Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Argue well. It is incredibly important to remember that, in any argument, it's not you against another person. Rather, it's you and the other person against the issue. Separate the human from the problem."

– Dr. Caroline Leaf

"We lost ourselves in what we read, only to return to ourselves, transformed and part of a more expansive world."

– Judith Butler

"Beware that, when fighting monsters, you yourself do not become a monster... for when you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss zes also into you."

– Fredrich Nietzsche

1. The Resurrection of the Jedburgh Team Concept in Ukraine

2. U.S. Department of State Concludes $200 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by RTX Corporation

3. U.S. Soldiers Could Fly into Combat on Powered Paragliders

4. China’s One Belt One Road is a spectacular domino of failed projects

5. Ukraine's Bradley Fighting Vehicle Dilemma Won't Go Away

6. Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Russia's Strategic Playbook with China, Iran, and North Korea

7. China Is Playing Games With the US in the Pacific

8. 100 days into the job, Taiwan’s new leader is cutting mainland ties by reframing history

9. Ex-UNSC chief backs bid for permanent seat by India, ‘world’s third-most powerful country'

10. Analysts Say Ukraine Strikes On Russian Power Plants Hurt Putin’s War Effort

11. Analysis: China's economic malaise seen accelerating obesity rates

12. The danger of AI in war: it doesn’t care about self-preservation

13. US Navy Brings Big-Deck Amphib to Protect Philippines

14. Ukraine Takes War to Russia With Drone Strikes but Struggles to Inflict Pain on Putin

15. ‘Moving in the Dark’: Hamas Documents Show Tunnel Battle Strategy

16. Gao Zhen, Artist Who Critiqued the Cultural Revolution, Is Detained in China

17. ‘Dark’ tanker crash exposes dangers of China’s thirst for cheap oil

18. Why the Free Market Is Hard to Defend

19. Ukraine’s Gamble

20. Peacekeepers Need Peacemakers

1. The Resurrection of the Jedburgh Team Concept in Ukraine

I do not know Ken Robinson. But he has just published a number of short pieces on LinkedIn on SOF, intelligence, hybrid warfare, Russia, Ukraine, and related topics.

His bio on LinkedIn is here: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ken-robinson-3aa20629/. I have pasted his detailed bio below his essay.

I have to post this because it is about our beloved Jedburghs.

Some of my thoughts about the history of the OSS as it relates to today:

•Problem

•We face threats from political warfare strategies supported by hybrid military approaches.

•

•Solution:

•Learn to lead with influence

•Learn to counter and conduct political warfare campaigns

•Cultural and/or organizational change

•Exploit lessons from the OSS (positive and negative)

Lessons from the OSS

•High Level Patron – POTUS – (later SOF – Congress)

•Relationship with UK/SOE

•Peculiar, unique leadership – empowered

•Relatively small agile organization 13,000/7,500

•Bureaucratic Infighting – Hybrid C2 with JCS and Theater Commanders (less MacArthur/Nimitz) and State

•Control of Intelligence (Magic/Ultra)

*Control of Information (influence activities) COI, OSS Morale Operations vs Office of War Information

*Greater emphasis on influence operations than any time since

*Research and Analysis – nothing has ever matched it – “non-departmental strategic analysis –collate data from all open sources and all departments of government”

The Resurrection of the Jedburgh Team Concept in Ukraine

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/resurrection-jedburgh-team-concept-ukraine-ken-robinson-eg6kc/?trackingId=QX0lpEP%2FketMyahMErbyaw%3D%3D

Ken Robinson

National Security, Counter Terrorism, Cyber Security, and Multi-Media Entertainment Professional

September 1, 2024

By: Ken Robinson

The Kursk incursion took Russia by surprise. It has caused a disorientation in its strategy, troop deployments, and employment along its front lines, and forced Russia to recall its proxy fighters from as far away as Burkina Faso, in Africa.

The unique nature of this incursion was characterized by the Ukrainian military application of “surprise, simplicity, security, repetition, speed, and purpose.” These tenants just happen to be the six core principles of a special operation mission.

It’s also how the western alliance special operations forces fought in World War II.

Who Were The Jedburghs: Why do they matter today?

The Jedburgh teams were elite special operations units deployed during World War II to support the Allied forces in occupied Europe. Their primary mission was to assist the Allied invasion of France, particularly during the D-Day landings and the subsequent liberation efforts. Operating behind enemy lines, their objectives included organizing and arming local resistance groups, conducting sabotage operations against German forces, and providing intelligence and guidance to Allied ground troops. Their work significantly disrupted German military operations, boosted the effectiveness of local resistance efforts, and provided critical support to advancing Allied forces.

Formation and Composition

The Jedburgh teams were composed of three-man units, each team typically consisting of a leader, a radio operator, and a liaison officer. Members were drawn from the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Free French Bureau, and the Dutch and Belgian armies in exile. These men were meticulously selected for their language skills, physical endurance, and adaptability, and underwent rigorous training in unconventional warfare, parachuting, demolitions, and guerrilla tactics. The teams were multi-national by design, intended to symbolize Allied unity and to foster collaboration among the diverse resistance groups operating in occupied territories.

Recruitment and Training

The recruitment process for the Jedburgh teams was unconventional and shrouded in secrecy. In the lead-up to D-Day, American servicemen were given the opportunity to volunteer for a "mysterious assignment" through announcements made over loudspeakers at military bases. Those who volunteered underwent a series of intensive physical and psychological tests to determine their suitability for special operations. The training program was comprehensive and grueling, including specialized courses in close combat, radio communications, map reading, demolition, and parachute jumping. The final phase of their preparation involved mock missions and exercises designed to simulate the conditions they would face in enemy-occupied territory.

Operations

The Jedburgh teams were among the first Allied troops to parachute into occupied Europe, often landing in remote areas under the cover of darkness. Their operations typically involved establishing contact with local resistance fighters, assessing the needs and capabilities of these groups, and coordinating supplies and support from Allied forces. They also played a crucial role in disrupting German supply lines, communications, and command structures through acts of sabotage, such as blowing up railways, bridges, and ammunition depots. By providing on-the-ground intelligence, they helped guide Allied bombing raids and troop movements, making them an invaluable asset in the overall strategy to defeat Nazi Germany.

Legacy

The Jedburgh teams are widely regarded as the forerunners of modern special operations forces. Their methods and principles—small, highly trained units operating independently behind enemy lines to conduct unconventional warfare—set the standard for future special operations. The skills, tactics, and operational concepts developed by the Jedburghs were later integrated into the doctrines of units such as the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets), British SAS, and other elite military units around the world.

Modern-Day Equivalent: Training Ukrainian Forces

In the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the United States and its NATO allies initiated a program to train and equip Ukrainian forces, reminiscent of the Jedburgh mission. This modern equivalent involves special operations units from the U.S. and other Western countries providing training, advisory support, and operational assistance to Ukrainian military and paramilitary forces.

Mission

The modern-day equivalent of the Jedburgh teams in Ukraine is focused on enhancing the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, particularly in areas of unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, and defense against Russian aggression. This support includes training in small-unit tactics, intelligence gathering, sabotage, and the use of advanced weaponry and communications systems. Additionally, Western special operations forces assist in developing strategic planning, leadership, and resilience within the Ukrainian military structure.

Composition and Deployment

These efforts have involved multiple NATO special operations forces, including the U.S. Army Green Berets, Navy SEALs, British SAS, and other allied units. The training takes place both within Ukraine and at NATO training facilities in Europe. The U.S. Department of Defense, through official statements, has confirmed that these operations are designed to bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities without directly engaging in combat against Russian forces.

Impact and Results

Since the beginning of the training programs, Ukrainian forces have shown significant improvements in their tactical effectiveness, adaptability, and overall combat readiness. This support has been crucial in Ukraine's efforts to defend its sovereignty against Russian-backed separatists and regular Russian military forces. The success of these training missions underscores the enduring legacy of the Jedburghs: empowering local forces to resist occupation and aggression through specialized, unconventional warfare tactics.

Official Statements

Both the U.S. Department of Defense and the Ukrainian government have acknowledged the role of these training missions. Official statements emphasize the defensive nature of the support provided and highlight the broader goal of enhancing Ukraine’s self-defense capabilities in line with international norms and agreements.

The training is part of a comprehensive security assistance package that includes not just military training but also logistical support, intelligence sharing, and the provision of advanced military equipment.

Through these modern-day equivalents of the Jedburgh teams, the principles of unconventional warfare continue to evolve, adapting to new geopolitical challenges while maintaining the core mission of supporting allies in their struggle against oppressive forces, and may now evolve into a new phase of the conflict, as Ukraine takes the battle to the Russians, forcing them on the defense of their own territory.

About

Currently, the Founder and Director of a Global Peace and Stability Initiative, based in Vienna, Austria, Ken focuses on promoting peace and stability among non-aligned nations. His use of Track II diplomacy – informal interactions between private citizens and non-state actors – builds trust and communication, exploring new ideas for conflict resolution, this journey has taken him to Russia, Ukraine, Poland, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Republic of Indonesia, as well as Mali, and Gabon, Africa, to name a few.

An award winning, experienced, multi-career professional starting with a distinguished career as a United States Army Ranger, Special Forces, and Military Intelligence soldier, who led global SOF clandestine operations in combat, extensively working with the CIA, NSA, & DIA.

After retirement, transitioning to a Director for Homeland Security in the private government-contracting sector, as well as leading a successful OCONUS Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) company.

Advised the White House Interagency Terrorism Response and Awareness Program (ITRAP), transitioning to an award winning Senior Producer, and Terrorism and National Security Analyst for the Cable News Network, with 18 years of combat-embedding with US forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Nominated to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB).

In media, creating & producing documentaries (INSIDE THE WAR ROOM, NO IGNORING, THE HORNET’S NEST, ARMY 360 Virtual-Reality Culture Series). He has written, and executive produced prime-time television, co-creating NBC's E-RING staring Dennis Hopper and Benjamin Bratt, and Paramount & MGM's cable spy series CONDOR, staring Max Irons, William Hurt, Mira Sorvino, Brendan Frasier, based on the iconic movie THREE DAYS OF THE CONDOR. Based on its premier success, AT&T Audience Network has picked up Condor for its second season on July 27th, 2018.

Awarded the First-Place National Headliners Award for the CNN coverage of the 9-11 Attacks on America, presented the Knowlton Award which recognizes individuals who have contributed significantly to the promotion of Military Intelligence in ways that stand out in the eyes of their superiors, subordinates, and peers.

He is also an inducted member of the 2004 class of the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame.

Currently, the founder of a global multi-media production company, based in the United Arab Emirates & Los Angeles, California.

2. U.S. Department of State Concludes $200 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by RTX Corporation

U.S. Department of State Concludes $200 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by RTX Corporation

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

August 30, 2024

https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-concludes-200-million-settlement-resolving-export-violations-by-rtx-corporation/

The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with RTX Corporation (RTX) to resolve 750 violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130. The Department of State and RTX reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

The administrative settlement between the Department of State and RTX, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses RTX’s unauthorized exports of defense articles resulting from the failure to establish proper jurisdiction and classification; unauthorized exports of defense articles, including classified defense articles; unauthorized exports of defense articles by employees via hand-carry to proscribed destinations listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1; and violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of DDTC authorizations.

RTX disclosed all of the alleged violations voluntarily. RTX also cooperated with the Department’s review of this matter and has implemented numerous improvements to its compliance program since the conduct at issue.

Under the terms of the 36-month Consent Agreement, RTX will pay a civil penalty of $200 million. The Department has agreed to suspend $100 million of this amount on the condition that the funds will be used for the Department-approved Consent Agreement remedial compliance measures to strengthen RTX’s compliance program. In addition, for an initial period of at least 24 months, RTX will engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee the Consent Agreement, which will also require at least one external audit of its ITAR compliance program and implementation of additional compliance measures.

This settlement demonstrates the Department’s role in furthering the national security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles only pursuant to appropriate authorization from the Department.

The Consent Agreement and related documents will be available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Penalties and Oversights Agreements section of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ website.

For additional information, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at pm-cpa@state.gov.

3. U.S. Soldiers Could Fly into Combat on Powered Paragliders

Again, I recall many years of hearing my Korean Special Forces brothers being ridiculed for training on paragliders at Maesan Ri drop zone. And now we are examining this.

U.S. Soldiers Could Fly into Combat on Powered Paragliders

Popular Mechanics · August 29, 2024

The U.S. Army is looking at the possibility of using powered paragliders to transport soldiers in war zones.
Paragliders are seen as a useful solution in a future where soldiers will operate in smaller groups across wider areas.
The Army has a history of experimenting with single-person flying machines, but none of them worked out.

Since World War II, United States Army paratroopers have trained to jump out of airplanes to seize critical objectives. Once they’re on the ground, however, lacking trucks and infantry fighting vehicles of their own, they tend to be limited to walking as a means of transportation. That could change soon—the service is exploring powered paragliders as a means of battlefield transportation.

Filling the Flying Soldier Gap

U.S. Special Operations Command

Marine Raiders with U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, operate powered paragliders during a capabilities demonstration during Special Operations Forces Week, Tampa, Florida, may 8, 2024.

As originally reported by Soldier Systems, the Army recently solicited ideas on a Personnel Air Mobility System, or PAMS for short. According to the Request for Proposals notice, the service wants a powered paraglider system capable of “addressing a capability gap to provide unit organic personnel air mobility to support freedom of movement in contested environments.

“Future battlefield threats,” the proposal explains, “are expected to require dispersed operations by small units in complex, contested environments. Traditional air assets, including fixed wing and rotary wing transport aircraft, will likely be unavailable for the movement of small teams due to supporting other missions and the difficulty of operating these vehicles in anti-access/area denial threat areas.”

U.S. Not Ready for a Major War: Report

Powered paragliders, “will support multiple mission types including reconnaissance, surveillance, troop movement, infiltration and exfiltration.” The Army is ideally looking for a paraglider with a range of up to 186 miles, a weight capacity of up to 400 pounds, and a maximum altitude of up to 20,000 feet.

No Longer Just a Recreational Vehicle

picture alliance//Getty Images

An abandoned powered paraglider used by Hamas lies near a destroyed house, Kfar Aza, Israel, October 2023.

Powered paragliders are probably the simplest powered aircraft in existence. Invented in 1964 by Canadian parachutist and inventor Domina Jalbert, these single-person craft consist of a paraglider system with an attached motor with a gasoline or diesel engine. Increasingly, so-called “paramotors” are being powered by electric batteries, though electric versions currently have far less range.

Powered paragliders are popular in the sports community but, although some armies have experimented with them, have never seen widespread military adoption. In 2018, the British Army trialed a powered paraglider drone, but the concept never took off (no pun intended).

The incident that put powered paragliders on the map was the October 7th, 2023 assault by the terrorist group Hamas on Israel. Hamas fighters used the aircraft to fly over border crossings and attack military and civilian targets in Israel. Video quickly spread on social media of Hamas powered paragliders buzzing over Israel. It’s not clear how many powered paragliders were involved and how effective they were as a transport, but they made a deep impression—especially as they flew over what was presumed to be a very secure border between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

View full post on Youtube

In May 2024, powered paragliders (top) made an appearance at the annual Special Operations Forces Week Capabilities Demonstration in Tampa, Florida. At least seven commandos flying powered paragliders participated in the demonstration, flying in ahead of an insertion by armed helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. It is unclear how long U.S. special forces troops have been training with powered paragliders and how they would use them in a wartime scenario.

How Practical is it?

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. and Allied special operations troops at the SOF Week Capabilities Demonstration in Tampa, Florida, May 2024.

Paragliders are relatively safe and easy to use, and paraglider pilots are capable of being trained in a very short time. The paragliders themselves are also lightweight, and their two-stroke engines use fuel sparingly. Although they can carry just one person, a 400-pound weight capability means a 180 pound soldier and his 45 pound paraglider can transport up to 170 pounds of gear. They can also fly under the radar and low to the ground, making them an infiltration platform worth considering.

Paragliders do have significant downsides for military forces. They are slow and noisy, and, coupled with a low-altitude flight profile, are sitting ducks to enemy air defenses. This is a particular problem as armies become increasingly well-versed in the threat posed by drones, which make a similar buzzing noise, and are turning their attention—and guns—skyward. There is no protection, other than personal body armor, for the pilot from enemy fire. Finally, they are single-person craft, meaning each person riding in a paraglider is a pilot that requires his or her own aircraft. One hundred soldiers would require one hundred paragliders.

U.S. Navy//Getty Images

A technician from Office of Naval Research (ONR) participates in freeflight after extensive testing for the Hiller Flying Platform. The platform was first flown in public in 1955.

The Pentagon has a long history of flirting with single-person flying machines. In the 1950s, the Army, Marines, and Air Force, flush with funding and eager to bring the Space Age to individual soldiers, tested no less than four single person aircraft designs. The Williams X-Jet used a turbojet engine to fly a single soldier at speeds of up to 60 miles an hour and an altitude of 10,000 feet. The de Lackner HZ-1 Aerocycle consisted of a single soldier precariously standing over a spinning set of rotors. The Hiller Model 1031-A-1 Flying Platform used an equally dangerous ducted fan, while the Hiller YROE-1 Rotorcycle, twelve of which were built for the Marine Corps, looked like a stripped down helicopter.

None of them worked particularly well, and many were quite dangerous. In military use, all of them shared the same problems as the paragliders, particularly the vulnerability to enemy fire. All of the craft were relatively new or untested designs, some of which were quite dangerous, and ultimately not a cost-effective way to move a draftee, soldier, or sailor around. While the Pentagon experimented with single person aircraft up until the 1960s, none of the designs were bought in large numbers and made operational.

