Quotes of the Day:
"Kimilsungism is a mixture of socialism, nationalism, and Kim Il Sung worship. North ZKorean propagandists have forged Kim Il Sung as the world's greatest nationalist, enabling Korea to emancipate itself from the imperial powers of Japan, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China."
-Aie-Rie Lee, Hyun-chool Lee, Ji-Yong Lee,and Il-Gi Kim, quoted in Benjamin Young's book, Guns, Guerrilla, and the Great leader; North Korea and the Third World
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."
- Robert A. Heinlein
"Philosophy is common sense with big words."
- James Madison
1. UN chief hopes for progress in inter-Korean ties during meeting with S. Korean president
2. More than 1 million people watched the U.N. General Assembly online — when K-pop band BTS took to the podium
3. What Do North Korea’s Latest Missile Launches Mean?
4. The US Should Support South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Aspirations
5. OECD ups 2021 growth outlook for S. Korean economy to 4 pct
6. The Korean Peninsula's Missile Race
7. north Korea: Where we're going, we don't need roads
8. North-South divide: only Koreans themselves can find a way out of the impasse
9. How North Korea Became One Of The Few Countries With Nuclear Weapons
10. Why the Korean War Has Not Formally Ended
1. UN chief hopes for progress in inter-Korean ties during meeting with S. Korean president
Hope is not a course of action. How do you convince Kim Jong-un to engage with the South as a responsible member of the international community?
(LEAD) UN chief hopes for progress in inter-Korean ties during meeting with S. Korean president | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS photo)
By Lee Chi-dong
NEW YORK, Sept. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres had discussions on Korean peace and pending global issues during their meeting here on Monday, Cheong Wa Dae said.
Guterres noted that the two Koreas mark the 30th anniversary this year of simultaneously becoming members of the U.N. and expressed hope that it will serve as an opportunity for the two sides to improve their relations.
He promised close cooperation with the South Korean government in that regard, Cheong Wa Dae added.
Moon briefed the U.N. chief on South Korea's plan to host an international conference on peacekeeping operations (PKO) in December and play a proactive role in the campaign to achieve the U.N.-led sustainable development goals (SDGs). Strengthening PKO is one of the U.N.'s key tasks under the leadership of Guterres.
It marked their sixth meeting. Earlier in the day, they attended the opening session of the second SDG Moment event, along with BTS, a South Korean boy band, at the U.N. headquarters.
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. More than 1 million people watched the U.N. General Assembly online — when K-pop band BTS took to the podium
Korean soft power rules!
Excerpt:
This is not the first U.N. visit by BTS, the face of South Korean soft power. But Monday’s visit was their first appearance in their new formal diplomatic role as “special presidential envoy for future generations and culture,” a designation by South Korean President Moon Jae-in ahead of their trip to accompany him to the 76th session of U.N. General Assembly in New York.
More than 1 million people watched the U.N. General Assembly online — when K-pop band BTS took to the podium
TOKYO — More than 1 million people tuned in to what felt like the hottest event on the Internet on Monday: A speech at the United Nations General Assembly meeting — that is, a speech by the K-pop superstar boy band BTS.
The U.N. General Assembly meeting is typically attended by policymakers and politicians and is not generally known for attracting widespread interest. While high-profile celebrities often appear to give speeches, the attention driven by BTS was uniquely intense.
Legions of BTS fans, a hyper-organized online community that can mobilize in an instant, flooded the United Nations’ official YouTube channel Monday with their signature purple heart emoji, along with tons of crying emoji, thumbs-up emoji and every other heart emoji available — as the band promoted their generation and encouraged the use of vaccines. More than 980,000 viewers were tuned in there, and tens of thousands of others viewed on other YouTube channels and platforms.
They took over the chat so fiercely during the K-pop icons’ speech and video performance that other users chimed in to remind them to be respectful of the meeting of global leaders, who had gathered to discuss sustainability.
But the BTS army plowed forward, amplifying the band’s message of hope and the power of those in their teens and 20s to shape the future, from climate change to digital interconnectedness.
The seven members — Jin, Suga, J-Hope, RM, Jimin, V and Jungkook — relayed the experiences of the younger generation, and how their views about their future paths were being shaped by the pandemic. Their younger fans in their teens and in their 20s have spent nearly two years in the pandemic learning new things online, connecting with each other on a deeper level, and studying up on issues like climate change and how they can make a difference, the band members said.
They said they hope that their generation would be appreciated for their ability to create a positive and healthy world through their online communities, rather than as victims of lost opportunities due to the pandemic.
“I’ve heard that people in their teens and 20s today are being referred to as covid’s lost generation,” RM said. “I think it’s a stretch to say they’re lost, just because the path they tread can’t be seen by grown-up eyes.”
And they also enthusiastically endorsed vaccines.
“Yes, all seven of us, of course we’ve received vaccinations. The vaccine was a sort of ticket to meeting our fans waiting for us and to being able to stand here before you today,” J-Hope said.
This is not the first U.N. visit by BTS, the face of South Korean soft power. But Monday’s visit was their first appearance in their new formal diplomatic role as “special presidential envoy for future generations and culture,” a designation by South Korean President Moon Jae-in ahead of their trip to accompany him to the 76th session of U.N. General Assembly in New York.
After a roughly seven-minute speech, the band showed a video performance of their summer hit song, “Permission to Dance.” The video showed the members singing and dancing throughout the General Assembly Hall and on the U.N. headquarter premises. The members said they hoped the song would inspire positivity and welcomeness.
In his remarks introducing BTS, Moon called the band “the artist that is most loved by the people around the world.”
Indeed, tens of millions of fans around the world responded with pride and appreciation for their message and platform, and social media reactions to BTS at the U.N. trended in various countries.
About an hour after their appearance — amid streams of countless purple hearts that continued to flood the live feed chat — the fans finally left and the U.N.'s YouTube channel dropped to a more typical under 50,000 viewers.
Read more:
3. What Do North Korea’s Latest Missile Launches Mean?
Yep. It could be that the regime simply must test to advance its program.
However, is the US playing outdated political games? Please describe such games for us. Lifting economic sanctions will not "entice" north Korea to denuclearize.
But for the author's recommendation to be effective requires KimJong-un act as a responsible member of the international community. He is the one who must stop playing "political games."
North Korea will never take steps toward denuclearization first. In the same context, the United States will not lift economic sanctions first to entice the North to dismantle its nuclear sites and give up its nuclear weapons. There will never be a perfect tit-for-tat approach that leads to the full denuclearization of North Korea. But there is one way that both countries can move forward from their stalled talks and outdated political games: a long-term, phased denuclearization process overseen by multilateral cooperation.
