Quotes of the Day:

“Democracy is fragile. You have to fight for every bit, every law, every safeguard, every institution, every story. You must know how dangerous it is to suffer even the tiniest cut. This is why I say to us all: we must hold the line.”

– Maria Ressa

"Some things are believed because they are demonstrably true, but many other things are believed simply because they have been asserted repeatedly and repetition has been accepted as a substitute for evidence." 

– Thomas Sowell

“There is something that will survive and prevail, there is a tiny and brilliant light during in the heart of man that will not go out no matter how dark the world becomes.”

– Leo Tolstoy

1. OPINION: Wake Up! Europe is Already at War

2. US military action in Venezuela may be best option

3. A U.S. return to Bagram isn’t a bad idea

4. Ukraine’s Supply Runs Turn to Nightmares as Drones Menace Roads Far Beyond the Front

5. Counterfeit Chinese Air-Bag Parts Tied to Five Deaths

6. The Japan-China Senkaku Islands War of 2025: Who Would Win?

7. Putin said he's eying higher taxes on the rich to bankroll the Ukraine war and pointed to a precedent set by the US

8. Trump Is Expanding the National Guard’s Role. Some Former Generals Worry.

9. OPINION: Nuclear Latency: Ukraine’s Best Security Guarantee

10. Trump’s U.N. Speech to Tout Achievements at a Place Where He Has Given Up Influence

11. Can Asia Copy the Best Bits of NATO Without Cracking?

12. The Daring Caper of a Faithful Tibetan Who Outfoxed China

13. Dangers of the UK's Surrender of the Chagos Islands Begin to Crystallize

14. A Polish Soldier, an Unusual Radar Dot and Then NATO Jets

15. TSMC’s Rise to Push Taiwan Past South Korea in Key Wealth Gauge

16. [OPINION] China’s mother of all lawfares against the Philippines

17. AUKUS, Australia, Alliances & the Pacific, with Gray Connolly--on Midrats

18. They Helped Oust a Dictator. Now the New Regime Is Coming for Them.

19. Nepal Uprising Is Latest Challenge to India’s Backyard Diplomacy

20. Axis of evil 2.0: How Russia, China and North Korea are becoming Israel's new threat

21. US victims of October 7 attacks file a new lawsuit against Hamas, Syria, Iran and North Korea

22. The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Has a Message for the U.S. Army

23. Trump Threatens Afghanistan If Bagram Air Base Not Handed Back To US

24. How ‘Safe China’ sells its security strategy to the world

1. OPINION: Wake Up! Europe is Already at War

Not just Europe needs to be woken up.

Concise analysis in bullet points. Useful for political leaders and social media.

Russia War in Ukraine Europe

OPINION: Wake Up! Europe is Already at War

Bullet points from a Finnish analyst on pertinent challenges and choices.

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/60227

By Joni Askola

Photo: depositphotos.com

Europe is under threat

• Russian drones have hit Poland, Romania, and Lithuania.
• This is not just Ukraine’s fight.
• The war is spreading.
• And it will keep spreading until Russia is stopped.

Putin has tied his legacy and survival to the war in Ukraine

• Ukraine is not the final goal.
• It is the first step.
• Russia will escalate again and again unless it is defeated.

Europe cannot just defend and wait

• Every time Russia escalates, it must pay a price.
• That means long-range weapons for Ukraine, more aid, tougher sanctions, and seizing frozen Russian assets.

Waiting for Trump or hoping the war will end on its own is a fantasy

• Putin will only stop when continuing the war becomes more costly than ending it.
• Right now, we are failing to make that clear.

Russia escalates because it sees weakness

• It sees the Trump administration procrastinating and appeasing Russia
• It sees hesitation in Europe.
• It sees fear of going it alone without the traditional US backing.

Weapons, sanctions, and action are the only language Putin understands

• This war will not end with speeches.
• It will end when Putin sees no benefit in continuing.
• That moment is still far away.
• And it is our fault.

Appeasement and delay only invite more aggression

• Europe must respond with strength, not just words.

The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.

2. US military action in Venezuela may be best option

It is interesting that this would make it through the PAO review process at NDU and the DOD/DOW.

Excerpts:

The administration’s goal appears to be regime change, not simply counternarcotics operations. Many Latin Americanists support regime change but eschew the use of force. Sorry, but in this case, the evidence strongly suggest that regime change will not occur without the use of force, or at least the threat thereof. And regime change in the case of ousting an aggressive transnational criminal and terrorist organization is a legitimate objective that would enhance U.S. and regional security.

But legitimacy alone does not ensure success. The use of force must be calibrated, proportional and part of a broader strategy that includes all instruments of national power, including diplomatic engagement, humanitarian support and post-conflict planning.

Military force should never be the first option. But when diplomacy fails, and when a regime devolves into a criminal-terrorist entity, the calculus changes. If the U.S. is serious about supporting democracy and security in the Western Hemisphere, it must be willing to act — not out of bravado, but out of necessity.

US military action in Venezuela may be best option

by Craig A. Deare, opinion contributor - 09/10/25 12:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5495131-why-us-military-action-in-venezuela-may-be-best-option/

The recent deployment of U.S. naval assets to the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela has reignited debate over the use of military force in Latin America.

Critics argue that such a move is reckless, unnecessary and reminiscent of Cold War-era intervention — gunboat diplomacy, even. But after more than a decade of failed diplomatic efforts, it may be time to confront a difficult truth: Military action could be the only remaining tool to restore democracy and stability to Venezuela.

This crisis did not begin with the Biden or Trump administrations. It dates back to Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013, when Nicolás Maduro — chosen for his loyalty, not his leadership — took power. Since then, Venezuela has devolved from a struggling democracy into a full-blown transnational criminal enterprise, a reality foreseen by Moisés Naím in 2013.

Despite bipartisan U.S. efforts to support opposition leaders like Juan Guaidó and Edmundo González, Maduro has clung to power through repression, electoral manipulation, deep ties to criminal networks and, most critically, support from Cuba, Russia and China. And although some elements of Venezuelan society might prefer to achieve a political transition without the use of force, the 67 percent of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition in the July 2024 elections — the internationally recognized vote total, despite the Maduro regime’s successful electoral theft — suggest strong support for the departure of Maduro and crew.

The Trump administration’s recent designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization of the Cartel de los Soles — the Venezuela-based criminal group allegedly headed by Maduro and his regime — marks a dramatic shift. It reframes the issue as Venezuela not being a legitimate sovereign state but rather a criminal-terrorist entity operating under Maduro’s leadership. This opens the door to legal justification for targeted military action under U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Military options need not resemble full-scale invasions. Precision strikes, naval blockades and special operations forces could be used to disrupt Maduro’s grip and support a legitimate transition. The goal is not occupation but “compellence” — the use of limited force to change behavior and restore democratic governance.

Yet even as we consider these options, we must confront the risks. Military action could worsen Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, harm civilians and destabilize neighboring countries already burdened by refugee flows — although it is difficult to see how the situation could be any worse. Since 2014, more than 7.7 million Venezuelans (over one-quarter of the original population) have fled the country.

Unilateral action without international backing risks violating global norms and fueling anti-U.S. sentiment across Latin America. However, many in Latin America resent the U.S. more for its inattention than its hubris.

History reminds us that regime change does not guarantee democratic outcomes. Power vacuums can lead to chaos, prolonged conflict and the rise of new authoritarian figures. But the opposition has attempted to gain power through democratic actions and has been abused in the process. Ultimately, it would fall upon the opposition to rise to the occasion here.

Domestically, the political fallout could be also be severe. If the operation falters or results in American casualties, public support may evaporate. Critics will argue that the U.S. is once again overreaching in its foreign policy.

These are valid concerns. But they must be weighed against the cost of inaction. Venezuela under Maduro is not merely an authoritarian regime — it is a hub for narcotrafficking, corruption and regional instability. Its continued existence threatens regional U.S. national security interests and undermines democratic movements across the hemisphere.

As students of security studies will recall, military force has four basic functions: to defend, to compel, to deter and to “swagger.” Although the deployment of naval assets is clearly sending a message to Maduro and company, it also suggests the administration is using force to change the behavior of an adversary. But this must be done with caution. Sending assets without a willingness to use them risks damaging credibility and emboldening adversaries.

The administration’s goal appears to be regime change, not simply counternarcotics operations. Many Latin Americanists support regime change but eschew the use of force. Sorry, but in this case, the evidence strongly suggest that regime change will not occur without the use of force, or at least the threat thereof. And regime change in the case of ousting an aggressive transnational criminal and terrorist organization is a legitimate objective that would enhance U.S. and regional security.

But legitimacy alone does not ensure success. The use of force must be calibrated, proportional and part of a broader strategy that includes all instruments of national power, including diplomatic engagement, humanitarian support and post-conflict planning.

Military force should never be the first option. But when diplomacy fails, and when a regime devolves into a criminal-terrorist entity, the calculus changes. If the U.S. is serious about supporting democracy and security in the Western Hemisphere, it must be willing to act — not out of bravado, but out of necessity.

Craig A. Deare, Ph.D., is a professor of national security affairs at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

3. A U.S. return to Bagram isn’t a bad idea

From the Washington Post Editorial Board.

Opinion

Editorial Board

A U.S. return to Bagram isn’t a bad idea

The abandoned airfield in Afghanistan was once a symbol of American power. Trump wants it back.

September 20, 2025 at 3:06 p.m. EDTYesterday at 3:06 p.m. EDT

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/09/20/bagram-afghanistan-trump-taliban-negotiate/

Amir Khan Muttaqi (left), acting foreign minister of the Taliban government, meets with Adam Boehler, U.S. special envoy for detainee affairs, in Kabul on Sept. 13. (Taliban Foreign Ministry Press Service via AP)

For nearly 20 years, the Bagram air base stood as the sprawling symbol of American power in Afghanistan and as the heart of the long U.S. military intervention there. The Biden administration secretly evacuated the base on July 1, 2021, a few weeks ahead of its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Afghan army left in control of the base surrendered to the Taliban.

Get first-person illustrated stories about how work is changing

Now, President Donald Trump says he wants Bagram back. “We gave it to them for nothing,” he said in in London on Thursday. “We’re trying to get it back, by the way. … We’re trying to get it back because they need things from us.” Good. Bagram is worth pursuing, though not at any cost.

Bagram is strategically important because of its proximity to the border with China and to a nuclear testing range at Lop Nur in a remote part of Xinjiang province. The testing range was long believed abandoned, but there have been reports of increased Chinese military construction activities in the area.

An American military presence at Bagram would also allow the U.S. to conduct counterterrorism operations in a volatile region against the Islamic State-Khorasan terrorist group, which is also at war with the Taliban and has also spread its tentacles into Europe.

What the Taliban wants most from the U.S. is recognition. The country’s seat at the United Nations is still held by the former government. The Taliban would also like to access $7 billion in assets frozen in the U.S. to boost its flagging economy.

Taliban officials don’t sound eager for American troops to return to Bagram. “Afghans have never accepted foreign military presence in their land throughout history,” a senior foreign ministry official, Zakir Jalaly, said. But there’s room to negotiate. As Jalaly pointedly added: “Afghanistan and America need engagement on economic and political relations based on bilateral respect and common interests.”

Trump has leverage. This month, the Taliban’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Trump’s special envoy for hostages, Adam Boehler, said they had reached a deal on a prisoner exchange. The Wall Street Journal reported that talks about a small American contingent basing out of Bagram were in the early stages.

Recognizing the Taliban’s government now would be a mistake. The regime’s abhorrent treatment of women and girls and its persecution of ex-government officials are unlikely to stop any time soon. Only Russia has extended full diplomatic relations to the Taliban’s government, but countries such as India and Japan maintain embassies in the country’s capital. It would not be a betrayal of American values to open an embassy in Kabul.

But there’s little reason to believe that the U.S. diplomatic boycott of Afghanistan, more than four years after the Taliban took over, is exerting meaningful pressure that will make the government crack. Other actors are filling the void. Better for Washington to have more influence in Kabul than less.

The return of a small American military contingent to Bagram would be a far cry from the commanding presence that existed before. But it would give the U.S. a toehold in a strategically vital region as competition with China continues.

4. Ukraine’s Supply Runs Turn to Nightmares as Drones Menace Roads Far Beyond the Front

Drone TTPs.

Photos at the link.

Like the Marines and every Marine is a rifleman, in modern war every soldier, sailor, airmen, and Marine is going to have to be proficient at counter drone operations whether on the frontline or in the rear area (and at home).

Excerpts:

In eastern Ukraine, supply roads have become nearly as dangerous as the trenches. 

In recent months, Russia has begun employing new methods to extend the range of its attack drones and relentlessly target Ukrainian logistics in an effort to stop men and supplies from reaching the front. Roads 20 miles from the nearest Russian positions, which were long considered safe, are now coming under regular attack.

In targeting supply lines, Russian forces are hoping to isolate the remaining Ukrainian-held strongholds in the Donetsk region that they have been unable to seize in 3½ years of brutal assaults.

Kyiv is adapting, installing antidrone netting over supply routes, traveling at night and moving in smaller vehicles instead of trucks.

Still, Russia’s focus on taking out logistics is exacerbating the existing shortages—of everything from water to ammunition and, especially, manpower—along the front line, by making it even more challenging to move anything in or out of the trenches.

“A year ago, these kinds of strikes were episodic,” said Lt. Col. Dmytro Zaporozhets of Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps. “Now, we face systemic attack waves targeting logistics routes, depots, roads into towns, and evacuation roads.”

Ukraine’s Supply Runs Turn to Nightmares as Drones Menace Roads Far Beyond the Front

New drone technology has allowed Moscow to menace Ukrainian vehicles up to 20 miles from the front line

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-supply-runs-turn-to-nightmares-as-drones-menace-roads-far-beyond-the-front-3d478ac4?st=dNd1iJ&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Nikita Nikolaienko and Ian Lovett

Follow | Photographs by Svet Jacqueline for WSJ

Sept. 20, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Quick Summary

• Russia is using drones to target Ukrainian supply routes, even far from the front lines, to isolate Ukrainian strongholds.View more

KRAMATORSK, Ukraine—As the daylight was fading, a Ukrainian pickup truck sped east to relieve exhausted troops on the front line about 12 miles away. Suddenly, an explosive drone slammed into the truck’s rear, tearing off the axle and throwing the vehicle into the air.

The five soldiers scrambled out and sprinted toward the trees, wary of more drones.

“The enemy picks a stretch of road and turns it into a nightmare,” said a junior sergeant who was in the pickup when it was hit in the Donetsk region earlier this month. “Every vehicle that passes gets hit.”

In eastern Ukraine, supply roads have become nearly as dangerous as the trenches.

UKRAINE

Detail

Slovyansk

H20

Kramatorsk

Anti-drone netting being installed

Druzhkivka

UKRAINE

T0504

Russian forces

Pokrovsk

10 miles

10 km

Note: Russian forces as of Sept. 15.

Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (Russian forces)

Emma Brown/WSJ

In recent months, Russia has begun employing new methods to extend the range of its attack drones and relentlessly target Ukrainian logistics in an effort to stop men and supplies from reaching the front. Roads 20 miles from the nearest Russian positions, which were long considered safe, are now coming under regular attack.

In targeting supply lines, Russian forces are hoping to isolate the remaining Ukrainian-held strongholds in the Donetsk region that they have been unable to seize in 3½ years of brutal assaults.

Kyiv is adapting, installing antidrone netting over supply routes, traveling at night and moving in smaller vehicles instead of trucks.

Still, Russia’s focus on taking out logistics is exacerbating the existing shortages—of everything from water to ammunition and, especially, manpower—along the front line, by making it even more challenging to move anything in or out of the trenches.

“A year ago, these kinds of strikes were episodic,” said Lt. Col. Dmytro Zaporozhets of Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps. “Now, we face systemic attack waves targeting logistics routes, depots, roads into towns, and evacuation roads.”

Smoke rises from a key road in the Donetsk region.

Lt. Col. Dmytro Zaporozhets of Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps.

Both sides in the conflict have targeted supply lines throughout the war. In 2022, Ukraine pummeled Russian efforts to move materiel across the Dnipro River with American-made rockets, ultimately forcing Moscow to retreat from the regional capital of Kherson in the south.

More recently, explosive drones have made it nearly impossible to move men to front-line trenches in armored vehicles, which are easy targets. For more than a year, soldiers from both sides have mostly hiked the last few miles on foot, carrying supplies with them. Troop rotations have become so difficult that soldiers sometimes spend months in a position, because it isn’t possible to safely send in replacements.

Now, technological advances are allowing Russia to menace Ukrainian roads further from the front than in the past. Drones connected to their pilots by fiber-optic cables—which means they can’t be downed by electronic jammers—can now travel more than 12 miles beyond the front line.

The threat of drones has meant soldiers trying to reach the front lines often hike the last few miles on foot.

In addition, Ukrainians troops said that Russian forces have begun using a new tactic in recent months: Heavy “mother ship” drones fly well beyond the line of control and release smaller explosive drones, which then attack Ukrainian vehicles. The mother ship also serves as a relay antenna, to keep the drones in contact with their pilots. Though 20 miles was already within artillery range, the drones are far more accurate, especially against moving targets, such as supply trucks.

Up until recently, the road that connected Izyum, in the northeastern Kharkiv region, to Slovyansk, in Donetsk, was considered safe, Ukrainian troops said. This month, however, the road has come under regular fire—including targeting civilian vehicles.

“Every month, the problem gets worse…the enemy can fly farther and in larger volumes,” said a senior lieutenant from the 225th Brigade. “They hit everything. They burn minibuses with people. They burn ordinary cars.”

Workers install antidrone netting over a road in the Donetsk region.

A hotel in Kramatorsk that has been struck by Russian drones.

Ukrainian officials say they are dealing with the new challenges, including by installing antidrone netting over key supply roads in Donetsk. In addition, Kyiv has retaken several villages there recently, according to officials and open-source channels. Ukrainian troops also say they are hitting Russian supply lines.

Still, the growing range of Russian drones is making life tougher for soldiers and civilians alike. 