Yet, despite the elusiveness of success, single-person aircraft have been a Pentagon obsession for the better part of a century. Is the powered paraglider the answer? The Army aims to find out.

Kyle Mizokami

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News, and others. He lives in San Francisco.

Popular Mechanics · August 29, 2024

4. China’s One Belt One Road is a spectacular domino of failed projects

Who would have guessed?

China’s One Belt One Road is a spectacular domino of failed projects

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, is a modern-day saga of imperial ambition, and mirrors the tale — a colossal effort beset by overconfidence and faltering outcomes.

deccanherald.com · by Ninad D Sheth

The flawed economics of upfront spending

At the heart of the OBOR’s failures lies a fundamental flaw in its economic model. China’s strategy hinged on a belief that massive upfront investments in infrastructure would stimulate economic activity in the host countries, leading to increased demand, and prosperity. This approach, which worked like magic domestically during China’s rapid urbanisation, has proven disastrous when exported.

The infrastructure projects, often built with Chinese loans and labour, have not catalysed the anticipated economic growth. Instead, they have become financial albatrosses for the host nations. The underlying assumption that demand would naturally follow investment has proven overtly simplistic, ignoring the complex realities of different regions.

Sri Lanka’s Hambantota International Port is a case study of the OBOR absurdity. The Chinese offered a $1.4 billion loan at 5 per cent interest for its construction, but the port has struggled to attract any ships.

Colombo’s inability to repay the Chinese loans for the port led to a controversial debt-for-equity swap in 2017, with Beijing taking a 99-year lease on the facility. The move sparked fears of neocolonialism, and underscored the risks for countries that borrow heavily under the OBOR. For China too, Hambantota represents a mistake. You can’t use a commercial port as a navy base, and that $1.4 billion investment is unlikely to be recovered in the near future and in a straight manner.

A train to nowhere

The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) linking Kenya’s capital Nairobi to the port city of Mombasa is another emblem of the OBOR’s troubled legacy. The $3.6 billion railway, funded largely by Chinese loans, was touted as a game-changer. The SGR has struggled to attract freight business, operating well below capacity. Now, China has had to offer debt restructuring with no interest.

The problem is simple: there isn’t enough demand to justify the railway’s existence. The project was based on overly optimistic projections of economic growth and trade volumes. Instead of boosting Kenya’s economy, the SGR has become a financial millstone. Kenya’s government is now saddled with debt, and the railway’s operational costs are far higher than its revenues.

A corridor of unaffordable ambitions

Perhaps nowhere is the OBOR’s flawed model more evident than in Pakistan, where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was hailed as a transformative initiative. The $62 billion CPEC project aimed to link the port of Gwadar to Xinjiang. It included highways, railways, power plants, and industrial zones.

Pakistan is now grappling with the consequences. The infrastructure built under the CPEC has not led to the expected economic dividends. Instead, Pakistan is facing a mounting debt crisis, with repayments on Chinese loans straining its economy and delaying a much-needed IMF bailout. This is compounded by political instability and a raging war for Balochistan’s freedom that just last week saw an attack killing more than 70 people.

Debt trap diplomacy

The OBOR failures point to a broader issue: the debt burden imposed on host countries. Chinese loans, often extended with minimal transparency and on terms that favour Beijing, have left many OBOR partners mired in debt. The latest is Hungary which took out a $1 billion cheque and now can’t repay.

For far too many countries the OBOR reality has been sobering. Instead of fostering economic independence, the initiative has deepened their financial dependence on China, and constrained their fiscal space.

A ridiculous vision in the face of China’s slowdown

As China’s economy slows, the contradictions at the heart of the OBOR become glaring. Beijing is now facing a difficult choice of admitting failure by scaling back the project.

In another Chinese epic ‘Journey to the West’ the Monkey King Sun Wukong’s pride leads him to rebel against the heavens, only to be humbled and imprisoned under a mountain by the Buddha. It’s this mountain of financial overreach that might imprison the OBOR.

The OBOR was born out of a mix of ambition and overconfidence.

As stalled projects and mounting debts meet purchasing power limits, the OBOR — which Beijing hoped would lead to a new world order — is turning into a spectacular domino of failed projects.

(Ninad D Sheth is a senior journalist.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.

deccanherald.com · by Ninad D Sheth

5. Ukraine's Bradley Fighting Vehicle Dilemma Won't Go Away

"Always with the negative waves, Moriarity."

Excerpt:

The idea that Ukraine is one weapons delivery away from punching through, gaining back some territory, or enhancing their position to better sue for peace, seems like wishful thinking. Nothing about the last two and a half years of fighting suggests that Ukraine is going to substantially improve their position. Instead of advocating for more weapons, the spending of more riches and the spilling of more blood, Ukraine should advocate for an end to the conflict.

Ukraine's Bradley Fighting Vehicle Dilemma Won't Go Away

The National Interest · by Harrison Kass · September 1, 2024

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. has provided Ukraine with over 300 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, significantly bolstering its defense. Some argue that Ukraine’s success with the Bradley highlights the potential benefits of supplying larger quantities of Western weapons. But not all agree.

-However, despite the substantial aid already given, some believe Ukraine is still one weapons delivery away from turning the tide. This perspective may overlook the need for a more aggressive pursuit of peace.

-The ongoing conflict, now over two years old, suggests that further escalation might not yield the decisive breakthroughs hoped for.

Bradley Fighting Vehicles: The Key to Ukraine’s Defense or Just More Wishful Thinking?

The U.S. has gifted Ukraine more than 300 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The Cold War-era Bradley, supplied to Ukraine in far greater numbers than tanks like the Abrams, has bolstered Ukraine’s defense and gained something of a legendary status among Ukrainian fighters.

Now, critics of the slow, incremental way the U.S. has supplied military aid to Ukraine point to the success of the Bradley as an example of what can be accomplished when Western weapons are gifted in greater quantity.

“The way Ukraine’s Western partners have supplied weapons, often in small numbers and after significant delays, has come with heavy criticism throughout the war,” Sinead Baker wrote for Business Insider. “Having enough of a weapon is important for militaries as it allows them to use those weapons more flexibly. It means being able to put the weapons in risky situations where they could achieve big breakthroughs, and if any are lost, it’s not a major tactical and public-relations disaster.”

Said more plainly, what Baker means is that if Ukraine had more Western weapons it wouldn’t be such a big deal when those systems, and the soldiers operating those systems, were destroyed; the military could absorb the loss more readily, and the public would be less likely to care. What Baker glosses over is the many billions-worth of weapons, aid, and cash already gifted to Ukraine, and the many thousands of soldiers already destroyed in a conflict that has long since calcified along fixed lines. Basically, what Baker is saying, nearly three years into the conflict is: give us just a little more and we’ve got this thing. More money. More weapons. More carnage.

The piece refuted the American wisdom for gifting smaller quantities of technical pieces of equipment, advocating instead for larger quantities of simpler, weaker pieces of equipment, citing the Bradley as an example. The Ukrainian Bradleys have been used to fight against Russian infantry, bunkers, troop carriers, drones, and tanks. Given the size of the Ukrainian Bradley fleet, the tank has been used liberally – and successfully.

Bradley cites “experts” for criticizing “the way many of Ukraine’s partners give it aid.” Specifically, the way that “weapons often arrive after months of debate (during which Russia can prepare), in small numbers, and in packages that don’t give Ukraine a clear picture or certainty on future deliveries.” The result is that “Ukraine’s soldiers often can’t develop long-term strategies.”

Well, my two cents would be that if you’re not in a position to supply your own means of defense, and you are not properly equipped to defend yourself, or able to develop long-term strategies, despite receiving billions and billions of dollars-worth of aid, then you may want to aggressively pursue peace.

The idea that Ukraine is one weapons delivery away from punching through, gaining back some territory, or enhancing their position to better sue for peace, seems like wishful thinking. Nothing about the last two and a half years of fighting suggests that Ukraine is going to substantially improve their position. Instead of advocating for more weapons, the spending of more riches and the spilling of more blood, Ukraine should advocate for an end to the conflict.

About the Author: Harrison Kass, Defense Expert

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Harrison Kass · September 1, 2024

6. Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Russia's Strategic Playbook with China, Iran, and North Korea

Again this is one of many of Ken Robinson's writings he just published on LinkedIn.

The Dark Quad and hybrid warfare.

The graphic at the link is very interesting: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hybrid-warfare-ukraine-russias-strategic-playbook-china-ken-robinson-lmdwc/

Though north Korea is shown some 5 times, its flag does not appear to have been properly generated by what I think must have been AI.

Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Russia's Strategic Playbook with China, Iran, and North Korea

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hybrid-warfare-ukraine-russias-strategic-playbook-china-ken-robinson-lmdwc/

Ken Robinson

National Security, Counter Terrorism, Cyber Security, and Multi-Media Entertainment Professional

August 31, 2024

By: Ken Robinson

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine represents a stark application of hybrid warfare, involving a calculated blend of military might, cyber operations, disinformation, and economic manipulation. Backed by China, Iran, and North Korea, Russia's multifaceted approach aims to destabilize Ukraine while exerting broader influence over the global geopolitical landscape. We must examine the tactical, operational, and strategic dimensions of Russia’s hybrid warfare, identifying the roles of its allies, and outlining the necessary steps for Ukraine, NATO, the EU, and the broader Western alliance to counter this threat.

Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Objectives

Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign against Ukraine operates on multiple levels:

Tactical Level: Russia’s immediate objectives include disrupting Ukrainian defense capabilities, targeting critical infrastructure through cyberattacks, and spreading disinformation to confuse and demoralize both the Ukrainian military and civilian populations. Tactics like these aim to create chaos, reduce Ukraine's operational effectiveness, and undermine public confidence in the Ukrainian government.
Operational Level: Russia employs a mix of conventional military engagements, cyber operations, and the manipulation of energy supplies to pressure Ukraine and its allies. By maintaining a sustained military presence and periodically escalating hostilities, Russia seeks to keep Ukraine in a state of constant instability. Cyber warfare tactics, such as disrupting communication networks and infrastructure, are designed to cripple Ukraine’s ability to respond effectively.
Strategic Level: Strategically, Russia aims to reassert its influence over former Soviet territories and weaken the NATO alliance. By collaborating with China, Iran, and North Korea, Russia is bolstering its position against the West, leveraging each ally's strengths—China's economic power and cyber capabilities, Iran’s experience with proxy warfare, and North Korea’s willingness to engage in disruptive activities. Together, these alliances form a multifaceted threat to Western democracies, seeking to fracture alliances and promote an anti-Western narrative globally.

Dissecting Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: The Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How

Who: Russia leads the hybrid warfare effort, backed by China, Iran, and North Korea. These nations provide material support, strategic cooperation, and mutual reinforcement in propaganda and cyber operations, each driven by their interests in diminishing Western influence. The west needs to deal with this cabal as a criminal block, not individual nation states – they are an axis.
What: The primary components of Russia’s hybrid warfare include direct military intervention, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. These activities aim to destabilize Ukraine while undermining the credibility and unity of the Western alliance.
When: This campaign has been ongoing since the initial invasion of Crimea in 2014, escalating significantly with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The collaboration with China, Iran, and North Korea has been increasingly evident, with these nations providing various forms of economic, logistical, and military arms and ammunition support at critical junctures.
Where: The primary battlefield is Ukraine, but the conflict extends into cyberspace and the broader geopolitical arena. Russia’s influence campaigns also target the global community, including Europe, Africa, and other regions where anti-Western sentiments can be fostered.
Why: Russia's ultimate goal is to reassert dominance over Ukraine and reestablish a sphere of influence across former Soviet territories. By undermining the credibility of Western alliances, Russia seeks to shift the global balance of power in favor of a multipolar world order where Western liberal democracies are weakened. Thus, BRICS: Russia, China, and Iran hide, veiled in a legitimate alternative economic block, using the United Nations as its shield, attempting to shape the behavior of its unwitting members.
How: Through a combination of conventional military force, cyber operations, economic leverage, and information warfare, Russia is executing a sophisticated strategy designed to achieve its objectives without crossing thresholds that would provoke full-scale military retaliation from NATO.

The Western Response: What Should Be Done?

To counter Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy, the Western alliance must adopt a coordinated, comprehensive approach that addresses both immediate threats and long-term challenges:

1. Strengthen Cyber Defenses: NATO and EU countries must enhance their cyber defenses, not only to protect critical infrastructure but also to counteract disinformation campaigns that seek to undermine public trust. This includes greater collaboration in intelligence sharing and developing unified cyber response protocols.

2. Unified Economic Sanctions: A unified and rigorous application of economic sanctions against Russia and its allies, targeting key sectors such as energy and finance, can exert significant pressure. Sanctions should be designed to be difficult to circumvent and coupled with support for countries that might be disproportionately affected by such measures.

3. Support for Ukraine: Military aid to Ukraine should be sustained and increased, including advanced weaponry, training, and intelligence support. Additionally, economic assistance is crucial to bolster Ukraine’s resilience against hybrid threats, ensuring that the country remains politically and economically stable.

4. Strategic Communication: The West must develop a cohesive narrative that counters Russian propaganda. This involves not only debunking false information but also actively promoting the values and benefits of democratic governance and international cooperation.

5. Enhanced Military Readiness: NATO should continue to enhance its military readiness, including positioning forces in Eastern Europe and conducting regular joint exercises. This demonstrates a credible deterrent and reassures frontline states of the alliance's commitment to their defense, especially as Russia is being forced to recall its proxy PMC fighters in Africa, and call up teenagers to defend the homeland. Recent legislation has been proposed to extend the eligible age of youth capable of joining the war effort to the age of 14! Russia is not a ten foot tall Grizzly bear, but it is resilient to hardship, and historically counts on harsh winters as its second line of defense.

6. Diplomatic Engagement: While military readiness is essential, diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions should not be neglected. Track II diplomacy, quiet negotiations, and engagement with non-aligned nations can help de-escalate this conflict and build broader coalitions against future hybrid threats.

Conclusion: A Roadmap for a Unified Western Response

To ensure peace and security in Europe and avoid a prolonged frozen conflict, the Western alliance must develop a coherent strategy that combines hard power & soft power, cyber resilience, and strategic communication with equal quiet diplomatic efforts.

By all means necessary to stop the bloodshed.

This strategy should prioritize rapid adaptation to evolving threats, proactive measures to counteract hybrid tactics, and a unified stance that reinforces the principles of international law and democratic governance.

By learning from past failures and investing in collective security, the West can deter hybrid aggression, protect vulnerable democracies, and lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability in Europe, and an unstable developing world.

The time to act is now, to avoid the costlier consequences of inaction, a decades long frozen conflict, or western disunity in the face of this multifaceted threat.

Russia only understands power, and strength, and has utter contempt to those who vacillate before it.

7. China Is Playing Games With the US in the Pacific

Can we play superior games with China?

Maps and graphic chart at the link.

China Is Playing Games With the US in the Pacific

While Beijing and Washington vie for influence in Oceania, a Chinese video game challenges US cultural primacy.

September 1, 2024 at 8:00 AM EDT

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-09-01/china-is-playing-games-with-the-us-in-the-pacific-islands?sref=hhjZtX76

By Tobin Harshaw

Tobin Harshaw is a Bloomberg Opinion senior editor and columnist on national security and military affairs. Previously, he was deputy editor at the op-ed page of the New York Times and the newspaper’s letters editor.

This is Bloomberg Opinion Today, a freedom of navigation patrol for Bloomberg Opinion’s opinions. On Sundays, we look at the major themes of the week past and how they will define the week ahead. Sign up for the daily newsletter here .

History Repeats

Oh man, is anybody having a tougher go of it right now than Jake Sullivan? The White House national security adviser was struggling to stay on top of hot wars in Europe and the Middle East, and a cold one in East Asia, even before his boss became a lame duck. His opposite number on the vice president’s team, Phil Gordon, is measuring the drapes in his office in preparation for a Kamala Harris administration.1And last week, he was dispatched to China to get talked at by Xi Jinping.

When the leader of a nation that is pushing an ethno-religious minority into concentration camps, building artificial islands as military bases in the South China Sea, and stalking dissidents in the New Jersey suburbs lectures you to be more “positive and rational,” the positive and rational thing might be to pack it all in. Sullivan’s face says it all:

One of these men is enjoying his job. The other, probably not so much.Photographer: Trevor Hunnicutt/AFP/Getty Images

I had a long chat with Sullivan in 2017, when he was living in the wilderness of the Donald Trump presidency, and he told me the thing that kept him up at night was “another pandemic, a next Ebola.” Well, at least he caught one break. It is pretty clear, however, that what will keep the next NatSec advisor up all night is Xi.

“As America’s presidential campaign nears its climax, domestic politics and geopolitics are combining to stimulate an important strategic debate,” writes Hal Brands. “Briefly stated, the question is: Should Washington deprioritize, perhaps even disengage from, regions outside East Asia so it can concentrate on the threat posed by China?”

History, Hal says, illuminates the folly of this approach. “During the early Cold War, and amid a brutal hot war in Korea, the original Asia Firsters argued that the US had to get out of Europe so it could get real about containing communism in Asia,” he writes. “Today’s Asia Firsters are right that the US needs greater urgency in grappling with the Chinese challenge. They are wrong if they believe that Washington can disengage from other regions without undercutting its ability to beat Beijing — and weakening its position around the globe.”

