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Quotes of the Day:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
- United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
“When liberty exceeds intelligence, it begets chaos, which begets dictatorship.”
- Will Durant
"You have to look deeper, way below the anger, the hurt, the hate, the jealousy, the self-pity, way down deeper where the dreams lie… Find your dream. It's the pursuit of the dream that heals you."
- Billy Mills, member of the Oglala Lakota and U.S. Olympic gold medalist in track and field
1. Siegfried Hecker on the New Russia-DPRK Relationship and Nuclear Cooperation
2. Unification minister calls for cooperation with U.S. against N. Korea's suspected arms deal with Russia
3. N. Korea holds politburo meeting to discuss Kim-Putin summit: KCNA
4. N.K. rights groups hold rally against repatriation of defectors in front of Chinese Embassy
5. Russia lodges protest to S.Korean envoy over Yoon's UN speech
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ New proclamation calls for intensified control over the economy
7. Kim Jong-un's rejection of Russia's food assistance irritates North Korean defectors
8. Kim's dubious deal with Putin
9. Countering North Korean ballistic missile submarines; choices for the threat
10. Open letter on China’s Forcible Repatriation of North Korean Refugees
11. S. Korea calls on Russia to ‘transparently explain’ its dealing with NK amid suspected arms supply agreement
1. Siegfried Hecker on the New Russia-DPRK Relationship and Nuclear Cooperation
Excerpt:
JW: If increased sanctions are not going to stop Russia from either the dual-use transfers or the more serious direct assistance with the North’s nuclear program, what’s to be done?
SH: The best bet is to alert China and the rest of the global community to the dangers of the new Russia-DPRK relations moving in this direction by pointing out the dangers, not only for Northeast Asia, but for the world. What I have outlined would be egregious violations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and responsible nuclear statehood. China can’t possibly want such a dramatic nuclear escalation—one that might spark a greater push for South Korea and Japan to build their own nuclear forces. And beyond the region, a completely fractured nonproliferation regime that could make others, such as Iran or Taiwan, become instant nuclear weapons states has to frighten China and the rest of the world. Perhaps these concerns could even awaken the Global South, which has been sitting mostly on the sidelines watching the Ukrainian crisis, to dissuade Russia from assisting the North’s nuclear program.
Siegfried Hecker on the New Russia-DPRK Relationship and Nuclear Cooperation
(Source: Korean Central News Agency)
On Sunday, Kim Jong Un returned triumphantly from a tour of Russia’s Far East. That trip has almost certainly set the stage for dangerous changes in Northeast Asia.
Joel Wit, a Distinguished Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, engaged Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, co-author of Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program, and frequent contributor to 38 North, to look deeper into what should concern the United States about increased nuclear cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).
Joel Wit: What’s your take on the new Russian-DPRK relationship and its implications for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons?
Siegfried Hecker: Russia’s actions since it invaded Ukraine 18 months ago have fractured what I call the Global Nuclear Order. Russia has threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to settle the war. It has taken the huge nuclear power complex in Zaporizhzhia hostage and trekked through the contaminated nuclear exclusion zone around the Chornobyl (Chernobyl) nuclear accident site. It has broken the security alliance system of the nonproliferation regime by trashing its promise to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty given in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which had convinced Ukraine to relinquish the Soviet nuclear weapons it had inherited. These are bad omens for potential Russia-DPRK nuclear cooperation.
North Korea may offer Vladimir Putin armaments to deal with his current difficulties in the war. For Kim Jong Un, it looks like an important step toward his new strategy of alignment with Russia and China while giving up on the US. However, Kim providing armaments to Putin to prolong the war and kill more innocent Ukrainians will surely find him on the wrong side of history.
JW: The North Koreans have reported at length Kim’s stops during his week-long trip to the Russian Far East, including meetings with President Putin and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, touring space and military manufacturing facilities, and viewing advanced Russian military aircraft and warships. There is considerable speculation, seemingly supported by the itinerary, that Kim seeks high-tech space and missile technology. You have followed the North’s nuclear and missile programs closely over the past two decades. What does Pyongyang need, and what do you think Moscow would be willing to provide?
SH: Although there is no reporting from the trip that either side raised the subject of the North’s nuclear weapons program, in my view, that should be very much of concern. Let me begin with what North Korea might think it needs to further develop its nuclear program, which is already quite advanced after six nuclear tests beginning in 2006. Once we examine that, we can come back to what Moscow may be willing to provide and what, if anything, we could do to prevent it.
JW: Are you concerned that Russia may provide direct assistance to the North’s nuclear program?
SH: Yes. My concerns have increased greatly with the changes seen in both countries during the past two years. North Korea appears to have made the fundamental policy change to seek strategic alignment with Russia and China around the beginning of 2022, abandoning its 30-year policy of seeking normalization with the United States. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24 of that year and its subsequent depiction of its drawn-out war being in defense of Russia against the hegemonic United States, assisted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has dramatically changed how we must view Russia. I am afraid anything is possible now.
JW: With North Korea’s nuclear program being quite advanced already, how could Russia assist the North?
SH: I like to describe nuclear weapons programs in three parts: production of bomb fuel, weaponization and delivery systems (together with command and control). Today, the size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is limited by the amount of bomb fuel—that is plutonium and highly enriched uranium for fission bombs and tritium (heavy hydrogen) for hydrogen bombs. It’s quite remarkable that the North has only a tiny inventory of roughly 50 kilograms of plutonium (it takes around six kilograms for a bomb), some 37 years after it began to produce it in its small 5 MWe Plutonium Production Reactor. Earlier this year, Kim Jong Un called for an exponential increase in its nuclear arsenal, specifically calling for expanded fissile materials production.
JW: Why doesn’t North Korea just ramp up plutonium production?
SH: It doesn’t have that capacity now, and it takes a long time to develop new capabilities. Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors. The only operating nuclear reactor the North has is the small 5 MWe Reactor. It has been operating intermittently since 1986 and is operating now. However, it can, at best, produce six kilograms per year. During my last visit to the Yongbyon nuclear complex in November 2010, they showed my Stanford University colleagues and me the construction start of an experimental light water reactor (ELWR). That reactor was likely intended as a prototype for an electricity-producing reactor, but it could be repurposed to produce plutonium. However, 13 years later, it is still not operational. Yongbyon also houses the small IRT-2000 research reactor built by the Soviets in the 1960s, but it has operated only sparingly since the collapse of the Soviet Union because of the lack of fresh reactor fuel.
JW: So, how could Russia assist North Korea with plutonium supply?
