Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"You always have the option of having no opinion. There is never any need to get worked up or trouble your soul about things you can't control. These things are not asking to be judged by you. Leave them alone."

– Marcus Aurelius

"Whoever has experienced the power and the unrestrained ability to humiliate another human being automatically loses his own sensations. Tyranny is a habit, it has its own organic life, it develops finally into a disease. The habit can kill and coarsen the very best man or woman to the level of a beast. Blood and power intoxicate ... the return of human dignity, repentance and regeneration becomes almost impossible."

– Fyodor Dostoevsky

"There are three kinds of men. The one that learns by reading. The few who learn by observation. The rest of them have to pee on the electric fence for themselves."

– WIll Rogers.

1. Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the General Assembly, 2025

2. Kim Jong Un’s Missiles Fly. He Doesn’t.

3. Kim Jong-un’s strategic choices

4. Kim Jong Un rides his trademark green train to China. He also has a plane, limos and white horses

5. North Korea announces new Hwasong-20 nuclear missile as Kim arrives in China

6. Lee Jae-myung to give UN speech on ‘Korean Peninsula’ vision this month

7. Kim Jong Un to seek Chinese support in Beijing to hedge against Moscow: NIS

8. Chinese-made robot vacuums' security vulnerabilities risk privacy breaches (Korea)

9. N. Korea's Kim arrives in Beijing ahead of military parade

10. N.K. leader appears to be accompanied by daughter on visit to China: NIS

11. About 2,000 N.K. troops deployed to Russia estimated to have been killed: NIS

12. S. Korea, U.S. yet to finalize talks over Seoul's defense spending hike: defense official

13. Nat'l Assembly speaker departs for Beijing to attend military parade

14. Lee awards symbolic swords to new generals

15. All eyes on solidarity between Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow

16. N. Korean memorial for Ukraine war dead sparks rare public anger at government

17. N. Korea declares special security alert ahead of Kim Jong Un’s China visit

1. Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the General Assembly, 2025

Note that this is an issue that extends beyond north Korea's borders. We must have a human rights upfront policy, See how human rights are connected to everything: Putin's war and nK support to cyber to nuclear weapons. We cannot neglect human rights in the hopes that doing so will entice KJU into making an agreement.

We should keep in mind that human rights are a moral imperative and a national security issue as he abuses human rights to build his nuclear weapons and missiles as well as to remain in power. He is threatened when we focus on human rights. We need to take a page from President Raegan ("tear down this wall") and include demanding that he "open this DMZ" when we deal with KJU.

Access the 17 page report here: https://seoul.ohchr.org/en/node/632

Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the General Assembly, 2025

Excerpts:

IV. Conclusions

There is a pattern that human rights violations committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea do not stay inside the country but extend beyond its borders. The State has historically, through its agents and collaborators, abducted foreign citizens for the interest of its leadership, and forcibly disappeared them. The whereabouts of most of the victims remain unknow to their families. The State has used a large number of overseas workers, in forced labour conditions, in order to generate foreign currency revenue. Since the 2000s, the State shifted from traditional transnational criminal activities to strengthening cyberwarfare capacities. It has dispatched many information technology workers, both as cyberattackers and as information technology overseas workers, to obtain foreign intelligence and to generate revenue. Since 2024, the State has dispatched its military personnel to participate in the armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine based on a treaty signed with the Russian Federation. This raises several concerns on human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular the conditions under which military service is performed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the protection of the rights of military personnel while in armed conflict.
Transnational repression serves the leadership by generating revenue and other gains, and by silencing dissent. Economic, political and technical gains contribute to the further militarization of the State. By contrast, the deployed overseas workers, including information technology workers, suffer from human rights violations, and many Democratic People’s Republic of Korea soldiers have been killed or injured in the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, people inside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have to keep meeting their quotas to be paid to the State. As such, militarization places a high “military burden” on the people, and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable, including children and women. As the country becomes more militarized, resources are further reduced, the exploitation of labour to finance militarization becomes rampant and, as a result, the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights is often overlooked.⁵³
The consequences of transnational human rights violations are large and long-lasting. It is challenging for the victims to seek justice. There remains no information about or family contact from the victims of abductions and enforced disappearance from other countries. According to international human rights law, the families of enforced disappearances are also victims, and the sufferings of those families amount to torture. Escapees who have worked hard to resettle in the Republic of Korea or other countries suffer psychological stress from cyberattacks and other reprisals, which makes their resettlement harder. Revenue gained through overseas workers and cyberactivities enables the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes, despite Security Council sanctions, thereby threatening international peace and security. In parallel, people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea increasingly suffer from hardship, without freedom or access to basic services, and in further isolation from the outside world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should make a fundamental shift in its approach: the State needs to put people first, not
militarization.

V. Recommendations

The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:
Provide detailed information on the fate and whereabouts of the victims of enforced disappearances, including foreign abductees, to allow them to communicate freely with their relatives and to repatriate them to their home countries as soon as possible or, in the event of their death, to locate, respect, identify and return their remains;
Allow communication between separated family members, including through the exchange of letters, videoconferencing technology and the resumption of family reunions;
Carry out a comprehensive reform of the labour system, including overseas workers, and ensure the right to work and labour rights in accordance with international law;
End the repression of escapees, including through cyberthreat activities;
Make every effort to respect peace and protect the right to life of people, including military personnel;
Provide alternatives to military conscription to ensure the right to conscientious objection, in accordance with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
Relax the restriction on information and respect freedom of expression and access to information;
Recognize the fundamental right to leave and enter the country, both in law and in practice, and ensure that those who are repatriated are not subjected to punishment, such as torture, enforced disappearance and imprisonment, upon repatriation;
Review its budget allocation to prioritize the realization of the economic, social and cultural rights of its people, including the rights to food; healthcare, such as maternal and reproductive care; education; and water and sanitation;
Resume diplomatic engagement and grant access to United Nations agencies and other humanitarian actors, to allow them to return to the country;
Strengthen engagement with the United Nations human rights mechanisms, including on technical cooperation in the implementation of the recommendations made during the fourth universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council.

The Special Rapporteur recommends that international community:
Strengthen measures to prevent transnational human rights violations and to protect escapees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have settled in their countries;
Continue to engage with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the return of and the clarification of the whereabouts of the victims of enforced disappeared;
Adopt a victim-centred approach in the development of a legal framework and mechanism for providing reparations, including fair and adequate compensation, and the fullest possible rehabilitation, such as medical and psychological care and legal and social services, to victims of human rights violations, including families of the victims of enforced disappearance, committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are living under their jurisdiction;
Support and encourage the role of escapees in peace and human rights in the host countries;
Continue to support civil society organizations that have been working on human rights issues in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supporting victims’ groups outside of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
Protect prisoners of war from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from acts of violence, intimidation, insults and public curiosity; and refrain from and regulate the circulation of photographs and videos showing the prisoners’ identities;
Respect the principle of non-refoulment of escapees and prisoners of war from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
Find solutions to preserve the safety of prisoners of war from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in cooperation of independent bodies;
Follow up on the recommendations accepted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during its fourth universal periodic review and encourage their implementation;
Discuss in advance how to place human rights front and centre in any possible negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, making the most of the existing international human rights mechanisms.

2. Kim Jong Un’s Missiles Fly. He Doesn’t.

What does that say about the regime if it cannot maintain one reliable aircraft for the king ... er ... I mean dictator?

Of course I could see a Dr. Strangelove-like method of transportation. KJU would look good atop one of his missiles.

Kim Jong Un’s Missiles Fly. He Doesn’t.

North Korean leader, lacking a reliable aircraft, takes the slow route to Beijing

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/kim-jong-uns-missiles-fly-he-doesnt-588d0f46

By Dasl Yoon

Sept. 2, 2025 5:22 am ET

Quick Summary

Kim Jong Un traveled by train to China to attend a military parade, rather than flying.View more

SEOUL—On his way to China’s grand military parade, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un revealed a great contradiction.

Before departing for a high-profile get-together of world leaders, Kim inspected a North Korean facility that builds engines for intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, and showed off his nuclear-capable short-range missiles—an arsenal that few nations can match.