Andreas Kluth also sees history as a guide, comparing today’s Pacific rivalry to the “Great Game” that the British and Russian empires played for control of Central and South Asia in the 19th century.2 “The game board is the globe, from the conflict zones of Eurasia to the Arctic and Africa. But the Pacific is among the board’s most valuable real estate,” Andreas writes. “Pacific islanders are used to watching the vagaries of Washington and fed up with cleaning up the flotsam and jetsam. The US has long struck the wrong notes in the region, where it has neglected even its own territories … if America wants to win against China in the 21st century, it’ll have to find a new tone toward much of the world, and especially the Pacific.”

The New Great Game in the Pacific

It's China vs the US-led West in the quest to project power

David Fickling feels China is getting a big win by wooing the game’s pawns. “Island governments have largely welcomed the long-overdue attention,” says David. “This January, Nauru became the latest to switch its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. Slowing further encroachments will require listening to the concerns of island governments, in particular on what they see as their foremost diplomatic issue: Protection against a climate crisis that threatens their very existence as nations.”

History is also helpful in thinking about the even tinier islands — the unpopulated reefs, shoals and atolls at the center of a heated dispute between the Philippines and Beijing — says James Stavridis. “Tensions between the two nations have continued to increase in a manner reminiscent of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, a conflict between Britain and Spain set off after a British sea captain had his ear severed by Spanish sailors in 1731. The war resulted in tens of thousands killed and hundreds of vessels lost,” Jim writes. What role can the US play? “First and foremost more ‘freedom of navigation,’ patrols,” Jim, a four-star admiral, recommends. “The idea is simple: by treating western Pacific waters as what they are — international ‘high seas’ under United Nations parlance — we emphasize to China that we reject its claims of ownership.”

South Korea, meanwhile, is so nervous about the Great Game that it may play the nuclear card. “According to opinion polling, a strong majority of South Koreans even want the country to build its own nuclear weapons,” writes Hal. “Once North Korea’s arsenal outstrips America’s homeland missile defenses, the thinking goes, the US won’t fight to defend Seoul if doing so could bring nuclear strikes on America itself. Then there is the Donald Trump factor. The publicly unstated, but unmistakable, fear is that a second Trump presidency would rupture the alliance with Washington, leaving South Korea alone and vulnerable.”

Global Nuclear Balance in 2024

The US military says China may have 1,000 warheads by 2030

Source: Federation of American Scientists

If South Korea gets the bomb, Who’s Next?3 Pretty much everyone. “As long as US alliances are strong and credible, US allies have better, cheaper options than nuclear self-help,” adds Hal. “But if the US pulls back, erstwhile allies from Eastern Europe to East Asia might feel that they face a choice between nuclear proliferation and national suicide — which is why debates about acquiring those weapons have gotten louder in the age of Trump.”

And that, folks, is a whole lot scarier than another Ebola.

Losing Game

Is a great game shaking up the Great Game?

Enter Black Myth: Wukong. The video game, crafted by the small Chinese developer Game Science and backed by Tencent Holdings, sold 10 million copies within 83 hours of its debut. Is China chipping away at what many feel is America’s biggest advantage over Beijing: global entertainment domination?

“Black Myth: Wukong looks set to be the most surprising gaming success of 2024 and is being hailed as China’s first AAA video game, industry jargon for a tentpole title with the budget and quality of a Hollywood blockbuster,” explains Gearoid Ready. “The game, set in China and based on the 16th century Chinese epic Journey to the West, has been helped by an enthusiastic patriotic response by domestic players — as well as gushing coverage from state-controlled media, which has hyped its use of local myths and locations.”

Howard Chua-Eoan feels the game transcends its medium. “Black Myth’s success is heartening for a person like me who prefers reading to toggling,” Howard writes. “The word after the colon is the given name of the supernatural monkey Sun Wukong at the center of Journey to the West, a five-century-old novel that’s picaresque and cosmic, pious and irreverent in equal measures. It’s core to Chinese culture but also part of a legacy shared with Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan and migrant communities in Southeast Asia.”.

But, China being China, Big Brother saw a threat in Girl Power. Video games are notorious for their misogyny and sexist imagery, and Game Science has proved no exception. “Some gamers who received a copy of Black Myth: Wukong were given guidelines for what to talk about as they streamed it. Discussing its stunning cinematic graphics, mythical 16th-century plotline, and engaging gameplay was permitted. But calling for equal rights for women? Off-limits,” Catherine Thorbecke writes. “What could have been a golden opportunity to use a runaway gaming hit to spark conversations about women's rights in China instead became a lightning rod for criticism.”

Catherine reports that a hashtag on the Chinese social media platform Weibo that translates as “Black Myth: Wukong insults women” was viewed millions of times before internet censors cleaned up posts that supposedly spread ‘gender opposition.’” “Game Science dismissing the Wukong controversy as feminist propaganda or part of a Western DEI agenda will be unwise in the long run, especially as Chinese companies increasingly look to global audiences to boost revenues,” she writes. “Instead of suppressing this dialogue, studios like Game Science should be driving the narrative.”

Alienating women. Blaming DEI. Censoring gamers. For China, a country looking to break into the global culture biz, that approach doesn’t sound very “positive and rational” at all.

Notes: Please send supernatural monkeys and feedback to Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

8. 100 days into the job, Taiwan’s new leader is cutting mainland ties by reframing history

Excerpts:

Timing is also important. Lai is promoting his ideology during the “vacuum period” of the US presidential election, when Americans typically pay less attention to the words and actions of a Taiwanese leader, according to Chen.

“I think US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi would definitely talk about this [but] the US worries more about the Middle East and the South China Sea now, and cross-strait issues do not appear on its alert radar,” he said.

Li Zhenguang, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Beijing Union University, said that from the mainland’s perspective, Tsai Ing-wen was more inclined towards “soft confrontation” while Lai’s provocations on the issue of Taiwanese independence have surpassed hers.

He warned that if Lai continued to push the “Taiwan independence historical narrative” to sever cross-strait ties or adopted a “hard confrontation” approach in cross-strait relations, the mainland will undoubtedly respond with “hard measures” to seek unification.

“This is evident from earlier actions such as the mainland issuing judicial documents to punish stubborn Taiwan independence elements, the People’s Liberation Army exercises targeting Taiwan, and the normalisation of law enforcement patrols by the mainland coastguard in the waters around Quemoy,” he said.

Sullivan’s just-concluded visit to Beijing also sent “a clear signal” that the US wanted to cooperate with the mainland to improve risk management regarding Taiwan, Li said.

100 days into the job, Taiwan’s new leader is cutting mainland ties by reframing history

William Lai Ching-te has used key speeches to showcase his fiery stance on cross-strait relations and minimise mainland links, analysts say

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3276618/100-days-job-taiwans-new-leader-cutting-mainland-ties-reframing-history

Lawrence Chungin Taipei

Published: 9:00am, 31 Aug 2024

South China Morning Post · August 31, 2024

His promotion of the “mutual non-subordination” theory to define Taiwan’s relationship with Beijing has raised concerns among observers, who fear it could further strain cross-strait ties and potentially lead to conflict.

In his three major speeches on cross-strait relations since taking office, Lai has consistently stressed his view that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are no longer connected.

“The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” Lai said in his inauguration speech, referring to the official names of the two sides.

According to analysts, Lai has sought to use these speeches to project a permanent disconnect, reframing the two sides of the strait as adversaries rather than kin.

“In contrast to Tsai, who adopted a strategic ambiguity approach by maintaining the Act Governing the Relations Between the People of Taiwan and the Mainland to avoid overly provoking Beijing, Lai chose to make it clear that the two sides are not subordinate to each other,” said Wang Kung-yi, head of the Taiwan International Strategy Study Society, a think tank in Taipei.

Promulgated in 1992, the act governs visits and exchanges of people between Taiwan and the mainland.

Although Tsai also promoted the island’s independence, Wang said that by maintaining the cross-strait relations act that still binds the two sides together, she managed to give Beijing the impression that she did not seek to overly offend.

But Lai has simply abandoned the act and directly touted the “mutual non-subordination” concept to wipe out the historic cross-strait link, Wang said.

Addressing the centennial celebration of the Whampoa Military Academy in Kaohsiung on June 16, Lai said: “Despite drastic changes over the past 100 years, we firmly believe that wherever the Republic of China is, there is the spirit of Whampoa.”

Lai made no mention of the late Kuomintang (KMT) leader Chiang Kai-shek, who headed the academy when it was first established in the southern mainland city of Guangzhou in 1924.

The academy was relocated to Taiwan shortly after the civil war, when Chiang’s defeated forces retreated to the island and set up an interim government there in 1949.

“Only those who fight for the survival, development and security of the Republic of China and its people are true graduates of the academy; those without such ambition are false ones,” Lai said.

Last week in Quemoy – a Taiwanese defence outpost also known as Kinmen – Lai addressed a ceremony to mark the 66th anniversary of the start of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, also known as the “August 23 Artillery Battle”.

“We are no longer trying to retake mainland China, but we are also unwilling to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party,” Lai said.”

“When the artillery battle happened, I wasn’t born yet, and the Democratic Progressive Party hadn’t been established either. Clearly, China’s intention to take over Taiwan is not directed at any particular person or political party in Taiwan, nor is it about what anyone has said or done.”

00:00

War scarred bunkers on Quemoy reflect the islands’ frontline role in Taiwan Strait tension

The battle in 1958 saw communist forces shelling the nearby islands of Quemoy and Matsu – another Taiwanese defence outpost close to the mainland – in an attempt to take control of Taiwan.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including Taiwan’s main international backer, the United States, do not recognise Taiwan as independent, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

Beijing sees Lai, leader of the DPP, as a “separatist” who could bring war to the Taiwan Strait and has stepped up military intimidation since he was elected to succeed Tsai in January.

“In his June address to the Whampoa Military Academy, Lai stressed that although the academy was set up 100 years ago in Guangzhou, it is now in Kaohsiung, and the Whampoa spirit only exists in Taiwan rather than in mainland China,” Wang said.

“Lai attempted to strike a delicate balance between acknowledging the academy’s historical roots in mainland China and promoting a distinct Taiwanese identity,” Wang added, saying he also sought to erase the legacy of Chiang, who had deep historical links with the mainland and whose influence still lingered within the military.

Huang Kwei-bo, a professor of diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taipei, said Lai’s August 23 speech was part of an ongoing attempt to decouple Taiwan from mainland China.

“In the case of the August 23 Artillery Battle, Lai sought to lead the public to believe that the battle was a conflict between ‘democratic Taiwan and communist China,’ whereas in reality, it was the extension of the Chinese civil war between the KMT and the [Communist Party],” Huang said.

Like the mainland, Taiwan was under one-party rule in 1958. The KMT is now the main opposition party in Taiwan.

Huang said Lai’s remarks that China’s attempt to take the island was “not directed at any particular person or political party in Taiwan” suggested that Beijing’s wish to seize Taiwan had nothing to do with the ruling DPP’s promotion of independence.

However, Lai I-chung, president of the Prospect Foundation, a government think tank, said that Lai’s remarks aimed to assert that Taiwan had “long since moved beyond the historical perspective of the Chinese Civil War”.

“The artillery battle should not be viewed as an extension of that civil war,” he said, adding the island’s leader sought to “break free from the Chinese civil war framework in Taiwan’s cross-strait discourse, anchoring it instead in the broader national context”.

Additionally, his remarks aimed to shift society away from an outdated historical viewpoint, urging Taiwanese to realise that Taiwan is now of global significance, Lai I-chung said.

“The Taiwan Strait issue is not merely a matter between Taiwan and China but a challenge faced by the entire world, and Taiwan is not facing it alone.”

02:13

Pending Taiwanese TV drama depicting PLA attack sparks emotion, worry and criticism

James Yifan Chen, a professor of diplomacy and international relations at Tamkang University in New Taipei, said Lai’s cross-strait policy rhetoric appeared to be more separatist than Tsai’s because of Lai’s repeated emphasis on how the two sides were not subordinate to each other.

“Lai is also framing a different concept which denies [Taiwan’s] past legacies on the mainland to push for more obvious separation as a historical revisionist,” Chen said.

Timing is also important. Lai is promoting his ideology during the “vacuum period” of the US presidential election, when Americans typically pay less attention to the words and actions of a Taiwanese leader, according to Chen.

“I think US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi would definitely talk about this [but] the US worries more about the Middle East and the South China Sea now, and cross-strait issues do not appear on its alert radar,” he said.

Li Zhenguang, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Beijing Union University, said that from the mainland’s perspective, Tsai Ing-wen was more inclined towards “soft confrontation” while Lai’s provocations on the issue of Taiwanese independence have surpassed hers.

He warned that if Lai continued to push the “Taiwan independence historical narrative” to sever cross-strait ties or adopted a “hard confrontation” approach in cross-strait relations, the mainland will undoubtedly respond with “hard measures” to seek unification.

“This is evident from earlier actions such as the mainland issuing judicial documents to punish stubborn Taiwan independence elements, the People’s Liberation Army exercises targeting Taiwan, and the normalisation of law enforcement patrols by the mainland coastguard in the waters around Quemoy,” he said.

Sullivan’s just-concluded visit to Beijing also sent “a clear signal” that the US wanted to cooperate with the mainland to improve risk management regarding Taiwan, Li said.

South China Morning Post · August 31, 2024

9. Ex-UNSC chief backs bid for permanent seat by India, ‘world’s third-most powerful country'

By displacing the UK.

Ex-UNSC chief backs bid for permanent seat by India, ‘world’s third-most powerful country'

hindustantimes.com · by HT News Desk · September 1, 2024

As the ‘third most-powerful country’ in the world, India should get its ‘rightful place’ as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), according to ex-Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, a former president of the top UN body.

An overall view as the UN Security Council holds a meeting on the situation in the Middle East at UN headquarters on June 10, 2024 in New York. (Photo by ANGELA WEISS / AFP)

The United Kingdom, one of the five permanent members, should ‘step aside’ for India, he said.

“There is absolutely no question that India is the third most-powerful country today after the United States and China. The Great Britain (UK) is no longer great,” Mahbubani told NDTV.

On why he thinks that the UK should relinquish its permanent membership, Mahbubani, who headed the UNSC between January 2001 and May 2002, stated that fearing ‘backlash,’ the UK has not used its veto power ‘for decades.’

“So, the logical things is to give up its seat to India,” Singapore's former Permanent Representative to the UN, added.

India, where the British rule ended in August 1947, is the fifth-largest economy in the world, having surpassed the latter in September 2022.

The US, UK, France, China, and Russia, hold the five permanent seats in the Security Council, where India has had eight terms as a non-permanent member, most recently in 2021-22.

There are fifteen members of the UNSC – five permanent (each with veto power) and 10 non-permanent (no veto power). The non-permanent seats are allotted on a rotational basis.

The G4 nations – Brazil, Germany, India, Japan – support each other's bids for a permanent membership.

Meanwhile, speaking on potential reforms in the United Nations, Mahbubani, the ex-UNSC chief, remarked that the founders of the world body ensured that ‘that all great powers of the time had vested interests in the organisation in order to make it work.’

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10. Analysts Say Ukraine Strikes On Russian Power Plants Hurt Putin’s War Effort

Analysts Say Ukraine Strikes On Russian Power Plants Hurt Putin’s War Effort

Forbes · by Ken Silverstein · September 2, 2024

Ukrainian drones hit near the Konakovo Power Station.

Baza Telegram

Communism and oppression led to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989. But the final nail in its coffin was its war with Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989. Indeed, the conflict drained the empire’s dwindling coffers and the people’s energies — a battle fought mainly with conscripts.

Today, history is repeating itself. The Soviet Union has collapsed, but Russia's current war against Ukraine serves as a stark reminder of the past. Throughout history, societies have consistently chosen freedom over totalitarianism. Ukrainians are determined to never again live in a closed, authoritarian system. To achieve victory, they are effectively targeting Russia's energy infrastructure deep inside the country.

“Ukrainians can win this war, and we see it,” says Elina Beketova, democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, at a virtual press event.

Interestingly, Putin said a few months ago that Russia has 700,000 troops and could outlast the West. The reality is that Russia is using poorly trained conscripts. By now, everyone is familiar with how Ukrainian troops marched straight into Russian territory just north of Ukraine’s Sumy region. The conscripts just surrendered.

Think back to August 1968, when the Czechoslovakians tried to break free of the Soviet’s grasp. Russians used Czech tanks to quell the rebellion. But fast-forward to August 2024. Similar tanks are rolling out of Ukraine and into Russia, taking over the Kursk region. Ukrainian forces control at least 60 square kilometers and 93 settlements in this area.

Putin is lashing out. In a sign of weakness, he routinely boasts that Russia has nuclear weapons. Given that the West is supplying Ukraine’s military and it, too, has a nuclear arsenal, the Russian leader’s options are limited. “That means that the Russian authoritarian regime is not so strong or sustainable,” says Pavel Luzin, senior fellow with the think tank.

Undoubtedly, Russia continues to pummel Ukraine. In late August, it sent a wave of drones into the country, attacking its energy infrastructure— the biggest such assault in months. Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, has lost nearly 90% of its generating capacity, costing about $50 billion in damages. DTEK supplies 20% of Ukraine’s electricity

Retaliatory Strikes

... [+]Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

Ukrainian President Zelensky called on Western allies to give the country long-range weapons to defend its citizens. Last night, Ukraine hit a power plant in Moscow with drones. It is also striking oil depots and refineries. “Ukraine has options now because it was successful in the initial phase of this incursion,” says Nico Lange, senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Russia's oil and gas revenues amounted to $219 billion in 2020. Together, these two sectors account for 60% of Russia's exports and 40% of its federal budget. Putin attempted to flex Russia's energy power by reducing natural gas exports to Europe and increasing prices. Russia was earning between $500 million and $1 billion per day from selling oil and gas globally to fund its war against Ukraine.