SH: For the longer term, Russia could help North Korea get the ELWR operational. It could justify that as helping the North with peaceful electrical power generation. North Korea could then repurpose it for plutonium production. Russia could also supply fresh fuel for the IRT-2000 reactor, which could provide a small amount of plutonium (as well as tritium—I’ll come back to that later).
For the shorter term, what concerns me most is Russia clandestinely supplying plutonium directly. To put matters in context, the Soviet Union likely produced around 125,000 kilograms of plutonium over the years. After its demise, Russia declared 35,000 kilograms as excess in a bilateral plutonium disposition program with the United States. The disposition agreement fell apart along with most other US-Russian nuclear accords. Much of Russia’s plutonium resides in the Fissile Materials Storage Facility (which the Americans helped finance in order to improve the security of Russia’s fissile materials).[1] There are no technical hurdles to shipping 100 or even 1,000 kilograms of plutonium from that facility to North Korea. Needless to say, that would allow North Korea to “exponentially” increase its nuclear arsenal.
JW: What about highly enriched uranium (HEU)?
SH: North Korea is in better shape with HEU, although how much it has is highly uncertain. I believe our plutonium estimates are quite good because I have been able to see their plutonium facilities, and we can tell when the reactor is operating from commercial satellite imagery. Uranium enrichment facilities are easy to hide and have few signatures of operation. The North Koreans did show us a surprisingly modern centrifuge facility during our 2010 visit to Yongbyon. I concluded then that they must have other facilities, but we don’t know how many or where they are. I have previously estimated that their total—Yongbyon plus covert facilities—production capacity is about 150 kilograms (roughly six bombs’ worth) per year. I estimate that the North may have as much as 1,200 kilograms, but it could be higher.
JW: With that much HEU, why would North Korea need more plutonium? Does Russia also have an excess of HEU?
SH: Plutonium is a much more potent bomb fuel—especially for miniaturized warheads that could be mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), particularly if that warhead is a hydrogen (two-stage thermonuclear) bomb. Such warheads may have a plutonium first stage that is boosted with tritium to set off the fusion second stage. North Korea claims to have detonated a hydrogen bomb in September 2017. In fact, it featured what it called a “two-stage thermonuclear” bomb in its news release.
Russia’s stockpile of HEU is enormous. It likely had produced 1.4 million kilograms of HEU during Soviet times. In fact, as part of US-Russia nonproliferation cooperation, Russia sold 500,000 kilograms of HEU to the United States after downblending HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel, which has produced a lot of electricity here. So, supplying a few thousand kilograms to North Korea would hardly make a dent in Russia’s inventory.
JW: Does North Korea have a supply of tritium for hydrogen bombs?
SH: Tritium, like plutonium, is produced in a nuclear reactor. North Korea has the capability to produce tritium but likely has a very small stockpile—enough for only a few hydrogen bombs. Making tritium in its reactors competes with making plutonium. Besides likely having only a small amount, tritium must be replenished regularly because its half-life (the time for half of it to transmute to helium) is only 12.3 years. This is another area where Russia could be of great help to North Korea. Russia has a large tritium stockpile and the ability to replenish it.
JW: What about assistance with weaponization—what you have defined as designing, building and testing nuclear weapons?
SH: Although North Korea has demonstrated that it can design and build nuclear devices (most likely both fission and fusion bombs), as demonstrated by its six nuclear tests, there could be a lot to learn from the Russians. After all, they have been at this since the late 1940s and have conducted 715 nuclear tests (I should note that the United States has conducted 1,054 such tests). They have built many thousands of nuclear devices. Its nuclear stockpile maxed out at 41,000 in the mid-1980s.
JW: What particularly concerns you about weaponization?
SH: I don’t think the North Koreans have yet demonstrated the ability to mount a nuclear warhead on an ICBM and deliver it to mainland America. I am concerned that the Russians may share some design information and nuclear test data to help them get there more quickly. Moreover, the Russians have designed and tested just about every nuclear weapon that can be conceived.
The ones that concern me the most at this time are tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons. The Russians still have a stockpile of nearly two thousand of these. They also have a strategy to use them in regional conflicts—which is a great concern as we watch the Ukraine crisis continue and the Russians threatening to use nuclear weapons. In discussions with Russian counterparts during my many visits to Russia over the years, they talked about their design and test experience with peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), which share some of the same requirements one would want from a tactical nuclear weapon. Since these tactical weapons are theater weapons used in close proximity to your own territory, you want them to be of lower yield and relatively clean—meaning low radiation levels, just as if you were using them for peaceful purposes like oil and gas fracking or earth excavation.[2] The Russians conducted some 29 PNEs during Soviet times. That information could be very useful to the North Koreans.
JW: That’s really disconcerting. How realistic is such cooperation? But first, why not finish the third leg—delivery systems?
SH: I’ll be brief. Missile delivery is the one area in which the Russians have provided the greatest help to the North, going back to the Soviet days. The early North Korean missiles, namely the Scud and Nodong short and medium-range missiles, are copies of Soviet designs. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine sold missile technologies to the North. It appears that Russia has continued some form of assistance over many years.
The North Koreans have made remarkable progress in missile technologies during the past decade, including launching two solid rocket motor ICBMs earlier this year. Yet, to master these technologies takes much more experience—and the Russians have it. They could significantly assist the North Koreans, especially since the North has launched all of its longer-range missiles in lofted trajectories to keep them close by and be able to monitor them. Moreover, North Korea has no test data on realistic reentry conditions for its missiles. The Russians have plenty.
It’s possible that the Russians may also share rocket and satellite technologies for military surveillance from space. They may also share technologies for the other two legs of the triad of delivery systems, namely submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-delivered (either gravity bombs or cruise missiles).
JW: How realistic is it that Russia would help North Korea in any of these areas? They all violate various United Nations Security Council resolutions.
SH: That won’t stop Putin and the Russian government. Foreign Minister Sergey (Sergei) Lavrov said just the other day that those sanctions were imposed during very different geopolitical times, implying they are no longer relevant. I don’t think additional sanctions would stop the Russians. I think a greater impediment to such transfers of materials, equipment and know-how is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Soviet Union and Russia had been responsible nuclear states and supporters of the NPT since it entered into force in 1970 up to the invasion of Ukraine.
JW: So, what if Russia just eased into providing assistance by starting with dual-use technologies under the guise of civilian nuclear assistance?