He then set off for Beijing on a slow-moving train—in part because his regime lacks a trustworthy aircraft like those flown by other high-profile leaders.

After departing on his personal train on Monday, Kim crossed into China early Tuesday morning, state media reported, and arrived in Beijing on Tuesday afternoon, a journey of around 20 hours when a plane would have taken less than two.

North Korea has advanced missiles and nuclear warheads, and Kim’s missile-factory detour served as a declaration that he deserves a place on the world stage alongside Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Kim is set to meet both men in Beijing, where Xi is hosting an elaborate military parade on Wednesday commemorating victory over Japan in World War II. It is Kim’s first trip to China since 2019.

“On one hand, Kim is eager to stand alongside nuclear powers and assert that his nuclear program is irreversible,” said Hong Min, a senior North Korea researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. “On the other, his Soviet-era private jet is outdated and could pose safety issues.”

Despite North Korea’s investment in its missile program, it faces international sanctions and economic constraints that hamper the Kim regime’s ability to acquire or build a secure private jet.

The 41-year-old North Korean leader chosen mode of transport isn’t lacking in style. His train, bulletproof and designed to withstand explosions, has conference rooms with LED screens, satellite communication and an emergency medical facility.

Past footage released by North Korean state television showed a train car lined with pink couches, where Kim held meetings. His Mercedes-Benz limousine could be seen inside one carriage.

Kim Jong Un visited a flood-affected area near the border with China in a photo released in 2014. Photo: kcna/Reuters

Kim Jong Un sets off for Beijing to attend a Chinese military parade. Photo: kcna/Reuters

Photographs published by state media on Tuesday showed Kim smoking a cigarette in front of the forest-green train and sitting in a wood-paneled conference room, the North Korean flag behind him.

The armored train moves slowly, at an average speed of 37 miles an hour.

But it has been Kim’s go-to transport. On his last known overseas trip, in September 2023, he took the train to meet Putin in Russia’s Far East.

While train travel is symbolic of the regime’s seclusion and obsession with security, the long journeys also serve as an opportunity for Kim to draw attention to his diplomatic ventures.

Kim’s father and grandfather, who preceded him at the helm of the North Korean dictatorship, also traveled by train. The train has been a centerpiece of North Korean propaganda around the Kim dynasty, showing leaders taking long journeys to meet people across the country. The lengthy train rides are represented as a way for leaders to work tirelessly for the people.

Kim’s private jet, which he last took overseas to the northeastern Chinese city of Dalian in 2018, has been in service for more than 40 years. The Kim regime sees it as unsafe for long flights, both for its performance and potential exposure to attack, analysts say.

Kim flew on a chartered Air China plane when he traveled to Singapore in 2018 to meet President Trump—but to arrive in Beijing on a foreign aircraft for Xi’s parade, an event that some two dozen leaders are set to attend, could prove embarrassing.

The North Korean leader can be expected to use the trip this week to show solidarity with China and Russia and potentially attract economic support from Beijing.

He might also be taking notes. In October, North Korea celebrates the 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party. Kim is planning his own military parade to mark the event.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Some interesting analysis worth pondering. The key point though is about the US and in the concluding paragraph: "The US approach to Kim remains unknown."

Excerpts:

In less than two years, Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow have deepened dramatically. Although North Korea was created by the Soviet Union after it ‘temporarily’ split the peninsula with the US in August 1945, for 30 years post-Soviet Russia’s relationship with its progeny was shallow. When Kim, seven years into his reign, finally made a diplomatic debut with a series of summits in 2018–19, adding Putin in Vladivostok in April 2019 almost seemed an afterthought – compared to five meetings with China’s President Xi Jinping and three each with US President Donald Trump and South Korea’s then-president Moon Jae-in.

...

The puzzle is why Kim chose to go all in and send soldiers as well as materiel. Again long denied until both sides finally admitted this in late April, from October 2024 North Korea began deploying combat forces as well. This upped the ante considerably, marking perhaps the first time since the Genghis Khan era that an East Asian state had dispatched soldiers to fight in Europe. Both North Korean and Russian sources are clear that this was Pyongyang’s, and specifically Kim’s decision, rather than at Moscow’s request.

...

Both of Kim’s new policy stances raise issues going forward. With Russia, it remains to be seen if the KPA will actually fight inside Ukraine, and how other powers (including China) will react if that happens. It is also unclear whether this military nexus will develop into a wider relationship. Despite new developments in tourism and transport, North Korea’s economic linkages overwhelmingly remain with China. Trade with Russia is much smaller.

With South Korea, given that Kim shunned even the highly accommodating Moon Jae-in after the failed Hanoi summit, he may yet give Lee Jae-myung the cold shoulder for the next five years. But the opportunity costs would be high, financially and politically. If, as mooted, Lee offers to restore the inter-Korean border treaty that both sides abrogated in 2023, it would be a surprise if both sides did not enter into a wider dialogue. This would begin in secret; the NIS under Lee Jong-seok is probably already putting out feelers. But for now, Kim’s stance remains as summarised by his sister, Kim Yo-jong, on 28 July 2025: ‘No matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed with the ROK.’

Amid these changes, Beijing has been constant. Despite its new financial support from Moscow for military aid, overall, North Korea remains economically dependent on China, which has absorbed cumulative trade deficits totalling US$34bn since 1990. Recently, at least three high-level bilateral banquets celebrating significant political and military anniversaries were held in July 2025, suggesting a thaw may be under way following the chill in 2024.

The US approach to Kim remains unknown. Busy on many fronts, Trump has spoken of reaching out to Kim, but his administration has yet to clarify its stance or craft any specific initiative. Reportedly, North Korean diplomats at the UN have refused to receive a letter from the US president several times. If a Trump–Kim relationship is somehow rekindled, it could create an opening for Seoul. Kim would be unwise to dismiss this a priori, particularly if the relationship with Putin begins to dim.

Download the 4 page PDF here: https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/publications/strategic-comments-delta/2025/08/sc-31-19-kim-jong-uns-strategic-choices.pdf

Kim Jong-un’s strategic choices

In late 2023, Kim Jong-un abandoned decades of North Korean strategic flexibility, deepening ties with Russia and declaring South Korea a sworn enemy. These high-stakes shifts bring immediate benefits but also expose the country to new risks at home and abroad.

https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2025/08/kim-jong-uns-strategic-choices/

In late 2023, North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, initiated two major changes in foreign policy. He drew far closer to Moscow, pouring materiel and soldiers into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. And in a sharp change from past ideology, he declared South Korea a sworn enemy, rejecting the idea of reunification. These shifts broke with the Kim regime’s long-standing preference to keep its options open. The rationale for doing so is not obvious, however, because both moves have created risks at home and opportunity costs abroad.

Self-reliance – juche – has long been the strategic aim of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Successive ruling Kims have pursued this goal in two main ways. Militarily, defying intense global pressure, Pyongyang developed its own nuclear deterrent. Diplomatically, Kim Il-sung, who ruled from 1948 until his death in 1994, sloughed off his Soviet masters to balance Moscow against Beijing. His son Kim Jong-il, in power from 1994–2011, similarly played China off against South Korea. Both were adept at taking money from all sides but orders from no one. Since inheriting power in 2011, Kim has developed an arsenal of new weapons and missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States. Diplomatically, his initial approach – summits on many fronts, including with the US – implied continuity. Yet recent moves suggest that Kim has abandoned the tradition of strategic flexibility in favour of firmer and riskier alignments.

All in with Putin

In less than two years, Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow have deepened dramatically. Although North Korea was created by the Soviet Union after it ‘temporarily’ split the peninsula with the US in August 1945, for 30 years post-Soviet Russia’s relationship with its progeny was shallow. When Kim, seven years into his reign, finally made a diplomatic debut with a series of summits in 2018–19, adding Putin in Vladivostok in April 2019 almost seemed an afterthought – compared to five meetings with China’s President Xi Jinping and three each with US President Donald Trump and South Korea’s then-president Moon Jae-in.

In less than two years, Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow have deepened dramatically.

