in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi that those alliances are not about a “cold war” with China.

“It’s not about containing China,” he said. “It’s about having a stable base” for global economic growth.

Yet the relationship is full of competing pressures.

The Biden administration shot down a Chinese spy balloon that traversed the continental U.S. earlier this year. The Chinese government hacked the emails of Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. The U.S. government has restricted the exporting of advanced computer chips to China. And after Chinese President Xi Jinping centralized his power, the Chinese economy has not rebounded as expected after ending its pandemic lockdowns.

The White House said Sullivan and Wang discussed the relationship between the two countries, global and regional security issues, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait. They also discussed artificial intelligence, counternarcotic efforts and the status of detained U.S. citizens in China.

“The United States noted the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The two sides committed to maintain this strategic channel of communication and to pursue additional high-level engagement and consultations in key areas between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the coming months,” according to the statement.

A Chinese statement said Wang emphasized that Taiwan is the most important red line for China in its relationship with the U.S. and that the U.S. must honor its commitment not to support Taiwan independence. It said the two sides conducted candid, substantive and constructive talks on stabilizing and improving China-U.S. relations.

A senior Biden administration official who briefed reporters on the talks said the two sides did not discuss the whereabouts of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who has not been seen in public since Aug. 29

Speculation about Li’s standing comes after Qin Gang was abruptly removed in July as foreign minister, a change announced weeks after he had disappeared from public view earlier in the summer.

Biden’s ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, used a social media posting last week to take note of Li’s situation. “As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” Emanuel wrote on X, formerly Twitter.

Asked why Sullivan did not raise the issue with Wang, the administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the closed-door meeting, said the talks were focused on the bilateral relationship.

The Sullivan-Wang meeting comes as Biden and other world leaders are set to take part in the annual gathering of the U.N. General Assembly. Biden is scheduled to address the world body on Tuesday and meet with leaders of five Central Asian nations -- Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Xi has stepped up his own courting of those countries. During his own summit in May with the Central Asian leaders, Xi promised to build more railway and other trade links with the region and proposed jointly developing oil and gas sources

Sullivan told reporters last week that Biden’s meeting with those leaders should not be seen as an effort to counterbalance Chinese influence in the region.

“Look, this summit is not against any country,” Sullivan said, previewing the meeting. “It is for a positive agenda that we want to work through with these countries.”

Xi did not attend last weekend’s G20 summit in New Delhi and is not expected to be in New York for the General Assembly. Biden has said he hopes to soon meet with Xi. The two leaders have not spoken since the they met for talks last November in Indonesia, according to the White House.

Sullivan also met with Malta’s prime minister, Robert Abela. They talked about the Mediterranean region’s role in helping to provide “global peace and security,” according to a statement by the Maltese government.

___

Boak reported from Wilmington, Delaware. Associated Press writer Ken Moritsugu in Beijing contributed to this report.

AAMER MADHANI

Aamer Madhani is a White House reporter.

twittermailto

JOSH BOAK

Boak covers the White House and economic policy.

twittermailto

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · September 17, 2023

16. How two SATCOM companies are responding to Starlink’s dominance

How two SATCOM companies are responding to Starlink’s dominance

c4isrnet.com · by Courtney Albon · September 15, 2023

LONDON — With SpaceX’s Starlink constellation dominating the space-based communications market, longstanding satellite operators are positioning themselves to compete with the billionaire-owned company — particularly when it comes to military and government services.

SpaceX, with its 5,000-satellite Starlink fleet, has a hedge on the satellite communication market, but executives at U.K.-based OneWeb and Luxembourg-based Intelsat told C4ISRNET this week during the DSEI conference here they see opportunities to join the behemoth in meeting increasing connectivity demands.

Chris Moore, OneWeb’s vice president for defence and security, said in a Sept. 12 interview demand for these services means that other providers likely won’t be waiting in the wings much longer.

“We’ve got a supply problem — it’s a good problem to have,” he said. “There’s plenty of room for us and Starlink in terms of meeting the world’s connectivity problems in the short term. And of course, others are going to be coming online.”

SpaceX’s success with Starlink has also pushed its competitors to refocus and make new investments, according to Rory Welch, vice president of global government and satellite services at Intelsat.

“It’s forced a lot of the traditional providers like Intelsat to up our game,” Welch said in an interview. “And we are. We’re making big investments in our future network.”

Starlink’s preeminence in the satellite internet services market has put SpaceX in the spotlight in recent weeks following the release of a biography of the company’s billionaire founder Elon Musk. The book, written by journalist Walter Isaacson, claims that Musk secretly turned off Starlink services to prevent Ukraine from targeting Russian naval vessels in Stevastopol, the largest city in Crimea.

Musk has since stated that he didn’t turn off Starlink, but had in fact never activated the service in the region over concerns about how Russia might respond to an attack.

While SpaceX wasn’t under a military contract at that time, the U.S. Defense Department has since formalized an agreement with the company for Starlink services, though officials have not confirmed details on the specifics of that deal.

The scenario has raised concerns among military leaders that commercial companies like SpaceX could refuse services in a time of conflict and underlines the pitfalls of relying on a single commercial provider for such a vital capability. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said this week at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber conference in National Harbor, Md., that without assurances that a commercial company will provide capabilities when needed, “they’re not something we can rely on in wartime.”

Global coverage

For OneWeb and Intelsat, the path toward competing with industry giant SpaceX has included a certain degree of rebuilding. Both companies declared bankruptcy in 2020 and underwent a financial restructuring.

Since emerging from bankruptcy, OneWeb has launched hundreds of satellites to low Earth orbit — about 1,200 miles (2,000 km) above the planet’s surface. That includes its latest batch in May, which brought its constellation to 634 spacecraft and helped it achieve global coverage in orbit. By early next year, it expects to have fully rolled out its ground infrastructure, which will close the loop for full global coverage.

During DSEI, OneWeb announced that Britain’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship, Argus, had connected to its LEO constellation — marking the first time a military vessel deployed its SATCOM services. It also revealed the release of a portable, lightweight terminal that will bring broadband connectivity to users in remote areas. The equipment, which can fold into a large backpack, is ideal for military operators and rescue crews working in hard-to-reach areas with difficult terrain.

OneWeb’s fleet is much smaller than Starlink’s, but Moore said the company has a narrower customer base that includes high-end industries like telecommunications and energy as well as military and other government agencies. While it may compete with Starlink in those areas, it’s less focused on the mass consumer market.

The company’s impending merger with French SATCOM provider Eutelsat — which is set to close at the end of this month — will also allow it expand its coverage to new orbits, offering future customers a more diverse capability.

Eutelsat operates a fleet of satellites in geostationary orbit, about 22,000 miles (35,000 km) above Earth. While LEO constellations like Starlink can provide a more responsive service to a broad set of consumers, GEO-based systems offer more power and capacity to support higher-end missions, such as machine-to-machine teaming for uncrewed military aircraft.

Having that combination, Moore said, differentiates the company.

OneWeb is also in the process of designing its next generation of LEO satellites, which could be operating as soon as 2025. The spacecraft will replace older systems in the constellation, bring more capacity and will be upgradeable through software modifications. The second-generation, or Gen 2, satellites will also be built with both military and commercial requirements in mind, Moore said.

“Where Gen 1 was very much a commercial platform and a commercial architecture with some military applications on top, we’re designing Gen2 to be dual-use from the outset,” he said. “We’re in lots of conversations with a few governments about what that looks like.”

Beyond low Earth orbit

Intelsat has also been working to bolster its position in the SATCOM market. A central feature of that work was establishing its global government and satellite services business in January, which Welch leads.

The new business unit is focused on growing the company’s work with international allies. That includes not only the traditional Five Eyes partners, but other countries in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and the Asia-Pacific region who worry about security threats from Russia or China.

“When they spend more on defense, typically there’s a drag along with them spending more on space,” Welch said. “And these are countries that tend to operate in a more austere environment with less infrastructure or where they’re doing more deployments outside of their individual countries, a lot more need for beyond-line-of-sight communications.”

Along with offering Intelsat’s core SATCOM services, the global business unit provides assistance to customers as they design, build, launch and operate their satellites.

The company is also looking to expand its global, GEO-based satellite network to include operations in medium Earth orbit, between GEO and LEO. Welch said Intelsat considered whether to develop its own LEO constellation but determined that MEO “made better sense” from a cost and complexity standpoint. The company is in the early stages of designing those satellites.

Intelsat is establishing new partnerships with LEO operators and is also producing a new line of software-defined GEO satellites that can reroute traffic and adjust beams to ensure full coverage across orbits.

“We’re really focused on the multi-layer elements of our network because we really think that it’s not just one — it’s not just LEO or GEO or MEO,” Welch said. “We’re going to compete with Starlink and other LEO operators because we’re a commercial company, but I think it’s more about what we can do as a multi-orbit constellation.”

About Courtney Albon

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.

17. Readers react to op-ed on honoring Vietnam War’s most secret warriors

As I have said, MACV-SOG is one of the best special operations units ever created.

Readers react to op-ed on honoring Vietnam War’s most secret warriors

militarytimes.com · by Military Times staff · September 17, 2023

Many readers responded to the opinion piece “The time is right to honor the Vietnam War’s most secret warriors” by retired Army Col. Paris D. Davis, a Medal of Honor recipient, calling for a Congressional Gold Medal to be awarded to the U.S Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group, or MACV-SOG. Here’s a selection of your comments.

As a Huey pilot who flew in support of those teams in I Corps, across the borders of Laos and North Vietnam, I fully endorse any recognition that can be sent their way. Those MACV-SOG CCN (Command and Control North) guys did amazing things, as did the teams in CCS (Command and Control South) and CCC (Command and Control Central).

We delivered them into harm’s way and we pulled them out, often under extreme conditions. The insertions were sometimes followed by almost immediate extraction because our Intel had not warned ... of the enemy locations (or the enemy had been warned by internal spies).

The motto of Army aviation is Above the Best. Those guys are The Best. We would do anything and everything to help the teams. They should never be forgotten.

Retired Chief Warrant Officer 4 Ken Fritz, Sacramento, California

Bravo to Col. Davis for speaking out and for his support of those who served in MACV-SOG. My husband is one of those soldiers, a two-tour Air Commando who was TDY to CCN Da Nang, and who now has a Parkinson’s diagnosis by VA neurology, but has been denied his claim due to missing records in his Official Military Personnel Files, or OMPF. I have appealed his claim to the VA Board of Appeals, where it has remained in remand and stagnated since June.

No one we have encountered in the VA system knows anything about this highly classified, covert unit, including the judge who heard my husband’s testimony. I have asked for assistance from two Congressmen, a Senator, and President Joe Biden’s office. They all needed to be educated too, yet again, no records.

I have sought clarification from the AF FOIA office, Defense Accounting, USSOCOM, and the AF Board of Corrections. No one can explain how a DD-214 with a VSM and OS Bars isn’t proof he was in Vietnam. I can’t get records that are possibly still classified, including Walter Reed treatment records, where he was taken after sustaining injuries from a grenade during his last mission. I even reached out to John Stryker Meyer, who encouraged me to keep pursuing it.

Col. Davis is correct when he says, “There’s also work to be done for living SOG members. . .”

Honor all those who served in this special forces operation, and release records for those who are still living so they can be recognized for their honorable service and get the benefits they earned by serving our country. As Col. Davis concluded in his article: “We cannot leave them (SOG) behind in our nation’s history.”

I will continue my fight to honor my husband’s sacrifice and service.

Karen Mihalic, wife of Vietnam veteran, Beaver, PA (who shared her husband’s DD-214 with Military Times)

I served on the Studies and Observations Group, or SOG, staff from June 1967 thru May 1969. Here are two updates to Col. Davis’ opinion piece.

SOG’s Chain of Command was directly to and from the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, or SACSA. SACSA reported to the Undersecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both were aware of SOG’s activities. So was the National Security Council.

Also read in on our operations: the overall U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, aka MACV, as well as Pacific Command, and their service components in the area. Regional State Department embassies, consulates and their associated U.S. governmental entities may also have been addressees on message traffic, based upon their need to know.

SOG’s tactical area of responsibility, or TAOR, was the former Indochina (then North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea.

SOG’s mission encompassed three main tasks: to monitor and disrupt traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran from North Vietnam thru Laos and Cambodia to South Vietnam to conduct operations supporting the North Vietnamese government in exile, code named The Sacred Sword of the Patriots League; and to track U.S. military personnel who were missing in action or captured, with intent to return them to U.S. control.

SOG resources included assigned special forces personnel and helicopters from the services, several purchased Norwegian high speed patrol boats, a squadron of MC-130 aircraft, and an RC-121 equipped with a FM broadcasting station to play Radio Free Hanoi programs.

Before the MC-130s, unmarked and foreign-crewed C-123s dropped propaganda and single station FM receivers throughout the old Indochina.

Upon their arrival, the MC-130 dropped the materials and FM receivers much closer to Hanoi. In a briefing prior to being a DO, or director of operations, I learned that the Norwegian highspeed patrol boats were instrumental in the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

SOG had two weekly mandatory messages that had to be sent to the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency aka the SACSA. One told of our plans for the next week and the second reported on last week’s activities. However, there was almost continuous contact with SACSA and other Southeast Asia command centers concerning our and enemy activities. In State Department circles, SOG was also known by the code phrase “ghost of White Star.”

I was SOG’s DO 29/30 January 1968 and the VC/NVA Tet Offensive was no surprise. Here is my recollection.

Army Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, then a colonel, was the Commander of the Studies and Observations Group and he had extraordinary insight into our enemy, the North Vietnamese, and the Viet Cong. As an example, as his DO the evening prior the enemy’s January 1968 Tet Offensive, he gave me the following instructions: “You will perform the normal functions as SOG duty officer. Army Maj. Army Smith will be responsible for the defense of the SOG headquarters compound. If headquarters is breached destroy everything to maintain our integrity.”

Next, he wanted to attach two previous messages, to go along with the one he’d dictate — in which he’d accurately predicted when the North Vietnamese attack would begin. The first was dated July 1967, and stated that the enemy will launch a general offensive during Tet 1968. The second, dated November 1967, stated a general offensive will start the first week of Tet 1968.

He then dictated the main message: “The Tet offensive will begin at 1:30 tomorrow morning.”

After dispatching the alert message, the command post returned to normal activities. At about 1:25 the next morning Col. Johnson, SOG director of operations, called in requesting if we had any reports of increased enemy activity and I replied, no. Col. Johnson then said, “It looks like the ‘Old Man’ missed it.”

At that very moment, our embassy was hit, and fire fights began all over the Saigon area.