SH: That’s the most likely way it may proceed. For example, it could help the North complete the ELWR, as I mentioned previously. It could help get the IRT-2000 back into operation. On the uranium front, it could supply the North with tons of LEU, claiming that it would be for ELWR fuel for electricity production. The North Koreans could then readily up the enrichment to weapons grade since LEU gets you about halfway there in terms of effort required. It could also start on the civilian front with help in space programs—satellite launch services and help with rockets. In all of these areas, the Russians could claim they’ll closely monitor to make sure the North uses these only for civilian programs—but that will ring pretty hollow to me.
JW: If Washington objects, couldn’t Moscow just point the finger back at Washington, saying that it has given similar questionable assistance, as in the case of the India deal?
SH: I imagine it would since the US dropped the sanctions it had applied to India after its 1998 nuclear tests. In 2005, the George W. Bush administration agreed to assist India with its civilian nuclear program and support its application to the Nuclear Suppliers Group despite India having declared itself a nuclear weapon state.
JW: If increased sanctions are not going to stop Russia from either the dual-use transfers or the more serious direct assistance with the North’s nuclear program, what’s to be done?
SH: The best bet is to alert China and the rest of the global community to the dangers of the new Russia-DPRK relations moving in this direction by pointing out the dangers, not only for Northeast Asia, but for the world. What I have outlined would be egregious violations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and responsible nuclear statehood. China can’t possibly want such a dramatic nuclear escalation—one that might spark a greater push for South Korea and Japan to build their own nuclear forces. And beyond the region, a completely fractured nonproliferation regime that could make others, such as Iran or Taiwan, become instant nuclear weapons states has to frighten China and the rest of the world. Perhaps these concerns could even awaken the Global South, which has been sitting mostly on the sidelines watching the Ukrainian crisis, to dissuade Russia from assisting the North’s nuclear program.
- [1]
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Siegfried S. Hecker, ed. Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers (Los Alamos: Bathtub Row Press, 2016), https://www.losalamoshistory.org/store/p265/Doomed_to_Cooperate.html.
- [2]
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Siegfried S. Hecker, ed. Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers, https://www.losalamoshistory.org/store/p265/Doomed_to_Cooperate.html.
2. Unification minister calls for cooperation with U.S. against N. Korea's suspected arms deal with Russia
Unification minister calls for cooperation with U.S. against N. Korea's suspected arms deal with Russia | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 22, 2023
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho expressed concerns Friday over North Korea's suspected arms deal with Russia and called for strengthened efforts between Seoul and Washington to protect international norms during his meeting with the U.S. ambassador in Seoul.
The meeting between Kim and Ambassador Philip Goldberg, their first encounter since Kim was appointed to the ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs, followed a rare summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin last week.
The summit took place at the Vostochny space center in Russia's Far East last Wednesday amid concerns the North could agree to supply ammunition for Russia's war in Ukraine in exchange for food aid and the transfer of weapons technology.
"It is unprecedented for a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to invade a neighboring country," Kim said, apparently referring to Russia's war in Ukraine.
"North Korea is taking this as an opportunity and supporting Russia with weapons," the minister said. "That is why in order for us to protect the rules and peace of the world, the United States and the Republic of Korea must cooperate."
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (R) and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg shake hands ahead of their meeting at the minister's office in Seoul on Sept. 22, 2023. (Yonhap)
Goldberg shared the minister's concerns over "what appears to be agreements between North Korea and Russia."
"All members of the U.N. Security Council have the responsibility to enforce the sanctions that are in place, and any exchange of weaponry and ammunition of any kind would be a violation of such commitments," he said.
Speaking on the North's dire human rights conditions, the unification minister stressed that the administration of Yoon Suk Yeol will continue to provide humanitarian aid to the reclusive regime, regardless of military and political situations, as it is closely related to human rights.
Goldberg said the U.S. also remains open to enter dialogue, without preconditions, with the North but that would require a regime that is "interested in negotiations and in denuclearization."
"We are deeply concerned about a regime in North Korea that spends its time and resources on building weapons of mass destruction rather than feeding its people," the ambassador said, adding the North's human rights situation is "intolerable."
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (R) and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg (L) meet at the minister's office in Seoul on Sept. 22, 2023. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 22, 2023
3. N. Korea holds politburo meeting to discuss Kim-Putin summit: KCNA
A victory celebration? WIll KCNA publish the results of the summit and include a description of the deals made?
(2nd LD) N. Korea holds politburo meeting to discuss Kim-Putin summit: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 22, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS photo, more info throughout)
SEOUL, Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held a politburo meeting with top officials to discuss the outcome of his latest summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and called for thorough follow-up measures, state media reported Friday.
During the political bureau meeting of the central committee of the Workers' Party held Wednesday, officials analyzed the significance of Kim's visit to Russia and introduced long-term plans for developing their bilateral relations, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
In his first politburo meeting since the summit, Kim stressed the need to "strengthen close contacts and cooperation among relevant fields of the two countries to expand and develop cooperation in every field in an all-round way."
He then called for active implementation of "constructive measures" for further deepening their bilateral ties in all fields and developing them onto a new high level."
The meeting also discussed a "series of ways for practically and comprehensively applying the successes" made by Kim "through his external activities," the KCNA said, without providing further details.
Presenting the report at the meeting, Kim Song-nam, department director of the committee, said the recent visit put North Korea-Russia relations on a "new strategic level in response to the demand of the new era and brought a radical change in the world geo-political situation."
The North's leader also held a photo session Wednesday with the delegation that accompanied him on his trip to Russia, the KCNA said in a separate report.
The rare summit between the two leaders took place at the Vostochny space center in Russia's Far East last Wednesday amid concerns the North could agree to supply ammunition for Russia's war in Ukraine in exchange for food aid and transfer of weapons technology.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from R, rear) presides over a politburo session of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang on Sept. 20, 2023, to discuss the outcome of his latest summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 22. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) holds talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space launch center in the Russian Far East on Sept. 13, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 22, 2023
4. N.K. rights groups hold rally against repatriation of defectors in front of Chinese Embassy
China is complicit in north Korean crimes against humanity.
N.K. rights groups hold rally against repatriation of defectors in front of Chinese Embassy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 22, 2023
SEOUL, Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- Civic groups on North Korea's human rights on Friday staged a rally in front of the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, urging Beijing not to send defectors back to their reclusive country amid apparently eased border controls.
In an open letter addressed to Chinese President Xi Jinping, the activists said over 2,000 North Korean defectors are being held in Chinese detention centers and facing severe punishment, such as the death penalty, if they return to the North.
Pointing out that China is a signatory of a U.N. Convention on refugees that prohibits refoulement, they urged Chinese authorities not to send the defectors back home.
Concerns have grown that defectors could be forcibly repatriated to the North as the secretive regime appears to be opening up its borders recently after years of stringent COVID-19 lockdown.