“Delays are constant now,” said a 38-year-old sergeant from a reconnaissance unit. “Sometimes a unit waits for ammo that should have been delivered a day earlier, and in the meantime they can’t operate at full strength. Evacuating the wounded is harder.”

The drone nets, he added, weren’t a permanent fix—Russian drones often try to hit poles that hold them up, collapsing the netting and instead turning it into an obstacle on the road.

“We constantly have to repair the damage” to the posts, said Vadym Filashkin, governor of the Donetsk region.

One 42-year-old medic, who goes by the call sign Buddha, says the condition of the roads near the front has severely deteriorated, complicating efforts to reach wounded soldiers and to keep them alive on the way out.

“You’re bouncing over holes, trying to give first aid while the car shakes like crazy,” he said. “There were times when we couldn’t get a needle into a vein because the car was throwing us around so hard. And we couldn’t slow down, because drones could hit us.”

Anna Babenkova works at an indoor market that was recently struck by a Russian drone.

The attacks are leaving civilians in eastern Ukraine short of supplies as well. Earlier this month, a drone also hit a market in Kramatorsk.

“It was terrible—the noise, the screams, the dust,” said Anna Babenkova, a 53-year-old saleswoman at the market. Just a day later, she said, the market was back in business, but getting products is becoming more difficult as suppliers are unwilling to brave the roads. “I don’t even know if we’ll get a delivery next week,” she said. “Drivers are afraid to come.”

Zaporozhets, the lieutenant colonel from the 11th Army Corps, said that, for now, Ukraine simply doesn’t have enough resources to protect supply lines across the entire front. Top-line systems, such as Israeli-made radars, cost millions of dollars each and cover only about 6 miles. Electronic jammers, he added, are also expensive and in short supply.

“With the lack of resources, we’re forced into firefighting mode,” he said.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Will the use of antidrone netting help Ukraine protect its key supply roads? Join the conversation below.

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

5. Counterfeit Chinese Air-Bag Parts Tied to Five Deaths

Perhaps it might seem counterintuitive to do so but should we assess this from the perspective of unrestricted warfare?

What happens to a country when it loses confidence in the supply chain of its manufacturers and cooperations or the government's ability to protect consumers/citizens?.

So I asked my research assistant (AI) to pull some relevant sections from the 1999 Unrestricted Warfare. (Recall in 2004 at the National War College I asked the Defense Minister from China if they were using Unrestricted Warfare to inform Chinese doctrine and concept development and he told me the book had been dn=bukned and not to believe everything I read - I had that Shakespeare feeling of "he doth protest too much").

1. Stock-market crashes, viruses, rumors as “new weapons”

The authors argue that modern conflict no longer requires tanks or bombs; even a stock-market crash triggered deliberately, a malicious computer virus, or a single damaging rumor can function as a weapon. They categorize these as part of a new arsenal where the boundaries between war and peace are blurred. The idea is to undermine confidence in financial markets and social stability without firing a shot.

2. Financial warfare and the example of George Soros

They describe financial warfare as one of the most powerful non-military weapons. In their view, figures like George Soros demonstrate how speculative attacks against currencies can destabilize entire nations, weaken governments, and shake public faith in institutions. This form of warfare can “bleed a nation white” economically while avoiding open military confrontation.

3. Credit rating agencies as manipulative actors

The text notes that organizations such as Moody’s and other credit-rating firms can influence or even manipulate national economies by adjusting credit ratings. This power, the authors suggest, means that financial instruments and institutions can become tools of war — creating crises of confidence in a country’s ability to protect its businesses, banks, or consumers.

4. No domain off-limits — financial, information, trade warfare

The authors insist that any field can become a battlefield: from information systems to trade disputes, from financial speculation to public opinion. They argue that there are no longer limits to what can be weaponized — implying that economic sanctions, trade blockades, or information campaigns against businesses are as much “warfare” as traditional battles.

5. Characteristics of financial war

Financial warfare, they emphasize, is easy to manipulate, hard to detect, and devastating in its consequences. Because it can be carried out covertly, with deniability, it becomes attractive to weaker actors who want to hurt stronger powers. This method undermines not just a government but also confidence in the business environment and market system that supports it.

6. Extreme methods to defend financial security

In a provocative section, the authors even ask rhetorically: if national financial security is at stake, could assassination be considered an appropriate tool against hostile financial actors like international speculators? While not prescribing this, the suggestion illustrates how far they are willing to push the idea of war beyond the battlefield.

7. Media ownership as warfare

They note that one could buy or manipulate media companies — by purchasing shares or exerting influence — and then use those outlets to wage media warfare. This could involve shaping consumer perceptions, damaging the reputation of national businesses, or amplifying crises that undermine public trust in government protection.

8. A catalog of “non-military” wars

The book lists a wide array of modern conflict forms: financial warfare, trade warfare, resources warfare, smuggling warfare, psychological warfare, and media warfare, among others. Each of these, they argue, can destabilize a nation’s economy and society just as effectively as traditional combat.

9. Paralyzing communications to cause panic

They warn that attacks on communications and mass-media networks could create social panic and political crises, even without destroying infrastructure. For example, if consumers believe supply chains or financial systems are collapsing, the loss of trust itself becomes the weapon.

10. New weapons tied to daily life

Finally, the authors emphasize that the new concept of weapons are those intimately connected to everyday life. Ordinary consumer goods, financial systems, and information platforms can all be turned into tools of coercion and disruption — meaning warfare now invades the daily experience of civilians, not just soldiers.

Counterfeit Chinese Air-Bag Parts Tied to Five Deaths

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy warns auto repair shops to be on alert for air-bag parts from Chinese supplier

https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/counterfeit-chinese-air-bag-parts-tied-to-five-deaths-a6436845?st=qavM2m&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Ryan Felton

Follow

Sept. 21, 2025 5:30 am ET

An example of a certified air-bag module, left, next to a counterfeit one filled with colored foam. Photo: Roger Kisby for WSJ

Quick Summary

• U.S. regulators are investigating seven incidents, with five fatalities, involving aftermarket air-bag parts that ruptured during collisions.View more

Two recent fatal accidents involving Chinese-made air bag parts are renewing warnings from regulators over counterfeit components that can explode during a crash.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration said it is looking into seven incidents, including five fatalities, involving aftermarket air-bag parts that failed and ruptured during collisions.

Federal regulators say they think the air bags in the incidents contain parts from a China-based company called Jilin Province Detiannuo Safety Technology, also known as DTN Airbag. DTN makes air-bag inflators, which contain hazardous chemicals that ignite during a crash to rapidly fill an air bag with gas.

The regulator said it is actively working to address the safety concern and is coordinating with other federal agencies on the issue. 

Last year, NHTSA said it was aware of five incidents, including three fatalities, involving substandard air-bag inflators failing during a crash. Now the agency is connecting DTN to those incidents and the two additional fatalities—including a crash as recent as July.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said that DTN’s inflators are dangerous and called on the auto repair industry to be on the lookout for the products. 

“My message to the auto repair industry is clear: whoever is bringing this faulty Chinese equipment into the country and installing them is putting American families in danger and committing a serious crime,” Duffy said. 

Air-bag replacements have been in focus since the 2014 recall of Takata air bags, which were linked to 28 deaths in the U.S. and tens of millions of vehicles recalled over the past decade. U.S. regulators and other federal agencies have been scrambling for years to understand how many drivers are at risk of substandard protection in a crash from a counterfeit or otherwise faulty air bag.

A deployed air bag at a Florida salvage yard in 2015. The largest automotive recall in history centered around defective Takata air bags found in millions of vehicles. Photo: Joe Raedle/Getty Images

DTN didn’t respond to requests for comment. An attorney listed as the company’s lawyer in an ongoing lawsuit in Florida didn’t respond to a request for comment. A statement on DTN’s website says the company doesn’t do business in the U.S. and that its products are prohibited from being sold to the U.S.

Counterfeit buyers in the U.S., including repair shops and assemblers, have purchased air bags online and received them by mail. Auction sites like eBay have been the subject of past complaints about fake inflators making it into the country.

Regulators and investigators say it is difficult to precisely determine how many of these fake air bag components have been installed in cars in the U.S. Imitations can appear identical to genuine devices. Some counterfeits can sell for as little as $100 a piece, The Wall Street Journal has reported. An authentic air-bag module can cost upward of $1,000. Drivers in need of an air bag should seek out a manufacturer-certified replacement, car companies and regulators say.

Bob Stewart, president of the Automotive Anti-Counterfeiting Council, an industry-led group that represents most major carmakers, said counterfeit auto parts are a growing problem in the U.S. Air bags are one of the most commonly counterfeited auto parts, he said.

“These fakes are often constructed with poor-quality materials and are more likely to fail because they’re only imitations of the engineering that goes into the real product,” said Stewart, who is also General Motors’ global brand protection manager. 

Fake parts often lack certain quality-check stickers like the one found on the right. Photo: Ryan Felton

In a July 2024 consumer alert issued by NHTSA, the agency described faulty inflators tied to some of the incidents as “cheap, substandard” replacements that can cause death or serious injury in otherwise survivable car crashes.  

The presence of DTN’s products in the U.S. emerged last year in a lawsuit filed by the family of Destiny Byassee, a 22-year-old mother of two in Florida.

Byassee died in a crash while traveling an estimated 30 miles an hour, after a counterfeit air bag installed in her used 2020 Chevrolet Malibu blew apart and exploded “like a grenade,” according to the lawsuit. Sharp metal and plastic sliced open her neck, and by the time emergency responders arrived, she was found unresponsive, according to records in the lawsuit.

Andrew Parker Felix, an attorney representing Byassee’s family, said that his firm has multiple cases where people lost their lives because of a counterfeit air bag installed in their car. “Chinese-made counterfeit air bags have a shocking record of exploding during crashes and killing vehicle occupants,” Parker Felix said.

Write to Ryan Felton at ryan.felton@wsj.com

6. The Japan-China Senkaku Islands War of 2025: Who Would Win?

The Japan-China Senkaku Islands War of 2025: Who Would Win?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Andrew Latham · September 19, 2025

Key Points and Summary – China’s scripted coast-guard incursions around the Senkaku Islands aim to normalize control through mass and proximity.

-But Japan has reorganized for rapid joint action, dispersing long-range anti-ship missiles across the Ryukyus, expanding fifth-gen air and AEW, and adding Tomahawks to create a lethal denial web. The U.S.–Japan alliance now signals unambiguous coverage, with carrier, Marine Littoral Regiment, and ISR/long-range fires ready to stiffen defense.

-In a limited clash, quick fusion of coast guard, navy, and air overwatch favors Japan.

-A longer fight trends toward a bloody stalemate at sea—still a Japanese “win” by denying any durable Chinese foothold while keeping the conflict contained.

Senkaku Islands War of 2025: What Would It Look Like?

Chinese coast guard cutters now patrol the waters around the Senkaku Islands with numbing frequency, testing Japanese and allied resolve. Each scripted Chinese incursion risks a spark – say, a ramming incident, an attempt to board or detain a Japanese fishing boat, or an escalatory use of force starting with water cannons and moving to warning shots, all cloaked as “law enforcement.” The questions write themselves. If a clash came, who would win? Would the United States show up? Given what we know, the answers also effectively write themselves: In a limited fight over the Senkakus, Japan would likely win, and it would do so with Washington’s active military support.

Start with the balance China prefers. In disputed and heavily contested waters, Beijing relies on mass – large coast guard ships backed by maritime militia and the theater navy – to harass and shoulder aside ships from adversary nations. Size and proximity favor China day-to-day.

If nothing else changed, this steady squeeze could normalize Chinese “administrative” behaviors around uninhabited islets that Japan administers. But the balance has changed. Tokyo has reorganized for joint, rapid decision-making, standing up a permanent joint operational nerve center to fuse ground, maritime, and air forces for exactly these southwestern island contingencies. Decision time is shrinking.

Firepower and reach are changing, too. Japan is dispersing long-range, networked anti-ship missiles along the Ryukyus, upgrading domestic systems for thousand-kilometer reach, and buying a large inventory of Tomahawks to establish a credible counterstrike option. Hypersonic glide programs are moving forward. Airborne early warning aircraft, tankers, and an expanding fifth-generation fighter footprint thicken the local sensor-shooter web.

The result promises punishment: Waters around the islets can be made lethal on short notice.

All of this nests inside an alliance posture that is clearer and harder to misread than at any time in a decade. The United States has repeatedly affirmed that the bilateral security treaty applies to the Senkakus. Forward presence in Japan is being modernized.

A carrier strike group is homeported at Yokosuka; rotational fifth-generation fighters in Okinawa put aerial assets on a glidepath to a more sustainable mix; and a Marine Littoral Regiment is present, built to sense, shoot, and maneuver inside the first island chain. Combined exercises have demonstrated land-based launchers capable of long-range maritime strike operating from Japanese soil. None of these elements guarantees victory, but together they shorten warning, stiffen command, and multiply ways to hold Chinese surface groups at risk without tripping every escalatory wire on day one.

Thinking Through the Conflict

So what would it mean to win a confrontation over the Senkakus?

For China, a win is establishing durable control or effective co-administration of the islands and adjacent waters – planting a flag, sustaining an outpost or persistent presence under a coast-guard screen, and compelling Japan to accept a new normal – while keeping the United States from intervening decisively. For Japan, a win is denying any seizure or co-administration, maintaining continuous administrative control and access, and imposing costs that make renewed attempts at coercion unattractive—ideally without triggering an open-ended, theater-wide conflict. These objectives are asymmetric: China seeks to alter the status quo and claim authority; Japan seeks to preserve the status quo and credibility.

Against that yardstick, outcomes depend on the ladder of escalation. If Beijing stays a shade below the escalation threshold – perhaps with a boarding attempt under coast-guard colors – China’s mass and proximity offer tactical leverage in the first minutes.

But Tokyo is better postured than even two years ago to push back with its own coast guard while instantly cueing navy and air presence. The path to a Chinese win here runs through Japanese hesitation. The path to a Japanese win runs through rapid fusion of sensors, law-enforcement vessels, and military overwatch that flips the legal narrative and raises operational risk for the intruders.

J-10. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

If Chinese forces try a fast grab – land, plant a flag, dare Japan to escalate – the decisive question is whether Tokyo can immediately make the area unacceptably lethal. With dispersed anti-ship missiles, E-2D early warning, F-35s, and modernized F-15s all operating under a common picture, and with alliance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), tankers, and long-range fires available from hour one, the answer increasingly is yes. The attainable objective is denial, not seizure: preventing Beijing from converting a provocation into durable control. In that narrow frame, Japan has the edge if it acts first and decisively.

From Bad to Worse…

If the clash expands into an air-sea fight lasting days or weeks, geography begins to rebound in China’s favor. Distances shrink for Chinese aircraft and ships; the sortie-sustainment math gets harder for allied forces as they fight inside the East China Sea’s tight spaces.

Yet the first island chain’s emerging archipelagic kill web, woven from Japanese standoff missiles, U.S. littoral forces, carrier air, and land-based fires, keeps large PLAN surface groups under continuous threat.

The likely outcome is not a parade-ground triumph, but an ugly stalemate at sea: damaged ships, aircraft losses on both sides, and neither navy operating freely around the islets. Measured against the definitions above, that ugly stalemate looks like a Japanese “win” because it preserves administrative control and denies Beijing a durable foothold.

Would America help? The legal answer is yes, and the political answer is yes. The operational answer is already visible in force posture and planning. Expect initial U.S. moves to emphasize ISR, logistics, electronic warfare, and long-range fires coordinated with Japanese forces – plus visible naval and coast-guard presence to contest any legal-administrative pretext.

USS George Washington. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

If shots are fired, Washington will not allow the ally that hosts its principal Western Pacific bases to be humiliated over islands explicitly covered by the treaty.

At the same time, U.S. leaders will aim to keep the fight short and local, both to reduce escalation risk and because a denial campaign favors the defense when time horizons are compressed.

The Bottomline: It Won’t Be Pretty

None of this implies a clean victory. The Senkakus have no residents and little intrinsic value; their significance lies in what control would signal about power and resolve in the East China Sea.

That is precisely why a Japanese-led, alliance-enabled denial strategy is the right objective: stop any seizure quickly, avoid a theater-wide campaign, and make the price of coercive revision outstrip the prize.

If Tokyo acts at once – and Washington meets it at the edge with sensors, shooters, and steel – Beijing’s best day in the Senkakus remains one it does not want.

Deterrence works when the surest outcome of aggression is not conquest, but a costly failure that leaves the attacker worse off than before.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities, and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Andrew Latham · September 19, 2025

7. Putin said he's eying higher taxes on the rich to bankroll the Ukraine war and pointed to a precedent set by the US

Perhaps imitation is not always the sincerest form of flattery.

But this is a reminder that in the past we did try to pay for our wars with taxes, bonds or both. We no longer do that and instead fund wars on the government credit card.

Putin said he's eying higher taxes on the rich to bankroll the Ukraine war and pointed to a precedent set by the US

By Huileng Tan

flip.it · Huileng Tan

Sep 19, 2025, 5:06 AM ET

• Russian President Putin is eyeing the wealthy elite to bankroll the Ukraine war as energy revenues shrink.
• Weak oil prices and Western sanctions are straining Moscow's wartime finances.
• The Kremlin also plans to revive a budget rule to counter low oil prices.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is eyeing Russia's wealthy elite to bankroll the war in Ukraine as shrinking energy revenues hit the Kremlin's finances.

On Thursday, he told leaders of Russia's parliamentary factions that higher taxes on luxury goods or stock dividends could be "reasonable" during wartime.

"The important thing here is not to overdo it," Putin added.

Putin said such moves align with wartime precedent abroad.

"In the United States, I don't want to politicize this, during the Vietnam War and the Korean War, that's exactly what they did. They raised taxes specifically on people with high incomes," he said.

During the Vietnam War, Congress passed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, which imposed a temporary 10% income tax surcharge on both individuals and corporations. In the Korean War era, the US reinstated an excess-profits tax, raised excise taxes, and increased both personal and corporate income taxes.

