Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"Evil people always support each other; that is their chief strength."
- Aleksander Solzhenitsyn

"Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction."
- Blaise Pascal

"One of the saddest lessons of history is this: if we've been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle."
- Carl Sagan




​1. S. Korea, China, Japan to hold high-level talks next week to discuss trilateral summit

2. N. Korea's food shortages probably improved on crop harvest, imports: unification ministry

3.  Mosaic of N. Korean leader erected in Pyongyang as part of personality cult

4. Senior S. Korean, US officials discuss recent N. Korea-Russia summit

5. Biden thanks S. Korea, other countries for helping achieve return of U.S. detainees from Iran

6. S. Korea sends experts to monitor Fukushima release as part of regular visits: official

7. S. Korean foreign ministry summons Russian envoy over N.K. ties

8. Could North Korea Send 'Volunteers' to Fight in Ukraine?

9. North Korea and Russia: How Far Could Their Partnership Go?

10. Kim’s Russia jaunt offers an uncertain mix of substance, theater

11. The Axis of Outcasts

12. Is it time to celebrate the military agreement? (South-north CMA)

13. Rethinking Engagement with North Korea

14.  Putin may regret forging closer ties with Kim: experts

15. North Korea's communism gives rise to ruthless capitalism: defectors






1. S. Korea, China, Japan to hold high-level talks next week to discuss trilateral summit


Our diplomats and (military personnel) from all three countries will work hard to sustain and build on the results of the Camp David Summit.



S. Korea, China, Japan to hold high-level talks next week to discuss trilateral summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 19, 2023

SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, China and Japan plan to hold a high-level meeting in Seoul next week to discuss three-way cooperation, including setting up a trilateral summit of their leaders, according to Seoul's foreign ministry Tuesday.

According to the ministry, the meeting, set for Sept. 26, will bring together South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Chung Byung-won, Takehiro Funakoshi, Japan's senior deputy foreign minister, and Nong Rong, China's assistant minister of foreign affairs.

Lim Soo-suk, spokesperson for the ministry, said the three sides will discuss various matters related to their trilateral consultative body, and review the current state and future direction of cooperation between the three countries.


South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (C) attends the ASEAN Plus Three foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta, in this file photo taken July 13, 2023, along with his Chinese and Japanese counterparts, Wang Yi (L) and Yoshimasa Hayashi, respectively. (Yonhap)

A ministry official told reporters the meeting will also discuss matters related to a possible trilateral summit that has been suspended since 2019.

"The trilateral summit is currently under discussion with the aim of holding it within the year," the official said, adding the three sides could hold a foreign ministerial meeting to coordinate a date for the summit.

Three-way summits among the regional neighbors, first held in December 2008, were suspended after the eighth gathering in December 2019 following a dispute between South Korea and Japan over forced labor compensation rulings and the pandemic.

Talks on the need to revive tripartite summit diplomacy have surfaced following a thawing of the frozen ties between Seoul and Japan since the launch of the current South Korean administration under President Yoon Suk Yeol in May of last year.

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 19, 2023



2. N. Korea's food shortages probably improved on crop harvest, imports: unification ministry


Seems like some slightly good news. But when things are so desperate a slight improvement is not likely to make a significant difference to those who are truly suffering.



N. Korea's food shortages probably improved on crop harvest, imports: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2023

SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's food situations may have improved, compared with the first half of the year, on the back of an increase in crop harvest and imports, South Korea's unification ministry said Tuesday.

With deaths from starvation reported in some regions, North Korea has reportedly been facing serious food shortages, as its prolonged COVID-19 border closure and disruptions in state-controlled food supply have aggravated the situation.

"There is a possible change in the North's food situations, as the country has boosted food imports and harvests of barley and wheat have significantly made progress," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

The official said the North seems to have suffered a food crisis in the first half due largely to problems in food distributions, rather than an absolute shortage of food.

Russia is ready to offer food aid to North Korea, but Pyongyang said it can "do without foreign help as it has good harvest," Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora said in an interview with Russia's state-run news agency TASS.

The North is known for chronic food shortages that have been apparently aggravated in recent years amid global sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs, unfavorable weather and border lockdowns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.


This image, captured from footage of North Korea's Korean Central Television on Sept. 3, 2023, shows harvesting under way at a county in North Pyongan Province. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2023



3.  Mosaic of N. Korean leader erected in Pyongyang as part of personality cult



Remember one of the main functions of the Propaganda and Agitation Department is to enhance the reputation of Kim Jong Un.


The mural really does resemble many of the poses and scenes of grandfather Kim Il Sung.  


Excerpts:

The secretive regime has been accelerating the personality cult for Kim Jong-un by bestowing him with the title "President," which was reserved for his late grandfather.
South Korea's unification ministry said the erection of Kim's mosaics and the use of such a title reflect the North's drive for idolizing him.




(LEAD) Mosaic of N. Korean leader erected in Pyongyang as part of personality cult | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 2, 7, 8)

SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- A mosaic mural depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was erected at an elite school in Pyongyang, state media reported Tuesday, as North Korea has been bolstering its leader's personality cult.

The North held a ceremony unveiling the mosaic Sunday at Mangyongdae Revolutionary School to portray his "benevolent image" shown during his visit to the school last year on its 75th founding anniversary, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The painting described Kim, wearing a red scarf around his neck, as smiling while being surrounded by students of the school, according to photos carried by the KCNA.


This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 19, 2023, shows the North unveiling a mosaic depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un being erected at Mangyongdae Revolutionary School in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea has set up mosaic murals, mainly made of pieces of colored glass and tiles, for late former leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il across the country for propaganda purposes.

North Korea revealed a mosaic mural of Kim Jong-un for the first time in October last year, with a painting depicting him as digging the first shovel of earth at a ceremony to mark the start of the construction of a greenhouse farm in Hamju County. But it marked the first time that the erection of such a mosaic was identified in Pyongyang.

The secretive regime has been accelerating the personality cult for Kim Jong-un by bestowing him with the title "President," which was reserved for his late grandfather.

South Korea's unification ministry said the erection of Kim's mosaics and the use of such a title reflect the North's drive for idolizing him.

"The North's leader has continued to stress the importance of the future generation and he seems to cherish the school as a symbol of his regime," a ministry official told reporters when asked about the government's assessment of the North's intent to set his mosaic at the school.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2023


4. Senior S. Korean, US officials discuss recent N. Korea-Russia summit


Sustained high level engagement across government agencies.



Senior S. Korean, US officials discuss recent N. Korea-Russia summit

The Korea Times · September 18, 2023

Kim Gunn, right, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs at South Korea's foreign ministry, poses with Brett Holmgren, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research, before their meeting in Seoul, Sept. 18, in this photo provided by the ministry. Yonhap


South Korea's top nuclear envoy met with a senior U.S. State Department official Monday to discuss the recent summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Seoul's foreign ministry said.