If the North’s missile tests are “business as usual,” there is no reason to hesitate to initiate such cooperation. Doing so could prevent the Korean Peninsula from becoming the next arena of the Cold War. Time is on North Korea’s side if the U.S. keeps hesitating to take bold steps toward a realistic denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.
What Do North Korea’s Latest Missile Launches Mean?
Sometimes a missile test is just a missile test, without any grand diplomatic messaging.
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Since its unusual military parade on September 9, which did not put on display any new weapons systems, North Korea has tested both cruise and ballistic missiles. Experts have offered a variety of theories to explain the move. Some analysts argued that the North has decided to further strengthen its self-defense capabilities to counter the U.S. effectively, indicating that renewed dialogue between the United States and North Korea is unlikely to happen in the near future. Others make the opposite argument, predicting that bilateral or multilateral negotiations on denuclearization will take place soon, considering the diplomatic efforts made by neighboring countries last week in Tokyo and Seoul.
In order to understand the motivation of the North’s missile launches, however, we only need to know one thing: Pyongyang is intent on developing its missile program to enhance national security. Last week’s missile launches have no secret motivation underneath the surface. They are exactly what they appear to be: weapons tests designed to further the North’s military capabilities.
Some have expressed concerns over the frequency of the North’s missile launches, but it was predictable based on Kim’s previous comments. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced his intention to develop more weapons and increase the country’s military capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. and South Korea at the Workers’ Party Eighth Congress in January.
As the 1950-1953 Korean War is still technically underway – the combatant countries have not declared the end of the war yet, only a truce – it is natural for the North and the South to continue to develop more advanced weapons. The two Koreas have kicked off their own arms race by introducing new and advanced weapons, especially after the U.S. lifted missile restrictions on South Korea. Meanwhile, the diplomatic options for tackling North Korea’s growing nuclear power are narrowing.
It is believed that, at the ill-fated summit in Hanoi, Kim demanded U.S. President Donald Trump publicly recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. This is a non-starter for Washington, as the U.S. has sought “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula under a series of administrations.
Since the Hanoi summit in 2019, Pyongyang has been crystal clear that it will never come back to the negotiating table unless Washington removes its so-called “hostile policies” first, which broadly refer to the devastating economic sanctions and the U.S. military presence on South Korean soil. That said North Korea has always left room for potential negotiations by avoiding crossing the U.S. “red lines” of intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) or nuclear tests.
“I don’t think that Pyongyang gives up diplomatic options because it needs the improvement of the relationship with the U.S. for both its short-term and long-term regime survival and national development,” said Ku Yang-mo, associate professor of political science at Norwich University, in an interview with The Diplomat.
True, the long-range cruise missiles and train-launched ballistic missiles that were tested in the past 10 days could pose a serious threat to the security of the U.S. and neighboring countries. However, it is important that North Korea has refrained from the ultimate provocations – ICBM or nuclear tests – even though Kim said he would no longer be bound by his country’s self-imposed moratorium on such tests in the wake of the failed Hanoi summit.
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The former Obama and Trump administrations took different approaches toward North Korea but there were no significant changes in the main demand: the total denuclearization of the North. But in practice, Washington has never ranked the denuclearization of North Korea as its top priority. The Obama administration’s “strategic patience” approach, for example, effectively allowed the North to keep developing its nuclear and missile programs under the economic aegis of China and Russia.
The Trump administration’s “top-down” approach, by contrast, was an audacious move to directly tackle the denuclearization of the North. Before Donald Trump, no U.S. president had ever considered sitting down with the North Korean leader and to discuss the issue. However, Trump’s approach was ill-suited to a substantive and irreversible outcome, as no agreements or agendas were discussed by working-level officials between the two countries before the summit was held.
Since U.S. President Joe Biden took office in January, North Korea has not sought to renew dialogue with the United States. The country tested short-range ballistic missiles in March, but there were no serious countermeasures taken by the United States at the time. Since then, the country has consistently tested more missiles, but these tests were considered just “business as usual” by Washington and Seoul.
At the moment, Washington takes the rise of China in the region more seriously than the North’s longstanding nuclear threat. However, the United States will ultimately need to cooperate with China to address the North’s growing nuclear capabilities.
“For China, it would be good to have North Korea to agree to denuclearization, even if it is unlikely this will happen,” said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, professor of international relations at King’s College London, in an interview with The Diplomat. “It would defuse tensions in one of China’s borders, which Beijing would welcome.”
Pardo also said that China would need to support denuclearization talks out of self-interest to prevent unpleasant outcomes – more tensions in the region with more reasons and motivation to build up the South’s military and strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
North Korea will never take steps toward denuclearization first. In the same context, the United States will not lift economic sanctions first to entice the North to dismantle its nuclear sites and give up its nuclear weapons. There will never be a perfect tit-for-tat approach that leads to the full denuclearization of North Korea. But there is one way that both countries can move forward from their stalled talks and outdated political games: a long-term, phased denuclearization process overseen by multilateral cooperation.
If the North’s missile tests are “business as usual,” there is no reason to hesitate to initiate such cooperation. Doing so could prevent the Korean Peninsula from becoming the next arena of the Cold War. Time is on North Korea’s side if the U.S. keeps hesitating to take bold steps toward a realistic denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.
4. The US Should Support South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Aspirations
No. There is no need for South Korea to waste the resources on developing a nuclear powered submarine. Although I will leave this to submarine experts I do not believe it will not appreciably improve deterrence against north Korea. Diesel subs are more effective in operations against north Korea. South Korea is not going to commit to employing nuclear submarines to defend the global commons/sea lanes of communication throughout the INDOPACIFIC because of its attempts to walk the tightrope between the US and China. The resources necessary for developing a capable nuclear powered submarine force would be better spent on other advanced capabilities that will significantly enhance the defense of the ROK; such as missile defense and counterfire systems as well as increased air power,funding a capable reserve force, and surface ships equipped with Aegis to name a few.
Unfortunately a nuclear powered submarine program in South Korea is simply a vanity project that will be a waste of resources.
I do not think South Korea would accept this conclusion:
Overall, however, U.S. efforts to assist a South Korean SSN program would strengthen the allies’ ability to cope with a more assertive and powerful China. The United States has long called on its Indo-Pacific partners to bolster their military capabilities and step up their contributions to regional security. The U.S. should welcome the fact that Seoul is ready to answer this call.
The US Should Support South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Aspirations
After offering SSNs to Australia, it’s time to extend similar support to South Korea.
Republic of Korea submarine ROKS Park Wi (SS 065) arrives at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-HIckam for routine training in the Hawaiian operations area and preparations for the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, June 1, 2018.
