Quotes of the Day:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

- United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

“When liberty exceeds intelligence, it begets chaos, which begets dictatorship.”

- Will Durant

"You have to look deeper, way below the anger, the hurt, the hate, the jealousy, the self-pity, way down deeper where the dreams lie… Find your dream. It's the pursuit of the dream that heals you."

- Billy Mills, member of the Oglala Lakota and U.S. Olympic gold medalist in track and field

1. Why America Should Send Military Advisers to Ukraine

2. Wither Political Warfare: The Future of Grey Zone Competition

3. Irregular Warfare Podcast: China’s Political Warfare

4. What is Meaningful Human Control, Anyway? Cracking the Code on Autonomous Weapons and Human Judgment

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2023

6. Zelenskyy returns to Washington as GOP dissent grows to funding war

7. Navy Campaigns of Learning

8. THE PATRIOT (General Milley)

9. Pentagon exempts Ukraine operations from potential government shutdown

10. The Threat of an Authoritarian Century

11. China sentences Uyghur academic to life in prison in Xinjiang

12. Opinion | The all-volunteer force is dying. Here’s how to save it.

13. The Black Box of Moscow

14. The Case Against Containment

15. S. Korea calls on Russia to ‘transparently explain’ its dealing with NK amid suspected arms supply agreement

16. Putin vows to strengthen support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative

1. Why America Should Send Military Advisers to Ukraine

Some good points in this essay. Of course my bias is toward the importance of advising and assisting. However, this conclusion needs further refinement. This is not a mission calling for simply sending a Security Force Assistance battalion (or even an entire SFA brigade). There will need to be an IW proficient campaign HQ (probably a purpose built task force) that knows how to orchestrate,advise and assist activities integrating a wide range of disciples and capabilities. You cannot simply deploy advising forces on a piecemeal basis. There are some models for consideration from El Salvador to Colombia to the Philippines.

Conclusion:

And deploying military advisers is, ultimately, one of the best ways Washington can help Kyiv win—especially given the cost. The routine deployment of a single battalion task force from a U.S. security force assistance brigade costs about $12 million, according to a recent study published by the Association of the United States Army. By contrast, the combined cost of just one Abrams tank and one Bradley Fighting Vehicle is almost $15 million. The training and advising that NATO troops are doing in Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom shows that such trainers can significantly bolster the Ukrainian armed forces. Western training, for example, taught Ukrainian soldiers how to skillfully use the long-range rockets that help neutralize Russian command posts and logistics hubs. If advisers begin working from inside Ukraine and at multiple levels of the country’s defense apparatus, they will strengthen the country’s democracy and fully prepare it for NATO membership. Advisers will, in other words, help bring about the war’s endgame: a free Ukraine integrated into the institutions at the foundation of Europe.

Why America Should Send Military Advisers to Ukraine

On-the-Ground Help Will Bolster Kyiv Without Risking Escalation

By Alexandra Chinchilla and Sam Rosenberg

September 22, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Alexandra Chinchilla and Sam Rosenberg · September 22, 2023

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive enters its fourth month, its armed forces have shown tenacity and adaptability. Kyiv is applying pressure across multiple fronts in southern and eastern Ukraine, and it has made notable progress. In August, Ukraine liberated the village of Robotyne, penetrating the first line of minefields, tank traps, and trenches in the south. Early in September, Ukrainian troops began attacking the second line, an important step toward severing the land bridge connecting Russia with its troops in Crimea and Kherson.

Still, Russia has recently managed to keep its territorial losses to a minimum, and analysts are naturally asking what Ukraine’s Western allies can do next to help Kyiv. It is not a simple question. The United States has provided more than $43 billion in military aid to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February 2022, including the latest artillery, air defenses, and armored vehicles. U.S. allies are planning to send F-16 fighter jets, too, which will arrive later this year. And since December 2022, Western advisers have trained more than 63,000 Ukrainian soldiers in 17 new combat brigades. Instructors have taught individual tactics, small unit drills, collective techniques, and specialized equipment and leadership skills. To some policymakers, it is hard to imagine what else the West could offer.

But there is still an important step the United States, in particular, can take to help Ukraine. Although Western instruction has reached many Ukrainian soldiers, it has missed the overwhelming majority. That is because Western training has been administered outside Ukraine, from locations across Europe. This distance has limited how many Ukrainians can access instruction and how customized the training can be to the terrain of Ukraine and the specialized tactics needed there. It also limits the extent to which the United States can catalyze enduring transformations in Ukraine’s defense establishment.

Washington should therefore lift the strict restrictions on the number of U.S. government personnel allowed in Ukraine and begin stationing military advisers within the country and across its defense apparatus. Sending advisers would increase the number of Ukrainian soldiers who receive top-of-the-line training. It would enhance Washington’s understanding of Kyiv’s material needs, allowing U.S. policymakers to fine-tune the aid they already provide and offer psychological assurance to Ukraine. Positioning U.S. advisers inside Ukraine would let Washington better champion crucial defense reforms that could pave Ukraine’s path toward NATO and EU membership. Advisers would give the United States an added layer of oversight, as well, ensuring that aid is both optimized and employed responsibly. And, critically, deploying advisers would deliver these results at a reasonable cost.

Some officials might fear that by sending advisers to Ukraine, the United States will prompt Russian President Vladimir Putin to escalate the conflict. If Washington put U.S. troops on Ukraine’s frontlines, it might. But it is possible to send noncombat advisers in a way that would keep U.S. combat troops out of the war. Past Western assistance has not changed Moscow’s behavior. So long as the United States places its advisers inside Ukraine but outside the battlefield, this decision won’t either.

U.S. advisers could, of course, still come under attack: no one in Ukraine is truly safe from Russia. Experts might also fear that—should Washington put boots on the ground—it will invariably lead to an endless American military commitment. But Kyiv does not want Washington to defeat Russia on its behalf; it is not South Vietnam. What Ukraine wants is more U.S. assistance, which it deserves to receive.

STEP INSIDE

The United States is accustomed to providing on-the-ground military advice. It has entire organizations—the Army Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces, and the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program—dedicated to providing guidance to other countries, and it should send these soldiers to Ukraine. There, U.S. forces can serve in three distinct capacities. One type of adviser—tactical-level trainers—could instruct the Ukrainian National Guard and armed forces on basic soldier skills, collective training, and junior leadership from well behind the frontlines. The second type, operational-level advisers, could embed with the Ukrainian general staff and service staffs responsible for the war’s strategy and its execution, where they would focus on improving logistics and gaining insights from the ongoing conflict. The final type, strategic-level advisers, could work directly with Ukraine’s government to lay the groundwork for EU and NATO membership. (Although there are some strategic-level advisers already in Ukraine, the country clearly needs more.) Critically, none of these advisers would accompany Ukrainian troops into active combat zones or help call in airstrikes.

Deploying these advisers would help Kyiv in multiple ways. At the most basic level, the advisers would give Washington a nuanced understanding of the conflict, allowing it to select and provide the most effective weapons, equipment, and training in a precise and timely fashion. These insights would also be valuable for the U.S. armed forces. Ukraine is, at this point, the world’s most experienced military power when it comes to confronting a near-peer adversary on the battlefield. Acquiring firsthand experience and insights from the Ukrainian battlefields could prove indispensable to Washington, especially if it has to fight against China or Russia in the future.

Training inside Ukraine would also yield immediate battlefield benefits. Kyiv, pressed for time and needing its soldiers on the frontlines, struggles to dispatch the majority of its soldiers abroad for training. This constraint denies its forces the opportunity for high-quality instruction. As a result, many soldiers die for completely preventable reasons, including simple blood loss that most Western troops can treat through tactical combat casualty care training. Bringing U.S. trainers into Ukraine would rectify this unfortunate situation, and it would help well-trained soldiers reach the frontlines much faster than they do today.

The United States has entire organizations dedicated to providing military guidance.

As these trainers help Ukraine win on the battlefield now, strategic-level advisers would help the country get ready for the months and years ahead. Strategic-level advisers, in particular, could guide Ukraine through the process of executing defense reforms, such as establishing a transparent and accountable procurement system for defense equipment. These reforms are necessary for Ukraine’s aspirations to join and integrate into NATO in the future. A 2020 study conducted by one of us (Chinchilla) and the political scientist Paul Poast looked at NATO enlargement in 2004, when the organization added Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states. The study found that the time leading up to NATO and European Union membership offers a unique window of opportunity for prospective members to establish robust democratic institutions. But to take advantage of this moment, Ukraine needs U.S. advisers who can offer an external push for reform.

The long-term benefits of on-the-ground training and advising go beyond reforms. If this support is accompanied by high-level visits from U.S. policymakers and military leaders, it will send a powerful message of reassurance to Kyiv. The United States would have “skin in the game” by sending its own service members, signaling to the Ukrainians that Washington is truly dedicated to helping them win. In a long-term war of attrition, such psychological support may prove decisive in helping Kyiv outlast Putin.

The United States would need to limit the size of its advising presence in order to manage the risk of being targeted by Russia. But this limit would be an advantage. According to a new study by the political scientists Liam Collins and Alex Deep, the United States is most successful at bolstering allied militaries when its advisory footprint is restricted. The reason is simple: larger deployments inadvertently undermine the perceived legitimacy of the partner country’s military—or can even build dependence. Washington will want to make sure that Kyiv continues to lead.

LOW RISK, HIGH REWARD

If the United States opts to send military advisers to Ukraine, there will invariably be backlash from analysts worried about escalation. These analysts will argue that Russia—in response to the presence of U.S. advisers—could take extreme measures including attacking another state, such as Moldova. But these fears would be overblown. Russia is in no position to escalate the conflict with conventional weapons given that it has its hands more than full fighting against Ukrainian forces. And Moscow has little to gain by attacking a NATO member, which would draw the United States deeper into the war and put Russia in an even weaker position.

Russia could also escalate by using its nuclear weapons—a prospect that everyone should take seriously. But all available evidence suggests that Moscow will not resort to its nuclear arsenal. A decision by Washington to send noncombat advisers 19 months into the war is consistent with the U.S. policy of gradually increasing aid, which some argue has effectively managed escalation thus far. (Sending combat troops would be a sharp escalation that breaks with this pattern.) Despite the saber rattling that followed Western shipments of lethal aid, Russia has done almost nothing in response.

In fact, the Kremlin has long tolerated U.S. military operations near its forces. During the early days of the Cold War, an estimated 6,000 Soviet military advisers were stationed right across from U.S. troops in South Korea, and these Soviet forces participated in dogfights against U.S. pilots. But the conflict never went nuclear. In 2018, according to The New York Times, U.S. soldiers killed hundreds of Russian and Syrian forces in a single engagement in Syria without provoking any tangible response. And from 2015 to 2022, Washington had military advisers in Ukraine, even as the country fought with Russia in its easternmost provinces. During this period, U.S. advisers helped build a training center at Yavoriv, created Ukraine’s special forces units, and offered guidance to the Ministry of Defense. Only in February 2022 were they pulled out.

All available evidence suggests that Moscow will not resort to its nuclear arsenal.

Some analysts may have a very different escalatory concern: that U.S. advisers could die, igniting a public outcry in the United States and thereby pressuring U.S. policymakers to intensify the conflict. But this fear, too, does not hold up to scrutiny. A 2023 article by the political scientists Paul Musgrave and Steven Ward threw cold water on the power of the so-called tripwire effect: the notion that initial casualties inevitably lead to broader military engagement. History, it turns out, is full of episodes in which Western forces died in a war without causing the conflict to intensify. British forces experienced significant losses in the 1982 Falklands War, for example, but the United Kingdom did not expand its objectives beyond holding onto the islands, keeping the war localized and contained. Similarly, when Americans were killed subduing Islamic State (or ISIS) fighters in Niger in 2017, the United States did not ramp up its operations in West Africa.

Washington can also take steps to reduce the risks of casualties. The United States could concentrate its military advisers at the U.S. embassy in Kyiv, which is protected by Patriot missiles. It could station the rest of them at a safe distance from the frontlines, although still close enough to have a meaningful effect. A recent report from ABC News and verified by a U.S. official indicates that the United States has dispatched a contingent of special operations advisers to the embassy aimed at bolstering intelligence support for Ukraine’s special forces. If this report is accurate, Washington has already decided to provide this kind of support. But its decision still leaves Ukraine’s conventional land forces—which do most of the fighting—without dedicated support or training inside the country.

A final slate of critics will not be worried about immediate escalation. Instead, they will argue that sending advisers to Ukraine will limit Washington’s capacity to exit the conflict, as the United States discovered in Vietnam and then in Afghanistan. The Vietnam scenario would be particularly concerning, given that the insurgency in South Vietnam grew stronger while U.S. advisers were in the country, ultimately pushing Washington to directly intervene in the war.

Ukraine is much more capable than Afghanistan or South Vietnam ever was.

But plenty of advisory missions never lead to broader military involvement. According to ongoing research by one of us (Chinchilla), out of 82 cases of advisory missions by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to countries experiencing civil war between 1946 and 2019, 28 ended without accompanying special operations forces or combat troops. An advisory mission to Ukraine would likely be another such example.

Ukraine is not, after all, fighting a civil war, and the United States tends to be even more cautious when dealing with interstate conflicts. Ukraine is also much more capable than Afghanistan or South Vietnam ever was, and Kyiv is not trying to pull the United States directly into the conflict. And unlike U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, who escalated the war in Vietnam to protect his own credibility, U.S. President Joe Biden’s reputation is not firmly tangled up in foreign adventures

There are plenty of historical templates that Washington can follow for how to deploy advisers and avoid escalation risks. The United States, for example, successfully helped the Philippine military put down the Hukbalahap Rebellion, and it helped Greece’s Hellenic Army win the country’s civil war. In both cases, the United States provided crucial assistance without becoming a combatant. But perhaps the best such case comes from El Salvador. During that country’s civil war, Washington helped the El Salvadorian government stand its ground against leftist militias by sending military advisers during the Carter and Reagan administrations. But the United States, wary of escalation, deployed these advisers in small numbers and positioned them away from the frontlines, underscoring their noncombat role. This measured approach kept Washington out of the war while still helping the government survive.

And compared with other governments Washington has assisted, Ukraine would be an exceptional partner. It is led by a government that enjoys substantial popular support and legitimacy. Its formidable military is buoyed by a populace dedicated to Ukraine’s defense. The United States has done much to help this populace by providing weapons and ammunition. But Washington’s experiences in El Salvador, Greece, and many other countries show that military advisers are the best way to bolster battlefield effectiveness and foster a stronger partnership between the United States and the local forces.

BE BOLD

Sending advisers to Ukraine will, of course, require substantial political will on the part of the Biden administration. Biden may struggle to muster such will, especially as he prepares for the 2024 election and faces political opponents much more hesitant to aid Kyiv.

But Biden should not underestimate the ability of Americans to grasp why it is important to support Ukraine. It is true that recent polls show that U.S. support for Ukraine has fallen, but the dip is slight and to be expected over any long intervention. On the whole, support for helping Kyiv remains remarkably strong. A September CBS News poll, for example, found that 67 percent of Americans want the United States to give aid to Ukraine.

Biden should seize on this support, and he should use his messaging power to keep it high. Effective communication can go a long way toward shaping public opinion, and Biden should explain to Americans why they ought to keep backing Kyiv. The answer, after all, is straightforward and compelling: Ukraine is a bulwark against Russian expansionism in Europe. Were Kyiv to lose, it would jeopardize Europe’s stability, which Washington has worked hard to maintain since the end of World War II. Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is also necessary for the United States’ pivot toward Asia. If Moscow triumphs, the United States risks being dragged back into Europe when it would rather focus its attention elsewhere.