This decade is very different. It is understandable for Kim to shun Washington and Seoul in light of the failed Hanoi summit in 2019. But he has also not met Xi for six years: a sharp contrast after five summits in 15 months. (That flurry followed another long gap: in his hermitic first six years, Kim met no foreign leaders.) Lower-level ties with China have continued, not least in trade, which Beijing almost monopolises (98% in 2023). Though 2024 was officially a year of friendship to mark 75 years of diplomatic ties, this was markedly low-key, with just one senior Chinese visitor to Pyongyang.

By then, Kim’s priorities lay elsewhere. His week-long tour of Russia’s Far East in September 2023, which focused on military and space cooperation and included a second summit with Putin, marked a new phase. In fact, this had already begun: North Korean arms shipments to Russia were first detected in May 2022. Illegal under United Nations Security Council sanctions, which Moscow voted for, these transfers remain unadmitted by either side – despite ample evidence in plain sight. Since then, their scale has grown. One study found that from August 2023–April 2025, Pyongyang sent 5.2 million 152 mm and 122 mm artillery shells, meeting 40% of Russia’s front-line needs (other estimates run as high as 60%). According to Ukraine, North Korea has also supplied at least 120 170 mm self-propelled guns as well as 120 multiple rocket launchers. These are older, originally Soviet armaments, but Kim has also furnished newer weapons, such as at least 100 Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles, seizing the opportunity to field-test these.

In return, North Korea has probably received technical assistance to launch spy satellites and improve air-defence systems. More importantly, for a cash-strapped regime, it has been paid for its arms sales. In April, a South Korean study by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses put Pyongyang’s earnings to date from these sales at US$19.2 billion. For a state with an estimated GDP in 2023 of a mere US$23.3bn and recorded exports of just US$330m, such a windfall – unthinkable before, or without Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may have seemed irresistible. The political downside is the wrath of Ukraine’s Western allies, but this merely confirms that Kim, as he has often said, entertains no hope of further nuclear negotiations.

The puzzle is why Kim chose to go all in and send soldiers as well as materiel. Again long denied until both sides finally admitted this in late April, from October 2024 North Korea began deploying combat forces as well. This upped the ante considerably, marking perhaps the first time since the Genghis Khan era that an East Asian state had dispatched soldiers to fight in Europe. Both North Korean and Russian sources are clear that this was Pyongyang’s, and specifically Kim’s decision, rather than at Moscow’s request.

Why did Kim do this? According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, manpower contributions have earned Pyongyang only US$280m to date. Another Seoul source puts annual payments for personnel at US$525m: either way, this is far smaller than the proceeds from supplying arms. In return, North Korea has paid a high price. No official figures exist, but South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) said on 30 April 2025 that of the 15,000 Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers dispatched to Kursk, 600 had been killed and 4,100 wounded. By mid-June, the United Kingdom’s defence ministry put total casualties at over 6,000. Moscow reportedly makes condolence payments to the DPRK government for North Koreans killed in action; estimates range between US$6,000 and US$30,000.

These are significant losses, militarily and also politically. Belated official acknowledgement of this sacrifice at least means that bereaved families will get some compensation and higher status in return. Whether that makes up for losing their sons is another matter. Parents may well be more bitter than proud at this loss of life on behalf of a foreign power, rather than defending their homeland. Such sentiments could breed potential discontent.

Kim’s presumed motives are twofold. Firstly, his elite troops are now battle-tested in modern ground warfare, albeit in terrain quite unlike the Korean Peninsula. There are no known defections and only two captured prisoners of war. Secondly, he appears to be hoping that this will bind Russia into a tighter alliance. Yet Kim’s effusive praise of Russia has not been reciprocated in Moscow, which views the relationship more transactionally. If the Russia–Ukraine war ends, bilateral ties might well revert to their previous nugatory level.

North Korea will soon dispatch another 6,000 soldiers, but not to fight. After his second visit to Pyongyang in as many weeks, Russia’s former defence minister Sergei Shoigu, now secretary of the Security Council, said on 17 June: ‘Chairman Kim Jong-un has decided to send one thousand sappers to Russia to demine Russian territory, as well as five thousand military construction workers to rebuild infrastructure facilities destroyed by the occupiers.’

That deployment is unproblematic, but the future of the 11,000 DPRK soldiers already in Russia is unclear. There is no sign yet of them returning home. Should they resume a combat role, it would be inside Ukraine rather than helping Russia recapture Kursk: a significant escalation.

Rebuffing the South

In late 2023, Kim made a second major foreign-policy shift. Hitherto, one of the few things the two Korean states agreed on was that each is part of a divided nation, whose reunification was the ultimate goal. That was the basis for both fitful dialogue and more frequent hostility, with the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) each claiming to be the sole legitimate government on the peninsula.

Kim now purports to reject this entire premise. In a speech in late December 2023, he called for ‘a decisive policy change in the work against the enemy’. Characterising South Korea as ‘nothing but a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state’, he declared that ‘north–south relations have been completely fixed into … relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones any more’. Accordingly, the Southern ‘clan’ can never be ‘the partner of reconciliation and reunification’.

In another speech a fortnight later in mid-January 2024, Kim went further: ‘We can specify in our constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case … a war breaks out’, and ‘education should be intensified to instill into [our people] the firm idea that ROK is their … invariable principal enemy’. If conflict erupts, ‘war will terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence’.

Action followed, albeit bureaucratic and symbolic rather than military. Pyongyang promptly abolished its organisations that handled inter-Korean affairs. Several months later, in October, it blew up North–South road and rail links on its side of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), the de facto inter-Korean border. Soon after, it reported that its constitution had been duly amended to define South Korea as a hostile state. No revised text has yet been published, which may suggest difficulties in wording the incoherencies of this doctrine. These include whether ‘South Korea’ is a state, a territory or a people; and by what right North Korea could presume to reclaim, subjugate and annex a separate ‘entity’.

From an international and domestic perspective, this does not make sense. If doubling down with Putin has pros as well as cons, rebuffing South Korea a priori has no discernible upside. Domestically, it causes at least three problems. Firstly, this is a U-turn from prior doctrine. Kim is openly rejecting the legacy of his grandfather and father, on whom his legitimacy rests. Secondly, and relatedly, this creates a cognitive dissonance that will necessitate a rewriting of history books and Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) educational materials. Thirdly, North Koreans know the new doctrine is untrue. Millions have family in South Korea, which most are aware by now is far richer than the North. Both speak the same language. Until Kim’s U-turn, the DPRK had inculcated into its citizens the common sentiment of a shared Korean identity north and south of the DMZ. Kim’s new line thus solves no problems while creating new ones.

Kim’s new line solves no problems while creating new ones.

What applies internally is even truer externally. Kim knows from his own experience that governments in Seoul often change to his advantage, when the liberal Democratic Party of Korea regains power from the conservative People Power Party. For the next five years, Kim thus faces not a sworn enemy but a wealthy would-be friend. The ROK’s new President Lee Jae-myung, who took office on 4 June 2025 right after winning the previous day’s election, may lack his liberal predecessor Moon Jae-in’s (2017–22) zeal for unification. That is actually a plus, allaying fears that Seoul seeks German-style absorption. Indeed, Chung Dong-young, the new unification minister – familiar to North Korea, as he held the same post in 2004–06 when inter-Korean dialogue was active – has suggested renaming the ministry to the vaguer Ministry of the Korean Peninsula. Lee Jae-myung’s surprise nominee as NIS director, Lee Jong-seok (no relation), is another former unification minister well known in Pyongyang.

Lee Jae-myung’s first weeks in office have already seen movement, and indeed some tacit reciprocity. On 11 June, he fulfilled an election pledge by suspending propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts at the DMZ. North Korea responded at once, pausing its own cross-border barrage of cacophonous sounds the next day. Similarly, soon after South Korea finished dismantling its loudspeakers at the border on 5 August, North Korea began doing the same – despite having added more (albeit unused) as recently as June.

More controversially, Lee, like Moon Jae-in before him, is trying to stop non-governmental organisations from floating propaganda-laden balloons into North Korea, with some success. In early July, Seoul shut down most of its (unacknowledged) radio stations, which for decades had broadcast into the North. With Trump also taking an axe to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, this leaves North Korea’s ruling WPK almost unchallenged in its information monopoly.