It is backfiring. Not only is it losing global market share, but BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, and Equinor have also scaled back their Russian operations. Meanwhile, Ukraine possesses the third largest natural gas reserves in Europe. Although it produced 70 billion cubic meters in the 1960s and 1970s, this decreased by more than half in 1991 due to Russia shifting production to Siberia. Ukraine’s Naftogaz said it could step up and provide fuel to Europe.

“Two years ago, European gas prices spiked," says Edward Lucas, a senior fellow at the think tank. “But now they are slightly above pre-war levels. It’s a little bit like Russia’s nuclear weapons — the dog that didn't bark.”

Senior Fellow Luzin points out that Ukrainian attacks on fuel storage facilities and electric substations are retaliatory, aiming to give Russians a taste of their own medicine. Russia's electricity network is already fragile and needs modern technologies to increase resiliency. These attacks, combined with the vulnerability of their electricity network, are expected to cause significant suffering for the Russian people this winter, possibly even more than the hardships experienced by the Ukrainian people.

The most compelling question is whether the Russian dictatorship will survive. If Russia loses, dissatisfaction among the public and political elites could increase. Continued economic sanctions and military losses may further strain Russia, potentially creating an opportunity for political opposition or factions within the government to challenge Putin's leadership.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces said as of August 31, the Russians have lost 615,000 soldiers and 368 planes.

The Cost Of War

... [+]POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Consider that the United States has a gross domestic product of about $27 trillion—a highly diversified economy. China’s GDP is $18 trillion. Russia’s economy is significantly smaller: $2.3 trillion and heavily dependent on oil and gas exports. Much of that money goes towards funding the war — not supporting Russian society. Russian unrest is bubbling beneath the surface.

When the Soviet Union fell, the world welcomed Russia and the satellite nations into the global community. Markets opened to Russia. But Putin’s war against Ukraine has changed that. Even worse, the regime has reversed the country’s democratic strides. Now, any critic of Putin or the state is imprisoned or killed.

While Putin wants to be known for restoring Soviet territory and pride, author Anne Applebaum said Russians will remember him as the one who destroyed the country. Her book Autocracy Inc. said that he shuns the interests of ordinary citizens.

“They are just cannon fodder to him,” she told RadioFreeEurope. That was the case in Afghanistan and now Ukraine. And if we listen to Putin’s deputies, they have their eye on the Baltic States and consider Poland their eternal enemy. It is, thus, crucial for Ukraine to win this war.

"A military loss could create a real opening for national self-examination or a major change, as it so often has done in Russia’s past,” she writes. “Only failure can persuade the Russians themselves to question the sense and purpose of a colonial ideology that has repeatedly impoverished and ruined their own economy and society, as well as those of their neighbors, for decades.”

So, how does this war end? Ukraine’s President Zelenksy thinks his country has to escalate to de-escalate, a tactic that involves taking Russian land while taking out critical Russian energy assets. However, Putin believes he can win the war of attrition. But at what cost?

The longer this goes on, the poorer Russia becomes and the more toothless it looks. That may empower the people and dethrone the dictator.

Forbes · by Ken Silverstein · September 2, 2024

11. Analysis: China's economic malaise seen accelerating obesity rates

Maybe China is more like the US than anyone thought? Do we face the same problems?

East Asia

Analysis: China's economic malaise seen accelerating obesity rates

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-obesity-economic-downturn-urbanisation-lifestyle-changes-unhealthy-habits-4581181

Obese Chinese boys do sit-ups as they take part in a weight-loss camp in Shenyang, northeast China's Liaoning province. (File photo: AFP/STR)

02 Sep 2024 02:28PM

(Updated: 02 Sep 2024 03:01PM)

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SHANGHAI: As China builds fewer houses and bridges, its consumers buy cheaper, less-healthy meals, and as factories and farms invest in automation, a new fiscal challenge is emerging - the country's obesity rate may grow much faster and add to healthcare costs.

Job stress, long work hours and poor diets are growing high- risk factors in the cities, while in rural areas, agriculture work is becoming less physically demanding and inadequate healthcare is leading to poor screening and treatment of weight problems, doctors and academics say.

China is facing a twin challenge that feeds its weight problem: In a modernising economy underpinned by technological innovation, more jobs have become static or desk-bound, while a prolonged slowdown in growth is forcing people to adopt cheaper, unhealthy diets.

With housing and infrastructure already abundant, for instance, millions of workers have switched from construction and manufacturing jobs to driving for ride-sharing or delivery companies in recent years.

The danger of AI in war: it doesn’t care about self-preservation | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Nishank Motwani · August 30, 2024

Recent wargames using artificial-intelligence models from OpenAI, Meta and Anthropic revealed a troubling trend: AI models are more likely than humans to escalate conflicts to kinetic, even nuclear, war.

This outcome highlights a fundamental difference in the nature of war between humans and AI. For humans, war is a means to impose will for survival; for AI the calculus of risk and reward is entirely different, because, as the pioneering scientist Geoffrey Hinton noted, ‘we’re biological systems, and these are digital systems.’

Regardless of how much control humans exercise over AI systems, we cannot stop the widening divergence between their behaviour and ours, because AI neural networks are moving towards autonomy and are increasingly hard to explain.

To put it bluntly, whereas human wargames and war itself entail the deliberate use of force to compel an enemy to our will, AI is not bound to the core of human instincts, self-preservation. The human desire for survival opens the door for diplomacy and conflict resolution, but whether and to what extent AI models can be trusted to handle the nuances of negotiation that align with human values is unknown.

The potential for catastrophic harm from advanced AI is real, as underscored by the Bletchley Declaration on AI, signed by nearly 30 countries, including Australia, China, the US and Britain. The declaration emphasises the need for responsible AI development and control over the tools of war we create.

Similarly, ongoing UN discussions on lethal autonomous weapons stress that algorithms should not have full control over decisions involving life and death. This concern mirrors past efforts to regulate or ban certain weapons. However, what sets AI-enabled autonomous weapons apart is the extent to which they remove human oversight from the use of force.

A major issue with AI is what’s called the explainability paradox: even its developers often cannot explain why AI systems make certain decisions. This lack of transparency is a significant problem in high-stakes areas, including military and diplomatic decision-making, where it could exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions. As Mustafa Suleyman, co-founder of DeepMind, pointed out, AI’s opaque nature means we are unable to decode the decisions of AI to explain precisely why an algorithm produced a particular result.

Rather than seeing AI as a mere tool, it’s more accurate to view it as an agent capable of making independent judgments and decisions. This capability is unprecedented, as AI can generate new ideas and interact with other AI agents autonomously, beyond direct human control. The potential for AI agents to make decisions without human input raises significant concerns about the control of these powerful technologies—a problem that even the developers of the first nuclear weapons grappled with.

While some want to impose regulation on AI somewhat like the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which has so far limited nuclear weapons to nine states, AI poses unique challenges. Unlike nuclear technology, its development and deployment are decentralized and driven by private entities and individuals, so its inherently hard to regulate. The technology is spreading universally and rapidly with little government oversight. It’s open to malicious use by state and nonstate actors.

As AI systems grow more advanced, they introduce new risks, including elevating misinformation and disinformation to unprecedented levels.

AI’s application to biotech opens new avenues for terrorist groups and individuals to develop advanced biological weapons. That could encourage malign actors, lowering the threshold for conflict and making attacks more likely.

Keeping a human in the loop is vital as AI systems increasingly influence critical decisions. Even when humans are involved, their role in oversight may diminish as trust in AI output grows, despite AI’s known issues with hallucinations and errors. The reliance on AI could lead to a dangerous overconfidence in its decisions, especially in military contexts where speed and efficiency often trump caution.

As AI becomes ubiquitous, human involvement in decision-making processes may dwindle due to the costs and inefficiencies associated with human oversight. In military scenarios, speed is a critical factor, and AI’s ability to perform complex tasks rapidly can provide a decisive edge. However, this speed advantage may come at the cost of surrendering human control, raising ethical and strategic dilemmas about the extent to which we allow machines to dictate the course of human conflict.

The accelerating pace at which AI operates could ultimately pressure the role of humans in decision-making loops, as the demand for faster responses might lead to sidelining human judgment. This dynamic could create a precarious situation where the quest for speed and efficiency undermines the very human oversight needed to ensure that the use of AI aligns with our values and safety standards.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Nishank Motwani · August 30, 2024

13. US Navy Brings Big-Deck Amphib to Protect Philippines

US Navy Brings Big-Deck Amphib to Protect Philippines - Warrior Maven

Osprey Tiltrotor aircraft and F-35B Joint Strike Fighters are taking off from the deck of the USS America in the Philippine Sea in a show of amphibious warship strength

warriormaven.com · by Kris Osborn · August 30, 2024

By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior

Osprey Tiltrotor aircraft and F-35B Joint Strike Fighters are taking off from the deck of the USS America in the Philippine Sea in a show of amphibious warship strength off the coast of the Philippines. Such a development, which places massive maritime air power within range of defending the Philippines, is not surprising given recent Chinese provocations against Philippine vessels and the fast-paced US effort to increase its military presence in the Philippines,

In fact, US warships may escort Philippine Navy vessels in coming weeks to add an additional, sought after level of security given the longstanding and now strengthening US-Philippine military cooperation. The two countries have had an ironclad mutual support treaty for many years, and in recent months the US military has been adding several new bases on the Philippines to stage operations, place assets and expand US-Philippine military-to-military operational cooperation.

Having the USS America in the Philippine Sea is quite significant for many reasons, perhaps the most of which is that it bring 5th-generation US Navy air power within range of defending the Philippines, protecting the airspace in the region and even striking mainland China or PLA Navy forces should that be required. There are roughly 1,800 nautical miles between the Philippines and mainland China, so if the USS America were positioned in between the two countries, an F-35B would be within range of operating near or over either country. An F-35B operates with range of 1,000-to-1,300 miles, and could be well positioned anywhere in the Philippine Sea with refueling. With refueling, F-35Bs could establish a free-reign air supremacy zone in the Pacific skies above the Philippine Sea. As part of this, the USS America could help erect a 5th-generation “wall” of F-35Bs accros the Philippine coastline, because a single big-deck amphib can deploy with as many as 20 F-35Bs.

F-35 Wall of Protection in the Philippine Sea

Given that F-35s are networked with one another through a secure and high-speed datalink called MADL, Multi-Function Advanced Datalink, threat details could quickly be shared across a wide operational envelope protecting the airspace, ocean and coastline along the Philippines. It would also make sense for the US to base some F-35As in the Philippines as well, given that the US Navy operates with a large 5th-generation air power advantage over China. The PLA Air Force operates the J-20 5th-generation stealth aircraft, however the plane cannot operate from the ocean and must take off and land on from land. The Chinese carrier-launched J-31 5th-gen stealth aircraft only exists in the form of a few prototypes, so the US Navy operates with a massive 5th-gen air advantage in the Pacific. If makes sense therefore, that an F-35B-armed big-deck amphib would operate in the area, as any Chinese amphibious assault upon the Philippines would have little chance of success without air supremacy or any kind of air support. The first two America-class amphibs, the USS America and the USS Tripoli, are specifically optimized for air power and are not built with a well-deck for traditional amphibious assault operations. These ships, which have been specifically re-configured to accommodate the F-35B, project amphibious air power in a way that is unprecedented.

Osprey Brings Threat of Marine Corps Air Attack

This includes the high-speed and heavily upgraded Osprey tiltrotor aircraft which can travel hundreds of miles from ship to shore in support of amphibious operations. Having Ospreys within range of the Philippine coastline could prove critical in the event of a PLA amphibious attack as the could bring Marines, weapons, supplies and cargo from ship to shore in support of Philippine defenses. Osprey’s in particular can operate at speeds greater than 220 knots and travel with a combat radius of 450 nautical miles, so they are positioned for what the Marine Corps calls Mounted Vertical Maneuver. This means the Marines, weapons and equipment can be dropped in behind enemy lines for reconnaissance and attack missions at high speeds. Finally, in the event that PLA forces were somehow able to succeed in gaining a land foothold on the Philippine shores, US Navy amphibious warfare assets might be needed to attack and liberate occupied Philippine territory.

Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

warriormaven.com · by Kris Osborn · August 30, 2024

14. Ukraine Takes War to Russia With Drone Strikes but Struggles to Inflict Pain on Putin

Ukraine Takes War to Russia With Drone Strikes but Struggles to Inflict Pain on Putin

Zelensky says the goal of the strikes is to ‘force Russia into peace’

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-takes-war-to-russia-with-drone-strikes-but-struggles-to-inflict-pain-on-putin-af33a5a3?mod=latest_headlines

By Ian Lovett

Sept. 2, 2024 11:18 am ET

Police officers stood outside an oil refinery targeted by Ukrainian strikes, in Moscow on Sunday. Photo: Alexander Ryumin/Zuma Press

Ukraine’s mass drone attack on Russia over the weekend was part of a fresh effort by Kyiv to take the war deep inside its invader and regain some initiative in the 2½-year conflict.

In its latest salvo, Kyiv fired more than 150 drones at oil refineries and power plants across much of Russia, which Kyiv has frequently targeted in recent months. Two refineries in the Moscow region were hit, according to local officials, while a large fire broke out at another refinery in the Tver region, northwest of the capital. No casualties were reported.

In his nightly address on Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that drone strikes inside Russia were part of a strategy to bring an end to the conflict by making the Russian public feel the war the same way Ukrainians do. Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region, he said, is part of that strategy.

“We must push the war back from where it was brought to Ukraine, and not just into Russia’s border regions,” he said. “The terrorist state must feel what war is.”

In recent weeks, Zelensky has been speaking more openly of the desire to find an end to the conflict. After repeating for most of the war that Ukraine would regain all Russian occupied territory, he told the BBC’s Ukrainian service this summer that he hopes to end the “hot phase of the war” this year. He also invited Russia to join a peace conference in November.

A large fire broke out at a refinery in the Tver region of Russia on Sunday. Photo: social media/Reuters

The change in rhetoric reflects a growing weariness of the war in Ukraine, where opinion polls show growing support for negotiating a cease-fire with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It also points to a growing recognition that Russia’s war machine has been able to put significantly more men and machines onto the battlefield and is pressing deeper into its much smaller neighbor. At the same time, Ukraine’s ability to combat Russia’s invasion depends heavily on Western support, which is entering an unpredictable phase with the impending U.S. presidential election.

Analysts said the advance into Kursk and the strikes deep inside Russia are aimed not only at gaining a military advantage but also bolstering Ukraine’s position in any future negotiations. Ukrainian forces have now seized more than 500 square miles of territory inside the Kursk region. Last month, Kyiv also debuted a new, homegrown weapon, which Zelensky called a missile-drone hybrid capable of striking well beyond the border.

Zelensky added Sunday that he hoped U.S. President Biden and other Western leaders would soon give Ukraine the capacity to hit deep inside Russia with long-range Western-made missiles—permission that Kyiv has been seeking for months. Anxious about expanding a conflict with a nuclear power, Western leaders have thus far resisted Kyiv’s pleas.

“To force Russia into peace,” Zelensky said. “We need effective tools.”

Meanwhile, Russia continued its assault on the northern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv on Monday, with guided aerial bombs injuring at least seven people. The attack comes one day after missile strikes on the city struck near a shopping center, injuring at least 47 people.

By contrast, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia have almost exclusively targeted airfields, ammunition depots and energy infrastructure, inflicting comparatively few civilian casualties.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says drone strikes inside Russia are part of a strategy to bring an end to the conflict. Photo: Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press

A fire caused by an Aug. 18 strike on an oil depot in Russia’s Rostov region was extinguished only on Monday, according to Russian officials.

“This isn’t about targeting the Russian people…it’s about targeting Putin and the political system, and making them question if the war against Ukraine is really worth it,” said Mick Ryan, a military strategist and retired major general in the Australian Army. “Whether they can achieve that is a bit harder to ascertain, because Putin may well be willing to bear these kinds of costs in a way that Ukraine can’t.”

So far, Kyiv’s attacks on Russian territory don’t appear to have changed the overall complexion of the war.

Russian troops are rapidly advancing toward the city of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub for Kyiv in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. Though Ukrainian officials said they hoped the incursion into Kursk would draw troops away from the eastern front, that doesn’t appear to have happened, and Ukrainian forces remain significantly outmanned in the region.

In addition, it is unclear how significantly the strikes on oil depots and power plants have affected Russia’s energy infrastructure. In major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, life is continuing on as normal, without the rolling blackouts or frequent air-raid sirens that have become a staple of life in Kyiv.

Russia has also continued missile and drone strikes on targets across Ukraine, including an attack on a children’s hospital in July and its largest missile barrage of the war last week.

Ann M. Simmons contributed to this article.

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

15. ‘Moving in the Dark’: Hamas Documents Show Tunnel Battle Strategy

I wonder how much assistance Hamas received from north Korea on this aspect. north Korea has a doctrine called "tunnel living" which they practice periodically where the military and most of the nation moves underground.