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The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced last week that the three will cooperate to allow Australia to develop a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). This new pact, dubbed AUKUS, will significantly strengthen the trilateral Australia-U.K.-U.S. relationship, bolstering Australia’s ability to project power throughout the Indo-Pacific region and helping to offset China’s rising naval capabilities. It also presents an opportunity for the United States to rethink its stance on the SSN aspirations of another critical Indo-Pacific ally: South Korea.
Seoul has repeatedly expressed its interest in either purchasing or producing a SSN. Former President Roh Moo-hyun launched a covert effort to explore nuclear propulsion in 2003, and current President Moon Jae-in has emphasized the South Korean need for an SSN force. However, despite South Korea’s longstanding interest in this platform, the United States has been reluctant to provide assistance due to non-proliferation concerns. The Dong-A Ilbo reported that the Trump administration rebuffed South Korean entreaties for low-enriched uranium for naval reactors in 2020.
We argue that the United States should reconsider its decision to withhold support for a South Korea SSN program. The U.S. needs more capable allies in the Indo-Pacific region given the rapid advancements in China’s military power. As the Biden administration has emphasized, China’s growing anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and emerging power projection capabilities threaten the regional military balance and U.S. interests. Washington doubtless hopes that Australian SSNs developed through the AUKUS pact can help confront this emerging challenge. South Korean SSNs could play a similar role, bolstering a key U.S. partner’s ability to contribute to allied naval operations throughout the broader Indo-Pacific region.
SSNs, while more costly than their diesel-electric (SSK) counterparts, offer enhanced speed, endurance, and range. They can transit more swiftly should conflicts emerge far from the Korean Peninsula in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or Indian Ocean while remaining submerged. Generally speaking, SSNs can support much more capable combat systems and perform more effectively than SSKs in both anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Given their ability to operate stealthily beneath the ocean’s surface for months at a time, SSNs are ideally suited to the increasingly contested waters of the Indo-Pacific, where China’s growing arsenal of anti-ship missiles and long-range bombers increasingly threaten surface vessels.
The United States has withheld support for a South Korean SSN program in part due to non-proliferation concerns. Some experts worry that this capability would bring South Korea closer to being able to pursue a nuclear weapon. It is worth noting, however, that Seoul is seriously considering developing a SSN even without U.S. assistance or approval. If the U.S. cooperates with South Korea in developing SSNs, it will be better positioned to ensure appropriate safeguards and accountancy measures are put in place.
Additionally, U.S. support for a South Korean SSN program would bolster the United States’ credibility as an ally. North Korea’s growing ability to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons, China’s rising regional military and economic influence, and concerns about internal divisions and political turmoil in the U.S. have all contributed to considerable anxiety in Seoul over the dependability of the United States as an ally. A new agreement to share submarine technology with South Korea could serve as a powerful signal of U.S. commitment and would doubtlessly generate considerable goodwill in Seoul. Indeed, U.S. support for a South Korean SSN program could go a long way toward convincing Seoul to step up its support for U.S. efforts to maintain a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific maritime commons. Conversely, if Washington continues to withhold support for Seoul’s SSN aspirations, even after offering the technology to Australia, it may further undermine South Korea’s confidence in its ally’s commitment and reliability.
Of course, any U.S.-South Korea agreement to work toward a Korean SSN would require considerable diplomatic effort. The current U.S.-ROK 123 agreement would need to be revised to allow South Korea to use enriched uranium for SSN reactors. Seoul would have to take concrete measures to address the United States’ legitimate concerns about nuclear proliferation. The U.S. would need to consult with other regional allies, particularly Japan, to alleviate any worries they might have about South Korea’s SSN program.
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Overall, however, U.S. efforts to assist a South Korean SSN program would strengthen the allies’ ability to cope with a more assertive and powerful China. The United States has long called on its Indo-Pacific partners to bolster their military capabilities and step up their contributions to regional security. The U.S. should welcome the fact that Seoul is ready to answer this call.
Authors
Guest Author
Jihoon Yu
Jihoon Yu is a commander (sel) in the ROK Navy and a professor of military strategy at the ROK Naval Academy. He is also a member of the ROK Navy’s task force on the CVX light aircraft carrier project.
Guest Author
Erik French
Erik French is an assistant professor of international studies at the State University of New York at Brockport and an affiliated scholar with the America in the World Consortium.
5. OECD ups 2021 growth outlook for S. Korean economy to 4 pct
(LEAD) OECD ups 2021 growth outlook for S. Korean economy to 4 pct | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS finance minister's comments in paras 7-9)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Sept. 21 (Yonhap) -- The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Tuesday raised its 2021 growth outlook for the South Korean economy to 4 percent, amid the country's strong exports and fiscal support.
The latest outlook is a 0.2 percentage-point rise from its May estimate of 3.8 percent growth for Asia's fourth-largest economy.
The Paris-based organization also revised up its 2022 growth forecast for South Korea to 2.9 percent from its earlier estimate of 2.8 percent.
The OECD joined other organizations that have boosted their growth outlook for the South Korean economy to the 4-percent range amid a global economic recovery.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected the South Korean economy to grow 4.3 percent this year. The Bank of Korea (BOK) forecast 4 percent growth for Korea.
Three global credit appraisers -- Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's Global Ratings (S&P), and Fitch Ratings -- also expected the Korean economy to grow 4 percent this year.
Finance Minister Hong Nam-ki described the OECD's upward revision of the growth outlook as a reaffirmation that South Korea has been responding to the COVID-19 crisis successfully in relative terms.
"Despite the difficult situation in which the growth forecast for the world economy this year has been revised down 0.1 percentage point due to the impact of the delta variant's spread, our country's growth outlook was revised upward, due apparently to strong exports and the effect of policy efforts, such as the second extra budget," Hong wrote on Facebook.
Commenting on the revision of next year's growth outlook, Hong said that South Korea has received a positive assessment that its economic recovery will continue not only during the process of overcoming the current crisis but also in a post-crisis period.
Asia's fourth-largest economy is on a recovery track on the back of solid exports despite the latest spike in COVID-19 cases.
The Korean economy grew a revised 0.8 percent in the second quarter from three months earlier, slowing from a 1.7 percent on-quarter gain in the first quarter, according to central bank data.
Exports, which account for half of the country's economy, rose 35 percent on-year in August, extending their gains to the 10th straight month.
In terms of an estimated average growth rate in 2020-21, South Korea ranked third with 1.6 percent among the Group of 20 (G-20). It also topped the list among 10 advanced nations from G-20.
"Growth should also pick up in Japan, Korea and Australia as infections abate and sanitary restrictions are lifted," the OECD said.
Meanwhile, the OECD upped its 2021 inflation outlook for Korea to 2.2 percent from its May forecast of 1.8 percent.