Outlook

Both of Kim’s new policy stances raise issues going forward. With Russia, it remains to be seen if the KPA will actually fight inside Ukraine, and how other powers (including China) will react if that happens. It is also unclear whether this military nexus will develop into a wider relationship. Despite new developments in tourism and transport, North Korea’s economic linkages overwhelmingly remain with China. Trade with Russia is much smaller.

With South Korea, given that Kim shunned even the highly accommodating Moon Jae-in after the failed Hanoi summit, he may yet give Lee Jae-myung the cold shoulder for the next five years. But the opportunity costs would be high, financially and politically. If, as mooted, Lee offers to restore the inter-Korean border treaty that both sides abrogated in 2023, it would be a surprise if both sides did not enter into a wider dialogue. This would begin in secret; the NIS under Lee Jong-seok is probably already putting out feelers. But for now, Kim’s stance remains as summarised by his sister, Kim Yo-jong, on 28 July 2025: ‘No matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed with the ROK.’

Amid these changes, Beijing has been constant. Despite its new financial support from Moscow for military aid, overall, North Korea remains economically dependent on China, which has absorbed cumulative trade deficits totalling US$34bn since 1990. Recently, at least three high-level bilateral banquets celebrating significant political and military anniversaries were held in July 2025, suggesting a thaw may be under way following the chill in 2024.

If a Trump–Kim relationship is somehow rekindled, it could create an opening for Seoul.

The US approach to Kim remains unknown. Busy on many fronts, Trump has spoken of reaching out to Kim, but his administration has yet to clarify its stance or craft any specific initiative. Reportedly, North Korean diplomats at the UN have refused to receive a letter from the US president several times. If a Trump–Kim relationship is somehow rekindled, it could create an opening for Seoul. Kim would be unwise to dismiss this a priori, particularly if the relationship with Putin begins to dim.

4. Kim Jong Un rides his trademark green train to China. He also has a plane, limos and white horses

Photos at the link: https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-china-kim-train-limos-horses-f8924b13be2c35c647df95368bcdcffc?utm

Kim Jong Un rides his trademark green train to China. He also has a plane, limos and white horses

flip.it · KIM TONG-HYUNG ·

World News

1 of 5 |In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korea leader Kim Jong Un waves from a train in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Sept. 10, 2023, as he leaves for Russia. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: “KCNA” which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)

2 of 5 |FILE -This photo provided by the North Korean government, shows that North Korea leader Kim Jong Un greets attendants in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Sept. 10, 2023, before boarding on a train to Russia. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: “KCNA” which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)

3 of 5 |In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, center, waves as he was given a send-off at the Beijing station in Beijing, China, on March 27, 2018. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: “KCNA” which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)

4 of 5 |North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves from his train as he arrives at the railway station in Dong Dang, Vietnam, on March 2, 2019, for an expected meeting with President Trump. (AP Photo/Minh Hoang, File)

5 of 5 |A train similar to one seen during previous visits by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrives at Beijing Railway Station in Beijing, China, on Jan. 8, 2019. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File)

KIM TONG-HYUNG

Kim has been covering the Koreas for the AP since 2014. He has published widely read stories on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the dark side of South Korea’s economic rise and international adoptions of Korean children.

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HYUNG-JIN KIM

Hyung-jin is an Associated Press reporter in Seoul, South Korea. He reports on security, political and other general news on the Korean Peninsula.

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5. North Korea announces new Hwasong-20 nuclear missile as Kim arrives in China

Kim iseeks to prepare and manipulate the information environment to his advantage.

North Korea announces new Hwasong-20 nuclear missile as Kim arrives in China

Kim Jong Un inspects materials used in long-range missile engines as state media reports 8 tests in last 2 years

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/north-korea-announces-larger-hwasong-20-icbm-plans-ahead-of-kims-china-visit/

Colin Zwirko September 2, 2025

Kim Jong Un inspects long-range missiles on Sept. 1 | Image: KCNA (Sept. 2, 2025)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited a factory producing nuclear missile materials on Monday including for a “next-generation Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),” according to state media, just before he left to meet the Chinese and Russian leaders and watch a military parade in Beijing.

Kim “visited the relevant institute of the General Academy of Chemical Materials under the Missile Administration of the DPRK on September 1 and met experts in the field of the research into the composite carbon fiber material,” the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Tuesday, without specifying the name or location of the institute.

KCNA released the report around 7:30 a.m. KST on Tuesday, soon after announcing that Kim Jong Un had crossed the border with China via armored train on his way to Beijing. It was not featured in Tuesday’s domestic-facing Rodong Sinmun newspaper, suggesting authorities may be trying to hide Kim’s latest missile activity from the North Korean public.

State media similarly reported Monday only via foreign-facing outlets on Kim inspecting nuclear-capable short-range missiles the previous day, possibly on the east coast in Hamhung.

Chad O’Carroll

During prior summits between Kim and Xi, denuclearization was a key component of Chinese official readouts of the discussions, even if DPRK state media was often quiet on the same topic. So, Kim’s inspection of a new ICBM type just a day before meeting Xi suggests the North Korean leader wants to make clear there is absolutely no way this topic can be discussed even with Xi. Unless coordinated with Xi in advance, this is likely to limit the scope of any detente between the two leaders — for the short term at least.

MISSILE ENGINE DEVELOPMENT

KCNA’s report stated that North Korea has found a “shortcut” to improving nuclear missile capabilities after Kim inspected “test results of the institute which made the high-thrust solid-fuel engine with the composite carbon fiber material.”

The institute has “verified the creditability of the operation of the engine and its accuracy through eight static firing tests in the past two years.”

“The maximum thrust of the new-type solid-fuel engine using the composite carbon fiber material is 1,960 kN,” KCNA reported. “The engine is to be used in the ICBM Hwasong-19 series and the next-generation ICBM Hwasong-20.”

The DPRK leader reportedly praised “the development of the engine as a significant success heralding a great change in bolstering up our strategic missile forces and expanding their capabilities.” He also proposed awarding “high-class state commendations to scientists of the relevant institute who opened a shortcut to bolstering up the strategic forces with important research results.”

KCNA only released one photo with Tuesday’s report, showing Kim Jong Un and top missile officials Kim Jong Sik and Jang Chang Ha inspecting large ring-shaped missile body sections likely over 2 meters (6.5 feet) in diameter.

Seen to the right of Kim Jong Un in this larger version of the photo released Tuesday are first vice-director of the Munitions Industry Department Kim Jong Sik and general director of the Missile Administration Jang Chang Ha | Image: KCNA (Sept. 2, 2025)

Photos displayed at a weapons expo last year show Kim inspecting motor casing development for the Hwasong-18 ICBM, as well as a multiple warhead configuration for the missile | Image: KCNA (Nov. 22, 2024), edited by NK Pro

North Korea unveiled the Hwasong-19 ICBM, the country’s most advanced solid-fuel long-range missile, at an inaugural test launch last October, after previously teasing an even larger transporter erector launch vehicle (TEL) that may be related to the Hwasong-20 plans.

Pyongyang has not offered any other details on the new missile, but could unveil it as part of a military parade expected to take place on Oct. 10.

A Hwasong-20 ICBM launch, possibly involving multiple-warhead test elements, could also take place this year before Kim’s five-year weapons development plan under the Eighth Party Congress expires and ahead of the Ninth Congress this coming December or January.

Jeffrey Lewis and Sam Lair from the James Martin Center’s Open-Source Team told NK News the claimed thrust of the new engine is similar to the first stage solid-fuel motor of the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM, in service from the 1980s through 2005.

Michael Duitsman from the Open-Source Team said the photo included with the report appears to show a composite carbon fiber motor casing section of the painted missile body in the foreground on the left, saying there are visible lines marking where the wound composite section, a metal flange and a conical interstage section are attached to each other.

He pointed out that North Korea appeared to use wound composite carbon fiber casings for solid-fuel motors in the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 ICBMs. Photos displayed at a weapons expo last November also showed Kim inspecting what appeared to be an engine casing section for the Hwasong-19 on an unknown date.