‘Moving in the Dark’: Hamas Documents Show Tunnel Battle Strategy

Hamas leaders spent years developing an underground warfare plan. Records from the battlefield show the group’s preparations, including blast doors to protect against Israeli bombs and soldiers.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/02/world/europe/hamas-tunnels-war-documents.html

An Israeli soldier walking out of a tunnel in the Gaza Strip during an escorted tour by the military for international journalists in December.Credit...Tamir Kalifa for The New York Times

By Adam Goldman Ronen Bergman and Natan Odenheimer

Reporting from Tel Aviv

Sept. 2, 2024

Updated 10:41 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Hamas’s handbook for underground combat describes, in meticulous detail, how to navigate in darkness, move stealthily beneath Gaza and fire automatic weapons in confined spaces for maximum lethality.

Battlefield commanders were even instructed to time, down to the second, how long it took their fighters to move between various points underground.

The 2019 manual, which was seized by Israeli forces and reviewed by The New York Times, was part of a yearslong effort by Hamas, well before its Oct. 7 attack and current war with Israel, to build an underground military operation that could withstand prolonged attacks and slow down Israeli ground forces inside the darkened tunnels.

Just a year before attacking Israel, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, approved spending $225,000 to install blast doors to protect the militia’s tunnel network from airstrikes and ground assaults.

The approval document said that Hamas brigade commanders had reviewed the tunnels below Gaza and identified critical places underground and at the surface that needed fortification.

The records, along with interviews with experts and Israeli commanders, help explain why, nearly a year into the war, Israel has struggled to achieve its objective of dismantling Hamas.

Israeli officials spent years searching for and dismantling tunnels that Hamas could use to sneak into Israel to launch an attack. But assessing the underground network inside Gaza was not a priority, a senior Israeli official said, because an invasion and full-scale war there seemed unlikely.

All the while, officials now realize, Hamas was girding for just such a confrontation.

Were it not for the tunnels, experts say, Hamas would have stood little chance against the far superior Israeli military.

The underground-combat manual contains instructions on how to camouflage tunnel entrances, locate them with compasses or GPS, enter quickly and move efficiently.

Image

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, last year.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

“While moving in the dark inside the tunnel, the fighter needs night-vision goggles equipped with infrared,” the document, written in Arabic, reads. Weapons should be set to automatic and fired from the shoulder. “This type of shooting is effective because the tunnel is narrow, so the shots are aimed at the kill zones in the upper part of the human body.”

Israeli officials knew before the war that Hamas had an extensive tunnel network, but it has proved to be more sophisticated and extensive than they realized.

Early in the war, they estimated that it stretched for about 250 miles. Now they believe it is up to twice as long.

And they continue to discover new tunnels. Just last week, Israeli commandos rescued a Bedouin Arab citizen of Israel who was found alone in an underground warren. The government said on Sunday that six hostages had been found dead in another tunnel.

Mr. Sinwar, Israel’s highest-value target, has been suspected of managing the war and evading capture from a tunnel.

The records show how both sides have had to adapt their tactics in the war. Just as Israel underestimated the tunnels, Hamas prepared for subterranean battles that have not materialized. Israel was reluctant, especially early in the war, to send troops underground where they might face combat. Hamas has primarily ambushed soldiers near tunnel entrances, while avoiding direct confrontations.

That has left Hamas to use the tunnels to launch aboveground hit-and-run attacks, hide from Israeli forces and detonate explosives using remote triggers and hidden cameras, according to Israeli military officials and a review of battlefield photos and videos.

These maneuvers have slowed Israel’s assault, but its military has still decimated Hamas’s ranks, routed them from strongholds and forced them to abandon huge swaths of the tunnel network that they invested so heavily to build.

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated

Sept. 2, 2024, 10:53 a.m. ET1 hour ago

Members of the Israeli military discovered the tunnel warfare document in Gaza City’s Zeitoun District in November, officials said. A letter from Mr. Sinwar to a military commander was found that same month south of the city. The documents were made available by to The Times by Israeli military officials.

Image

Israeli troops walking past destroyed buildings in the Zeitoun district, where the Israeli military says the tunnel warfare document was discovered, on the outskirts of Gaza City, in November.Credit...Mahmud Hams/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A military spokesperson said that “the fact that Hamas is hiding in tunnels and managing much of the fighting from there prolongs the war.” A senior Hamas official declined to comment on the tunnel strategy.

The markings on the documents are consistent with other Hamas materials that have been made public or been examined by The Times. And Israeli soldiers have described details, like camouflaged tunnel entrances and recently installed blast doors, that are consistent with the Hamas documents. The documents also describe the use of gas detectors and night-vision goggles, equipment that Israeli forces have found inside tunnels.

“Hamas’s combat strategy is based on underground tactics,” said Tamir Hayman, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence. “This is one of the primary reasons they have managed to withstand the I.D.F. thus far.”

Since the war started, much has been revealed about the subterranean network, which has been called the “Gaza Metro.” Hamas uses some rudimentary tunnels simply to mount attacks. The fighting manual describes how people should maneuver these narrow passages in darkness: with one hand on the wall and the other on the fighter in front.

Others tunnels are sophisticated command-and-control centers or arteries connecting underground weapons factories to storage facilities — concealing Hamas’s entire military infrastructure. In some cases, Hamas has used solar panels installed on the roofs of private homes to provide power underground.

Photographs taken during an escorted visit on Feb. 9 to a tunnel under the United Nations agency for Palestinians in Gaza City show a telecomunications system set up in a climate-controlled room.Credit...Ronen Bergman/The New York Times

Some tunnels also serve as communication hubs. This past winter, Israeli forces discovered a Nokia telecommunications system underneath the headquarters of the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees.

Such Nokia systems provide voice and data services, according to the manual obtained by The Times, and could have functioned as a switchboard for an underground communication network. But the features require additional hardware and it is not clear what abilities Hamas had.

Hamas has been known to hold Israeli hostages underground, so every tunnel needs to be investigated and cleared, Israeli officials say.

Image

A sketch of a tunnel that Israeli soldiers drew on the wall of a Palestinian family home where they found a tunnel in January in central Gaza.Credit...Avishag Shaar-Yashuv for The New York Times

Destroying a tunnel section can take dozens of soldiers about 10 hours, according to a senior Israeli officer who is an expert on tunnel warfare. Last year, the Israeli Army discovered a tunnel that had a depth of 250 feet — about the height of a 25-story building. The army said it took months to destroy it.

“I cannot overstate that in any way. The tunnels impact the pace of the operations,” said Daphné Richemond-Barak, a tunnel warfare expert at Reichman University in Israel. “You can’t advance. You can’t secure the terrain.”

“You’re dealing with two wars,” she added. “One on the surface and one on the subsurface.”

One Israeli special operations officer, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss military activities, said that as soldiers approached the tunnels, Hamas sometimes blasted the ceilings, causing cave-ins that would block the path.

An Israeli military official said that it could take years to destroy the entire tunnel network.

Israel’s military leadership has made the tunnels its main target. But the campaign has come at a steep cost for Palestinian civilians. Many of the tunnels snake beneath densely occupied areas. Israel has publicized videos of the military destroying tunnels with more than 16 tons of explosives per kilometer.

The Israeli military estimates that it costs Hamas about $300,000 to build roughly a half-mile-long rudimentary tunnel. Ms. Richemond-Barak said that the letter from Mr. Sinwar highlighted the expense and sophistication behind the effort.

Image

Palestinians searching the rubble of destroyed buildings after a strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, last October.Credit...Mohammed Dahman/Associated Press

The letter was written to Muhammad Deif, the group’s military commander, who is believed to have been an architect of the Oct. 7 attack. It is not clear when Hamas completed its review of tunnel fortifications or whether it was done in connection to the attack planning. Mr. Sinwar wrote that “the brigades will be given the money according to the level of importance and necessity.”

The letter could indicate where the group anticipated the toughest fighting. Mr. Sinwar authorized the most money for doors in northern Gaza and Khan Younis. Indeed, some of the heaviest fighting during the war has taken place in those areas.

“The Hamas tunnel system was an essential, if not existential element of their original battle plan,” said Ralph F. Goff, a former senior C.I.A. official who served in the Middle East.

It is not clear when Hamas started using the doors, but Ms. Richemond-Barak said the group’s heavy reliance on them was new. She was not aware of Hamas using them during a 2014 war with Israel.

Blast doors seal tunnel segments from each other and from the outside, protecting against bombings and breaches. They also hamper the army’s use of drones to inspect and map tunnels.

The Israeli military has repeatedly encountered blast doors as they cleared tunnels. Despite the tactics described in the tunnel-fighting manual, once those doors have been breached, Israeli officials say, soldiers seldom find Hamas fighters behind them. They have fled, reflecting an attack-and-retreat strategy that has become commonplace.

Image

An Israeli soldier standing at the entrance of a tunnel found by the Israeli military inside a house during an escorted tour by the military for international journalists in central Gaza in January.Credit...Avishag Shaar-Yashuv for The New York Times

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington.

Adam Goldman writes about the F.B.I. and national security. He has been a journalist for more than two decades. More about Adam Goldman

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

See more on: Israel-Hamas War News, Hamas, Yehya Sinwar, Muhammad Deif

16. Gao Zhen, Artist Who Critiqued the Cultural Revolution, Is Detained in China

Gao Zhen, Artist Who Critiqued the Cultural Revolution, Is Detained in China

Mr. Gao is being held on suspicion of slandering China’s heroes and martyrs, an offense punishable by up to three years in prison, his brother said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/02/world/asia/gao-zhen-arrested-china.html

Gao Zhen, left, and Gao Qiang, with their artwork, “Mao’s Guilt,” in 2009.Credit...Shiho Fukada for The New York Times

By Yan Zhuang and Zixu Wang

Sept. 2, 2024

Updated 10:56 a.m. ET

Gao Zhen, a Chinese artist who has drawn international acclaim for works critiquing the Cultural Revolution, has been detained in China, his brother and artistic partner Gao Qiang said on Monday.

The Gao brothers are best known for their statues depicting Mao Zedong in provocative or irreverent ways, such as “Mao’s Guilt,” a bronze statue depicting the leader on his knees, supplicant and remorseful.

The police in Sanhe City detained Gao Zhen, who moved to the United States two years ago, last week while he was visiting China, his younger brother said in an email, on suspicion of slandering China’s heroes and martyrs — a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in prison.

The police also confiscated several of the brothers’ artworks, all of which were created more than 10 years ago and “reassessed Mao’s Cultural Revolution,” Gao Qiang said. The works included “Mao’s Guilt”; “The Execution of Christ,” a statue depicting Jesus facing down a firing squad of Maos; and “Miss Mao,” a collection of statues of Mao with large breasts and a protruding, Pinocchio-like nos.

About 30 police officers stormed the brothers’ art studio on Aug. 26 in Yanjiao, a town in Sanhe City about an hour away from Beijing, Gao Qiang said. The officers asked Gao Zhen, 68, to hand over his mobile phone, and when he refused, they handcuffed and arrested him, Gao Qiang said. Gao Zhen was in China with his wife and son, visiting relatives, his brother said.

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The next day, Gao Zhen’s wife was notified by the Sanhe City public security bureau that he was being detained on suspicion of slandering heroes and martyrs, Gao Qiang, 62, said.

The Sanhe public security bureau declined to comment.

The slander of heroes and martyrs was made a crime in 2021, as part of a newly amended criminal code, under a campaign by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to sanctify the Communist Party’s version of history. It has been enforced zealously since it came into effect, with officials creating phone and online hotlines for citizens to report violations. A version of the statute was first adopted in 2018 but without criminal punishments.

Gao Qiang said he had been severely depressed and having trouble sleeping since his brother’s detention. He did not know why the police had arrested Gao Zhen now, for artworks created long before the law came into place, he said.

Much of the Gao brothers’ works reflect their personal history. During the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, their father was labeled a class enemy and dragged off to a place that was “not a prison, not a police station, but something else,” where he died, Gao Zhen told The New York Times in 2009.

In 2022, after years of traveling between China and the U.S., where he held permanent residency, Gao Zhen moved to New York, his brother said, both because his son, who is an American citizen, was reaching school age, and because of the “deteriorating environment in China.”

Although the brothers have long clashed with the Chinese authorities over their politically sensitive artwork and have had their exhibitions shut down and their studio raided, they had rarely suffered serious repercussions.

To circumvent the authorities, they had put on invite-only exhibitions, with the location spread only via word of mouth and coded text message hours before the events. They designed the “Mao’s Guilt” statue so that its head could be removed from the body, leaving it unidentifiable.

A decade ago, when Ai Weiwei, China’s most famous dissident artist, was detained, the brothers also “encountered many issues because we accepted interviews with Western media and created artworks involving political figures,” Gao Qiang said. “But we were able to come out the other side unscathed every time.”

But, he said, Gao Zhen’s arrest showed that “now, the space for freedom in China has shrunk a lot compared to then.”

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Yan Zhuang is a Times reporter in Seoul who covers breaking news. More about Yan Zhuang

Zixu Wang is a Times reporter and researcher covering news in mainland China and Hong Kong. More about Zixu Wang

17. ‘Dark’ tanker crash exposes dangers of China’s thirst for cheap oil

Please go to the link to view this in proper format with the interactive graphics.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/china-dark-ships-south-china-sea/?itid=hp-more-top-stories_p005_f002

South

China

Sea

MALAYSIA

Ceres I path

From June 1

to Aug. 22

SINGAP.

Asia

‘Dark’ tanker crash exposes dangers of China’s thirst for cheap oil

By Rebecca Tan, Pei-Lin Wu and Júlia Ledur

September 2, 2024 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

9 min

360

SINGAPORE — A crude oil tanker traveling from Iran made a delivery to the Chinese port city of Ningbo two months ago before heading back toward the Middle East. The Ceres I had made this round trip several times in the past year, according to ship tracking data. But it didn’t complete this voyage.

The Ceres I and another tanker collided off Malaysia in the South China Sea on July 19, causing significant damage to both vessels. Malaysian authorities said the Ceres I had experienced “technical difficulties.” But shipping and energy analysts say the pattern of the vessel’s movements before the collision suggest another explanation: The Ceres I had been broadcasting a fake location on ship locator channels.

Among groups that track ship movements, the Ceres I was widely known to be part of a “dark” fleet of tankers operating outside international regulations to feed China’s appetite for sanctioned crude oil. China, the world’s biggest importer of oil, is one of the few remaining customers of crude from countries such as Iran, Venezuela and Russia, which are subject to heavy sanctions by the United States.

China needs this fuel, which is discounted from international benchmarks, to supply its manufacturing sector and prop up its flagging oil refineries. To bypass Western financial systems and shipping services, China relies on a fleet of aging, substandard tankers that operate illicitly and increasingly threaten the safety of international sea lanes, say analysts.

Map showing the Ceres I sailing from Malaysia to Iran

Radio frequency signals from the Ceres I

IRAN

CHINA

March

2024

INDIA

Ceres I

path

MALAYSIA

Feb.

2024

Leaves from

Malaysia to Iran

Map showing the Ceres I returning to China from Iran

Apr.

2024

IRAN

CHINA

March

2024

INDIA

No detectable

frequency

No detectable

frequency

MALAYSIA

Sails back

to China

The Ceres I returns to Singapore. After anchoring there, the ship heads north toward Malaysia, where it crashes with the Hafnia Nile.A collision involving ships like the Ceres I was “not a matter of if but a matter of when,” said Ian Ralby, a senior fellow for maritime governance at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Crew members from both vessels in the crash were injured but none died. If the Ceres I hadn’t just offloaded its cargo of oil, Ralby said, “we’d be looking at catastrophe.”

The Chinese owners of the Ceres I did not respond to inquiries for this story.

Last year, over objections from Iran and Russia, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations shipping agency, issued a resolution expressing grave concern over the prevalence of “dark” tankers, adding that there as many as 600 tankers servicing this shadow trade — vessels that had unclear ownership, were not compliant with safety standards and lacked adequate insurance.

Tankers are required to broadcast their location on their Automatic Identification System (AIS) so they can be detected by other vessels. But “dark” tankers were masking or falsifying their locations on AIS — a process called “spoofing” — to travel illicitly, said the IMO. The safety risks, the agency warned, were “real and high.”

China does not officially acknowledge that it imports sanctioned oil but defends its trade with countries like Iran. “China conducts normal energy cooperation with other countries under international law, which is legitimate and lawful,” Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson for China’s Embassy in D.C., said in a statement.

An inflatable boat belonging to the Singapore Navy near the fire-blackened Hafnia Nile following its collision with the Ceres I on July 19. (Republic of Singapore Navy/Reuters)

Secretive transfers at sea

The Ceres I was an archetype of the “dark” fleet, analysts say.

Launched in 2001, it had been operating past the 15- to 20-year limit that tanker operators impose for safety reasons. In the last five years, it has operated under four different flags, most recently under São Tomé and Príncipe, an African island country known for having low registration fees and lax oversight.

Data provided to The Post by the space-based data firm Spire Global, which uses satellites to track and validate the location of vessels, shows that in the two years before the Ceres I’s collision, it had been traveling predominantly between China and Iran, with regular pit stops in the waters off eastern Malaysia in the South China Sea.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, nearly 90 percent of China’s oil shipments pass through the South China Sea, a highly disputed waterway that is claimed in part by seven governments and thus difficult to police.

In recent years, a stretch of the South China Sea near Malaysia has become a hot spot for the ship-to-ship transfer of oil, which is when tankers mix sanctioned oil with oil from elsewhere to deliver as “blends,” said Muyu Xu, a China oil analyst at the maritime analysis group Kpler. This maneuver increases the risks of collision and pollution, especially when done hastily or when ships are not broadcasting their accurate locations.