At about 2:00a.m., Col. Singlaub appeared and wanted to know where his staff was. As they had not assembled, in very direct terms he said, “I came in on the VC infiltration route, so call them and tell them to get in here, and in the meantime, I’m going to see Gen. Westmoreland,” aka Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then the head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Upon Col. Singlaub’s return from Gen. Westmoreland’s headquarters, his SOG staff was assembled. He opened the meeting by saying in general what he told Gen. Westmoreland: “The objective of this offensive for the North Vietnamese is for the South Vietnamese and U.S. Military to eliminate the Viet-Cong so the NVA can take command over this war. The enemy’s base camps are empty and undefended, so we need to occupy them and destroy their support infrastructure to deny the North Vietnamese their use.

“We need a worldwide request for all available military forces be sent here to secure a line from the South China Sea along the demarcation line extended across Laos to the Mekong River to block North Vietnam from resupplying their forces in South Vietnam while concurrently south of our defensive line destroying all logistics stores along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia.

“Upon holding that line, declare we’ve accomplished our mission and withdraw our forces from South Vietnam.”

If Col. Singlaub’s Post ‘68 Tet concept for disengagement from South Vietnam had been accepted, the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia would have ended during the fall of 1968.

Retired Air Force Col. David McNabb, Tampa, Florida

18. Six reasons the Pentagon should retire ‘deterrence by denial’

Discuss amongst yourselves.

The six:

It is vague. 

It is aimed at the wrong audience.

It distorts U.S. force design.

It may not be feasible against new forms of aggression.

It undermines U.S. credibility.

It imposes disproportionate costs on the U.S. military. 

​ Conclusion;

The first step toward change is admitting there is a problem. The 2022 National Defense Strategy started down this path by de-emphasizing denial. But easy ideas are hard to abandon. Pentagon leaders need to do the hard work to describe and implement approaches that will create uncertainty and costs for potential aggressors like China while conflict can still be averted.

Six reasons the Pentagon should retire ‘deterrence by denial’

The recent decade has exposed the concept’s weaknesses.

By BRYAN CLARK and DAN PATT

• SEPTEMBER 17, 2023 08:00 AM ET
• 
  
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defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

As the United States begins another presidential campaign season and conditions worsen in China, Russia, and Iran, this is a good time to step back and reconsider some of the conventional wisdom undergirding U.S. defense policy. Perhaps most flawed and underexamined is the concept of deterrence by denial.

The idea, which gained favor after the Cold War, still enjoys the loud support of defense officials, think-tank studies, and government strategies. But events of the past decade suggest their faith is misplaced. Russia was not deterred by risks of denial or punishment before invading Ukraine; China continues to reshape the security environment of the South and East China Seas through largely uncontested “gray-zone” activities; and the Pentagon’s own wargames suggest completely denying an invasion of Taiwan is likely infeasible.

Even the Defense Department’s own recent behavior underscores the growing insolvency of deterrence by denial. A flurry of diplomatic successes in the last two years strengthened alliances and improved U.S. defense posture in Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam. At the same time, the proposed U.S. defense budget reduced spending in real terms, with each of the U.S. military services accepting troop cuts to pay for future high-tech weaponry. Far from a “ring of steel” around allies like Taiwan, these developments suggest the DOD is pursuing a more sophisticated strategy to convince China’s leaders that aggression is risky and could cost more than it gains.

Here are six reasons why deterrence by denial no longer works as an organizing construct for U.S. strategy:

It is vague. On its face, “denial” implies U.S. and allied forces will stop or reverse the efforts of aggressors, as they did against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. That may not be possible if, for example, China—a nation of 1.4 billion with the world’s largest navy, coast guard, shipping fleet, and rocket force—invades Taiwan, a nation of 24 million with a modest military. Confronted with the concept’s infeasibility, advocates often argue that “denial” means creating uncertainty for the aggressor, which is opposite of the certainty a denial strategy should convey. And uncertainty is likely better achieved by making the U.S. military more creative and resilient rather than dramatically and unaffordably expanding its capacity for predictable strike operations.

It is aimed at the wrong audience. If its goal is actually to shake the potential aggressor’s confidence and reshape its risk calculus, the DoD should pursue capabilities, tactics, and posture that maximize uncertainty based on assessments from the U.S. intelligence community about opponents’ concerns. However, in practice DoD budgets are designed to convince U.S. defense officials and Congress that U.S. and allied forces could deny aggression because that is easier to explain.

It distorts U.S. force design. Rendering strategy into an operational analysis of what forces are needed to stop an act of aggression is satisfying and helps justify defense programs. However, a force able to sink 350 ships in 72 hours may only be a larger version of the force adversaries like China are already planning against and the resulting increase in uncertainty will be small. Moreover, building the capacity to meet denial metrics is likely to crowd out capabilities to address other paths aggression could take, such as protracted blockades, cyber and information campaigns, or incremental attacks by paramilitaries.

It may not be feasible against new forms of aggression. A strategy of denial depends on something to deny. The rising efficacy of gray-zone operations and potency of cyber and information warfare suggests different approaches are needed to deter an opponent willing to take a slower or more circuitous path to its goals. In China’s case, this will likely require the U.S. military to engage in gray-zone confrontations and take actions that influence leaders in Beijing to steer away from escalation.

It undermines U.S. credibility. Denial demands the infliction of rapid, massive losses that could lead to catastrophic escalation against a nuclear-armed opponent. Based on the U.S. government’s reticence to provoke Russia through more robust support to Ukraine, U.S. leaders could be expected to avoid implementing a denial campaign, which weakens deterrence.

It imposes disproportionate costs on the U.S. military. Sustaining the overseas posture needed for short-notice strikes against hundreds of ships or thousands of vehicles is expensive and challenging for a military already at the breaking point. Exacerbating this problem, it is cheaper for an opponent like China to field targets than it is for the current U.S. military to field effective shots on target.

The time has come to retire deterrence by denial. It had a good run when the U.S. was dominant, but denial no longer means what it says and drives U.S. defense plans and investments toward greater predictability rather than creating uncertainty for opponents. In denial’s place, DoD leaders should more fully embrace the approach implied by their 2022 National Defense Strategy. Its lines of effort for Integrated Deterrence, Campaigning, and Building Enduring Advantages are focused more on targeting adversaries’ vulnerabilities and undermining their confidence than perpetuating denial as a basis for defense planning.

The Pentagon’s recent successes in the Indo-Pacific reflect Integrated Deterrence in action. But episodic victories like these will not by themselves keep adversaries off-balance and unwilling to act. They should be complemented by a long-term campaign, guided by rapidly improving information technologies, that shows how constantly-evolving U.S. and allied capabilities could defeat aggressors’ strategies and enable defenders to prolong a fight like Ukraine is doing to Russia. A recent Hudson Institute report outlined this approach and the technologies and concepts that could bring it to life.

The first step toward change is admitting there is a problem. The 2022 National Defense Strategy started down this path by de-emphasizing denial. But easy ideas are hard to abandon. Pentagon leaders need to do the hard work to describe and implement approaches that will create uncertainty and costs for potential aggressors like China while conflict can still be averted.

Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and Director of the Hudson Center for Defense Concepts and Technology. Dan Patt is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute.

defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

19. Because I was a woman who served, I was stereotyped by a stranger

Because I was a woman who served, I was stereotyped by a stranger

militarytimes.com · by Noelle Wiehe, The War Horse · September 15, 2023

Editor’s note: This commentary was first published in The War Horse, an award-winning nonprofit news organization educating the public on military service. Subscribe to their newsletter.

My calendar stood wide open that Saturday as I drove around listening to the local country radio station. So when I heard an advertisement for a resource fair for veterans at my favorite local brewery — Service Brewing Company — I figured I’d give it a shot.

I served four years in the Operational Camouflage Pattern uniform and bun hair. I liked finding ways to improve my life after leaving active duty, and the fair sounded like a good opportunity, even though I already had a job.

After I arrived, I got one of the owner’s small-batch sour beers and wandered from booth to booth, asking each representative what they had to offer. I was met with the same question at every table: “Are you a veteran?”

I wondered whether everyone got the same question. Was I not veteran enough? Oh, well, I thought, and nodded my head and smiled.

Eventually, I stopped at a financial company’s table. A man and a woman sat on bar stools with pamphlets in front of them. I asked my usual: “What’s going on here?”

I listened to their spiel and left with a business card and a chance to win a gift card. I also had a newfound desire to get my finances in order and possibly even invest, especially when they told me their services were free to veterans.

A few days later, I got a text message that I’d won a gift card to Amazon. I just needed to meet the woman from the financial company somewhere downtown.

I headed to the tavern where we’d agreed to meet, excited to learn about the financial freedom the company could help me achieve. We made small talk at a booth, and then I asked what her company had to offer. In turn, she asked me what I did in the military.

“Journalism,” I told her. “I served as a public affairs specialist. Journalism was always the plan.”

I wasn’t prepared for what she asked me next, or the turn the conversation was about to take.

“Were you ever sexually assaulted in the military?” she asked me.

Stop. Replay that line.

Where am I? I thought. I felt like I paused forever, my eyes darting around the table to the floor, to the ceiling, to my lap, to her eyes. My brain turned over a series of questions. Who is this woman again? What am I doing here? What is she meeting me for? What gave her this idea?

A million things ran through my head all at once. I thought maybe she had read too many headlines recently and generalized. I thought about my suicide watch for the friend I made in advanced individual training and wondered what she would say if she’d been cornered like this. I thought about the fact that I knew this woman had not served. I reminded myself we were in a tavern so I could collect my winning gift card and talk about financial freedom.

My mind flooded with more questions: Is this woman a lawyer? Is there an angle with money and sexual harassment?

Didn’t matter.

It felt like forever passed before I finally answered her, although it was probably only a second or two.

“No,” I told her.

Time restarted. The world went on spinning. Sort of.

I couldn’t make eye contact with her.

What do I say now?

I wasn’t hiding something. I’d had it fairly easy in the military. No horror stories, except for poor leadership — strictly in the business sense. I hadn’t lived on base and I hadn’t experienced anything close to sexual assault. Had I insinuated? Given off a vibe? No way I could have. I don’t lie. I don’t tell people something happened in my career that didn’t.

Shit, she’s still trying to meet my eyes.

“I mean, I know people who have been,” I fumbled, as if I needed to justify myself. As if I needed to validate her question while knowing full well I didn’t own this trauma.

Surely she didn’t have this same conversation among coworkers. Or those who hadn’t worn the uniform.

My answer seemed to suffice. She opened her mouth and filled the silence that had begun to make me uncomfortable.

She apologized.

Perhaps my reaction disconnected me enough from the situation for her to change the topic. I suddenly welled with empathy for anyone who had reason to say yes. Not just a woman in the military. Any woman.

Chazz Gilbert, left, and Noelle Wiehe reunite at the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, after completing advanced individual training at the U.S. Army’s Defense Information School at Fort Meade, Maryland. (Photo courtesy of Chazz Gilbert)

There is a time and a place for a question like this. For a conversation about this. There are those that women ought to be able to trust, to open up to about their trauma. But this wasn’t it. Not even close.

I knew women who would cry at this moment. How could anyone ask such a personal question in the middle of a conversation about finance? I wanted to leave. But then she’d probably think I had lied. That I had been sexually assaulted.

What would it matter to her? WHY WAS SHE ASKING?! I gathered myself, tried to reroute the conversation. But I’m writing about it because the truth is it bugged me.

I left that meeting with a $25 Amazon gift card. But I was so perturbed by her insensitivity about such a sensitive topic that I knew my finances could wait.

Still, I met her later the next week. But I wasn’t comfortable. Did she assume all women in the military were victims of sexual assault? What an awful assumption — that just because I served I must be a victim. And didn’t that take away from the women who had experienced this kind of life-altering trauma?

I knew I couldn’t work with her.

The conversation prompted a few rants with close friends who found the interaction equally uncomfortable. It also prompted a lot of personal reflection.

Veterans represent less than 10% of the adult population in the U.S. Eight-nine percent are men. And because I was a woman who served, I was stigmatized, stereotyped by a stranger. And even though I knew I was a minority — as an American service member and a woman — I was stunned. I’d attended a resource fair where the first question I got was whether or not I’d served. And then one of those vendors had assumed that I’d had the same experience as women at the center of some of the worst news stories I’d ever heard.

Noelle Wiehe always knew she wanted a career in journalism. She spent four years in the military as a public affairs specialist. (Photo courtesy of Noelle Wiehe)

It wasn’t fair. None of it. I guess maybe you don’t know how generalizing someone can hurt so much until it’s happened to you.

I know this much. I would never ask someone such a personal question. And I don’t think anyone ought to. Unless they can help, and unless it’s a safe setting—but even then I’m not so sure.

Could this woman have helped? Didn’t matter. I wasn’t the person who needed help. But what if I was? My heart breaks for the person who does need help. Is this why they don’t speak up?

I’ve taken a lesson from this. Don’t ever assume. Don’t think you know something about someone because they served in the military.

Would you ask someone who served in Iraq or Afghanistan if they have post-traumatic stress disorder? You shouldn’t.

Every person in this world is fighting a battle of their own. A private battle. Military veterans face unique battles, no doubt. But we aren’t all fighting the same battles, and it’s not safe or kind to assume we are.

Statistics exist for a reason. But we don’t all have the same story. There is something I believe we all have in common, though. Our service helped protect the freedoms all of us enjoy. That should include the freedom from judgment by those who know nothing about us.

Noelle Wiehe is an award-winning journalist from Cincinnati, Ohio. She worked as a civilian journalist covering several Army units, including the U.S. Army’s Cadet Command and the 75th Ranger Regiment. She joined the military as a public affairs specialist and was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. She deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve to Kuwait. As a Military Veterans in Journalism fellow, she covered every branch of the military as well as the first responder community at Coffee or Die Magazine. She now resides in Lafayette, Louisiana, and serves as a media relations specialist for the military’s healthcare system.

20. A veteran started a gun shop. When a struggling soldier asked him to store his firearms – he started saving lives.

Excerpts:

Morse said after two combat tours in Iraq, serving in the National Guard, and then working as a military contractor in Iraq for four years, essentially "running from my problems," he fell into a depression returning home to Louisiana. Like many other soldiers, he struggled upon entering a society that often doesn't understand military that served in combat. He said he survived due to the support of his wife, who is his high-school sweetheart, and his two children.

He said, "I know what it's like to have that dark place. I know what it's like to have that weight on your shoulders where you feel like you know what, I suck. You know, I failed."

Since that first time, Morse says he's stored about 100 firearms, if not more, for veterans who are thinking of hurting themselves or others, and installed outside storage lockers in his shop.

"And it's been a blessing," he said. "It's been a big blessing to help people."

A veteran started a gun shop. When a struggling soldier asked him to store his firearms – he started saving lives.