Its forecast is higher than the BOK's projection in August of 2.1 percent. South Korea's central bank aims to keep annual inflation at 2 percent over the medium term.
The OECD lowered its 2021 growth outlook for the global economy to 5.7 percent from 5.8 percent amid a global resurgence in COVID-19 cases. Next year, the global economy is expected to grow 4.5 percent.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. The Korean Peninsula's Missile Race
The Korean Peninsula's Missile Race | Aviation Week Network
The Korean Peninsula's Missile Race
North Korean State Media KCNA
North Korea fired two tactical ballistic missiles on Sept. 15, within minutes of each other, from a train operated by the Railway Mobile Missile Regiment. Pyongyang says the drill was aimed at confirming the practicability of the railway mobile missile system deployed for the first time.
North Korean State Media KCNA
The North Korean KN-23 missile resembles the Russian Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile and is designed to fly 800 km. Railway-based systems are not new but were last seen during the Cold War era in the Soviet Union. Railway systems give North Korea the ability to deploy and hide missile launchers quickly in its vast rail network and tunnels.
North Korean State Media KCNA
On Sept.11-12, North Korea test-fired a new class of long-range cruise missile developed by its Academy of National Defense Science. The missiles flew on predetermined oval and figure-eight waypoints for 2 hr. before hitting their target 1,500 km away.
North Korean State Media KCNA
The two-stage liquid-fueled Hwasong-15 (named after Mars) is currently the largest ICBM in North Korea’s arsenal, capable of ranges exceeding 8,500 km. It is also one of the few missiles that is capable of reaching the continental U.S. and military facilities in the Pacific.
South Korean Defense Ministry
South Korea developed the Hyunmoo-4 tactical ballistic missile based on the Hyunmoo-2 series missile and in April 2020 tested two missiles, one of which misfired.
South Korean Defense Ministry
With a 2.5-3-ton penetrating warhead, Hyunmoo-4 can reach targets up to 800 km away and is designed to destroy North Korea’s underground bunkers and missile facilities. Seoul recently released a video showing the missile’s accuracy and ground-penetrating features.
South Korean Defense Ministry
South Korea became the first non-nuclear country to possess submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities. On Sept. 15, hours after the North Korean railway missile launches, the South Korean Navy fired its Hyunmoo 4-4 from the new Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine. The Hyunmoo 4-4 had been reported to be based on the ground-launched Hyunmoo-2B.
South Korean Navy
The 3,000-ton Dosan Ahn Changho-class KSS-III submarine is underway with six vertical launch system (VLS) hatches visible behind the conning tower. A Batch II submarine will feature 10 VLS hatches.
South Korean Defense Ministry
Following the Hyunmoo launch, the South Korean Defense Ministry released a video of the test-firing of a newly deployed vertical-launched supersonic land-attack/anti-ship cruise missile. The missile resembles the Indian-Russian BrahMos Aerospace P-800 supersonic ramjet missile with the distinctive spike inlet and nose intake.
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Since the Korean War armistice was signed in 1953, North and South Korea have remained in a state of high readiness against any form of aggression. To gain leverage against the more powerful South Korea, allied with the U.S., North Korea has pursued weapons of mass destruction and numerous ways to deliver them. Ballistic missile development has accelerated under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, with Chinese and Russian assistance. The culmination is a new unidentified ICBM first seen in late 2020.
South Korean systems date back to 1970s tactical missiles based on the MIM-14 Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile and are intended to defend and retaliate against a North Korean attack. This preemptive “kill chain” strategy targets nuclear and missile facilities north of the 38th parallel.
In May, the Biden administration terminated the 42-year-old U.S.-South Korea missile guidelines, giving South Korea free rein to develop new rockets and missiles. The last restriction limited surface-to-surface weapons to 800 km (500 mi.).
Chen Chuanren is the Southeast Asia and China Editor for the Aviation Week Network’s (AWN) Air Transport World (ATW) and the Asia-Pacific Defense Correspondent for AWN, joining the team in 2017.
7. north Korea: Where we're going, we don't need roads
One of the expert Korea watchers I really trust said this is one of the best and moist succinct analyses of the north Korea missile tests. "This guy is very smart – a prof in Holland."
The DPRK's new rail-based missile launcher in action (credit: DPRK state media)
Where we're going, we don't need roads
- Published on September 16, 2021
Associate Professor Ballistic Missile Defense
Yesterday South-Korean and Japanese media reported that the DPRK launched two short-range ballistic missiles near its East Coast, both landing in the Sea of Japan. Today North Korean state media published pictures of both launches, as well as a video (courtesy of Dr. Tomohiko Kawaguchi) showing one of them. The missiles were launched from a train. During parades and previous launches, the North Koreans always liked to show off their tracked or wheeled launch vehicles, but despite their rugged looks, their mobility is likely to be hindered by the DPRK's poor road network. Reportedly, only about 800 km of the roads outside of urban areas are paved and many of them are in poor repair. However, the DPRK also has a 6000 km railway network, largely inherited from the Japanese occupation, with a lot of tunnels due to the rugged nature of the landscape. So, rail-basing makes a lot of sense. It's also not without precedent. Nazi-Germany experimented with rail based launchers for the V-2 missile, the Soviet Union / Russia operated the rail-based RT-23 Molodets (NATO name SS-24 "Scalpel") from 1987-2015 and even the US looked at rail-basing Minuteman ICBMs and later tested ICBM launching trains for the so-called "Peacekeeper Railway Garrison", until the program was cancelled in the early nineties.
The DPRK missiles launched yesterday look very similar to the ones the DPRK launched in May and July of 2019, also known as the "Unskander" because of their similarity to the Russian "Iskander" (SS-26 "Stone") short-range ballistic missile. They are much smaller than ICBMs, which means two of them can fit in a railway car that looks little different from a standard freight car, except for a few extra doors in the sides (for venting exhaust gasses), doors in the roof for launching the missiles, and supports that can be lowered onto the rails to prevent it from rocking on its suspension during launch operations.
8. North-South divide: only Koreans themselves can find a way out of the impasse
"Thoughtful visions?" Let's keep in mind what we know about Kim Jong-un's vision (to include the intent on subverting the ROK in order to dominate it).
People ask what is north Korean Strategy?
I think when we use “Kim knows” we lose the debate. People will say “Kim knows" he cannot win a war against the South. “Kim knows” he cannot absorb and rule South Korea. “Kim knows” China will not let him attack the South. “Kim knows” but we cannot know what he knows.
We can only know what the Kim family regime has said and done over the past 70 years and that is what we must assess - not one what we think "Kim knows."