Kim Gunn, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and Brett Holmgren, assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research, exchanged views on the motives behind the North's provocations and future prospects, according to the ministry.


Holmgren shared Washington's assessment of the recent summit and the growing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, and also agreed to closely cooperate with Seoul on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.


The meeting, held in Seoul, comes as last week's rare summit has raised concerns over potential arms deals between the two increasingly isolated countries. (Yonhap)



The Korea Times · September 18, 2023



5. Biden thanks S. Korea, other countries for helping achieve return of U.S. detainees from Iran





(2nd LD) Biden thanks S. Korea, other countries for helping achieve return of U.S. detainees from Iran | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 19, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with details of Seoul foreign ministry's statement in paras 9-10)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Sept. 18 (Yonhap) -- President Joe Biden expressed his appreciation Monday to South Korea and other countries for helping achieve the return of five American citizens who were detained in Iran.

Biden issued a statement celebrating their release under a rare swap deal with Tehran that reportedly saw around $6 billion in Iranian funds frozen in South Korean banks under U.S. sanctions unlocked.

"I am grateful to our partners at home and abroad for their tireless efforts to help us achieve this outcome, including the Governments of Qatar, Oman, Switzerland, and South Korea," he said, noting the detainees endured "years of agony, uncertainty and suffering."


This photo, taken on Aug. 18, 2023, shows President Joe Biden speaking during a joint press conference with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, Yoon Suk Yeol and Fumio Kishida, at Camp David. (Yonhap)

Biden gave special thanks to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, and the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq, for helping facilitate the deal.

He also reminded U.S. citizens of the "serious risks" of traveling to Iran, while stressing reuniting "wrongfully" detained Americans with their loved ones has been a priority for his administration.

In a separate statement, Secretary of State Antony Blinken also thanked South Korea.

"We also thank the Republic of Korea for its close coordination and partnership," he said, referring to the East Asian ally by its official name.

The Iranian funds in two South Korean banks -- the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) and Woori Bank -- had been frozen under U.S. sanctions that were reimposed after then U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from a landmark 2015 nuclear deal with Iran in 2018.

Seoul's foreign ministry issued a statement confirming the successful transfer of the Iranian funds to a third country under close cooperation between relevant nations.

It also expressed hope for the development of relations with South Korea and Iran following the transfer of the funds.

Tensions arose between South Korea and Iran as the Islamic republic had demanded the transfer of its frozen money. The demand posed a diplomatic challenge to Seoul, which has been striving to strengthen its treaty alliance with Washington and its economic partnership with Tehran.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 19, 2023


6. S. Korea sends experts to monitor Fukushima release as part of regular visits: official



S. Korea sends experts to monitor Fukushima release as part of regular visits: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 19, 2023

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea dispatched a team of experts to Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant Tuesday as part of regular visits to monitor the release of contaminated water into the ocean, according to an official.

"This visit marks the first onsite activity since the first round of water release concluded on Sept. 11," Park Ku-yeon, first deputy chief of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, said during a daily briefing on the Fukushima issue. The controversial release had commenced on August 24.

The two countries earlier agreed on regular visits by local experts to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) field office located in Fukushima after President Yoon Suk Yeol asked Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to include South Korean experts.

An undisclosed number of nuclear experts from the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety also intend to hold talks with IAEA officials and visit key facilities at the plant, including the monitoring control room, during their visit, according to Park.

Meanwhile, Japan is set to release additional contaminated water three more times by next March, according to the Seoul government.


Park Ku-yeon (L), first deputy chief of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, speaks during a daily briefing on the Fukushima issue in Seoul on Sept. 18, 2023. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · September 19, 2023


7. S. Korean foreign ministry summons Russian envoy over N.K. ties


This must have been an interesting conversation. Iwonder how the Ambassador explained the visit.




S. Korean foreign ministry summons Russian envoy over N.K. ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · September 19, 2023

SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean foreign ministry summoned the top Russian envoy to the country Tuesday to lodge a complaint over Moscow's discussions of arms deals and military cooperation with North Korea.

Seoul's Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin called in Russian Ambassador Andrey Kulik earlier in the day and called for Moscow to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, the ministry said in a message to reporters.

The summons came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin last week and toured a series of key military sites amid growing concerns about a possible arms deal between the two nations.

Chang called for Russia to "immediately" end moves to seek military ties with North Korea.

He also stressed that Russia should act "responsibly" as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and that any violations of the resolution, as well as actions that threaten South Korea's security, would have a negative impact on the relationship between the two countries.


Seoul's Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin (R) speaks with Russian Ambassador Andrey Kulik in Seoul on Sept. 19, 2023, in this photo released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)


(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Yoon-seung · September 19, 2023




8. Could North Korea Send 'Volunteers' to Fight in Ukraine?


I am sure it could. But will it? I would not be surprised to learn that there are nKPA in Russia and occupied areas of Ukraine.


If we learn of their presence I would like to see Ukraine really beat up on those units and then use that to support an information campaign against the nKPA in the north..


Excerpts:

The role in that latter conflict was downplayed, and in fact, it was only in 2011 after Romania released a classified document from that Cold War that it was noted that North Korea dispatched personnel to Vietnam to carry out psychological warfare against the nearly 313,000 South Korean troops sent to fight against the North Vietnamese between 1965 and 1973. A North Korean Air Force regiment was also sent to help defend the skies of North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks.
More recently, North Korea has provided support in the civil wars in Ethiopia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Though the number of troops was small, North Korea’s military has likely gained much experience in guerilla warfare tactics that could be useful to the Kremlin.
Though it is unclear if Kim and Putin actually discussed the sending of any “volunteers,” it should be noted that Moscow played a significant role in the Korean War aiding the North.
Though it denied it at the time, it is now a known fact that the Soviet Union provided diplomatic support, as well as strategic and grand tactical planning – while more importantly, it supplied and trained the air forces of both China and North Korea. In addition, Soviet “volunteer” pilots flew aircraft with Chinese or North Korean markings, and after the war even claimed to have shot down more than 400 aircraft.
Perhaps Kim will repay that debt with some ground forces.




Could North Korea Send 'Volunteers' to Fight in Ukraine?

North Korea has provided support in the civil wars in Ethiopia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Though the number of troops was small, North Korea’s military has likely gained much experience in guerilla warfare tactics that could be useful to the Kremlin.


19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · September 18, 2023

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his six-day trip to Russia on Sunday, beginning his journey home via his personal armored train. Much like a tourist, he reportedly returned home with a number of souvenirs, including five explosive “kamikaze” drones, a reconnaissance drone, and a “bulletproof vest” – gifts from a regional Russian governor.

The visit to the Russian Far East was Kim’s first official trip abroad since the COVID-19 pandemic, and the North Korean leader met directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin last week as the pair toured a space launch facility. Kim also visited a number of military sites, shipyards, and aircraft factories.

Closer Ties between North Korea and Russia

The trip marked the closer ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, and the potential technology sharing has worried many in the West. Putin has offered to provide assistance that could allow North Korea to launch a spy satellite into space – as its technology is decades behind Russia’s.