CBS News · by Cara Tabachnick

When Caleb Morse got a call from his Army buddy he served with in Iraq announcing he was in Louisiana, he had a feeling something was wrong.

He couldn't understand why his buddy, who lived in Colorado Springs, had suddenly shown up in the South. Morse says he told him, "Man, like, I love having you here. And my wife and kids love seeing you and everything else. And you're great to be around, but you would never move to Louisiana."

Caleb Morse joined the 2nd Infantry Division Special Troops Battalion in 2003. He served two tours in Iraq. courtesy Caleb Morse

A few days later his friend showed up at Rustic Renegade, a gun shop and shooting range that Morse, 39, had opened in Lafayette, Louisiana, about a year earlier in 2018 after leaving the military where he served in the combat unit 2nd Infantry Division Special Troops Battalion. His friend arrived with his car and his dog. He opened the trunk and started to unload his car, Morse recalled. He started to bring all these guns inside the shop, Morse said, "And I'm like, brother, what are you doing?"

Morse knew from his time in the military that often when people start giving away their things they can be considering suicide.

He knew his friend was in a bad spot so Morse asked him to sit, but "I grabbed two cups of coffee and when I came back he was gone."

He didn't answer Morse's calls — "he had left cold, he didn't answer his phone" — but Morse still had his firearms. He decided to hold them at Rustic Renegade in case his friend ever came back.

Six months passed. Finally, his friend called and explained he had been in a bad spot and wondered where his guns were. Morse said he told him, "They're your guns, man. They're yours, you may want them back. And whenever you're ready, they're here for you."

More than half of all gun-related deaths in the United States are suicides, according to the Centers for Disease Control. In 2022, the CDC reported that 26,993 people died by firearm suicide. Deaths by gun suicide are at an all-time high and have steadily increased, nearly uninterrupted, since 2006 according to researchers at John Hopkins School of Public Health.

In the veteran population the problem is acute; in its 2022 National Veteran Suicide Prevention Report, the Department of Veterans Affairs found that the suicide rate in 2020 was 57.3 % greater for veterans.

Guns are more commonly involved among veteran suicides, at 71%, than the rest of the population, at 50.3%, according to the CDC.

Somehow, another veteran a short time later came into Morse's shop and told Morse he, too, was in a bad spot. The veteran asked Morse to hold his guns at Rustic Renegade. Morse decided to set up a system that logged the guns into the store's books and gave the veteran a receipt and told him to pick up his firearms when he felt better. Morse said he thought nothing of it. Other veterans dropped off guns "about a dozen times," in just over a year he said, when he got a call from Gala True.

True, an associate professor at Louisiana State University School of Medicine who researches community-engaged efforts to prevent veteran suicides, met Morse in 2021. She was coordinating with firearms retailers interested in providing options for those in crisis who wanted to store firearms outside their homes.

The Armory Project was launched in Louisiana in 2021 with three retailers interested in providing storage. There are now 11 retailers that offer storage according to the map built by the network. courtesy The Armory Project

"We try to create time and distance between a person having a mental health crisis and a loaded firearm," True said. The Armory Project was launched in Louisiana in 2021 with three retailers interested in providing storage. Through a Veterans Administration grant, True and her team provided infrastructure and resources to the firearms retailers to build networks and partnerships.

Louisiana joined nine other states including Colorado, New Jersey, Mississippi, Maryland and Washington in the growing number of communities that have developed temporary storage off-site for firearms. In 2018, Colorado built its first statewide map showing storage or places considering storage. Other states have followed by building detailed online maps that show retailers that can temporarily hold firearms. The Biden Administration has supported off-site storage for suicide prevention.

Suicide prevention experts know people in crisis who don't have easy access to a gun will not likely find another way to kill themselves. Suicide prevention expert Mike Anestis, Executive director of the New Jersey Gun Violence Research Center and a professor at Rutgers University, said no other methods are as "close to as lethal as firearms for a suicide death." Around 90 to 95% of suicide attempts with a firearm will result in death while less than 5% of all other attempts will result in death, he said.

In a country that already has an estimated 400 million guns in circulation the solution just can't be about banning firearms or stopping people from buying them, said Anestis.

Anestis said outside storage is a public health approach similar to approaches with issues like drunk driving is to "take the keys" – and limit access.

"We've learned the best way to prevent the outcome that you're trying to avoid, is to limit the individual's access to the method that can cause that outcome," said Anestis.

Gun owners have to be able to make decisions that allow them to retain control over their autonomy, as well as fits their values, said Anestis. Outside storage can be a legal — and truly effective — way to prevent injury and death, he said. Temporary storage also serves as a solution for firearm owners who might not want a gun in their home for various reasons, such as a grandchild visiting or if a teen or other family member inside the home is struggling.

True and Morse both say for these programs to succeed, gun shops need to be able to participate – so gun owners can feel they have a safe place to store their firearms. Gun owners generally can't just hand over their firearms to anybody they want. Federal law doesn't prohibit people from storing guns for each other on a personal basis, but each state has various regulations saying who can hold onto a gun and who is liable.

Some states, such as Washington and Vermont, allow immediate or extended family members to hold onto guns if a family member is in crisis. But other states, such as New York or Massachusetts, prohibit the transfer of any firearms. And since states have such a patchwork of laws, researchers – and firearms shops – feel those shops can be the best repository for outside storage. But the businesses need to be protected, said True. She said one of the main questions firearm shop owners asked when the Armory Project launched was "If a person goes on to harm themselves, can the firearm retailer be sued and lose their business?"

Morse said when he first decided to start his program, he contacted a lawyer, who said, "No, no, you're opening yourself to a ton of liability. What if you give them their firearm back and they kill themselves?"

Caleb Morse, 39, opened Rustic Reneagade, a gun shop in Lafayette, Louisiana after leaving the military. A veteran asked him to store his firearms at his shop in 2019 and Morse said he's stored about 100 guns since then. He went to the state capitol with his wife to testify about safe storage. Courtesy Caleb Morse

Morse said he was going to store the guns anyway. He answered the lawyer: "I just want to give them a pause —that moment in time where they say, 'Look, someone cares, maybe life isn't so bad.'"

In Louisiana, the coalition worked to pass legislation that said gun shop owners wouldn't be liable. The legislation passed "easily" with "very little concern," said True. Coalitions in Texas and Oregon are trying to pass similar laws, she said.

In July 2023 the ATF issued an open letter to FFL and gun shops clarifying how to legally and safely store firearms for individuals.

One option is providing gun storage lockers at the gun shop that an individual can open and put their firearms inside. "In this situation, an FFL does not 'receive' or 'acquire' the firearm into its inventory, nor does the FFL assume control of the individual's firearm," the letter said, which can reduce liability for gun shops that want to provide outside storage for others.

Morse said after two combat tours in Iraq, serving in the National Guard, and then working as a military contractor in Iraq for four years, essentially "running from my problems," he fell into a depression returning home to Louisiana. Like many other soldiers, he struggled upon entering a society that often doesn't understand military that served in combat. He said he survived due to the support of his wife, who is his high-school sweetheart, and his two children.

He said, "I know what it's like to have that dark place. I know what it's like to have that weight on your shoulders where you feel like you know what, I suck. You know, I failed."

Since that first time, Morse says he's stored about 100 firearms, if not more, for veterans who are thinking of hurting themselves or others, and installed outside storage lockers in his shop.

"And it's been a blessing," he said. "It's been a big blessing to help people."

Cara Tabachnick is a news editor for CBSNews.com. Contact her at cara.tabachnick@cbsinteractive.com

CBS News · by Cara Tabachnick

21. The paranoia behind China's spy war

​Just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not out to get you.

Excerpts:

Whatever the truth of these specific salacious cases, it is absolutely clear that Xi is quite convinced that the West and its agents are hell-bent on infiltrating China and subverting Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. Because Western countries “have always regarded China’s development and growth as a threat to Western values and institutions”, he thundered at an assembly of top party leaders in 2016, these countries “have not for a moment ceased their ideological infiltration of China”.

In this, he was merely echoing a long series of similar declarations, as in 2013, when he warned that said “hostile forces” were “doing their utmost to propagate so-called ‘universal values’” with an aim to “vie with us [on] the battlefields of people’s hearts”, split up China “overtly and covertly”, and ultimately “overthrow our socialist system”. For Xi, China is engaged in an “extraordinarily fierce” global ideological struggle with Western liberalism that, “although invisible, [is] a matter of life and death”.

Western leaders don’t necessarily disagree. President Joe Biden regularly describes the United States as engaged in a global “battle between democracy and autocracy”. Former President Donald Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, went so far as to insist while in office that the United States must “engage and empower the Chinese people” to enact regime change, because, he asserted, “if the free world doesn’t change Communist China, Communist China will change us”. British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, for his part, this week vowed not only to improve security but to “defend our democracy” — implying that undermining it must be Beijing’s actual target, rather than mundane intelligence gathering.

Both China and the West, therefore, not only suspect infiltration by the agents of their foreign competitors, but demonstrably view this as part of a much wider, more threatening, and more enduring struggle between rival systems. The hard truth, then, is that, in a very real sense, we’ve all been thrust back into an era much akin to the Cold War, when constant spying and attempted subversion were simply geopolitical facts of life. It may be best for leaders in Westminster, and indeed in capitals around the world, to come to terms with this not-so-unprecedented reality, and to move forward with open eyes: prepared, serious, and without naivety about what’s happening — but also without any undue shock and outrage. Surely the nation of James Bond, at least, can manage to carry on with good cheer.

The paranoia behind China's spy war

Espionage is a fact of geopolitical life

BY NATHAN LEVINE

Nathan Levine is Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

unherd.com · by Nathan Levine · September 15, 2023

The revelation that a parliamentary researcher was arrested in March on suspicion of being a Chinese spy has sent Westminster “reeling” and left the British political establishment in “shock”. Or that, at least, is the impression offered by London’s news media, which has covered the scandal with barely contained excitement.

That China’s agents would dare to infiltrate the heart of the British government has been widely portrayed as an unprecedented development. “This is a major escalation by China,” one anonymous senior Whitehall source told The Times, which broke the news, adding that: “We have never seen anything like this before.” It is hard to know whether such sentiments are genuine or exaggerated for effect. Either way, they seem rather overwrought.

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China has been engaged in extensive espionage operations in Britain, and around the world, for decades. As a 2021 report by the Intelligence and Security Committee stated accurately: “China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world.” Moreover, as the report also noted, China employs a “whole-of-state” approach to espionage, co-opting a range of state and non-state actors, as well as ordinary citizens at home and abroad, to help carry out this work. Chinese students studying abroad, for example, may sometimes be pressured by the government into reporting information back to Beijing — though far more often about the activities of their fellow ethnic Chinese students than state secrets.

It is true that, in recent years, a rising China has escalated its overseas intelligence operations. Since he came to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has made what he calls “comprehensive national security” the central priority for China’s party-state. He has handed China’s premier foreign intelligence service, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), along with its military equivalents in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), greater authority and more resources both old and new (such as cyber) to more assertively collect intelligence, protect Chinese interests and project Chinese influence worldwide. The result has been the uncovering of a litany of hacks, thefts and scandals. Of these, the Chinese spy balloon that traversed the United States in February may have been the most high-profile, but was among the least successful and consequential (as compared with, say, MSS’s massive 2015 breach of US government security clearance records).

But this is simply what nation-states, and especially the world’s major powers, do. Though perhaps distasteful, it should hardly be a shock. In fact, Britain should be particularly familiar with the business, given its history as an epicentre of the Cold War spy game. Those who walk the corridors of power in Westminster and think the present situation is unprecedented had best read up on the Cambridge Five.

Of course, Britain and its allies in the Western world are also spying on China — as we taxpaying citizens might reasonably hope they would be, if China really is the security “challenge” our governments say it is. In July, CIA Director Bill Burns did not shy away from saying publicly that the agency had “made progress” in rebuilding and expanding its spy network in China, years after Chinese counter-intelligence managed to identify and kill nearly all of the CIA’s agents operating in the country, following a 2010 intelligence breach (potentially the work of either a mole or cracked encryption).

There is some evidence that our spies have been wildly successful of late — at living rent-free in Xi’s head, anyway. Because whatever the furore in London, it pales in comparison with the escalating level of paranoia about hidden hands and foreign forces that has emerged in Beijing in recent years. Not only is China in the middle of a sweeping ongoing counter-espionage campaign — with the MSS currently calling on the public to engage in a “whole of society mobilisation” to hunt down spies and traitors, and triumphantly highlighting arrests on its new social media account — but more serious, if mysterious, goings-on higher up hint that Xi’s concerns about the loyalty of his people could be playing havoc within the Chinese system.

The breaking news on Thursday night was that China’s defence minister, Li Shangfu, had been arrested and placed under investigation. The source for this information was, of course, US intelligence. But the fact had already been rumoured in China, as he had not been seen in public in weeks. Li’s fate seems linked to that of two top generals of the PLA Rocket Force (which oversees China’s nuclear weapons) who were hauled away a few months ago. The Force’s deputy commander, meanwhile, allegedly committed suicide. China’s short-lived foreign minister, Qin Gang, also suddenly disappeared and was replaced without explanation this summer.

There is no evidence, to be clear, that any of these officials were engaged in or suspected of espionage. The more likely explanation is old-fashioned corruption. The persistent rumour in China is that the PLA Rocket Force generals had taken money Xi handed them to expand China’s nuclear arsenal and pilfered it instead. Li, who previously ran the PLA’s equipment procurement department, may have been involved. But it seems plausible that the current atmosphere of extreme suspicion regarding foreign infiltration and subversion contributed to these officials’ exposure and removal, with Xi now no longer trusting the reliability of anyone, especially in his national security apparatus. Corruption itself can, after all, open the door to foreign intelligence services willing to wield blackmail or simply offer additional cash.

This distrust is particularly clear in Qin’s case. The ex-foreign minister disappeared after a Phoenix TV reporter strongly hinted that he’d had an extramarital affair (and fathered a secret child) with her while they were both previously stationed in Washington, DC. Since many Chinese officials have mistresses without facing any repercussions, and because Qin was previously considered personally favoured by Xi, some suspect that it was the fact that he’d engaged in his covert indiscretions only a few miles from Langley that was of greater concern. Naturally, the online rumour in China is that the TV reporter, Fu Xiaotian (who has also disappeared), was in fact herself an MSS agent deployed to Washington undercover.

Whatever the truth of these specific salacious cases, it is absolutely clear that Xi is quite convinced that the West and its agents are hell-bent on infiltrating China and subverting Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. Because Western countries “have always regarded China’s development and growth as a threat to Western values and institutions”, he thundered at an assembly of top party leaders in 2016, these countries “have not for a moment ceased their ideological infiltration of China”.