No one knows what Kim knows or believes. That said, we should start with Occam’s Razor. The simplest answer is the regime has been telling us & the Korean people it’s strategy for 7 decades. We spin that at our peril.
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the Kim regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
We should never forget that north Korea is a master of denial and deception in all that it does from military operations to strategy to diplomatic negotiations.
nK engages in active subversion of the ROK as well as the ROK/US Alliance (See UFD and 225th Bureau mission statements).
The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Those are my completely biased views of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
North-South divide: only Koreans themselves can find a way out of the impasse
- Thoughtful visions from Koreans both north and south of the DMZ are the best remedy for the perpetually tense Korean peninsula
- Outside powers claim to want to help fix the problem, but almost 70 years after the Panmunjom armistice, reconciliation is no closer
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Published: 3:30am, 21 Sep, 2021
Frustrations come with any occupation, and writing columns about Asia and America, as I have without stop for 25 years, is no exception. Asia is powerful and dynamic, and one size does not fit all. But, for me, no one subject has proven more elusive and more frustrating than the enduring topic of the two Koreas on their tensely divided peninsula.
Outsiders should venture an opinion about this elongated legacy of the Cold War only with deepest humility. My initial take on the divided peninsula back in the 1990s, in the Los Angeles Times, took the idealistic view that Koreans, north and south, could work out their own peace settlement if only those darn outsiders would just stay out of it.
The idea had appeal to many Koreans but scant international traction. Outside powers claimed to want to help fix the problem, but here we are. Almost 70 years after the Panmunjom armistice put the pistols back in the holsters, Koreans are no closer to reconciliation.
Perhaps the continuing divide of north and south is embedded in East Asian geopolitics. Buffer-lover China gets to claim it loves Koreans so much that good diplomatic relations with both sides are a must.
By contrast, the United States, self-designated global defender of freedom, notably lacks even a low-level official American mission up north. It subcontracts embassy business to harmless go-between Sweden.
Japan is anything but thrilled with Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, of course, but it cannot be but quietly delighted that its former colony remains cut down in size by its division.
In the south, below the demilitarised zone (DMZ) line that sliced Korea in half with all the tenderness of the cutting of a tree trunk, the US has yet another dug-in military settlement in Asia. It ostensibly serves solely to deter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which at most has the population of Shanghai.
For its part, North Korea has a small but growing nuclear arsenal in existential fear of what the West – in particular the US – might do. Last week, it lit up the skies of the East Asia Sea and once again inflamed regional fears with rocket launches. Two splashed down in the Yellow Sea but made waves globally.
Earlier in my column’s evolution, I would liken the North’s periodic missile eruptions to the tantrums of a child in the corner playpen screaming for someone’s attention. Even today, this might have some validity.
International economic sanctions, which have been applied to North Korea almost continuously since its founding in 1948 – well before it went nuclear – are up for renewal at the United Nations at the autumn session of the General Assembly that brings national leaders together. The rockets’ red glare was Pyongyang’s primary aim.
International economic sanctions against any country do cause pain and are frequently the weapons of choice by the UN and major powers when they don’t know what else to do. The question is, who are they really hurting? In this instance, they certainly did not stop Pyongyang from going nuclear.
The truth is that sanctions are usually the mindless default option. Everyone knows that ruling elites manage to keep their caviar or kimchi supply line open no matter what; it is the general populace that mainly feels the pain.
South Korea is a wunderkind economically and technologically. While the North Korean economy gets ranked below even Palestine, the Republic of Korea is like some glittering Las Vegas.
By the indexing metric of gross domestic product, South Korea’s economy ranks in the world’s top dozen, ahead of even Russia. President Moon Jae-in’s administration in Seoul has pushed a pro-negotiation line with the North.
This approach would be called a “sunshine policy” in past administrations, especially that of Kim Dae-jung, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. I always supported it, in fear of the obvious – the darkness of apocalypse.
But South Korean presidential terms are limited by the national constitution to one five-year term. France, by contrast, has evolved into a more sensible limit of two five-year terms.
By next year, it is possible that South Korea will revert to the risky and unimaginative Pyongyang hawk-hardline. Domestic politics as well as outside international influences nail the country’s north policy to a bed of bipolar inconsistency.
Concern is global. The Korean diaspora is well spread out, but in the US it is concentrated in New York and southern California, power centres in American politics. As much as Koreans complain about erratic US diplomacy, they know where they would have to turn in a true crisis.
As if to emphasise the connection, one of South Korea’s most prominent political figures – a minister in the current Moon cabinet – recently got the red-carpet treatment from the Rand Corporation. One of America’s most famous think tanks laid out for her a buffet of policy briefings by its razor-sharp experts.
Park Young-sun returned the favour with pointed insights about the two Koreas. Invited to sit in, I tried to keep a low profile – not my greatest talent. I was struck by her admission that her country’s rising material success has not lifted all Koreans and that Korea must count for something far more special than kimchi and K-pop.
Thoughtful visions from Koreans like her – north and south of the DMZ alike – is the best remedy for the perpetually tense Korean peninsula. It is by going deep within itself that Korea will find its way out. That is well beyond the ken of Beijing and Washington.
Tom Plate, Loyola Marymount University’s Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies, is also vice-president of the Pacific Century Institute, based in Los Angeles, and author of “Conversations with Ban Ki-moon” in the Giants of Asia book series
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Tom Plate is a university professor and a veteran columnist focused on Asia and America. This Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies at Loyola Marymount University has orchestrated live interactive seminars with major universities across Asia, as part of the LMU’s path-finding Asia Media International Centre. He is also the author of 13 books, including the bestsellers “Confessions of an American Media Man” (2007), four volumes in the “Giants of Asia” series, and three In the 'Tom Plate on Asia' book series. He is vice-president of the Pacific Century Institute, in Los Angeles.
9. How North Korea Became One Of The Few Countries With Nuclear Weapons
Hmmm... some interesting background. We forget the history at our peril. The history certainly continues to influence the KIM family regime.
Conclusion:
Since becoming a nuclear power, North Korea has steadily increased its capabilities at the cost of becoming even more of a global pariah. Even more so with the accession to power in 2011 of the third generation of Kim to lead the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In just three years, from 2013-2016, Kim Jong-un had ordered and completed "more tests of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles carried out ... than under his father and grandfather combined," says the Council on Foreign Relations.
For several decades, North Korea successfully financed and developed a domestic nuclear weapons program while subject to various sanctions from multiple countries. They haven't so much evaded those sanctions as they have found several alternative revenue models. As reported by Business Insider in 2017, for the longest time, North Korea relied "on manufacturing drugs and counterfeiting foreign bank notes." However, those activities have been supplemented or replaced by "smuggling products from endangered species, fake pharmaceuticals, and counterfeit cigarettes."