As the BBC reported, helping put a satellite in space so North Korea can watch its enemies is vastly different from the Kremlin aiding a nuclear and missiles program banned by the UN Security Council. Pyongyang has nuclear warhead-topped intercontinental ballistic missiles which in theory could reach the U.S. – yet they can’t fly through space successfully. Moscow could provide the technology to Pyongyang, which could put the U.S. within striking distance.

North Korea could perhaps pay back the debt – as well as an even older debt to Moscow – by supporting the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. Already North Korea has provided ordnance to Moscow, but it could next provide something else in seemingly short supply – namely troops!

While Kim wouldn’t likely officially support the war, it is possible “volunteers” from North Korea could bolster the Kremlin’s forces.

Foreign Volunteers

North Korea wouldn’t be the only Russian ally to send such volunteers, as there have been reports of Syrians fighting for Russia.

Another Russian partner has been less eager to aid Moscow however.

Earlier this month, Cuba arrested 17 over the alleged recruitment of its citizens to fight for Russia in Ukraine, claiming some of the recruits were misled into believing they’d be working in Russia, not fighting in its war.

The two nations are political allies and Cubans do not require a visa to travel to Russia – and many go there to study or to work. It now appears that some have been recruited to fight in Ukraine, as Russian law allows foreign nationals to enlist in its military. However, Cuban law generally doesn’t allow its citizens to serve as mercenaries, even as its military advisors had provided aid to a number of nations and insurgent forces during the Cold War.

A North Korean Legion?

The Korean People’s Army, which was founded as an anti-Japanese guerilla force in 1932, took its current form 75 years ago with the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is the armed wing of the Workers’ Party of Korea and considers its primary adversaries to be the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the United States Forces Korea, across the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

It is now the second largest military organization in the world, with 29.9 percent of the North Korean population actively serving, in reserve or in a paramilitary capacity. This includes some 200,000 Special Forces troops.

North Korea is technically still at war with its neighbor to the South, but it hasn’t officially been involved in a conflict abroad – yet Pyongyang has sent its forces to support its allies in a number of conflicts, including the Vlora Incident in Albania in the 1960s, the Simba Rebellion in the Congo in 1964, the Communist insurgency in Thailand, and most notably the Vietnam War.

The role in that latter conflict was downplayed, and in fact, it was only in 2011 after Romania released a classified document from that Cold War that it was noted that North Korea dispatched personnel to Vietnam to carry out psychological warfare against the nearly 313,000 South Korean troops sent to fight against the North Vietnamese between 1965 and 1973. A North Korean Air Force regiment was also sent to help defend the skies of North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks.

More recently, North Korea has provided support in the civil wars in Ethiopia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Though the number of troops was small, North Korea’s military has likely gained much experience in guerilla warfare tactics that could be useful to the Kremlin.

Though it is unclear if Kim and Putin actually discussed the sending of any “volunteers,” it should be noted that Moscow played a significant role in the Korean War aiding the North.

Though it denied it at the time, it is now a known fact that the Soviet Union provided diplomatic support, as well as strategic and grand tactical planning – while more importantly, it supplied and trained the air forces of both China and North Korea. In addition, Soviet “volunteer” pilots flew aircraft with Chinese or North Korean markings, and after the war even claimed to have shot down more than 400 aircraft.

Perhaps Kim will repay that debt with some ground forces.

Author Experience and Expertise

A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · September 18, 2023



9. North Korea and Russia: How Far Could Their Partnership Go?


Of course I agree with my good friend Bruce Klingner.  

The U.S. should counter the growing North Korean military threat by continuing to strengthen security cooperation with allies South Korea and Japan. Last year, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo restarted trilateral military exercises. Along with the reinstatement of large-scale U.S.–South Korean exercises, these will increase allied deterrence capabilities.
During a Camp David summit in August, the countries’ three leaders pledged even more extensive trilateral military exercises, real-time exchange of information on North Korean missile launches, and increased cooperation on ballistic missile defense. The leaders’ commitment to consult and coordinate responses to common security threats was a major step forward in trilateral military cooperation but stopped far short of formal alliance

We have significantly improved ROK/US military combined readiness over the past two plus years. Yes it is time to go further with trilateral cooperation. 


But we must go even farther with our response. We need a new strategy that is based on a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.





North Korea and Russia: How Far Could Their Partnership Go?

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed their strong ties during initial talks that hinted Russia will provide military and technological support to North Korea.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · September 18, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed their strong ties during initial talks that hinted Russia will provide military and technological support to North Korea.

During Kim’s trip to Russia — his first trip outside North Korea in four years — he doubled down on his support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, depicting it as a fight to “punish the evil forces that ambitiously pursue hegemony and expansion.”

Putin said he is considering military cooperation with North Korea, though he noted “certain restrictions” resulting from stringent international sanctions on both countries. Strengthened military ties between the two despotic regimes will pose significant challenges to U.S. strategic interests in Europe and Asia.

Growing Threats

A successful North Korea-Russian arms deal would enable Moscow’s continued aggression against Ukraine. In return, Russian military technology could help Pyongyang further refine its rapidly growing missile and conventional weapons forces. Doing so would augment the North Korean military threat to U.S. allies South Korea and Japan.

The Kim-Putin meeting confirms a growing military and diplomatic entente between the two countries, one that has solidified since Russia invaded Ukraine. North Korea was one of few countries that opposed the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion. Pyongyang recognized the “independence” of Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.

Last year, the U.S. asserted that North Korea had sold “millions of artillery shells and rockets” to Russia. The artillery ammunition likely consisted of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells and rockets, which are compatible with Russian systems.

Washington recently warned that North Korea and Russia were “actively advancing” negotiations for a new arms deal following an exchange of letters by the two leaders “pledging to increase their bilateral cooperation.” In July, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to North Korea. During the first visit by a Russian defense minister since 1991, Shoigu was escorted by Kim to an exhibition of North Korean weapons systems. Shoigu reportedly asked Pyongyang to sell more artillery ammunition to Russia and proposed North Korea join Russian-Chinese combined naval exercises for the first time.

An Ambitious but Ambiguous Partnership

Neither Kim nor Putin mentioned specifics of a comprehensive deal. Recent media reporting indicated an agreement could include massive North Korean artillery ammunition sales to support Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine. In return, Russia would support Pyongyang’s ambitions to obtain military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines.

The two leaders might be hesitant to publicly confirm any deal that would constitute violations of numerous UN resolution sanctions, but it appears certain that bilateral military support is forthcoming. Kim’s visits to a Russian civilian rocket launch facility, to civilian and military factories, and to a demonstration of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, allowed him to see the military and civilian technology Putin could provide in return for a new tranche of North Korean ammunition.