Moscow has increased income tax rates on top earners this year. As Forbes Russia reported in July, Russia's richest individuals took home record dividends in 2024, making them an obvious target for new levies.

But even with the possibility of higher taxes on the wealthy, Russia's fiscal troubles run deep.

Russia's war chest under siege

The Kremlin's finances are being squeezed from several directions.

In July, the European Union unveiled its 18th sanctions package against Russia since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It replaced the fixed $60-per-barrel cap on Russian oil with a more flexible mechanism, which cuts into Moscow's take from every exported barrel.

Sanctions are only part of the story. Oil prices have slumped this year on ample supply and weak demand.

As a result, oil and gas sales — the backbone of Russia's budget — could fall by about 23% in September from a year earlier, according to Reuters calculations published on Thursday.

The energy slump is colliding with a sharp slowdown in growth. In July, Russia's central bank said it expects the economy to expand just 1% to 2% this year, down from 4.3% in 2024.

The US is looking to tighten the squeeze on Moscow by going after its oil trade.

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump said that targeting Russia's oil trade is the key to ending the conflict.

"Very simply, if the price of oil comes down, Putin is going to drop out," Trump said. "He's going to have no choice. He's going to drop out of that war."

Moscow plans countermeasures

To shore up its finances, the Russian government is looking to restore its so-called "budget rule," a mechanism designed to insulate the economy from volatile commodity markets.

Under the system, oil revenues above a set cut-off price are saved in a fiscal reserve fund, which can be tapped when prices fall below that level.

On Thursday, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said the revised rule will gradually lower the cut-off from $60 a barrel now to $55 by 2030, a shift he said would make the budget less dependent on energy.

"We are saying that we must make the budget more muscular, one that would respond to any restrictions we face," Siluanov said.

flip.it · Huileng Tan

8. Trump Is Expanding the National Guard’s Role. Some Former Generals Worry.

A reminder:

“Because when it goes bad — like Kent State — it goes bad,” General Honoré said, referencing the day in 1970 when Ohio National Guard troops fatally shot four students at Kent State University who were protesting the Vietnam War.

“We want to make sure we’re on the side of saving lives, not taking lives in America.”

Trump Is Expanding the National Guard’s Role. Some Former Generals Worry.

Responding to crises at home is part of the Guard’s mission. Helping crack down on crime in U.S. cities isn’t, say some former leaders, who fear this shift could hurt the force.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/21/us/national-guard-crime-washington-cities.html

Some former generals say the National Guard should not be used as a law enforcement agency. Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

By Chris Hippensteel

Sept. 21, 2025, 

5:00 a.m. ET

In the past quarter-century, National Guard troops have hoisted desperate survivors from rooftops in Hurricane Katrina. Fought the flames of devastating wildfires in Maui and Los Angeles. Searched for survivors and secured the skies after Sept. 11. And deployed in the hundreds of thousands to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Delivering relief and maintaining order in times of great need is a well-established part of the Guard’s mission. But as the Guard fulfills a different kind of role envisioned by President Trump, supporting a crackdown on crime in Washington, D.C., that he now aims to expand to Memphis and other cities, several generals who have led Guard troops fear that shift will damage the force.

That includes, they say, hurting morale, weakening recruiting and retention, and straining the Guard’s relationship with the American public.

“The thing that supports the morale of the National Guard is that, for decades, we’ve been the good guys,” said Brig. Gen. Paul G. Smith, the former assistant adjutant general of Massachusetts whose command included responding to Hurricanes Sandy and Irene and the Boston Marathon bombings. “We fish families out of flood waters. We shovel ambulances through the snow to get to women delivering babies.”

But, he added, “patrolling the monuments, creating this sort of military net that’s descended on these urban areas — that’s not something a lot of people signed up for.”

The five generals who spoke to The Times included retired senior leaders at the National Guard Bureau, the agency in Washington, D.C., that oversees the Army and Air National Guard. Two were former top-ranking officers of the Massachusetts and Illinois National Guard, both appointed by Democratic governors. One was an Army general who oversaw one of the largest domestic Guard deployments in modern history. All of them served for decades under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Image

National Guard members are seen around Smithsonian metro station in Washington, D.C., last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

It is unclear whether their views are shared by a broader group of their peers. Several other former leaders who were appointed by Republicans to top Guard positions or who became Republican members of Congress declined or did not respond to requests for comment.

Last week, Mr. Trump authorized Guard troops to be deployed in Memphis next, saying that violent crime there had overwhelmed the local government, though the city’s mayor has said that crime had decreased in the city. That order came after weeks in which the president publicly mulled similar deployments to cities like Chicago, New Orleans and Baltimore, drawing backlash from local leaders.

And in late August, he took another step to expand the Guard’s domestic law enforcement role, ordering the establishment of a unit within each state’s ranks dedicated to “quelling civil disturbances” and “ensuring the public safety and order,” deployable at a moment’s notice to anywhere the country.

The president has many supporters in that effort, who see crime in Washington and other urban areas as a dire problem that requires federal intervention because, they say, cities have not done enough to address it, even though violent crime rates in many of them have been on the decline.

That approach has received the backing of defense secretary Pete Hegseth, a former infantry officer in the Minnesota National Guard, several former Guard troops in Congress and seven Republican governors who have agreed to send troops to assist units in Washington.

“It doesn’t matter if you’re from a blue city or a red state, you want to live in a place where it’s safe,” Representative Scott Perry, Republican of Pennsylvania and retired brigadier general in the National Guard, said in an interview with Fox Business in late August.

Several of the generals who were interviewed expressed support for Mr. Trump’s overall goal of tamping down crime in major cities. But they contended he should pursue those goals by leveraging local resources and dedicated law enforcement agencies in cooperation with local leaders, not with the National Guard.

The Guard “is not a law enforcement agency,” said Maj. Gen. William Enyart, a former adjutant general of Illinois — the Guard’s top officer in the state — and former Democratic congressman.

He added: “The military is designed to fight external enemies, not citizens.”

Maj. Gen. Randy E. Manner, former acting vice chief of the National Guard Bureau, said Mr. Trump’s decision to deploy the Guard to D.C. represented an attempt to “intimidate the local population,” politicizing the force and misusing its limited resources. He added that using the military to police American citizens “is the beginning of a divide between our military and our citizens, and that is absolutely detestable.”

He also noted that soldiers on deployment cannot train for another part of their mission: serving as a reserve force to support the active-duty U.S. military abroad.

Image

Pete Hegseth, the defense secretary, is also a former National Guard member. Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

General Enyart said that the risks to morale were especially high given the personal cost that deployments impose on troops.

Unlike service members in the other military branches, most Guard troops serve part time. While deployed, they leave behind jobs, families and businesses, General Enyart said. They often make less income than they would in their civilian jobs, and many are college students for whom a deployment can mean missing weeks or months of school.

“These are all really disincentives for retention, for morale, for recruiting,” General Enyart said. “It’s one thing when you’re out there sandbagging to prevent the Mississippi River from washing the town away. It’s another thing when you’re fulfilling a president’s political desires.”

On recent weekends in Washington, Guard troops were mostly seen taking up posts in subway stations and meandering among crowds on the waterfront. Their mission has included patrolling tourist areas, landscaping and cleaning up trash and graffiti.

Many troops, approached in public places, said their job was to follow orders regardless of personal opinions. Two troops said that they had deployed before for hurricane recovery and acknowledged that this mission felt different. Both also expressed a desire to go home. One of them, a carpenter in his civilian life, said he told his mother not to post on Facebook about his mission, because he feared a backlash.

Representative Barry Moore, Republican of Alabama, who served six years in the state’s National Guard, said that in his experience Guard members are eager to serve on any mission they’re called for. He contended that Mr. Trump’s use of the Guard was unlikely to damage the Guard’s ability to attract new soldiers.

“When we sign up, we don’t necessarily have a specific job description,” he said. “Ultimately, it’s to protect the American people — whatever that looks like.”

Several of the former generals also cautioned that maneuvering the Guard into domestic law enforcement against the wishes of state governors veered into legally dubious territory.

Mr. Trump is not the only leader to have summoned the National Guard to cities troubled by crime. The Democratic governors of both New York and New Mexico deployed the Guard in recent years for just that purpose, but those deployments were limited in scope.

An 1878 law called the Posse Comitatus Act forbids the active-duty military, with narrow exceptions, from carrying out law enforcement functions on U.S. soil. The National Guard, on the other hand, can perform those duties, but only when they are called into action at the request of a state governor.

Brig. Gen. David L. McGinnis, former chief of staff for the National Guard Association of the United States, which works as an advocate for the force on Capitol Hill, described any move to deploy the Guard over governors’ wishes as being firmly “outside the constitutional box.”

Washington, D.C., where local law grants the president greater authority to deploy the National Guard, is an exception to that rule. And in Los Angeles, where Mr. Trump deployed Guard troops in response to protests this year over the objections of Gov. Gavin Newsom of California, the president claimed an exemption by arguing that protesters were impeding the enforcement of federal immigration law.

A federal judge ruled that the president had overstepped his authority in deploying the Guard to Los Angeles. The administration has appealed the ruling.

Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré, a retired Army general who commanded the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, which included tens of thousands of Guard members, said he was not just concerned about how Mr. Trump’s contentious deployments might politicize the Guard. He also worries about putting Guard troops in a situation where they could be the focus of hostility from unreceptive citizens.

“Because when it goes bad — like Kent State — it goes bad,” General Honoré said, referencing the day in 1970 when Ohio National Guard troops fatally shot four students at Kent State University who were protesting the Vietnam War.

“We want to make sure we’re on the side of saving lives, not taking lives in America.”

Aishvarya Kavi, Emily Cochrane and Bernard Mokam contributed reporting.

Chris Hippensteel is a reporter covering breaking news and a member of the 2025-26 Times Fellowship class, a program for journalists early in their careers.

9. OPINION: Nuclear Latency: Ukraine’s Best Security Guarantee

The response to this article from one of my friends and colleagues will be: "See Ukraine enver should have given up its nuclear weapons in the first place."

A lesson we might learn from this is that no country that has nuclear weapons will ever give them up for any reason or inventive or guarantee they will suffer the Ukraine fate.

OPINION: Nuclear Latency: Ukraine’s Best Security Guarantee

Possessing all the technology, expertise and infrastructure needed to quickly develop nuclear weapons, without actually doing so, is known as “nuclear latency.” This might be Ukraine’s best option.

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/60437

By Dr. Albert B. Wolf

Sept. 20, 2025, 5:10 pm

depositphotos.com

Share Flip 

Thomas Schelling once argued that a tiny garrison in West Berlin could stop the Soviets: “They can die heroically… and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.” The lesson seemed clear: symbolic courage could enforce credibility. History tells a different story. Small forces rarely deter determined aggressors – the British tripwire deterrence failed to prevent the Germans from overrunning Belgium in 1914, just as the US’s tripwire did not prevent North Korea from sweeping into South Korea in 1950. Deterrence depends on capability, not drama.

Ukraine faces the same problem. US President Donald Trump suggested the US could guarantee Kyiv security with air support. But low-capability tripwires rarely stop a militarily powerful adversary. Offshore, high-capability deployments are more credible – but costly and risky. A less conventional, but potentially more effective, path is nuclear latency: giving Ukraine the ability to assemble nuclear weapons quickly if needed, without fully deploying them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has indicated that if NATO membership remains out of reach, Ukraine should explore a nuclear option. Latency signals that future conquest carries unacceptable risk. History supports this grim logic. Since 1945, no nuclear-armed state has been conquered. Nuclear weapons did not prevent all conflicts – Israel fought Egypt and Syria in 1973, India and Pakistan have clashed repeatedly – but they have reliably prevented all-out wars between nuclear powers. The United States and the Soviet Union never confronted each other directly, and the catastrophic potential of retaliation has restrained other major states.

Other Topics of Interest

The Ukrainian University That Is Flourishing in Wartime

Amid the tragedy and hardship of war in Ukraine, some very bright lights shine through. Zhytomyr Polytechnic State University stands out as a rare wartime success story.

Nuclear latency offers Kyiv a middle path. It avoids permanent US deployments while providing credible deterrence. A latent program could include secure storage of fissile material and delivery systems designed to signal capability rather than immediate threat. Conventional alliances, economic resilience, and diplomatic support can reinforce the deterrent.

Nuclear latency directly addresses the commitment problem: assuring Kyiv without pulling the US into a prolonged conventional conflict.

Risks are real. Latency must be credible: half-measures or poorly secured programs invite miscalculation. Proliferation concerns could arise, and Moscow might misread the program as an imminent threat. The stability-instability paradox warns that latent nuclear power may deter total war while encouraging limited aggression at the conventional level. Careful diplomacy and safeguards are essential.

Compared with low-capability tripwires or temporary NATO guarantees, nuclear latency directly addresses the commitment problem: assuring Kyiv without pulling the US into a prolonged conventional conflict. It also reframes negotiations: a latent arsenal reduces the importance of territorial concessions, giving Kyiv leverage while signaling that further aggression carries catastrophic consequences.

No solution is perfect. Nuclear latency cannot reclaim territory or coerce Russia into changing behavior. But in a world where conventional deterrence has often failed, it may be the least-worst option. The logic is stark: credible nuclear potential makes conquest irrational.

For Ukraine, latent nuclear capability – backed by diplomacy, conventional defense, and economic resilience – could stabilize the conflict. Schelling’s heroic garrisons once aimed to deter by risking death; nuclear latency deters by making destruction unavoidable. In the long run, it may be the clearest path to peace and sovereignty: a deterrent so potent that Moscow has no rational choice but to respect Ukraine’s independence.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. 

Dr. Albert B. Wolf

Dr. Albert B. Wolf is a Global Fellow at Habib University. He has advised three U.S. Presidential campaigns on American foreign policy in the Middle East. His work has appeared in Barron’s, Foreign Policy, The Hill, Roll Call, The Washington Post, and several other publications. He has also published in academic journals such as Comparative Strategy, International Security, Middle East Policy, Polity, and Survival. He has provided analysis and commentary for BBC Radio and CNBC.

10. Trump’s U.N. Speech to Tout Achievements at a Place Where He Has Given Up Influence

I hope with the confirmation of Ambassador Mike Waltz that POTUS will allow him to do what he does best to counter Chinese malign activities and unrestricted warfare and its three warfares. Allow him to employ a counter unconventional warfare strategy to influence the minds and wills of the member countries as well as the UN organizations that have been co opted and coerced by China due to our lack of leadership.

Or is Ambassador Waltz going to be forced to oversee us washing our hands of all UN influence as we retrench from global affairs?

Trump’s U.N. Speech to Tout Achievements at a Place Where He Has Given Up Influence

The U.S. has left ambassador posts unfilled for months, aligned with Russia on key votes and trimmed its contribution to the global body’s budget

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trumps-u-n-speech-to-tout-achievements-at-a-place-where-he-has-given-up-influence-ffaad09f

By Robbie Gramer

Follow and Alexander Ward

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Sept. 20, 2025 5:30 am ET

President Trump is scheduled to address the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday. Photo: Leon Neal/Press Pool

Quick Summary

• President Trump will address the U.N. General Assembly, promoting his vision of unilateral U.S. power despite reduced U.S. engagement.View more

President Trump’s speech Tuesday to the United Nations General Assembly in New York will tout his assertion of unilateral U.S. power abroad to a global body where his administration has surrendered much of its once-leading role.

The U.S. has slashed its contribution to the U.N. budget, positioned itself against decadeslong allies on the Security Council, and been without an ambassador for eight months until Friday when the Senate confirmed Mike Waltz, Trump’s former national security adviser, for the job.

In a stark sign of the waning U.S. influence, France, the U.K., Canada and Australia are planning to jointly announce Monday at the annual opening of the General Assembly that they are recognizing a Palestinian state in defiance of Trump’s wishes and those of America’s closest Middle Eastern ally, Israel.

The U.S. has sided multiple times with Russia in the Security Council, including in February when the two longtime adversaries joined in rejecting a Ukraine resolution condemning Moscow’s invasion. Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that the U.N. has “tremendous potential” at the same time he was signing an executive order cutting its funding.

The U.N. has long been a favorite target of Republicans. But its defenders say the Trump administration’s disregard has been especially damaging at a time of heated international tensions and bloody conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

“The Trump administration’s approach to the U.N. has been destructive and at times vindictive,” said Richard Gowan, U.N. director at the International Crisis Group, a think tank. “The administration seems immune to concerns about reputational damage.”

The U.S. has slashed its contribution to the U.N. budget and positioned itself against decadeslong allies on the Security Council. Photo: Eduardo Munoz/Reuters

Administration officials say the U.N. is riven with financial mismanagement and ineffective peacekeeping and development programs that shouldn’t be underwritten by U.S. tax dollars.

The U.S. can exert its global influence outside the U.N. and its many institutions, they say, arguing that the world body appears incapable of tackling crises and is increasingly hostile to Israel.

White House spokesman Davis Ingle said Trump would “lay out his vision for a safe, prosperous, peaceful America and world” at the UNGA. “Under President Trump’s leadership, our country is strong again, which has made the entire globe more stable,” he added.

When Trump and top aides travel to New York in the coming week, one of their main goals will be countering recognition of a Palestinian state.

The move might harm the chances of a two-state solution, senior administration officials say, emboldening Hamas and perhaps encouraging Israel to annex parts of the West Bank.

“We think it undermines future prospects of peace in the region,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a visit to Israel this past week.

During the week, Trump administration officials will push other nations to adopt restrictions on asylum rights, analysts said, after getting a preview of his remarks from administration officials.

The White House is working to schedule Trump for bilateral talks with world leaders such as Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, two people familiar with the planning said. Trump also might meet with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres for the first time in his second term.

The White House hasn’t commented on Trump’s schedule of meetings. 

One of Trump’s main goals at the U.N. General Assembly will be countering recognition of a Palestinian state. Photo: Carlo Allegri/Reuters

During a visit to the U.K. on Thursday, Trump said Russian President Vladimir Putin has “let me down” but has yet to impose any new U.S. sanctions on Moscow as it drags its heels on peace talks. He said the U.S. would apply more financial pressure on Moscow but only if European countries cease purchasing Russian oil and gas.