And deploying military advisers is, ultimately, one of the best ways Washington can help Kyiv win—especially given the cost. The routine deployment of a single battalion task force from a U.S. security force assistance brigade costs about $12 million, according to a recent study published by the Association of the United States Army. By contrast, the combined cost of just one Abrams tank and one Bradley Fighting Vehicle is almost $15 million. The training and advising that NATO troops are doing in Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom shows that such trainers can significantly bolster the Ukrainian armed forces. Western training, for example, taught Ukrainian soldiers how to skillfully use the long-range rockets that help neutralize Russian command posts and logistics hubs. If advisers begin working from inside Ukraine and at multiple levels of the country’s defense apparatus, they will strengthen the country’s democracy and fully prepare it for NATO membership. Advisers will, in other words, help bring about the war’s endgame: a free Ukraine integrated into the institutions at the foundation of Europe.

• ALEXANDRA CHINCHILLA is an Assistant Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
• SAM ROSENBERG is a Ph.D. candidate at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army. The views expressed here are his own.

Foreign Affairs · by Alexandra Chinchilla and Sam Rosenberg · September 22, 2023

2. Wither Political Warfare: The Future of Grey Zone Competition

A view from Australia. The author is a man after my own heart lamenting the lack of consideration for political and irregular warfare (and the gray zone).  

Instead, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has seemingly snapped back to what Cathal Nolan described as the “allure of battle,” a cognitive dissonance orientated to the false ideal of decisive battle. Such dissonance is evidenced by the lack of discourse surrounding political warfare and irregular warfare concepts, a situation that is unsurprising given the historically scant appearance of such concepts within Staff College and War College curricula, and professional military journals. This cognitive dissonance reminds us that alliances are only as effective as their common sense of threat and their common alignment to an effective response. Efforts like the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the Irregular Warfare Centre, the Competitive Statecraft Initiative at Arizona State University, and the Security and Defence PLuS Alliance, are nascent responses to this international dialogue and education imperative.

...

Because Australia is orienting bureaucratically toward battle in warfighting domains, it is unclear who responds to the cross-domain, thematic challenges of political warfare, irregular warfare, and information warfare.

...

Despite rhetoric of an increased risk of conflict, we must also acknowledge that today we are in a daily competition for the global rules-based order that is being eroded by the establishment of parallel hierarchies that​ require an appropriate response. This is even more important given that such competitive measures continue in conflict, as has been well evidenced by PWE efforts in Europe during World War II.

As Australia develops its 2024 Australian National Security Strategy, allies must work with Australian agencies to address gaps in our mutual appreciation of threats faced in the Indo-Pacific. We cannot afford to wither in understanding political warfare and must instead adapt to compete across the grey zone of competition.

Wither Political Warfare: The Future of Grey Zone Competition - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Andrew Maher · September 22, 2023

“Nothing becomes a General more than to anticipate the Enemy’s plans.”

— Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, Book 3, Verse 18.

The term “grey zone” was a curious absentee from this year’s Australian Defence Strategic Review. Nor were similar terms, like “political warfare,” “subversion,” or “irregular warfare,” even once mentioned. This absence is notable given the prominence afforded in the earlier Defence Strategic Update, where grey zone was defined as one of a range of terms used to describe “activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict.” The DSU identified that such activities are occurring now, a conclusion reinforced by a recent study of China’s strategy of political warfare by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS argues that “China is conducting an unprecedented campaign below the threshold of armed conflict,” using what the American Enterprise Institute described as “persuasion, coercion, and compellence.” In other words, grey zone activities are occurring now with unprecedented frequency and purpose.

Despite the purpose of the DSR being to respond to a state of increasing competition in the Indo-Pacific region, the DSR has seemingly ignored the nature of that competition.

The resultant dilemma is a grey zone gap that suggests a bureaucratically disinterested and culturally oblivious Australian Defence Force regarding the means of competing with actors engaging in grey zone activities, or “comprehensive coercion.” This, as Machiavelli indicates above, implies a need for leadership. That leadership has been provided by Ross Babbage and David Stillwell, who explore the issues associated with the Chinese Communist Party’s use of political warfare on the IWI podcast.

Australian Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell also provided such leadership in 2019, stating a “new, modernised version of political warfare may have already begun.” He recently reinforced this message by stating that Australia was responding to “political warfare’s worst excesses.” Grey zone activities “subverted, eroded and undermined,” he argued, but “fell short of requiring a war response.” The silence in response to General Campbell’s 2019 call to arms is telling: it suggests that there is limited understanding of how to respond to such threats among his subordinates, as is evidenced by the gaps in the DSR. It might also point to a limited cultural interest in responding to such threats.

It is possible such criticism is unwarranted, and that the classified version of the DSR does appropriately address autocratic political warfare, economic coercion, information campaigns, and “united front” tactics. Absence of such threats from the unclassified version, is a dangerous omission, for several reasons. First, as Colin Gray reminds us, the strategy bridge must be built between operational concepts (ways) and resources (means), to connect with political objectives (ends). This helps to ensure that a political narrative unites society with a sense of purpose, to shoulder the costs of their defense, as the DSR implores the Australian polity. Second, the DSU discussed such topics at an unclassified level in 2020, likely cognisant of the need for political support and therefore a precedent of calling out such threats exists. Third, the US National Defense Strategy (NDS) included an unclassified Irregular Warfare Annex, to “influence populations and affect legitimacy” with a stated purpose “to impose costs and create dilemmas for our adversaries across the full spectrum of competition and conflict.” The NDS creates such a strategy bridge not just across the US defense community but also with America’s allies. Failure to address or even acknowledge these alliance concerns in the DSR suggests that Australian strategists aren’t attuned to this element of US policy.

Instead, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has seemingly snapped back to what Cathal Nolan described as the “allure of battle,” a cognitive dissonance orientated to the false ideal of decisive battle. Such dissonance is evidenced by the lack of discourse surrounding political warfare and irregular warfare concepts, a situation that is unsurprising given the historically scant appearance of such concepts within Staff College and War College curricula, and professional military journals. This cognitive dissonance reminds us that alliances are only as effective as their common sense of threat and their common alignment to an effective response. Efforts like the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the Irregular Warfare Centre, the Competitive Statecraft Initiative at Arizona State University, and the Security and Defence PLuS Alliance, are nascent responses to this international dialogue and education imperative.

A defense culture obsessed with the allure of battle manifests in the combat-centric themes in the DSR and in the bureaucratic structure of the Defence Department. The Information Warfare Division within the ADF, recently became the Cyber Warfare Division, seemingly shifting what might have been a logical home for a thematic, strategic capability for information warfare, psychological operations, and deception, instead into a battle-orientated domain. In short, there seems to be limited bureaucratic organisation in the Australian national security community oriented toward grey zone threats and it is thus unsurprising that gaps then emerge in policy.

This bureaucratic shift from an information warfare division to a cyber warfare division is emblematic of Western warfighting culture that is confused between the mechanisms and means of grey zone competition. The mechanisms of political warfare remain unchanged over time: the establishment of influence in a target society via cadres, the orchestration of those cadres to identify and exacerbate existing grievances, the establishment of competing narratives, the alignment of such narratives with a parallel hierarchy, coercion of the population to conform with the dictates of that parallel hierarchy, and the negation of a target governance structure (whether it be village, district, state or national) to create un- or under-governed space that can then be exploited. This multi-step mechanism has, for instance, exploited physical cadres in South Vietnam, local newspapers in support of Indira Gandhi in India over the 1970s, and social media handles today. The reality is that cyber is not the threat—subversive influence is—and it might be affected via “fifth columnist” whispering campaigns, loudspeakers, leaflets, newspapers, or social media posts. Because Australia is orienting bureaucratically toward battle in warfighting domains, it is unclear who responds to the cross-domain, thematic challenges of political warfare, irregular warfare, and information warfare.

Autocratic political warfare, by contrast, has a clear mechanism, intent, and purpose. It coerces through the slow and methodical establishment of a parallel hierarchy of competitive control to pursue its revisionist political agendas. A parallel hierarchy can be seen in extra-judicial police stations and coercion of diaspora communities. A parallel hierarchy can also be seen in narratives of “one China” that implicitly coerce toward Beijing’s will. Work undertaken in building parallel hierarchies is undertaken by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, the International Liaison Department, and the United Front Work Department. In the Chinese system, there are clear bureaucratic responsibilities and authorities for the conduct of political warfare. Autocratic political warfare is employed to achieve objectives in a cumulative strategy of building relative advantages to such an extent that military means become an untenable or irrelevant response option.

This context matters to an American audience as it works with allies and partners to contest the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Indo-Pacific. It is most likely that the CCP will continue its incremental efforts, thus attempting to win without fighting, as their recent assault on democracy in Hong Kong demonstrates. To contest such gradualism, Western democracies should, in fact, recognise that there are many Chinas and many systems, as China’s autonomous and special administrative regions implicitly recognise. Many Chinas are also created by a worldwide diaspora of ethnically Chinese people, many of whom enjoy the freedoms life in the United States, Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, and elsewhere affords; just as there are many forms of democracy worldwide, tailored to the values their local, provincial, state, or national governments represent. The security of these people and their communities is threatened by an inherently dictatorial One China political warfare narrative that deserves an appropriate response in Australia’s 2024 National Security Strategy.

Despite rhetoric of an increased risk of conflict, we must also acknowledge that today we are in a daily competition for the global rules-based order that is being eroded by the establishment of parallel hierarchies that​ require an appropriate response. This is even more important given that such competitive measures continue in conflict, as has been well evidenced by PWE efforts in Europe during World War II.

As Australia develops its 2024 Australian National Security Strategy, allies must work with Australian agencies to address gaps in our mutual appreciation of threats faced in the Indo-Pacific. We cannot afford to wither in understanding political warfare and must instead adapt to compete across the grey zone of competition.

Andrew Maher is a PhD candidate and lecturer on irregular warfare with the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Canberra. He holds fellowships with the Modern War Institute at West Point, Joint Special Operations University, and Charles Sturt University Terrorism Studies programs.

Main image: Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin meet with their staffs at Australian Navy base HMAS Watson in Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2015. (D. Myles Cullen/DoD)

3. Irregular Warfare Podcast: China’s Political Warfare

Take 50 minutes for this podcast at this link:  https://mwi.westpoint.edu/irregular-warfare-podcast-chinas-political-warfare/

Irregular Warfare Podcast: China’s Political Warfare - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Darnley-Stuart, Julia McClenon · September 22, 2023

What are the fundamental tenets of China’s approach to political warfare? What does it look like when Beijing employs political warfare in the real world? And how is it different, in both theory and practice, from the way the United States and its allies conceptualize warfare?

In this episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, our guests explore these questions and more. Dr. Ross Babbage is a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, served as the head of strategic analysis in Australia’s Office of National Assessments, and is the author of the book The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win against China? David Stilwell is the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a retired US Air Force officer, and former director of the China Strategic Focus Group at US Indo-Pacific Command.

During the discussion, the two offer examples of China’s information operations and how they intersect with a variety of global security challenges. They also share recommendations on how to counter China’s political warfare and build resilience against it.

You can listen to the full episode, hosted by Adam Darnley-Stuart and Julia McClenon, below, or find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Be sure to subscribe so you don’t miss an episode!

Image credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro, US Navy

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Adam Darnley-Stuart, Julia McClenon · September 22, 2023

4. What is Meaningful Human Control, Anyway? Cracking the Code on Autonomous Weapons and Human Judgment

Conclusion:

It is important to conceptualize and embed MHC in an AWS, but experts must broaden the scope of what and who contributes to MHC in practice. Deconstructing the weapon system life cycle offers a glimpse into stages wherein different stakeholders operationalize MHC in a multitude of ways. Each stage explored here—design and development, operational planning, and tactical planning and engagement—presents different considerations and interests that permeate decision-making at that stage and ultimately demonstrate MHC’s different varieties and manifestations. This is not to advocate that one stage, more than others, is where MHC exists—although many current discussions do implicitly make that case by focusing one tactical employment. It is also not to suggest that all the stages cumulatively constitute MHC. MHC is a moving target. But as autonomous weapon systems increasingly appear on the future battlefield, it is imperative to prepare by pushing the boundaries of current discourse on MHC and thinking creatively about how it can and should be operationalized in practice.

What is Meaningful Human Control, Anyway? Cracking the Code on Autonomous Weapons and Human Judgment - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Lena Trabucco · September 21, 2023

Flying high above a near-future battlefield, an AI-enabled MQ-9 Reaper drone alerts operators that it has detected enemy forces moving in a vehicle in a remote location. The drone uses available data to predict that the vehicle will enter a residential area in fifteen seconds. Operators receive the alert and a request to authorize a strike before the window of opportunity closes. With three seconds left for optimal strike conditions, the operator is still deliberating, and the drone has not yet received either approval or rejection for the strike request. The drone engages the vehicle with one second left under what it has identified as optimal conditions. Six noncombatants are killed.

In the wake of the strike, the public discussion focuses on whether the operator had meaningful human control (MHC) of the autonomous weapon system (AWS). But that is the wrong question to ask, and focusing on the MHC of solely the operator in this tactical situation fails to appreciate the significance of the entire life cycle of the AWS. What about the MHC of the developers and designers of the AWS? What about the campaign planner who authorized the introduction of the AWS into this operational environment and authorized AWS strike capacity if the strike occurred in remote areas? In an era of rapidly increasing autonomy, failing to expand our conceptualization of MHC risks overlooking other opportunities, earlier in an AWS’s life cycle, for embedded MHC that can lead to more responsible and robust autonomous weapons.

What is Meaningful Human Control?

MHC is a loaded political concept that emerged from the debate on autonomous weapons. It generally refers to preserving human judgment and input while employing autonomous systems. Some advocates maintain that MHC is necessary for compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This position assumes that an AWS inherently cannot comply with existing legal principles (notably distinction) and that an AWS will alter the direct relationship between exercising control and legal responsibility. However, LOAC does not explicitly require human control; instead, it requires any means or method of warfare to comply with existing legal obligations. If an AWS submits to a legal review and, thus, complies with LOAC requirements, then there is little to suggest that MHC is a legal obligation.

There is far greater debate on MHC in the policy space. The concept has struggled to reach a consensus among the United States and its international partners due to disagreements in terminology. While the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, specifically its Group of Governmental Experts, has employed the phrase, US Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 uses the term “appropriate human judgment” instead. Differences in state preferences for particular terminology have resulted in a stalemate on the operationalization of MHC. Despite this stalemate, stakeholders need to address bigger issues to produce guidance for the responsible implementation of military autonomy.

The biggest issue remains identifying what constitutes MHC in practice and determining what steps satisfy the threshold for MHC of autonomous systems. Even more problematic, there needs to be more consensus on the threshold itself. Regardless, MHC should incorporate human judgment into machine performance to maintain the benefits inherent to autonomy without losing the unique benefits of human judgment. Experts must take a deeper step into the technology and trace embedded human judgment in developing autonomous weapons through the weapon systems’ life cycles.

The term “meaningful human control” first appeared in a 2013 report from Article 36, a British nongovernmental organization. In the original report, Article 36 identified three elements constituting MHC (descriptions of each element are drawn directly from the report).

1. Information. A human operator, and others responsible for attack planning, need to have adequate contextual information on the target area of an attack, information on why any specific object has been suggested as a target for attack, information on mission objectives, and information on the immediate and longer-term weapon effects that will be created from an attack in that context.
2. Action. Initiating the attack should require a positive action by a human operator.
3. Accountability. Those responsible for assessing the information and executing the attack need to be accountable for the outcomes of the attack.

These elements resemble other commentators’ conceptualization of MHC (see, for example, here and here). However, upon close examination, the elements each have shortcomings that raise questions of whether, collectively, they truly establish meaningful human control as a distinct standard. The first element requires combatants to acquire relevant information to contextualize an attack. This information includes geographic details, reliable intelligence about the target, and the effects of the weapon used in an attack. However, this is already a requirement under LOAC and, as such, the element does not add value. This step is undoubtedly important in maintaining human control because the commander ultimately decides whether to use an AWS for a particular operation based on certain information, which will be discussed further. However, this is not a new requirement and reflects current international legal obligations.