North Korea previously claimed achievements in developing carbon fiber motor casings and new “multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines” for hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Jan. 2025 and Jan. 2024, after conducting static test-fires of first- and second-stage high-thrust motors in Nov. 2023.

The last time state media published data on new solid-fuel engine thrust capabilities was after a static motor test in Dec. 2022, claiming a new high-thrust motor had “a thrust of 140tf” — equal to around 1,373 kN, lower than Tuesday’s claim.

NK Pro has identified evidence of multiple rocket engine tests at the Sohae satellite launch complex on the west coast in recent years that have not been reported by state media, including as recently as late June, but these were from a vertical test stand associated with liquid-fuel engines used in the country’s stalled military satellite launch program.

The larger first-stage motor test in Nov. 2023, as well as the test in Dec. 2022, took place at an adjacent horizontal stand at Sohae, while the Nov. 2023 smaller second-stage motor test took place from a horizontal stand at Magunpho on the east coast near Hamhung.

Kim visited the Chemical Material Institute under the Academy of Defense Science (국방과학원 화학재료연구소) in 2017 to inspect solid-fuel missile engine development, a candidate location for his latest visit. However, the name reported Tuesday — the General Academy of Chemical Materials under the Missile Administration (미싸일총국산하 화학재료종합연구원) — is different from the Hamhung facility, and it will be difficult to confirm the location without additional photos.

NK Pro has also reported this year on major ongoing construction at a missile factory near Pyongyang suspected of manufacturing missile engines. Kim’s reported discussion with missile officials on Monday about “laying a foundation for specialized serial production [of the new engine] in the future” may be related to the Thaesong Machine Factory upgrades.

North Korea has shifted its long-range missile development focus in recent years from liquid to solid-fueled engines, offering quicker set-up and launch procedures. Pyongyang has not tested a liquid-fuel missile in two and half years, though some appeared in images of Kim visiting missile bases last October.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Updated on Sept. 2 at 8:35 a.m. KST with more details from state media, and at 11:33 a.m. and 3:08 p.m. with expert comments and additional context

6. Lee Jae-myung to give UN speech on ‘Korean Peninsula’ vision this month

I wish he would announce a human rights up front approach, a sophisticated information and influence activities campaign and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea to end the threats on the Korean peninsula.

Let me give him fourteen words which is all he needs to say:

"Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights."

I fear that is only my fantasy now.

Lee Jae-myung to give UN speech on ‘Korean Peninsula’ vision this month

South Korean president likely to outline North Korea policy vision when he attends General Assembly in late September

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/lee-jae-myung-to-give-un-speech-on-korean-peninsula-vision-this-month/

Jooheon Kim September 2, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung during a meeting | Lee Jae-myung via Facebook (Aug. 1, 2025)

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will outline his vision for the Korean Peninsula in a speech at the U.N. General Assembly in New York this month, his office announced on Tuesday, providing a high-profile opportunity to promote his plans for peace with North Korea.

“President Lee Jae-myung is scheduled to attend the high-level session of the 80th United Nations General Assembly, which will be held in New York, U.S., starting Tuesday, September 23,” presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said during a briefing.

During his keynote speech, Lee is expected to discuss “South Korea’s experience in overcoming and recovering from democratic crises” — an apparent reference to the martial law crisis that toppled his predecessor — and “present the government’s vision and policies on key global issues, including the Korean Peninsula.”

Cha Du-hyeogn, a former Blue House official and vice president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said he expects Lee’s speech in New York to echo his remarks on South Korea’s Liberation Day last month, when he outlined his DPRK policy approach.

“The message will be about patiently continuing to seek reconciliation and cooperation until North Korea comes to the dialogue table,” he told NK News.

Despite North Korea’s rejection of inter-Korean relations under its hostile two-state theory, the expert said Lee will likely say in his speech that the two Koreas are “on a shared path toward peaceful reunification.”

The president rejected the notion of unification by absorption during his Liberation Day speech and called for the restoration of inter-Korean military agreements, including the suspended 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) that aimed to reduce military tensions along the border.

South Korean leaders have often used General Assembly speeches to make major statements about North Korea on a global stage.

In a 2023 U.N. speech, then-President Yoon Suk-yeol condemned North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as a major threat to world peace, while stating that DPRK arms sales to Russia could directly endanger South Korean security.

By contrast, former President Moon Jae-in called for a formal end to the Korean War in his 2021 U.N. speech, which emphasized mutual respect and inter-Korean reconciliation despite the breakdown of DPRK nuclear talks over two years earlier.

Meanwhile, Lee will also become the first ROK president to directly preside over an open debate at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) as its chair this month, as South Korea assumes the Council’s rotating presidency.

The presidential official said the ROK will host an open UNSC debate on artificial intelligence and international peace and security on Sept. 24.

South Korea previously served as chair of the UNSC in June 2024 under the Yoon administration, which used the opportunity to spotlight North Korean human rights abuses and link them to the country’s nuclear weapons program.

However, Cha of the Asan Institute downplayed the importance of the ROK assuming the presidency this month.

“It helps raise the country’s overall status. But the U.N. won’t offer any special treatment just because the speech is given by the leader of the Security Council presidency country.”

The General Assembly’s high-level week starts annually on the third Tuesday of September and lasts about a week, with senior officials from all 193 member states invited to attend.

Edited by Bryan Betts

7. Kim Jong Un to seek Chinese support in Beijing to hedge against Moscow: NIS

We must remember that the CRInK is built on fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

But it is also a transactional relationship among the "partners." And this requires hedging.

Kim Jong Un to seek Chinese support in Beijing to hedge against Moscow: NIS

ROK spy agency says North Korean leader also wants to get Xi’s backing ahead of potential talks with US

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/kim-jong-un-to-seek-chinese-support-in-beijing-to-hedge-against-moscow-nis/

Anton Sokolin September 2, 2025

Kim Jong Un on his private train at the end of his trip to Vladivostok in April 2019 | Image: Primorsky Krai government

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will likely seek additional Chinese economic support to secure a “lifeline for the regime” during his trip to Beijing this week, hedging against overdependence on Moscow ahead of an eventual end to the Ukraine war, according to Seoul’s spy agency on Tuesday.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) also assessed that Kim’s goal is to repair ties with China following earlier signs of souring relations, as well as to win Beijing’s backing ahead of potential talks with the U.S.

The spy agency delivered its assessments during a closed briefing at the National Assembly, with ROK lawmakers Lee Sung-kwon and Park Sun-won later conveying the NIS conclusions in a televised press conference.

Kim Jong Un reportedly arrived at Beijing Station on Tuesday, according to Yonhap News Agency, ahead of his participation in a military parade the following day.

The NIS reportedly said that his sister Kim Yo Jong, wife Ri Sol Ju and logistics handler Hyon Song Wol are likely accompanying him, in addition to the officials shown with him in DPRK state media photos before departure.

Kim is “expected to receive a special welcome with security and protocol treatment on par with President [Vladimir] Putin,” the NIS reportedly added.

According to the lawmakers, the spy agency said that Kim will participate in “reviving a Cold War style triangular alignment” by standing next to Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia’s Putin at Tiananmen Square.

Kim will likely hold bilateral talks with the two leaders, attend a “gala reception and performance” alongside other leaders and “possibly visit the DPRK Embassy in Beijing,” the NIS reportedly assessed.

However, the lawmakers made no mention of whether a trilateral meeting is in the works.

“Looking ahead, the NIS sees this trip as Kim’s debut in multilateral diplomacy, a bold move to showcase North Korea-China-Russia solidarity optics,” Lee said, while conceding that the three are unlikely to “immediately” engage in practical cooperation.

Speaking about DPRK troops, the ROK intelligence agency reportedly said 1,000 military engineers have already reached Russia and that Pyongyang is gearing up for a third deployment of another 6,000 soldiers.

“Previously dispatched troops are currently stationed in the rear as reserve forces,” he said, adding that North Korea may replace some field commanders following the return of senior officers to Pyongyang late last month.

Notably, the NIS more than tripled its estimate for the number of DPRK soldiers killed fighting for Russia: Lee said the agency has updated its April estimate of 600 killed in action to around 2,000 based on recent commendation ceremonies and newly unveiled casualty numbers.