Since last August, Kpler has detected more than 1,005 unique vessels participating in ship-to-ship transfers here, at least 30 percent of which Kpler estimates were doing so illicitly.

This stretch of sea was also where the Ceres I arrived in mid-July after leaving port in Singapore, according to Spire’s data.

Map showing the path of the Ceres I in the weeks preceding the crash with the Hafnia Nile

The weeks leading up to the Ceres I crash

Vessel radio frequency signals

June 15

July 11

July 19

In mid-June, the Ceres I arrived in Singapore from China. It then took a trip to the eastern coast of Malaysia and returned to Singapore, where it anchored on July 8.

The Ceres I sailed north for three days before stopping again in eastern Malaysia, where it stayed for a week.

At 3:55AM on July 19, the Ceres I stopped transmitting its location via AIS and soon after collided with Singapore-flagged Hafnia Nile.

South

China

Sea

Ceres I

path

MALAYSIA

Approximate location

of crash

MALAYSIA

Mid-June

July 11

Hafnia

Nile path

SINGAPORE

Late

June

Anchors on July 8

Singapore

Strait

INDONESIA

Sources: Spire Global, MarineTraffic

On the evening of July 18, the Ceres I broadcast via AIS that it was “at anchor” there, although Spire’s data shows it was moving northward. At 3:55 a.m. on July 19, the Ceres I stopped transmitting its location via AIS and did not begin again until 26 hours later. During this period, the Ceres I crashed into another tanker, the Singapore-flagged Hafnia Nile, bound for Japan. Spire was not able to pinpoint the exact point of the collision.

After the crash, the fire-damaged Hafnia Nile was towed back to home port by a Singaporean naval vessel. The Ceres I went missing for two days and then was intercepted by Malaysia’s coast guard, which found the tanker being pulled deeper into the South China Sea by two tugboats.

A collision in the South China Sea

0:25

Two oil tankers collided in the South China Sea on July 19, raising questions about the costs of China's demand for for sanctioned oil. (The Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency)

Unanswered questions

Malaysian authorities said based on preliminary findings the Ceres I had dropped anchor because it was experiencing technical difficulties and the Hafnia Nile had tried to avoid it but failed.

Three shipping analysts who studied the movement of the Ceres I said that this account raises major questions.

It’s unclear why the Hafnia Nile would have had problems avoiding the Ceres I, a 1,000-foot-long supertanker if the latter vessel had been anchored and transmitting its authentic location, said Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a principal analyst at the maritime-trade research firm Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Leading up to the crash, the Hafnia Nile had been traveling at 14 knots, near its maximum speed, suggesting it did not detect another vessel in its way, said Bockmann.

Hafnia, the company that owns the Hafnia Nile, declined to respond to questions, saying it was still investigating.

Dimitris Ampatzidis, a risk and compliance analyst at Kpler, said he thinks it’s likely the Ceres I had been “spoofing” its location, preventing the Hafnia Nile from detecting it. AIS data transmitted by the Ceres I in the days before it went dark has unusual gaps and shows “erratic and overlapping movements in a concentrated area, followed by sudden, sharp turns and long, straight paths” — patterns consistent with spoofing, he said.

Ampatzidis, who leads Kpler’s monitoring of suspicious vessels, said he has identified activity suggesting the Ceres I carried out ship-to-ship transfers on multiple occasions this year, including at least three times in Malaysian waters. “What we’re talking about is a vessel that has been connected to illicit activities for an extensive period of time,” he said.

From 2019 to 2021, the Ceres I was operated by a Shanghai-based company, Shanghai Prosperity Ship Management, which shares contact details with another shipping business whose owners were placed under sanctions by the United States for oil transactions with Iran, according to corporate records. More recently, the Ceres I has been owned and operated by a Hong Kong-based company, Ceres Shipping Limited.

Shanghai Prosperity Ship Management did not respond to inquiries. Ceres Shipping Limited does not have public contact information. A listed agent of the company did not respond to inquiries over email or to calls, and the Hong Kong Shipowners Association, the main trade group for shipowners in the Chinese territory, said it was not aware of the company.

In August last year, customs officials in Ningbo warned in an essay in a state-owned outlet that Western sanctions were going to drive more Russian oil toward China’s shores in “black fleets” that “pose a threat to our country’s maritime entry and exit order.” Around the same time, authorities in Shandong province began detaining tankers with safety lapses.

While these efforts suggest that Chinese officials, at least on the local level, have concerns over the substandard tankers arriving at their ports, they have not made a dent in curbing the trade of sanctioned oil, say analysts. In 2023, oil from Iran, Venezuela and Russia made up 26 percent of China’s oil imports, up from 20 percent in 2021, according to data from Kpler. In the first seven months of 2024, this figure was up to 28 percent.

“As long as Iran continues being sanctioned and as long as China continues to buy, this trade will continue,” said Emma Li, a China oil analyst at Vortexa, an energy analytics firm.

Wu reported from Taipei, Taiwan.

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Rebecca Tan

Rebecca Tan is the Southeast Asia Bureau Chief, covering 12 countries in a rapidly evolving part of the world. She was a Livingston Award finalist for her reporting on conflict in Myanmar and was previously part of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize in public service for coverage of the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. @rebtanhs

Júlia Ledur

Júlia Ledur is a graphics reporter covering foreign news at The Washington Post. Before joining The Post in 2021, she worked as a graphics editor at the COVID Tracking Project at the Atlantic. Previously, she was on the graphics team at Reuters, covering Latin American politics, the environment and social issues with data and visuals. @juledurg

18. Why the Free Market Is Hard to Defend

Conclusion:

Defending the free market does not make one a libertarian, or a globalist, or a neoliberal, or a free-market ideologue. The free market can and does fail, sometimes horribly. And human flourishing involves institutions, practices, virtues, and forms of action that the free market cannot provide, and which it even sometimes undermines. Every domain of human action is subject to moral evaluation, but we should beware of what Thomas Sowell calls “fact-free moralizing,” which only credits the good intentions of an act or policy, even when the consequences are demonstrably bad. The argument here is comparative and prudential: In thinking about market failure and government intervention, we should always keep in mind that the free market provides a powerful and irreplaceable means of making use of valuable but limited and highly dispersed information, that the free market is the most defenseless sphere of the common good, and that governments also fail, with consequences far worse than failures of the market.

Why the Free Market Is Hard to Defend – Nathan W. Schlueter

The free market exists because of something no one likes to be reminded of: scarcity.

lawliberty.org · by Nathan W. Schlueter · August 27, 2024

Under steady pressure from post-liberal and populist voices, Republican party leadership seems to have taken a surprising turn against the free market and towards interventionist policies—protectionism, industrial policy, regulations, welfare, and labor unions—more traditionally associated with the Left than the Right.

The truth is that the free market is not easy to defend. That is not to say it is indefensible. To the contrary, there are many strong arguments in favor of it, including the scope it gives to human freedom and creativity; the innovation and wealth it generates; and the incompetence, injustice, and dangers of undue government interference and control.

But most people find it difficult to understand and appreciate these arguments when faced with the immediate advantages of government intervention. The problem is not logical, it is psychological. Instead of an explicit rejection of the free market, we have witnessed the steady growth of well-intentioned anti-market attitudes and policies, which cause real but hidden harm while nudging us along what F. A. Hayek famously called The Road to Serfdom.

We can see why the defense of the free market is so difficult and yet so important by juxtaposing it with other domains of human action. The common good of a healthy political association is not simple. It includes at least three spheres that exist in a dynamic and uneasy tension with one another: civil society, the free market, and government.

This seemingly clear division can be very misleading, since all of these spheres, and their corresponding activities and habits, overlap and intersect in ways that are difficult to distinguish. Each sphere has its own distinctive purpose, activity, and “logic” or mode of practical reasoning. And one consequence of this complex reality is that human beings must learn, and learn to apply, different standards of evaluation and behavior to different domains in their lives.

Put most simply, civil society is the sphere where persons pursue the “intrinsic” goods—goods we have reason to want for their own sake—that constitute happiness and flourishing. Civil society is the space of genuine leisure; not merely entertainment, but worship, marriage, family, friendship, and culture. It operates by a “logic” of generosity, commitment, caregiving, and charity.

The free market is the sphere of “instrumental goods”—goods such as money that we only have reason to pursue for the sake of other goods—where persons acquire the means for their flourishing by exchanging their time, labor, resources, and other instrumental goods. It operates by a “logic” of negotiation, calculation, and thrift.

Finally, government is the sphere that provides the overall framework within which the other two spheres can operate well. Government also helps prevent encroachments by the other spheres and provides goods that are difficult or impossible for the other spheres to provide. Government operates by a “logic” of common deliberation and collective action on behalf of the common good, backed by coercive power.

Each of these spheres provides something distinctive that cannot be provided by the others. Left alone and in isolation from the others, each is prone to expand beyond its due limits, harming people and the common good. The challenge is to make all three work together and correct one another in the way that best promotes human flourishing. The constant ideological temptation is to reduce them to one. Totalitarian ideologies such as communism and fascism attempt to absorb civil society and the market into government. Libertarianism tends to reduce government and civil society to the logic of the market. More subtly, theocracy seeks to subordinate both government and the market to a unified vision of civil society determined by religious authority and doctrine.

Of these three spheres, the free market is the most difficult to defend. And that difficulty is not simply the result of market excesses or externalities, like manipulative advertising, a surplus of cheap, ugly products, or pollution. The difficulty is intrinsic to even a healthy market. The reasons have to do with scarcity, utility, impersonality, self-interest, and complexity. These words typically cause a negative emotional reaction. Yet each word expresses a reality we rely upon every day, and which we must humbly acknowledge and accept in order to flourish.

First, the free market exists because of something no one likes to be reminded of: Scarcity. Human beings are very needy. Nature does not spontaneously provide food, clothing, and shelter, much less the time or instruments of leisure like books and musical instruments.

Second, the primary advantage of the free market is its usefulness in helping overcome scarcity. We all like and need useful things, but as Aristotle repeatedly observes in his Nicomachean Ethics, the useful is not beautiful. Beauty consists in a gratuitous overflow of being that attracts our wonder and admiration, whereas the useful is merely necessary.

True, the market unleashes astonishing creativity and energy. Ayn Rand is a mediocre novelist, but her romantic entrepreneurs remind us of the kinds of human greatness that can find a place in the free market, and of the gratitude we should have for their efforts. Still, in the end, for most people, the market is about “getting and spending,” in which all too often “we lay waste our powers.”

Third, the logic of the free market is impersonal. If the first two elements did not elicit immediate negative reactions, this one is sure to do so. We are naturally attracted to the intimate personal relationships that characterize civil society, and resist anything that threatens to depersonalize us. And for many, the “impersonal” seems dangerously close to the “de-personal.”

And yet St. Peter tells us in Acts 10:34 that “God is no respecter of persons.” What could this possibly mean? Put most simply, it means that justice is impersonal, and that God is just. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, respect of persons means showing an undue partiality to specific persons. It is a sin against distributive justice. This is why justice is often depicted as a blindfolded woman holding scales. It is the reason judges wear black robes.

The market too is impersonal in the sense that typical market exchanges are motivated by goods rather than persons. As suspicious as this sounds, we demonstrate this fact every time we go through the check-out line at the grocery store. The transaction is hopefully personable, but it is not personal in the sense that either you or the clerk is primarily there out of an altruistic desire to help the other person. In fact, you are in some sense using one another in a way that reflects Aristotle’s friendships of utility. This is not the highest form of friendship, but unless force or fraud are involved, neither is it wrong. Neither grocery clerks nor buyers feel “used” in their transactions, as one naturally feels used when one has been taken advantage of or manipulated. It is precisely this impersonality that makes the market work so well, whether it involves buying milk from the grocery store or a used guitar from a seller in a different country.

Fourth, and relatedly, the logic of the market is undeniably self-interested. Yes, the market is driven by people serving one another, and without it, we would not have even the simplest things we take for granted, like pencils. But in the market people primarily (though not exclusively!) serve others in order to benefit themselves. As Adam Smith famously wrote, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from regard to their own self-interest.” We should not let sentimentalism prevent us from acknowledging the truth of this statement.

But as Smith also affirmed, self-interest is not the same thing as selfishness, nor is it necessarily individualistic. When we shop at the grocery store, we are not always seeking to provide only for ourselves. Usually, we are also seeking to provide for the closer circle of persons for whom we are responsible: our parents, spouses, children, and friends. And it matters that even though persons in market transactions do not have the good of the other foremost in their minds, typical market exchanges are not a zero-sum game, but a win-win. All parties to the exchange benefit.

As Hayek showed, government control over the means to human flourishing leads inevitably to government control over the ends of human flourishing.

Along with self-interest, the logic of the market fosters distinctive virtues such as saving, thrift, and industry. These virtues certainly lack the self-giving splendor of generosity, magnanimity, or friendship, not to mention faith, hope, and love. In isolation from the other human virtues, they would turn us into Ebenezer Scrooges: alone, angry, and sad. Nevertheless, they involve real human excellences, and without the reasonable self-care that they support, the other virtues would be impossible. How can one care for one’s friends and family if one does not work hard, save, and spend wisely?

Finally, the free market is a kind of spontaneous, “polycentric” order that emerges from the diverse activities of individual persons by a hidden process that is impossible for any human being, or group of human beings, to fully understand or manage. It is “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design,” to quote Adam Ferguson. It thus dramatically differs from organizations, which are made and managed from the top and center, such as households and corporations. This quality of the market unsettles many human beings, who are often distrustful and even fearful of things they cannot fully understand and control.

But spontaneous orders are an essential means of human flourishing. Take language, for example. Language—vocabulary, syntax, grammar, style—although in some sense made by human beings, is not the result of a single human plan or design imposed from above. It develops organically through the interactions of persons and communities in time, in a complicated and largely tacit process of tradition, standardization, and innovation. Of course, this does not prevent attempts to impose Orwellian newspeak, as with today’s “preferred pronouns” craze. Another example of a spontaneous order is natural science, a fact richly illuminated by Michael Polanyi.

These examples help put the free market in a new light. As F. A. Hayek argued, the best explanation and justification for the free market is not egoism or greed or even wealth, but the “knowledge problem”: No single human being or government can possibly know the relative value of goods for everyone, how many and what kind of shoes, apples, houses, books, et cetera, to produce, because this information is widely dispersed. In almost all cases, individual persons know best what their needs and interests are. Prices, emerging through a multitude of different transactions, uniquely coordinate this widely dispersed information so that each of us can know and respond to the relative value of scarce goods we want and need.

Hayek, who was not a libertarian, knew the free market only functions well when political institutions secure private property and economic liberty. He also knew that markets sometimes “fail,” and he advocated an “indirect method” of government action to help correct market failure by harnessing the forces of spontaneous order. Although he supported compulsory education, for example, he was an early proponent of tax-funded tuition vouchers for parents.

But Hayek warned against government attempts to replace the market. The free market requires humility, or an appreciation for the limits of human knowledge and control. Humility will always be disadvantaged against human pride and pretension, especially when the advantages of government interference are immediate while the costs are indirect and often “not seen.” This problem was first identified by the French economist Frederick Bastiat, whose famous “parable of the broken window” insightfully draws our attention away from the work generated by the need to repair a broken window (what is seen), to the more productive work that labor might otherwise have done (what is not seen).

A favorite example of mine is the New Jersey law requiring that all gas be pumped by a service station attendant. Not surprisingly, polls consistently indicate that a majority of New Jersians support this law. They see this wonderful gas pumping service in the middle of a New Jersey winter. They do not see the higher prices they must pay for other goods like food, beverages, and of course, gas. If they were ever given a clear choice between the expensive gas pumping law and a money-saving self-service law, they might choose differently, since wherever this choice has been given gas pumpers have disappeared.

Increased prices are not the only “unseen” cost of this law. According to a story in the New York Times, New Jersey gas stations have also been forced to shut down pumps due to labor shortages. Apparently there is more valuable work gas pumpers might otherwise be doing—house maintenance and construction, farming, food service, lawn care—instead of providing a luxury service mandated by the state for which there is likely little to no real demand.

The costs of the New Jersey gas pumping law are relatively small. But the logic of the law, consistently applied to other domains of human activity such as mowing lawns or buying groceries, would reveal the horrible truth of what happens when governments attempt to engineer the market. In fact, our society is a wild jungle of “New Jersey Gas Pumping laws,” mandates, subsidies, and restrictions in energy production, manufacturing regulations and labor requirements, protective tariffs, medicine, and education—that are inefficient and costly, and yet have popular support because the costs are hidden (or redistributed to others) and we only see the benefits.

Worse, our system perversely incentivizes government intervention, taxing our earnings to pay politicians for full-time work to come up with new ways to interfere in the market. And in most cases, these interventions, like the New Jersey gas pumping law, are not the result of careful deliberation about costs and benefits for the common good. They are the product of well-financed, powerful interests seeking to use the government for their private advantage.

The five reasons listed above explain why we have a dangerously large and growing national debt driven by an inefficient, unjust, and increasingly unsustainable entitlement system, and why none of our leading politicians and presidential candidates will talk about it. Whether the area is energy, finance, labor, education, or healthcare, at each stage gross distortions in the market and civil society created by government interference have resulted in demands for further government interference, placing us inexorably on the “road to serfdom.” And as Hayek showed, government control over the means to human flourishing leads inevitably to government control over the ends of human flourishing. In the political race to subject the market to moral ends, everyone loses.