The second element calls for positive action by a human operator to authorize an attack. A requirement for operator authorization would prevent an AWS from independently engaging a target, much like current drone operations. However, a positive action may not best reflect the advantage an AWS offers. One of the benefits of autonomy is delegating functions requiring human cognition to a machine—AWS may offer unparalleled capabilities in targeting by removing human cognition and decision-making at this stage, which can be slower and prone to mistakes. Requiring a human to positively authorize an attack qualifies as MHC but negates the added advantage of autonomous capabilities.

Finally, the third element calls for a clear pathway of responsibility for appropriate combatants. While important, this element does not factor into the performance of the autonomous system. If human control is to qualify as meaningful, there must be an effect on the system’s behavior. Responsibility issues are relevant after an attack has occurred and in the situation of machine failure or other unintended consequences. While establishing a regime of responsibility is vital, other stakeholders have also called for similar requirements. Again, however, this is separate from MHC.

Current proposals resembling Article 36’s MHC elements do not adequately capture what is unique about autonomous systems and the myriad of roles human judgement (or control) has prior to activating the system.

Meaningful Human Control Embedded in the Life Cycle

Deconstructing the life cycle of an AWS offers insights that provide a better, more nuanced understanding of MHC for policymakers and experts. Firstly, and most importantly, it identifies what MHC is in practice. Current discussions are abstract and theoretical—but a life cycle perspective operationalizes MHC and forces researchers to identify actions and protocols that qualify as MHC. Three stages of an AWS life cycle, in particular, are important to explore: design and development, operational planning, and tactical planning and engagement.

Autonomous systems suffer from what some call the many hands problem; that is, many people are involved in making AWS a reality. This problem is typically only discussed in the context of assigning responsibility—if many hands are involved, who should be responsible in the event of machine failure or malfunction? Nevertheless, the many hands problem is also relevant to the MHC discussion. There are opportunities for embedded MHC by expanding the scope to include the many groups with various expertise in creating the AWS, and a life cycle perspective will better capture the various roles involved in that process.

The first stage is the design and development of the AWS. AI developers create intelligent systems capable of learning, analyzing, and predicting. Developers are responsible for defining the type of system (whether machine learning, deep learning, or neural networks) and creating the software architecture or the system’s boundaries that define the parameters for system behavior. System designers have an essential role in creating design principles for the system to encounter unexpected environmental stimuli that may occur simultaneously in dynamic environments. The purpose of employing an autonomous weapon system (or any autonomous system) is for the advantages in speed and accuracy for specific processes that are mundane or overwhelming to human cognition. By developing the system architecture, does the developer qualify as having MHC to a degree sufficient to comply with policies or other requirements of MHC? Do developer decisions made at this stage effectively embed MHC in AWS?

The second stage is operational planning. Even though this stage has essential implications for MHC, as will be discussed, it receives less consideration than other stages. Nevertheless, decisions made at this stage do factor into determining MHC. This stage is close to the elements Article 36 proposed because this stage includes contextual decision-making regarding attacks. The most critical decision is whether to employ an AWS in a particular operational environment. Much of the controversy surrounding AWS (and, indeed, the calls necessitating MHC) stems from the risk of an AWS in an urban environment where distinctions between civilians and noncombatants will be most challenging. However, there are other environments where an AWS will not pose the same risks to the civilian population or objects, such as the vast majority of the sea domain and areas on land that are largely or entirely uninhabited, like deserts and forests. Several other factors could inform the decision to use an AWS unrelated to the operational environment, such as command leadership style or willingness to accept risks posed to friendly troops. These considerations are another facet of MHC that is distinct from the considerations at the design and development stage.

The third stage is the tactical planning and engagement phase and is the most intuitive phase for applying MHC standards. Article 36’s elements of MHC ultimately come down to target engagement. Traditional notions of human control are associated with the “positive action” Article 36 calls for in its second MHC element. As previously noted, requiring a human to take a positive action and authorize a target engagement ultimately defeats the purpose of employing an AWS. Because of this, some suggest that “human supervision has been and is likely to remain a necessary form of control measure to ensure safety, reliability and efficiency of military operation[s].” However, supervision on its own is not likely to amount to MHC—definitionally, it falls short of “positive action.” But there are other important considerations, like those that occur at the design and development stage and the operational planning stage, that influence how supervision occurs at the tactical stage and can significantly impact how “meaningful” that supervision is.

For example, data presentation to an operator can influence how the operator interprets what is happening on the ground. Operators can easily be biased, swayed, or otherwise influenced by the way the interface presents data and operator authorizations. Humans process information differently from one another, so a particular operator may respond differently to map- or image-based data presentation than to a text-based interface. Even something as simple as a system that reports a 95 percent probability that a target is an enemy force might produce a different operator response than one that emphasizes the 5 percent probability that it is not, and that there is therefore a one-in-twenty chance that civilians would likely be killed. Does the human have MHC if the very same scenario can lead to different outcomes because the data is presented differently?

Additionally, the supervision of AWS asks a lot of the human brain. Experts have repeatedly recognized the fast-paced nature of algorithmic decision-making and rightfully raised concerns about human cognition’s ability to keep up. Would supervision qualify as MHC if the human operator cannot keep pace with a machine in real time? This is even more unlikely if an operator has more than one system to monitor, such as a swarm scenario. However, the other side of the spectrum also bears acknowledging—instances where the system is idle or has minimal action and is too slow to hold human attention. An AWS will likely not be in constant, fast-paced situations; instead, the system may need to wait and monitor an environment long before engaging with an intended target. Like speed, this is one of the benefits of an AWS: the system will not get too tired or bored, unlike its human counterparts. It is only natural that operators tasked with AWS supervision will struggle to keep up or stay vigilant.

It is important to conceptualize and embed MHC in an AWS, but experts must broaden the scope of what and who contributes to MHC in practice. Deconstructing the weapon system life cycle offers a glimpse into stages wherein different stakeholders operationalize MHC in a multitude of ways. Each stage explored here—design and development, operational planning, and tactical planning and engagement—presents different considerations and interests that permeate decision-making at that stage and ultimately demonstrate MHC’s different varieties and manifestations. This is not to advocate that one stage, more than others, is where MHC exists—although many current discussions do implicitly make that case by focusing one tactical employment. It is also not to suggest that all the stages cumulatively constitute MHC. MHC is a moving target. But as autonomous weapon systems increasingly appear on the future battlefield, it is imperative to prepare by pushing the boundaries of current discourse on MHC and thinking creatively about how it can and should be operationalized in practice.

Lena Trabucco is a visiting scholar at the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College, specializing in artificial intelligence and international law. She is also a research affiliate at Cambridge University and the University of Copenhagen. She holds a PhD in law from the University of Copenhagen and a PhD in international relations from Northwestern University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Airman 1st Class Victoria Nuzzi, US Air Force

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Lena Trabucco · September 21, 2023

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian armored vehicles are operating beyond the final line of the Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are currently penetrating, although ISW is not yet prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken fully through this Russian defensive layer.
• Russian forces currently defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast have been unable to prevent Ukrainian forces from making gradual but steady advances since mid-August.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting the Russian airfield near occupied Saky, Crimea, and may have damaged Russian aircraft.
• Satellite imagery confirms that Ukrainian forces also struck the 744th Communications Center of the Command of the Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea on September 20 as part of an apparent Ukrainian effort to target Black Sea Fleet facilities.
• Russian forces conducted a notably large series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 to 21, likely to correspond with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the United States.
• The Kremlin continues to seek to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Russian State Duma will reportedly propose a bill allowing the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to include volunteer formations amid continued rumors about the Wagner Group operating alongside Rosgvardia.
• The Kremlin is reportedly pushing propaganda narratives that highlight Russian artillery and aviation while downplaying the efforts of Russian forces conducting ground operations, likely in order to avoid discussion of Russian personnel losses and poor counterbattery capabilities.
• The Kremlin is likely aiming to blame Armenian leadership and the West for Azerbaijan’s recent military operation into Nagorno-Karabakh.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 21, 2023

Sep 21, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 21, 2023, 8:55pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on September 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian armored vehicles are operating beyond the final line of the Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are currently penetrating, although ISW is not yet prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken fully through this Russian defensive layer. Geolocated footage posted on September 21 indicates that Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced south of the Russian anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth obstacles that are part of a tri-layered defense and engaged in limited combat immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces retain these positions, however. This is the first observed instance of Ukrainian forces operating armored vehicles beyond the Russian tri-layer defense.[2] The presence of Ukrainian armored vehicles beyond the final line of the current Russian defensive layer indicates that the Ukrainians have secured their breach of the first two lines of this layer sufficiently to operate vehicles through the breach. Ukrainian forces have likely suppressed Russian artillery and other anti-tank systems in the area enough to bring their vehicles forward.[3] The Ukrainian ability to bring armored vehicles to and through the most formidable Russian defenses intended to stop them and to operate these vehicles near prepared Russian defensive positions are important signs of progress in the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] Additional geolocated footage published on September 20 and 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces also advanced west and southwest of Verbove.[5]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces have breached the main Russian defensive line in western Zaporizhia Oblast with armored vehicles, citing an unnamed Ukrainian officer serving in the area.[6] WSJ also reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced to the edge of Novoprokopivka (16km south of Orikhiv), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this report as of this publication.[7]

Russian forces currently defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast have been unable to prevent Ukrainian forces from making gradual but steady advances since mid-August. ISW has consistently observed Ukrainian forces making slow but regular advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite the Russian military’s lateral redeployment of elements of relatively elite units to reinforce Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] The Russian military laterally redeployed elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Airborne (VDV) Division and the 76th Guards VDV Division to the Robotyne area in mid-August to repel Ukrainian attacks and possibly to relieve elements of the 22nd and 45th Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that had been counterattacking against Ukrainian advances during the earlier phases of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[9] Geolocated footage published on September 20 and 21 shows elements of the 22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), suggesting that the Russian command has tactically transferred elements of the 22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade to support VDV elements already observed defending in the area.[10] A Ukrainian soldier defending in southern Ukraine told the WSJ in an article published on September 21 that Russian troops defending front-line trenches are “poor-quality,” but that counterattacking assault troops are “stronger.”[11] The Ukrainian soldier’s statements are consistent with ISW’s observations that relatively elite Russian Spetsnaz and VDV elements appear to be the primary counterattack elements in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting the Russian airfield near occupied Saky, Crimea, and may have damaged Russian aircraft. The Department of Strategic Communications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that Ukrainian forces launched a combined attack on the Russian airfield near Saky (60km north of Sevastopol).[12] Suspilne Crimea reported that sources in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy launched drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems near the airfield and then conducted strikes with Neptune missiles.[13] Twelve Russian combat aircraft including Su-24 and Su-30 fighter-bombers, were reportedly present at the time of the strikes, and Suspilne’s SBU sources stated that strikes caused unspecified serious damage at the airfield.[14] ISW has yet to observe footage detailing the consequences of the Ukrainian strike, however. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian air defenses downed up to 19 Ukrainian drones over the Black Sea and Crimea on the night of September 20 to 21 but did not acknowledge any Ukrainian missile strikes.[15] Russia’s Black Sea Fleet manages the Saky airfield, which is the latest Black Sea Fleet target that Ukrainian forces have struck.

Satellite imagery confirms that Ukrainian forces also struck the 744th Communications Center of the Command of the Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea on September 20 as part of an apparent Ukrainian effort to target Black Sea Fleet facilities.[16] The imagery shows that the Ukrainian strikes destroyed a significant portion of the command post near Verkhnosadove (16km northeast of Sevastopol).[17] Ukrainian forces have increasingly targeted Black Sea Fleet naval assets in and around Crimea in recent weeks, including a strike that destroyed a Ropucha-class landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine and damaged the Sevmorzavod naval repair facility in Sevastopol.[18] Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is an element of the Russian navy subordinate to the Southern Military District (SMD), but commands air and ground units in occupied Crimea and elsewhere along the front in Ukraine in addition to its naval vessels. Elements of the Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are engaged in critical defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the Black Sea Fleet’s 22nd Army Corps is defending positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[19] The Black Sea Fleet’s control of the Saky airfield gives it charge of ground-based aircraft in addition to its naval-based assets. The Black Sea Fleet appears to be heavily responsible for maintaining Russian logistics from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea to the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine, especially since Ukrainian strikes have complicated Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the area.[20] Russian forces routinely launch drone and missile strikes from Black Sea Fleet assets and within the Black Sea Fleet’s area of responsibility in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai.[21] The Black Sea Fleet is the only formal structure of the Russian military that has had a long-term presence in occupied Ukraine as it has been headquartered in Sevastopol since before Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Black Sea Fleet is more than its naval assets, and the Ukrainian attacks on the Black Sea Fleet will likely achieve effects beyond the degradation of Russian naval capabilities.

Russian forces conducted a notably large series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 to 21, likely to correspond with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the United States. Ukrainian sources reported on September 21 that Russian forces launched 44 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles targeting Ukrainian energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City, Cherkasy City, and Lviv City.[22] Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted 38 Russian cruise missiles.[23] Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian forces launched six S-300 missiles at Kharkiv City.[24] Ukrainian Commander-in Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian forces launched the missiles in several waves from different directions and that the missiles changed course along their routes.[25] Russian milbloggers amplified photos and footage claiming to show the aftermath of Russian missile strikes throughout Ukraine.[26] Russian forces have not conducted a comparably large-scale missile strike since the night of August 29 to 30, when Russian forces launched 28 cruise missiles against Ukraine.[27]

The Kremlin continues to seek to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The export of Ukrainian grain along European land routes has emerged as an area of tension between Ukraine and its European partners since Russia’s withdrawal from the initiative in July and its attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure since then, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian strikes on Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure are part of a Russian campaign to damage Ukrainian relations with its Western neighbors.[28] Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morwiecki announced on September 20 that Poland would focus on building up its own weapons arsenals and would no longer transfer weapons to Ukraine.[29] The Polish and Ukrainian Ministers of Agrarian Policy agreed on September 21 to work together to find a solution regarding the export of Ukrainian agricultural products in the coming days, however.[30]

The Russian State Duma will reportedly propose a bill allowing the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to include volunteer formations amid continued rumors about the Wagner Group operating alongside Rosgvardia. Russian Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy Alexander Khinshtein announced that members of the State Duma and Federation Council plan to introduce a bill on September 22 that would allow for the inclusion of volunteer formations within Rosgvardia.[31] Khinshtein stated that the bill would extend all previously established powers and mechanisms of the Russian MoD to Rosgvardia as Rosgvardia performs tasks in the war in Ukraine similar to those of the Russian MoD.[32] Khinshtein claimed that the Russian president will make decisions regarding Rosgvardia volunteer formations.[33] ISW previously reported that Russian sources claimed that some Wagner Group personnel are working closely with Rosgvardia in order to rejoin the war in Ukraine.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 18 that Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov met with the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, Pavel Prigozhin, and Wagner commander Anton Yelizarov (known under the callsign “Lotos”) and discussed the “preservation” of Wagner.[35] Russian opposition media, insider sources, and milbloggers have claimed that Yevgeny Prigozhin left his assets to Pavel Prigozhin and that Pavel Prigozhin will take over the management of Wagner.[36]

The Kremlin is reportedly pushing propaganda narratives that highlight Russian artillery and aviation while downplaying the efforts of Russian forces conducting ground operations, likely in order to avoid discussion of Russian personnel losses and poor counterbattery capabilities. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on September 21 that the Russian Presidential Administration distributed a manual on September 19 instructing Kremlin-affiliated media to highlight Ukrainian equipment and personnel losses and emphasize that Russian artillery fire and air strikes are effectively suppressing Ukrainian offensive actions.[37] ISW has routinely observed Russian units actively engaged in ground assaults, and the Russian information space has repeatedly complained about Russian forces’ poor counterbattery capabilities.[38]