“I’m willing to do other things, but not when the people that I’m fighting for are buying oil from Russia,” Trump told reporters. “If the oil price comes down, very simply, Russia will settle.” 

In one example of cooperation with customary allies, the U.S. is backing European governments’ move to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, a process known as “snapback.” Iran has continued work on its nuclear program in violation of a 2015 agreement, prompting European signatories to reinstate once-lifted sanctions. 

French President Emmanuel Macron recently told Israel’s Channel 12 that the sanctions would likely be reapplied, after Iran showed no signs of placing limits on its nuclear program.

Trump’s return to the Oval Office has left U.N. diplomats fearful that the international body will be crippled by steep U.S. funding cuts. That contrasts with his first term when he engaged more regularly with Guterres. Even as he criticized the U.N., he leaned heavily on it to advance foreign policy priorities, including with North Korea over nuclear talks.

“The U.N. is a useful foreign policy tool,” said Robert Anthony Wood, a former career ambassador who served in senior posts at the U.S. mission to the U.N. “What could be more ‘America First’ than advancing U.S. interests using a major foreign policy tool we actually first created?”

Write to Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

11. Can Asia Copy the Best Bits of NATO Without Cracking?

NEATO. SEATO. (IYKYK) Where are they now?

Excerpts:

NATO’s evolving division of labor offers useful inspiration—and a cautionary tale. Specialization sharpens missions and can stretch resources. But without political cohesion and trust, it can also magnify vulnerability at the moment of truth.

For the Indo-Pacific’s democracies, facing converging threats and chronic uncertainty, a neat division of labor is a start, not a strategy. The center of gravity must be redundancy, adaptability, and habits of unity that hold under pressure. Equipment deters; consistency wins.

World News

/

September 15, 2025

Ju Hyung Kim

Can Asia Copy the Best Bits of NATO Without Cracking?

https://intpolicydigest.org/can-asia-copy-the-best-bits-of-nato-without-cracking/

As Russia’s war on Ukraine grinds on, NATO countries are rearming at speed—and, in the process, reviving something old with a distinctly modern edge: a functional division of labor. No treaty mandates who does what. Yet in practice, allies are apportioning roles according to comparative advantage, with the aim of wringing more capability out of constrained budgets and legacy force structures.

Consider the current mix. Poland has positioned itself as Europe’s ground “center of gravity,” pouring resources into tanks, artillery, unmanned systems, and short-range air defense. The United Kingdom and France are doubling down on maritime, air, and nuclear deterrence, including expeditionary naval forces and credible strategic assets. Germany, after its Zeitenwende, is rebuilding the industrial scaffolding for armored platforms, munitions, and logistics infrastructure across rail, roads, and depots. At the hub sits the United States, linking the system with forward-based forces, strategic lift, ISR, nuclear deterrence, and command-and-control.

This is more than administrative neatness. It’s a strategic answer to new threats, tight finances, and uneven starting points. But the model also raises an obvious question for Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul: Is this template exportable to the Indo-Pacific—or would replicating it create brittle interdependence across Asia’s democracies?

NATO’s Unwritten Playbook

Formally, NATO assigns no state a singular mission. Informally, practice has settled into a division of responsibility. Poland is expanding heavy ground units and layered air defenses, and is aligning its defense industry closely with allied production lines despite procurement delays and domestic politics. The UK and France bring expeditionary reach at sea and in the air, and credible nuclear deterrents. The Baltic states, living under direct Russian threat, have invested in cyber capacity, civil preparedness, and networked early-warning systems. And the United States connects the enterprise with strategic lift, ISR, nuclear deterrence, and command-and-control infrastructure.

The upside is intuitive. Specialization reduces duplication, focuses force design, and accelerates response. Think of it as a production line for security: Country A fields armored brigades, Country B owns logistics at scale, Country C ensures air dominance. Each link, optimized, can be more agile and precise than a one-size-fits-all approach.

Could Asia Mirror the Model?

A similar pattern is conceivable among U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific. Japan could take a lead in anti-ship operations, maritime ISR, and homeland air defense with Aegis destroyers, new strike capabilities, and layered missile defenses. South Korea might prioritize armored warfare and urban- and cyber-resilience on the peninsula, while providing rear-area ISR and logistics in a Taiwan contingency—if politics allow. Australia, advantaged by geography and the AUKUS submarine program, could anchor long-range sustainment, maritime-air interdiction across Southeast Asia, and subsurface capabilities. As in Europe, the United States would underwrite the scheme with nuclear deterrence, space and cyber dominance, and global-strike capacity.

Such a design would let partners concentrate on what they do best, rationalize procurement plans, and ensure that combined operations are more than the sum of their parts. But the gains come with familiar risks.

When Efficiency Becomes Fragility

Specialization breeds dependence. The more each country narrows its role, the more the whole becomes hostage to the weakest link. If one ally’s politics or supply chains falter—say Poland’s armor plants stall or Germany’s munitions lines slow—others’ readiness can be degraded by events beyond their control.

That interdependence can look like architectural elegance until one pillar shifts. NATO’s model works only so long as trust holds, adjustments are swift, and logistics flow. In Asia, where political confidence between key partners remains uneven—witness the still-delicate relationship between Japan and South Korea—a division of labor without redundancy would be a house of cards. Political consolidation, institutionalized coordination, and built-in backstops are prerequisites, not afterthoughts.

Burden asymmetries create another fault line. Within NATO, countries such as Poland and the UK have assumed heavier operational roles while others emphasize diplomatic and industrial contributions. That imbalance already produces friction. Indo-Pacific partners will have to calibrate contributions against both capacity and proximity to risk—or risk eroding solidarity before the shooting starts.

There is also the danger of fighting the last war. Specialization tends to channel investment into familiar hardware—tanks, ships, aircraft—at the expense of the murkier domains where today’s conflicts are often decided. Russia has shown how cyber operations, information warfare, and covert disruption can blunt platforms before they reach the battlespace. A rigid role definition can narrow the aperture and slow adaptation to gray-zone coercion, which rarely presents clean military “lanes.”

How Adversaries Exploit the Gaps

Russia already plays inside NATO’s seams. By pressuring Germany politically and probing its cyber defenses, Moscow can constrain the alliance’s industrial engine and, in turn, sap Poland’s frontline preparedness. The tactic is systemic: target the node that feeds the network, and the network starves.

Beijing could import the method to Asia. It could exploit Japan’s constitutional constraints and domestic debates to induce caution; probe Australia’s undersea communications and energy infrastructure; and wage legal and psychological campaigns in a Taiwan crisis to delay South Korea’s decisions. The goal wouldn’t be to beat every ally everywhere—it would be to paralyze the one that others depend on.

A related risk is “preemptive decoupling.” If Moscow concludes NATO cannot surge in time, it might attempt a short, sharp offensive before reinforcements arrive. In the Indo-Pacific, China could gamble on a rapid move against Taiwan, betting that a specialized but slow-to-assemble coalition would fail to cohere fast enough.

Finally, politics will always be part of the battlespace. NATO’s efficiency depends on consensus; that makes it susceptible to disinformation, electoral interference, and legislative brinkmanship. Asia is no different. A delayed deployment from Seoul, or a sudden supply-chain shock in Australia, could reverberate across an interlocked plan and collapse it at speed.

What Asia Should Take—and What It Should Leave

The lesson for Asia is not to copy-paste NATO’s playbook, but to adapt it with guardrails. Specialization should be paired with interoperability, strategic elasticity, and reserve capacity. No single ally should become an operational chokepoint, and role assignments should be stress-tested against domestic politics as much as against adversary capabilities.

To that end, the region needs a standing defense-planning mechanism with real teeth—an Indo-Pacific analogue to NATO’s Defense Planning Process. A formalized “Quad-Plus” or a new Pacific Security Council could set shared force goals, deconflict procurement, and stress-test logistics. Scenario-based exercises and decision-making simulations should pull in political leaders alongside military commanders, because alliance speed is as much about cabinet consensus as it is about lift capacity and munitions stockpiles.

The soft tissue matters as much as the hard kit. Standardized engagement protocols, common threat assessments, and pre-negotiated contingency procedures can compress decision time and keep coalition operations inside an adversary’s OODA loop. Trust is not a by-product of drills; it is their first objective and the core enabler of any division-of-labor system.

Nor should “rear areas” be treated as safe or secondary. Cyber resilience, information assurance, and supply-chain security are frontline functions in any future crisis. Hardening ports, data links, satellite networks, and industrial nodes would do more for deterrence than stockpiling a few extra platforms that networks cannot support under duress.

From Hardware to Habits

NATO’s evolving division of labor offers useful inspiration—and a cautionary tale. Specialization sharpens missions and can stretch resources. But without political cohesion and trust, it can also magnify vulnerability at the moment of truth.

For the Indo-Pacific’s democracies, facing converging threats and chronic uncertainty, a neat division of labor is a start, not a strategy. The center of gravity must be redundancy, adaptability, and habits of unity that hold under pressure. Equipment deters; consistency wins.

If you're interested in writing for International Policy Digest - please send us an email via submissions@intpolicydigest.org

12. The Daring Caper of a Faithful Tibetan Who Outfoxed China

Resistance and resilience.

Inspiring.

Whenever I read stories like this I always think to ask myself: Could I have endured such circumstances?

The Daring Caper of a Faithful Tibetan Who Outfoxed China

He escaped from police and crossed thousands of miles of wilderness on a decadelong odyssey toward freedom

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/tibet-china-dalai-lama-78ecc180

By Niharika Mandhana

Follow and Josh Chin

Follow | Illustrations by Alexandra Citrin-Safadi

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Sept. 20, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Chinese Communist Party officials stepped up a recruitment drive in the Tibetan village of Larima in the fall of 2012, tempting residents with offers of new homes and free pantry staples. 

There was a catch. To collect, villagers had to renounce Buddhism, give up their prayer beads, and swear to oppose the Dalai Lama. For Tibetans, the religious leader is the embodiment of their faith. To Beijing, he is a dangerous separatist, an enemy of the state.

Some took the handouts, feigning party loyalty—but not Phurba Tsering. He rejected the offer, settling instead for more modest gifts that went to all families. The gifts came with a poster depicting Mao Zedong and other past Chinese leaders. Families were told to hang the posters in their home as a sign of gratitude.

As a practical matter, Phurba could have used financial help. He had a wife and three young children, and he scratched out a livelihood digging for caterpillar fungus, a prized ingredient in traditional Tibetan and Chinese medicine. Yet he had been raised in the Buddhist faith, listening to sermons on a portable cassette player while tending yaks, sheep and horses in the mountains. One teaching, the impermanence of wealth, stayed with him.

Phurba said later he couldn’t stomach the idea of party officials trying to buy his allegiance and turn him against the Dalai Lama. He tossed his poster in the trash in a private act of defiance. Later, he burned the trash on the banks of the Xianshui River.

In the moment, Phurba didn’t see it as a test of character or a life-shattering decision, though it turned out to be both. He learned too late there was little privacy from China’s ubiquitous surveillance measures. Days later, police came for him.

Phurba, 30 years old at the time, would never return home.

At the local police station, six policemen beat Phurba with their fists, feet and metal pipes, led by a Han Chinese officer known to Tibetan residents as Crooked Nose. The officers lashed Phurba with coiled wire and gave him electric jolts with a cattle prod.

Between beatings, they interrogated him, their fingers jabbing two photographs. One was a picture of the Dalai Lama that police took from his home after he was detained.

Why are you so grateful to him? Does he give you even a mouthful of food?

The other photo showed Phurba on the riverbank, bent over the flaming poster of Mao and the others.

Why are you so ungrateful to Communist Party leaders? What are you doing to their portrait? 

“Just burning trash,” Phurba said, recalling the exchange.

So you think Communist Party leaders are trash?

“Yes,” he said, overcome with anger. 

Most of all, the police wanted to know who else was involved. “Who is behind you?” they asked, seeking the name of a rebel instigator. 

Phurba recalled the next two days as a blur of assaults, blackouts and questions from police. The officer Crooked Nose beat him until his mouth filled with blood and threatened to kill him. The first miracle came at the end of the second day.

As officers left Phurba after a final pummeling that night, one of them—a Tibetan from a local family—surreptitiously dropped a strip of metal. It looked like a fragment of a radio antenna with the tip flattened. Phurba shoved it in the lock of his handcuffs and rattled it around. After a few tries, the bracelets clacked open. He checked the door. It was unlocked. 

Phurba could hear bursts of laughter from the officers upstairs and decided to take his chances. Once outside, he climbed a stack of firewood, clambered over the compound walls and fled. He was hungry and covered in welts. A stabbing pain felt like broken ribs.

Phurba dragged himself to a relative’s house but didn’t stay long, knowing Crooked Nose would soon be after him. After a meal and a night’s rest, he set off wearing a traditional ankle-length chuba coat, beginning a decadelong escape, largely on foot, that would take him across thousands of miles of rugged terrain and three countries.

Tibetans risk retribution for speaking out about their homeland, which Beijing has largely closed from international view. This account is based on interviews with Phurba, his family and officials in the Tibetan government-in-exile in India, as well as Chinese legal documents and Communist Party policy documents on Tibet.

Authorities in Sichuan province’s Xinlong County, where Larima is located, said the matter was confidential and declined to comment.

Servitude

While Phurba was held by police, his wife, Tsering Lhamo, was home with their children, the youngest only a few weeks old. For two days, she heard nothing and braced for the worst. When she finally learned Phurba had made it out, her relief turned to fear.

As punishment for her husband’s escape, Tsering was forced to work as an unpaid servant at the police station. She swept floors, chopped firewood, shoveled snow and scrubbed toilets, often with her children in tow. Her brothers-in-law helped her with money but there was never enough. After 18 months of labor, with no end in sight, Tsering made a difficult choice.  

She packed a small bag and dropped off her children with her mother. She said she needed to run errands. Instead, she left town, planning to travel 120 miles north to the high pasturelands of Golog, for centuries a home to Tibetan nomads. There, she could find work milking yaks and making cheese. After saving enough money, she planned to return for her children. 

Over the next two weeks, Tsering walked, hitchhiked and stopped at restaurants and hotels where she washed dishes and cleaned floors in exchange for food and a place to sleep. She met a monk who helped her get a job in Golog tending livestock for a nomadic family. Tsering missed her children but had no way to call them.  

If she had, she would have learned of the troubles back home.

On the run

After Phurba escaped from police, he took refuge in the mountains that ring his hometown—a landscape of green peaks speckled with blue snow-fed lakes. The land is steeped in Tibetan lore going back centuries, before Beijing carved it into the province of Sichuan.

Growing up, Phurba and his siblings absorbed the trauma of China’s takeover decades earlier. Their mother’s uncle died in Chinese detention, she had told them. Their father’s uncle was forced to renounce his monkhood and hid from Chinese authorities in the mountains. 

That family history fueled Phurba’s rage when the police insulted his devotion to the Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India. “He has been in our hearts since our ancestors’ time,” Phurba said. “It was unacceptable.” While many Tibetans learned to keep their faith quiet, Phurba’s wife described him as a man not easily swayed or cowed—stubborn, she said.

For months, Phurba and his brothers hoped police interest in his capture would fade. But his jailbreak had embarrassed and infuriated local authorities, especially Crooked Nose, his brothers told him. Among Tibetans, Crooked Nose had developed a reputation for cruelty.

Phurba decided to remain in hiding.  

The oldest of his siblings, Phurba relayed messages through relatives to his brothers, who ferried supplies such as barley flour and dried meat to rendezvous points away from settlements and police patrols. A few times, when supplies ran low, Phurba took the risk of borrowing a cellphone to call his brothers directly.

Nearly two years after Phurba’s escape, the deliveries stopped for good.

Behind bars

In August 2014, police took two of Phurba’s younger brothers into custody. There was no point denying that they were in touch with Phurba, police told them. Authorities had monitored their phones and knew of the calls. 

The older of the two brothers, Pema Rinzin, ended up in a solitary cell with his arms stretched overhead and cuffed to the bars of a window. Police took turns kicking and punching him. Pema had a choice, they said. Either help them find Phurba and go free, or spend years in detention. 

As the days passed, Pema said, one or both of his arms remained cuffed to window bars, forcing him to stand. When he nodded off or passed out, the cuffs tightened around his wrists, jolting him awake. Police used cattle prods, whips and batons on him, he said.

Pema told police that the brothers had helped Phurba with food and clothes a few times, but he said he didn’t know how to find Phurba in the vast wilderness.   

The torture stopped after a month, but the brothers remained behind bars, unable to meet or talk to each other. Every day, they had to read Communist Party slogans. Sometimes, they were shown propaganda documentaries of Tibetans welcoming the invading Chinese army in 1950.

A year ticked by, then two, then three. Pema didn’t know if his brother was dead or alive.

Lost yak

From the start of Phurba’s odyssey, he steered clear of villages, unsure of how wide Crooked Nose’s search for him had spread. He skirted nomadic communities where he might be recognized. 

After losing contact with his brothers, he pushed deeper into the mountains. When he met strangers, he told a simple cover story: “I’m looking for my lost yak.” At night, he sometimes asked nomads for food and shelter, saying he would continue his search in the morning. 

In summer, Phurba looked for raspberries and other wild fruit, as well as mushrooms, rhubarb and edible herbs, relying on skills he learned as a boy. On rare occasions, he found scraps of meat left behind by nomads. When he was desperate, he picked flesh off animal carcasses left by wolves, which he spotted from the vultures circling overhead. 

In winter, temperatures fell below freezing and the land turned barren. Phurba, who didn’t have the strength to haul a tent, slept on the ground. He fashioned the long, broad sleeves of his coat into a pillow.

Weeks turned to months and years. His skin hardened, wind-scorched and leathery. He looked “almost like a monster,” Phurba said. “I often thought that it would be better to die than to live like that.” 