Defending the free market does not make one a libertarian, or a globalist, or a neoliberal, or a free-market ideologue. The free market can and does fail, sometimes horribly. And human flourishing involves institutions, practices, virtues, and forms of action that the free market cannot provide, and which it even sometimes undermines. Every domain of human action is subject to moral evaluation, but we should beware of what Thomas Sowell calls “fact-free moralizing,” which only credits the good intentions of an act or policy, even when the consequences are demonstrably bad. The argument here is comparative and prudential: In thinking about market failure and government intervention, we should always keep in mind that the free market provides a powerful and irreplaceable means of making use of valuable but limited and highly dispersed information, that the free market is the most defenseless sphere of the common good, and that governments also fail, with consequences far worse than failures of the market.

lawliberty.org · by Nathan W. Schlueter · August 27, 2024

19. Ukraine’s Gamble

Excerpts:

For much of 2024, the West has been supporting a Ukrainian strike campaign in Crimea without a good explanation for what was meant to follow. It was serviceable as an end onto itself, degrading Russian air defense and support infrastructure. But that campaign now seems disconnected from Ukraine’s efforts in Kursk and its broader drone strike campaign against economic infrastructure in Russia. A series of disparate efforts do not a strategy make. If it was not clear before Kursk, the offensive puts into sharp relief the apparent lack of an agreed strategy between Ukraine and its Western partners. It therefore presents both challenges and opportunities. This turn of events should lead to a revision of the current strategy in this war, assuming one exists.

Since 2023, Washington has been out of ideas for how to successfully end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. Kyiv, meanwhile, has been focused on stabilizing the frontline, but equally worried about the prevailing gloomy narrative and the sense that Ukraine is losing the war. The Kursk operation helps address the latter at the risk of doing damage to the former. Whether or not Kursk succeeds, at least it is not an attempt to refight the failed 2023 offensive, a set piece battle in which Ukraine held no decisive advantages. That said, Kyiv’s present theory of success remains unclear.

Beyond the Kursk offensive and the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is increasingly the bigger problem. Ukraine faces an uncertain winter. It needs generators and air defense to close gaps in its coverage. More important, Ukraine needs a way to compel Russia to stop these strikes, if not in 2024, then certainly in 2025. In this light, Ukraine’s desire to lift the remaining restrictions on the use of Western long-range strike systems is understandable. The Kursk offensive has prompted that conversation, but it needs to do much more. Holding Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s hand, assuming Ukraine can also hold the line, exhaust Russia’s offensive potential, and withstand Russia’s strike campaign this winter. However it ends, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its partners to get on the same page—and shake off the current drift.

Ukraine’s Gamble

The Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region

By Michael Kofman and Rob Lee

September 2, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee · September 2, 2024

On August 6, Ukraine launched a bold offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, leveraging surprise and speed to quickly bypass Russian defensive lines. Since then, Ukraine has captured a significant tract of Russian territory and taken hundreds of Russian soldiers as prisoners. Now, three weeks into the attack, Ukrainian forces are holding territory and continuing offensive operations. They appear intent on consolidating a defensible buffer inside Russia.

This offensive has shifted the formerly gloomy narrative, at least for the moment, about the negative trajectory of the war. But Kyiv must decide what to make of its initial win. The offensive has yet to draw significant Russian forces from Ukraine’s eastern regions, and it remains unclear how Ukraine’s leaders intend to translate this tactical success into strategic or political gains. The offensive offers opportunities, but also carries considerable risks and costs. So far, Ukraine’s operations have been conducted by a mixed grouping of units, featuring perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers in total, with elements of regular brigades and Ukrainian special operations forces. These are some of Ukraine’s better and most experienced troops, with the backbone drawn from Ukraine’s elite Air Assault Forces. Some have been pulled off the frontlines in Donetsk and Kharkiv, where they were fighting against a Russian advance, whereas others would have served as an important reserve to stem Russian momentum.

By redirecting resources away from defensive efforts in the eastern Donetsk region, Ukraine is betting that other parts of the 750-mile front won’t collapse, that it will not lose a large number of soldiers and equipment in Kursk, and that the benefits from its operations in Kursk will outweigh the costs sustained elsewhere. Ukraine’s military leadership also hoped the incursion would divert Russian forces from its front lines in the east; however, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, said that Russia has instead intensified its efforts and deployed its most combat-ready units to the Pokrovsk front in Donetsk. Politically, Ukraine is also likely gambling that it can hold Kursk long enough to use it as a bargaining chip in the event that Kyiv is pressured to conduct negotiations. This could work if there is a way to compel Moscow to negotiate on such preferred timelines. But the territory could further strain Ukraine’s military over the winter. Either way, Kyiv hopes the Kursk offensive will spur a change in the perception that the war is on a negative trajectory, unlocking additional material assistance and altering the West’s weapons restrictions.

NOT WAITING

Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has raised flagging morale among its troops and restored its initiative along a patch of the front. The attack has also deeply embarrassed Moscow, demonstrating how unprepared Russia was for an offensive operation along the border. Three months after launching its own incursion into Kharkiv, Russia’s leadership undoubtedly believed that the war was steadily going its way and that time was on its side. Kursk will force Moscow to consider that Ukraine retains options, and that the outcome of this war is still unsettled.

So far, Kyiv has signaled that it will hold Kursk as a buffer space inside Russia, which means Ukrainian forces are there to stay. How large a salient projecting into Russia Kursk will become, and how much frontage Ukraine intends to hold, is not yet clear. But this offensive’s objectives appear much more limited in scope than prior ones. Unlike when Ukraine fought to expel Russia from Kharkiv region in 2022, the Kursk offensive has not encircled or destroyed substantial Russian forces, which would lead to captured equipment and ruined offensive capability. The prisoners Ukraine has taken are primarily border guards, conscripts, and Akhmat units—paramilitary Chechen units ostensibly under the Russian National Guard. Some Russian conscripts have already been exchanged with Moscow for Ukrainian prisoners of war.

The offensive does not redress the current materiel imbalance in the war. For now, Russia retains an advantage in manpower, equipment, and ammunition. This advantage has not proved decisive, or led to operationally significant breakthroughs, but Russian forces have steadily gained 750 square miles of territory since October 2023, and they have kept advancing in the weeks since Ukraine pushed into Kursk. Recently, the pace of that advance has accelerated, and Ukraine’s position looks increasingly precarious along parts of the front.

Kyiv has signaled that it will hold Kursk as a buffer space inside Russia.

Russian advances put at risk cities. That includes Pokrovsk, which is an important transit Ukraine is now forced to evacuate. As the pressure mounts, Ukrainian forces could end up ceding terrain gradually, then suddenly, in some places. But judging success by territory gained is misleading. More important is the balance of attrition. Holding a prepared defense is easier than offense and typically less costly. Before the Kursk operation, Ukraine was slowly bleeding Russian offensive power in exchange for territory gained. That kept the risk of a Russian breakthrough low, and it offered Ukraine the chance to rebuild its exhausted military over the coming months. An expanded strike campaign into Russia with drones and newly made missiles was slowly raising the costs of sustaining the war. This was not an especially daring or novel approach, but it was effective. After a new mobilization law went into effect in May, Ukraine more than doubled the number of volunteers and mobilized soldiers joining the military. Ukraine was steadily addressing its deficit of manpower and fortifications, increasing attrition to Russian forces on the battlefield, and supporting infrastructure behind the front lines. In this context, the Kursk offensive freights Ukraine’s position with added risk.

The attacking force in Kursk was composed of pieces from many brigades, assault battalions, and specialized units. Unless rotated back, these troops will not be able to plug gaps, serve as reserves, or counter Russian advances inside Ukraine. The offensive, in other words, weakens Ukraine’s already shaky front. Following Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in May, Ukraine’s military has been stretched thin, with defensive lines buckling across Donetsk. Russian forces have also been pushing Ukrainian lines back along several axes running from Vuhledar to Pokrovsk, Toretsk to Chasiv Yar, and near Kupiansk.

This is not to say that the offensive was inherently ill conceived. The operation was well-executed and quickly achieved several limited, but important, objectives, which would have made it an effective one-week raid. If it could pull significant Russian forces from other fronts, then the payoff would be more than worth the risk. But thus far, there is little evidence of it doing so.

The timing and organization of the offensive suggests that Ukraine’s leaders judged they needed to act. One possible reason is the looming U.S. election, which threatens to push Kyiv into negotiations with Moscow while in a position of weakness. In theory, by seizing Russian territory, Ukraine can significantly improve its bargaining power. Ukraine’s leadership may therefore judge that they are now better positioned for whatever political reality they will face in January. But this is a matter of perspective. No negotiations were in the offing, and Kyiv certainly could have waited until it had a sense of the future of U.S. policy. Right now, there is no compelling reason for why Moscow must negotiate while Ukraine holds its territory, and no indication that it might be inclined to do so. If anything, Russia is likely to maintain offensive pressure along the frontline while building up forces to eventually counterattack at Kursk. A Russian attack could be more effective in the winter, once the dense foliage in tree lines used by Ukrainian forces for concealment dissipates.

AN UNEXPECTED OFFENSIVE

Although Russia had two defensive lines established in Kursk, they were lightly manned by border guards and conscripts, backed by an Akhmat unit. Effectively combining armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, Ukrainian forces quickly bypassed or encircled the Russian defenders. Ill equipped and unprepared to counter such a force, many surrendered. The Ukrainian military demonstrated that it had learned from past offensives, bringing mine-clearing vehicles, air defense, and electronic warfare systems to support the initial assault. Ukraine also seems to have achieved success countering Russian reconnaissance drones with first-person view drones at the beginning, limiting Russia’s ability to quickly respond. Even though Russian drones detected and observed the offensive, Ukraine achieved operational surprise. Planning appears to have been closely held, even within Ukraine’s own government circles. Kyiv did not inform international partners, who might have discouraged it or leaked the plans. During past operations, such as Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive or its second raid into Russia’s Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, Russian forces appeared well positioned in advance with detailed knowledge of Ukrainian planning. In this case, there were no Russian units pre-positioned to respond and no operational reserve that could quickly answer.

In an ode to the 2022 Kharkiv offensive, which was also planned by the Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian units leveraged speed, sowing confusion as they flew down roads through multiple towns. Early Russian efforts to send reinforcements were countered with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes, destroying columns of Russian troops that were careless in their positioning. The initial Russian response has been shambolic, typical of the military leadership’s inability to respond to dynamic situations. Command-and-control arrangements are also confusing in this part of Russia, where responsibilities between the Moscow military district, forces belonging to the Leningrad military district, the Federal Security Service, and other organizations overlap. Unlike in Ukraine, where the battlefield is divided among regional groupings, it has taken Russia some time to sort out who oversees the overall, national response versus who is commanding the military effort.

Russia has been sending reinforcements to the region. They feature an incohesive grouping of conscripts from deeper within the country and regular units redeployed from less important fronts inside Ukraine. The Russian military used battalions piecemeal from their brigades, including naval infantry and Airborne Forces, and deployed special operations and irregular units. Thus far, Russia has pulled from Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv while maintaining offensive operations around the eastern cities of Vuhledar, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Kupiansk. It also appears that Russia is prioritizing the redeployment of unmanned aerial vehicle strike units that can move faster and have less of an effect on Russian offensive operations than infantry reserves. At the same, Russia has quickly constructed fortifications deeper in Kursk. Russia’s response to Kursk, thus far, appears to be an economy of force effort to contain the incursion, as it continues to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk. Moscow may be showing a degree of caution, aware that, in past years, Ukraine has typically launched attacks on multiple axes. It is possible that this is not Ukraine’s only planned offensive operation.

Russia’s air force has shifted air support from other fronts, particularly from Kharkiv, to counter the Kursk incursion, but the overall Russian offensive effort has not slowed. Most recently, Russian units have captured most of Niu-York, advanced into Toretsk, and come within artillery range of Pokrovsk. As a key transit hub, Pokrovsk important for sustaining defense in Donetsk and blocking further Russian advances. Even if Russia cannot quickly capture the city, placing Pokrvosk within artillery range has forced civilians to flee and will prevent its use as a rail hub for the area. The Russian advance there also threatens Ukraine’s flanks and could force a larger retreat down from Kurakhove and Vuhledar. The Kursk offensive has left Ukraine short on reserves to respond to any Russian breakthrough and, in some cases, rationing artillery ammunition.

UNCERTAIN TERMS

Although Ukraine’s initial losses in Kursk have been light, they are mounting as Russian forces become more organized and deploy reinforcements. Ukrainian forces are digging in, and Kyiv has signaled its intent to setup a military administration in the region. If Ukraine intends to hold the Kursk pocket for the foreseeable future—and all indicators suggest that it does—there is a strong likelihood the region will become the site of another grinding battle.

Much depends on how Moscow responds. If Russian forces throw themselves at Ukrainian lines, then Kyiv may force Moscow into a battle on its terms, lifting pressure across the front. This would be akin to how Russia responded to Ukraine’s capture of the village of Krynky across the Dnieper River in Kherson in 2023. Russia prioritized retaking the village, despite its minimal strategic importance, and sustained heavy losses among elite units as a result. Kursk could similarly sap Russian offensive strength, shifting the fight to Russian territory. Moscow may also feel compelled to create a sizable operational reserve and deploy larger garrisons along its borders. This, too, would reduce the combat power Russia has available to fight inside Ukraine. But if Russia contains the offensive and focuses on weakening Ukrainian forces with aviation, drones, and only a minimal commitment of troops, then this gambit may not pay off for Kyiv.

Ukraine’s strategy does not yet appear fully formed. The country’s military is working out logistics, communications issues, and other necessities for sustaining this salient. It will have to establish a defensible set of positions and a broader but shallower buffer inside Russia. Its advances in Kursk are likely designed to secure these objectives; the strikes on bridges, for example, are supposed to further isolate Russian forces along the border. Kyiv will have to choose whether to hold what it has or to invest more scarce resources into the operation in an effort to force a much larger Russian effort to counter it. But the risks should not be understated. The best-case scenario is that Ukrainian forces will hold Russia to relatively minor gains in Donetsk and retain Kursk with a sustainable force commitment. The offensive could also lead to changes in Western policy on the use of long-range strike weapons and infuse much needed energy into the West’s thinking on the way forward at this point in the war. The worst-case scenario is that, months from now, Ukraine will have lost significant tracts of land in its east and retained no territory in Kursk that it can use as a bargaining chip. The deeper Ukraine advances into Russia, the greater the risk of overextension.

COSTS AND BENEFITS

Ukraine had alternative options at this stage of the war. It could have focused on defense and reconstituted its understrength forces while expanding long-range strikes against Russia. Ukraine’s newly developed capabilities increasingly put Russian military and economic infrastructure at risk. Ukraine’s new volunteer and conscripted soldiers could have been sent to refill brigades holding the frontlines. They would have been used to build new formations. If Ukraine had focused on defense, it would have had a good chance of exhausting the Russian offensive while fixing manpower issues and stabilizing the frontlines by winter. At that point, Kyiv could have assessed its options.

Ukraine still would have lost territory in Donetsk, but it would have halted the Russian offensive and possibly held some of the cities currently at risk. Russia had reached the peak of its materiel advantage, so the risk of a major Russian breakthrough was decreasing, and Moscow could have been held to incremental gains. Ukraine could then have launched an offensive like the one in Kursk in 2025 under much more favorable circumstances. Russian limitations in equipment and manpower would have become more glaring, and Ukraine would have the benefit of newly formed brigades by that point, reducing the overall risk in force allocation.

None of these options were risk-free or cost-free. Military strategy is about choices. The Kursk offensive is creative, and it avoids a symmetric fight against a numerically superior opponent. Yet the longer the battle goes on and becomes positional in character, the more likely those advantages will dissipate. A fair amount of the future also depends on what happens not just at Kursk, but also in the battles for Ukraine’s cities in Donetsk. Kyiv may be resigned to losing cities such as Pokrovsk, assuming the consequences will not prove dramatic. But that, too, is a gamble. Both on the ground and in public perceptions, the pendulum can swing rather quickly if the news from the front is a steady drumbeat of lost cities and towns.

Ukraine has not been immune to sunk-cost thinking.

When under pressure, a fair bit can go wrong in coordinating defensive operations, especially among depleted units, and commanders may struggle to get an accurate understanding of the situation. Recurring problems with unit rotations, adjacent unit coordination, unclear command relationships, and employment of attached units by brigades exacerbate Ukraine’s relative inferiority in manpower and ammunition. Some of these issues are made worse by the Ukrainian military’s structure around brigades. As a result, tactical mistakes can become even more costly and lead to greater Russian advances. Many of the elite brigades deployed to Kursk would be less likely to commit these mistakes.

In the past, Ukraine has reinforced success, but its leadership has not been immune to the sort of sunk-cost thinking that leads states to feed resources into battles in which the costs outweigh the benefits, particularly once the military factors change. Early in 2023, Ukraine spent too many of its more experienced troops in a costly and geographically unfavorable battle over the city of Bakhmut, which was ultimately lost. Later that summer, Ukraine committed its reserves to a failed offensive, even though its day-one objectives had not been reached. It kept trying to advance as late as November, long after it ran out of assault-capable infantry and ammunition. And when Ukraine launched a cross-river operation in Krynky, its marines spent eight months holding a narrow lodgment, a small defensible position on the other side of the river. Russian forces wasted many of their airborne units trying to counterattack the position, but Ukraine’s marines paid a high price to sustain the operation, which had no hope of developing into anything other than an attritional battle. Although Ukraine might see Krynky as a model to improve on, the salient in Kursk is much larger and will require far more manpower to maintain.