The Kremlin is likely aiming to blame Armenian leadership and the West for Azerbaijan’s recent military operation into Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian Presidential Administration’s manual also reportedly advised Kremlin-affiliated media to blame the West and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for recognizing Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.[39] The manual also advised state media to emphasize Russian peacekeepers’ role in “evacuating civilians.”[40] The Russian government is likely attempting to portray Pashinyan’s leadership poorly after a series of statements criticizing Armenia’s ties to Russia.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian armored vehicles are operating beyond the final line of the Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are currently penetrating, although ISW is not yet prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken fully through this Russian defensive layer.
• Russian forces currently defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast have been unable to prevent Ukrainian forces from making gradual but steady advances since mid-August.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes targeting the Russian airfield near occupied Saky, Crimea, and may have damaged Russian aircraft.
• Satellite imagery confirms that Ukrainian forces also struck the 744th Communications Center of the Command of the Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea on September 20 as part of an apparent Ukrainian effort to target Black Sea Fleet facilities.
• Russian forces conducted a notably large series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 to 21, likely to correspond with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the United States.
• The Kremlin continues to seek to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Russian State Duma will reportedly propose a bill allowing the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to include volunteer formations amid continued rumors about the Wagner Group operating alongside Rosgvardia.
• The Kremlin is reportedly pushing propaganda narratives that highlight Russian artillery and aviation while downplaying the efforts of Russian forces conducting ground operations, likely in order to avoid discussion of Russian personnel losses and poor counterbattery capabilities.
• The Kremlin is likely aiming to blame Armenian leadership and the West for Azerbaijan’s recent military operation into Nagorno-Karabakh.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not make any confirmed advances on September 21. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) but did not specify an outcome.[42] Geolocated footage published on September 21 shows that elements of the Russian 25th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are operating near Synkivka.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 20 that unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) units have been pushing Ukrainian forces from positions in the forests west of Kreminna over the past week.[44] Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated on September 21 that Russian forces are reinforcing forward tank and assault units in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[45]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on September 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces regained previously lost positions in Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[46] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna) and Shepylove (8km south of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[47] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the LNR 2nd Army Corps, repelled 15 Ukrainian attacks against Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast over the past week.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 21 and reportedly advanced. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated on September 21 that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success near Odradivka (9km south of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing along the Klishchiivka-Ozaryanivka line (7-14km southwest of Bakhmut) line and that a meeting engagement occurred near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[51] Yevlash stated that Ukrainian positions near Andriivka and Klishchiivka allow Ukrainian forces to bring artillery closer to the T0513 (Bakhmut-Horlivka) highway making it more difficult for Russian forces to use this GLOC. [52]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 21 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Zaitseve (it's unclear if the Ukrainian General Staff was referring to the Zaitseve 6km southeast of Bakhmut or the Zaitseve 13km south of Bakhmut), northeast of Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), and northeast and east of Andriivka.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[54]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 21 but did not advance. Ukrainian military officials stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction, near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City).[55] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted assaults in Marinka.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar) in western Donetsk Oblast on September 21.[57]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on September 21. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force operation near Staromayorske.[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing north of Zavitne Bazhannya (12km south of Velyka Novosilka).[60]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked east of Zavitne Bazhannya near the Mokri Yaly river and the T0518 (Velyka Novosilka to Nikolske) highway in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 19, but did not specify an outcome.[61]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 21 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest and west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[62] Ukrainian Director of the Planning Department of the Main Directorate of the National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated on September 21 that Ukrainian forces have achieved unspecified successes, advanced into Russian defenses, and continue to push Russian forces out of their positions in southern Ukraine, likely in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[63] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced one kilometer between Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orikhiv) and Verbove and controlled the N08 (Polohy-Voskresenka) highway.[64] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed on September 20 and 21 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv), and Verbove.[65]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance on September 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 108th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating in the Orikhiv area.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian officials reported on September 21 that Russian occupation officials continued forced mobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials are handing out summonses to men ages 18 through 60 in occupied Myrne, Kherson Oblast.[68] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Yuri Malashko stated that Russian occupation officials have increased mobilization efforts in occupied territories since the conclusion of regional elections.[69] Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated that Russian occupation police are actively identifying male residents who are on military registration lists.[70]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that Russian forces in an unspecified sector of the front received a batch of modernized Msta-S howitzers with improved tactical and technical characteristics.[71] The milblogger claimed that Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec produces the Msta-S systems.[72] The milblogger claimed that the system can hit targets with several different types of projectiles along different trajectories which, he argued, will allow Russian forces to evade retaliatory strikes.[73] It is unclear at what scale the Russian forces in Ukraine are receiving these modified howitzer systems.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian forces will conduct training exercises in Belarus from September 22 to 26. Ukrainian and Belarusian military sources stated on September 21 that Belarusian military and territorial defense forces will conduct training exercises at five training grounds in Mogilev, Brest, Grodno, and Minsk oblasts.[74]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Zelenskyy returns to Washington as GOP dissent grows to funding war

Zelenskyy returns to Washington as GOP dissent grows to funding war

militarytimes.com · by Lisa Mascaro, Mary Clare Jalonick and Ellen Knickmeyer, AP · September 21, 2023

Editor’s note: This story was updated at 1:35 p.m. EST with additional information about Zelenskyy’s visit.

WASHINGTON — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a whirlwind return visit to Washington on Thursday to shore up U.S. support for Ukraine, delivering an upbeat message on the war’s progress while facing new questions about the flow of American dollars that for 19 months has helped keep his troops in the fight against Russian forces.

The Ukrainian leader received a far quieter reception than the hero’s welcome he got last year, but also won generally favorable comments on the aid he says he needs to stave off defeat.

Zelenskyy, in long-sleeve olive drab, came to the Capitol with a firm message in private talks with Republican and Democratic leaders. The Ukrainians have a solid war plan, and “they are winning,” lawmakers quoted him as assuring them, at a time that the world is watching Western support for Kyiv.

Zelenskyy also spoke with military leaders at the Pentagon and was meeting with President Joe Biden at the White House. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin greeted Zelenskyy at the Pentagon without the usual ceremonial band or fanfare that is typical of a high-level visit.

The Ukrainian president found varying levels of support from House lawmakers. Republican leaders pressed him for his plans for winning Ukraine’s counteroffensive against invading Russian forces, as the war moves closer to the two-year mark without major breakthroughs in Russia’s heavily mined lines.

Zelensky “conceded that it’s tough, very tough to overcome entrenched defenses,” Independent Sen. Angus King said. “They believe they will make slow but steady progress, but it’s not going to be quick.”

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, who faces opposition on support for Ukraine among followers aligned with former President Donald Trump, notably chose not to join in greeting the Ukrainian president before the cameras. That left House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries to escort Zelenskyy into the Capitol.

But Republican Rep. Mike Turner, the chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee, said Zelenskyy in his meeting with House lawmakers “gave us details on the offensive that were very positive and his long-term goals and objectives. People in the room appreciated and supported it.”

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul played down Republican dissent about continuing to support Ukraine with money and arms, saying, “The majority of the majority support this.”

But McCaul stressed lawmakers needed confidence that there was a clear strategy for victory.

“War of attrition is not going to win this,” McCaul said. “That’s what Putin wants,” he said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin. “He wants to break the will of the American people and the Europeans.”

It is Zelenskyy’s second visit to Washington since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and comes as Biden’s request to Congress for an additional $24 billion for Ukraine’s military and humanitarian needs is hanging in the balance. Back home, Russian launched its heaviest strikes in a month in the hours before Zelenskyy’s arrival at Congress, killing three, igniting fires and damaging energy infrastructure as Russian missiles and artillery pounded cities across Ukraine.

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby called the Ukrainian president “our best messenger” in persuading U.S. lawmakers to keep vital U.S. money and weapons coming.

“It’s really important for members of Congress to be able to hear directly from the president about what he’s facing in this counteroffensive,” Kirby told reporters Wednesday, “and how he’s achieving his goals, and what he needs to continue to achieve those goals.”

Biden has called on world leaders to stand strong with Ukraine, even as he faces domestic political divisions at home. A hard-right flank of Republicans, led by Trump, Biden’s chief rival in the 2024 race for the White House, is increasingly opposed to sending more money overseas.

Zelenskyy faces challenges in Europe as well as cracks emerge in what had been a largely united Western alliance behind Ukraine.

Late Wednesday, Poland’s prime minister said his country is no longer sending arms to Ukraine, a comment that appeared aimed at pressuring Kyiv and put Poland’s status as a major source of military equipment in doubt as a trade dispute between the neighboring states escalates.

Zelenskyy’s visit comes with U.S. and world government leaders watching as Ukrainian forces struggle to take back territory that Russia gained over the past year. Their progress in the next month or so before the rains come and the ground turns to mud could be critical to rousing additional global support over the winter. Russian President Putin, who believes he can outlast allied backing for Kyiv, will be ready to capitalize if he sees Ukraine is running low on air defense or other weapons.

Administration officials were set to announce another $325 million Thursday in what’s known as presidential drawdown assistance for Ukraine. The package will include dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, or cluster munitions, and ammunition for HIMARS rocket artillery systems, two U.S. officials said on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the weapons package prior to its announcement.

Since the start of the war, most members of Congress supported approving four rounds of aid to Ukraine, totaling about $113 billion, viewing defense of the country and its democracy as an imperative, especially when it comes to containing Putin. Some of that money went toward replenishing U.S. military equipment sent to the frontlines.

Democratic Sen. Mark Kelly of Arizona, who traveled to Kyiv this week, said cutting off U.S. aid during the Ukrainians’ counteroffensive would be “catastrophic” to their efforts.

“That would clearly be the opening that Putin is looking for,” Kelly said Wednesday. “They cannot be successful without our support.”

The political environment has shifted markedly since Zelenskyy addressed Congress last December on his first trip out of Ukraine since the war began. He was met with rapturous applause for his country’s bravery and surprisingly strong showing in the war.

His meeting with senators on Thursday took place behind closed doors in the Old Senate Chamber, a historic and intimate place of importance at the U.S. Capitol, signifying the respect the Senate is showing the foreign leader.

Zelenskyy received a warm welcome from both parties on his stop in the Senate. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and Majority Leader Chuck Schumer flanked him as he walked in. A few lawmakers of both parties wore clothes with blue and yellow, the colors of the Ukrainian flag.

Rep. Steny Hoyer, Democrat of Maryland who attended the House meeting with Zelenskyy and lawmakers, said that McCarthy made no promises but that Republicans and Democrats were united in supporting Ukraine.

“I think the message was not necessarily a promise but a determination to make sure that we could help Ukraine win this war for freedom and for all of us,” he said.

Associated Press writers Seung Min Kim, Kevin Freking, Lolita M. Baldor and Farnoush Amiri contributed to this report.

7. Navy Campaigns of Learning

Graphics at the link.

We really should look at the intellectual investments made in the interwar years. And we should start expending some real intellectual capital to prepare for the future.

Navy Campaigns of Learning

A rigorous learning culture prepared the Navy for World War II, and, reinvigorated, it could prepare today’s Navy for the next war.

By Captain John T. Hanley Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)

September 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/9/1,447

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/september/navy-campaigns-learning

Former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday’s Navigation Plan 2022 calls for a “rigorous campaign of learning” as part of a “continuous, iterative force design process to focus our modernization efforts and accelerate capabilities we need to maintain our edge.” He identifies a “learning culture” as essential.

The Navy during World War II developed a learning culture modeled on the Prussian campaign of learning. The Navy’s campaign dissipated following the war, as the national security establishment and the Navy evolved, though the submarine force and the CNO Strategic Studies Group successfully used similar campaigns during the Cold War. An attempt to re-create a campaign of learning for naval warfare innovation failed in the 1990s. The learning initiatives in Navigation Plan 2022 are essential for regaining headway in competition with China.

U.S. Navy Reforms

World War II leaders (left to right) Admirals Raymond Spruance, Ernest King, and Chester Nimitz and Brigadier General Sanderford Jarman visit Saipan in 1944. The Navy’s interwar campaign of learning prepared these leaders for victory by teaching them to learn from every battle. Naval History and Heritage Command

The Prussian campaign of learning balanced theoretical study and practical experience and exercises, including war games. Leading U.S. Navy reform, Stephen B. Luce sought to follow the Prussian campaign, resulting in the founding of the Naval War College (NWC) in 1884. Luce explained his idea for the college declaring, that “there are no professors competent to teach” warfare. “All here, faculty and class alike, occupy the same plane, without distinction of age, rank, or assumption of superior attainments.”1

The first NWC curriculum included Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theoretical lectures—which lead to books such as The Influence of Seapower upon History and The Problem of Asia—assisted by war games developed by McCarty Little for learning naval concepts. In 1894, games became an integral part of the instruction, with a selected adversary studied each year.

Rear Admiral William S. Sims, president of the NWC following World War I, emphasized the practical over the theoretical and preparing minds versus preparing plans. Using games to test new principles and plans for future operations was secondary to building character and developing leadership skills—grooming officers for command at sea.

In the 19th century, the Secretary of the Navy directed Navy operations. When the Spanish-American War came along, Secretary John Davis Long received competing war plans from the NWC, naval intelligence, and the Bureau of Navigation. As a result, Long created a General Board in 1900, led by Admiral George Dewey and other distinguished admirals, to oversee war plans and manage the disparate Navy bureaus and offices, with the president of the NWC, a senior Navy intelligence officer, and the head of the Bureau of Navigation as ex officio members.

Overcoming congressional fears about creating a Prussian-style general staff and the opposition of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Admiral Bradley Fiske championed legislation in 1915 that created the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The Office of the CNO (OpNav) took over war planning from the NWC and General Board, but a web of interactions among the CNO, the General Board, naval intelligence, the NWC, fleet commanders, and technology developers led to an interwar campaign of learning. Under the CNO, this Navy-wide effort orchestrated annual Fleet Problems to develop operational and tactical concepts using emerging technology (Figure 1).2

Courtesy of the Author

This learning culture prepared the Navy for victory in World War II. Leaders such as Ernest King, Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance, Richmond Kelly Turner, Charles Lockwood, and others learned from every operation.3 They developed the combat information center to allow rapid decision-making and fleet tactics in which short codes instructed task forces to adopt a particular formation.4

Punctuated Evolution

Although war games continued at the Naval War College after World War II, the curriculum shifted from naval strategy and tactics to strategy and policy, with students more often playing the role of national decision makers and less focused on the roles of tactical and operational commanders. Naval History and Heritage Command

Following the war, the national security establishment experienced a punctuated evolution. Contributions from top mathematicians such as Alan Turing and John von Neumann and other scientists led to computers and atomic weapons. The successes of scientists such as Philip Morse and Bernard Koopman supporting the Tenth Fleet created a new discipline of operations research.5

The National Security Act of 1947 created a powerful Secretary of Defense. President Harry S. Truman—fearing a recession as the war wound down—focused on stabilizing the U.S. economy, devoting as little funding as he could to defense.6 Louis Johnson, who followed James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense, believed all the country needed was an Air Force and atomic bombs. He demobilized Army and naval equipment as quickly as he could until the Korean War reversed the process.7

Johnson’s cutting the Navy’s plan for a supercarrier and his attempts to muzzle dissent led to a revolt of the admirals and CNO Admiral Louis Denfeld being fired. Rivalry between the Navy and Air Force was fierce. Conditions were set for competition for scarce budgets, both among the services and the warfare branches within them.8 By the time Arleigh Burke became CNO in 1955, the Pentagon’s focus was finely tuned to budgets and programs.9

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell speech, he addressed perils of both the military-industrial complex and the rising influence of defense intellectuals.10 Focusing the techniques developed during World War II for researching operations based on analyzing the cost-benefit of systems, McNamara established the planning, program, and budgeting system (PPBS) that continues today with few modifications.