In this, he was merely echoing a long series of similar declarations, as in 2013, when he warned that said “hostile forces” were “doing their utmost to propagate so-called ‘universal values’” with an aim to “vie with us [on] the battlefields of people’s hearts”, split up China “overtly and covertly”, and ultimately “overthrow our socialist system”. For Xi, China is engaged in an “extraordinarily fierce” global ideological struggle with Western liberalism that, “although invisible, [is] a matter of life and death”.

Western leaders don’t necessarily disagree. President Joe Biden regularly describes the United States as engaged in a global “battle between democracy and autocracy”. Former President Donald Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, went so far as to insist while in office that the United States must “engage and empower the Chinese people” to enact regime change, because, he asserted, “if the free world doesn’t change Communist China, Communist China will change us”. British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, for his part, this week vowed not only to improve security but to “defend our democracy” — implying that undermining it must be Beijing’s actual target, rather than mundane intelligence gathering.

Both China and the West, therefore, not only suspect infiltration by the agents of their foreign competitors, but demonstrably view this as part of a much wider, more threatening, and more enduring struggle between rival systems. The hard truth, then, is that, in a very real sense, we’ve all been thrust back into an era much akin to the Cold War, when constant spying and attempted subversion were simply geopolitical facts of life. It may be best for leaders in Westminster, and indeed in capitals around the world, to come to terms with this not-so-unprecedented reality, and to move forward with open eyes: prepared, serious, and without naivety about what’s happening — but also without any undue shock and outrage. Surely the nation of James Bond, at least, can manage to carry on with good cheer.

unherd.com · by Nathan Levine · September 15, 2023

22. Co-Opting Clausewitz: Using On War to Explain Success and Failure in the War in Ukraine

Excerpts:

The relevance of Clausewitzian analysis to the war in Ukraine will be considered in relation to two of Clausewitz’s major strategic principles. The first is that defence is the stronger form of war, the second is that efforts need to be focused on an enemy’s centre of gravity. Both appear particularly relevant to the war in Ukraine but there are traps into which analysts may fall, especially if they seek to explain success or failure. One pitfall is to assume that following Clausewitz’s principles of strategy is a sure road to victory while failure to follow them leads to defeat. Another is the temptation to overlook the complexity and conditionality of Clausewitz’s strategic thinking. Warnings against such pitfalls abound in On War but they are not always heeded.

...

Against a less popular leader than Zelensky and with better planning and logistics the first clash of arms might have led to the collapse of Ukrainian forces, the fall of Kyiv and Ukraine’s acceptance of defeat. As Clausewitz recognises, it is important to estimate the enemy’s strength and will to resist, but immediately adds that it cannot be known ‘whether the first shock of battle will steel the enemy’s resolve and stiffen his resistance, or whether, like a Bologna flask, it will shatter as soon as its surface is scratched’. [572]

In conclusion, it is important not to see success or failure in war as proof of the validity or invalidity of any given theory – evidence, perhaps, but not proof. Clausewitz’s analysis of war is valuable in understanding the strategy – and to some extent the politics – of the war in Ukraine. But it is not a formula for winning wars – that requires the far more complex and difficult effort of bringing resources to bear on an opponent in accord with strategies judged to be relevant. Clausewitz wrote a brilliant analysis of strategy and its characteristics, not a handbook for waging wars.

Co-Opting Clausewitz: Using On War to Explain Success and Failure in the War in Ukraine - Military Strategy Magazine

Hugh Smith - Australia

Dr. Hugh Smith lectured and published in strategic thought, war and ethics, and armed forces and society at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is the author of On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

To cite this article:

Smith, Hugh, “Co-Opting Clausewitz: Using On War to Explain Success and Failure in the War in Ukraine,” Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 9, Issue 1, Summer 2023, pages 4-8.

militarystrategymagazine.com

Published in 1832, re-published many times and translated into several languages, On War has been regarded by many as one of the greatest, if not the greatest book On War ever written.[i] Clausewitz’s interpretation of war as a continuation of politics – and, indeed, of society – has seen him called a ‘philosopher of war’.[ii] If this term is appropriate it is because he places war in its wider social and political context.[iii] But Clausewitz also provides concepts central to understanding the conduct of war. His theories of military strategy have received much attention, influencing many later theorists while also creating greater controversy.

Some political and military leaders have admired Clausewitz, believing that he offered an understanding of war that suited their purposes. In the years leading up to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, for example, the Prussian general Count von Moltke thought that On War advocated Napoleonic-style warfare with an emphasis on mass, morale, patriotism and leadership. Prussia, Moltke concluded, must wage war vigorously and seek total victory.[iv]

Others have condemned Clausewitz for promoting such militarism. In 1908 Colonel F.N. Maude’s introduction to an English edition of On War declared that the spread of Clausewitz’s ideas were responsible for ‘the readiness for war of all European armies.[v] After WW I Captain Basil Liddell Hart echoed this view, depicting Clausewitz as ‘the apostle of total war’ and ‘the ill-omened prophet of mass’.[vi] After the outbreak of WW II Liddell Hart declared that On War and its theory of unlimited war ‘had gone far to wreck civilisation’.[vii]

Such extreme misrepresentations of Clausewitz did little to promote the understanding of war or the understanding of Clausewitz’s analysis of war.[viii] Fortunately, failure to grasp Clausewitz’s ideas has become less common and less influential in recent decades. This is partly because On War became more accessible to many scholars and military thinkers thanks to the Howard-Paret translation of 1976.[ix] Clausewitz has been paid serious academic attention and now boasts a long list of books and articles on his works as well as a scholarly website devoted to him.[x] War Colleges and military professionals now regularly salute him; academics and analysts frequently cite him.

The question of relevance

Before considering how some of Clausewitz’s ideas can be applied to the war in Ukraine, it is fair to ask whether ideas formulated around 200 years ago can be relevant to modern times. This is an issue Clausewitz himself recognised. His studies of earlier warfare almost totally excluded ancient and medieval campaigns because of their very different social, political and organisational circumstances. The absence of reliable sources was also a factor. [173-4] Clausewitz’s numerous campaign histories thus go back only as far as 1660 while On War itself refers almost exclusively to campaigns and battles from the Seven Years War (1756-63) onwards.

Surely the advent of industrialised warfare, nuclear weapons, ICBMs, global communications, cyber threats, remotely controlled weapons platforms, chemical and biological weapons and so on has changed everything about war? The doctrine of mutual assured destruction during the Cold War, for example, required the two superpowers to leave themselves vulnerable to attack – a concept unthinkable to Clausewitz.[xi] The world, however, has not seen an end to wars that display the essential, characteristics that Clausewitz identified. The war in Ukraine is being fought by sovereign states over competing national interests; it is being conducted primarily by organised armed forces under military command and political direction; and it is killing people and destroying assets. On War does not appear completely outdated.

Interestingly, some of Clausewitz’s own military histories bear on the question of relevance. In one such study he examines the campaigns conducted by Russia from bases in Ukraine (then part of Russia) against the Turks and Tatars in Crimea in the four summers from 1736 to 1739.[xii] On War mentions these campaigns briefly in a chapter entitled ‘The Key to the Country’ though mainly to debunk the idea that conquest of a particular stretch of territory will allow an attacker to dominate the defending country. [456-9] More relevant, as Alexander Burns points out, are Clausewitz’s observations on Russia’s conduct in these campaigns: Russia’s political purpose lacked clarity, vacillating between conquest of Crimea and simply weakening it by devastating its territory; Russia was initially overconfident of success; Russian logistics were poorly organised; and Russia accepted very heavy casualties in return for minor territorial gains. Burns also notes that, while the campaigns were ineffective, Russia learned lessons that stood it in good stead in subsequent wars.[xiii]

The relevance of Clausewitzian analysis to the war in Ukraine will be considered in relation to two of Clausewitz’s major strategic principles. The first is that defence is the stronger form of war, the second is that efforts need to be focused on an enemy’s centre of gravity. Both appear particularly relevant to the war in Ukraine but there are traps into which analysts may fall, especially if they seek to explain success or failure. One pitfall is to assume that following Clausewitz’s principles of strategy is a sure road to victory while failure to follow them leads to defeat. Another is the temptation to overlook the complexity and conditionality of Clausewitz’s strategic thinking. Warnings against such pitfalls abound in On War but they are not always heeded.

Defence is the stronger form of war

In examining the dynamic relationship between offence and defence in war Clausewitz weighs a wide range of factors. Some – for example, numbers and disposition of forces – are available to both attacker and defender but others favour one side or the other. Thus he

argues at several points in On War that ‘defense is a stronger form of fighting than the attack’. [84, 358, 380] He is not saying that defence will always triumph but that it possesses characteristics that make it more likely to prevail. By definition, defence has a passive aim – preservation – whereas offence has a positive goal, namely ­conquest. In short, it is simply ‘easier to hold ground than take it’. [357-8] Factors more readily available to the defence include fortifications, shorter supply lines and national morale. A defending state is also more likely to win support from allies.

Only one factor, Clausewitz argues, distinctly favours the offence, namely surprise. But this can effectively be achieved primarily at the tactical level. The surprise initiation of a war is far more difficult. Given the extensive preparations involved, Clausewitz suggests, war ‘will usually be announced in the press before a single shot is fired’. [210] Strategic surprise is highly valuable but usually requires ‘major, obvious and exceptional mistakes on the enemy’s part’. [364]

While friction troubles both defender and attacker there are dynamic factors that specifically burden the attack. First, as gains are made, they must be defended against counter-attacks. Resources must be devoted to defending these gains, often under less favourable conditions. Clausewitz describes the need to defend as the ‘mortal disease’ of the offence. [524] Second, the defending state may well be able to organise itself more effectively with shorter supply lines, use of militia forces and high morale. Third, the attacker loses momentum – thanks to factors such as casualties, supply problems, and delays caused by defensive strongpoints. Doubts in the political leadership may also arise or allies lose heart. [527, 567-9]

As a result, Clausewitz argues, there will be a ‘culminating point’ at which the burden becomes too great for the attack to carry. [528] A campaign must achieve its political purpose before reaching this point. Thus Napoleon, even though he had captured Moscow in 1812, fell victim to ‘strategic consumption, and had to use the last strength of his sick body to drag himself out of the country’.[xiv]

In many cases, however, the attack will not be pushed as far as its culminating point. Strength and ambition fade; pause, delay, and indecision take their place. Surprise is more difficult to achieve because energy is lacking. Inevitably, too, a general will have difficulty in recognising when the culminating point is approaching or even when it has been reached. Consequently, Clausewitz argues, most generals prefer caution for fear of overshooting the mark. [573] Only major political objectives and strong military leadership will drive the attack onwards.

As the attack becomes progressively weaker, moreover, there is a point at which the defence can take the initiative. For Clausewitz this means defence will cut less ‘sorry a figure when compared to attack’ which in turn ‘will no longer look so easy and infallible’. [371] It is when ‘the flashing sword of vengeance’ can be taken up and provide ‘the greatest moment for the defence’. [370] Indeed, Clausewitz never regards defence as purely passive since even when awaiting an assault ‘our bullets take the offensive’, while ‘a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles’. [524]

In putting forward the notion that defence is the stronger form of war Clausewitz is, of course, arguing in the abstract. He must assume there is no great disparity between the two sides in factors that may be critical to the success of otherwise of an attack. The number of troops, their morale and training, the deployment of forces, the achievement of strategic surprise, the strength of fortifications, the effectiveness of supply and logistics, popular support and the reactions of allies are all relevant to the actual outcome of a war. For the attack to triumph it must outperform its opponent in some or all of these dimensions. For the defence to succeed assets must be employed judiciously and energetically.

While Clausewitz implicitly and in places explicitly warns against expecting easy success in an attack, he does not present a case against aggression. The decision to initiate war is a matter for political leaders who must weigh expected benefits against uncertain risks. He does not condemn Napoleon for his disastrous invasion of Russia since this appeared the only possible way for France to avoid simultaneous wars against both East and West. [628] The furthest he goes is to describe Napoleon’s campaign as in a political sense ‘an extravaganza’. [325]

Ultimately it is a matter for politics – not for an analysis of war – to decide whether such great political risks and military efforts are justified. This is so even if they lead to national ruin. What he does caution is that political leaders should at least be clear about their objectives and understand the nature and possible consequences of any military action they undertake.

Centre of Gravity

A second concept sometimes called upon by those examining the war in the Ukraine is Clausewitz’s ‘centre of gravity’. Often this is taken to be an opponent’s capital city: capture Kyiv (or Moscow, or wherever) and surrender will follow. Alternatively, it may be taken to mean a point of weakness such as an enemy’s communications, morale, or a gap in defences which should therefore be the principal target of the attack.

Clausewitz’s analysis is more subtle. He borrows the term ‘centre of gravity’ [Schwerpunkt] from mechanics – the imagined point where all the forces of gravity bear on an object, a point which if moved can throw that object off balance. For Clausewitz the centre of gravity in strategy is not the enemy’s point of strength or weakness but his point of unity and cohesion. Especially where a war is fought to achieve a decisive result rather than a minor advantage, the centre of gravity is ‘the most effective target for a blow’. [485-6]

Identifying the centre of gravity of an opponent in a particular conflict is ‘a major act of strategic judgement’. [486] And it is all the more difficult given incomplete and perhaps inaccurate intelligence about the opponent and the inherent unpredictability of war. In the course of a war, moreover, the centre of gravity may change as hostilities impact on both belligerents and cause ambitions to change. Clausewitz suggests four candidates where an enemy’s centre of gravity can be located: its territory, its capital city, its alliances and its army.

Territory is important because it holds people and resources which, once captured, are lost to the defending nation. But they do not add automatically to the strength of the conqueror since popular resistance may be provoked and harnessing the resources gained may require significant effort. In a major war, Clausewitz suggests, territory may not be that important. Occupation by the enemy may be only temporary such that territory is ‘merely lent to him’. [488]

A capital city may seem the most obvious candidate for a centre of gravity. As Clausewitz observes, it is the centre of a nation’s political activity and administration, and often represents its will to resist. But Napoleon’s occupation of Moscow proved that a capital is not always decisive in ending a war.[xv] Putin’s initial thrust toward Kyiv suggests his belief that Ukraine’s capital was the centre of gravity and hence the key to success.

In some wars a nation’s principal ally may serve as the centre of gravity so the ally’s centre of gravity must be considered the focus of attack. The task is easier, Clausewitz argues, where there are several allies on which a state depends. For their unity depends on mutual political interests which may be ‘precarious and imperfect’ and on their cohesion in action which will ‘usually be very loose, and often completely fictitious’. [486] The attacker, Clausewitz suggests, can exploit division among allies of the defender directly or chip away at their unity step by step. The war in Ukraine may prove an interesting test case.