The rally was held on the occasion of North Korea Freedom Week, an annual campaign that aims to raise public awareness of the humanitarian situation in the reclusive nation. This year's freedom week, the 20th of its kind, runs until Saturday.
This undated file graphic, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows a map of North Korea with images of people. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 22, 2023
5. Russia lodges protest to S.Korean envoy over Yoon's UN speech
Russia is pretty thin skinned.
Russia lodges protest to S.Korean envoy over Yoon's UN speech
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-22 21:21 | North Korea · September 22, 2023
President Yoon Suk Yeol , left, poses for a photo with new Ambassador to Russia Lee Do-hoon after awarding him with a letter of credence at the presidential office in Seoul on July 26, 2023. Korea Times photo by Seo Jae-hoon
By Lee Hyo-jin
Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a complaint to South Korean Ambassador to Moscow Lee Do-hoon, Thursday (local time), over President Yoon Suk Yeol's remarks against Russia in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, marking an escalation in a diplomatic row between the two countries.
Russia's Vice Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko met the South Korean envoy to point out Yoon's remarks made earlier this week referring to Russia's engagement with North Korea , according to Moscow's foreign ministry, Friday.
"(The remarks) have seriously damanged Russia-South Korea relations. Unfortunately, it seems that Seoul prefers to shape its policy toward Russia based on conjecture and speculation," the ministry said in a statement.
It also warned that such a move will "create an unfavorable atmosphere for the development of bilateral cooperation and lead to dissapointment."
S. Korea calls on Russia to 'transparently explain' its dealing with NK amid suspected arms supply agreement
Lee said he will promptly deliver Russia's position to the South Korean government.
During his speech at the U.N. meeting in New York, Wednesday (local time), Yoon issued a warning against military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, saying any arms deal between the two countries would be a "direct provocation" against South Korea.
"If North Korea acquires the information and technology necessary to enhance its Weapons of Mass Distruction (WMD) capabilities in exchange for supporting Russia with conventional weapons, the deal will be a direct provocation threatening the peace and security of not only Ukraine, but also the Republic of Korea," he said.
Seoul's Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin summoned Russian Ambassador to Seoul Andrey Kulik, Monday, to protest Russia's military ties with North Korea.
During the meeting, Chang called on Moscow to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions and immediately end its moves to strenghthen military ties with North Korea.
Bilateral relations between South Korea and Russia have been showing signs of deterioration since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space center in Russia's Far East last week.
In response to the South Korean government's concerns about a potential arms deal between Moscow and Pyongyang, Russia warned Seoul against joining the "Washington-led anti-Russian propaganda."
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-22 21:21 | North Korea · September 22, 2023
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ New proclamation calls for intensified control over the economy
No centrally controlled economy has ever been successful in the long term. Kim has been using COVID to crack down on the population (recall that he fears the Korean people in the north more than the combined ROK/US militaries). But the blowback could be catastrophic for the regime because unlike the Arduous march of 94-96 three is no safety mechanism for either the regime or the people.
We must observe for indicators of instability.
COVID-19 Paradox
- No reported cases for 2 years – Outbreak (May 2022) and then Over (July 2022!)
- Assessment: highly unlikely
- Myriad reports from inside about quarantine camps and outbreaks among military
- Kim exploiting COVID to oppress, repress, and suppress
- Close borders, hinder markets, seize foreign currency, stop movement, information crackdown
- “Arduous March” – Great Famine of 1994-1996
- Estimated possibly 3 million perished
- “Saved” by ROK Sunshine policy (and $billions in aid from 1997-2007)
- Development of 400+ markets resilient women taking care of families
- Comparison –a COVID outbreak could be far worse
- Made worse by Kim’s policy decisions to exploit the situation to keep a stranglehold on the people and sustain power
- Regime Collapse: loss of central governing effectiveness by the party combined with loss of coherency and support of the military
＜Inside N. Korea＞ New proclamation calls for intensified control over the economy…Intense crackdowns on circulation of goods and use of foreign currency (3) Proclamation reveals Kim regime’s anti-market policies…government crackdowns down heavily on private economic activities
asiapress.org
(FILE PHOTO) An individual wearing a red armband is a market management officer who is monitoring sellers. Taken by “Mindeullae” at the Hyesan Market in August 2013. (ASIAPRESS)
＜Inside N. Korea＞New proclamation calls for intensified control over the economy…Intense crackdowns on circulation of goods and use of foreign currency (1) The authorities confiscate Chinese yuan and US dollars
In early August, the Kim Jong-un regime suddenly issued a proclamation ordering a ban on the use of foreign currency and that all distribution of goods fall under the management and control of the state. The proclamation said that severe violators of the order would face execution, which shows the state’s strong intent to tighten control over private business activities. The third part of ASIAPRESS’s investigation into the proclamation and its impact focuses on crackdowns on the distribution of goods. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)
◆ Proclamation reveals Kim regime’s anti-market policies
According to reporting partners in Yanggang and North Hamgyung provinces in mid-August, the proclamation, which was issued by the Ministry of Social Security, was entitled: “In Regards to the Thorough Ban on Goods Transactions Outside of Government Control and the Circulation of Foreign Currency.”
With the release of the proclamation, the authorities conducted explanatory lectures at neighborhood watch unit meetings and demanded adherence to its orders. Based on reports from multiple reporting partners, the main points of the proclamation can be summarized as follows:
〇 A strict ban on the use of foreign currency.
〇 Those involved in the retail and wholesale of state-owned food and goods handled by trading companies must register their activities with “commerce management bureaus” and preregister the food and products they intend to sell before engaging in sales activities. In principle, all sales must go through state-owned distribution networks, including state-run shops.
〇 The proclamation is aimed at ensuring that the prices, transport and storage of goods and food are not managed at the whim of private sellers.
〇 The act of a private citizen hiring someone else is considered an anti-socialist act and any violations will be strictly suppressed.
※ Neighborhood watch units are North Korea’s lowest administrative units and are typically made up of 20-30 households. The units take orders from local district offices and report on what people are doing and thinking to the authorities.
Below, ASIAPRESS has added some additional explanations regarding the above.
“Commerce management bureaus” are departments within people’s committees (local governments) that manage the distribution of consumer goods. The bureaus oversee “market management offices,” which manage and monitor state-run markets, which are also referred to as “jangmadang.”
“State-owned food” generally refers to crops produced by collective farms and imported food. There are times when authorities grant permission for food supplied to factories and companies to be sold to market sellers. Starting 3-4 years ago, the government banned the siphoning off of food produced in farms by private citizens and market sellers, and severely cracks down on violators of the ban.