In 1944, Navy Secretary Frank Knox appointed Vice Admiral William Pye, who had become president of the NWC in 1942, president of a board to study the methods of educating naval officers. Pye had participated on a similar board with Captain Ernest King (then head of the Naval Postgraduate School) and Commander Dudley W. Knox of the NWC in 1920. The board recommended that the NWC include three tiers: a command-and-staff course prior to command of a large ship, a course before commanding a division of ships, and an advanced course for flag officers.11

Rear Admiral William Sims (left) was president of the Naval War College following World War I. He emphasized the practical over the theoretical—using games to test new principles and plans was secondary to grooming officers for command at sea. Naval History and Heritage Command

The NWC was never to achieve a scheme of education progressing with officers’ increased responsibilities over their careers, nor the stature in the Navy that it held before the war. Pushed for by Admiral Ernest King, in 1945, Congress passed legislation making the Naval Postgraduate School a fully accredited graduate degree–granting institution.

CNO Admiral Chester Nimitz made Spruance president of the NWC in 1946. The curriculum shifted from naval strategy and tactics to strategy and policy; games had the students playing the roles of national decision-makers rather than commanders. The curriculum lost its balance between practical reason and theoretical understanding. The web of interactions that had formed the campaign of learning disintegrated. The Pentagon focused on programs and budgets rather than strategies for defeating potential adversaries, and the fleet was organized for continuous deployment.

Because the NWC emphasized policy and strategy, the Navy sent few students who had the potential to become future Navy leaders.

PostWar Navy Campaigns of Learning

Though big Navy lost its culture of learning, several organizations created learning cultures similar to those of the interwar years. Facing demobilization, the submarine force established Submarine Development Group Two to develop antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics and technology. It used an open door to laboratories established during World War II and a program of designing frequent exercises using prototype concepts and technology, collecting data during exercises and forward operations, reconstructing engagements, and conducting unvarnished analysis. As a result, the submarine force went from having no ASW capability during the war to being the dominant ASW force within a decade.12

Other programs adopted the submarine force’s methods. Among the successes was finding that the Navy did not have the communications required to employ submarines as an outer screen for a carrier battle group, nor the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to employ antiship Tomahawk missiles in a cluttered sea environment—resulting in a sole focus on land-attack Tomahawks. Using consistent data collection methods across multiple exercises and carefully reconstructing that data allowed the Navy to make informed tactics, organizational, and procurement decisions.13

In the 1990s, the CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) also employed a web of interactions in a campaign of learning that involved study, critical analysis, and war games that led to concepts for the 1986 Maritime Strategy. Many successful innovations came from a practical focus on both combat and other influence operations.

An effort to create a campaign of learning for naval warfare innovation in the 1990s failed. The CNO Executive Panel formulated a process, and CNO Admiral Mike Boorda directed the SSG to focus on concept generation. Unfortunately, Admiral Boorda’s death came as the first SSG he tasked readied to brief him on their concepts. Attempting to make this approach work, CNO Admiral Jay Johnson changed the mission and organization of the SSG to focus solely on naval warfare innovation and the NWC to “provide unity of effort by realigning Navy warfare doctrine development, concept innovation, and fleet experimentation with strategy development and wargaming under the command of the President, Naval War College.”14 (See Figure 2.)

Courtesy of the Author

The Naval Doctrine Command became the Naval Warfare Development Command and moved to Newport. However, no changes were made to the NWC curriculum or the relationship between the college’s theoretical academic and practical research sides. While the new organizational structure was consistent with a campaign of learning, absent the coordinating oversight of an organization like the General Board, the necessary interactions did not mature. The next CNO, Admiral Vernon Clark, moved Navy Warfare Development Command back to Norfolk to be closer to the fleet, and the NWC president reverted to a two-star admiral. OpNav provided no funding for demonstration. The Navy is now pursuing many of the SSG’s concepts from the 1990s.15

Implications

Each of the Navy’s communities depends on the others—OpNav should not be the focal point for the Navy’s campaign of learning. A modern General Board with the presidents of the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, the Director of Naval Intelligence, heads of systems commands, the Chief of Naval Research, and regional fleet commanders convening to inform the CNO on which problems “big Navy” should focus would accelerate the learning campaign. The Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 should be implemented.16

Students conduct a wargaming exercise at the Naval War College (NWC). The NWC curriculum should be modeled after Admiral Sims’ use of theater-level games to develop character and command skills, and teach officers to fight outside their warfare specialties. U.S. Naval War College

When the SSG’s mission was making captains of ships into captains of war, of 88 officers assigned, the program produced eight four-star and ten three-star admirals. Absent a course for all flag officers, the SSG should be resurrected with this mission, using a similar program to the one that proved successful during the late Cold War.

The Secretary of the Navy and CNO should implement the recommendations of the two Pye boards, balancing practical and theoretical studies. The Navy should have a curriculum for officers headed to their first commands modeled after Sims’ use of theater-level games to develop character and command skills, learning how to fight outside their warfare specialties.

Officers headed to major command should have a similar curriculum balancing practical studies of specific adversaries combined with higher-level operational considerations, directly addressing Navy component commander roles in combatant commander plans. These courses would meet JPME Phase 1 criteria and satisfy demands for a master’s degree. In addition, the president of the Naval War College should be a post-numbered-fleet command three-star with oversight of the Naval Warfare Development Center to connect the fleet.

8. THE PATRIOT (General Milley)

A lot of retrospectives on the Chairman as he retires.

A long read.

POLITICS

THE PATRIOT

How General Mark Milley protected the Constitution from Donald Trump

By Jeffrey Goldberg

Photographs by Ashley Gilbertson

The Atlantic · by Jeffrey Goldberg · September 21, 2023

The missiles that comprise the land component of America’s nuclear triad are scattered across thousands of square miles of prairie and farmland, mainly in North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. About 150 of the roughly 400 Minuteman III inter­continental ballistic missiles currently on alert are dispersed in a wide circle around Minot Air Force Base, in the upper reaches of North Dakota. From Minot, it would take an ICBM about 25 minutes to reach Moscow.

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These nuclear weapons are under the control of the 91st Missile Wing of the Air Force Global Strike Command, and it was to the 91st—the “Rough Riders”—that General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, paid a visit in March 2021. I accompanied him on the trip. A little more than two months had passed since the January 6 attack on the Capitol, and America’s nuclear arsenal was on Milley’s mind.

In normal times, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the principal military adviser to the president, is supposed to focus his attention on America’s national-security challenges, and on the readiness and lethality of its armed forces. But the first 16 months of Milley’s term, a period that ended when Joe Biden succeeded Donald Trump as president, were not normal, because Trump was exceptionally unfit to serve. “For more than 200 years, the assumption in this country was that we would have a stable person as president,” one of Milley’s mentors, the retired three-star general James Dubik, told me. That this assumption did not hold true during the Trump administration presented a “unique challenge” for Milley, Dubik said.

Milley was careful to refrain from commenting publicly on Trump’s cognitive unfitness and moral derangement. In interviews, he would say that it is not the place of the nation’s flag officers to discuss the performance of the nation’s civilian leaders.

But his views emerged in a number of books published after Trump left office, written by authors who had spoken with Milley, and many other civilian and military officials, on background. In The Divider, Peter Baker and Susan Glasser write that Milley believed that Trump was “shameful,” and “complicit” in the January 6 attack. They also reported that Milley feared that Trump’s “ ‘Hitler-like’ embrace of the big lie about the election would prompt the president to seek out a ‘Reichstag moment.’ ”

These views of Trump align with those of many officials who served in his administration. Trump’s first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, considered Trump to be a “fucking moron.” John Kelly, the retired Marine general who served as Trump’s chief of staff in 2017 and 2018, has said that Trump is the “most flawed person” he’s ever met. James Mattis, who is also a retired Marine general and served as Trump’s first secretary of defense, has told friends and colleagues that the 45th president was “more dangerous than anyone could ever imagine.” It is widely known that Trump’s second secretary of defense, Mark Esper, believed that the president didn’t understand his own duties, much less the oath that officers swear to the Constitution, or military ethics, or the history of America.

From the October 2019 issue: Jeffrey Goldberg on why James Mattis resigned as secretary of defense

Twenty men have served as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs since the position was created after World War II. Until Milley, none had been forced to confront the possibility that a president would try to foment or provoke a coup in order to illegally remain in office. A plain reading of the record shows that in the chaotic period before and after the 2020 election, Milley did as much, or more, than any other American to defend the constitutional order, to prevent the military from being deployed against the American people, and to forestall the eruption of wars with America’s nuclear-armed adversaries. Along the way, Milley deflected Trump’s exhortations to have the U.S. military ignore, and even on occasion commit, war crimes. Milley and other military officers deserve praise for protecting democracy, but their actions should also cause deep unease. In the American system, it is the voters, the courts, and Congress that are meant to serve as checks on a president’s behavior, not the generals. Civilians provide direction, funding, and oversight; the military then follows lawful orders.

Ashley Gilbertson / VII for The Atlantic

The difficulty of the task before Milley was captured most succinctly by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, the second of Trump’s four national security advisers. “As chairman, you swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, but what if the commander in chief is undermining the Constitution?” McMaster said to me.

For the actions he took in the last months of the Trump presidency, Milley, whose four-year term as chairman, and 43-year career as an Army officer, will conclude at the end of September, has been condemned by elements of the far right. Kash Patel, whom Trump installed in a senior Pentagon role in the final days of his administration, refers to Milley as “the Kraken of the swamp.” Trump himself has accused Milley of treason. Sebastian Gorka, a former Trump White House official, has said that Milley deserves to be placed in “shackles and leg irons.” If a second Trump administration were to attempt this, however, the Trumpist faction would be opposed by the large group of ex-Trump-administration officials who believe that the former president continues to pose a unique threat to American democracy, and who believe that Milley is a hero for what he did to protect the country and the Constitution.

“Mark Milley had to contain the impulses of people who wanted to use the United States military in very dangerous ways,” Kelly told me. “Mark had a very, very difficult reality to deal with in his first two years as chairman, and he served honorably and well. The president couldn’t fathom people who served their nation honorably.” Kelly, along with other former administration officials, has argued that Trump has a contemptuous view of the military, and that this contempt made it extraordinarily difficult to explain to Trump such concepts as honor, sacrifice, and duty.

Before Milley, no Joint Chiefs chairman had been forced to deal with a president who’d attempted to foment a coup in order to remain illegally in office.

Robert Gates, who served as secretary of defense under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, told me that no Joint Chiefs chairman has ever been tested in the manner Milley was. “General Milley has done an extraordinary job under the most extraordinary of circumstances,” Gates said. “I’ve worked for eight presidents, and not even Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon in their angriest moments would have considered doing or saying some of the things that were said between the election and January 6.”

Gates believes that Milley, who served as his military assistant when Gates was Bush’s secretary of defense, was uniquely qualified to defend the Constitution from Trump during those final days. “General Milley expected to be fired every single day between Election Day and January 6,” he said. A less confident and assertive chairman might not have held the line against Trump’s antidemocratic plots.

When I mentioned Gates’s assessment to Milley, he demurred. “I think that any of my peers would have done the same thing. Why do I say that? First of all, I know them. Second, we all think the same way about the Constitution.”

Some of those who served in Trump’s administration say that he appointed Milley chairman because he was drawn to Milley’s warrior reputation, tanklike build, and four-star eyebrows. Senator Angus King of Maine, a political independent who is a supporter of Milley’s, told me, “Trump picked him as chief because he looks like what Trump thinks a general should look like.” But Trump misjudged him, King said. “He thought he would be loyal to him and not to the Constitution.” Trump had been led to believe that Milley would be more malleable than other generals. This misunderstanding threatened to become indelibly ingrained in Washington when Milley made what many people consider to be his most serious mistake as chairman. During the George Floyd protests in early June 2020, Milley, wearing combat fatigues, followed Trump out of the White House to Lafayette Square, which had just been cleared of demonstrators by force. Milley realized too late that Trump, who continued across the street to pose for a now-infamous photo while standing in front of a vandalized church, was manipulating him into a visual endorsement of his martial approach to the demonstrations. Though Milley left the entourage before it reached the church, the damage was significant. “We’re getting the fuck out of here,” Milley said to his security chief. “I’m fucking done with this shit.” Esper would later say that he and Milley had been duped.

For Milley, Lafayette Square was an agonizing episode; he described it later as a “road-to-Damascus moment.” The week afterward, in a commencement address to the National Defense University, he apologized to the armed forces and the country. “I should not have been there,” he said. “My presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.” His apology earned him the permanent enmity of Trump, who told him that apologies are a sign of weakness.

On June 1, 2020, Milley and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper (center) accompanied Donald Trump partway to St. John’s Church after the clearing of Lafayette Square. Milley’s apology for appearing to lend military support to a political photo op earned him Trump’s enmity. (Patrick Semansky / AP)

Joseph Dunford, the Marine general who preceded Milley as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had also faced onerous and unusual challenges. But during the first two years of the Trump presidency, Dunford had been supported by officials such as Kelly, Mattis, Tillerson, and McMaster. These men attempted, with intermittent success, to keep the president’s most dangerous impulses in check. (According to the Associated Press, Kelly and Mattis made a pact with each other that one of them would remain in the country at all times, so the president would never be left unmonitored.) By the time Milley assumed the chairman’s role, all of those officials were gone—driven out or fired.

At the top of the list of worries for these officials was the manage­ment of America’s nuclear arsenal. Early in Trump’s term, when Milley was serving as chief of staff of the Army, Trump entered a cycle of rhetorical warfare with the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. At certain points, Trump raised the possibility of attacking North Korea with nuclear weapons, according to the New York Times reporter Michael S. Schmidt’s book, Donald Trump v. The United States. Kelly, Dunford, and others tried to convince Trump that his rhetoric—publicly mocking Kim as “Little Rocket Man,” for instance—could trigger nuclear war. “If you keep pushing this clown, he could do something with nuclear weapons,” Kelly told him, explaining that Kim, though a dictator, could be pressured by his own military elites to attack American interests in response to Trump’s provocations. When that argument failed to work, Kelly spelled out for the president that a nuclear exchange could cost the lives of millions of Koreans and Japanese, as well as those of Americans throughout the Pacific. Guam, Kelly told him, falls within range of North Korean missiles. “Guam isn’t America,” Trump responded.

Read: Donald Trump and the threat of nuclear war

Though the specter of a recklessly instigated nuclear confrontation abated when Joe Biden came to office, the threat was still on Milley’s mind, which is why he set out to visit Minot that day in March.

In addition to housing the 91st Missile Wing, Minot is home to the Air Force’s 5th Bomb Wing, and I watched Milley spend the morning inspecting a fleet of B‑52 bombers. Milley enjoys meeting the rank and file, and he quizzed air crews—who appeared a little unnerved at being interrogated with such exuberance by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs—about their roles, needs, and responsibilities. We then flew by helicopter to a distant launch-control facility, to visit the missile officers in charge of the Minuteman IIIs. The underground bunker is staffed continuously by two launch officers, who are responsible for a flight of 10 missiles, each secured in hardened underground silos. The two officers seated at the facility’s console described to Milley their launch procedures.

The individual silos, connected to the launch-control facility by buried cable, are surrounded by chain-link fences. They are placed at some distance from one another, an arrangement that would force Russia or China to expend a large number of their own missiles to preemptively destroy America’s. The silos are also protected by electronic surveillance, and by helicopter and ground patrols. The Hueys carrying us to one of the silos landed well outside the fence, in a farmer’s field. Accompanying Milley was Admiral Charles Richard, who was then the commander of Strategic Command, or Stratcom. Stratcom is in charge of America’s nuclear force; the commander is the person who would receive orders from the president to launch nuclear weapons—by air, sea, or land—at an adversary.