Pyongyang has not offered an official death toll for the war, only acknowledging several hundred dead so far.

BREAD AND CIRCUSES

North Korea is preparing to host major celebratory events on Oct. 10 when it will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, according to the NIS, noting that Pyongyang might also hold the Ninth Party Congress early next year.

“For the Oct. 10 celebration, North Korea is rehearsing a large military parade involving over 10,000 troops and is expected to stage a massive mass gymnastics performance with some 100,000 participants, the first in five years,” lawmaker Park said, citing the NIS.

In the lead up to the festivities, the spy agency assessed that Pyongyang has “allowed private car ownership” and introduced policies “such as honoring fallen soldiers to consolidate internal unity.”

The NIS reportedly said the North Korean economy is showing signs of recovering from a slump, with foreign trade bouncing back to about 90% of pre-pandemic levels.

North Korea is also likely to see a bumper harvest this year, with the NIS projecting grain production to hit “around 4.8 million tons, exceeding the two-year average of 4.6 million tons.”

On inter-Korean relations, the NIS said Pyongyang maintains its stance that the two Korean states are separate countries but has “shown some responsiveness by ceasing border loudspeaker broadcasts and [accepting] repatriated fishermen,” according to Park.

However, the DPRK’s “perceived need to adjust or shift its policy toward the South is relatively low,” the lawmaker cited the NIS as saying, adding that “improvement in inter-Korean relations in the short term is seen as unlikely.”

At the same time, the DPRK is “closely monitoring” the South’s political moves and high-level remarks, while keeping tabs on Seoul’s summits with the U.S. and Japan.

The briefing came as Kim departed for Beijing on his armored train, crossing into China early Tuesday, while unconfirmed reports suggest his train was seen passing through Shenyang en route to the Chinese capital later in the day.

It also follows President Lee Jae-myung’s first summit with U.S. counterpart Donald Trump, who expressed interest in reviving diplomacy with Pyongyang and meeting Kim Jong Un this year.

Edited by Bryan Betts

8. Chinese-made robot vacuums' security vulnerabilities risk privacy breaches (Korea)

Chinese unrestricted warfare.

English Market & Money

Chinese-made robot vacuums' security vulnerabilities risk privacy breaches

Korea Consumer Agency identifies risks in Dreame, Ecovacs, Narwal models; advises secure passwords and updates

https://www.chosun.com/english/market-money-en/2025/09/02/PPPWLROTGFCYHFBYP356XZMHJU/

By Kim Ji-seop

Published 2025.09.02. 16:14

Updated 2025.09.02. 17:29

It has been revealed that Chinese-made robot vacuums, popular for their cost-effectiveness, have security vulnerabilities, including the ability to steal photos and videos from homes through smartphones used to remotely control the devices.

KISA Korea Consumer Agency full investigation results on the security status of six major robot vacuum cleaners distributed in the Korean market (Courtesy of KISA)/News1

The Korea Consumer Agency announced on the 2nd the results of a security investigation into six major robot vacuums widely sold in the market. The two domestic products investigated were Samsung’s ‘Bespoke AI Steam’ and LG’s ‘CordZero RoboKing AI All-in-One’. The remaining four were Chinese-made: Roborock’s ‘S9 MaxV Ultra’, Dreame’s ‘X50 Ultra’, Ecovacs’ ‘Deebot X8 Pro Omni’, and Narwal’s ‘Freo Z Ultra’.

Ecovacs flagship model DEEBOT X8 (Ecovacs Robotics)

A new robot vacuum cleaner 'Aqua 10 Ultra Roller' from Chinese home appliance company Dreame is moving while avoiding suddenly appearing obstacles. /News1

Among them, the problematic products were Dreame, Ecovacs, and Narwal. These three models, priced between 800,000–900,000 Korean won—300,000–400,000 Korean won cheaper than Samsung, LG, and Roborock, which holds the top global market share—have gained popularity as ‘cost-effective products’ due to their relatively strong performance despite their lower prices.

However, these products were found to lack or have inadequate user authentication procedures, allowing unauthorized access or manipulation via connected smartphones. A source from the Korea Consumer Agency stated, “Vulnerabilities were confirmed that could expose personal privacy, such as photos of the interior being leaked externally or cameras being forcibly activated.” In some cases, personal information like names and contact details was exposed, or security settings for the built-in software ‘firmware’ were insufficient. In contrast, Samsung and LG’s products had the highest security performance, with Roborock at a similar level.

The agency said it has instructed the three companies with risks of hackers extracting information or manipulating devices to address the security issues. The source added, “When using robot vacuums, users should set secure passwords and regularly perform security updates to protect their privacy.”

※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.

9. N. Korea's Kim arrives in Beijing ahead of military parade

(7th LD) N. Korea's Kim arrives in Beijing ahead of military parade | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS top photo)

By Park Boram

BEIJING/SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- A special armored train carrying North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrived in Beijing on Tuesday as he is set to appear at China's upcoming military parade, which will be attended by dozens of state leaders, setting the stage for his multilateral diplomatic debut.

The train arrived at Beijing Railway Station at around 4 p.m. (local time), nearly a day after departing Pyongyang, accompanied by Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and other officials.

Citing witnesses, Reuters also reported that a train carrying a North Korean flag was seen in Beijing before a motorcade with the flag departed the station.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrives in Beijing on Sept. 2, 2025, in this photo released by Xinhua News Agency. (Yonhap)

North Korea's state media said, later confirmed by Seoul's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that Kim departed Pyongyang the previous day aboard his private train en route to Beijing and crossed into China at dawn.

Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin will be among dozens of foreign leaders attending Wednesday's military parade presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Tiananmen Square to celebrate the 80th anniversary of "victory" over Japan's surrender and the end of World War II.

Kim will stand "side by side" with Xi and Putin at Wednesday's military parade, the NIS said. It also predicted that Kim may hold separate summits with both leaders on the sidelines.

Russian reports have said Kim will be seated to Xi's left, with Putin on his right. The three leaders, appearing shoulder to shoulder, would send a strong signal to the world about their strengthening trilateral solidarity.

"Kim will demonstrate trilateral solidarity by standing side by side with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin during Wednesday's military parade at Tiananmen Square," the NIS assessed earlier in the day.

This photo from Kyodo News on Sept. 2, 2025, shows sedans carrying North Korean flags moving in Beijing. (Yonhap)

Russia's Tass news agency also reported Tuesday that Kim and Putin could hold a summit in China, citing the Kremlin.

Russia may discuss the possibility of a Kim-Putin summit once Kim arrives in Beijing, a Kremlin spokesperson said.

Kim has not yet appeared at a multilateral diplomatic event since taking power from his late father, Kim Jong-il, although he has participated in bilateral summits.

His rare decision to attend the Chinese military parade is widely seen as an effort to restore traditionally close ties with China and shed his long-standing pariah image.

With bilateral summits and the signing of a mutual defense treaty last year, Kim and Putin have rapidly deepened military ties, prompting Pyongyang to deploy troops and weapons to support Moscow's war against Ukraine and straining its ties with Beijing.

Kim's trip also comes amid growing prospects of the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, which could shift Moscow's focus westward, away from Pyongyang, along with its economic assistance.

The NIS assessed that Kim's trip is aimed at "expanding his room to maneuver by restoring North Korea-China relations and securing China's economic assistance to buoy his regime."

Some also suggest that Kim may be seeking to recover relations with China in a bid to leverage them to strengthen his bargaining position ahead of a potential resumption of negotiations with the United States.

These photos (from L to R) of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, are published by Xinhua News Agency, Tass and the Korean Central News Agency, respectively. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

10. N.K. leader appears to be accompanied by daughter on visit to China: NIS

Kim is giving the "Kimologists" a spectacle so they can speculate about succession. I think this is KJU's form of reality TV with Juche characteristics.

N.K. leader appears to be accompanied by daughter on visit to China: NIS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un appears to be accompanied by his daughter, Ju-ae, on his visit to China, South Korea's spy agency said Tuesday.