In the run-up to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, trading companies largely sold goods and food imported from China to domestic markets, earning significant amounts of money in the process. The companies also handle the sale of food and consumer items, regardless of whether they are locally produced or imported. In Pyongyang and other areas, the wealthy entrepreneurial class, otherwise known as the “donju,” have long dominated the distribution of these goods.
In principle, North Korea’s socialist system has precluded any private employment; however, after the country’s economic collapse in the 1990s, the market economy flourished, leading the government to turn a blind eye to private employment outside of government control across a wide range of sectors. The “donju” have again played the main role in the spread of private employment through collusion with those in power.
(FILE PHOTO) A proclamation entitled “In Regards to the Strict Punishment of Those Who Distribute Foreign Currency Throughout the Territory of the DPRK,” which was posted in South Pyongan Province in December 2009. The proclamation even mentions execution of violators. Taken by journalist KIM Dong-chul (ASIAPRESS)
◆ The government states it will “not forgive” anyone violating its orders
While the proclamation reveals the Kim Jong-un regime’s “anti-market” policies, such policies are nothing new. In 2019, the regime had already begun intensifying efforts to suppress private economic activities across the country.
Then, in April 2021, the central government ordered strict controls to be imposed on private economic activities and crackdowns began, with even privately run restaurants being forced to close. It became impossible for businesspeople to hire others to help in small-scale business activities, such as selling food like bread and rice cakes, or even making clothes or transporting items by handcart.
The reporting partners told ASIAPRESS that these bans followed an order to “intensify socialism” and wage a “struggle against non-socialism and anti-socialism” that was emphasized during the Eight Party Congress in January of that year.
The massive crackdown conducted two years ago was implemented amid anti-disease controls aimed at stopping the movement of people and goods. Urban dwellers were dealt a major blow to their cash income as opportunities to do business or engage in day labor dried up. Among the vulnerable classes in provincial cities, people died of starvation and disease.
Through the recent proclamation, the regime has come out strongly against a phenomenon that has yet to be eliminated: the distribution of goods by private sellers. The proclamation’s mention of execution is a warning to those who fail to adhere to the government’s orders and shows the Kim Jong-un regime’s particular interest in intensifying its crackdowns on private business activities.
In the afternoon of August 30, nine people were publicly executed in Hyesan, Yanggang Province, although it is unclear whether their executions were related to the proclamation. They were accused of butchering a state-owned cow and distributing its meat for sale.
◆ Street sellers are forced to register their activities and pay market fees
Then, what kind of impact has the proclamation had on markets in North Korea? Several reporting partners in Yanggang Province provided the following reports:
“After the proclamation was issued, even those who sell goods near the markets must register themselves with ‘market management offices’ or they can’t sell things. There are a lot of people who come out to sell goods on the streets when the markets are about to close, but unregistered sellers have their entire stock confiscated by enforcers. The authorities conduct checks several times a day to confirm whether sellers inside and outside the markets are registered.
“You must pay market fees everyday once you’re registered. While the cost differs depending on the type of business, market fees range from KPW 250 to 500. The proclamation and the crackdowns are aimed at increasing the state’s coffers, in my view.”
※ KRW 10 equals around KPW 66.
“In the past, farmers sold vegetables and other food they grew in their gardens to market sellers, but now the authorities are cracking down on people who try to sell large amounts of their crops, saying that it goes against the proclamation.”
While what is happening near the markets is what gets noticed, the authorities’ crackdowns on small-scale business activities are just the tip of the iceberg. The reporting partners say that the real target of the crackdowns is somewhere else:
“The goal (of the crackdowns) is to eliminate the donju.” (To be continued in the next installment)
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)
asiapress.org
7. Kim Jong-un's rejection of Russia's food assistance irritates North Korean defectors
Another indication that Kim has no concern for the Korean people in the north.
He continues to prioritize nuclear and missile development (and support to the elite) over the welfare of the Korean people.
Kim Jong-un's rejection of Russia's food assistance irritates North Korean defectors
The Korea Times · by 2023-06-26 16:22 | North Korea · September 22, 2023
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un waves as he boards his train at a railway station in the town of Artyom outside Vladivostok in the Primorsky region, Russia, Sept. 17 / Reuters-Yonhap
By Kang Hyun-kyung
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un turned down Russia’s humanitarian offer to provide wheat to help relieve the North’s reportedly acute food shortages, according to a Russian diplomat.
In an interview with the Soloviov Live television channel on Sunday, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora quoted Kim as saying that the food situation in the North has improved.
“We offered our assistance and supplied 50,000 tons of wheat in 2020. (It was) free of charge as humanitarian assistance,” Matesegora said. “We were ready to do it now again.”
But he said Kim answered “no thanks” to Russia’s offer, adding the North Korean leader said he would ask them if the food situation in the North gets worse.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's food assistance offer came while Kim was in Russia for a summit between the two leaders. Kim left Pyongyang on his heavily armored train on Sept. 10 for the summit and returned home on Sept. 19 wrapping up his first international trip after the COVID-driven border closure.
North Korea reportedly has been plagued by severe crop shortages this year.
According to media reports and multiple North Korean defectors with access to informants in the North, a large but unspecified number of people are suffering from malnutrition and many cases of death by starvation have been reported, even in North Korea’s capital.
Some said the food situation in the North is the worst since the great famine that killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the mid-1990s.
North Korea plagued by worst famine, wary of impact
Kim’s turning down of Russia’s humanitarian assistance drew the ire of North Korean defectors living in South Korea who are all too familiar with the food crisis in the North.
Kim Seong-min, president of Free North Korea Radio in Seoul, lashed out at the North Korean leader for rejecting Russia’s offer, calling him “inhumane, cruel and self-centered.”
“I just came back from a seminar held in Seoul and met several North Korean defectors who were crying for help as their families, relatives and friends they left behind in the North are starving,” he told The Korea Times. “But Kim is turning a blind eye to poor North Koreans.”
When asked why he thinks Kim rejected Russia’s humanitarian assistance, the defector said Kim tried to save face. “He didn’t want to be seen as a needy, poor cousin begging for food,” he said. “He is fixated on securing technologies related to nuclear weapons and missiles and he doesn’t care how desperate the people of North Korea are.”
The North Korean public is known to have gone through one of the toughest years to date in terms of food scarcity.
Kwon Tae-jin, a senior economist at the private think tank GS&J Institute in Hanam City, Gyeonggi Province, said various factors had contributed to the food situation in the North going from bad to worse this year.