The most common centre of gravity is the opponent’s armed forces. In symbolic terms defeat of an enemy army is often more effective than occupying enemy territory or its capital. Napoleon’s problem before Moscow was that his army was too weak to defeat the Russian army. [582] Occupation of the city had little effect on the course of the war. The loss of an army, by contrast, usually undermines an opponent’s will to resist and exposes its people to occupation. Even so, in Clausewitz’s view, military defeat may be countered by a resort to militia (reserve) or irregular forces which can offer a chance of successful defence. [479-83]

Ukraine and strategic theory

That the war is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means goes without saying. More complex is its relationship with strategic theory. For Clausewitz strategic theory is derived from a study of actual military history through a process he calls Kritik (critical analysis).[xvi] The result is initially an understanding of past wars – not necessarily of present or future wars. It is not ‘a new technique’ for waging war but provides ‘a rationale for the actions of every general in history’. [486] When it comes to application to current or future wars Clausewitz is clear that strategic theory has limitations.

First, every war has its unique circumstances, even those wars that occur in the same era or locations, or among the same belligerents. Strategy is a matter of successive actions and reactions, many of them unpredictable, such that wars can take on more variations than a game of chess.

Second, success in war is not a matter of applying this or that strategic theory; nor will ignoring one or another theory inevitably result in failure. Strategic theory helps the general or statesman learn from the past and guides their decisions. It does not offer a sure recipe for success. For principles of strategy are applied during the course of a war when information is far from complete or reliable and when hindsight is unavailable. Military leaders will use their knowledge, experience and judgement, but must to some extent ‘guess’ how events will turn out. [572]

Generals are in essence gamblers. The best display of what Clausewitz calls military ‘genius’ – a combination of not simply knowledge and intellect but also strong character, quickness of perception (coup d’oeil), boldness and perseverance. [100-112] The height of genius is to grasp which principles of strategy are relevant in any given situation (and which can be ignored) and then to apply them effectively. And, one might add, to change strategies if events demand it.

Third, when concepts such as centres of gravity or defence as the stronger form of warfare are used, it is important to recognise their interdependence with the actual course of the war. President Putin, for example, may well have ignored Clausewitz’s ‘advice’ that defence is the stronger form of warfare by underestimating Ukrainian resistance and overestimating Russian strength. But no one could be sure in advance that such a misjudgement would be critical in the war.

Against a less popular leader than Zelensky and with better planning and logistics the first clash of arms might have led to the collapse of Ukrainian forces, the fall of Kyiv and Ukraine’s acceptance of defeat. As Clausewitz recognises, it is important to estimate the enemy’s strength and will to resist, but immediately adds that it cannot be known ‘whether the first shock of battle will steel the enemy’s resolve and stiffen his resistance, or whether, like a Bologna flask, it will shatter as soon as its surface is scratched’. [572]

In conclusion, it is important not to see success or failure in war as proof of the validity or invalidity of any given theory – evidence, perhaps, but not proof. Clausewitz’s analysis of war is valuable in understanding the strategy – and to some extent the politics – of the war in Ukraine. But it is not a formula for winning wars – that requires the far more complex and difficult effort of bringing resources to bear on an opponent in accord with strategies judged to be relevant. Clausewitz wrote a brilliant analysis of strategy and its characteristics, not a handbook for waging wars.

References

[i] See, for example, Bernard Brodie, ‘On Clausewitz: A Passion for War’, World Politics, vol. 75 no. 2 (January 1973).

[ii] W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978); Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. C. Booker, N. Stone (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1983). See also Hugh Smith, ‘Clausewitz as Sociologist’, Infinity Journal, Special Edition, Clausewitz and Contemporary Conflict (February 2012). https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/47/Clausewitz_as_Sociologist/

[iii] Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) passim.

[iv] Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1998) 78.

[v] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, new rev ed. 1940) ix.

[vi] Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1977) 37-8, 80-81.

[vii] Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 3rd rev. ed. 1954) 357.

[viii] On interpretations of Clausewitz in the English-speaking world see Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[ix] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Subsequent citations are from this edition with page numbers in square brackets.

[x] https://www.clausewitzstudies.org There is also a more broadly focused website https://www.clausewitz.com

[xi] Smith, On Clausewitz, 244-8.

[xii] Entitled ‘Krieg der Russen gegen die Türken von 1736–1739’ the study is short (12 pages) and not yet translated into English. Accessed at https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=p55DAAAAcAAJ&pg=GBS.PA16&num=19

[xiii] Alexander S. Burns, ‘Clausewitz’s Analysis Resonates to this Day’, The National Interest, 1 March 2023.

[xiv] Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London: 1843; reprinted by Academic International, Hattiesburg, 1970), 166.

[xv] Clausewitz refers to Moscow as the effective capital of Russia while recognising St Petersburg, the formal capital, as a ‘second capital’. This duality complicated Russia’s defensive strategy. [622]

[xvi] On War, Book II, ch. 5; on the relationship between theory and practice in Clausewitz’s thinking see Smith, On Clausewitz, chs 14,15.

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23. From Non-Alignment to Realignment

"From Non-Alignment to Realignment," Akhil Ramesh and Cleo Paskal , Comparative Connections

https://cc.pacforum.org/2023/09/from-non-alignment-to-realignment/

CONNECT WITH THE AUTHORS

Akhil Ramesh

Senior Resident Fellow, Pacific Forum

Cleo Paskal

Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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This chapter was made possible through a grant from the Hindu American Foundation.

The US and India expanded cooperation across various domains in the second reporting period of 2023. The two moved to materialize projects and initiatives that were conceived in the first quarter, in wide-ranging domains with significant geopolitical and geoeconomic scope including defense cooperation, critical and emerging technologies, and infrastructure development. While New Delhi continued to straddle groupings such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the US-India partnership broke ground on more initiatives than any of India’s other bilateral relationships. Modi and Biden visited each other’s capitals and reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based international order. The rousing reception Modi received in Washington and the continued US preeminence in most major trade and technology initiatives conceived by India highlighted the growing partnership between the two democracies. And the two leaders, while facing elections next year, seem willing to work together on common global priorities—sometimes at domestic political costs.

Also, while taking place outside the May-August reporting period, the enormous groundwork Delhi laid over the summer (and earlier), plus the absence of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, transformed the G20 meeting that took place in September into an event that showcased India’s leadership in finding common ground between the priorities of the Global South and the US. The result was potentially transformative geoeconomic initiatives that could reshape geopolitics, and encourage, for example, the conditions necessary for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. This wasn’t the India of nonalignment; this was an India shaping a realignment, with tacit US support.

Figure 1 President Biden and Prime Minister Modi meet at the Oval Office in Washington on June 22, 2023. Evan Vucci/AP

Democracy is Boisterous

In India, the months between May and August witnessed the clamor associated with election season, although in this case, it was the year before national elections. Arbitrary and historical issues filled headlines over pressing matters of economic or national security concern.

Meanwhile, Delhi worked on feats such as landing a rover on the dark side of the moon. On Aug. 23, the country celebrated as India’s spacecraft, Chandrayaan-3 successfully landed on the lunar south pole, making India the fourth nation to successfully land on the moon and the first on the lunar south pole. Space has been an arena for increased cooperation between the US and India. The Modi administration embarked on a privatization drive of the space industry, opening it up to private investors and players in the private sector. The success of the mission, coming on the heels of privatization measures and expanding US-India cooperation, was welcomed by policymakers in both nations.

Figure 2 A 3-channel image of the Chandryaan-3 lunar lander from the rover’s NavCam Stereo Images on the Moon. LEOS/SAC/ISRO

Given the nature of politics and media in a democracy, some tried to turn the success of the mission into a debate over attributing credit to different leaders, with the immediate distraction coming in the form of comments surrounding the Hindu faith by a political leader in the Southern part of India; and soon after there was debate surrounding the name of the nation itself. In late August, invitations to the G20 went out with “Bharat” over India, sparking commotion throughout the nation. Historical debates surrounding the etymology of the word’s origins in Hindu religious texts only subsided when the event convened in early September.

The clamor was not limited to political and cultural issues. Between May and July, unusual weather affected crop cultivation across parts of India, shooting up risks of inflation. In response, the Indian government instituted a ban on rice exports affecting the price of rice around the world. As one of the world’s largest exporters of rice, the export ban squeezed the rice market and shot up the price of the staple by 20% in select markets across the Indo-Pacific region where rice is largely consumed.

Similarly, with the US going to the polls next year, a wide range of issues tested Biden’s presidency, including wildfires that raged across the island of Maui in Hawaii, storms in Florida, the relentless war in Ukraine. Another serious issue was the administration’s slow walk-back of its initial hawkishness toward China. Over the summer, the administration made repeated attempts at thawing relations with China by sending several high-ranking officials to Beijing. These overtures in hope of stabilizing relations have not paid dividends.

These domestic pressures could influence the administration’s foreign policies, and affect US-India relations. For example, the catalyst for expanded cooperation between these two democracies has been the shared concern over a rising, belligerent, and expansionist China. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the US and India have faced China’s repeated violations of their sovereignty. India lost men in the border clashes at the Galwan valley in 2020, and this year the US came to discover spy balloons and secret police stations across the nation, which may be used to harass dissident communities.

The bone of contention since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the divergence in views between US and India surrounding Moscow. Domestic pressure in the US, especially coupled with inflationary pressure and a rolling debt crisis raise questions on increasing US financial commitments to Ukraine. A recent poll by CNN found that the majority of Americans opposed giving more aid to Ukraine. Right or wrong, supporting Ukraine with aid and addressing domestic issues are increasingly viewed by some voters as a zero-sum endeavor. This could pressure Biden vis-a-vis Ukraine.

There are other domestic US issues with trajectories difficult to predict. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, under pressure from Freedom Caucus Republicans, opened an impeachment enquiry against the president. The migrant crisis is no longer limited to border states. With less than a year to elections, domestic pressures could unpredictably affect Biden’s foreign policy.

At the recently concluded G20 event, despite fears that the leaders would not be able to find consensus, the group managed to settle differences and agree to a statement raising concerns over the war in Ukraine without naming Russia—the US has supported Ukraine in the conflict, while India has thus far declined to speak out against Russia. While speculations ran amok, the watered-down message may have been the US helping India save face at the G20. With tensions surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war relatively contained, Modi capitalized on Xi and Putin’s absence at the G20 meeting to introduce several initiatives with the US, such as the one with Brazil, South Africa and the US, the Global Biofuel Alliance and the India-Middle East-Europe corridor promoting trade and connectivity from the shores of India to the shores of Europe.

Figure 3 Members of the newly launched Global Biofuels Alliance pose together at the G20 Summit on Sept. 9, 2023. Photo: Press Trust of India

Geoeconomics (albeit with geopolitical implications), continued to be a lynchpin for increased cooperation between the world’s largest and fifth-largest economy.

Trade as National Security

As noted in earlier chapters of Comparative Connections covering US-India bilateral relations, the Indian economy has come a long way from the days of a “license raj” marred by socialist regulations to one now being positioned as a friendly shore for supply chain diversification and more. Dregs of the raj era still clog parts of the system however and the Modi government has embarked on a reform drive to liberalize, privatize, and shape policies to positively affect the investment climate. Since the term “friend-shoring” came into parlance a few years ago, the US has consistently positioned India in that context and explored supply chain diversification opportunities across various sectors.

During their trips to New Delhi, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai emphasized India’s role as an alternative to China. Moreover, at the Semicon India conference—a large-scale conference on semiconductors and other critical technologies organized in the western state of Gujarat—several US conglomerates discussed their interest in establishing manufacturing in the country.

There weren’t just grand statements; there were several acts of walking the walk. For example, India and the US decided to settle all outstanding trade disputes at the WTO, and Indian Ambassador to the US Taranjit Singh Sandhu signed the Artemis accords for increased space cooperation. In late July, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry met with counterparts in the Indian government to explore India’s potential to be a key manufacturer of electric vehicles.

Cooperation, or at least the stated intent to grow cooperation, in trade, supply chains and critical technology has become a mainstay of US-India relations. Even on the margins of the G20, US and India settled trade disputes, finalized purchases of drones and other defense equipment, and announced new geoeconomic and geopolitical initiatives. Slicing the BRICS grouping, India brought the US into a group with South Africa and Brazil now known as the IBSA. Furthermore, several nations formed the Global Biofuel Alliance. Probably the most geoeconomically significant development was the India-Middle East-Europe trade corridor established to promote connectivity between these regions. Dubbed an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, this connectivity project announced at the G20 event Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment aims to stimulate economic development through enhanced connectivity across two continents. While these initiatives were conceived by policymakers, all have a large private sector role, making their foundation stronger and their shelf life longer.

A bone of contention for big businesses trying to operate in India has been the difficult operating environment. Threats of China’s weaponization of interdependence and economic coercion have pushed policymakers in Washington and New Delhi to drive policy changes with relative urgency, giving confidence to select businesses interested in operating in India. The increasing intersection of national security and trade policymaking that initially raised concerns in business circles is now encouraging the development of economic engagement with India’s large market. For example, US and Indian conglomerates are beginning to explore complimentary attributes across verticals in the critical technology and defense sectors. For US businesses, these collaborations provide access without the bottlenecks they’d face when operating solo. For Indian conglomerates, these partnerships give them access to advanced technologies and a leg up as they compete with the technological giants of China.

Friend-shoring Begins to Materialize

Among the many proposed joint ventures and partnerships, a few stand out due to their geoeconomic and geopolitical significance. Increased cooperation in defense, infrastructure, and critical technology are three spheres with such relevance.

For India, increased cooperation in the defense realm strengthens national security as it faces persistent Chinese aggression at its northern and eastern borders. China’s infrastructure development across the Indian Ocean and subcontinent, from Sri Lanka to Nepal has increased risk in the operating environment. These existing and developing risks have made India a customer for US predator drones and helicopters, including New Delhi’s purchase of 31 MQ-9B Predator drones from General Atomics. General Electric (GE) is working with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to co-produce GE F-414 fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force.

In terms of infrastructure, for Washington, India’s hegemonic position in the Indian Ocean, while under constant threat from China and its proxies, remains a potent force to leverage. In late June, the US Navy concluded a master ship repairs agreement (MSRA) with the Indian infrastructure company Larson and Toubro (L&T) in Kattupalli, India. There was also an announcement about the US and India recommitting “to advancing India’s emergence as a hub for the maintenance and repair of forward-deployed U.S. Navy assets and other aircraft and vessels.”

In the critical and advanced technology space, US chipmaker Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) announced a $400 million investment in India over the next five years, including a new design center in Bengaluru. And in late August, Nvidia announced partnerships with India’s TATA and Reliance in the field of artificial intelligence.