Pyongyang and Moscow both suffer from international isolation. They also must confront the material effects of sanctions brought on by their aggressive actions and repeated violations of UN resolutions and international law. Russia’s push for foreign ammunition suppliers, despite its own extensive weapons and ammunition production capability, reflects a desperation to replenish reserves depleted by its high expenditure of ammunition in Ukraine. It also shows how global sanctions have severely restricted Moscow’s supply chains. North Korea languishes after years of self-imposed, draconian Covid restrictions on trade, as well as international sanctions and decades of failed socialist economic policies.

Concerns about a potential arms deal could spur additional measures by European and Asian nations. Although Moscow and Beijing would obstruct any U.S. proposal for new, punitive UN Security Council resolutions, existing resolutions provide sufficient basis for more rigorous sanctions enforcement against both countries.

How Washington Can Lead the Response

The Biden administration should step up its enforcement of U.S. and UN sanctions and work systematically with the international community to target North Korean violators, as well as entities in Russia, China, and elsewhere that facilitate Pyongyang’s transgressions.

The U.S. has taken minimal steps recently to counter the growing collaboration. Washington sanctioned a North Korean national for providing financial, material, or technological support for Yevgeniy Prigozhin of the Wagner Group and for facilitating shipments of munitions to Russia. In August, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned three entities that seek to evade sanctions by supporting arms deals between North Korea and Russia. Two of the entities were involved with a previously sanctioned individual who sought to transfer over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions to Russia in exchange for a range of goods, including raw materials and commodities, to North Korea.

The U.S. should counter the growing North Korean military threat by continuing to strengthen security cooperation with allies South Korea and Japan. Last year, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo restarted trilateral military exercises. Along with the reinstatement of large-scale U.S.–South Korean exercises, these will increase allied deterrence capabilities.

During a Camp David summit in August, the countries’ three leaders pledged even more extensive trilateral military exercises, real-time exchange of information on North Korean missile launches, and increased cooperation on ballistic missile defense. The leaders’ commitment to consult and coordinate responses to common security threats was a major step forward in trilateral military cooperation but stopped far short of formal alliance.

North Korea Ballistic Missile Test. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The extensive security agreements reached at Camp David, however, will require greater U.S. commitment to improving its military posture in the Indo–Pacific in a way that offsets advancing Chinese and North Korean capabilities. As it stands today, the U.S. military is not in a strong enough position to fully support the needs and requirements of confronting multiple malign actors across the Indo–Pacific.

About the Author

Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. His analysis and writing about North Korea, South Korea and Japan, as well as related issues, are informed by his 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. From 1996 to 2001, Mr. Klingner was CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · September 18, 2023



 10. Kim’s Russia jaunt offers an uncertain mix of substance, theater


Was it really a "jolt" for the administration? I doubt that Korea hands in the administration were caught off guard.


But I agree that a profound rethink of not only policy but the strategy is necessary. If we embark on a new strategy it will take strong leadership and work every day to implement the strategy and synchronize and orchestrate the elements of national power.\ to achieve strategic objectives. I think you know my recommendation: a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated information campaign (and this is the key to the strategy) and the solution of the "Korea question" (which is in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice). The answer to the Korea question is of course a free and unified Korea.


Excerpts:


The visit was a jolt for the Biden administration, which has been rudely rebuffed by the Kim regime after offers to resume direct talks.
Independent experts have warned for decades that Washington’s goal — North Korean denuclearization — was unrealistic given the security needs and paranoia of the North Korean leadership. Pyongyang, they said, would never melt its “sacred sword” of atomic weapons.
Since the advent of the Ukraine war, China and Russia have blocked U.S. attempts to add sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, further eroding the council’s effectiveness. With Russia seeming ready to break several taboos by dealing with Mr. Kim, U.S. diplomats might have to reconsider the power dynamics in the region.
“This could prompt the most profound rethink of the U.S. approach toward North Korea in decades,” Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, wrote in Foreign Policy.





Kim’s Russia jaunt offers an uncertain mix of substance, theater

Growing prospect of arms deal may fuel U.S. policy rethink

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon


By - The Washington Times - Monday, September 18, 2023

SEOULSouth Korea — How many 152 mm artillery shells could be bartered for an SU-57 stealth fighter bomber? How many days of work by a company of North Korean laborers will get you an aid package of food and fuel? How many 122 mm tactical rockets buy a satellite launch?

These may be some of the calculations after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his delegation returned home Monday from a closely watched, unexpectedly expansive six-day traipse around Russia’s Far East.

It is unknown whether Moscow and Pyongyang approved any deals during Mr. Kim’s trip, but Russian President Vladimir Putin showed up for one-on-one talks and gave Mr. Kim a peek at various military technologies at multiple sensitive sites.

Pyongyang portrayed the visit as a relationship reset — “an opportunity to further solidify the traditional bond of good-neighborhood cooperation between the two countries, which are rooted in comradely friendship and military unity, and to open a new chapter in the development of relations,” according to North Korean state media.

The USSR helped establish the North Korean state in 1948 and aided it during and after the Korean War. After the Soviet Union’s implosion, China took on North Korea’s life support by supplying the isolated, sanctioned Kim regime with essential food and fuel.

Now, as his war in Ukraine drags on inconclusively, Mr. Putin is looking for friends and suppliers. He could offer Mr. Kim advanced weaponry and technology to reset the peninsula’s military balance and complete North Korea’s “nuclear triad” deterrent. The Kremlin could also slash Mr. Kim’s uncomfortable food and fuel reliance on Beijing.

Mr. Putin could gain masses of North Korean tactical ammunition and cheap, disciplined labor to work on reconstruction in occupied territories.


With a single trip in less than a week, the isolated Mr. Kim also showed Russians that they have friends capable of standing up to Washington.

For outsiders, it is unclear whether the visit represents a dangerously rejuvenated relationship or is simply political theater. Regardless, the early reviews from Seoul and Washington are downbeat at best.

Packed agenda

A fawning Russian state media showed the visitor, dubbed “Comrade Kim,” hobnobbing with Mr. Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Mr. Kim was seen avidly touring the Vostochny satellite launch complex and a factory producing SU-35 and SU-57 warplanes. He visited an airfield where nuclear-capable Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers are stationed and was shown a Russian MiG-31, a supersonic interceptor that can carry hypersonic missiles.

In Vladivostok, he boarded a frigate of the Pacific Fleet and was shown missile launch controls. He visited a food factory, met North Korean technical students and found time to watch a ballet and visit an aquarium.

Russian news outlets reported that Mr. Kim left the country aboard his armored train with promises of new drones, next-generation military uniforms — reportedly invisible to thermal imaging — and possibly a new Russian limo. Mr. Putin and Mr. Kim exchanged matching gifts: a pair of rifles.

Even a scene of Mr. Kim’s bodyguards carefully sanitizing his seat before his sit-down with Mr. Putin was followed with fascination. State TV talk shows, translated by YouTube channel Russian Media Monitor, had discussants gleefully toting up the summit’s headaches for the Biden administration.