The National Intelligence Service made the assessment hours after Kim arrived in Beijing in a special armored train to attend Wednesday's ceremony marking the anniversary of the end of World War II.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R), alongside his daughter, known as Ju-ae, applauds in the Wonsan-Kalma tourist area on the North's east coast on June 24, 2025, during a ceremony to mark the completion of the resort area known for its beautiful seaside scenery, in this file photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on June 26. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

11. About 2,000 N.K. troops deployed to Russia estimated to have been killed: NIS

About 2,000 N.K. troops deployed to Russia estimated to have been killed: NIS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 2, 2025

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- The spy agency estimated around 2,000 North Korean troops dispatched to Russia for combat in Ukraine were killed, lawmakers said Tuesday.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) shared the assessment during a closed-door briefing to the parliamentary intelligence committee, Reps. Park Sun-won and Lee Seong-kweun told reporters.

The NIS said Pyongyang is planning to additionally send some 6,000 soldiers to Russia in its third batch of troop deployment to aid Moscow's war with Ukraine, while around 1,000 combat engineers have already arrived in Russia.

The existing troops are stationed in the "rear front as reserve forces," the agency said, pointing to the possibility of a leadership change among the dispatched troops.

"North Korea revealed it sustained around 350 deaths in the first and second rounds of deployment, while the NIS reported at least 600 deaths in a briefing to the parliamentary intelligence committee in April," Lee said, noting that the NIS has increased its estimate of the death toll to 2,000 after a "comprehensive review" with other countries.

Since October last year, North Korea has sent around 13,000 troops and conventional weapons to support Russia's war efforts.

This image captured from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's X page on Jan. 12, 2025, shows a man reported to be a North Korean soldier captured by Ukrainian forces. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 2, 2025

12. S. Korea, U.S. yet to finalize talks over Seoul's defense spending hike: defense official

Let's be realistic and get this right.

S. Korea, U.S. yet to finalize talks over Seoul's defense spending hike: defense official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 2, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have yet to conclude consultations over details about a hike in Seoul's defense spending, Defense Vice Minister Lee Doo-hee said Tuesday.

Lee made the remark during a parliamentary session in response to a media report that South Korea has agreed to hike its defense spending to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) during consultations with the United States.

He said the government has a plan to gradually raise defense spending, but it is currently hard to set a specific target.

"As the consultations have not been finalized, it is not appropriate to specifically make a comment," Lee said, noting that an increase in defense budget will be used to bolster the country's defense capabilities.

South Korea is under growing pressure from the U.S. to boost defense spending to 5 percent of GDP as Washington wants Seoul to play a greater role over security on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea's defense spending for 2025 accounted for 2.32 percent of GDP. The defense ministry seeks an 8.2 percent hike in defense budget for next year to 66.3 trillion won (US$47.6 billion).

President Lee Jae Myung vowed to increase defense spending in a bid to play a more "leading" role in bolstering the country's security posture during his visit to Washington last month.

Defense Vice Minister Lee Doo-hee (L) responds to lawmakers' questions during a plenary session of the National Defense Committee on Sept. 2, 2025. (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 2, 2025

13. Nat'l Assembly speaker departs for Beijing to attend military parade

Korea walking the tightrope as the shrimp among whales. I wonder how many democratic, free countries will be represented at the Parade? India and South Korea?)

(LEAD) Nat'l Assembly speaker departs for Beijing to attend military parade | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with departure, remarks; CHANGES headline, photo)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik departed for Beijing on Tuesday to attend a ceremony marking China's anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II.

Woo will represent South Korea at the military parade Wednesday, raising the possibility of a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who also plans to attend the event along with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Speaking to reporters at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, Woo said he is unsure whether such a meeting will take place.

"If we meet, we will discuss issues related to peace on the Korean Peninsula," he said. "I plan to talk about whether there are ways to expand peace on the Korean Peninsula."

Observers say Woo could meet Kim atop the rostrum at Tiananmen Square or at a reception event, attended by other world leaders.

During his visit, Woo will also hold talks with senior officials of the National People's Congress and the State Council before returning home Friday.

"I plan to convey to China the interests of our businesses operating in China and use it as an opportunity to expand their business environment and footing there," Woo told reporters.

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik (R) speaks to reporters at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul, on Sept. 2, 2025, before departing for Beijing to attend a ceremony marking China's anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · September 2, 2025

14. Lee awards symbolic swords to new generals

(LEAD) Lee awards symbolic swords to new generals | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 2, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS remarks in paras 3-4)

SEOUL, Sept. 2 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Tuesday awarded symbolic swords to seven newly promoted generals, including Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman nominee Air Force Gen. Jin Yong-sung.

At a ceremony at the presidential office, Lee presented the "samjeonggeom" sword to Jin, the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the deputy commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the Army chief of staff and the chief of naval operations.

During the ceremony, Lee urged the generals to stay true to their duty to serve the nation in order to help restore public trust in the military eroded by ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed attempt to impose martial law, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung told reporters.

"Be loyal to the nation, not to political power, and carry out your duty to the office, not to yourself," Lee was quoted as saying by Kang.

Jin, who was promoted to four-star general, must first undergo a confirmation hearing before being formally appointed.

As commander in chief, the president bestows the swords on generals as a traditional symbol of national defense, unity and prosperity.

President Lee Jae Myung (L) and Air Force Gen. Jin Yong-sung, the nominee for Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, pose for a photo after Lee awarded a symbolic sword to Jin during a ceremony at the presidential office in Seoul on Sept. 2, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 2, 2025

15. All eyes on solidarity between Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow

Solidarity due to fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

All eyes on solidarity between Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

All eyes on solidarity between Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un steps off his private train upon arriving in Beijing, Tuesday, the day before a commemorative military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Xinhua-Yonhap

By Lee Hyo-jin

Published Sep 2, 2025 12:26 pm KST
Updated Sep 2, 2025 9:21 pm KST

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Lee Hyo-jin

Published Sep 2, 2025 12:26 pm KST

Updated Sep 2, 2025 9:21 pm KST

Leaders of North Korea, China, Russia to stand shoulder to shoulder at Beijing's military parade

The heads of North Korea, China and Russia are set to meet during a major military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, during which they are expected to display trilateral solidarity and strengthen ties between the three nations, according to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and experts Tuesday.

The NIS, however, saw little chance of Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meeting for a trilateral summit, which would be a first for them.

Kim arrived in Beijing late Tuesday afternoon via his private train, nearly a day after departing from Pyongyang.

Accompanied by senior party and government officials, including Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, Kim will attend the large-scale military parade in China to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, a date Beijing commemorates as its victory over Japan.

A motorcade bearing North Korean flags drives through downtown Beijing, Tuesday, as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is reportedly in the Chinese capital to attend a commemorative military parade the next day marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Yonhap

This will be the first time the leader of the reclusive regime appears alongside a large group of foreign officials, as China has invited 26 world leaders to the event.

During the parade, Kim will be seated to Xi's left and Putin to Xi's right, according to the Kremlin. It will mark the first time in 66 years for the leaders of North Korea, China and Russia to stand shoulder to shoulder, a striking display of ties that trace back to the Cold War.

China has not released details of the itinerary, but a potential trilateral summit on the sidelines of the event could serve as a high-profile show of solidarity against U.S. influence.

But the NIS views a trilateral summit as unlikely, despite a high chance of separate bilateral Kim-Xi and Kim-Putin summits, Rep. Lee Seong-kweun of the People Power Party said after the spy agency's closed-door briefing at the National Assembly.

The NIS also said that even if Kim and Putin do not have a bilateral talk this time, the Victory Day event will open the door for Kim to visit Russia in the near future.

Some analysts also expect that Beijing may proceed with caution.

"China aims to use this event to project itself as a peacemaker and regional mediator, while avoiding any move that would cement a Cold War-era rivalry with the West. I see little chance that Xi will arrange a trilateral meeting with Kim and Putin along those lines," said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies.

China has been walking a careful line in its relationship with Washington, with a potential bilateral summit between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump on the horizon.

Both leaders are widely expected to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in South Korea in late October. The prospect of this gathering suggests Xi may avoid any moves that would overtly cement an anti-U.S. bloc, even as Beijing signals solidarity with North Korea and Russia.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin walk at Zhongnanhai, the personal residence of the Chinese leader, in Beijing, Tuesday. Reuters-Yonhap

The NIS also assessed Kim’s visit to China as "an unusually bold diplomatic step to mark his debut on the multilateral stage and to highlight solidarity with Beijing and Moscow."