It was windy and cold at the silo. Air Force officers showed us the 110-ton blast door, and then we walked to an open hatch. Richard mounted a rickety metal ladder leading down into the silo and disappeared from view. Then Milley began his descent. “Just don’t touch anything,” an Air Force noncommissioned officer said. “Sir.”

Then it was my turn. “No smoking down there,” the NCO said, helpfully. The ladder dropped 60 feet into a twilight haze, ending at a catwalk that ringed the missile itself. The Minuteman III weighs about 80,000 pounds and is about 60 feet tall. The catwalk surrounded the top of the missile, eye level with its conical warhead. Milley and I stood next to each other, staring silently at the bomb. The warhead of the typical Minuteman III has at least 20 times the explosive power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. We were close enough to touch it, and I, at least, was tempted.

Milley broke the silence. “You ever see one of these before?”

“No,” I answered.

“Me neither,” Milley said.

I couldn’t mask my surprise.

“I’m an infantryman,” he said, smiling. “We don’t have these in the infantry.”

He continued, “I’m testifying in front of Congress on nuclear posture, and I think it’s important to see these things for myself.”

Richard joined us. “This is an indispensable component of the nuclear triad,” he said, beginning a standard Strategic Command pitch. “Our goal is to communicate to potential adversaries: ‘Not today.’ ” (When I later visited Richard at Offutt Air Force Base, the headquarters of Stratcom, near Omaha, Nebraska, I saw that his office features a large sign with this same slogan, hanging above portraits of the leaders of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.)

I used this moment in the silo to discuss with Milley the stability of America’s nuclear arsenal under Trump. The former president’s ignorance of nuclear doctrine had been apparent well before his exchanges with Kim Jong Un. In a 2015 Republican-­primary debate, Trump was asked, “Of the three legs of the triad … do you have a priority?” Trump’s answer: “I think—I think, for me, nuclear is just—the power, the devastation is very important to me.” After this, Senator Marco Rubio, a foreign-policy expert who was one of Trump’s Republican-­primary opponents, called Trump an “erratic individual” who could not be trusted with the country’s nuclear codes. (Rubio subsequently embraced Trump, praising him for bringing “a lot of people and energy into the Republican Party.”)

I described to Milley a specific worry I’d had, illustrated most vividly by one of the more irrational public statements Trump made as president. On January 2, 2018, Trump tweeted: “North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the ‘Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”

This tweet did not initiate a fatal escalatory cycle, but with it Trump created conditions that easily could have, as he did at several other moments during his presidency. Standing beside the missile in the silo, I expressed my concern about this to Milley.

“Wasn’t going to happen,” he responded.

“You’re not in the chain of command,” I noted. The chairman is an adviser to the president, not a field commander.

“True,” he answered. “The chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense to that guy,” he said, pointing to Richard, who had moved to the other side of the catwalk. “We’ve got excellent professionals throughout the system.” He then said, “Nancy Pelosi was worried about this. I told her she didn’t have to worry, that we have systems in place.” By this, he meant that the system is built to resist the efforts of rogue actors.

Shortly after the assault on the Capitol on January 6, Pelosi, who was then the speaker of the House, called Milley to ask if the nation’s nuclear weapons were secure. “He’s crazy,” she said of Trump. “You know he’s crazy. He’s been crazy for a long time. So don’t say you don’t know what his state of mind is.” According to Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, who recounted this conversation in their book, Peril, Milley replied, “Madam Speaker, I agree with you on everything.” He then said, according to the authors, “I want you to know this in your heart of hearts, I can guarantee you 110 percent that the military, use of military power, whether it’s nuclear or a strike in a foreign country of any kind, we’re not going to do anything illegal or crazy.”

General Milley outside his residence on Generals’ Row at Fort Myer, alongside Arlington National Cemetery, in Virginia (Ashley Gilbertson / VII for The Atlantic)

Shortly after the call from Pelosi, Milley gathered the Pentagon’s top nuclear officers—one joined by telephone from Stratcom headquarters—for an emergency meeting. The flag officers in attendance included Admiral Richard; the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Hyten, who was Richard’s predecessor at Stratcom; and the leaders of the National Military Command Center, the highly secure Pentagon facility from which emergency-­action messages—­the actual instructions to launch nuclear weapons—­would emanate. The center is staffed continuously, and each eight-hour shift conducts drills on nuclear procedures. In the meeting in his office, Milley told the assembled generals and admirals that, out of an abundance of caution, he wanted to go over the procedures and processes for deploying nuclear weapons. Hyten summarized the standard procedures—including ensuring the participation of the Joint Chiefs in any conversation with the president about imminent war. At the conclusion of Hyten’s presentation, according to meeting participants, Milley said, “If anything weird or crazy happens, just make sure we all know.” Milley then went to each officer in turn and asked if he understood the procedures. They all affirmed that they did. Milley told other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “All we’ve got to do is see to it that the plane lands on January 20,” when the constitutional transfer of power to the new president would be completed.

I found Milley’s confidence only somewhat reassuring. The American president is a nuclear monarch, invested with uni­lateral authority to release weapons that could destroy the planet many times over.

I mentioned to Milley a conversation I’d had with James Mattis when he was the secretary of defense. I had told Mattis, only half-joking, that I was happy he was a physically fit Marine. If it ever came to it, I said, he could forcibly wrest the nuclear football—the briefcase containing, among other things, the authentication codes needed to order a nuclear strike—from the president. Mattis, a wry man, smiled and said that I was failing to take into account the mission of the Secret Service.

When I mentioned to Milley my view that Trump was mentally and morally unequipped to make decisions concerning war and peace, he would say only, “The president alone decides to launch nuclear weapons, but he doesn’t launch them alone.” He then repeated the sentence.

He has also said in private settings, more colloquially, “The president can’t wake up in the middle of the night and decide to push a button. One reason for this is that there’s no button to push.”

During conversations with Milley and others about the nuclear challenge, a story from the 1970s came frequently to my mind. The story concerns an Air Force officer named Harold Hering, who was dismissed from service for asking a question about a crucial flaw in America’s nuclear command-and-control system—a flaw that had no technical solution. Hering was a Vietnam veteran who, in 1973, was training to become a Minuteman crew member. One day in class, he asked, “How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?” The Air Force concluded that launch officers did not need to know the answer to this question, and they discharged him. Hering appealed his discharge, and responded to the Air Force’s assertion as follows: “I have to say I feel I do have a need to know, because I am a human being.”

The U.S. military possesses procedures and manuals for every possible challenge. Except Hering’s.

After we climbed out of the missile silo, I asked Milley how much time the president and the secretary of defense would have to make a decision about using nuclear weapons, in the event of a reported enemy attack. Milley would not answer in specifics, but he acknowledged—as does everyone in the business of thinking about nuclear weapons—that the timeline could be acutely brief. For instance, it is generally believed that if surveillance systems detected an imminent launch from Russia, the president could have as few as five or six minutes to make a decision. “At the highest levels, folks are trained to work through decisions at a rapid clip,” Milley said. “These decisions would be very difficult to make. Sometimes the information would be very limited. But we face a lot of hard decisions on a regular basis.”

The story of Milley’s promotion to the chairmanship captures much about the disorder in Donald Trump’s mind, and in his White House.

By 2018, Trump was growing tired of General Dunford, a widely respected Marine officer. After one White House briefing by Dunford, Trump turned to aides and said, “That guy is smart. Why did he join the military?” Trump did not consider Dunford to be sufficiently “loyal,” and he was seeking a general who would pledge his personal fealty. Such generals don’t tend to exist in the American system—Michael Flynn, Trump’s QAnon-addled first national security adviser, is an exception—but Trump was adamant.

The president had also grown tired of James Mattis, the defense secretary. He had hired Mattis in part because he’d been told his nickname was “Mad Dog.” It wasn’t—that had been a media confection—and Mattis proved far more cerebral, and far more independent-minded, than Trump could handle. So when Mattis recommended David Goldfein, the Air Force chief of staff, to become the next chairman, Trump rejected the choice. (In ordinary presidencies, the defense secretary chooses the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the president, by custom, accedes to the choice.)

“Knowing Trump, I knew that he was looking for a complete carnivore, and Milley fit that bill.”

At that point, Milley was Mattis’s choice to serve in a dual-hatted role, as NATO supreme allied commander in Europe and the head of U.S. European Command. Mattis has said he believed Milley’s bullish personality made him the perfect person to push America’s European allies to spend more on their collective defense, and to focus on the looming threat from Russia.

But a group of ex–Army officers then close to Trump had been lobbying for an Army general for the chairmanship, and Milley, the Army chief of staff, was the obvious candidate. Despite a reputation for being prolix and obstreperous in a military culture that, at its highest reaches, values discretion and rhetorical restraint, Milley was popular with many Army leaders, in part because of the reputation he’d developed in Iraq and Afghanistan as an especially effective war fighter. A son of working-class Boston, Milley is a former hockey player who speaks bluntly, sometimes brutally. “I’m Popeye the fucking sailorman,” he has told friends. “I yam what I yam.” This group of former Army officers, including Esper, who was then serving as the secretary of the Army, and David Urban, a West Point graduate who was key to Trump’s Pennsylvania election effort, believed that Trump would take to Milley, who had both an undergraduate degree from Princeton and the personality of a hockey enforcer. “Knowing Trump, I knew that he was looking for a complete carnivore, and Milley fit that bill,” Urban told me. “He checked so many boxes for Trump.”

In late 2018, Milley was called to meet the president. Before the meeting, he visited Kelly in his West Wing office, where he was told that Trump might ask him to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But, if given a choice, Kelly said, he should avoid the role. “If he asks you to go to Europe, you should go. It’s crazy here,” Kelly said. At the time of this meeting, Kelly was engaged in a series of disputes with Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner (he referred to them acidly as the “Royal Couple”), and he was having little success imposing order over an administration in chaos. Each day, ex–administration officials told me, aides such as Stephen Miller and Peter Navarro—along with Trump himself—would float absurd, antidemocratic ideas. Dunford had become an expert at making himself scarce in the White House, seeking to avoid these aides and others.

Kelly escorted Milley to the Oval Office. Milley saluted Trump and sat across from the president, who was seated at the Resolute Desk.

“You’re here because I’m interviewing you for the job of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Trump said. “What do you think of that?”

Milley responded: “I’ll do whatever you ask me to do.” At which point, Trump turned to Kelly and said, “What’s that other job Mattis wants him to do? Something in Europe?”

Kelly answered, “That’s SACEUR, the supreme allied commander in Europe.”

Trump asked, “What does that guy do?”

“That’s the person who commands U.S. forces in Europe,” Kelly said.

“Which is the better job?” Trump asked.

Kelly answered that the chairmanship is the better job. Trump offered Milley the role. The business of the meeting done, the conversation then veered in many different directions. But at one point Trump returned to the job offer, saying to Milley, “Mattis says you’re soft on transgenders. Are you soft on transgenders?”

Milley responded, “I’m not soft on transgender or hard on transgender. I’m about standards in the U.S. military, about who is qualified to serve in the U.S. military. I don’t care who you sleep with or what you are.”

The offer stood.

It would be nearly a year before Dunford retired and Milley assumed the role. At his welcome ceremony at Joint Base Myer–Henderson Hall, across the Potomac River from the capital, Milley gained an early, and disturbing, insight into Trump’s attitude toward soldiers. Milley had chosen a severely wounded Army captain, Luis Avila, to sing “God Bless America.” Avila, who had completed five combat tours, had lost a leg in an IED attack in Afghanistan, and had suffered two heart attacks, two strokes, and brain damage as a result of his injuries. To Milley, and to four-star generals across the Army, Avila and his wife, Claudia, represented the heroism, sacrifice, and dignity of wounded soldiers.

It had rained that day, and the ground was soft; at one point Avila’s wheelchair threatened to topple over. Milley’s wife, Holly­anne, ran to help Avila, as did Vice President Mike Pence. After Avila’s performance, Trump walked over to congratulate him, but then said to Milley, within earshot of several witnesses, “Why do you bring people like that here? No one wants to see that, the wounded.” Never let Avila appear in public again, Trump told Milley. (Recently, Milley invited Avila to sing at his retirement ceremony.)

Read: Trump: Americans who died in war are ‘losers’ and ‘suckers’

These sorts of moments, which would grow in intensity and velocity, were disturbing to Milley. As a veteran of multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, he had buried 242 soldiers who’d served under his command. Milley’s family venerated the military, and Trump’s attitude toward the uniformed services seemed superficial, callous, and, at the deepest human level, repugnant.

Milley was raised in a blue-collar section of Winchester, Massachusetts, just outside Boston, where nearly everyone of a certain age—­including his mother—was a World War II veteran. Mary Murphy served in the women’s branch of the Naval Reserve; the man who became her husband, Alexander Milley, was a Navy corpsman who was part of the assault landings in the central Pacific at Kwajalein, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. Alexander was just out of high school when he enlisted. “My dad brought his hockey skates to the Pacific,” Milley told me. “He was pretty naive.”

Though he was born after it ended, World War II made a power­ful impression on Mark Milley, in part because it had imprinted itself so permanently on his father. When I traveled to Japan with Milley this summer, he told me a story about the stress his father had experienced during his service. Milley was undergoing a bit of stress himself on this trip. He was impeccably diplomatic with his Japanese counterparts, but I got the impression that he still finds visiting the country to be slightly surreal. At one point he was given a major award in the name of the emperor. “If my father could only see this,” he said to me, and then recounted the story.

It took place at Fort Drum, in upstate New York, when Milley was taking command of the 10th Mountain Division, in 2011. His father and his father’s younger brother Tom, a Korean War veteran, came to attend his change-of-command ceremony. “My father always hated officers,” Milley recalled. “Every day from the time I was a second lieutenant to colonel, he was like, ‘When are you getting out?’ Then, all of sudden, it was ‘My son, the general.’ ”

He continued, “We have the whole thing—troops on the field, regalia, cannons, bugle—and then we have a reception back at the house. I’ve got the Japanese flag up on the wall, right over the fireplace. It’s a flag my father took from Saipan. So that night, he’s sitting there in his T-shirt and boxers; he’s having probably more than one drink, just staring at the Japanese flag. One or two in the morning, we hear this primeval-type screaming. He’s screaming at his brother, ‘Tom, you got to get up!’ And I’ll say it the way he said it: ‘Tom, the Japs are here, the Japs are here! We gotta get the kids outta here!’ So my wife elbows me and says, ‘Your father,’ and I say, ‘Yes, I figured that out,’ and I go out and my dad, he’s not in good shape by then—in his 80s, Parkinson’s, not super mobile—and yet he’s running down the hallway. I grab him by both arms. His eyes are bugging out and I say, ‘Dad, it’s okay, you’re with the 10th Mountain Division on the Canadian border.’ And his brother Tom comes out and says, ‘Goddamnit, just go to fucking bed, for Chrissakes. You won your war; we just tied ours.’ And I feel like I’m in some B movie. Anyway, he calmed down, but you see, this is what happens. One hundred percent of people who see significant combat have some form of PTSD. For years he wouldn’t go to the VA, and I finally said, ‘You hit the beach at Iwo Jima and Saipan. The VA is there for you; you might as well use it.’ And they diagnosed him, finally.”

Left: Milley wears the patch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his sleeve, September 2023. Right: Milley with the flag his father took from Saipan during World War II. Seeing it on Milley’s wall once plunged his father, who had PTSD, into a combat flashback. (Ashley Gilbertson / VII for The Atlantic)

Milley never doubted that he would follow his parents into military service, though he had no plans to make the Army a career. At Princeton, which recruited him to play hockey, he was a political-­science major, writing his senior thesis on Irish revolutionary guerrilla movements. He joined ROTC, and he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in June 1980. He began his Army career as maintenance officer in a motor pool of the 82nd Airborne; this did not excite him, so he maneuvered his way onto a path that took him to the Green Berets.