North Korea has “a colossal arsenal and we very much need those shells at the front, even despite our own production,” said panelist Gevorg Mirzayan, a research fellow at Russia’s U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute. “Of course, some are expired, but it does not mean it could not be launched.”

Mr. Mirzayan said Mr. Putin’s hints that he might offer Mr. Kim space technologies were “Level-80 trolling.” Others said technology transfers were feasible.

The North Koreans “are quite successful building their submarines. They just need to make them nuclear-powered,” political scientist Sergey Mikheyev said on one of the most popular Russian TV talk shows. “Theoretically, we can help them with this.”

Mr. Mikheyev applauded Pyongyang’s resistance to pressure from the U.S. and its allies.

“A low living standard is North Korea’s weakness but also its strength,” he said. The U.S. “can’t do anything to these people.”

Some overseas analysts questioned the likely extent of the arms trades, given both nations’ domestic security demands.

North Korea is going to help Russia but has to maintain its own security concerns on the peninsula,” said Alex Neill, a security expert at the Pacific Forum. “Can North Korea really put that on the table? Or is this just international theater designed to appeal to anti-U.S. sentiments?”

Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general, said Pyongyang’s arms complex should not be underestimated.

“They have 2 million workers hard at work making munitions and all that good stuff,” he said.

Rising fears

If Moscow offers advanced aircraft, as Mr. Kim’s itinerary and some Seoul pundits suggest, then Pyongyang could complete its “nuclear triad.” The launch systems on land, at sea and in the air are designed to frustrate any combatant’s effort to disable the North’s nuclear arsenal.

Not everyone agrees. “I don’t think North Korea would want the triad: ground-launched and sea-launched are good enough for their purposes,” Mr. Chun said.

Russian supply of cutting edge kit could overturn long-held strategic assumptions that North Korea boasts mass and atomic arms but prosperous South Korea wields high technologies.

“There is a list of things that might fall into the hands of the North Koreans,” he said. “Those are really advanced technologies that could tip the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea and Russia share a land border, making covert transfers relatively easy. Technical blueprints can be dispatched online, and missile components can be moved at a lower visibility than finished products.

“There is huge asymmetry in the wish lists, so a lot of people say this is not going to happen or is just a fantasy, but we have to look at the intangibles and abstracts,” said Daniel Pinkston, an international relations expert at Troy University.

Some cooperative modes would not even be sanctioned.

“They can do stuff like technical training and training pilots,” he said. “Russia could give them jet fuel for that training, which would not be sanctioned as it is inside their country.”

The visit was a jolt for the Biden administration, which has been rudely rebuffed by the Kim regime after offers to resume direct talks.

Independent experts have warned for decades that Washington’s goal — North Korean denuclearization — was unrealistic given the security needs and paranoia of the North Korean leadership. Pyongyang, they said, would never melt its “sacred sword” of atomic weapons.

Since the advent of the Ukraine war, China and Russia have blocked U.S. attempts to add sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, further eroding the council’s effectiveness. With Russia seeming ready to break several taboos by dealing with Mr. Kim, U.S. diplomats might have to reconsider the power dynamics in the region.

“This could prompt the most profound rethink of the U.S. approach toward North Korea in decades,” Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, wrote in Foreign Policy.

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon




11. The Axis of Outcasts


Axis of authoritarians,

Axis of failures

threesome of convenience

Axis of outcasts


Excerpts:


We are witnessing the emergence of an axis of outcasts: countries united in their willingness to violate international law by starting wars, developing nuclear weapons, and violating sanctions. This list also includes Iran, where Russia has been acquiring kamikaze drones with which to attack Ukrainian cities and civilians.

But make no mistake: reaching out to a country like North Korea is a sign of profound weakness. China and India might not openly condemn Russian aggression, but nor have they endorsed it or done much to help Putin’s war effort (other than purchasing Russian hydrocarbons). And whatever support Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, or Mali are capable of offering, it will not help the Kremlin achieve the aims of its “special military operation” in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, these outcasts, driven by desperation, will deepen their cooperation, introducing new risks to regional stability and the global order. For example, if Russia furnishes North Korea with the technologies it needs to advance its missile or nuclear programs, it is bound to have repercussions for Northeast Asian security.

Russia and North Korea may be failing in their space efforts. But their sanctions-busting and rule-breaking here on Earth are sure to have a destabilizing effect on the international order.








The Axis of Outcasts

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/axis-of-outcasts-russia-north-korea-iran-by-carl-bildt-2023-09

Sep 18, 2023

CARL BILDT


Russian arms deals with North Korea and Iran point to the emergence of a new axis of outcasts: countries united in their willingness to violate international law and ignore United Nations sanctions. Driven by desperation, these pariahs pose a threat to regional and global stability that should not be underestimated.

STOCKHOLM – Russian President Vladimir Putin had obvious reasons for hosting North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un at Vostochny, Russia’s new spaceport in eastern Siberia, this month. Owing to his illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, Putin is running low on both friends and ammunition.




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The Vostochny spaceport has a troubled history. Intended to replace the Baikonur facility in Kazakhstan, its construction was plagued by repeated delays and allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Now, it is rarely used – though it did launch the high-profile Luna-25 mission that crashed into the moon recently.


Russian-North Korean relations have a similar backstory. Once upon a time, the bond between the Kremlin and the Kim regime was tight. After all, communist North Korea was essentially a Soviet creation, and it relied heavily on Soviet support for decades. But following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders saw more to gain by developing relations with booming South Korea. The Kremlin effectively switched sides, joining the (unsuccessful) international effort to prevent the Hermit Kingdom from developing nuclear weapons.


Now the situation has changed once again. Putin’s attempt to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe has made Russia an international pariah – just like North Korea. Most of the world’s developed economies have signed on to comprehensive sanctions against Russia, and the United Nations General Assembly has issued several resolutions condemning Putin’s war of aggression. The very few countries that have sided with Russia constitute an international rogues’ gallery: Eritrea, Syria, Nicaragua, Belarus, Mali, and – of course – North Korea.


Meanwhile, many countries that have abstained from these UN votes have increasingly made known their objections to Putin’s war. At the recent G20 summit in New Delhi, for example, the final joint declaration included a clear affirmation of the principle of territorial integrity – an obvious reference to Russian aggression and the Kremlin’s misbegotten strategic objectives.


Putin expected a quick victory when he launched his war in February 2022, but Russian forces have since lost roughly half of what they captured during the initial invasion. After nearly 600 days, they are bogged down and struggling to defend themselves against an independent, democratic Ukrainian polity that is determined to defend its freedom.






Putin therefore had little choice but to roll out the red carpet for the North Korean dictator. Though the details of the Vostochny dealmaking will remain undisclosed, it is safe to assume that Russia will get ammunition in exchange for various essentials that North Korea desperately needs, not least food and energy. Beyond that, there has also been talk of Russia assisting North Korea in developing and deploying satellites, an area where it has been singularly unsuccessful.


Whatever the details, there can be little doubt that the deal violates the UN Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea, which were originally put in place with Russian support. In claiming that the North Korea sanctions regime is a UN matter, not a Russian one, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is being dishonest in the extreme.