These initial successes are a result of increased coordination at the highest levels of government. During Modi’s visit to Washington in early summer, a defense initiative, the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (Indus-X) was launched to strengthen defense industrial ecosystems, making them more innovative, accessible, and resilient. This initiative is a product of the US Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense’s joint efforts to expand cooperation not only amongst large firms but startups in the defense space.

These joint ventures are not limited to the China+1 strategy of companies but serve Washington’s larger geopolitical goal of strengthening India’s deterrent capabilities in the Indian Ocean region. The complimentary nature of industrial policies in both nations that are designed to reduce overdependence on China for vital inputs in key strategic sectors is well supplemented by these joint ventures.

While the success of industrial policies can only be measured over time, these initiatives are what the doctor ordered for increased diversification. Plus, a perennial challenge for the US in courting India was its long friendship with Russia and its reliance on Russian arms and defense imports. With increased defense collaboration, Washington may have a chance at limiting India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment. Furthermore, through partnerships, the US is supporting India’s “Make in India” goals. This can have spillover effects in the global defense sector. Indian defense production companies’ partnerships with Russian state-owned firms have paid dividends through new export markets such as Philippines and Vietnam. The Indian defense industry, while in its nascent stages, is exploring new markets, particularly emerging ones in Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The US can capitalize on India’s access to these markets to outcompete Russian defense exports.

Figure 4 Prime Minister Modi and President Biden meet with various CEOs and other senior officials in the East Room of the White House on June 23, 2023. Photo: Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

While the US technology supports India’s ascent to the fourth industrial revolution, India’s goodwill in the Global South could pay dividends for the US, particularly in parts of the world where it has a complex legacy.

The Bridge Between the Global South and North

COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting economic and political crises have led the resurgence of the “Global South”—developing countries seeking a leverage through unity on the global stage. Increasingly, they’ve found themselves caught in the crossfire of larger nations such as the US and China. James Marape, prime minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), in his address at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation, called for Modi to offer a third voice in the face of the Global North. Hailing Modi as the leader of the Global South, Marape went on to suggest that the Pacific Island countries would rally behind him voice at global forums. Interestingly, Biden had to cancel his scheduled participation at the meeting to attend more pressing domestic concerns over the debt ceiling crisis. While Secretary of State Antony Blinken made the trip and signed a crucial defense agreement with PNG, he did not receive the same warmth and welcome as the Indian prime minister. Modi and Marape shared solidarity and as the PNG leader called it, “shared history of being colonized by colonial masters” brought about a unique kinship.

India is not the only state capitalizing on the shared experiences of colonial rule or Western imperialism and the resulting solidarity to strengthen ties with nations of the Global South. China has consistently reminded former colonies in the Global South of the brutality of the Western world and sought to gain goodwill among leaders and civil society. While the wounds evoked may be the same, the remedy offered is markedly different. The stark contrast between the Indian approach to the Global South and the Chinese approach can be seen in how they talk about the Western world. New Delhi does not remind nations of their past as a motivation for revenge but rather to spur cooperation with the West on more equal terms. Beijing (much like Moscow) calls for deliberate mechanisms and groupings in opposition to the West.

For example, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions on its economy, Moscow has sought the creation, expansion, or hardening of groupings to stand against the Western world. The BRICS grouping, initially a talk shop, has expanded to address a plethora of issues impacting the larger Global South. Russia and China are trying to shape it into a platform for nations with disputes with the Western world to exacerbate the cleavage. In early 2023, 16 nations applied to become part of the BRICS. In the last major meeting of the group in Johannesburg, South Africa in August, six nations were added. Moscow and Beijing continue to use the group to test alternative mechanisms for the SWIFT banking network and other instruments to sanction-proof themselves. The creation of development banks such as the NDB has given the group more access to the developing world and tapped into the grievances surrounding the debts offered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

New Delhi continues to engage with a range of groups to capitalize on the benefits they offer while advocating for its own interests, and having useful sideline meetings with others that, like India, may be looking for options. Its outreach to the Global South has largely been bilateral and it hasn’t used these platforms for broad anti-West coalition building. Rather it has tried to build multilateral inclusivity that can lead to stronger bilateral ties.

Take India’s successful advocacy to include the African Union (AU) in the G20 group. Modi had consistently called for including the AU in the group. At the G20 meeting in September, the African Union represented by Azali Assoumani, president of Comoros, was made a permanent member. This makes the G20 more inclusive and broader in scope, and dovetails with India’s own outreach to African countries. As one small example, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Tanzania earlier in the summer to inaugurate a university and discuss increased cooperation on a variety of sectors.

Part of this has strategic implications. India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific region is not the same as that of the US. While the US conceptualization roughly parallels the operational area of the US Indo-Pacific Command—from just west of the Maldives to the coast of the Americas—India includes the whole Indian Ocean, including the eastern shore of Africa.

Also, over the last six months, India has increasingly shown willingness to be involved in the Pacific part of the Indo-Pacific, beyond ASEAN and including the Pacific Islands. There was a port call in Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea and India opened a new embassy in Dilli, Timor-Leste. There is eagerness in the Pacific Islands to see what follows the 12 point plan for engagement that Modi announced in his May visit to PNG. India’s engagement with the Pacific Islands has traditionally been on nonconventional security issues such as public health and capacity building, exactly the sort of engagement many Pacific Islands have said they want.

Figure 5 Prime Minister Modi delivers opening remarks in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation summit on May 22, 2023. Adek Berry/AFP via Getty Images

Furthermore, in an unusual turn of events, the former heads of the three branches of the Indian military visited Taiwan for a closed-door meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. By engaging with the full Indo-Pacific, from east African nations to Pacific Islands, and including sensitive points such as Taiwan, India is more than testing the waters as an expanding security provider—especially in human security, which is much in demand across the region.

India does not have the same legacy as the West’s previous “point country” in the Pacific Islands, Australia, nor has it been as disconnected from the African continent as has the US. The last US president to visit the continent was Barack Obama in 2015, and that was not a state visit but a visit to his ancestral village in Kenya. Over the same decade, China has made inroads into nations small and big. Beijing’s BRI project runs along the length and breadth of the continent. To counter China’s predatory lending, New Delhi has advocated for expanding lending to poorer nations, including at the recently concluded G20. President Biden has supported India’s recommendation and called for increased funding for the World Bank. From the Pacific Islands to east Africa, India can knit the region together in a way that the West can’t, and China doesn’t want to. The G20 showcased the potential for India and the US (and likeminded countries) to work together to develop solutions for the people of Global South, aiding in economic stability and ultimately for upholding a rules-based international order.

With Xi and Putin not attending the event, Modi and Biden stole the spotlight and shone it on a potential future that many wanted to see. That said, press releases are one thing. It will be outcomes that matter.

Conclusion

On social media, two covers of the Indian magazine India Today have been making the rounds. One was from the early ‘80s, with Indira Gandhi and Fidel Castro on the cover, with the headline “India Leads.” The other, from 2023, had Xi, and Putin together on one side, and Modi and Biden together on the other, with the headline “the big power game.”

Long gone are the ‘80s and the era of nonalignment. In this era of realignment, the US-India relationship is not perfect (and no relationship between two clamorous democracies should be) but it is on solid ground and planting serious roots, as the last four months would indicate.

The areas and scale of cooperation keep expanding, and the evolving world order may be a good opening for the US and India to reimagine a world driven by shared interests and a commitment for the rules-based order. Perhaps it is time for something along the lines of an Indo-Pacific Charter for an Indo-Pacific Century, just as the Atlantic Charter shaped the Atlantic Century. In the coming months, if policymakers in both democracies live by the motto “carpe diem,” they can take inspiration from India’s inspiring moonshot and realize that even the sky is not the limit.

Chronology of US-India Relations

May — August 2023

May 1, 2023: Indian Ambassador to the US Taranjit Singh Sandhu Sandhu attends the SelectUSA Investment Summit in the Washington, DC area.

May 2, 2023: United States Agency for International Development (USAID) convenes the first South Asia Clean Energy Forum (SACEF) to foster regional cooperation and advance clean energy initiatives in South Asian countries including India.

May 11, 2023: Prime Minister Narendra Modi lays the foundation stone of LIGO-India, a project funded by the US National Science Foundation.

May 11, 2023: Eric Garcetti presents credentials to President Droupadi Murmu to be US ambassador to India.

May 17, 2023: 17th US-India Defense Policy Group discuss goals in the Indo-Pacific to deepen the Major Defense Partnership.

May 19, 2023: US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce in India renew MOU to enhance development collaboration in India.

May 20, 2023: Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar meets US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the G7 leaders’ summit in Hiroshima.

May 21, 2023: India, the US, and their G7 partners conclude a successful summit, having discussed several issues including climate, food security, investment, and nuclear disarmament.

May 21, 2023: MH-60R helicopters purchased by India from the United States land for the first time on INS Kolkata, representing a major increase in Indian antisubmarine capabilities.

May 22, 2023: US Department of Commerce’s Cybersecurity Business Development Trade Mission arrives in India for four days of talks with officials of the local governments of Mumbai and New Delhi and the central government.

May 22, 2023: Neeta Prasad, joint secretary for International Cooperation at the Indian Ministry of Education, and Donald Lu, assistant secretary at the State Dept. Bureau of South and Central Asia, co-host launch of the US India Education and Skills Development Working Group and hold, in hybrid format, its first meeting.

May 23, 2023: US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) hosts workshop on US-India 5G & Next Generation Networks to develop new opportunities for US-India technical and commercial cooperation in the sector.

May 26, 2023: State Department formally dedicates new consulate in Hyderabad.

May 29, 2023: US Consulate General Kolkata announces that after years of coordination between the US and Indian governments, the remains of Maj. Gen. Henry Kleinbeck Pickett, decorated veteran of both world wars who passed away in Darjeeling in 1965, would be repatriated to the United States.

May 30, 2023: US Navy Vice Adm. Brad Cooper meets Indian Navy Vice Adm. Dinesh K. Tripathi on a visit to Mumbai.

May 30, 2023: Department of Labor awards Lalitha Natarajan, a Chennai-based lawyer, with the 2023 Iqbal Masih Award for the Elimination of Child Labor at the US Consulate General in Chennai.

May 31, 2023: Two more American-made MH-60R Romeo helicopters arrive in India for use on INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya. One of them makes its maiden landing on INS Vikrant.

June 1, 2023: US collaborates with India to address air pollution and climate change during a workshop with the Delhi-based nonprofit Lung Care Foundation at the India International Center.

June 3, 2023: President Biden releases a press statement expressing sorrow over a crash in eastern India when two passenger trains and a freight train collide, resulting in the deaths of at least 288 people.

June 4, 2023: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin meets Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in New Delhi to strengthen the US-India defense partnership.

June 9, 2023: India and the US launch the India-US Strategic Trade Dialogue (IUSSTD), designed to further enhance collaboration and trade in critical domains.

June 13, 2023: US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan meets Prime Minister Modi, Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar, and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval in New Delhi to discuss removing obstacles to technology and defense trade between the US and India in preparation for the upcoming official state visit.

June 15, 2023: Indian government approves the acquisition of 31 MQ-9B Predator drones from US manufacturer General Atomics. They will be used for maritime surveillance and monitoring the country’s borders with China and Pakistan.

June 21, 2023: Minister of State for Tourism Shripad Yesso Naik meets US Director of National Travel and Tourism Office Brian Beall at the fourth Tourism Working Group and Ministerial Meeting at G20.

June 21, 2023: Prime Minister Modi and First Lady Jill Biden participate in the “India and USA: Skilling for Future” event at the National Science Center in Washington, DC.

June 21, 2023: US Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense launch the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X).

June 21, 2023: Indian Ambassador to the US Taranjit Singh Sandhu signs the Artemis Accords, an agreement on space cooperation, on behalf of India in Washington, DC.

June 22, 2023: General Electric signs an MOU with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to co-produce GE F-414 fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force.

June 22, 2023: USAID and Indian Railways announced an MOU to combat climate change and achieve Indian Railways’ target of net-zero carbon emissions by 2030.

June 22, 2023: President Joe Biden meets Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington, DC to discuss deals on critical technologies, strengthen their defense partnership and prioritize clean energy. During these meetings, after years of preparation, India also became the 14th member of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership.

June 22, 2023: India agrees with the US to terminate six disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and India removes retaliatory tariffs.

June 23, 2023: Secretary Blinken and Vice President Kamala Harris host State Luncheon for Prime Minister Modi.

June 23, 2023: India’s Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) successfully concludes Operation Broader Sword, a joint effort with various US agencies.

June 23, 2023: Prime Minister Modi speaks to about 1,000 leading professionals of various disciplines, inviting them to partner with India in their business ventures, at the John F. Kennedy Center in Washington DC.

July 6, 2023: Ambassador Eric Garcetti expresses sorrow over ethnic violence in India’s northeastern state of Manipur after 120 people were killed in clashes between Kuki and Meiteis tribes.

July 9, 2023: Uzra Zeya, US undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights meets with senior Indian officials, including Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra, to deepen US-India cooperation on humanitarian support and Indo-Pacific stability.

July 9, 2023: US Navy Ship Salvor arrives in India for repairs, the first ship to be welcomed to the L&T Shipyard since the signing of the Master Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA) between the shipyard and the Navy.

July 12, 2023: US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti and Minister of State Jitendra Singh launch a new grant from the United States-India Science & Technology Endowment Fund, available to innovators from both nations in quantum technologies and artificial intelligence.

July 13, 2023: NASA announces that the two main components of the NISAR satellite, one primarily built by the US, and one primarily built by India, had been joined in mid-June.

July 17, 2023: US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen discusses the advancement of multilateral development banks with the Minister of Finance of India Nirmala Sitharaman at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Gandhinagar, Gujrat.

July 18, 2023: Prime Minister Modi thanks the US for the return of 105 trafficked antiquities as old as the 2nd century A.D.

July 18, 2023: US Navy vessel USS Stethem conducts exercises with Indian Navy vessel INS Tarkash to improve interoperability and demonstrate a commitment to cooperation on the seas.

July 18, 2023: Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep S. Puri and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm hold third ministerial meeting of the US-India Strategic Clean Energy Partnership (SCEP) in New Delhi. The sides noted the growing importance of bilateral energy cooperation while underscoring the critical importance of bilateral clean energy engagement.

July 25, 2023: Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry meets Dr. Mahendra Nath Pandey to discuss sustainable energy and India’s potential to be a key manufacturer of electric vehicles.

July 27, 2023: Michael Regan, administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, joins a shore walk across the Chennai coastline, where he meets Indian high school students who provide demonstrations of the impact of ocean health on climate.