As with the battle of Bakhmut and the 2023 summer offensive, it may take some time before observers can properly assess the Kursk operation. Furthermore, open-source intelligence is more likely to provide a distorted picture during rapid offensives that involve a more fluid front line than they are during the routinized fighting taking place across the front. Maps that rely purely on open-source information and geolocations are, in particular, less likely to accurately reflect day-to-day changes in the front line because much of the footage is not released publicly each day. This can give a distorted view of the rate of advances. Ukraine has a greater incentive than Russia does to withhold footage from Kursk, and it may want to publish misleading information to fool Russia. For outside observers, this makes it more difficult to assess the casualty ratio and relative equipment losses between Russia and Ukraine. The habit of both sides to deploy individual companies or battalions from brigades in a piecemeal fashion may also give false impressions about the size of the forces committed. Observers need to be cognizant that their view of the operation will almost certainly be flawed, and they need to be careful in drawing lessons about what happened and why.

WHITHER A STRATEGY?

Determining what this operation says about Ukraine’s overall strategy and the implications it has for the broader war effort is essential. In some ways, the offensive raises more questions than answers. Kyiv has long sought to end the war on favorable terms or, at the very least, avoid an unfavorable settlement that includes compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty or conceding territorial losses. In 2023, Kyiv hoped to gain the necessary leverage by breaking through Russian lines in the south and threatening Crimea. Seizing a part of Kursk may be an alternative means to achieve a similar end, assuming Ukraine can hold the territory for long enough.

For much of 2024, the West has been supporting a Ukrainian strike campaign in Crimea without a good explanation for what was meant to follow. It was serviceable as an end onto itself, degrading Russian air defense and support infrastructure. But that campaign now seems disconnected from Ukraine’s efforts in Kursk and its broader drone strike campaign against economic infrastructure in Russia. A series of disparate efforts do not a strategy make. If it was not clear before Kursk, the offensive puts into sharp relief the apparent lack of an agreed strategy between Ukraine and its Western partners. It therefore presents both challenges and opportunities. This turn of events should lead to a revision of the current strategy in this war, assuming one exists.

Since 2023, Washington has been out of ideas for how to successfully end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. Kyiv, meanwhile, has been focused on stabilizing the frontline, but equally worried about the prevailing gloomy narrative and the sense that Ukraine is losing the war. The Kursk operation helps address the latter at the risk of doing damage to the former. Whether or not Kursk succeeds, at least it is not an attempt to refight the failed 2023 offensive, a set piece battle in which Ukraine held no decisive advantages. That said, Kyiv’s present theory of success remains unclear.

Beyond the Kursk offensive and the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is increasingly the bigger problem. Ukraine faces an uncertain winter. It needs generators and air defense to close gaps in its coverage. More important, Ukraine needs a way to compel Russia to stop these strikes, if not in 2024, then certainly in 2025. In this light, Ukraine’s desire to lift the remaining restrictions on the use of Western long-range strike systems is understandable. The Kursk offensive has prompted that conversation, but it needs to do much more. Holding Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s hand, assuming Ukraine can also hold the line, exhaust Russia’s offensive potential, and withstand Russia’s strike campaign this winter. However it ends, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its partners to get on the same page—and shake off the current drift.

MICHAEL KOFMAN is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
ROB LEE is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee · September 2, 2024

20. Peacekeepers Need Peacemakers

Excerpts:

Even peacekeeping has its limits. Missions can only operate in line with the three guiding principles of peacekeeping: the parties to a conflict consent to the presence of peacekeepers; the peacekeepers remain impartial; and the peacekeepers do not use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. UN Peacekeeping cannot engage in proactive, offensive warfighting operations. But peace can rarely be achieved with armed groups that have no interest in it, and sometimes, stronger so-called enforcement operations are required—operations that can only be carried out by partners outside the UN. The UN must therefore strengthen its partnerships outside the UN, with entities such as the African Union (AU). To be effective, however, these partnerships must be better supported, funded, and prepared, including to ensure their compliance with international humanitarian law. Crises are increasingly diverse; the tools for responding to them should be, too. In 2023, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2719, which opened the door to directing UN funding to AU peace operations. Such support is critical to enabling the international community to enforce peace, and UN Peacekeeping is currently working with the AU to improve the readiness of AU-led peace operations.

But whatever form a peace operation takes, to be effective in the long run it must be anchored in and contribute to an overarching political solution. The success of any peacekeeping initiative will depend on whether the UN member states prove willing to harness the power of multilateral solutions. The critical importance of the interventions that UN peacekeepers are currently making in places such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan must not be underestimated. Preserving a cease-fire is not only essential to protecting civilian life; it also preserves the chance that a future political process will eventually lead to enduring peace.

If UN peacekeepers only have the resources to work toward the immediate goals of preserving cease-fires and protecting civilians, they can only prevent a bad situation from getting worse, not help build a path to peace. And if peacekeepers manage, rather than resolve, conflicts, then large-scale violence can easily return when the troops leave. UN peacekeepers are already bravely saving countless lives for a relatively small investment. But their missions need the attention, political backing, and resources they deserve. There are few better tools for securing peace in a fragile age.

Peacekeepers Need Peacemakers

What the UN and Its Members Owe the Blue Helmets

By Jean-Pierre Lacroix

September 2, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jean-Pierre Lacroix · September 2, 2024

Peacekeeping missions are often criticized, but rarely do critics imagine what the world would be like in their absence. In fact, multiple studies have shown that peacekeeping missions are one of the most effective tools the UN Security Council has at its disposal to prevent the expansion of war, stop atrocities, and make it more likely that peace agreements endure. In a comprehensive 2021 meta-analysis of peacekeeping operations presented in this magazine, the political scientists Barbara F. Walter, Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna found that “peacekeeping not only works at stopping conflicts but works better than anything else experts know,” and “at a very low cost. . . . Conflict zones with peacekeeping missions produce less armed conflict and fewer deaths than zones without them.” The “relationship between peacekeeping and lower levels of violence is so consistent,” the authors concluded, that it ought to be considered “one of the most robust findings in international relations research.”

Today, however, the challenges facing UN Peacekeeping are greater than ever. Currently, the United Nations has 11 peacekeeping missions deployed around the globe—missions that are making extraordinary contributions to containing violence amid a surge in conflict worldwide. In the Golan Heights and Cyprus, peacekeepers are monitoring and preserving cease-fires. In the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan, they are protecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable civilians. In the context of escalating exchanges of fire between Israel and Lebanon following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, the UN Peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon has worked to help avert escalations beyond those that have occurred throughout the ten-month conflict. Preserving cease-fires, protecting civilians, and containing violence are among the intermediate goals of peacekeeping, which also include mediating local conflicts and strengthening local institutions.

But the ultimate objectives of all peacekeeping operations are political. Such operations’ primary goal is to resolve conflicts by helping quarreling parties to reach and implement the kind of agreements that help establish durable peace that outlasts the presence of peacekeepers. As the head of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts, however, I can attest that recent developments make it extremely challenging for UN Peacekeeping missions to accomplish these long-term goals. More and more, conflict is driven by armed groups that operate across national borders, weaponize cheap technologies such as improvised explosive devices, spew hate speech online, engage in terrorism and transnational organized crime, and often lack any political ambition beyond sparking disorder. Although the practice of peacekeeping must adapt to meet these daunting challenges, there is only so much peacekeeping can do on its own.

The iconic blue helmets’ ability to successfully complete their missions also depends on the political will of the UN member states. And today, these countries are increasingly divided, their attention and resources split among multiple crises. Insufficient political support from UN member states has made enabling conflict to come to a lasting end a distant prospect for many UN Peacekeeping missions. Without more coordinated support from member states, missions are often limited to doing damage control—preventing conflicts from spiraling out of control rather than resolving them.

To empower UN Peacekeeping missions to move from managing to resolving conflicts, two changes must occur. First, the practice of peacekeeping will need to adapt more quickly to evolving threats that exacerbate conflict, such as transnational organized crime, climate change, misinformation, and digital technologies such as drones and AI. Second, and even more important, UN member states need to provide stronger and more unified support to peacekeeping missions—particularly to the peace processes that they seek to advance in the countries in which they serve. All UN Peacekeeping operations are designed to support peace agreements between parties to a conflict. But UN member states often need to exert their own pressure to encourage adversaries to reach or implement an agreement—especially as conflict flares anew worldwide.

DISTURBANCE OF THE PEACE

In 1948, just a year and a half after the UN itself was founded, the UN launched its first peacekeeping mission—to maintain the cease-fire that ended the Arab-Israeli War. The first armed peacekeeping mission came eight years after that, when the deployment of 6,000 lightly armed UN peacekeeping troops to the Egyptian-Israeli border helped end the Suez Crisis. In 1992 and 1993, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia facilitated an end to the country’s devastating civil war, including by organizing a successful election. In Cote d’Ivoire between 2004 to 2017 and in Liberia between 2003 and 2018, UN Peacekeeping missions supported the end of civil war and a return to constitutional order.

Three major factors contributed to the success of peacekeeping in those countries. The first was strong leadership by the UN Security Council. That allowed for the creation of new peacekeeping initiatives such as a governance and economic management assistance program in Liberia, which sought to address the governance deficits at the root of the conflict, and a certification mandate in Cote d’Ivoire that helped bring a 2011 post-election crisis to a peaceful resolution. Both countries’ peace processes benefited from a coalition of international and regional partners working to end the conflicts. Peacekeepers had a designated role supporting the implementation of the political agreements. And the proactive efforts of Liberian and Ivorian leaders and citizens themselves were crucial: no peacekeeping operation or international partner can substitute for a host government’s determination to fulfill its responsibilities.

Over the past two decades, however, most UN Peacekeeping operations have also been hampered by a discrepancy between their capacities and what the Security Council and the host countries expect them to accomplish. Peacekeeping missions’ budgets often prove inadequate to achieve their mandated tasks. The $5.59 billion budget that the UN General Assembly approved for peacekeeping operations worldwide constitutes just 0.3 percent of global military spending. It is far less than the approximately $11 billion that New York City budgeted for its police department in 2024, even though UN Peacekeeping maintains 20,000 more personnel. These budgetary constraints mean that often, peacekeepers are also unevenly and inadequately trained and provisioned.

With conflicts increasing in number and severity, UN member states’ resources are understandably stretched. Despite these constraints, UN Peacekeeping has continued to deliver on its intermediate goals of preserving cease-fires and protecting civilians. But being confined to addressing intermediate goals means that peacekeeping operations now sometimes withdraw from a country before durable peace is achieved, which in some instances means leaving such countries vulnerable to tipping back into conflict. At other times, the missions remain in place with little prospect of establishing durable peace.

Peacekeeping missions in Africa are particularly impaired by the dangerous combination of very broad, detailed, and ambitious mandates paired with resource limitations and a lack of strong, unified UN member state support. Peacekeeping principles dictate that even when the Security Council mandates UN Peacekeeping missions to protect civilians, they may use force only in self-defense and defense of their mandate. But when a peacekeeping operation lingers in a situation that has little prospect of progressing politically toward peace, local authorities and populations tend to become less accepting of the peacekeepers’ presence. This frustration is ripe for exploitation by groups who benefit from instability and use disinformation as just one of many weapons against peacekeeping missions, as well as local populations.

RIGHT OF SUPPORT

The UN’s peacekeeping operations can only ever be as strong as the support of UN member states. But against a backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions as well as shifting global and regional alliances, peacekeeping operations are increasingly unable to rely on the UN member states to act in a unified manner to support peacekeepers’ political efforts. Many member states certainly are stepping up by actively encouraging the parties to a conflict to work toward a political settlement. And the large majority of UN member states continue to strongly support UN Peacekeeping writ large—support that was demonstrated at the 2023 Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting in Ghana. The Security Council also continues to extend the mandates of peacekeeping operations, although with more limited unanimity.

Mostly absent, however, are the kind of broader coalitions of member states that would undergird UN peacekeepers’ efforts. In some cases, member states simply are not engaging enough to back the political processes that peacekeeping operations are mandated to support. Take South Sudan: the situation there is increasingly unstable, driven in part by the dire conflict in Sudan. At this fragile moment, UN member states need to send strong messages pressuring the political players to keep their commitment to the peace agreement.

In other cases, member states have been sending conflicting messages to the parties to the conflict. With respect to Mali, for example, Security Council member states were united for many years around shared political objectives for the country, including the ones that guided the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate. Over the past several years, however, that unity frayed, and Mali became terrain where competition over strategy between the most influential member states prevailed. This only compounded the challenges that the peacekeeping mission already faced due to the increasing prevalence of terrorism in the region. The peacekeeping mission’s presence became untenable, and in mid-2023 the Malian government requested that the mission withdraw.

The extent to which these conditions impair peacekeeping from supporting durable solutions to conflict must not be interpreted as a failure of the tool of peacekeeping. Skeptics about the value and impact of peacekeeping must ask: Is there a realistic better alternative to securing peace? What would happen in regions wracked by conflict if peacekeeping operations were not there? Haiti’s tragic descent into chaos showcases how peacekeeping cannot accomplish its ultimate goals without a strong political process implemented in parallel—and demonstrates the dangers of withdrawing peacekeepers before durable peace has been achieved. The UN Peacekeeping mission deployed to Haiti between 2004 and 2017 had many serious shortcomings. But it successfully secured Haitians the most basic security. It also assisted Haiti to rebuild its infrastructure after its catastrophic 2010 earthquake. In 2019, peacekeepers had to withdraw. Since then, the world has sadly witnessed the country spiral into a multidimensional crisis, with devastating impacts on the lives of ordinary Haitian people.

STRENGTH THROUGH PEACE

Member states themselves must recommit to peacekeeping. Along with providing more realistic, focused, and prioritized mandates and peacekeeping budgets that match these mandates’ goals, member states must place diplomatic pressure on the parties to the conflicts.

For peace operations to remain a relevant tool in an increasingly chaotic age, peacekeeping itself must change, too. In 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres laid out a broad initiative, Action for Peacekeeping, to improve peacekeeping missions, including by monitoring troops’ performance and accountability, ensuring their safety, better integrating different mission components, enforcing zero tolerance of sexual exploitation, expanding the role of women in peacekeeping, and building new strategic communication capabilities such as fighting disinformation. Going forward, peacekeeping operations must develop stronger partnerships in the field, too—in conjunction with non-UN international and regional financial institutions, including the World Bank, as well as other UN agencies, funds, and programs. Some of the primary drivers of conflict, such as the impacts of climate change and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, are now regional and global, requiring peacekeeping missions to work with partners beyond the borders of the countries where they are deployed. These drivers could be addressed through initiatives such as a joint partnership between UN Peacekeeping, the World Bank, and other relevant entities to tackle the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Africa’s Great Lakes region.

The UN Peacekeeping mission currently deployed in Abyei, a small territory disputed by Sudan and South Sudan, offers a powerful example of what such partnerships can do. This mission’s efforts also show why it may be useful for outside observers to moderate their expectations of what peacekeeping can achieve in the current context. In Abyei, the mission is successfully striking local peace agreements among herders and farmers, who compete over increasingly scarce natural resources such as land and water. It has done so by working alongside UN and non-UN partners on the ground to facilitate a series of conferences ahead of cattle migration season, with the aim to prevent conflict and ensure a peaceful resolution to the disputes that frequently arise in this season. There has been little high-level political progress on the territorial dispute, but the mission has not been a failure. On the contrary, peacekeepers are protecting civilians by preventing conflict between communities and keeping the situation from deteriorating as the civil war in Sudan escalates. If outside observers’ expectations for peacekeeping missions are too grandiose, they can fail to see—and fail to support—these kinds of accomplishments.

Even peacekeeping has its limits. Missions can only operate in line with the three guiding principles of peacekeeping: the parties to a conflict consent to the presence of peacekeepers; the peacekeepers remain impartial; and the peacekeepers do not use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. UN Peacekeeping cannot engage in proactive, offensive warfighting operations. But peace can rarely be achieved with armed groups that have no interest in it, and sometimes, stronger so-called enforcement operations are required—operations that can only be carried out by partners outside the UN. The UN must therefore strengthen its partnerships outside the UN, with entities such as the African Union (AU). To be effective, however, these partnerships must be better supported, funded, and prepared, including to ensure their compliance with international humanitarian law. Crises are increasingly diverse; the tools for responding to them should be, too. In 2023, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2719, which opened the door to directing UN funding to AU peace operations. Such support is critical to enabling the international community to enforce peace, and UN Peacekeeping is currently working with the AU to improve the readiness of AU-led peace operations.

But whatever form a peace operation takes, to be effective in the long run it must be anchored in and contribute to an overarching political solution. The success of any peacekeeping initiative will depend on whether the UN member states prove willing to harness the power of multilateral solutions. The critical importance of the interventions that UN peacekeepers are currently making in places such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan must not be underestimated. Preserving a cease-fire is not only essential to protecting civilian life; it also preserves the chance that a future political process will eventually lead to enduring peace.

If UN peacekeepers only have the resources to work toward the immediate goals of preserving cease-fires and protecting civilians, they can only prevent a bad situation from getting worse, not help build a path to peace. And if peacekeepers manage, rather than resolve, conflicts, then large-scale violence can easily return when the troops leave. UN peacekeepers are already bravely saving countless lives for a relatively small investment. But their missions need the attention, political backing, and resources they deserve. There are few better tools for securing peace in a fragile age.

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX is the Undersecretary-General for Peace Operations at the United Nations.

Foreign Affairs · by Jean-Pierre Lacroix · September 2, 2024

21.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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