CHINA

Detail

CHINA

Counties where Phurba walked for five years after his escape

Tibet

Chengdu

Larima

Phurba’s hometown

SIchuan

INDIA

100 miles

100 km

Source: staff reports

Daniel Kiss/WSJ

The hardest part, he said, was not knowing his family’s fate. Once he asked herders whether they knew about a man from the village of Larima who was on the run for burning a Communist Party portrait. The herders said they had heard that the man’s wife and mother had left their hometown. 

To where, they didn’t know.

Crossed paths

After five years roaming a mountainous 15,000 square-mile stretch of western Sichuan, Phurba decided to head north to Golog, where he had a distant relative, a monk, who might know where his family was. 

Phurba, who had no idea how to reach Golog, sought guidance from locals. For months, he avoided highways and hewed to mountain trails, worried his wild look might attract attention. He confided his circumstances to someone who suggested he pose as a religious pilgrim, which would excuse his appearance and make travel easier on direct routes. 

In 2018, Phurba left the mountains, hoping he had put enough miles between himself and authorities back home to travel safely. He asked around and eventually got a phone number for his relative, who told him that his mother had moved from their hometown years earlier, but he wasn’t sure where. 

For months, Phurba called his relative periodically on borrowed phones, hoping for any news on his mother’s whereabouts. One day, the monk said he had found her phone number.  

Phurba called, and a familiar voice answered, bringing tears to his eyes. His mother, Ashong, denied her identity at first, worried that the call was a trap by authorities. Phurba persuaded her that he was, in fact, her son, and they reunited in the highlands of Hainan, a Tibetan region of Qinghai province, where she worked grazing and milking yaks.

Hardship had transformed them both. After years apart, Phurba was struck by how frail she appeared. “She didn’t look like the mother I remembered,” he said. Phurba spared her the details of his journey. “She could tell how much I had suffered just by looking at me,” he said.

Phurba’s mother revealed the secret behind his escape in 2012. She had paid a bribe to the family of the Tibetan police officer who provided the tool and the open door. Phurba also learned the consequences of his flight—his wife leaving behind their children and his two brothers locked up for years. 

Phurba’s mother had brought his eldest son to live in a monastery close to her. Phurba’s daughter had been sent to a Chinese-language boarding school near their hometown. His youngest child was with relatives. Phurba didn’t dare visit them, fearing capture. 

He learned his wife was in Golog, south of where his mother lived. He arrived without warning. “It was surreal,” said Tsering, who expected to never see him again. They spent a few days in a joyous reunion before Phurba left, worried his wife’s employers would learn he was a wanted man. He found work helping herders 130 miles north, at Qinghai Lake.

Qinghai

Lake

Detail

CHINA

Xinghai

Where Phurba reunited with his mother

Xueshan

Where Phurba reunited with his wife

Golog

Prefecture

Qinghai

Province

CHINA

Shanghongke

Tibet

Chengdu

Larima

SIchuan

100 miles

100 km

Source: staff reports

Daniel Kiss/WSJ

Not long after, he learned his brothers had been freed after four years in detention. A condition of their release was that they must never contact Phurba. Despite that, the men reunited. 

Pema, the older of the two freed brothers, said he didn’t blame Phurba for what happened. Yet, if he could rewind the clock, Pema said, he would have stopped him from burning the poster.

The brothers debated whether the family could ever live in peace. They were all scattered, with Phurba and his wife expecting their fourth child.

“We came to the conclusion,” Phurba said, “that staying in Tibet offered no hope.”

Last leg

For years, Tibetans fleeing China crossed into Nepal and then to India, where many settled. But the number of escapees had dwindled after Beijing tightened the border around 2012 with foot patrols, surveillance cameras and drones. 

Pema decided their youngest brother should try first. It took months of preparation, and their mother’s life savings, to get him to India in 2019. Phurba planned to go next, but the Covid-19 pandemic stalled him.  

In 2022, after visiting his wife to say goodbye, Phurba traveled to Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then to the border town of Kyirong, on the east bank of the Kyirong Tsangpo river. A guide, who would help him navigate the Himalayas into Nepal, was waiting on the other side of the river.

Heavy summer rains had caused the river to swell, making it too dangerous to cross. The guide’s fee kept piling up for the 18 days it took Phurba to make it across.

Approaching the China-Nepal border, Phurba would need one more bit of luck. He and his guide descended a steep slope, careful to avoid nearby border guards. Phurba’s foot kicked loose a chunk of rock that tumbled loudly down the mountainside. He froze, afraid the guards would turn their way. As Phurba prayed to the Dalai Lama, a herd of mountain goats thundered past in a cacophony of hooves, he said, masking the presence of the two men.  

Phurba arrived in Nepal in August 2022. From there, he traveled to the northern Indian city of Dharamshala, where the Dalai Lama has lived since fleeing Tibet in 1959. 

CHINA

Qinghai

Province

Detail

CHINA

Dharamshala

Where Phurba now lives

Tibet

Lhasa

Kyirong

Nepal

Bhutan

INDIA

100 miles

100 km

Source: staff reports

Daniel Kiss/WSJ

As a new exile, Phurba received the Dalai Lama’s blessings in person. 

“You have faced many hardships on your journey, I have been keeping you in my thoughts,” Phurba recalled the Dalai Lama saying. “Don’t worry, you will be reunited with your family.”

The following year, Phurba’s wife, who was more than six months pregnant, their four children and Phurba’s mother made their own escapes to India. After their arrival, Phurba saw his three older children for the first time in 10 years. 

Later in 2023, Pema fled China. He and his mother now live in a Tibetan settlement in southern India where they run a small restaurant.  

Phurba and Tsering sell Tibetan steamed dumplings and noodles from a street cart. It isn’t an easy life, Phurba said, but he likes living in the mountains. They remind him of home.

Phurba Tsering in India. Photo: Niharika Mandhana/WSJ

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com and Josh Chin at Josh.Chin@wsj.com

Illustration source imagery: iStock

13. Dangers of the UK's Surrender of the Chagos Islands Begin to Crystallize

Will this be a grave strategic error for the free world?

Dangers of the UK's Surrender of the Chagos Islands Begin to Crystallize

maritime-executive.com · The Maritime Executive

B-2 Spirit strategic bomber at Diego Garcia, Chagos Islands, 2020 (USAF file image)

Published Sep 16, 2025 9:43 PM by The Maritime Executive

The UK government’s plan to surrender sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius took a major step forward this week when the bill passed its Second Reading in the House of Commons, its primary legislative hurdle. The Bill now goes to the House of Lords, where there could be delays. But the most likely obstacle to the deal going through would be a change of heart in the United States – which will be the ultimate loser when the arrangements in the deal unwind and its true character emerges.

The deal envisages continued US use of the Diego Garcia Naval Support Facility, but under a lease-back arrangement, once the UK has surrendered sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory.

The deal was originally promoted in the UK by a group of progressive human rights lawyers (with Starmer a core member), who believed the UK’s national interest would best be served by giving primacy to international law. The mood in Britain has changed significantly since then, and Sir Kier Starmer’s involvement in forcing the deal has not helped his prospects. The Reform party, which leads in the UK polls, has promised to reverse the deal if it gets into office.

A more realistic assessment is that the deal will be completed, and sovereignty will be transferred to Mauritius. However, even before completion, the dangers of the deal are becoming evident.

The most likely adverse occurrence would be the Mauritian government exploiting its rights under the deal to obstruct American use of the base, thereby reducing its value as a strategic asset. The requirement to notify the Mauritius government of any impending attack on a third party, and the right of Mauritius to maintain a presence on Diego Garcia - able in effect to spy on American activity - are the most obvious levers which could be exploited. The Mauritian government and its opposition are far more aligned with Chinese and Indian interests than those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Once the deal is signed, these antagonisms will emerge. The deal has not bought the friendship or loyalty of Mauritius.

Mauritius PM Navin Ramgoolam meets Chinese Ambassador Dr Huang Shifang, May 14 (Instagram)

India, seen as a friend by the United States several months ago but last seen standing alongside Russia, China, Iran and North Korea at the recent military parade in Beijing, has already made an unsolicited offer to ‘help’ Mauritius patrol the Chagos Islands Maritime Protection Area. While greeting the deal as a victory for anti-colonialism, the Indian government has already in effect annexed the Mauritian islands of Agaléga to construct a military base, despite strong opposition from the island’s inhabitants. The Mauritian economy is tied closely to that of India, which has strong leverage over the island.

If India does not use its muscle in favor of anti-American interests, the Chinese are waiting in the wings to do so. At a meeting on May 14, the Chinese Ambassador Dr Huang Shifang pledged to strengthen Mauritius-Chinese relation, particularly in light of the ‘strategic advantages’ which Mauritius enjoys, and that there would be ‘broad prospects for future collaboration’. The Mauritian Prime Minister has had close personal links with China since his father established China-Mauritian diplomatic ties in April 1972. Both China and Russia have welcomed the deal.

The deal could also potentially collapse if a future United Kingdom not supportive of the surrender decided to renege on its payment schedule. The UK government is committed to paying Mauritius an annual rent of $220 million for each of the first three years, $160 million for the next ten years, and then $160 million rising with inflation thereafter. The deal was originally lifetime-costed in the House of Commons at $5 billion, a figure subsequently raised using government accounting protocols to $47 billion. Given the UK’s budget deficit, any future government might be tempted to stop paying the annual cost for the privilege of having surrendered the sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory in 2025.

It is difficult to predict accurately what consequence will occur and when, but most of them threaten the United States’ continued use of the Diego Garcia Naval Support Facility - at best guess, within the next ten years.

Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has recently described the UK National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell who negotiated the deal as “strategically an absolute fool”, adding his opinion that “Mauritius is a close ally of the Chinese Communist Party and not only will we lose Diego Garcia, but you will have Chinese power projection from Diego Garcia.”

maritime-executive.com · The Maritime Executive

14. A Polish Soldier, an Unusual Radar Dot and Then NATO Jets

Putin searches to exploit weakness.

A Polish Soldier, an Unusual Radar Dot and Then NATO Jets

After Russian drones entered Poland, the country scrambled to shoot them down. Western officials concluded that the incursion was to probe their defenses.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/20/world/europe/poland-drones-russia-nato.html

A house damaged in Lublin, eastern Poland, this month, after Russian drones were shot down over the area.Credit...Kacper Pempel/Reuters

By Michael Schwirtz

Reporting from Warsaw

Published Sept. 20, 2025

Updated Sept. 21, 2025, 4:29 a.m. ET

The Polish soldier had been at his post for hours one night last week, watching the latest bombardment of neighboring Ukraine on his radar screen, when he noticed an unusual blip. Its trajectory was different from the hundreds of other Russian drones in the air that night.

It was headed toward Poland, toward home.

The soldier called his commanders, setting in motion a military operation not seen in most of Europe for 80 years. Air raid alarms sounded and fighter jets took to the sky. From his command post in Warsaw, Lt. Gen. Maciej Klisz mustered a polyglot force of Polish, German, Italian and Dutch soldiers on a NATO rotation. He waited for his pilots to visually confirm that the objects were indeed Russian drones and that they were pushing into alliance airspace. Then he ordered them to fire.

“There was no change to the course, so I said to my team, ‘Team, are you ready to rock ‘n’ roll?’” General Klisz, who oversaw the mission, said in an interview describing the operation.

The drone incursion was among the latest in a series of increasingly provocative moves by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia aimed at NATO countries that include sabotage, murder and now military action. On Friday, three Russian fighter jets violated Estonia’s airspace for 12 minutes, an unusually long stretch.

The goal, according to officials and experts in Poland and elsewhere in alliance territory, was to probe the limits of Western resolve, search for weaknesses and lay the groundwork for any future confrontation.

“That’s the strategy of Putin’s Russia,” said Marcin Przydacz, the top foreign policy adviser to President Karol Nawrocki of Poland. “If they are not stopped by someone who is strong enough or stronger than them, they always move forward.”

Image

Gen. Wieslaw Kukula, chief of the Polish military, left, and Lt. Gen. Maciej Klisz, who oversaw the mission to down the Russian drones, at a National Security Council meeting after the incursion.Credit...Wojtek Radwanski/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The drone incursion was the first time since World War II that the Polish armed forces had been mobilized to fight off a threat to their homeland, and the first time since NATO’s creation that allied forces had engaged an enemy in its airspace.

Mr. Putin exploited a moment of global tumult, with wars, partisan division and an unpredictable U.S. president all creating fissures in a security architecture built to insulate the West from the world’s perils.

In Poland, a government rived by partisanship responded with one voice, as did the leaders of major European countries. President Trump, after an initial ambiguous statement, came around, at least rhetorically, to the view of the other Western leaders that the drone crossover into Poland was unacceptable.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Poland and Russia? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

NATO forces dispatched the threat, though it turned out to be flimsier than it looked on radar. More than 20 drones entered Polish air space, most of them foam dummies that floated to the ground when they ran out of fuel. Three Shahed-style armed drones like the ones that menace Ukraine nightly were shot down, Polish officials said.

No deaths were reported, though a house in eastern Poland was damaged not by Russian drones but by a missile fired by a NATO aircraft, according to a Polish official with knowledge of the episode who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a military action. A cage housing rabbits was hit by one of the dummy drones, the official noted. The animals survived.

As in the past, Russian officials denied and obfuscated. The drones, affected by electronic warfare measures, could have veered off course, the Kremlin’s allies in neighboring Belarus said. The Russian Defense Ministry denied that it had drones in its arsenal capable of flying as far as Poland. On social media, bots and Kremlin proxies pushed a counternarrative suggesting that Ukraine had launched drones as a ruse to drag Poland into the war.

Image

Clearing debris in Lublin. No deaths were reported from the Russian incursion.Credit...Czarek Sokolowski/Associated Press

Polish officials said they were certain that Russia had sent the drones on purpose. They were launched from Russian territory, near the border shared by Ukraine and Belarus, officials said. They flew a route over a forested region in northern Ukraine and southern Belarus far from any military targets in Ukraine and kept a steady bearing throughout the flight. They carried no munitions, but they were modified with larger fuel tanks or extra fuel tanks to hold the fuel required to make the journey, the officials said.

“We have no doubt that this was an intentional incursion and I would say an intentional attack,” said Pawel Zalewski, a senior Defense Ministry official.

For General Klisz, the night began as normal. At his command center in Warsaw, he received a report indicating a Russian attack on Ukraine involving more than 400 drones as well as ballistic missiles and other ordnance. Poland’s air defenses were on alert, but nothing indicated that this attack would be any different from the many that came before.

At about 11 p.m., that changed. The Polish soldier, who was at a mobile radar installation deployed at the Belarus border, noticed what General Klisz later described as “this freaking dot,” moving toward the Polish border.

At that point, a number of things had to happen at once, General Klisz said. Fighter jets, in this case F-16s and F-35s, as well as military helicopters, had to get in the air, and ground-based air defenses including advanced Patriot systems had to be readied. General Klisz also had to clear Poland’s airspace to make sure air defense systems did not mistakenly interpret a passenger aircraft as a target.

The operation was different from those that occur almost nightly in Ukraine. There, with hundreds of missiles and drones sent from Russia, the moment something appears in the sky, Ukraine’s military attacks it with gunfire from the ground and the air. Wreckage from drones and spent ordnance often rains down on cities and towns.

Image

A photograph posted on social media purporting to show a damaged drone in the eastern Polish village of Czosnowka.Credit...Dariusz Stefaniuk, via Reuters

In Poland, a country technically at peace, the operation was more surgical. Before opening fire, protocol dictated that pilots obtained visual confirmation that the objects were hostile. General Klisz explained that he did not want to use multimillion-dollar equipment to shoot down a glider or a balloon, which he said smugglers from Belarus sometimes used to cross the border. He also had to avoid collateral damage.

In the end, he said, he ordered his forces to shoot down only a few drones. Most, he said, were dummies constructed of foam and intended for use in Ukraine to throw off air defenses. The ones shot down, he said, more closely resembled Shahed attack drones, which are made of metal and appear different on radar than the dummies.

The drones shot down had a trajectory indicating they might be headed to the Rzeszow airport, near the Ukraine border, the Polish official with knowledge of the military action said. The airport is heavily protected by air defense systems, including Patriots, because it serves flights delivering foreign armaments destined for the front. The official speculated that Russia had wanted to test the airport’s defenses. In the end, only the Patriot systems’ radars were used, not its missiles, which are more costly than aircraft-fired missiles and would have caused much more damage had they gone awry.

In the aftermath, allies pledged solidarity and NATO launched a military operation, called Eastern Sentry, that will increase air patrols and ground-based interceptor systems.

Image

French soldiers participating in NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission in Minsk Mazowiecki, eastern Poland, on Wednesday.Credit...Thibaud Moritz/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

After suggesting that the drone incursion might have been an accident, Mr. Trump declared that he would condemn Russia “even for being near that line,” and in earlier talks with Mr. Nawrocki, he raised the possibility of sending additional American troops to Poland.

Mr. Przydacz, a seasoned diplomat, labeled Mr. Trump’s mixed messaging “the poetry of negotiation” and part of the American president’s push to end the war.

“I’m pretty sure that the goal for President Trump is to stop the killing,” he said.

The broader NATO show of support reassured Poles, who have a “traditional trauma of being left alone,” born of the country’s abandonment by its allies Britain and France when the Nazis attacked in 1939, said Janusz Reiter, a former Polish ambassador to the United States and Germany.

NATO’s response showed that at least for the moment, the Russian threat has not split the West, as Mr. Putin perhaps intended, Mr. Reiter said.

“But I’m not naïve,” he added. “I know this could change.”

Tomas Dapkus and Anatol Magdziarz contributed reporting.

A correction was made on Sept. 21, 2025: An earlier version of this article misstated the surname of a Polish Defense Ministry official. He is Pawel Zalewski, not Zalevski.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more

Michael Schwirtz is the global intelligence correspondent for The Times based in London.

A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 21, 2025, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: A Polish Soldier, an Unusual Blip on Radar and Then NATO Jets. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

15. TSMC’s Rise to Push Taiwan Past South Korea in Key Wealth Gauge

The power of one company. Amazing.