We are witnessing the emergence of an axis of outcasts: countries united in their willingness to violate international law by starting wars, developing nuclear weapons, and violating sanctions. This list also includes Iran, where Russia has been acquiring kamikaze drones with which to attack Ukrainian cities and civilians.


But make no mistake: reaching out to a country like North Korea is a sign of profound weakness. China and India might not openly condemn Russian aggression, but nor have they endorsed it or done much to help Putin’s war effort (other than purchasing Russian hydrocarbons). And whatever support Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, or Mali are capable of offering, it will not help the Kremlin achieve the aims of its “special military operation” in Ukraine.


Nonetheless, these outcasts, driven by desperation, will deepen their cooperation, introducing new risks to regional stability and the global order. For example, if Russia furnishes North Korea with the technologies it needs to advance its missile or nuclear programs, it is bound to have repercussions for Northeast Asian security.


Russia and North Korea may be failing in their space efforts. But their sanctions-busting and rule-breaking here on Earth are sure to have a destabilizing effect on the international order.




CARL BILDT

Writing for PS since 2009

116 Commentaries

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Carl Bildt was Sweden’s foreign minister from 2006 to 2014 and prime minister from 1991 to 1994, when he negotiated Sweden’s EU accession. A renowned international diplomat, he served as EU Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Special Envoy to the Balkans, and Co-Chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference. He is Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 





12. Is it time to celebrate the military agreement?


Celebrating a one sided agreement that weakens ROK and alliance military readiness? Is this serious?



Tuesday

September 19, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 19 Sep. 2023, 20:35

Is it time to celebrate the military agreement?

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-09-19/opinion/editorials/Is-it-time-to-celebrate-the-military-agreement/1873373


Former President Moon Jae-in on Tuesday attended a ceremony to commemorate the fifth year of the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, which took place on Sept. 19, 2018. The former president traveled to Seoul for the first time after starting his post-retirement life in South Gyeongsang last year. The event was attended by Moon’s former aides and ministers, as well as current members of the Democratic Party (DP).


But we wonder if this is the right time for such a celebration, given the stark security situation around the country. In that summit between Moon and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, both sides signed a military agreement banning any hostile activities against one another. But the agreement didn’t work at all.


At the time, the Moon administration praised the agreement as a “de facto agreement on non-aggression.” But the North’s violation of the agreement continued. Following the firing of artillery shells in the buffer zone of the Yellow Sea in 2019, the North fired hundreds of rounds at our guard post on the front line in 2020. The North even flew military drones over Seoul last December. It has violated the agreement as many as 17 times since 2018. Who could believe the efficacy of the agreement under such circumstances?



Moreover, North Korea is ratcheting up the level of its nuclear and missile technology. Bragging about its nuclear-tipped tactical missiles, the North ceaselessly unveils its advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. At the time of the military agreement, both countries were interested in preventing an accidental clash. But today, the entire region of South Korea is within the shooting range of the North’s tactical nukes. On top of that, there is the possibility of Russia transferring its advanced missile technology to the North, as may have been agreed to between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in their recent summit. Is it really a good time for such a narcissistic meeting?


After the aerial penetration of North Korean drones, President Yoon Suk Yeol ordered his aides to consider a suspension of the Sept. 19 joint declaration. The nominees for the new unification minister and defense minister also mentioned the possibility of suspending the joint agreement. But if we first declare a cessation of the agreement, it poses many risks. It will be better for the government to urge North Korea to respect the agreement, while leaving room for the suspension.


The severed inter-Korean and North-U.S. relations make it difficult to find an effective solution to cope with the mounting nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. Despite the failed agreement, Moon’s close allies gathered to celebrate the signing of the joint declaration. We hope they wake up and cooperate to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea instead of celebrating themselves.




13. Rethinking Engagement with North Korea


The author must make the assumption that engagement will lead to a change in north Korea - change in the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Is that a valid assumption?


Like most pundits and the press - his cherry picking of the Camp David Summit is different than my cherry picking. He focuses on the words of denuclearization of north Korea. My focus is on the fact that the three leaders of JAROKUS (Japan - ROK - US) support. free and unified Korea. That should be the focus of a new strategy: "National Strategy for Countering North Korea,"   https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/


Excerpts:

The Perils of Neglect
The above scenario underscores the perils of neglect. Over the years, the global community has hoped to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and sporadic engagement. Although these measures provided short-lived respite, they didn’t ensure a long-term solution.
Ignoring North Korea might lead not only to a nuclear-armed rogue state but also to an inherently unstable Northeast Asia. It’s time to rethink strategy by emphasizing engagement, understanding the Kim regime’s entrenched insecurities, and formulating a plan ensuring enduring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The challenges ahead are immense, but the stakes are too high for passive or complacent behavior.
While some analysts argue the window for North Korean diplomacy is swiftly narrowing, a stronger case exists for redefining our “diplomatic engagement” aim. Not as unrealistic denuclearization, but as a more feasible “risk management,” similar to the Biden administration’s recent “de-risking“ approach to China. This strategy pivot led to high-level dialogues aiming to avoid miscalculations and potential conflict.
This engagement shift would not just present a more practical approach to Pyongyang but would also transition away from the increasingly lofty goal of denuclearization without matching it with commensurate policy investment. The Camp David summit by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, held in August 2023, calls for “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” Yet, without outreach for engagement, dialogue, and negotiation with North Korea, such a resolution will not materialize. Regrettably, at present, Washington seems hesitant to adopt this perspective. For the sake of U.S. security and global stability, it’s imperative for the United States to present a persuasive argument.



Rethinking Engagement with North Korea

Ignoring North Korea might lead not only to a nuclear-armed rogue state but also to an inherently unstable Northeast Asia.

The National Interest · by Seong-hyon Lee · September 18, 2023

Last year, North Korea’s marked increase in missile launches was widely interpreted as a bid to sharpen its capability to target South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons. Aided in part by Washington’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war and Taiwan Strait tensions, this surge in testing has persisted. This has been further exacerbated by China and Russia’s veto of United Nations sanctions, effectively giving North Korea free rein to test any weapons and launch any missiles it desired. One year later, we are witnessing a seismic shift in North Korea’s enhanced ability to threaten major American cities, from Los Angeles to New York, covering both coasts and from south to north. This development, alarming yet frequently underplayed, brings forth complex and troubling questions. Has Washington consistently underestimated North Korea’s missile prowess and its limited policy resource allocation, thereby endangering American security? Crucially, due to inadequate policy engagement, Washington might eventually find itself forced to consider a strong preemptive kinetic response. Such an action could not only devastate North Korea but also plunge the region into chaos.