July 28, 2023: G20 climate summit in Bengaluru concludes with an agreement on the majority, but not all 68 points of discussion.

July 28, 2023: Consul General of Mumbai Mike Hankey affirms his belief in India’s “golden opportunity” for US private sector investment at Semicon India 2023, inaugurated by Modi.

July 28, 2023: US chipmaker Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) dedicates $400 million investment in India over the next five years to include a new design center in Bengaluru and the creation of 3,000 new engineering roles.

Aug. 8, 2023: Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Rao Gupta concludes a week-long visit to India, during which she leads the US delegation to the G20 Alliance for the Empowerment and Progression of Women’s Economic Representation Conference and the G20 Ministerial Conference on Women’s Empowerment.

Aug. 9, 2023: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) hosts an international conference in celebration of World Biofuel Day 2023 in New Delhi, with speakers including Minister of State for Environment, Forests, and Climate Change Shri Ashwini Kumar Choubey , and Jonathan Heimer, Minister Counselor for Commercial Affairs at the Commercial Service.

Aug. 9, 2023: Ambassador Garcetti meets Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan to discuss student mobility and promote skill cooperation.

Aug. 16, 2023: Prime Minister Modi receives a US congressional delegation, emphasizing the importance of the two countries’ shared democratic ideals and expressing his appreciation for the US Congress’ support for US-India relations.

Aug. 21, 2023: US and Indian Navies conclude their annual Exercise Malabar, this time accompanied by Japan and Australian forces and hosted in Sydney.

Aug. 22-27, 2023: Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs Lee Satterfield concludes a visit to India, which included leading the US delegation to the G20 Culture Ministers’ Meeting in Varanasi.

Aug. 26, 2023: Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal meets US Trade Representative Katherine Tai, including to address concerns over India’s decision to impose import restrictions on certain electronic devices and the effect this may have on US exports.

Aug. 26, 2023: EducationUSA, supported by the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, kicks off a fair bringing US university representatives to India to meet potential Indian students.

Aug. 28, 2023: US “Tridents” of Patrol Squadron (VP) 26 complete a week-long training on maritime patrol and reconnaissance with Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 312 in Tamil Nadu.

Aug. 29, 2023: Indian Health Minister Mansukh Mandviya meets Ambassador Garcetti to discuss “health collaborations in Research and Development, artificial intelligence and increasing health access and equity.”

Aug. 29, 2023: Officials from Department of Energy (DOE) meet counterparts from the Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to launch the US-India Renewable Energy Technology Action Platform (RETAP), designed to advance new and emerging renewable technologies.

24. Balancing Space Superiority and Space Services to Better Sustain the Joint Force

Balancing Space Superiority and Space Services to Better Sustain the Joint Force - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Dennis Rice · September 18, 2023

Speaking before Congress, Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman stated that the Space Force had two fundamental missions: “to provide essential services to the joint force and to protect the joint force from adversary hostile uses of space systems.” Recent work on space warfare primarily focuses on the latter goal, with publications available on counterspace weapons, space superiority in great power competition, and operational imperatives. But the first goal remains important as well. Members of the new U.S. Space Force service components assigned to terrestrial combatant commands are particularly well placed to go beyond just focusing on space superiority. To effectively increase joint force lethality, they must also find new ways to provide essential services to joint forces. As the first space service component of a terrestrial combatant command, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians should set a new operational standard for space. Given the Indo-Pacific theater’s unique challenges, the operational focus must shift toward a more balanced approach — space operations to sustain joint forces.

Unlike other servicemembers in components such as Pacific Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, or U.S. Army Pacific, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians cannot be solely focused on their associated domain. They have the added challenge of bridging two of the nation’s largest geographic combatant commands, Indo-Pacific Command and Space Command. If that is not hard enough, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians must also set a new operational standard for space operations, which have historically been isolated to the strategic level of warfare. In the words of General Saltzman, “This is an important step as we normalize Space into the joint force. Given today’s multi-domain character of war, Space must be deeply integrated with the joint team.” If they are to realize General Saltzman’s goals, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians cannot simply be good joint team players. They should be fundamentally joint focused.

Space Operations and Joint Sustainment

To be inherently joint focused and increase joint force lethality, guardians should re-energize an operational connection that the joint force has taken for granted — space operations and joint sustainment. Currently, only one paragraph of Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, discusses space operations and joint sustainment. It reads:

[Positioning, navigation, and timing], [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], [satellite communication], and environmental monitoring support joint sustainment. Space-based environmental monitoring information provides regional weather, sea states, and terrain and ground stability and supports delivery of supplies and personnel. [Satellite communication] supports logistics and communications networks and links supporting the [common operating picture]. Space-based intelligence collection and environmental monitoring provide information for logistics route planning, timing, delivery methods, and locations. Space-based [global navigation satellite systems] … provide [positioning, navigation, and timing] to civil and military users worldwide.

Become a Member

The Space Force, although just over three years old, also has a lot of room for improvement in this area. Although enabling joint lethality and effectiveness is cited as a cornerstone responsibility, much space doctrine focuses on space operations to achieve space superiority. Seeking space superiority remains vital, of course; however, focusing only on this goal risks squandering the advantage it achieves. Ineffectively using U.S. space-based capabilities would be a dangerous missed opportunity for the joint force. In this regard, Russia’s missteps in utilizing its apparent space-based intelligence and precision navigation advantages in its recent war with Ukraine is a cautionary tale.

Only a handful of publicly available articles hint at the need to develop better procedures to effectively prioritize essential space-based services in a conflict. One 2018 National Defense University paper notes that “in recent exercises, white cell teams quickly restored denied space services and capabilities to allow progress in order to meet training objectives.” The claim was based on direct observations of tier 1 military exercises since 2011. Given this paucity of research and preparation, it is likely that in a crisis scenario where satellites are degraded, space forces will not have had sufficient practice in prioritizing and providing limited space services to relevant joint task forces. Fortunately, the creation of space components, like Space Forces Indo-Pacific, is a step in the right direction. Through the new space component staff, dedicated warfighters can now better prepare for denied space services scenarios. But they can only do so if there is a balanced effort incorporating both the pursuit of space superiority and the provision of essential space-based services.

High Demand, Low Density

To sustain joint forces requires space operations to maintain space superiority and to deliver space-based services to priority forces at the right time. The latter is made more critical because of the high-demand, low-density nature of space capabilities. In other words, there is not enough capability for everyone. Furthermore, an ever-increasing demand for exquisite capabilities like high-fidelity satellite imagery and over-the-horizon encrypted communications places even more strain on aging space systems. To make matters worse, developing counterspace threats like ground-based lasers and antisatellite missiles threaten the availability of critical space systems in crisis or conflict. Thus, guardians will be expected to anticipate needs and practice command and control processes to make the best use of surviving space-based services.

The dual focus on space operations and joint force enhancement can distinguish space components like Space Forces Indo-Pacific from Space Command, the geographic combatant command for the space domain. While Space Command members can primarily focus on space superiority operations, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians can ensure that space operations provide the required terrestrial effect.

To achieve synchronized terrestrial and space operations, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians should learn to anticipate joint force movement and maneuvers. The ability to anticipate is made more critical by the growing capabilities of U.S. adversaries. Moreover, in a conflict with potentially degraded communications across a vast ocean, the ability to anticipate and provide ready space-based services to the right task forces can significantly influence the outcome. To be effective, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians should understand, arguably in greater detail than other joint services, the joint force commander’s intent and the entire joint operations plan. Moreover, guardians should be able to anticipate several action-reaction possibilities as the conflict progresses and provide responsive sustainment support from space systems. In practice, this involves influencing space operations so that the most critical space services are preserved.

At the same time, guardians should coordinate the provision of key space services to prioritized forces, even ahead of any space support request. Acquiring such a high level of proactive planning begins with establishing a culture of historical study and early joint education, training, and experience.

One of the best historical studies for Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians is the 1982 Falklands War, which featured vast ocean distances, limited areas for operational support, multidomain battles, and the use of space-based services. Much of the information detailing space capabilities used during the Falklands War remains in classified vaults. However, the data that historians have so far uncovered demonstrate the impact of space-based support. Notably, historians have even uncovered hints of the Soviet Union providing space-based intelligence to Argentina during the conflict. This means the Falklands was an earlier example of the “first space war,” a term typically associated with Desert Storm.

No single historical event can speak to all modern operational challenges. The value is in the questions that stimulate reflection. For example, how did British forces mitigate the impacts of long distances during their Falkland campaign? How were multidomain operations executed, and to what effect? The more historical study becomes embedded in guardian culture, the more adept they will be at anticipating probable outcomes.

Early Joint Education, Training, and Experience

Beyond historical studies, the Space Force should also rethink the education, training, and experiences of its guardians. A key step is to better incorporate relevant studies in the arts into educational qualifications. The Space Force should also build in earlier joint education and training programs that equip guardians to better understand land, sea, and air operations. One option is for guardians to attend a sister service primary school, like how select guardians attend sister service intermediate-level education. Another is to train and qualify guardians as joint operations planners.

Of course, there is no better substitute for experience. Therefore, the Space Force should seek to integrate guardians into the operational level echelons of its sister services, like the Army’s multidomain task forces, the Navy’s fleet staffs, or the Air Force’s air operations centers. In so doing, a space component staff trains creative, innovative, and logical problem-solvers who can employ operational art to achieve unified action with joint forces.

As the first space component assigned to a terrestrial combatant command, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians are uniquely postured to set a new operational standard for space. While most theorists and scholars will focus on potential engagements in the space domain, Space Forces Indo-Pacific guardians should not lose sight of how space-based services are provided to joint forces. By establishing a culture of historical study and rethinking education, training, and experiences, they can be better equipped to work with joint partners, anticipate future support needs, and provide the right space-based services to the right forces at the right time.

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Dennis Rice is a Space Force officer who has led operations in multiple domains during his assignments with Space Forces Indo-Pacific, Pacific Air Forces, Cyber Command, National Security Agency, and Seventh Fleet. He earned a B.S. from the University of California San Diego and an M.S. from National Intelligence University, and was an Academic Year 2023 Art of War Scholar at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Image: Courtesy photo by ULA

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Dennis Rice · September 18, 2023

25. Taiwan’s Path Between Extremes

Excerpts:

Like many other advanced economies, Taiwan is facing the challenges of a declining birth rate and a shrinking labor force. I advocate integrating military service and youth employment. Since 2019, New Taipei City has successfully cooperated with businesses to offer employment to men who have completed their military service. This experience can be expanded to the whole country. Issues such as access to housing, education, and childcare also concern young people and, when not addressed, work to lower the birth rate. I will communicate openly with young Taiwanese to steer our society toward positive progress.

As the mayor of New Taipei City and a presidential candidate, I have been a public servant nurtured by the government for decades and long committed to serving the people of Taiwan. Pragmatism is my motto, and people trust me, recognizing I am a strong decision-maker who delivers on his promises and plans. I will also ensure that Taiwan stands with the international community. Together, we will promote peace, stability, and development across the Indo-Pacific region.

Taiwan’s Path Between Extremes

The Kuomintang Presidential Candidate Lays Out a Plan to Avert War With China

By Hou Yu-ih

September 18, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Hou Yu-ih · September 18, 2023

Taiwan is recognized around the world for its economic development and democratic achievements, its cutting-edge industries, and its vibrant civil society. In recent years, however, this island of 23 million people has been described in international media in darker terms. Some have called it a flashpoint that could start the next world war or even, according to The Economist, “the most dangerous place on earth.” That is because Beijing has grown increasingly assertive in its rhetoric and actions at a time when Taiwan and mainland China have no channel of communication to limit rising tensions. In the view of many observers, the equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait is in danger. If that were not enough, Taiwan also faces major internal challenges, including economic disruptions, declining birth rates, energy shortages, and the loss of factories as foreign firms restructure their supply chains.

Under my leadership, Taiwan will manage external and internal challenges with proactive pragmatism and be a responsible stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region. A strong military will help deter aggression and keep at bay any prospect of war in the Taiwan Strait. But peace also requires dialogue, and I will seek to interact constructively with Beijing in ways consistent with the Republic of China’s constitution and its laws. That interaction will lead to de-escalation. The world does not need rashness on either side, and Taiwan will chart a course between extremes. We will work with our partners to construct a future that fosters peace, stability, and development. This is Taiwan’s vision.

A Strong Defense

My experience as Taiwan’s chief of police taught me the importance of using both offense and defense when dealing with rivals—and the essential role of negotiations. When it comes to relations across the Taiwan Strait, I have always believed both in maintaining peace while increasing dialogue and in maintaining peace through strength. But I have no unrealistic expectations about Beijing’s intentions of seeking unification, and if necessary, by force. Taiwan’s most important priority should be to strengthen its national defense and deter the use of force by mainland China. To do so, I aim to build a strong military, enhance cooperation with partners and allies, and increase our deterrence capabilities to better safeguard Taiwan and the island groups of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.

The balance of military power across the strait tilts heavily in favor of Beijing, and the gap continues to widen. This makes it much more challenging for our military to deter the People’s Liberation Army and keep it off the island of Taiwan. Additionally, the PLA in recent years has been deploying large numbers of aircraft and vessels for “gray zone” tactics, operations below the threshold of outright war designed to intimidate adversaries and demonstrate strength. These military and paramilitary actions have increased the risk of accidents and an unexpected conflict.

Given the disparity in military might between Taiwan and mainland China, we must build and maintain effective deterrence to make planners in Beijing wary of taking any rash actions. Taiwan must creatively use available weapons and technologies, developing innovative and asymmetric capabilities that could stymie a large and well-resourced PLA. By increasing the likely cost of any war, Taiwan can reduce its opponent’s willingness to invade. I will also continue to assess our defense needs and strengthen our capabilities through arms procurement.

A strong military will help deter aggression and keep at bay any prospect of war in the Taiwan Strait.

In response to the increasing number of gray zone actions Taiwan has endured in recent years, I will direct relevant agencies to establish an early warning system. Such a system will better anticipate PLA displays of force or gray zone behavior and help develop various contingency plans to deal with Beijing’s harassment, infiltrations, and provocations.

I will initiate structural reforms within the government in order to strengthen the public’s awareness of what is needed for all-out defense. I will establish a cabinet-level All-Out Defense Mobilization Council directly under the executive branch of government, chaired by the vice premier. This body will completely integrate defense mobilization policy across various ministries and agencies.

And I will expand cooperation with like-minded partners. In particular, Taiwan should deepen its collaboration with the United States in various areas such as sharing intelligence and promoting regular joint training exercises. Such cooperation will strengthen mutual military interoperability to improve coordination between Taiwan’s forces and those of its partners in case of a contingency.