TSMC’s Rise to Push Taiwan Past South Korea in Key Wealth Gauge

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-19/taiwan-beating-korea-in-key-wealth-gauge-with-lots-of-tsmc-help?utm

Taiwan’s dominance in products underpinning AI development has created boom times for its exports.Photographer: An Rong Xu/Bloomberg

By Miaojung Lin, Heesu Lee, and Yian Lee

September 18, 2025 at 8:30 PM EDT

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Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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• Taiwan is set to surpass South Korea in terms of wealth for the first time in over two decades, driven by the ascent of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.
• Taiwan's gross domestic product is expected to expand 4.55% in 2025, putting it on track to exceed South Korea's GDP per capita, with a projected GDP per capita of just over $38,000.
• The growth is attributed to a global spending boom around artificial intelligence, which has transformed Taiwan's economic fortunes, but also raises concerns about the economy's over-reliance on a single industry.

Taiwan is set to surpass South Korea this year in terms of wealth for the first time in over two decades, marking a shift in Asia’s economic ranks made possible by the ascent of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.

According to the latest forecasts released Thursday by Taiwan’s central bank, the island’s gross domestic product is expected to expand 4.55% in 2025, a further upward revision from the 4.45% estimate made by the statistics bureau in August.

The growth trajectory puts Taiwan on track to exceed South Korea’s GDP per capita — a key measure of living standards — already in 2025, a year earlier than predicted by the International Monetary Fund in April. While both are ahead of Japan, Taiwan with this year’s projected GDP per capita of just over $38,000 remains at less than half the level of Singapore.

Taiwan Is Catching Up With South Korea's GDP Per Capita

Source: IMF

Although skewed by the Taiwanese currency’s surge against the US dollar, Asia’s new pecking order offers another glimpse into how a global spending boom around artificial intelligence has transformed the economic fortunes of the self-governing island of 23 million people.

Taiwan saw its economy stagnate for decades after key manufacturers started to depart for China to take advantage of cheaper costs there starting in the late 1980s. But pandemic-era chip shortages vaulted its firms into global prominence, when state leaders and executives from the US to Europe scrambled to secure the semiconductors they needed to keep their economies humming.

The advent of ChatGPT then turbocharged that growth for TSMC and others like Foxconn Technology Group, which together assemble the majority of the world’s most advanced chips and servers essential to the development of AI. By contrast, Samsung Electronics Co., a conglomerate whose revenue is equivalent to about 11% of South Korea’s economy, has been struggling to catch up.

What Bloomberg Economics Says...

“South Korea’s economy spans a wide range of industries, including struggling sectors like petrochemicals, while Taiwan is more concentrated in the tech sector and has benefited more from the global AI boom. With Korea’s potential growth rate slipping due to aging and other structural issues, the trend may continue rather than prove temporary.”

— Hyosung Kwon.

Global demand for high-end tech products from Taiwan and South Korea has kept them both relatively immune to the sweeping US tariffs imposed by Donald Trump.

But whereas South Korea’s economy has stagnated, expanding less than 1% from a year earlier in the second quarter, Taiwan clocked one of the world’s quickest growth rates with a gain of over 8%.

The Bank of Korea projects full—year growth at 0.9%. BOK Governor Rhee Chang Yong has repeatedly warned that structural challenges such as a low birthrate and an aging population are dragging the economy’s potential growth rate into the 1% range.

Taiwan's Economy Far Outpaces Growth in South Korea

Source: Taiwan's statistics service, Bank of Korea

Taiwan’s dominance in products underpinning AI development has created boom times for its exports, which exceeded those of South Korea in August for the first time.

That milestone is especially telling given how South Korea’s population and overall GDP are more than double Taiwan’s size.

US Demand Drives Taiwan's Exports to a Record

Source: Taiwan's Ministry of Finance

The rapid appreciation of Taiwan’s dollar this year is another factor that helps explain why the island’s GDP per capita has caught up so fast.

It’s the best performer among Asian currencies this year with a gain of around 9%, after exporters rushed to sell the greenback in part on expectations the authorities will allow it to strengthen to help reach a trade deal with the Trump administration. The South Korean won has gained just over 6% against the US dollar so far in 2025.

While the currency fallout has done nothing to slow tech powerhouses like TSMC, a stronger and more volatile exchange rate is a threat to Taiwan’s other, more traditional exporters.

• Read More About Taiwan, South Korea:AI Boom Propels Taiwan Economy to Fastest Growth in 4 Years
• Taiwan’s Exports Hit Monthly Record Despite Tariff Worries
• S. Korea Exports Stay Solid on Chip Demand Despite US Tariff
• S. Korea Sees Economy Performing Weakest Since Pandemic Shock

Looking ahead, the worry for the economy is that its over-reliance on a single industry — with the US accounting for an ever-greater share of Taiwan’s exports — risks turning a strength into a vulnerability, especially at a time of geopolitical unease and tensions with China.

“Given limited resources, it is very hard for Taiwan to diversify to other industries,” said Woods Chen, chief economist of Yuanta Securities Investment Consulting in Taipei. “What’s needed is to transform traditional industries into suppliers for high-tech companies like TSMC. Then the government needs to figure out how to redistribute revenues generated from tech companies.”

— With assistance from Myungshin Cho, Edwin Chan, Debby Wu, and James Mayger

16. [OPINION] China’s mother of all lawfares against the Philippines

​Geography and history matter. Always.

Excerpts:

China is now in estoppel, bound by its own admission. China cannot reverse what it has admitted voluntarily, unilaterally, and publicly.

In conclusion, the Philippines, through its Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), must now make a thorough response to China’s recent declaration of a Chinese “national nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal.

The categorical response should be that Scarborough Shoal is Philippine territory as judicially admitted by China in its position paper in the South China Sea Arbitration. The DFA must trace Philippine sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal starting with the three official maps of Philippine territory during the Spanish regime and explaining in detail why the 1900 Treaty of Washington was entered into between Spain and the US.

[OPINION] China’s mother of all lawfares against the Philippines

https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinion-china-mother-all-lawfares-against-philippines/?utm

Sep 21, 2025 9:00 AM PHT

Antonio T. Carpio

flip.it · Chay Hofilena

Remarks delivered by Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Ret.) on September 18, 2025 at the Manila forum on “Asymmetric Threats: Cross-Regional Strategies for Europe and the Indo-Pacific” organized by the think-tank Stratbase.

China’s mother of all lawfares against the Philippines is China’s claim that Philippine territory is limited only to the islands within the 1898 Treaty of Paris lines. Scarborough Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the Spratlys are clearly outside the 1898 Treaty of Paris lines.

Thus, China has been proclaiming to the world that Scarborough Shoal and the KIG do not form part of Philippine territory since they are outside the 1898 Treaty of Paris lines. And since Scarborough Shoal and the entire Spratlys are within China’s 10-dash line, they all belong to China.

In China’s Manila embassy website you will find China quoting verbatim Article 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution which defines Philippine territory as the territory ceded by Spain to the United States in the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1900 Treaty of Washington, as well as the territory falling on the Philippine side of the boundary established in the 1930 treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom demarcating the boundary line between southern Philippines and British North Borneo.

China points to this particular provision of the 1935 Philippine Constitution as basis that Philippine territory is limited to the islands within the 1898 Treaty of Paris. You will find the same statement in the Chinese foreign ministry website in Beijing.

In February 2016, in a major policy speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC before diplomats from all over the world, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi repeated the claim that Philippine territory is defined in three treaties, namely, the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the 1900 Treaty of Washington, and the 1930 boundary treaty with the British. Wang Yi declared that these three treaties limited Philippine territory to the islands within the 1898 Treaty of Paris lines.

In the South China Sea Arbitration at The Hague, China submitted a position paper to the Arbitral Tribunal that Philippine territory is limited to the islands within the 1898 Treaty of Paris lines, quoting verbatim Article 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

Not surprisingly, the Philippines also declares that Philippine territory is defined by the three treaties mentioned in Article 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. So both China and the Philippines actually agree that Philippine territory is defined in the three treaties specified in Article1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. So what is the territorial dispute between China and the Philippines?

The dispute is in the 1900 Treaty of Washington, which with only one article, is one of the shortest treaties in the world. The sole article of the 1900 Treaty of Washington states: “Spain relinquishes to the United States…any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines” of the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The 1900 Treaty of Washington expressly retroacts to the date of effectivity of the 1898 Treaty of Paris.

The notes verbale between Spain and the US that led to the signing of the 1900 Treaty of Washington clearly establish beyond any doubt that the intention of both Spain and the US in signing the Treaty of Washington was for Spain to cede to the US “any and all islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago lying outside the lines” of the 1896 Treaty of Paris. Both Spain and the US understood that the 1898 Treaty of Paris omitted many islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago. The 1900 Treaty of Washington was precisely entered into to include those omitted islands in the cession of the 1898 Treaty of Paris.

To repeat, it is beyond dispute that Philippine territory under the 1900 Treaty of Washington was not limited to the islands within the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The express language of the 1900 Treaty of Washington, as well as the notes verbale between Spain and the US that led to the signing of the Treaty of Washington, clearly establish that “any and all islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago lying outside the lines” of the Treaty of Paris, were ceded to the US. The phrase “any and all” means without exception.

Where is the document, where is the map, showing the islands of the Philippine archipelago lying outside the lines of the 1898 Treaty of Paris? We find that in the three official maps of Philippine territory during the Spanish regime: the 1734 Murillo Velarde map, the 1808 Carta General del Archipielago Filipino, and the 1875 Carta General del Archipielago Filipino. All these three official Spanish maps show that Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys formed part of Philippine territory during the Spanish regime.

The 1875 Carta General del Archipielago Filipino was the most complete and detailed map of Philippine territory during the Spanish regime. That is why the US adopted the 1875 Carta General as the official map of Philippine territory during the American regime.

The US reissued the 1875 Carta General four times — in 1899, 1900, 1901 and 1902. The US even submitted in the famous Islas Palmas arbitration between the US and the Netherlands, a leading case in international law, the 1875 Carta General as the official map of the Philippines under both Spanish and American rule.

The US expressly stated in the Islas Palmas arbitration that the 1875 map shows the territory ceded by Spain to the US in the 1898 Treaty of Paris.

Thus, two colonial powers, Spain and the US, agreed that the 1875 Carta General depicted the entirety of Philippine territory during their colonial rule in the Philippines. In the 1930 treaty between the US and the UK demarcating the boundary between southern Philippines and British North Borneo, the UK expressly recognized that the term “Philippine archipelago” is the territory ceded by Spain to the US in the 1898 Treaty of Paris and in the 1900 Treaty of Washington.

Under the international law doctrine of Uti Possidetis Juris, the boundaries established by the colonial powers for their colonies at the time these colonies became independent must be respected not only by the successor states of the colonial powers, but also by the rest of the world, unless of course third-party states made timely objections to the treaties establishing these boundaries.

China never objected to the three treaties establishing the territory of the Philippines. In fact, China judicially accepted the three treaties defining Philippine territory when China submitted its position paper in the South China Sea Arbitration. Besides, China has repeatedly announced to the world that Philippine territory is defined by the three treaties mentioned in Article 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

China is now in estoppel, bound by its own admission. China cannot reverse what it has admitted voluntarily, unilaterally, and publicly.

In conclusion, the Philippines, through its Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), must now make a thorough response to China’s recent declaration of a Chinese “national nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal.

The categorical response should be that Scarborough Shoal is Philippine territory as judicially admitted by China in its position paper in the South China Sea Arbitration. The DFA must trace Philippine sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal starting with the three official maps of Philippine territory during the Spanish regime and explaining in detail why the 1900 Treaty of Washington was entered into between Spain and the US. – Rappler.com

flip.it · Chay Hofilena

17. AUKUS, Australia, Alliances & the Pacific, with Gray Connolly--on Midrats

I really love the map the CDR Salamander has provided at this link. I like the visual geographic orientation.

AUKUS, Australia, Alliances & the Pacific, with Gray Connolly--on Midrats

friends far and further

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/aukus-australia-alliances-and-the?publication_id=247761&post_id=174158836&isFreemail=true&r=7i07&triedRedirect=true

CDR Salamander

Sep 21, 2025

Yes, September is Australian Appreciation Month on the Midrats Podcast. Building on our discussion earlier this month with Liz Buchanan, we are returning to the perspective from the Antipodes with returning guest Gray Connolly.

From Afghanistan, to the Antarctic, to the approaches to the Arctic through the Pacific, we’ll have a broad-reaching discussion of allied national security concerns from the Australian perspective.

You can listen live at this link, starting later than usual at 7 PM Eastern time.

If you read this after the live show, check back later Sunday night on Substack, and I will update the page with the podcast.

Gray Connolly served as a Naval Intelligence officer in the Royal Australian Navy. He graduated from the Royal Australian Naval College and holds the King’s Commission.

Gray is a graduate in Arts (Honours - History) from the University of Sydney and in Law (Dean’s Merit List) from the University of New South Wales.

Gray served previously in Asia and the Middle East, including service in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, East Timor, and the Middle East. Gray served in the Iraq War (two deployments) and Afghanistan.

Gray is now a Barrister-at-Law in Sydney. He has advised the Australian Government on national security and public law matters and served as a Senior Member of the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

He keeps a blog at “Strategy Counsel” and his Twitter is @GrayConnolly

All of Gray’s comments and opinions are his alone and do NOT represent the view of the Australian Government.

18. They Helped Oust a Dictator. Now the New Regime Is Coming for Them.

​The dictator's playbook is simple, not a secret, and enduring.

They Helped Oust a Dictator. Now the New Regime Is Coming for Them.

President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and his wife, who is co-president, have been arresting longtime loyalists, in an apparent quest to ensure no one outside the family rises to power.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/20/world/americas/nicaragua-ortega-arrests.html

Rosario Murillo is said to be the true power in Nicaragua and appears intent on remaining so.Credit...Inti Ocon/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Frances Robles

Frances Robles has been covering Nicaragua for more than two decades.

Published Sept. 20, 2025

Updated Sept. 21, 2025, 1:58 a.m. ET

Leer en español

They fought side by side in Nicaragua with Daniel Ortega in the 1970s, back when the Sandinistas were rebels trying to topple a brutal dictatorship that had ruled the country for more than four decades.

Many joined Mr. Ortega when he first became president, running the country in the 1980s, and again when he took office a second time nearly 20 years ago.

But now many of these loyal trusted associates who remained close to Mr. Ortega for decades find themselves accused of crimes — and in jail or under house arrest.

From members of the original ruling Sandinista Party national directorate to high-ranking military officers and even a family member, Mr. Ortega and his co-president and wife, Rosario Murillo, are purging even the closest of former friends and allies.

In a country already known for widespread arbitrary arrests and a lack of political freedom, the detentions of longtime Sandinista partisans represent a remarkable escalation of an offensive against anyone who might challenge the ruling couple’s authority.

But the dismantling of the leftist Sandinista party’s inner circle appears to be not solely the work of Mr. Ortega but actually driven by Ms. Murillo. She is considered the true power in Nicaragua and has helped turn the Central American country into one of the most repressive states in Latin America.

‘Is the next one me?’

Over the past year, Ms. Murillo has increased her authority through constitutional changes widely viewed as a power grab, a new paramilitary force loyal to the government and the wholesale dismantling of the judiciary, which gave the presidency more control over the courts.

Experts believe she is trying to eliminate any potential rivals and pave the way for her to become Nicaragua’s eventual sole authoritarian leader.

“They are purging people in key positions,” said Alberto Cortés, a Nicaragua expert at the University of Costa Rica. “Everyone is asking: Is the next one me?”

Image

A government billboard with a photograph of President Daniel Ortega and Ms. Murillo, his wife and co-president.Credit...Meridith Kohut for The New York Times

Bayardo Arce, a former guerrilla revolutionary fighter turned economic adviser, was the last of the original nine Sandinista commanders who ruled in the 1980s to remain at Mr. Ortega’s side. He did so for more than 50 years, even as many other Sandinista leaders abandoned the party, accusing its leadership of corruption and authoritarianism. Many have been arrested or forced into exile.

Today, even the last man standing has fallen.

Mr. Arce, 76, was arrested in July after prosecutors said he had failed to respond to a summons for questioning over what they said were irregularities with properties he owns. Mr. Arce has been a controversial figure for years, having amassed great wealth while espousing leftist ideology and holding ill-defined government posts.

His surprising arrest this summer, experts say, proved that no one in Nicaragua is immune from the presidential couple’s quest to tighten their already iron grip on power.

His demise surely came at the orders of Ms. Murillo, they said. After years of serving as a relentlessly hardworking first lady, she became vice president in 2017, and then early this year assumed the newly created position of “co-president.”

As Mr. Ortega approaches 80, experts say his wife, 74, seems obsessively determined to get rid of her rivals.

Ms. Murillo did not respond to a request for comment.

Image

Bayardo Arce in his office in Managua in 2015. He was the last of the original nine Sandinista commanders to remain at Mr. Ortega’s side. Credit...Meridith Kohut for The New York Times

Loyalists Imprisoned

Nestor Moncada Lau, a national security adviser who was believed to be one of the principal people responsible for a violent crackdown on protests in 2018, has been imprisoned at the national penitentiary since Aug. 16, after being questioned about a property confiscation, according to Confidencial, a Nicaraguan newspaper that operates from Costa Rica.

In May, a retired brigadier general, Álvaro Baltodano Cantarero, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for treason, and his assets were ordered confiscated. Henry Ruiz, who, like Mr. Arce, was one of the original nine Sandinista commanders, was put under house arrest in March. No charges were made public.

Mr. Ortega’s brother, Humberto Ortega, who led the army under the Sandinista’s first rule, died in September after four months of house arrest. His arrest came after Humberto Ortega, who was also one of the original nine Sandinista leaders, publicly referred to his brother as a dictator.

Lenin Cerna, a former colonel who served as head of the feared state security agency in the 1980s, was also reportedly arrested, but rumors of his detention had surfaced before and proved false, the Nicaraguan media reported.