His first overseas mission was to parachute into Somalia in 1984 with a five-man Special Forces A-Team to train a Somali army detachment that was fighting Soviet-backed Ethiopia. “It was basically dysentery and worms,” he recalled. “We were out there in the middle of nowhere. It was all small-unit tactics, individual skills. We were boiling water we got from cow ponds, and breakfast was an ostrich egg and flatbread.” His abiding interest in insurgencies led him to consider a career in the CIA, but he was dissuaded by a recruiter who told him working in the agency would make having any kind of family life hard. In 1985, he was sent to Fort Ord, where he “got really excited about the Army.” This was during the Reagan-era defense buildup, when the Army—now all-volunteer—was emerging from what Milley describes as its “post-Vietnam malaise.” This was a time of war-fighting innovation, which Milley would champion as he rose in rank. He would go on to take part in the invasion of Panama, and he helped coordinate the occupation of northern Haiti during the U.S. intervention there in 1994.

Clockwise from top left: Milley played high-school hockey at Belmont Hill School, in Massachusetts, in the mid-’70s. Milley getting his ROTC commission at Princeton in 1980. Milley with his mother and father, both World War II veterans, at his ROTC commissioning ceremony in 1980. Milley (left) deployed in Somalia with the Green Berets of the 5th Special Forces Group in the 1980s. (Courtesy of the Milley family)

After September 11, 2001, Milley deployed repeatedly as a brigade commander to Iraq and Afghanistan. Ross Davidson, a retired colonel who served as Milley’s operations officer in Baghdad when he commanded a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, recalled Milley’s mantra: “Move to the sound of the guns.” Davidson went on to say, with admiration, “I’ve been blown up, like, nine times with the guy.”

Davidson witnessed what is often mentioned as Milley’s most notable act of personal bravery, when he ran across a booby-trapped bridge at night to stop a pair of U.S. tanks from crossing. “We had no communication with the tanks, and the boss just ran across the bridge without thinking of his own safety to keep those tanks from blowing themselves up,” he told me. “It was something to see.”

Davidson and others who fought for Milley remember him as ceaselessly aggressive. “We’re rolling down a street and we knew we were going to get hit—the street just went deserted—and bam, smack, a round explodes to our right,” Davidson said. “Everything goes black, the windshield splinters in front of us, one of our gunners took a chunk of shrapnel. We bailed out and Milley says, ‘Oh, you want a fight? Let’s fight.’ We started hunting down bad guys. Milley sends one Humvee back with the wounded, and then we’re kicking doors down.” At another point, Davidson said, “he wanted to start a fight in this particular area north of the city, farm fields mixed with little hamlets. And so we moved to the middle of this field, just circled the wagons and waited to draw fire. He was brought up in a school of thought that says a commander who conducts command-and-control from a fixed command post is isolated in many regards. He was in the battle space almost every day.”

Once, when the commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, Lloyd Austin—now the secretary of defense—was visiting Baghdad, Milley took him on a tour of the city. Milley, Austin, and Davidson were in a Humvee when it was hit.

Milley found himself in a disconcerting situation: trying, and failing, to teach President Trump the difference between appropriate battlefield aggressiveness and war crimes.

“Mark has the gift of gab. I don’t remember what he was talking about, but he was talking when there was an explosion. Our second vehicle got hit. Austin’s window shattered, but we didn’t stop; we punched through,” Davidson said. “Wedged into Austin’s door was this four-inch chunk of shrapnel. If it had breached the door seam, it would have taken Austin’s head clean off. It was a ‘Holy shit, we almost got the commanding general killed’ type of situation. That wouldn’t have gone well.”

(When I mentioned this incident recently to Austin, he said, “I thought that was Mark trying to kill his boss.” That’s an elaborate way to kill the boss, I said. “You’ve got to make it look credible,” Austin answered, smiling.)

Dunford, Milley’s predecessor as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was the four-star commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2013 when Milley, by then a three-star general, came to serve as the international joint commander of all ground forces in the country. He describes Milley as ambitious and creative. “He was very forward-leaning, and he set the bar very high for himself and others,” Dunford told me. “He puts a lot of pressure on himself to perform. There’s just a level of ambition and aggressiveness there. It would be hard for me to imagine that someone could have accomplished as much as he did in the role. Hockey was the right sport for him.”

Clockwise from top left: In the late ’90s, Milley (seated on truck) served in the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, the forward line against a North Korean invasion. Returning home to Fort Ord, California, after the invasion of Panama, January 1990. Milley speaks to members of the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, which he commanded, in Iraq in 2005. In 1994, Milley helped coordinate the U.S. occupation of northern Haiti. (Courtesy of the Milley family)

Soon after becoming chairman, Milley found himself in a disconcerting situation: trying, and failing, to teach President Trump the difference between appropriate battlefield aggressiveness on the one hand, and war crimes on the other. In November 2019, Trump decided to intervene in three different cases that had been working their way through the military justice system. In the most infamous case, the Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher had been found guilty of posing with the corpse of an Islamic State prisoner. Though Gallagher was found not guilty of murder, witnesses testified that he’d stabbed the prisoner in the neck with a hunting knife. (Gallagher’s nickname was “Blade.”) In an extraordinary move, Trump reversed the Navy’s decision to demote him in rank. Trump also pardoned a junior Army officer, Clint Lorance, convicted of second-­degree murder for ordering soldiers to shoot three unarmed Afghans, two of whom died. In the third case, a Green Beret named Mathew Golsteyn was accused of killing an unarmed Afghan he suspected was a bomb maker for the Taliban and then covering up the killing. At a rally in Florida that month, Trump boasted, “I stuck up for three great warriors against the deep state.”

The president’s intervention included a decision that Gallagher should be allowed to keep his Trident insignia, which is worn by all SEALs in good standing. The pin features an anchor and an eagle holding a flintlock pistol while sitting atop a horizontal trident. It is one of the most coveted insignia in the entire U.S. military.

This particular intervention was onerous for the Navy, because by tradition only a commanding officer or a group of SEALs on a Trident Review Board are meant to decide if one of their own is unworthy of being a SEAL. Late one night, on Air Force One, Milley tried to convince Trump that his intrusion was damaging Navy morale. They were flying from Washington to Dover Air Force Base, in Delaware, to attend a “dignified transfer,” the repatriation ceremony for fallen service members.

“Mr. President,” Milley said, “you have to understand that the SEALs are a tribe within a larger tribe, the Navy. And it’s up to them to figure out what to do with Gallagher. You don’t want to intervene. This is up to the tribe. They have their own rules that they follow.”

Trump called Gallagher a hero and said he didn’t understand why he was being punished.

“Because he slit the throat of a wounded prisoner,” Milley said.

“The guy was going to die anyway,” Trump said.

Milley answered, “Mr. President, we have military ethics and laws about what happens in battle. We can’t do that kind of thing. It’s a war crime.” Trump answered that he didn’t understand “the big deal.” He went on, “You guys”—meaning combat soldiers—“are all just killers. What’s the difference?”

At which point a frustrated Milley summoned one of his aides, a combat-veteran SEAL officer, to the president’s Air Force One office. Milley took hold of the Trident pin on the SEAL’s chest and asked him to describe its importance. The aide explained to Trump that, by tradition, only SEALs can decide, based on assessments of competence and character, whether one of their own should lose his pin. But the president’s mind was not changed. Gallagher kept his pin.

When I asked Milley about these incidents, he explained his larger views about behavior in combat. “You have accidents that occur, and innocent people get killed in warfare,” he said. “Then you have the intentional breaking of the rules of war that occurs in part because of the psychological and moral degradation that occurs to all human beings who participate in combat. It takes an awful lot of moral and physical discipline to prevent you or your unit from going down that path of degradation.

“I’ll use Gallagher as an example. He’s a tough guy, a tough, hard Navy SEAL. Saw a lot of combat. There’s a little bit of a ‘There but for the grace of God go I’ feeling in all of this. What happened to Gallagher can happen to many human beings.” Milley told me about a book given to him by a friend, Aviv Kochavi, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces. The book, by an American academic named Christopher Browning, is called Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland.

“It’s a great book,” Milley said. “It’s about these average police officers from Hamburg who get drafted, become a police battalion that follows the Wehrmacht into Poland, and wind up slaughtering Jews and committing genocide. They just devolve into barbaric acts. It’s about moral degradation.”

During Milley’s time in the Trump administration, the disagreements and misunderstandings between the Pentagon and the White House all seemed to follow the same pattern: The president—who was incapable of understanding or unwilling to understand the aspirations and rules that guide the military—would continually try to politicize an apolitical institution. This conflict reached its nadir with the Lafayette Square incident in June 2020. The day when Milley appeared in uniform by the president’s side, heading into the square, has been studied endlessly. What is clear is that Milley (and Mark Esper) walked into an ambush, and Milley extracted himself as soon as he could, which was too late.

The image of a general in combat fatigues walking with a president who has a well-known affection for the Insurrection Act—the 1807 law that allows presidents to deploy the military to put down domestic riots and rebellions—caused consternation and anger across the senior-officer ranks, and among retired military leaders.

“I absolutely, positively shouldn’t have been there,” Milley says of Lafayette Square. “I’m a soldier, and fundamental to this republic is for the military to stay out of politics.”

“I just about ended my friendship with Mark over Lafayette Square,” General Peter Chiarelli, the now-retired former vice chief of staff of the Army, told me. Chiarelli was once Milley’s superior, and he considered him to be among his closest friends. “I watched him in uniform, watched the whole thing play out, and I was pissed. I wrote an editorial about the proper role of the military that was very critical of Mark, and I was about to send it, and my wife said, ‘You really want to do that—end a treasured friendship—­like this?’ She said I should send it to him instead, and of course she was right.” When they spoke, Milley made no excuses, but said it had not been his intention to look as if he was doing Trump’s bidding. Milley explained the events of the day to Chiarelli: He was at FBI headquarters, and had been planning to visit National Guardsmen stationed near the White House when he was summoned to the Oval Office. Once he arrived, Trump signaled to everyone present that they were heading outside. Ivanka Trump found a Bible and they were on their way.

“As a commissioned officer, I have a duty to ensure that the military stays out of politics,” Milley told me. “This was a political act, a political event. I didn’t realize it at the moment. I probably should have, but I didn’t, until the event was well on its way. I peeled off before the church, but we’re already a minute or two into this thing, and it was clear to me that it was a political event, and I was in uniform. I absolutely, positively shouldn’t have been there. The political people, the president and others, can do whatever they want. But I can’t. I’m a soldier, and fundamental to this republic is for the military to stay out of politics.”

Trump, inflamed by the sight of protesters so close to the White House, had been behaving especially erratically. “You are losers!” the president screamed at Cabinet members and other top officials at one point. “You are all fucking losers!”

According to Esper, Trump desperately wanted a violent response to the protesters, asking, “Can’t you just shoot them? Just shoot them in the legs or something?” When I raised this with Milley, he explained, somewhat obliquely, how he would manage the president’s eruptions.

“It was a rhetorical question,” Milley explained. “ ‘Can’t you just shoot them in the legs?’ ”

“He never actually ordered you to shoot anyone in the legs?” I asked.

“Right. This could be interpreted many, many different ways,” he said.

Milley and others around Trump used different methods to handle the unstable president. “You can judge my success or failure on this, but I always tried to use persuasion with the president, not undermine or go around him or slow-roll,” Milley told me. “I would present my argument to him. The president makes decisions, and if the president ordered us to do X, Y, or Z and it was legal, we would do it. If it’s not legal, it’s my job to say it’s illegal, and here’s why it’s illegal. I would emphasize cost and risk of the various courses of action. My job, then and now, is to let the president know what the course of action could be, let them know what the cost is, what the risks and benefits are. And then make a recommendation. That’s what I’ve done under both presidents.”

He went on to say, “President Trump never ordered me to tell the military to do something illegal. He never did that. I think that’s an important point.”

We were discussing the Lafayette Square incident while at Quarters Six, the chairman’s home on Generals’ Row at Fort Myer, in Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac from the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Capitol. Next door to Quarters Six was the home of the Air Force chief of staff, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., who is slated to become the next chairman. Generals’ Row was built on land seized by the Union from Robert E. Lee’s plantation. It is a good place to hold a discussion about the relationship between a democracy and its standing army.

I tried to ask Milley why Lafayette Square had caught him off guard, given all that he had seen and learned already. Only a few weeks earlier, Trump had declared to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a meeting about China, that the “great U.S. military isn’t as capable as you think.” After the meeting, Milley spoke with the chiefs, who were angry and flustered by the president’s behavior. (Esper writes in his memoir, A Sacred Oath, that one member of the Joint Chiefs began studying the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which can be used to remove an unfit president.)

“Weren’t you aware that Trump—”

“I wasn’t aware that this was going to be a political event.”

I tacked. “Were you aware that this was”—I paused, searching for an artful term—“an unusual administration?”

“I’ll reserve comment on that,” Milley responded. “I think there were certainly plenty of warnings and indicators that others might say in hindsight were there. But for me, I’m a soldier, and my task is to follow lawful orders and maintain good order and discipline in the force.”

“You didn’t have situational awareness?”

“At that moment, I didn’t realize that there was a highly charged piece of political stagecraft going on, if you will. And when I did, I peeled off.” (That evening, Lieutenant General McMaster texted Milley the well-known meme of Homer Simpson disappearing into a hedge.)

The lesson, Milley said, was that he had to pay more attention. “I had to double down on ensuring that I personally—and that the uniformed military—that we all stayed clear of any political acts or anything that could be implied as being involved in politics.”

The week after Lafayette Square, Milley made his apology in the National Defense University speech—a speech that helped repair his relationship with the officer corps but destroyed his relationship with Trump.

“There are different gradients of what is bad. The really bad days are when people get killed in combat,” Milley told me. “But those 90 seconds were clearly a low point from a personal and professional standpoint for me, over the course of 43, 44 years of service. They were searing. It was a bad moment for me because it struck at the heart of the credibility of the institution.”

The chasm dividing Milley and Trump on matters of personal honor became obvious after Lafayette Square. In a statement, referring to Milley’s apology, Trump said of the chairman, “I saw at that moment he had no courage or skill.”

Milley viewed it differently. “Apologies are demonstrations of strength,” Milley told me. “There’s a whole concept of redemption in Western philosophy. It’s part and parcel of our philosophy, the Western religious tradition—the idea that human beings are fallible, that we sin and that we make mistakes and that when you do so you own the mistake, you admit it, and then you learn from that mistake and take corrective action and move on.”

For his part, General Chiarelli concluded that his friend had simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Quoting Peter Feaver, an academic expert on civil-military relations, Chiarelli said, “You have to judge Mark like you judge Olympic divers—by the difficulty of the dive.”

That summer, Milley visited Chiarelli in Washington State and, over breakfast, described what he thought was coming next. “It was unbelievable. This is August 2, and he laid out in specific detail what his concerns were between August and Inauguration Day. He identified one of his biggest concerns as January 6,” the day the Senate was to meet to certify the election. “It was almost like a crystal ball.”

Chiarelli said that Milley told him it was possible, based on his observations of the president and his advisers, that they would not accept an Election Day loss. Specifically, Milley worried that Trump would trigger a war—an “October surprise”­—to create chaotic conditions in the lead-up to the election. Chiarelli mentioned the continuous skirmishes inside the White House between those who were seeking to attack Iran, ostensibly over its nuclear program, and those, like Milley, who could not justify a large-scale preemptive strike.

In the crucial period after his road-to-Damascus conversion, Milley set several goals for himself: keep the U.S. out of reckless, unnecessary wars overseas; maintain the military’s integrity, and his own; and prevent the administration from using the military against the American people. He told uniformed and civilian officials that the military would play no part in any attempt by Trump to illegally remain in office.