North Korea’s Dramatic Leap in Its ICBM Capabilities

In the intricate landscape of twenty-first-century geopolitics, the allure of focusing on palpable threats often overshadows the steady drumbeats of persistent challenges. North Korea, with its familiar pattern of bluster followed by conciliatory gestures, epitomizes this latter category. Yet, a myopic view of Kim Jong-un’s Hermit Kingdom, especially in light of its burgeoning nuclear and missile prowess, risks destabilizing not just the immediate region but the very architecture of the global order. As North Korea’s nuclear arsenal grows and diversifies, the threat it poses to its neighbors and, more alarmingly, to the U.S. mainland, becomes more tangible with each missile test. For a long time, this threat was acknowledged but largely seen as a future concern. Now, Washington’s policy neglect may have brought us past the tipping point, as North Korea has the kinetic capability to target the entire United States.

On July 12, in response to the U.S. reconnaissance flight over North Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Pyongyang launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Its landing in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) was anticipated, but the trajectory raised concerns among military experts.


Startling details surfaced. Both South Korean and Japanese militaries confirmed the missile’s origin from the North Korean capital. Despite a high launch angle, it reached 3,738 miles (6,000 km) in altitude and traveled approximately 621 miles (1,000 km) before descending. The missile remained airborne for seventy-four minutes, surpassing the earlier record of seventy-one minutes set by a launch earlier in the year. Analyzing these specifics, Japan’s Ministry of Defense suggests that, depending on the warhead’s weight, its maximum range could exceed 9,320 miles (15,000 km) when launched at a typical ICBM trajectory—encompassing the whole U.S. mainland. North Korea’s audacious test follows three other ICBM tests conducted earlier this year and as many as seven last year. Each test demonstrated progressively enhanced capabilities. The latest ICBM is designed to carry up to four warheads per missile. Many experts also posit that the missile utilized a more advanced solid fuel, which provides both increased mobility and reduced detectability compared to its liquid-fueled counterparts.

The implications are clear: the ground-based interceptors that the United States has stationed in Alaska and California may no longer provide the robust defense they once did. If North Korea were to launch a dozen of these missiles, it could potentially overwhelm the United States’ defense systems. It’s tempting to downplay North Korea’s achievements, emphasizing that there’s still a time gap between technical achievements and actual deployment. This sentiment is compounded by Washington’s desire to maintain focus on Ukraine without distractions. Yet, informed circles are increasingly ringing cautionary bells. Dennis Wilder, a former CIA deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific, noted, “This is a neglected problem in East Asia. I believe it holds more potential for a crisis than even the Taiwan Strait situation.”

Then, on September 8, North Korea launched a new tactical nuclear attack submarine in a ceremony attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, calling it “the beginning of a new chapter” for its military. Some American observers were quick to point to the old Soviet-designed Romeo-class submarine and belittle it as “Frankensub.” However, there might still be a tendency to underestimate Kim’s unwavering ambition to develop a nuclear-armed navy as a countermeasure against the United States and its Asian allies. North Korea is actively enhancing its nuclear capabilities, consistent with its public declarations. “When it comes to weapons technology development, North Korea is growing increasingly confident,” retired Lieutenant General In-Bum Chun shared with me during a research interview. He emphasized that, given North Korea’s technical confidence in nuclear weaponry, the country is now rapidly diversifying its arsenal—from ICBMs to miniaturized nuclear devices and nuclear submarines. In a further show of defiance, North Korea now publicly threatens to deploy nuclear weapons during U.S.-South Korea military drills. Reacting to North Korea’s unwavering advancement in its nuclear weapons program, South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol administration has highlighted North Korea’s augmented nuclear and missile capabilities as the “most pressing challenge” facing the region.

Washington’s Potential Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities

Over the years, U.S. strategy toward North Korea has oscillated between diplomacy and stern warnings, predominantly being reactive. The strategy largely hinged on China, North Korea’s main ally and trade partner, to rein in its unpredictable neighbor. However, Beijing has generally prioritized peninsular stability over denuclearization despite often disapproving of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. This stance has empowered North Korea. Now, with missiles that can technically reach the United States, Washington might feel pressured to act. But decisions to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear abilities could cause immense collateral damage and regional upheaval. This is not a hypothetical situation.

In 1994, Washington contemplated a surgical strike on North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear site. This was avoided through former President Jimmy Carter’s personal intervention with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang. In 2017, President Donald Trump publicly threatened North Korea with total destruction. Amid escalating tensions with Kim Jong-un, Trump even mused about using a nuclear weapon against North Korea and deflecting blame. South Korea, directly in North Korea’s line of sight, would suffer most in a U.S.-North Korea conflict. Then-South Korean president Moon Jae-in, clearly concerned, remarked, “War must not break out again on the Korean Peninsula” during a dinner in Seoul he hosted for Trump.

An unprovoked strike on North Korea would have cascading consequences. Besides the immediate humanitarian catastrophe, the geopolitical fallout would be vast. It could trigger a full-fledged conflict on the Korean Peninsula, roping in South Korea, China, Japan, and perhaps Russia. This turmoil could unpredictably reshape regional dynamics, possibly diminishing U.S. influence in Asia and complicating its strategic approach toward China. The move might also fray global alliances, with allies potentially reluctant to back a preemptive attack.

The Perils of Neglect

The above scenario underscores the perils of neglect. Over the years, the global community has hoped to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and sporadic engagement. Although these measures provided short-lived respite, they didn’t ensure a long-term solution.

Ignoring North Korea might lead not only to a nuclear-armed rogue state but also to an inherently unstable Northeast Asia. It’s time to rethink strategy by emphasizing engagement, understanding the Kim regime’s entrenched insecurities, and formulating a plan ensuring enduring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The challenges ahead are immense, but the stakes are too high for passive or complacent behavior.

While some analysts argue the window for North Korean diplomacy is swiftly narrowing, a stronger case exists for redefining our “diplomatic engagement” aim. Not as unrealistic denuclearization, but as a more feasible “risk management,” similar to the Biden administration’s recent “de-risking“ approach to China. This strategy pivot led to high-level dialogues aiming to avoid miscalculations and potential conflict.

This engagement shift would not just present a more practical approach to Pyongyang but would also transition away from the increasingly lofty goal of denuclearization without matching it with commensurate policy investment. The Camp David summit by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, held in August 2023, calls for “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” Yet, without outreach for engagement, dialogue, and negotiation with North Korea, such a resolution will not materialize. Regrettably, at present, Washington seems hesitant to adopt this perspective. For the sake of U.S. security and global stability, it’s imperative for the United States to present a persuasive argument.

Seong-Hyon Lee, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations and a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard University Asia Center.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Seong-hyon Lee · September 18, 2023


​14. Putin may regret forging closer ties with Kim: experts



Be careful what you ask for.




Putin may regret forging closer ties with Kim: experts

The Korea Times · September 19, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un examine a launch pad during their meeting at the Vostochny cosmodrome outside the city of Tsiolkovsky in Russia's Amur region, Sept. 13. AP-Yonhap 


China concerned about losing influence on N. Korea


By Lee Hyo-jin

Closer relations between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin is not a win-win partnership, but "Kim's win," according to analysts, who viewed that the Russian leader may later regret his decision to forge closer ties with Pyongyang.