According to a 2021 U.N. report obtained by the Associated Press, North Korea has diversified further still, "using cyberattacks to help finance its programs and continuing to seek material and technology overseas for its arsenal including in Iran." The report accuses North Korea of stealing over $316 million in just one year through "malicious cyber activities," enabling them to evade international sanctions and continue building their nuclear arsenal.
How North Korea Became One Of The Few Countries With Nuclear Weapons
grunge.com · by Thomas A Brown · September 20, 2021
Tatohra/Shutterstock
By /Sept. 20, 2021 1:30 pm EDT/Updated: Sept. 20, 2021 1:34 pm EDT
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is run by Kim Jong-un. Like most dictators, he has a lot of titles, per The Christian Science Monitor: the first secretary of the Workers' Party, the chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, and the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army, among others. Some titles were held by his late family members and are considered symbolic, with the intention of boosting his authority over the country. Yet even with all of these titles, Kim technically "shares" power with his father and grandfather, despite their being dead. "Kim Jong-il remains 'eternal general secretary' and Kim Il Sung is 'eternal president,'" CNBC reports.
As the leader of North Korea, Kim has power over all facets of its operation, including nuclear weapons. And how it acquired them is a story as strange, unbelievable, and tragic as the country itself.
North Korea was destroyed during the war
Keystone/Getty Images
After the Japanese Empire surrendered in 1945, it handed its former imperial territory of Korea to the United States and the Soviet Union to administer. Ostensibly designed to nurse and guide the country back towards self-governance, the plan suffered from the fact that the U.S. and USSR divided the country in half, which quickly led to de facto separate governments on both sides. By 1948, the split was official, and the Republic of Korea (south) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (north) were born.
Hostilities between the two Koreas began immediately. Northern spies and saboteurs committed assassination in the South, Southern soldiers would massacre border villages, and troops from both countries frequently clashed at the border. The actual war began in 1950 when the North invaded the South, who asked for international help and got it. The North started the clash, but during the active portion of the Korean War, the U.S. and its allies basically killed up to 20% of the population. "We went over there," General Curtis LeMay is quoted in the Intercept as saying, "and fought the war and eventually burned down every town in North Korea."
While there's no shooting anymore, the Korean War is technically still active. Plus, the North has a long memory, as Asia policy expert Kathryn Weathersby said in The Washington Post. For the North, "it is still the 1950s ... and the conflict with South Korea and the United States is still going on."
President Truman said he considered using nukes in Korea
Keystone/Getty Images
The Korean War was the first major military intervention for the fledgling United Nations. Twenty-one nations contributed to the defense of South Korea, but the Americans were in the lead and everyone knew it. The U.S. military dictated the course of the war, with General Douglas MacArthur in charge of the U.N. forces. MacArthur was famously fired by President Harry Truman for publicly contradicting him and demanding to be allowed to nuke China. Smithsonian quoted General Omar Bradley describing it as a "strategy would involve us in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy."
Nuclear bombers were stationed in the Pacific Ocean in the very first month of the war. In Air & Space Magazine, historian Roger Dingman said the approach was designed "to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea." When the Chinese entered the war with massive numbers of veteran soldiers, the successes of the U.N. forces were quickly overturned. What had been widely seen as a thorough route of the North turned into a meat grinder for all sides. On the second November of the war, seven months after firing MacArthur, President Truman said in a press conference that the U.S. was considering using nuclear weapons in Korea. This turned out to be a bluff, as the bombers returned home having never even deployed to Korea.
North Korea has its own uranium mines
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President Truman's restraint from using atomic weapons in Korea impresses many historians because at that point, the United States was the only country in the world with offensive nuclear weapons capability. The Soviet Union had tested its first weapon only the year prior and wouldn't have nuclear bombers for a few more years, while the Chinese wouldn't start its tests for a few years. Of course, they would all catch up eventually.
North Korea is surrounded by nuclear weapons: Russian nukes, Chinese nukes, and American ones in South Korea. And events would increasingly isolate the tiny country. "The Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s and the U.S.-led détente with China in 1972," explains the Pacific Forum foreign policy think tank, "supported North Korea's aspirations for developing nuclear weapons." They quote North Korea's founder, Kim Il-sung, as saying that nuclear weapons are necessary to "protect its sovereignty against the internal and external enemies."
The Russians began importing radioactive materials from North Korea in 1947 — before the country technically existed — and China would follow suit after the war, according to a timeline from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. According to a Stanford study, even though only one mine is publicly acknowledged, there are up to 18 possible uranium mines in the country. And North Korea is encircled with nukes, is headed by a family of paranoid leaders, and is one of less than two dozen uranium-producing countries — yeah, they likely pursued nuclear weapons.
The USSR helped North Korea
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Sitting between nuclear powers and atop nuclear fuel, it was only natural that in 1956, North Korea would become a founding member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. For decades, Soviet research facilities welcomed North Korean physicists, Soviet universities trained North Korean engineers, and Soviet expertise built North Korea's nuclear infrastructure. According to a timeline compiled by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in 1958, the Korean People's Army built the "Atomic Weapons Training Center" with Soviet help. The following year, Russia "agrees to provide technical assistance in the establishment of a nuclear research center in North Korea." In 1964, Russian technicians designed and constructed the North's first nuclear research reactor, and it was used for medical and industrial research. Just two years later, it went critical.
During the 1960s, the USSR built or donated several reactors, reactor assemblies, research labs, and assorted nuclear components in North Korea. By the middle of the decade, "North Korean technicians learn plutonium-reprocessing techniques while receiving training at Soviet plutonium separation facilities and laboratories." And according to the NTI timeline, defectors claim that Pyongyang stocked its Pakch'ŏn-kun facility with nuclear capabilities thanks to the help of France and Austria. By the end of the decade, another defector said Kim Il-sung ordered the North Korean military to actively pursue domestic nuclear weapons production.
China and North Korea are fair-weather friends
RAUF.ISMIKHAN/Shutterstock
China is so ancient that the American Historical Association calls it "the oldest living civilization," with over 3,500 years of written history and an archaeological record nearly three times as long. China's borders expanded and contracted multiple times over the millennia, and what counted as "China" at any given time could be kind of complicated. Per Al-Jazeera, this uncertainty complicates China's current international relationships when they make "historic" claims to territory that is generally recognized as belonging to nearly a dozen other countries. And this made for delicious irony when two North Korean leaders asked two Chinese leaders in a row to recognize Korean sovereignty to northeast China.