“Purges aren’t new, but purges of extremely prominent loyalists are pretty new,” said Karen Kampwirth, a political science professor at Knox College in Illinois who is writing a biography of Ms. Murillo. “I think her thinking is that she has no legitimacy at all among the ‘historic’ Sandinistas — the people who came out of the guerrilla struggle.”

The campaign seems directed at any former guerrilla fighter respected by leaders in the armed forces and by other longtime party members, experts said.

Ms. Murillo is afraid that as long as people like Mr. Arce remain in office, longtime party faithful in the military would support them after Mr. Ortega dies, Ms. Kampwirth said.

Image

Nicaraguans at a protest against the Ortega government in Managua in 2015.Credit...Meridith Kohut for The New York Times

“There could be a group in the military that would coalesce behind him,” she said. “Nobody is going to coalesce behind her.”

Mr. Cortes, from the University of Costa Rica, wonders whether Ms. Murillo’s moves will backfire and cause party loyalists in the military to move against her.

A Long Rise to Power

Ms. Murillo and Mr. Ortega met in the 1970s, while the Sandinista rebels were waging an armed rebellion against the Somozas, a dynastic right-wing dictatorship that led Nicaragua for more than 40 years.

Though they have been together for decades and she ran safe houses during their time in hiding, Ms. Murillo never held a rebel leadership position and is not considered an important revolutionary figure.

Still, when Mr. Ortega returned to office in 2007, she became the true power behind his presidency. She worked endless hours and involved herself in all manner of minutiae — such as serving as government spokeswoman and doling out land titles to the poor — which caused friction with veteran party leaders loyal to Mr. Ortega.

In their nearly 20 years in power, the couple, beyond ousting opponents, were accused of rigging elections and taking control of the national assembly and the Supreme Court.

“She knows she doesn’t have the political strength that Daniel has to stay in power,” said Dora María Téllez, a former Sandinista health minister who broke from the party decades ago, was imprisoned in 2021 and now lives in exile in Spain.

With the separation of powers eliminated, all branches of government report to Ms. Murillo, Ms. Téllez said. She pushed through the constitutional changes that created the position of “co-president,” but notably, though she has held the co-president title since January, a vice president has not been named to replace her.

Image

Mr. Ortega and Ms. Murillo in 2019. He is said to be ailing.Credit...Jorge Torres/EPA, via Shutterstock

Questions Over Succession

One of the couple’s sons, Laureano, is widely viewed as being groomed to succeed his parents. An opera singer, he has served as an adviser on international investments and plays a key role in the country’s relationships with China, Russia and Iran.

But even he has not been tapped to fill the vacant vice presidency, which experts say underscores Ms. Murillo’s desire to be the only person in a position to take her husband’s place.

Experts say Ms. Murillo’s fixation on who might succeed her husband coincides with rumors swirling about his failing health. In recent months he has seemed diminished in his rare public appearances, Ms. Téllez said.

The arrests of so many of his closest allies while he is still alive suggest that Mr. Ortega has either given his blessing to them or lost the capacity to protect the people closest to him, she said.

Ms. Murillo has tried to build her own following among younger members of the governing party, known formally as the Sandinista National Liberation Front, or F.S.L.N.

“One thing this shows is that no one is untouchable within the F.S.L.N.,” said Kai Thaler, a global studies professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “It also shows very firmly that longtime loyalty to the party, and to Daniel, is not going to protect you.”

Frances Robles is a Times reporter covering Latin America and the Caribbean. She has reported on the region for more than 25 years.

A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 21, 2025, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: Nicaraguan Leader and His Wife Purge Longtime Loyalists. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

19. Nepal Uprising Is Latest Challenge to India’s Backyard Diplomacy

​As an aside is Nepal a bellwether? A canary in a coal mine? Does this foreshadow the future of young (or Gen Z) movements?

Nepal Uprising Is Latest Challenge to India’s Backyard Diplomacy

The overthrow of Nepal’s government is the latest in a series of uprisings among India’s neighbors, creating a political churn that complicates its ties.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/21/world/asia/india-nepal-diplomacy-asia.html

Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, in New Delhi, earlier this month.Credit...Manish Swarup/Associated Press

By Anupreeta Das and Hari Kumar

Anupreeta Das reported from Kathmandu, Nepal.

Sept. 21, 2025, 12:08 a.m. ET

Just weeks before Nepal erupted in flames this month, India had invited the Nepali prime minister to New Delhi on a state visit, partly to smooth over testy ties between the South Asian neighbors.

The prime minister, K.P. Sharma Oli, never got the chance. He was forced to resign earlier this month as sudden protests engulfed the small Himalayan nation, fueled by a groundswell of anger among young people at corruption, elitism and widening inequality.

A similar uprising in Bangladesh last year upended the authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina. And in 2022, protests in Sri Lanka over a tanking economy forced out a president who was a member of a political dynasty many Sri Lankans saw as brazenly corrupt.

Such instability across South Asia distracts India from focusing on its ambition to be a global superpower. But India cannot leave things unattended in its own backyard. It already faces accusations from its smaller and poorer neighbors that it switches between ignoring them and bullying them, postures driven by self-interest rather than helping their development.

Neighbors such as Nepal have occasionally found themselves depending on India for humanitarian assistance and their economic stability, while chafing at its meddling in their domestic affairs.

Image

Burned-out vehicles outside the Nepali prime minister’s office in Kathmandu last week. Nepal’s political turmoil was fueled by a groundswell of anger among young people at corruption, elitism and widening inequality.Credit...Atul Loke for The New York Times

Letting power vacuums develop in adjoining countries or failing to show leadership only risks further harm to India’s interests, analysts said. It also emboldens China, which is edging its way into India’s traditional sphere of influence, from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, by providing India’s neighbors with funding for energy, construction and other infrastructure projects.

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India “can’t afford to be complacent and conclude that neighbors’ negative sentiment toward India is neutralized by their need for Indian support,” said Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst and senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. “The risk for India is that the region’s churn will produce new leaders, or give more space to political actors hostile to Indian interests.”

India has always recognized the importance of nurturing economic ties with partners with whom its history and culture are deeply entwined. “Neighborhood First” is a chapter in its foreign policy playbook. South Asia — which includes Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan and the Maldives — is home to a quarter of the world’s people and has its largest youth population. Increasingly, India’s regional diplomacy is being driven by its rivalry with China as both vie to become leaders of the Global South.

India’s value proposition to its neighbors is that the “Indian economy is growing fast and you, too, can grow along with us by partnering with India,” said Gautam Bambawale, a former ambassador of India to China.

But India’s neighbors have not always made it easy. It already has a hostile neighbor, Pakistan, to its west. To its east lies Bangladesh, a country of 170 million that has sheltered anti-India insurgents, and which has a longstanding conflict with India about undocumented migrants crossing their shared 2,500-mile border. Sri Lanka, to its south, invited China to finance a port along a strategic waterway, just a few hundred miles from Indian shores, threatening India’s national security.

Several countries, like Nepal, have complained that they are tools in a geopolitical tussle between the two Asian Goliaths, although they have opportunistically played one against the other. Political parties have campaigned on “anti-India” or “pro-China” platforms.

In Nepal, Mr. Oli had a decidedly pro-China bent, but his replacement — Sushila Karki, a former chief justice chosen as a caretaker prime minister until elections in March — reached out to Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India before anyone else.

Image

China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, and Nepal’s prime minister, K.P. Sharma Oli, met in Kathmandu, in 2019. The two countries began signing more agreements after India had imposed an economic blockade on Nepal years before.Credit...Pool photo by Prakash Mathema

Nepal, a Himalayan nation of 30 million, shares deep cultural connections and an open border of more than 1,000 miles with India, and is dependent on it for crucial supplies like fuel. But relations between the two have soured in the past decade.

In 2015, as Nepal was recovering from devastating earthquakes, India stopped sending fuel trucks into the country, citing political unrest around a proposed new Constitution. But Nepal accused India of imposing the blockade as punishment for refusing to amend provisions of the document that would have benefited Nepali groups with close ties to India.

The dispute ignited anti-India sentiments and Nepal began signing more agreements with China, said Apekshya Shah, an assistant professor of international relations and diplomacy at Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. That became “a bone of contention with India,” Ms. Shah said, which has a “zero-sum mentality” when it comes to Nepal-China relations.

India has also upset some of its neighbors by putting its weight behind certain political players and refusing to recalibrate when they become unpopular. Relations with Bangladesh have deteriorated in the past year after Sheikh Hasina, the country’s former prime minister, was ousted by a popular uprising and fled to India.

Many Bangladeshis are incensed at India’s continued support of Ms. Hasina — a politician whose authoritarian tendencies and brutal use of force on protesters alarmed human rights groups, but whom India saw as a staunch ally. At the same time, attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh have angered Hindu right-wing groups in India.

Image

Hindus in Dhaka, Bangladesh, last year, protesting against recent attacks on their community after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country and her government collapsed.Credit...Atul Loke for The New York Times

India stopped issuing almost all visas to Bangladeshi citizens, and earlier this year both countries curbed the use of their land ports for exporting goods.

Bangladesh has begun wooing China under the leadership of the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who visited the country in March and signed several trade agreements.

The staunch Hindu nationalism of Mr. Modi, combined with India’s regional dominance and a jingoistic domestic media, can alienate other religious groups in neighboring countries, said Husain Haqqani, a former ambassador of Pakistan to the United States.

“Hindutva may be a unifier for Hindu-majority India but it does not help win over Muslims in Bangladesh or Maldives and Buddhists in Sri Lanka,” said Mr. Haqqani, using the term for a Hindu-first ideology.

Given India’s hostilities with Pakistan, which has grown ever closer to China, regional integration is virtually impossible. Instead, India has sought to build economic and trade ties via bilateral agreements and smaller groupings.

It has always been quick to extend humanitarian assistance to its neighbors. But in the past year, it has also become a more active lender and backer of infrastructure projects. It has invited neighboring leaders for state visits to strengthen ties.

President Mohamed Muizzu of the Maldives — a tiny archipelago of 500,000 people of great strategic importance to India and China — won its 2023 election on a campaign that called for expelling Indian military troops from the country, using slogans like “India Out.” But last year, Dr. Muizzu paid a visit to India and the two countries began warming to each other. In July, Mr. Modi announced a $565 million credit line to the Maldives and said the countries would launch free-trade talks.

Image

An Indian-funded housing project in the Maldives, last year.Credit...Elke Scholiers for The New York Times

India still has the upper hand in South Asia, even when it appears close to squandering it, analysts said. Mr. Kugelman, the analyst, said the region remained a “powder keg” that was hard to navigate, with hot borders, polarized politics, aggrieved publics and fragile economies.

But “as a nation with great power aspirations, India will have a strategic incentive to ensure its neighborhood doesn’t become a costly distraction from its pursuits further afield,” he said.

Saif Hasnat and Bhadra Sharma contributed reporting from Dhaka and Kathmandu.

Anupreeta Das covers India and South Asia for The Times. She is based in New Delhi.

Hari Kumar covers India, based out of New Delhi. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

20. Axis of evil 2.0: How Russia, China and North Korea are becoming Israel's new threat

Axis of evil 2.0: How Russia, China and North Korea are becoming Israel's new threat

Analysis: What once seemed a distant threat from Asia is now a direct pipeline of weapons to the Middle East, confronting Israel with a new security reality and demanding a fundamental shift in its security doctrine

https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hk95ws2oex

Jeshurun Hight|Yesterday | 12:35

ynetnews.com · September 20, 2025

For two decades, Israel focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The assumption was that the greatest threat lay in the possibility of Tehran one day acquiring a nuclear weapon.

In reality, the more immediate danger was always the network of armed groups Iran already supports across the Middle East. The nuclear program was meant to serve as a shield, giving those groups protection under the threat of a future nuclear umbrella. That calculation is now being upended.

1 View gallery

(Photo: Sergey Bobylev / POOL / AFP)

A shifting global alignment

A new geopolitical reality is emerging in the form of a cooperative bloc between Russia, China, and North Korea. This loose partnership, which could be called an “axis of immunity,” is united by a common goal of challenging the U.S.-led world order. North Korea, once an isolated state, is becoming a critical supplier of advanced weaponry to countries and non-state groups hostile to Israel.

In this arrangement, Russia provides military protection and technology in exchange for munitions, while China offers an economic cushion that helps North Korea weather international sanctions. This alignment transforms Pyongyang into a major arsenal for conflicts far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

New threats to Israel’s military edge

The direct consequence for Israel is the erosion of its traditional military advantage. Instead of waiting years for adversaries to slowly develop their own missile systems, groups like Hezbollah could gain access to advanced, ready-made weapons from North Korea.

One example is the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile. These missiles fly on unpredictable, low trajectories that make them difficult to intercept. If such weapons reached Hezbollah, they would significantly challenge Israel’s air defenses and restrict the freedom of action of the Israeli Air Force in a future conflict.

International safeguards breaking down

Israel’s long-standing security strategy relied on international cooperation, especially within the UN Security Council, to monitor and contain weapons proliferation. But with Russia now vetoing sanctions enforcement and shielding North Korea, that mechanism has been dismantled. Diplomatic tools that once slowed the spread of advanced weapons are no longer reliable.

At the same time, traditional military solutions are far less viable. A preventative strike against North Korea is unrealistic when the regime enjoys explicit protection from a nuclear power like Russia. This creates a new model for rogue states: trade weapons for a great power’s protection and gain immunity from conventional military responses.

The way forward

In this new reality, Israel must rethink its security doctrine. Intelligence agencies need to prioritize the arms pipeline linking Pyongyang and Tehran just as much as Iran’s nuclear program. Diplomacy must pivot toward building a broader coalition of countries directly threatened by this alignment, from South Korea and Japan to Gulf Arab states.

Such a coalition would need to focus on intelligence sharing, coordinated sanctions outside the UN framework, and joint operations to intercept shipments before they reach their destination. The strategy must shift from passive containment to active prevention.

The sense of distance that once insulated Israel from events on the Korean Peninsula has disappeared. Weapons from Pyongyang can now find their way to Israel’s northern border. Addressing this new threat will require nothing less than a fundamental shift in Israel’s national security doctrine.

ynetnews.com · September 20, 2025

21. US victims of October 7 attacks file a new lawsuit against Hamas, Syria, Iran and North Korea

US victims of October 7 attacks file a new lawsuit against Hamas, Syria, Iran and North Korea | News Channel 3-12

By CNN NewsourcefollowFollow "" to receive notifications about new pages on "".

Published September 18, 2025 10:24 am

keyt.com · CNN Newsource · September 18, 2025

https://keyt.com/news/national-world/cnn-national/2025/09/18/us-victims-of-october-7-attacks-file-a-new-lawsuit-against-hamas-syria-iran-and-north-korea/

By Elizabeth Wolfe, CNN

(CNN) — A prominent Jewish advocacy group filed a lawsuit on Thursday against Hamas and other armed groups, as well as Iran, Syria and North Korea, seeking billions in damages over the October 7 attacks in Israel.

The suit, brought on behalf of more than 140 plaintiffs, including US victims and their family members, was filed by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and law firm Crowell & Moring in the US District Court in Washington, DC, just weeks before the two-year anniversary of the attack.

The lawsuit seeks at least $7 billion in damages from the armed groups and from the three foreign countries, which it accuses of providing Hamas with “support and resources” for the terror attacks.

The lawsuit appears to be largely symbolic in nature and it’s not clear how those bringing the case plan to serve papers on foreign states or Hamas, an Islamist movement that has been majorly diminished and had much of its leadership eliminated during the war in Gaza.

Many of the plaintiffs and defendants are also parties in a lawsuit filed by the ADL in the same court last year against Iran, Syria and North Korea, which similarly accused the states of providing support to Hamas. The plaintiffs in that case were able to serve papers to Iran with diplomatic help from Switzerland, but they have not successfully served Syria or North Korea and none of the countries have responded in court.

“The victims of the October 7 massacre deserve justice, accountability and redress,” said ADL CEO Jonathan A. Greenblatt. “This lawsuit seeks to do that by holding those responsible for the carnage accountable, from the state sponsors who provided the funding, weapons, and training to the terrorist organizations who carried out these unspeakable atrocities.”

Among the plaintiffs in the case are David and Hazel Brief, whose son Yona, an Israeli soldier, died from injuries sustained during the attack. They said in a statement provided by the ADL that Yona’s life was “senselessly cut short.”

“We believe it is critical that those responsible for the horrific terror inflicted that day are held accountable in a court of law, to ensure the record is clear as to who helped support, plan and carry out the violence that day,” they added.

During the October 7, 2023 attack, Hamas and several other militant groups stormed the Nova Music Festival and nearby communities in southern Israel, killed more than 1,200 people and took 251 others hostage. Nearly two years later, 148 hostages have been returned alive to Israel, but the Israeli government says 47 are still held captive inside Gaza. 25 of those remaining have been declared dead, while 20 are believed to be alive; the status of the others is uncertain.

Over the course of the war, Israeli forces have killed nearly 65,000 Palestinians and injured more than 164,000, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health. This week, Israel announced it had begun a ground incursion into Gaza City and an independent UN inquiry concluded for the first time that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, which its government has denied.

Iran, Syria and North Korea have been designated by the US State Department as “state sponsors of terrorism.” The designation is applied by the secretary of state to countries found to have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”

Foreign states are typically allowed immunity from prosecution in the US under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. But the law makes exceptions for state sponsors of terrorism, as well as for “personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking” or “material support” of these activities by state officials.

In their statement, David and Hazel Brief said they hoped that the litigation would “help prevent attacks like these in the future, so that no other families have to go through losing a loved one as a result of such violence.”

The-CNN-Wire

™ & © 2025 Cable News Network, Inc., a Warner Bros. Discovery Company. All rights reserved.

keyt.com · CNN Newsource · September 18, 2025

22. The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Has a Message for the U.S. Army

​It has been a long time since I went through Bradley transition in 1984 in Graf, Vilseck and Hohenfels in D/1-30th Infantry. What a vehicle it turned out to be.