While North Korea has a lot to gain from Russia such as technological support in advancing its weapons and food supply, the same cannot be said for Moscow as the summit has only highlighted Putin's deepening international isolation.


According to the North's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Tuesday, Kim returned home on Monday after completing his "official goodwill" visit to Russia which has "opened a new chapter" in bilateral ties. After entering Russia on Sept. 12, Kim met with Putin and visited key military sites, sparking concerns from the outside world that the two sides may strike a major weapons agreement.


"It was a successful trip for Kim," Patrick Cronin, the chair for Asia-Pacific Security at the Hudson Institute, told The Korea Times.


"Although we don't know the details of what Putin has promised, it's clear that Russia is willing to provide the space program modernization that Kim wants. And undoubtedly, there are other benefits that we'll learn about in the future weeks and months," he said.


Victor Cha, the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), gave a similar assessment. "Kim gained what he wanted. Probably more than what he wanted actually, because he stayed longer," he said.


The North Korean leader's latest visit to the Russian Far East was his longest overseas trip since taking power in 2011. Including the travel time on the railways, Kim spent a total of eight days on his trip to Russia.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un waves as he boards his private train bound for Pyongyang from Primorsky-1 railway station in Artyom, 40 kilometers northeast of Vladivostok, Sunday. Reuters-Yonhap 


Russia, on the other hand, has little to gain from closer relations with North Korea, Cha said. He viewed that Putin will face consequences if it receives ammunition from Pyongyang for its war in Ukraine.


"Russia may regret it, because it could affect South Korea's decision about Ukraine," he said. "If North Korea is selling ammunition to Russia, then Russia can't say anything if South Korea sells ammunition to Ukraine. South Korean ammunition is much better than North Korean ones."


Seoul has maintained its stance of not providing lethal arms to Kyiv, but recent speculation that Pyongyang may provide ― or has already been providing ― weapons to Moscow may prompt the South Korean government to reconsider its current policy.


Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, described the Kim-Putin summit as the latest indication of the Russian leader's narrowing international horizons.


In August, Putin did not attend an annual summit of BRICS nations in South Africa, a move widely speculated to be due to an indictment issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against him over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Similar reasons seemed to have led Putin to skip the recent G20 summit held in India earlier this month.


"The perception about Putin has become worse after the summit. Instead of being at meetings with other global leaders, he has reached out to someone like Kim Jong-un, one of the most isolated people in the world," Pacheco Pardo said.

Also notable is the fact that North Korea may have had the upper hand in negotiations with Russia, he added.


"Putin now has to pay much for what North Korea has to offer. He wouldn't have had to pay a lot to North Korea in the past. But the situation has changed now. Russia is isolated, desperate, with many countries refusing to give weapons."


Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the plenary session of the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, Aug. 23. Reuters-Yonhap 


How China will respond to the burgeoning North Korea-Russia military cooperation is also being closely watched by officials in South Korea and the United States.


"China very much wants to not lose control over these critical developments on its periphery. It ostensibly will acknowledge broad support for the so called 'anti-imperialist' movement by North Korea and Russia," Cronin said.


"But under the surface, China is quite concerned about Russia and North Korea for destabilizing the situation in Ukraine or in the Chinese periphery, especially on the Korean Peninsula."


Pacheco Pardo said the North Korean leader may soon reach out to China to explain about the summit with Putin. But he commented it remains to be seen whether a meeting between Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping will take place soon.


"Xi has been reluctant to meet many leaders. He didn't show up at the G20 summit nor the U.N. General Assembly currently taking place in New York," the professor said.

The Korea Times · September 19, 2023


15.North Korea's communism gives rise to ruthless capitalism: defectors


Excerpt:


All the escapees said having a second and even third job has become essential for survival in North Korea, adding that they were among those who were fortunate because they at least could work and eventually escaped from the cruel system where only the strong survive. They said they saw those who were less fortunate die from starvation because they had no money for food.


North Korea's communism gives rise to ruthless capitalism: defectors

The Korea Times · September 19, 2023

This Sept. 22, 2020, file photo shows a "jangmadang," or local market, crowded with people in Hyesan, a North Korean city near its border with China. North Korea's communist system has ironically given rise to a ruthless capitalist model where only the strong survive, according to North Korean escapees, Tuesday. Yonhap


Second jobs have become essential for survival after distribution system collapse

By Jung Min-ho


North Korea's political system that claims to guarantee "equal rights" for everyone has given rise to one of the most oppressive dictatorships in the modern world. The same paradox also pervades its economy: After the collapse of its distribution system for "common ownership," all but a small number of the powerful elite there have been driven into a ruthless capitalist competition for survival, according to North Korean escapees, Tuesday.


After witnessing her grandmother's death from hunger during North Korea's great famine in the mid-1990s, Kim Yoo-a, who was just 13 years old then, woke up to the fact that the state would not feed her.


"That's when I started selling ice cream on streets. I knew I had to work to survive," she said at an event organized in Seoul for the 20th North Korea Freedom Week from Sept. 17 to 23.


Her first official job was as a researcher at the propaganda center in Samjiyon, a city close to the North Korea-China border. She was supposed to receive a monthly wage of 2,400 won ― enough to buy a few eggs. But Kim said she was never paid; not even once.


"But officials came home regularly to collect money, in the name of loyalty fund and support for the army among many others," Kim said. In order to survive and to avoid imprisonment for failing to show up for work, she had to pay her boss to secure time for her second job as a smuggler, she added.


Kim Yoo-jin, another North Korean defector who shared her story at the event, said that she also sold scrap metal and wood while giving about 30,000 won to her boss at a hotel in Ryanggang Province every month to buy her time away from her primary employment.


She, too, never received any money from the hotel. But fortunately, her business was quite successful, making more than 450,000 won or even more a month. But after bribing officials at checkpoints to keep her business running and sharing profits with her partners, she was only able to buy the bare necessities such as rice, corn, potatoes and medicine for her mother's heart disease problem.


"I usually bought one meal a day … When I was hungry, I ate leftover food at the hotel," she said.


Lee Ji-hye was the only one who received money from the state. Her husband was a security official, who was paid 4,300 won a month. But that was still a meager amount insufficient to purchase even 1 kilogram of rice. So she started working as a money changer.


All the escapees said having a second and even third job has become essential for survival in North Korea, adding that they were among those who were fortunate because they at least could work and eventually escaped from the cruel system where only the strong survive. They said they saw those who were less fortunate die from starvation because they had no money for food.


After her husband died of an unknown illness, Ji Han-na had to take care of her two sons all by herself. She said she sold everything possible on the streets, but she was barely able to feed her family. Because her family could not buy rice, they often ate tofu dregs mixed with corn powder and grass.


"I was an ordinary mother with an ordinary dream of raising my children well … But I had to escape because I could not let my children grow up in a country with no future," she said.



The Korea Times · September 19, 2023





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



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