He said the COVID-led border closure, which continued for over three years from January 2020 following the outbreak of COVID-19 in China, the shutdown of markets and the poor grain harvest last year are some of the key reasons for the severe food shortages the North is experiencing.
“Earlier this year, North Korea imported grain from China. The total amount of grain shipments from China was the largest since 2020,” he said, without detailing how much food was imported. “But the imports didn’t help relieve food shortages, because unofficial food imports were banned. The unofficial food imports account for a larger portion of North Korea’s entire food supply.”
Kwon said the North Korean public, who don’t get rations from the government, suffered most as a result.
“If you want to buy food, you need cash. But they don’t have it,” he said.
Kwon said the food situation in the North had been serious until spring, adding that the situation will improve from October as corn harvesting began in August and continues through September.
There is no official data about North Korea’s food situation.
South Korea’s Rural Development Administration releases data on North Korea's food supply annually, based on projections. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, better known as the FAO, also releases data about crop production in North Korea from time to time. Unlike many other countries, North Korea doesn’t turn in related data every year to the FAO making it difficult for the U.N. agency to produce regular updates about the country.
The Korea Times · by 2023-06-26 16:22 | North Korea · September 22, 2023
8. Kim's dubious deal with Putin
Conclusion:
Putin and Kim have seen and discussed what each can offer the other. It won’t take long, however, for North Korea to tire of the Russians intruding into a country in which Russia, right now, has little real interest. For Putin, all that counts is North Korea's potential as a source of weapons for a war in which Kim has no stake aside from whatever he can extort from Russia.
Kim's dubious deal with Putin
The Korea Times · September 21, 2023
By Donald Kirk
Kim Jong-un’s magical mystery tour through the Russian Far East may have added a frightening dimension to the standoff between alliances in Northeast Asia. Russia appears poised to shower North Korea with fighter planes, warships and the technology to put satellites into orbit while North Korean factories, hidden around the country, pump out millions of artillery shells for Russia's beleaguered forces in Ukraine.
Neither the Russians nor the North Koreans, however, will find it all that easy to live up to whatever bargain they may have made. The fact that Russia’s President Putin has had to rely on a private army is one sign of weakness. What strong government hires a rather large security force competing, and at times conflicting with, its own regular army?
It’s just as telling that Russian industry cannot produce all the arms and ammunition needed to fight what is still an isolated war in a confined area. Just think of the strength of the old Soviet army when it defeated the Germans in 1943-45 after they had surrounded Leningrad, driven to the edge of Moscow and taken over Stalingrad in the darkest days of World War II.
The Russians suffered by far the worst casualties of any of the warring armies. After the war, however, they were strong enough to maintain their grip on satellite nations from Eastern Europe to Central Asia for another 40 or so years.
It was to recapture those glory days that Putin foolishly decided to conquer Ukraine after having seized Crimea and much of the southeastern Donbas region and bitten off bits of Georgia and Moldova. He wanted it all, as did Joseph Stalin when he tyrannized Ukraine into submission in the 1930s, starving the wheat-rich country by claiming harvests for Mother Russia.
Now, the question is whether the Russians can afford to build planes and much else for North Korea when they have to pump out ever more tanks and cannons and much else to replace their losses in a futile war. Sure, they can move supplies by train or truck to North Korea across their 20-kilometer-long Tumen River border and by sea without leaving territorial waters, but how much can they give while suffering shortages at home?
To meet the requirements as the war grinds on, Russian forces need about 10 million shells a year. Russian factories can make maybe 2 million shells. Can North Korea churn out that many? Not likely. Putin’s newfound love for North Korea has little to do with the North's welfare. He is going to lose patience when the North Koreans stop shipping all the shells he wants and aren’t able to provide other basic weapons either.
Yet another issue to consider is the historic rivalry between Russia and China. We keep hearing they are allies, two huge neighbors under dictatorial presidents, in common cause against U.S.-led alliances in Europe and Asia.
China’s President Xi Jinping cannot be totally thrilled, however, by the notion of Russia taking over as North Korea’s best friend. Remember the Sino-Soviet split of the Cold War when it turned out Mao Zedong and Stalin were not on such good terms after all?
And remember also that a Chinese, not a Russian, general joined in signing the armistice in Panmunjeom that ended the Korean War in 1953. The Russians were nowhere in sight at the signing despite having nurtured Kim Il-sung as a Soviet army officer and installed him as the North’s top leader after the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945.
Once Mao had led his Red Army to victory over all China in 1949, his “volunteers” saved the North from annihilation in the Korean War. The Soviet Union provided heavy equipment and air support in the war and exported supplies to North Korea until the fall of communist rule 32 years ago, after which they refused to accept worthless North Korean won in payment. Ever since, China has exerted by far the dominant influence.
Putin and Kim have seen and discussed what each can offer the other. It won’t take long, however, for North Korea to tire of the Russians intruding into a country in which Russia, right now, has little real interest. For Putin, all that counts is North Korea's potential as a source of weapons for a war in which Kim has no stake aside from whatever he can extort from Russia.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) writes about war and peace in Asia from Seoul and Washington.
The Korea Times · September 21, 2023
9. Countering North Korean ballistic missile submarines; choices for the threat
Excellent conclusion. I hope LTG Chun's wise counsel is heeded.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the North Korean ballistic missile submarine presents a formidable challenge to South Korean security. However, the pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine project must be balanced with the ability to meet the threat in a timely manner and within budget constraints. As we navigate this complex and evolving security landscape, a comprehensive strategy that includes enhancing anti-submarine capabilities remains a prudent course of action while negotiations and preparations for a nuclear-powered submarine program progress.
Countering North Korean ballistic missile submarines; choices for the threat
The Korea Times · September 21, 2023
By Chun In-bum
In the rapidly evolving landscape of international security, the recent unveiling of a modified Soviet-era submarine by North Korea has raised serious concerns. On Sept. 6, North Korea showcased a revamped submarine with the apparent capability to launch ten ballistic missiles. While it is understood that North Korea would require multiple submarines of this type to achieve full operational capacity, the mere existence of such a vessel represents a significant shift in the military balance in and around the Korean Peninsula.
The modified North Korean submarine operates on a diesel engine, a design choice that imposes certain limitations. Notably, it constrains the submarine's ability to launch ballistic missiles across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. However, the East Sea's favorable conditions for underwater vessels enhance the threat posed by this weapon system, especially concerning South Korea's security.