The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Has a Message for the U.S. Army

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Harry Kazianis · September 20, 2025

Key Points and Summary – The M2 Bradley grew out of a Cold War need to move infantry with tanks and kill enemy armor at range.

-Born from the MICV program and fielded in 1981, it paired a 25 mm Bushmaster with TOW missiles and enough protection for mechanized fights in Europe.

-It was blooded in Desert Storm, evolved into urban and COIN wars after 9/11, and—four decades on—still matters, now with A4 powertrain and Iron Fist active protection upgrades.

-Ukraine’s battlefield has showcased its strengths and limits against drones, mines, and artillery.

The Army’s XM30 program will replace it, but not before the Bradley writes a final, useful chapter.

The M2 Bradley: Why The Army Built It, How It Fought, And What Comes Next

By the late 1960s, U.S. mechanized infantry faced a brutal math problem. Soviet formations fielded the BMP-1, a fast, gun-armed troop carrier meant to keep infantry with tanks and kill American vehicles from standoff range. The U.S. M113 could haul troops, but not fight its way through a European battle at the speed and lethality the new doctrine demanded. The Army needed an infantry fighting vehicle that could ride with the Abrams, protect a squad, and overmatch Soviet IFVs—ideally with the reach to menace tanks, too. That requirement birthed the family of programs labeled MICV, and ultimately the vehicle we know as Bradley.

The Origin Story: From MICV To M2 Bradley

The first serious push, MICV-65, explored turning the M113 into a fighting carrier; it proved the concept but not the solution. A clean-sheet tracked prototype, XM723, followed—more protection, better mobility, firing ports, and a small cannon. As the Army formalized AirLand Battle, it merged infantry carrier and scout ideas onto one chassis, creating XM2 (infantry) and XM3 (cavalry). The turret grew to mount the 25 mm M242 Bushmaster and a twin-tube TOW launcher, giving the new vehicle the punch to kill BMPs and threaten tanks while carrying a (smaller) dismount team. Type-classification arrived at the dawn of the 1980s, and Bradley entered service in 1981.

Troopers with 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division firing the 25mm canon on a Bradley fighting vehicle in order to zero the vehicles weapons systems at a range in Poland. Ranges such as these familiarize troopers with the vehicles systems in order to ensure combat readiness.

That compromise—firepower and protection vs. troop capacity and weight—defined Bradley’s character. It would never carry a full nine-man rifle squad under armor; it would carry fewer troops, fight alongside the Abrams, and contribute meaningful anti-armor fires. In a doctrinal fight against a Soviet front, that trade made sense.

Early Service: A Mechanized Fighter, Not Just A Ride

On paper, Bradley was built for Central Europe. In practice, it spent the 1980s proving it could pace the tank, share the fight, and give commanders options. The family mattered: M2 brought a squad and a steady 25 mm gun; M3 tilted more toward sensors, radios, and anti-armor missiles for cavalry work. Crews learned to live with a fighting carrier’s realities—tight internal space, heat, noise, and the need to dismount fast—while discovering how much the thermal sight and TOW changed their options at night and across long fields of fire.

Combat History I: Desert Storm And Its Hard Lessons

Operation Desert Storm tested the design in open desert—and it performed. Bradley crews praised the vehicle’s lethality and mobility, and the Army’s early accounting showed most vehicle losses were to friendly fire, not enemy overmatch. That painful fact drove immediate improvements in identification and procedures. The larger lesson was that a well-trained Bradley crew could hit hard at standoff and keep up with tanks on a fast advance—exactly what mechanized commanders needed.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 2nd Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Task Force Reaper, conduct movement procedures with M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles during the Jade Cobra VI exercise in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, Feb. 19, 2025. Jade Cobra VI strengthens military-to-military partnerships, increases readiness, and facilitates security cooperation between the United States and Jordan. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Hector Tinoco)

Combat History II: Iraq, Afghanistan, And Urban War

Post-9/11 fights were not the Central Front. In Iraq’s cities and along IED-laced routes, Bradleys took RPG and mine hits that stressed floors, side armor, and optics. Units responded with armor kits, tactics that emphasized crew survival, and a heavy dose of maintenance. The vehicle’s thermal sights, stabilized gun, and TOW still mattered in urban fights and open-desert skirmishes; the cost was sustainment labor and a cat-and-mouse game with low-tech threats. The Army institutionalized lessons with survivability packages and training—evolution, not reinvention.

The Upgrade Path: Keeping A 1980s IFV Relevant In 2025

The Army has kept Bradley current by refreshing what matters: power, sensors, electronics, and protection.

M2A4 increases power generation and automotive performance, giving crews margin for modern electronics and armor kits.

3rd-Generation FLIR sharpens long-range detection and identification, improving the night fight and target discrimination.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle cuts loose several rounds from the 25mm main gun on the orchard Combat Training Center Range.

Soldiers completed training this week of the Bradley Commanders Course with the 204th Regional Training Institute, (RTI), of the Idaho Army National Guard on Gowen Field. The course is designed to train active duty, reserve and national guard officers and non-commissioned officers in combat critical M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Commander Skills. Field exercises were conducted on the newest Range 10, the Digital Air Ground Integrated Range (DAGIR), on the Orchard Combat Training Center grounds.

Iron Fist active protection on the M2A4E1 adds a hard-kill layer against incoming rockets and missiles—crucial on a battlefield crowded with top-attack threats and FPV drones.

These changes don’t turn Bradley into a new vehicle; they stretch a proven one into the drone-sensor-missile era with better “see first, shoot first, survive first” attributes.

Operational History And Deployments: The Long War Resume

Beyond Desert Storm and the post-9/11 campaigns, M2 Bradley has served wherever mechanized infantry mattered: deterring on NATO’s flank, rotating through Europe, and anchoring heavy brigade combat teams at home. Its two-crew-plus-dismount rhythm shapes how battalion and brigade commanders fight: Bradleys suppress and screen; squads dismount to clear, hold, and maneuver; TOWs keep enemy armor honest.

The Army’s production moves reflect a bridge strategy—keep modern A4s flowing while the replacement matures. Recapitalized hulls converted to A4 standard sustain brigade sets and readiness while new programs spin up.

Ukraine: A New Battlefield, Familiar Truths

Ukraine has given the M2 Bradley a brutal second life—and a very public one.

U.S.-donated M2A2 ODS-SA vehicles have been used to ambush Russian armor, absorb punishing artillery and drone attacks, and haul crews away from wrecks that a lesser vehicle would have turned into fatalities. The same videos that show losses also show crew survival and rapid recoveries—vital in a war of attrition.

Aerial drone image of Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews from the 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conducting Table XII gunnery at Fort Stewart, Ga. December 7, 2016.

Aerial drone image of Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews from the 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conducting Table XII gunnery at Fort Stewart, Ga. December 7, 2016.

Troopers with 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division firing the 25mm canon on a Bradley fighting vehicle in order to zero the vehicles weapons systems at a range in Poland. Ranges such as these familiarize troopers with the vehicles systems in order to ensure combat readiness.

The tactical picture is nuanced. Against mines, massed artillery, and top-attack drones, no IFV is invulnerable, and Bradleys have been knocked out and later repaired.

But Ukraine confirms the original logic: a vehicle that can see, stabilize, and shoot on the move, while protecting a small dismount team, is a force multiplier in combined-arms fights—especially when paired with active protection.

Is M2 Bradley “Obsolete”? The Honest Answer

“Obsolete” is sloppy. What’s true is that Bradley’s growth margin is finite. Weight gain over decades has squeezed under-armor volume; the layout makes adding still more protection and electronics a game of inches and amps; and a three-person crew plus a small dismount team reflects 1970s design choices, not 2030s concepts. Drones and top-attack munitions demand organic protection and power for sensors and effectors that the A4 can support—but only so far.

That’s why the Army’s XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle exists: to replace Bradley with an open-architecture, better-protected, more easily upgraded platform that can host current and future sensors, effectors, and autonomy. The program has moved through competitive design and into prototyping, with timelines that reflect the complexity and risk of building a true next-gen IFV.

The Pending Retirement: How A Fleet Actually Fades

The Army won’t park every Bradley on the same day. Expect a tiered sunset: A4s (and A4E1s) hold the line in priority brigades while XM30 prototypes shake out; earlier variants shift to training and second-line roles; recapitalized hulls keep readiness numbers honest. Meanwhile, depots keep turning old hulls into usable A4s because brigade combat teams need availability more than brochure promises. That’s the unglamorous reality of fleet management: you retire a system functionally, mission by mission, as the replacement arrives in enough numbers to carry the load.

What The Bradley Still Teaches

Three enduring lessons travel with Bradley into its final act:

Combined Arms Wins. M2 Bradley was never meant to be a solo tank. It’s a node—sensors, firepower, mobility—for squads and tanks to fight together. Ukraine has re-proved that rule in the drone age.

Sustainment Is Combat Power. Desert Storm and Iraq taught hard truths about ID, armor kits, and repair pipelines. Ukraine adds drone mitigation and battle-damage repair at scale. The winner is the force that fixes faster and learns quicker.

Upgrade Wisely, Replace Relentlessly. The A4 and Iron Fist buys are smart, targeted life-extenders. But the Army is right to move on. A future mechanized force needs more electrical power, better protection geometry, an open digital spine, and headroom for autonomy—attributes you design in, not bolt on.

The Bradleys’ Place In U.S. Army History

Few vehicles stay this relevant for this long. The M2 Bradley is a Cold War design that earned credibility in desert thunder runs, adapted to urban attrition, and now fights under drones and ubiquitous ISR. Its legacy isn’t perfection—it’s usefulness: a machine that let commanders put infantry where it mattered, protected them well enough to do the job, and brought enough teeth to change an enemy’s mind.

That’s why the right epitaph for M2 Bradley is not “obsolete,” but “mission accomplished—time for the next one.” The XM30 will inherit a tough standard: sprint with tanks, keep soldiers alive, and punch above its weight in a battlefield that is only getting faster and more lethal. The Bradley did that for forty years. That’s a legacy worth matching.

About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis

Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is Editor-In-Chief and President of National Security Journal. He was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master’s degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Harry Kazianis · September 20, 2025

23. Trump Threatens Afghanistan If Bagram Air Base Not Handed Back To US

Trump Threatens Afghanistan If Bagram Air Base Not Handed Back To US

September 21, 2025 00:56 CET

Updated September 21, 2025 12:13 CET

• By RFE/RL

flip.it · RFE/RL · September 21, 2025

Summary

•  US President Donald Trump threatened Afghanistan with consequences if Bagram Airfield is not returned to US control.
• Trump emphasized the base's strategic location near China as a key reason for regaining control.
• The Taliban, facing internal and external challenges, rejected the demand but expressed an openness to improving ties with the US.

US President Donald Trump threatened Afghanistan with unspecified “bad things” if it doesn’t turn Bagram Airfield back to the United States, an action previously rejected by the country’s Taliban rulers.

Afghan Taliban officials pushed back, saying a deal was "not possible," and called on the United States to abide by prior agreements to not interfere in Afghan matters.

Trump's September 20 remarks were the second time in two days that he has signaled Washington's intent to regain control of the sprawling base north of Kabul, which the US controlled until its abrupt pullout in 2021.

Trump has cited the base's proximity to China as a major reason for regaining US control of the facility, which was originally built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s.

SEE ALSO:

Why Does Trump Want Afghanistan's Bagram Air Base Returned To US Control?

"If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back to those that built it, the United States of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN," Trump said on September 20 in a social media post, writing in all caps letter.

Speaking later to reporters at the White House, he echoed the threat, though did not specify what might happen.

"We're talking now to Afghanistan, and we want it back and we want it back soon, right away. And if they don't do it -- if they don't do it, you're going to find out what I'm gonna do," he told reporters.

Speaking to Afghan media on September 21, Fasihuddin Fitrat, chief of staff of the Taliban Defense Ministry, said "some people" want to take back the base through a "political deal." He did not specify whom he was speaking about.

"A deal over even an inch of Afghanistan's soil is not possible. We don't need it," he was quoted as saying.

In a post to X, a Taliban government spokesman called on Washington to abide by the 2020 Doha Accords, which paved the way for the 2021 pull-out of US forces.

"The United States pledged that 'it will not use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, nor interfere in its internal affairs'," the spokesman, Hamdullah Fitrat, said. "Therefore, it is necessary that they remain faithful to their commitments."

The Taliban rulers, beset by natural disasters, unrest, poverty, and terrorist attacks, have attempted to improve ties with the global community, although Russia is the only country to so far establish diplomatic relations.

Western nations have said the Taliban must first improve its human rights record, especially in regard to the treatment of women and girls.

In comments two days earlier in London, Trump suggested Afghanistan's Taliban's rulers were negotiating with Washington on unspecified matters.

“We're trying to get it back because they [Taliban rulers] need things from us," Trump said at a news conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

“But one of the reasons we want that base is, as you know, it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons. So a lot of things are happening,” he said.

The Wall Street Journal, citing people with knowledge of the matter, said US officials and the Taliban had discussed allowing the US military to use Bagram as a “launch point” for counterterrorism missions.

Experts have said that even if Taliban leaders did allow a US presence at Bagram, the base would need to be defended against threats from the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State terror groups still operating in Afghanistan.

Bagram, about 40 kilometers north of Kabul, was built by the USSR in the 1950s but vastly improved and expanded by the US military.

It was the largest US base in Afghanistan and served as the central command during its 20-year occupation of the country.

The base was handed over in July 2021 to the previous Afghan government -- weeks before the chaotic withdrawal of US troops and the eventual takeover of the country by the Taliban.

SEE ALSO:

Afghan Taliban Claims Prisoner Exchange With US Is Imminent

Washington has kept a minimal level of public engagement with Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, restricting it to hostage negotiations. Afghanistan has remained largely isolated on the global stage and its economy is struggling to attract foreign support and private investments.

Taliban officials rejected Trump’s suggestion that the United States might regain control of Bagram, but they left open the possibility of talks to improve ties.

“Without the US having any military presence in Afghanistan, both Afghanistan and the US need to engage with each other, and they can have political and economic relations based on mutual respect and shared interests,” Zakir Jalaly, a Taliban foreign ministry official, said on social media.

With reporting by Reuters

NOTE: This article has been amended to clarify that Donald Trump is the current US president.

flip.it · RFE/RL · September 21, 2025

24. How ‘Safe China’ sells its security strategy to the world

​Timely and important. We need to understand this.

And I will say again this:

My assessment is that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

How ‘Safe China’ sells its security strategy to the world

Global leaders — and not just autocrats — are lining up to learn about Beijing’s policing tactics and surveillance state

Sheena Chestnut GreitensAdd to myFT

Financial Times · Sheena Chestnut Greitens · September 21, 2025

The writer is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and the author of ‘Dictators and Their Secret Police’

Last week China kicked off its annual Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in Lianyungang. Most China watchers were focused on Beijing, where the Ministry of Defence was hosting the Xiangshan Forum. But China’s main push to rewrite the global security order was taking place in city further south.

The security forum is China’s flagship effort to build a new global architecture that centres not on militaries, but on police and internal security agencies. It might seem like a tall order for a highly authoritarian regime to line others up behind its vision of global police co-operation, but China’s efforts have got traction: Lianyungang has grown from a small, somewhat obscure, forum in 2022 to Beijing’s premier platform for security co-operation. This year saw about 2,000 people attend — larger than any other event China organises on global security issues. Indeed, the forum’s ambitions reach beyond the so-called axis of autocracies, positioning China as a model and a global security provider to developing countries. The opening speech this year by the minister of public security, Wang Xiaohong, touted China’s alternative to a western-led order.

Beijing’s white paper on national security, published in May, pivots from emphasising the pre-eminence of internal and regime security to lauding China for having some of the world’s lowest crime, homicide and terrorism rates. China attributes much of that success to police technology and surveillance — which has enough public support that Chinese citizens watching the news of Charlie Kirk’s murder in Utah this month favourably compared their own surveillance state to the slow and initially ineffective US search for his killer.

The 2024 event included a tour of nearby police training facilities to show off the achievements of what Beijing refers to as “Peaceful China”. Under Xi Jinping, China has begun referring to economic development and long-term social stability as the country’s “two miracles”. The security forum is the capstone in a much larger push by the Ministry of Public Security to present “Peaceful China” as an example for the world to follow.

One of its most prominent backers is the president of Interpol, Emirati interior ministry official Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi, who has thrown Interpol’s weight behind the forum even as reports suggest that Interpol has facilitated China’s transnational repression by repatriating fugitives, including Uyghur human rights advocates. Another endorsement came from the Solomon Islands, where Beijing is piloting a wholesale export of surveillance technology and a model of grassroots social control.

Global outreach by China’s internal security apparatus now matches or even exceeds the diplomacy carried out by the People’s Liberation Army. Chinese companies have also seized the opportunity to spread Chinese tools of internal security around the world by marketing surveillance technology and police equipment at the forum. Products on display included AI-enabled surveillance tools that can match individuals caught on police bodycams to databases of targeted individuals. Huawei advertises that its surveillance platforms leave criminals — or dissidents — “nowhere to hide”.

Showcasing China’s standards, tools and practices allows Beijing to normalise its surveillance state as a public security good and to present this as a response to public demand. It also positions China as the arbiter of what counts as security, and who provides it best. This year’s forum will release a “Global Public Security Index Report”, assessing the performance of 50 countries in public safety, counterterrorism, traffic safety and cyber security. Last year, the inaugural report found that China was the world’s safest country (scoring 86 out of 100); the US received a dismal 69.

In a world where China’s approach to “counterterrorism” has involved the forced re-education of large swaths of its Uyghur Muslim population, and where its security agencies are routinely discussed by western powers as persistent cyber security threats, the index could serve as a powerful alternative narrative.

These arguments appear to be working — not just with autocrats but from a broader set of leaders whose security views often align with Beijing’s. Many of their security problems are more likely to be fixed by high-tech police work than high-end fighter jets. If China can successfully make its case, Beijing’s bid to rewrite global security governance may displace the US — not by directly confronting it, but simply by creating alternatives that circumvent and surpass it.

Financial Times · Sheena Chestnut Greitens · September 21, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com