Peace currently reigns in the Taiwan Strait, but the status quo is unstable and the possibility of conflict is rapidly escalating. Stronger deterrence is essential for Taiwan to fend off external threats, and I will continue to invest in ensuring that such deterrence is in place. But safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy is not just a question of military deterrence. Dialogue between Taipei and Beijing is also a crucial way to defuse crises and ensure peace and stability.

A Fine Balance

Peace across the Taiwan Strait has always been a matter of maintaining a delicate equilibrium. My position is to further cross-strait relations based on the constitution of the Republic of China and its amendments. I support the 1992 Consensus, the approach to cross-strait dialogue agreed to by Taiwanese officials and counterparts from the mainland, consistent with the constitution.

I uphold Taiwan’s democratic and free political system while opposing both demands for Taiwan’s independence and any attempt to absorb the island into unification with mainland China under the guise of “one country, two systems.” I advocate for both sides to carry out official interactions based on a model of mutual nonrecognition of sovereignty and mutual nondenial of jurisdiction. Taiwan’s future will be determined only by its own people.

The majority of people in Taiwan want to maintain this status quo. Unfortunately, the status quo can be upset. During the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party, the lack of communication across the Taiwan Strait edged the situation closer to potential conflict. Many fear these circumstances are pushing Taiwan to the brink of war.

The past seven years have seen rising tensions in cross-strait relations. Repairing those relations will be tricky. It would be impossible to instantly revert to the way both sides interacted in the past. In facing my counterpart in Beijing, I would uphold our democratic and free system, strengthen national defense, deter the mainland from using force, increase cross-strait exchanges, and reduce the probability of conflicts, all to keep Taiwan away from war.

I am dedicated to avoiding recklessness in Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China.

During my presidency, I will stay committed to the sovereignty of the Republic of China and its free and democratic system. I will oppose any push for independence and insist that cross-strait differences should be resolved through peaceful means. My goal is stability in the Taiwan Strait, security for Taiwan, and peace of mind for the world.

I am dedicated to avoiding recklessness in Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China and upholding a free and democratic system. It is about urging both sides to jointly promote democracy, human rights, mutual benefits, and mutual trust. In addition, the KMT has always believed that a majority of Taiwanese do not want formal independence, that such independence will damage Taiwan’s relations with its allies and neighboring countries, and that independence will inevitably undermine regional stability. A push for de jure independence, as included in the Democratic Progressive Party platform, is an absolutely untenable strategy that must not be adopted. The KMT’s approach is not just passive in its opposition to the use of force by mainland China. It still allows the prudent strengthening and perfecting of Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities while simultaneously avoiding miscalculations and resolving any crises through cross-strait dialogue.

I propose a “three Ds” strategy to maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader Indo-Pacific region: deterrence, dialogue, and de-escalation. In the interest of deterrence, Taiwan must enhance its self-defense capabilities. Taiwan has to integrate innovative thinking and its diverse resources. By being prepared for war, but not provoking it, Taiwan will make the opponent feel hesitant about its own military capabilities, thus decreasing its desire to invade. Taiwan will use strength to safeguard peace and stability across the strait.

Under my administration, any dialogue with mainland China will be in accordance with the constitution and the 1992 Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, the Taiwanese law that provides a legal framework for cross-strait relations. Drawing from successful experiences with such dialogue during past KMT governments, such as the collaborative efforts to combat crime since the 1990s that culminated in a comprehensive agreement on judicial mutual assistance signed in 2009, I will continue cross-strait communication while avoiding military miscalculations.

Continued interactions between the two sides on functional matters will help de-escalate future risks. This is what I call principled interactions on the basis of equality, goodwill, and dignity. In this way, Taiwan can enhance understanding through exchanges and ensure peace through strength. Through mid- and long-term interactions between both sides, I believe it is possible to gradually decrease hostility and reduce the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait—and avoid the threat of war.

Taiwan in the World

Taiwan is an important actor and needs to be a responsible force in the Indo-Pacific region. The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is of great importance, and the United States and other like-minded countries have been long-standing and essential allies to Taiwan. Our country is grateful to Washington for its arms sales and various Taiwan-friendly acts passed by Congress and signed by the White House over the years. Since the ending of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Republic of China in 1979, the substantive relationship between the two has only grown. I want to express my gratitude to our friends in various sectors in the United States for their support for Taiwan and offer my encouragement to the diplomatic personnel who tirelessly work hard for the Republic of China.

U.S.-Taiwanese relations should continue to strengthen, encompassing governmental interactions on various issues and the exchange of positive sentiments among the people. I welcome the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a deal agreed to earlier this year, and I hope that the United States can assist Taiwan in joining other regional trade and economic arrangements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Taiwan will continue to seek to advance trade liberalization with its partners, including by signing free trade agreements.

I insist that the Republic of China is a sovereign state. In international intergovernmental organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, it participates as an equal member alongside other countries. In the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the international community also expects meaningful participation from Taiwan. Having substantive, consistent, timely, and comprehensive participation in these international organizations is crucial for Taiwan. For example, the island should be allowed to join as an observer in the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and Interpol in the years to come.

Faced with rapidly changing global dynamics and geopolitical and economic challenges, Taiwan should not retreat from the world but instead wield its strength and influence to do more. It can be a defender of regional order and democratic values, a leader in technological innovation and digital transformation, a promoter of sustainable development and the green economy, a contributor of humanitarian aid and foreign assistance, and both a facilitator of peace and a defender of security in the Taiwan Strait.

I will not take the United States’ security support of Taiwan for granted, and I will also not cause any unnecessary trouble for our friends. Under my leadership, Taiwan will be a peacemaker committed to reducing risks. Within the framework of the constitution, we will pragmatically engage in cross-strait dialogue, creating conditions for peace and strengthening relations with the United States and Japan. Taiwan, the United States, and other like-minded countries in Asia can still further improve our relations. I also hope to continue cooperating with Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and friends in Southeast Asia. As president, I will continue my unwavering commitment to safeguard Taiwan’s democratic achievements and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and beyond.

The Resilient Island

Whatever the peril in its neighborhood, Taiwan also has to pay attention to its own set of domestic problems. Like many other countries, post-pandemic Taiwan faces many internal challenges. As president, I would certainly have to focus on building Taiwan’s resilience in times of uncertainty.

Energy security is crucial to Taiwan’s survival, and even more so in the event of a military blockade or an all-out war, as Taiwan is an island. Maintaining its nuclear energy supply is extremely important since over 95 percent of Taiwan’s energy is imported and its high-tech industries require stable energy sources. Establishing energy resilience is an essential matter of national security and a necessity for economic development. Since the Democratic Progressive Party’s pledge to wind down the use of nuclear energy by 2025 is precipitous and impractical, I advocate a policy of ensuring a secure power supply with an orderly transition away from fossil fuels, prioritizing energy conservation while moving sustainably toward green energy. This approach involves gradually reducing reliance on fossil fuels such as coal and increasing the proportion of clean energy, with nuclear energy as a useful bridge to the future. Only then can Taiwan achieve its ambitious climate goals, including becoming a net-zero emitter by 2050.

I will pragmatically increase renewable energy production and effectively use existing nuclear power sources after ensuring their safety is in line with international standards. More important, I will also emphasize efficient energy conservation and the regulation of supply and demand, including through investments in energy efficiency, energy storage, and smart grids. And I will incrementally increase the share of green energy in the overall supply.

Whatever the peril in its neighborhood, Taiwan also has to address its own set of domestic problems.

Taiwan is a key player in the global semiconductor industry, and building Taiwan’s supply chain resilience will also be my focus. The Taiwan Strait is vital for global trade. In the post-pandemic era, policymakers are increasingly concerned about reducing manufacturing and transportation risks. The United States’ “friend-shoring” policy aims to enhance the resilience of global supply chains, strengthening their ability to withstand and respond to emergencies. Taiwan can play a proactive role in this initiative. In the future, Taiwanese businesses from various industries, including those that make semiconductors, will expand their global base through manufacturing or R&D investments in friendly countries. As for firms that cannot invest abroad due to their nature or their scale, the government will continue to guide them in upgrading and linking with overseas Taiwanese businesses. This will help promote the growth of all industries and benefit Taiwan’s economic development.

Regarding cybersecurity threats, the government should also strengthen Taiwan’s cyber-resilience through legislation and cooperation with the public and private sectors. This will ensure that communication lines and the chain of command are not interrupted in the event of a natural disaster or a conflict.

Like many other advanced economies, Taiwan is facing the challenges of a declining birth rate and a shrinking labor force. I advocate integrating military service and youth employment. Since 2019, New Taipei City has successfully cooperated with businesses to offer employment to men who have completed their military service. This experience can be expanded to the whole country. Issues such as access to housing, education, and childcare also concern young people and, when not addressed, work to lower the birth rate. I will communicate openly with young Taiwanese to steer our society toward positive progress.

As the mayor of New Taipei City and a presidential candidate, I have been a public servant nurtured by the government for decades and long committed to serving the people of Taiwan. Pragmatism is my motto, and people trust me, recognizing I am a strong decision-maker who delivers on his promises and plans. I will also ensure that Taiwan stands with the international community. Together, we will promote peace, stability, and development across the Indo-Pacific region.

• HOU YU-IH is the Kuomintang candidate for president of the Republic of China (Taiwan). He has served as the Mayor of New Taipei City since 2018.

Foreign Affairs · by Hou Yu-ih · September 18, 2023

26. Ukraine Just Dismissed All Its Deputy Defense Ministers – Here’s Why

Ukraine Just Dismissed All Its Deputy Defense Ministers – Here’s Why

The move is standard procedure after the new defense minister is appointed but some reports suggest a huge overhaul is underway at the Ministry.

by Julia Struck, Maryna Shashkova | September 18, 2023, 1:01 pm | Comments ( 1)

kyivpost.com

Ukraine Verkhovna Rada

The move is standard procedure after the new defense minister is appointed but some reports suggest a huge overhaul is underway at the Ministry.

by Julia Struck, Maryna Shashkova | September 18, 2023, 1:01 pm |

Ukraine's Deputy of Defence Minister Hanna Maliar addresses a press-conference in Kyiv on December 15, 2022. (Photo by Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP)

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dismissed all the country’s deputy defense ministers – including Hanna Maliar – during a meeting on Monday, Sept. 18.

Taras Melnychuk, the government's representative in the Verkhovna Rada, confirmed that this decision affected six deputy heads of the Ministry of Defense and the state secretary of the ministry.

Who exactly was fired?

The government dismissed:

• Volodymyr Gavrylov – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine
• Rostyslav Zamlynsky – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine
• Hanna Maliar – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine
• Denis Sharapov – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine
• Andriy Shevchenko – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for European Integration
• Vitaly Deinega – Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for Digital Development, Digital Transformations, and Digitalization

"The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine also dismissed Vashchenko Kostyantyn Oleksandrovych from the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine," Melnychuk wrote on his Telegram channel.

Why did the dismissals take place?

It is important to note that these dismissals are a standard procedure that occurs whenever the head of the ministry changes. Subsequently, the government either reassigns the dismissed deputy ministers or appoints new ones.

The former head of the ministry, Oleksiy Reznikov, was recently replaced by Rustem Umerov, triggering the latest development.

On Sept. 6, People's Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko reported via Telegram that three deputy ministers of defense had submitted their resignations even before the appointment of Umerov.

According to Goncharenko, statements were submitted by Volodymyr Gavrylov, Vitaly Deinega, and Andriy Shevchenko. However, Deinega denied his resignation and announced that he would cooperate with the new minister.

"The new minister and I will resolve our differences, and then I will provide a comprehensive update. I believe that we both have expectations from each other, and it will take time for us to align our strategies," Deinega noted on Facebook.

More on this topic

‘Prepare For a Long War’ – NATO Chief Issues Stark Warning, Says Ukraine Will Join Alliance ‘Eventually’

Jens Stoltenberg also said the world needs to recognise that if Ukraine stops fighting “their country will no longer exist.” If Russia stopped "we will have peace," he added.

But adding to the intrigue, Ukraiinska Pravda reported on Monday lunchtime that all deputies have written applications for resignation voluntarily after the request of Umerov and will not return to these positions.

A source close to the Ministry of Defense said “a complete update is underway.”

Umerov's reaction

In his Facebook post, Minister of Defense Umerov, said: "Reboot. We've started. We're working as usual. The rest of the news – later. Right now, the focus is on Rammstein."

Kyiv Post also inquired about the possibility of reappointing any of the dismissed ministers to which the press secretary of Umyerov responded: "There will be news on this matter later."

Zelensky calls for immediate changes in the Ministry of Defense from Umerov

On Sept. 5, the Verkhovna Rada voted to accept Reznikov's resignation as the head of the Ministry of Defense, concurrently removing Rustem Umerov from his position as the head of the State Property Fund.

On Sept. 6, Umerov assumed the official role of Ukraine's Minister of Defense, a move overwhelmingly endorsed by the country's parliament.

He pledged to do "everything possible and impossible for the victory of Ukraine." Umerov defined victory as "when we liberate every centimeter of our country and every one of our people."

This appointment, occurring more than a year and a half into Russia's full-scale invasion, marks a significant transition for Ukraine and follows a series of corruption scandals within the defense ministry.

When introducing Umerov as the new Minister of Defense, President Zelensky emphasized the immediate need for changes within the ministry, with a focus on anti-corruption measures and the well-being of Ukrainian troops and their families.

The President said: "People are not expendable; their time and energy are valuable to our state." Zelensky emphasized that the Ministry of Defense has identified several key objectives for Umerov, including a reduction in bureaucratic procedures that consume the time and energy of soldiers.

"Anything that can be digitized should be digitized," Zelensky said. "Any unnecessary bureaucracy should be eliminated. Anything that can save lives and protect the health of our soldiers must be identified and provided to our troops."

The recent controversy surrounding Hanna Maliar

Last week, on Sept. 14, Maliar disseminated false information regarding the liberation of Andriivka by Ukrainian defenders in the direction of Bakhmut. However, she explained that the misinformation stemmed from a breakdown in communication among several information sources.

"I do not publish such information without coordination and agreement with the military. Currently, there is a communication breakdown among several information sources reporting directly from the scene."

However, on the very next day, Sept. 15, the General Staff of the Armed Forces confirmed that the Ukrainian defense forces had indeed liberated Andriivka.

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Julia Struck

Julia Struck is a news writer and Kyiv Post correspondent who has previously worked as a parliamentary editor, journalist, and news editor. She has specialized in covering the work of Ukrainian parliament, government, and law enforcement agencies.

Maryna Shashkova

Ukrainian journalist. Senior Corespondent at Kyiv Post. I have been working as a journalist for almost 10 years. I write about Ukrainian politics and social issues.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

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