As reported by Asian Nikkei, Chinese historian Shen Zhihua said former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il once demanded to inspect the Chinese side of the border. The move was allegedly driven by former Chairman Mao, who told his father — former leader Kim Il-sung — that "the entire 'northeast' [of China] belongs to us." North Korea has yet to press these claims hard because the two nations are officially allies. Nevertheless, a tense relationship has persisted between them. According to Korean magazine Hankyoreh, Chairman Mao objected to Kim Il-sung's quest for a nuclearized North, asking, "Does Choson [North Korea] really need to go to that length?" When China engaged South Korea diplomatically in 1992, the North was only further encouraged to go that length — alone. In 2017, Professor Shen said the DPRK's nuclear antics mean that "[North] Korea is now China's potential enemy."
North Korea has a peculiar self-reliant philosophy
Mark Edward Harris/Getty Images
North Korea started life as an overtly communist project. The Soviet Union was its biggest ally until it collapsed; meanwhile, the People's Republic of China devoted hundreds of thousands of troops to its defense in the Korean War and remains one of the North's few trading partners. Reading the first line of North Korea's constitution seems to confirm its Marxist bonafide, but it quickly veers into the weirdness the country is known for. "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a socialist fatherland of Juche which embodies the idea of and guidance by the great leader Comrade Kim II Sung," it reads, via the Constitute Project.
That statement embodies both the country's special brand of Stalinist personality cult as well as their Darwinian modification to socialist philosophy. "The Juche idea," reads North Korea's official government website, "is based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything." Speaking to Vox, North Korean scholar David Kang explained that the term is generally translated as "self-reliance" and is an umbrella term encompassing nationalist, socialist, and Confucian values "that can be deployed however the leader wants."
"The Korean people value the independence of the country," says the government's official explanation, and "under the pressure of imperialists and dominationsts, have thoroughly implemented the principle of independence, self-reliance, and self-defense." North Korea stands alone, by design, and it needs to defend itself. According to the Associated Press, the North even calls nuclear weapons the "treasured sword" of Juche, or "Juche shells."
North Koreans are proud of their nukes
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North Koreans are marinated in propaganda and indoctrination. In an interview with Vox, professor of Korean philosophy Don Baker said their national philosophy of Juche is basically a state religion. "Human beings don't need God," he said. "They now have the Kim family." And the pinnacle of Juche expression is through North Korea's nuclear might.
In a 2019 blog for the Wilson Center, North Korea Associated Press reporter Jean Lee spoke of the country's use of military propaganda. "During my years reporting in North Korea, I saw rockets on posters, stamps, and calendars," she said. "Every child wanted to be photographed in front of the rockets at the kimilsungia and kimjongilia flower shows." She described going to the capital city's biggest supermarket and buying school notebooks decorated with missiles. Children especially are targets of the regime's indoctrination, and North Korean students are literally taught to hate America and support everything that could destroy it. "And there's no illusion that these are rockets meant for space," said Lee, "the walls of kindergartens I have visited feature murals with tanks and missiles in flight — and children cheering them on."
The propaganda suggests that having nukes is evidence the Kim family has delivered on its promises. Lee recounts a scene from one of their most popular TV shows where the characters stop their antics to celebrate a Korean nuclear missile launch against the U.S. "It's a telling indication of how the weapons are used as a way to build a sense of pride and unity among North Korea's long-suffering population," she said.
Pakistan helped North Korea get nukes
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Pakistan had "the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile" as recently as 2011, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The country exists in a quarrelsome region and shares one of the most turbulent borders in the whole world. Pakistan was formed from a violent partition from India, and the nations have fought two wars and multiple border skirmishes over the last 70 years. The Pakistani president declared back in 1965 that "if India builds the bomb ... we will get one of our own," and though it took them twenty years, they did.
India and Pakistan both officially joined the nuclear club in 1998. However, India detonated its first test device in 1974. According to Outrider, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was a Pakistani nuclear scientist working in Amsterdam at the time, and when India detonated its nuke, he volunteered his skills to the Pakistani government. Khan also provided it with "classified plans for a centrifuge that would create bomb-grade uranium" he stole from his employer. Khan spent the next thirty years not only building his nation's nuclear infrastructure but also giving "Iran, North Korea, and Libya the building blocks they needed to create nuclear weapons." And as it was mutually beneficial for both countries, Pakistan shared centrifuge technology so North Korea could militarize its uranium in exchange for missile technology for Pakistani nuclear bombs. In 2004, Dr. Khan was punished for disseminating weapons of mass destruction technology with five years of house arrest.
North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Chung Sung-jun/Getty Images
You'd be forgiven for thinking that the Cold War was just a chain of intercontinental ballistic missile factories cranking out weapons every year. But in fact, efforts to reduce the growth, dissemination, use, and very existence of nuclear weapons began early on. By 1968, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was introduced in the United Nations for signature by member nations. "The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States," says the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs. The NPT has not, unfortunately, been very effective. When it was designed, there were only five states with nuclear weapons (U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and France), but now, even though 191 countries signed the Treaty, there are near twice as many.
According to the Arms Control Association, three nations (India, Pakistan, and Israel) have yet to sign the NPT. And even though Israel "does not admit or deny having nuclear weapons," all three "are known to possess nuclear weapons." In 1985, due to Soviet pressure, North Korea actually signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and publicly committed to a denuclearized Korean peninsula seven years later, per the Council on Foreign Relations. Still, they threatened to withdraw from the NPT just one year later over the indignation of "inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency" and finally withdrew from it in 2003.
President Bush put North Korea in the axis of evil
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The events of September 11, 2001, essentially pit Americans against the rest of the world. In an address to Congress a week after the event, President Bush basically proclaimed the next two decades of American foreign policy. "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," he said, per Voice of America. A few months later, in his State of the Union address, Bush got a bit more specific: "States like these [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world" (via The Washington Post).
Not even a year later, North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In its statement about exiting the Treaty, the North Korean government directly referenced the "axis of evil" comment and accused the U.S. of "[singling out North Korea] as a target of [a] pre-emptive nuclear attack, openly declaring a nuclear war" (full text per the Atomic Archive). This lead many people, like scholars at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, to observe that Kim Jong-il could easily argue "that North Korea's security requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons to deter a possible U.S. pre-emptive attack. They also said that "it would be difficult to imagine why North Korea would give up its aspirations to develop nuclear weapons."
North Korea officially became a nuclear power in 2006
Chung Sung-jun/Getty Images
In their declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003, the North Korean government said flatly that they "have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity." During the first rounds of the "Six Party Talks" (nuclear negotiations involving North and South Korea, USA, China, Japan, and Russia) that began later that same year, North Korea flatly "denies having a uranium-enrichment program," Per the Council on Foreign Relations. But Global News reported that the CIA suspected they "probably" already had a couple of plutonium warheads by that point.