For Kim, his first appearance at the multilateral gathering carries significant diplomatic weight for his isolated nation, long shunned by the international community in part due to its missile programs.

A day before departing for Beijing, Kim visited a missile research institute in North Korea, overseeing the development of a new high-powered engine for solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency.

The new engine is slated for the Hwasong-19 series and the next-generation Hwasong-20 ICBM, the state media said.

The visit appears aimed at bolstering the presence of the regime's nuclear arsenal ahead of his rare overseas trip, as Pyongyang seeks formal recognition as a nuclear-armed state.

National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik speaks to reporters at Incheon International Airport, Tuesday, as he departs for Bejing to attend a military parade in China the next day. Yonhap

Meanwhile, South Korea's delegation to China's military parade, led by National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik — the second-highest official in Seoul’s protocol order — departed Tuesday evening.

Speaking to reporters on his way to Beijing, Woo said he would like to discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula if he meets Kim, but added, "I’m not sure if I will have that opportunity. I’ll have to see how things unfold."

Woo may share the venue with the North Korean leader, although any meaningful interaction is unlikely given that Pyongyang has rebuffed the Lee Jae Myung administration's recent diplomatic overtures.

16. N. Korean memorial for Ukraine war dead sparks rare public anger at government

Potential resistance indicators? This bears watching. Does this also indicate family values and ties are stronger than party and juche ideological indoctrination?

N. Korean memorial for Ukraine war dead sparks rare public anger at government

"A few measly medals can't substitute for the lives of our fallen soldiers," one person was heard to say

By Jeong Seo-yeong - September 2, 2025

dailynk.com · September 2, 2025

An image showing suspected North Korean troops deployed to Russia receiving supplies. /Photo=Screenshot from a video released on X (formerly Twitter) by Ukraine's Strategic Communications and Information Security Center (SPRAVDI)

A gloomy mood has come over some North Koreans after the authorities held a memorial for North Korean soldiers who have died fighting in Ukraine.

“A solemn ceremony was held at the headquarters of the Central Committee in Pyongyang on Aug. 20 to issue state commendations to commanders and soldiers in units fighting in the Russia-Ukraine War and to honor the fallen. Most people in Hoeryong who heard about the ceremony were visibly upset,” a source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.

“The ceremony was portrayed as a glorious occasion for individuals who performed meritorious service in their honorable missions on the foreign front to receive personal commendation from Kim Jong Un. But everybody’s eyes were fixed on (the photographs of) the young men who had lost their lives on the battlefield. You couldn’t help feeling sorry for them,” the source said.

North Koreans were deeply grieved to hear Kim’s remarks about the soldiers who are still fighting overseas.

“I can’t help thinking of the valiant soldiers who fell in battle and the soldiers who are, at this very moment, focused on carrying out their mission, faithfully obeying the orders of the fatherland,” Kim said during the event.

This was when several North Koreans who have not heard from sons in the military broke into tears.

“Everybody has heard that troops have been deployed to Russia and that many have died there. But seeing wreaths being laid in front of the funeral portraits of the fallen soldiers brought those vague stories to life, making everybody feel hollow and disillusioned,” the source said.

Growing anger toward government sparks rare criticism

Those feelings have persisted because even now, the source said, North Koreans can be heard sadly sharing stories about the soldiers who died fighting in a foreign war.

Some North Koreans have even spoken critically of the government.

The source quoted some people driven to speak by their anger. “A few measly medals can’t substitute for the lives of our fallen soldiers,” one said.

“What’s the point of those young men getting themselves killed fighting for another country?”

“I wouldn’t feel so angry if they had died fighting for our country.”

Younger people raised questions about the real reason for the troop deployment.

“Why was our government so eager to send our soldiers overseas to be cannon fodder in another country’s war?”

“It wasn’t like they even needed to be sent.”

“Did they sell our boys down the river to earn hard currency?”

State security officers were reluctant to even address such questions, but they explained that since the Ukrainian army is backed by the United States, the Russia-Ukraine war is comparable to the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.

In a related incident, a woman in Hoeryong was taken to the state security office on Aug. 21 after being heard saying, “My son doesn’t need to be a hero—I just want him to come back alive.”

The woman is wracked with anxiety because she has not heard anything from her son since he joined the army four years ago. Even now, the source said, the woman does not know for certain whether he is alive or dead.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · September 2, 2025

17. N. Korea declares special security alert ahead of Kim Jong Un’s China visit

Security concerns.

But just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not out to get you.

N. Korea declares special security alert ahead of Kim Jong Un’s China visit

Sinuiju residents are prohibited from nighttime movement, entertaining guests, holding gatherings, and drinking parties

By Seulkee Jang - September 2, 2025

dailynk.com · September 2, 2025

North Korea has declared a nationwide special security alert ahead of Kim Jong Un’s visit to China.

According to multiple Daily NK sources inside North Korea on Sept. 1, North Korean authorities declared a special security period nationwide from 8 p.m. on Aug. 30 until midnight on Sept. 11. During this period, travel to other regions and business trips are restricted without state approval, and the issuance of travel permits or approval numbers (permits for entering Pyongyang and state secret facilities) is prohibited.

With observations suggesting that Kim will likely travel by train rather than aircraft, the Cabinet’s Ministry of Railways, State Security Department, and Ministry of Social Security conducted joint on-site inspections of railways, bridges, train stations, and surrounding areas nationwide from Aug. 28-30, just before the special security alert was declared, and began resetting security perimeters.

In North Pyongan province’s Sinuiju area specifically, access restrictions have been significantly tightened around train stations including Seokha Station, South Sinuiju Station, and Sinuiju Youth Station, as well as around the China-North Korea Friendship Bridge (Yalu River Bridge) leading to Dandong in China’s Liaoning province. The Yalu River border area has been designated as a shoot-on-sight zone starting from midnight on Aug. 31.

A source in North Pyongan province said, “They unified entry and exit routes at railway stations, conducted inspections for dangerous items and security camera operations at platforms and waiting rooms, and expanded no-parking zones around railway stations and bridges. Security around railways and bridges has been strengthened with the declaration of the special security alert for Kim’s overseas activities.”

Additionally, freight truck entry into Sinuiju city is currently restricted, which is expected to disrupt commercial and trade activities for organizations and individuals for some time.

Enhanced surveillance and movement restrictions

Security agencies have also intensified crackdowns on illegal mobile phone use using signal-blocking equipment, apparently intended to prevent internal North Korean situations and confidential matters related to Kim Jong Un’s personal security from being leaked to the outside through those using Chinese mobile phones.

Furthermore, Sinuiju residents are prohibited from nighttime movement, entertaining guests, holding gatherings, and drinking parties. Meanwhile, orders have been issued to various units for beautification work including maintenance of areas around railways and roads, and slogans and propaganda materials.

These current developments in Sinuiju are interpreted as supporting the possibility of Kim Jong Un’s train travel.

A heightened security atmosphere is also being detected in Dandong, China, which faces Sinuiju. According to a Chinese source on North Korea, merchants who had been doing business around the China-North Korea Friendship Bridge all withdrew on Aug. 30, and barriers were installed along the Yalu River on the morning of Sept. 1. With these barriers in place, it has become difficult to observe the appearance of Sinuiju across the Yalu River or vehicles and trains traveling between North Korea and China.

The source said, “These barriers have signs reading ‘Construction site – entry prohibited,’ but they weren’t installed the previous evening (Aug. 31), so it appears no actual construction is taking place. There are also signs that barriers will soon be installed around Dandong Station.”

Meanwhile, the source reported that large numbers of public security personnel have been deployed throughout Dandong, and plainclothes security personnel are also patrolling the streets.

North Korea previously announced Kim Jong Un’s China visit plans through the Rodong Sinmun newspaper – an unusual move. A Pyongyang source said this was “to demonstrate that regime stability is completely guaranteed,” but added that “since it was published in the newspaper, the party’s policy is that security and protection work should be carried out as quietly as possible.”

dailynk.com · September 2, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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