In response to this growing threat, proponents in South Korea have advocated for the development of nuclear submarines for two compelling reasons. Firstly, nuclear submarines have the remarkable capability to stay submerged for months, in stark contrast to conventional diesel-electric submarines, which are limited to days or weeks underwater. Secondly, nuclear submarines can maintain speeds of up to 40 knots at depth, a critical advantage over non-nuclear submarines that struggle to achieve speeds exceeding twenty knots underwater for prolonged durations, necessitating frequent resurfacing for battery recharging. These attributes make nuclear submarines ideally suited for detecting and neutralizing North Korean ballistic missile submarines.
The public sentiment in South Korea largely aligns with this viewpoint, overwhelmingly favoring the development of nuclear-powered submarines as a means to counter the North Korean threat. The concept revolves around South Korean nuclear submarines lying in wait for North Korean submarines to depart from their ports, tracking and shadowing these vessels, and taking decisive action if any indication of an attack emerges.
However, realizing this vision poses a complex challenge. The Republic of Korea must engage in negotiations with the United States to secure a new agreement regarding the use of atomic energy, a process that demands substantial effort and diplomacy and which could potentially generate friction between the two allies.
The duration and consequences of these negotiations remain uncertain, leaving South Korea with a pressing question: What steps should be taken in the interim?
North Korea's development of additional ballistic missile submarines and resolution of operational issues is expected to span three to five years. During this critical period, South Korea must establish a robust defense against this threat. Even if a new atomic agreement with the United States is successfully negotiated, the timeframe for designing, constructing and deploying nuclear-powered submarines is unlikely to align with the urgency of the situation. Thus, an immediate response is imperative.
One viable alternative to nuclear submarines is an investment in enhanced anti-submarine capabilities, which would be instrumental in patrolling, tracking and containing North Korean naval threats. Collaborative efforts with the United States and Japan to monitor the first island chain could foster trust and cooperation, potentially paving the way for a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine project in the future.
This comprehensive approach includes the upgrading of South Korea's air-independent propulsion submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and naval surface combatants. Collaborative initiatives with Washington and Tokyo should focus on the enhancement, sharing and analysis of acoustic and non-acoustic anti-submarine sensor information. Moreover, South Korea should direct resources toward developing new anti-submarine technologies, including airborne and underwater drones, anti-submarine wave runners, and artificial intelligence-enhanced anti-submarine systems.
Cost is a pivotal factor in this deliberation. The construction and maintenance of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines entail substantial expenses that necessitate a considerable increase in the defense budget. The fiscal implications of such a commitment must be meticulously evaluated and weighed against the urgency of the threat.
In conclusion, the North Korean ballistic missile submarine presents a formidable challenge to South Korean security. However, the pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine project must be balanced with the ability to meet the threat in a timely manner and within budget constraints. As we navigate this complex and evolving security landscape, a comprehensive strategy that includes enhancing anti-submarine capabilities remains a prudent course of action while negotiations and preparations for a nuclear-powered submarine program progress.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
The Korea Times · September 21, 2023
10. Open letter on China’s Forcible Repatriation of North Korean Refugees
Open letter on China’s Forcible Repatriation of North Korean Refugees
en.tjwg.org
September 21, 2023
President Xi Jinping
Zhongnanhai Ximen, Fuyou Street
Xicheng District, Beijing 100017
People’s Republic of China
CC:
Wang Xiaohong
Minister of Public Security
No. 14, Donchang’anjie,
Dongchengqu, Beijing, 100741
People’s Republic of China
Wang Yi
Foreign Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No. 2, Chaoyangmen Nandajie,
Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100701
People’s Republic of China
Re: China’s Forcible Repatriation of North Korean Refugees
Dear President Xi Jinping,
We are writing to express our concern about the resumption of forcible returns of North Koreans detained in the People’s Republic of China to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), which had stopped since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. We are concerned regarding news of North Korea’s border reopening, with the registration of around 200 athletes, coaches and officials to attend the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China (23 September to 8 October 2023), and your government’s resumption of forcible repatriations of reportedly 2,000 North Koreans detained in China.
The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (DPRK COI) found that the North Korean government committed crimes against humanity against persons forcibly repatriated from China. According to the DPRK COI, North Koreans who flee their country are at risk of torture, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and even execution and forced abortion and infanticide upon their forcible repatriation. However, China, which is a party to the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol and the Convention against Torture, which codify the principle of non-refoulement, continues to arbitrarily detain and hold North Korean escapees waiting for North Korea’s border opening to forcibly return them.
The DPRK COI recommended “China and other States” to “respect the principle of non-refoulement” and “abstain from forcibly repatriating any persons to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, unless the treatment there, as verified by international human rights monitors, markedly improves.” There has been no documentation of such improvement of treatment in North Korea. On 16 December 2013, the DPRK COI wrote a letter to Beijing summarizing its “concerns relating to China’s policy and practice of forced repatriation of DPRK citizens [including] particular concern about Chinese officials providing specific information on such persons to DPRK authorities,” and urging Beijing to “caution relevant officials that such conduct could amount to the aiding and abetting of crimes against humanity where repatriations and information exchanges are specifically directed towards or have the purpose of facilitating the commission of crimes against humanity in the DPRK.”
However, China’s policy and practice of forced repatriation of North Koreans has continued since then. During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment sent a letter to Beijing bringing to its attention information concerning “the arrest, detention and threat of repatriation of at least 1,170 individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in China, who have been arrested and detained for over a year since the borders between the DPRK and China were shut in January 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns”. The letter also referred to information that “on 14 July 2021, [the Chinese government] repatriated over 50 individuals of the DPRK who had been detained over a year in Shenyang”.
At a conference entitled “Actions to Tackle Forced Repatriation of North Korean Escapees in China” held in Seoul on September 7, 2023, James Heenan, the Representative of OHCHR Seoul, stated that: “Credible reports suggest a large number of North Koreans have been reportedly detained by Chinese authorities [over the] last three years but whom the DPRK would not accept back into the country due to the border closure and other COVID-19 prevention measures. As the DPRK begins to reopen its borders, these individuals could be repatriated at any time. For those that do not wish to return, the repatriation would be forcible”.
The UN Special Procedures, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and treaty bodies, especially the Committee against Torture and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, have repeatedly called upon China to respect the principle of non-refoulement for North Korean escapees. Various countries have made the same recommendations to China during its Universal Periodic Reviews.
China claims to address North Korean escapees in accordance with China’s domestic law, international law and humanitarian principles. However, China has failed to institute the “screening process” for North Korean asylum seekers or to provide them with “temporary identity certificates issued by public security organs” under article 46 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law, enacted in 2012.