The Six Party Talks proceeded apace, producing nothing except further angry rhetoric from North Korea and the U.S. In 2005, over $25 million of laundered North Korean assets were essentially seized by the U.S. Treasury, creating further tensions between the two in the talks. Later that year, a deal was reached: The U.S. promised not to attack North Korea, which promised to cease developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the North tested their first nuclear bomb almost exactly a year later.
The United Nations condemned the test. The Security Council passed a unanimous resolution to place "sanctions on the DPRK, calling for it to return immediately to multilateral talks on the issue."
North Korea uses hackers and scammers to fund their nuclear weapons
Aleksandar Malivuk/Shutterstock
Since becoming a nuclear power, North Korea has steadily increased its capabilities at the cost of becoming even more of a global pariah. Even more so with the accession to power in 2011 of the third generation of Kim to lead the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In just three years, from 2013-2016, Kim Jong-un had ordered and completed "more tests of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles carried out ... than under his father and grandfather combined," says the Council on Foreign Relations.
For several decades, North Korea successfully financed and developed a domestic nuclear weapons program while subject to various sanctions from multiple countries. They haven't so much evaded those sanctions as they have found several alternative revenue models. As reported by Business Insider in 2017, for the longest time, North Korea relied "on manufacturing drugs and counterfeiting foreign bank notes." However, those activities have been supplemented or replaced by "smuggling products from endangered species, fake pharmaceuticals, and counterfeit cigarettes."
According to a 2021 U.N. report obtained by the Associated Press, North Korea has diversified further still, "using cyberattacks to help finance its programs and continuing to seek material and technology overseas for its arsenal including in Iran." The report accuses North Korea of stealing over $316 million in just one year through "malicious cyber activities," enabling them to evade international sanctions and continue building their nuclear arsenal.
grunge.com · by Thomas A Brown · September 20, 2021
10. Why the Korean War Has Not Formally Ended
Good analysis from Professor Kelly.
This is the key point (among a number of important ones the professor makes): "A treaty is all upside for North Korea with no obvious benefit for the South."
Why the Korean War Has Not Formally Ended
The lack of paperwork—a formal peace treaty—has no bearing on the empirical situation on the ground which is obviously not open conflict.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has provoked a wave of concern that the United States might withdraw from other commitments, such as South Korea or Taiwan. This occasioned some debate on the still unresolved status of the Korean War. Hostilities only stopped under an armistice, not an actual peace treaty.
Dovish analysts in the Korea policy community have argued that a treaty would ameliorate the peninsular stand-off. Notionally, a final deal would make reconciliation easier, facilitate disarmament, reduce foreign intervention in Korean affairs, and so on. Yet such a deal never happens despite this idea floating around for decades.
First, Korea is not at “war” in the normal sense of the word. In fact, it has not been at war since 1953. So suggesting that a treaty will bring a state of peace is an empirical exaggeration, as that state already basically exists. It is a mischaracterization to refer to Korea as another “forever war.” That term connotes regular, kinetic exchange between two sides in an unwinnable quagmire with no obvious end-point. That is a good description of U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but not of the Korean Peninsula. The armistice has held since 1953, and provocations along the border have always come from North Korea, not from South Korea or the United States. The lack of paperwork—a formal peace treaty—has no bearing on the empirical situation on the ground which is obviously not open conflict.
Second, a peace treaty is irrelevant if the two Koreas do not change to become more like each other and thus more likely to get along normally post-treaty. If they stay as they are—a liberal democracy on the one hand and an Orwellian gangsterish autocracy on the other—a treaty will make no empirical difference as all the actual issues dividing the Koreas will remain. Since South Korea is not going to constitutionally become more like North Korea, then a narrowing of the gap means, in practice, the liberalization of North Korea. The case on the Korean Peninsula is likely similar to that of Germany. Recall that the division of Germany was wound down on paper only after the Soviet Union reformed. Specifically, if North Korea stays the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that everyone has known for decades—with a million soldiers flush against the South’s border, gulags, a spiraling nuclear missile program, a quasi-theocratic leadership cult—then what would change post-treaty? Would South Korea and its allies suddenly trust North Korea more? Almost certainly not. Signing a treaty without any reform is a costless move for the North. So neither side would disarm; the inter-Korean arms race would continue; the United States and UN commitment to South Korea would still be needed; human rights would still be a big issue; and so on.
Third, doves frequently finger U.S. obduracy for the lack of movement toward a treaty, and it is true that the United States fears a treaty would undercut the legality of the UN Command in Korea as well as its own forces’ position. But there are other, more important reasons the United States and South Korea do not push hard for a treaty.
The implacable resistance of the South Korea Right. The Right is staunchly anti-communist and pro-Southern-led unification. The current dovish government has made no overture to them on this issue, which has led to conservative paranoia over the government’s intentions. The right would fight a treaty hard and seek to undo it as soon as conservatives re-took the South Korean presidency.
The South Korean median voter is cool to a treaty for fear it might push out the Americans. The U.S. alliance is very popular. Centrist and low information voters understand, however vaguely, that the U.S. presence backstops South Korea’s participation in the global economy, and that jeopardizing that arrangement for a deal with the deeply mendacious North is a huge risk. There is just not much enthusiasm for a treaty outside of the South Korean Left, which is perhaps 35-40 percent of the public. Hence this idea, which has been kicked around by the South Korean left for decades, never comes to fruition. It is also why President Moon Jae-in’s 2019 idea for an inter-Korean “peace economy” flopped too. If Moon and his leftist coalition really want this treaty, then he needs to use the bully pulpit of his presidency to convince centrist and conservative voters. He has never tried.
South Korea wants to avoid legal and constitutional confusion. Seoul did not sign the 1953 armistice, so it is legally unclear what its role would be in a treaty. But China did sign the armistice which would, presumably, give it a veto over the treaty’s shape. China has already bullied South Korea in recent years as part of its “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Treaty negotiations would invite Beijing further into peninsular affairs. Also, the South Korean constitution claims the sole right of governance over the whole peninsula for Seoul. A treaty would probably involve some kind of recognition of North Korea, which might well require amending the South’s constitution.
A treaty is all upside for North Korea with no obvious benefit for the South. It suggests the inter-Korean diplomatic normalization and the legitimization of North Korea as an equal, normal Korean state rather than the Orwellian gangster fiefdom and errant black hole of Korean history which it is. Also, it undercuts the legitimacy of UN and U.S. presence.
So why would the South do this? Again, outside of the small percentage of Left, there is almost no interest or enthusiasm for this project. And if Seoul gets nothing from the treaty, then it is easy to understand why.
In short, it is easy to predict there will be no treaty until North Korea is dramatically different.
Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