China justifies the deportation of North Koreans under the bilateral treaties with North Korea such as the Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Cooperation for the Maintenance of State Safety and Social Order (July 1998), which provides in article 4(1) that those “who do not hold legal documents or have used a crossing point not specified in the documents will be treated as illegal border crossers” and in article 4(2) that “[i]llegal border crossers will be returned to the other side with information on their identity and specific situation.” However, such bilateral treaties cannot enable the forced return of North Korean refugees in violation of the principle of non-refoulement under article 33 of the Refugee Convention and article 3 of the Torture Convention.
Moreover, any humanitarian consideration should result in the granting of a legal status for the North Korean escapees and the stopping of their deportations back to North Korea where torture, sexual and gender-based violence, forced abortion, imprisonment in brutal labor camps and even executions await them. We note that the UN Refugee Agency in 2004 categorized North Korean escapees in China as “persons of concern” meriting humanitarian protection and proposed that China create a special humanitarian status for them to provide them with temporary documentation, access to services, and repeatedly called for protection against refoulement.
The official slogan of the 19th Asian Games Hangzhou 2022 is “Heart to Heart, @Future.” As Martin Luther King, Jr. said, we will not only win our freedom for ourselves, we will so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win you in the process, and our victory will be a double victory. In this regard, we urge you to officially end the policy of forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees and to implement the procedure for the individualized determination of refugee status.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Signature organizations and individuals (as of September 21, 2023)
Organizations
ACAT – Belgique (Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture) / Belgium
ACAT – France (Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture) / France
ACAT Germany (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture) / Germany
ACAT UK (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture) / UK
Advocates for Human Rights / USA
Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN) / Malaysia
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD) / Philippines
Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos / El Salvador
Association of Family Members of Disappeared (AFMD) / Sri Lanka
Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw, Inc. (BALAOD Mindanaw) / Philippines
Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL) / Argentina
Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) / UK
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) / South Korea
Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) / Indonesia
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) / USA
Death Penalty Focus (DFC) / USA
Desaparecidos Pilipinas / Philippines
Disarmament and Non-Violence / Georgia
Families of the Disappeared (FoD) / Sri Lanka
Federal Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany / Germany
Free Jonas Burgos Movement / Philippines
German Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (GCADP) / Germany
HanVoice / Canada
Human Rights Hub / Sri Lanka
Human Rights Watch (HRW) / USA
Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) / Belgium
Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI) / Indonesia
Improving North Korean Human Rights Center (INKHR) / South Korea
International Coalition Against Enforced Disappearances (ICAED)
International Coalition to Stop Crimes against Humanity in North Korea (ICNK)
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex (ILGA) Asia
Italian Federation for Human Rights (FIDU – Federazione Italiana Diritti Umani) / Italy
Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF) / Taiwan
Justice For North Korea / South Korea
Karapatan Alliance Philippines (KARAPATAN) / Philippines
Korean War POW Family Association / South Korea
Legal Literacy / Nepal
Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) / USA
Madres de Plaza de Mayo – Línea Fundadora / Argentina
Mulmangcho / South Korea
Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet) / South Korea
No Chain / USA
Non-Violence International / Canada
North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC) / USA
Peace and Hope International
Safeguard Defenders / Spain
Save North Korea / South Korea
Stepping Stones / UK
Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty (TAEDP) / Taiwan
THINK / South Korea
Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) / South Korea
UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea / UK
Viet Tan
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP)
Individuals
David Alton / Independent Crossbench Member of the House of Lords & Co-chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea
Sonja Biserko / Former Commission of Inquiry (COI) member on the situation of human rights in the DPRK & current chair at the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia
Roberta Cohen / Co-Chair Emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
Marzuki Darusman / Former UN Special Rapporteur/Commission on Inquiry (COI) member on the situation of human rights in the DPRK
Lee Yanghee / Former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar & Former Chairperson of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Tomás Ojea-Quintana / Former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK
Suzanne Scholte / Seoul Peace Prize Recipient & President of Defense Forum Foundation (USA)
Download the English PDF
Download the Korean PDF
Download the Chinese PDF
______________________________________________________
Kyodo News, “North Korea eyes sending 200-strong delegation to Asian Games in China”, May 13, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/05/3b8211a3706a-n-korea-eyes-sending-200-strong-delegation-to-asian-games-in-china.html (accessed September 5, 2023).
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the General Assembly (October 13, 2022), A/77/522, para. 9 (“The Special Rapporteur has received information that as many as 2,000 escapees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are currently detained in China as “illegal migrants” and are at risk of being repatriated to their country once the border reopens.”), https://undocs.org/A/77/522 (accessed September 5, 2023).
Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (7 February 2014), A/HRC/25/CRP.1, para. 1098-1114, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (accessed September 5, 2023).
Id., paras. 380-434.
Id., paras. 435-477.
Id., para. 1221(a).
Id., para. 1197.
Joint allegation letter to China by Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Miriam Estrada-Castillo, Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; and Nils Melzer, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, JAL CHN 8/2021, August 23, 2021, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26571 (accessed September 5, 2023).
Ha Chae-rim, “UN Human Rights Office Head Says “North Korean escapees in danger of torture if repatriated to North Korea; China should not forcibly repatriate” [유엔인권사무소장 “탈북민 북송시 고문위험…中, 강제송환 안돼“]”, Yonhap News, September 7, 2023 [in Korean], https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230907054551504 (accessed September 10, 2023).
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,, Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of China (May 31, 2023), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/9, para. 29, https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/9 (accessed September 5, 2023); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China (February 3, 2016), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, paras. 46-48, https://undocs.org/CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (accessed September 5, 2023); Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of China (December 12, 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, para. 26, https://undocs.org/CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (accessed September 5, 2023).
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China) (December 4, 2013), A/HRC/25/5, paras. 186.66, 186.241, 186.242 and 186.243, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/25/5 (accessed September 5, 2023).
Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the 27th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on June 30, 2012), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/09/22/content_281474988553532.htm (accessed September 5, 2023).
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Press Release, UNHCR chief calls on states to respect non-refoulement after North Koreans deported from Laos, May 30, 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/news/news-releases/unhcr-chief-calls-states-respect-non-refoulement-afternorth-koreans-deported (accessed September 7, 2023); Shin Hyon-hee, “UNHCR ups efforts to protect N.K. defectors,” Korea Herald, March 2, 2014, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140302000452 (accessed September 7, 2023).
en.tjwg.org
11. S. Korea calls on Russia to ‘transparently explain’ its dealing with NK amid suspected arms supply agreement
Explain yourself, Russia.
"I want to lead the axis of authoritarians."
S. Korea calls on Russia to ‘transparently explain’ its dealing with NK amid suspec
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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