The desire on the part of Trump and his loyalists to utilize the Insurrection Act was unabating. Stephen Miller, the Trump adviser whom Milley is said to have called “Rasputin,” was vociferous on this point. Less than a week after George Floyd was murdered, Miller told Trump in an Oval Office meeting, “Mr. President, they are burning America down. Antifa, Black Lives Matter—they’re burning it down. You have an insurrection on your hands. Barbarians are at the gate.”

According to Woodward and Costa in Peril, Milley responded, “Shut the fuck up, Steve.” Then he turned to Trump. “Mr. President, they are not burning it down.”

I asked Milley to describe the evolution of his post–Lafayette Square outlook. “You know this term teachable moment ?” he asked. “Every month thereafter I just did something publicly to continually remind the force about our responsibilities … What I’m trying to do the entire summer, all the way up to today, is keep the military out of actual politics.”

He continued, “We stay out of domestic politics, period, full stop, not authorized, not permitted, illegal, immoral, unethical—­­we don’t do it.” I asked if he ever worried about pockets of insurrectionists within the military.

“We’re a very large organization—2.1 million people, active duty and reserves. Some of the people in the organization get outside the bounds of the law. We have that on occasion. We’re a highly disciplined force dedicated to the protection of the Constitution and the American people … Are there one or two out there who have other thoughts in their mind? Maybe. But the system of discipline works.”

So you had no anxiety at all?

“Of anything large-scale? Not at all. Not then, not now.”

In the weeks before the election, Milley was a dervish of activity. He spent much of his time talking with American allies and adversaries, all worried about the stability of the United States. In what would become his most discussed move, first reported by Woodward and Costa, he called Chinese General Li Zuocheng, his People’s Liberation Army counterpart, on October 30, after receiving intelligence that China believed Trump was going to order an attack. “General Li, I want to assure you that the American government is stable and everything is going to be okay,” Milley said, according to Peril. “We are not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations against you. General Li, you and I have known each other for now five years. If we’re going to attack, I’m going to call you ahead of time. It’s not going to be a surprise … If there was a war or some kind of kinetic action between the United States and China, there’s going to be a buildup, just like there has been always in history.”

Milley later told the Senate Armed Services Committee that this call, and a second one two days after the January 6 insurrection, represented an attempt to “deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and prevent war between great powers that are armed with the world’s most deadliest weapons.”

The October call was endorsed by Secretary of Defense Esper, who was just days away from being fired by Trump. Esper’s successor, Christopher Miller, had been informed of the January call. Listening in on the calls were at least 10 U.S. officials, including representatives of the State Department and the CIA. This did not prevent Trump partisans, and Trump himself, from calling Milley “treasonous” for making the calls. (When news of the calls emerged, Miller condemned Milley for them—even though he later conceded that he’d been aware of the second one.)

Milley also spoke with lawmakers and media figures in the days leading up to the election, promising that the military would play no role in its outcome. In a call on the Saturday before Election Day, Milley told news anchors including George Stephan­opoulos, Lester Holt, and Norah O’Donnell that the military’s role was to protect democracy, not undermine it. “The context was ‘We know how fraught things are, and we have a sense of what might happen, and we’re not going to let Trump do it,’ ” Stephanopoulos told me. “He was saying that the military was there to serve the country, and it was clear by implication that the military was not going to be part of a coup.” It seemed, Stephanopoulos said, that Milley was “desperately trying not to politicize the military.”

When the election arrived, Milley’s fear—that the president would not accept the outcome—came to pass. A few days later, when Acting Secretary Miller arrived at the Pentagon accompanied by a coterie of fellow Trump loyalists, including Kash Patel, senior officers in the building were unnerved. Patel has stated his conviction that the Pentagon is riddled with “deep state” operatives.

A few days after Esper’s firing, Milley gave a Veterans Day speech, in the presence of Miller, to remind the armed forces—and those who would manipulate them—of their oath to the Constitution. The speech was delivered at the opening of the National Army Museum at Fort Belvoir, in Virginia.

“The motto of the United States Army for over 200 years, since 14 June 1775 … has been ‘This we will defend,’ ” Milley said. “And the ‘this’ refers to the Constitution and to protect the liberty of the American people. You see, we are unique among armies. We are unique among militaries. We do not take an oath to a king or queen, a tyrant or dictator. We do not take an oath to an individual. No, we do not take an oath to a country, a tribe, or religion. We take an oath to the Constitution … We will never turn our back on our duty to protect and defend the idea that is America, the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”

He closed with words from Thomas Paine: “These are times that try men’s souls. And the summer soldier and the sunshine Patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of their country. But he who stands by it deserves the love of man and woman. For tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered.”

When Miller followed Milley, his remarks betrayed a certain level of obliviousness; Milley’s speech had sounded like a warning shot directed squarely at hard-core Trumpists like him. “Chairman, thanks for setting the bar very high for the new guy to come in and make a few words,” Miller said. “I think all I would say to your statements is ‘Amen.’ Well done.”

I asked Milley later if he’d had Miller in mind when he gave that speech.

“Not at all,” he said. “My audience was those in uniform. At this point, we are six days or so after the election. It was already contested, already controversial—and I wanted to remind the uniformed military that our oath is to the Constitution and that we have no role to play in politics.”

He would remain a dervish until Inauguration Day: reassuring allies and cautioning adversaries; arguing against escalation with Iran; reminding the Joint Chiefs and the National Military Command Center to be aware of unusual requests or demands; and keeping an eye on the activities of the men dispatched by Trump to lead the Pentagon after Esper was fired, men who Milley and others suspected were interested in using the military to advance Trump’s efforts to remain president.

“I’m not going to say whether I thought there was a civilian coup or not. I’m going to leave that to the American people to determine, and a court of law.”

Shortly after Esper was fired, Milley told both Patel and Ezra Cohen-Watnick, another Trump loyalist sent to the Pentagon, that he would make sure they would see the world “from behind bars” if they did anything illegal to prevent Joe Biden from taking the oath of office on January 20. (Both men have denied being warned in this manner.)

I asked Milley recently about his encounters with Trump’s men. As is his on-the-record custom, he minimized the drama of those days.

I said, “You literally warned political appointees that they would be punished if they engaged in treasonous activities.”

He responded: “I didn’t do that. Someone saying I did that?”

“You warned Kash Patel and others that they were fucking around and shouldn’t have been.”

“I didn’t warn anybody that I would hold them accountable for anything.”

“You warned them that they would be held accountable for breaking the law or violating their oaths.”

Suddenly, acquiescence.

“Yeah, sure, in conversation,” he said. “It’s my job to give advice, so I was advising people that we must follow the law. I give advice all the time.”

Today Milley says, about Trump and his closest advisers, “I’m not going to say whether I thought there was a civilian coup or not. I’m going to leave that to the American people to determine, and a court of law, and you’re seeing that play out every day. All I’m saying is that my duty as the senior officer of the United States military is to keep out of politics.”

What is certain is that, when January 20 finally arrived, Milley exhaled. According to I Alone Can Fix It, by the Washington Post reporters Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, when Michelle Obama asked Milley at the inauguration how he was doing, he replied: “No one has a bigger smile today than I do.”

The arrival of a new president did not mean an end to challenges for Milley, or the Pentagon. Attempts to enlist the military in America’s zero-sum culture war only intensified. Elements of the hard right, for instance, would exploit manifestations of performative leftism—a drag show on an Air Force base, for instance—to argue that the military under Biden was hopelessly weak and “woke.” (Never mind that this was the same military that Trump, while president, had declared the strongest in history.) And in an unprecedented act of interference in the normal functioning of the military, Republican Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama has placed holds on the promotions of hundreds of senior officers to protest the Defense Department’s abortion policies. The officers affected by the Tuberville holds do not make such policies.

An even more substantial blow to morale and force cohesion came late in the summer of 2021, when American forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan against the advice of Milley and most other senior military leaders. The withdrawal—­originally proposed by Trump, but ordered by Biden—was criticized by many veterans and active-duty soldiers, and the damage was exacerbated by the callous manner in which Biden treated America’s Afghan allies.

This summer, Milley and I visited the War Memorial of Korea, in Seoul, where Milley laid a wreath in front of a wall containing the names of hundreds of Massachusetts men killed in that war. I asked him about the end of America’s war in Afghanistan.

“I’ve got three tours in Afghanistan,” he said. “I lost a lot of soldiers in Afghanistan, and for any of us who served there and saw a considerable amount of combat in Afghanistan, that war did not end the way any of us wanted it to end.”

Do you consider it a loss?

“I think it was a strategic failure,” he answered, refusing to repeat the word I used. “When the enemy you’ve been fighting for 20 years captures the capital and unseats the government you’re supporting, that cannot be called anything else.”

He continued, “We sunk a tremendous amount of resources, a tremendous amount of money and, most importantly, lives into helping the Afghan people and giving them hope for a better future. For 20 years we did that. And our primary goal for going there was to prevent al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization from striking the United States ever again. That was the strategic promise President Bush made to the American people. And we have not, to date, been attacked from Afghanistan, so all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that served in Afghanistan should hold their heads high and should be proud of their contributions to American national security. But at the end of the day, the Taliban took the capital.”

From the October 2023 issue: Franklin Foer on America’s final days in Afghanistan

Milley had recommended to Biden that the U.S. maintain a residual force of soldiers to buttress the American-allied government in Kabul. Biden, Milley said, listened to the military’s advice, weighed it, and then chose another path. “It was a lawful order, and we carried out a lawful order,” Milley said.

But, I asked him, did you think Afghanistan was winnable?

“I think it would have been a sustainable level of effort over time,” he answered. “Take where we’re at right now. We are still in Korea today, 70 years after the armistice was signed. When North Korea came across the border in the summer of 1950, the South Korean military was essentially a constabulary, and we had a limited number of advisers here. And then we reinforced very rapidly from our occupation forces in Japan, and then we fought the Korean War. So we ended up preventing North Korea from conquering South Korea, and that effort led to one of the most flourishing countries in the world.”

He went on to say, however, that he understood why leaders of both political parties, and a majority of Americans, wanted U.S. troops pulled out of Afghanistan. “These operations aren’t sustainable without the will of the people,” he said. “Would I and every soldier who served there wish that there was a better outcome? Absolutely, yes, and to that extent, that’s a regret.

“The end in Afghanistan didn’t happen because of a couple of decisions in the last days,” he said. “It was cumulative decisions over 20 years. The American people, as expressed in various polls, and two presidents of two different parties and the majority of members of Congress wanted us to withdraw—and we did.”

If the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a low, then a continuing high point for the Defense Department is its enormous effort to keep the Ukrainian army in the fight against Russia. Milley and Lloyd Austin, his former commander and Biden’s secretary of defense, have created a useful partnership, particularly regarding Ukraine.

The two men could not be more unalike: Milley cannot stop talking, and Austin is loath to speak more than the minimum number of words necessary to get through the day. But they seem to trust each other, and they sought, after Austin’s appointment, to bring stability back to the Pentagon. When I met Austin in his office in mid-September, he alluded to this common desire, and to the turbulence of the recent past. “We needed to make sure we had the relationship right and the swim lanes right—who is responsible for what,” he said. “The trust was there, so it was easy to work together to reestablish what we both knew should be the rules of the road.”

The massive effort to equip, train, and provide intelligence to Ukrainian forces—all while preventing the outbreak of direct warfare between the U.S. and Russia—must be considered (provisionally, of course) a consequential achievement of the Austin-Milley team. “We’ve provided Ukraine with its best chance of success in protecting its sovereign territory,” Austin told me. “We’ve pulled NATO together in a way that’s not been done, ever. This requires a lot of work by the Department of Defense. If you look at what he and I do every month—we’re talking with ministers of defense and chiefs of defense every month—it’s extraordinary.”

Milley has been less hawkish than some Biden-­administration officials on the war with Russia. But he agrees that Ukraine is now the main battlefield between authoritarianism and the democratic order.

Ashley Gilbertson / VII for The Atlantic

“World War II ended with the establishment of the rules-based international order. People often ridicule it—they call it ‘globalism’ and so on—but in fact, in my view, World War II was fought in order to establish a better peace,” Milley told me. “We the Americans are the primary authors of the basic rules of the road—and these rules are under stress, and they’re fraying at the edges. That’s why Ukraine is so important. President Putin has made a mockery of those rules. He’s making a mockery of everything. He has assaulted the very first principle of the United Nations, which is that you can’t tolerate wars of aggression and you can’t allow large countries to attack small countries by military means. He is making a direct frontal assault on the rules that were written in 1945.”

The magnitude of this assault requires a commensurate response, but with a vigilant eye toward the worst possible outcome, nuclear war. “It is incumbent upon all of us in positions of leadership to do the very best to maintain a sense of global stability,” Milley told me. “If we don’t, we’re going to pay the butcher’s bill. It will be horrific, worse than World War I, worse than World War II.”

The close relationship between Milley and Austin may help explain one of Milley’s missteps as chairman: his congressional testimony on the subject of critical race theory and “white rage.” In June 2021, both Milley and Austin were testifying before the House Armed Services Committee when Michael Waltz, a Republican representative from Florida (and, like Milley, a former Green Beret), asked Austin about a lecture given at West Point called “Understanding Whiteness and White Rage.” Austin said that the lecture sounded to him like “something that should not occur.” A short while later, Milley provided his own, more expansive views. “I want to understand white rage, and I’m white,” he said. And then it seemed as if the anger he felt about the assault on the Capitol spilled out of its container. “What is it that caused thousands of people to assault this building and try to overturn the Constitution of the United States of America?” he asked. “What is wrong with having some situational understanding about the country for which we are here to defend?”

These comments caused a new round of criticism of Milley in some senior military circles, including from generals who agreed with him but believed that this sort of commentary was the purview of the political echelon.

Colonel Ross Davidson, Milley’s former operations officer, who was watching the hearing, told me he thinks Milley’s contempt for the January 6 insurrectionists was not the only thing that motivated his testimony. Seeing Austin, the first Black secretary of defense and his friend, under sustained criticism led Milley, as Davidson describes it, to “move to the sound of the guns.”

“That’s in his nature,” Davidson said. “ ‘Hey, man, my battle buddy Lloyd is being attacked.’ ”

Today, Austin defends Milley’s statements: “In one instance, in one academic institution, a professor was exposing his students to this,” he said, referring to critical race theory. “If you are familiar with all of our curriculum and what we do in our various schools and how we train leaders, it’s kind of upsetting and insulting” to suggest that the military has gone “woke.”

When I asked Milley recently about this episode, his answer was, predictably, lengthier, more caustic, and substantially more fervent.

“There’s a lot of discourse around whether it’s a tough Army or a woke Army,” he said, referring to commentary on right-wing news channels. “Here’s my answer: First of all, it’s all bullshit. Second, these accusations are coming from people who don’t know what they’re talking about. They’re doing it for political purposes. Our military wasn’t woke 24 months ago, and now it’s woke?”

He continued, “You want woke? I’ll give you woke. Here’s what your military’s doing: There are 5,000 sorties a day, including combat patrols protecting the U.S.A. and our interests around the world. At least 60 to 100 Navy warships are patrolling the seven seas, keeping the world free for ocean transport. We have 250,000 troops overseas, in 140 countries, defending the rules-based international order. We’ve got kids training constantly. This military is trained, well equipped, well led, and focused on readiness. Our readiness statuses are at the highest levels they’ve been in 20 years. So this idea of a woke military is total, utter, made-up bullshit. They are taking two or three incidents, single anecdotes, a drag show that is against DOD policy. I don’t think these shows should be on bases, and neither does the secretary of defense or the chain of command.”

This table-pounder of a speech prompted an obvious question: What will Milley say publicly once he’s retired? Donald Trump is the presumptive favorite to win the Republican nomination for president, and Trump represents to Milley—as numerous books, and my understanding of the man, strongly suggest—an existential threat to American democracy.

“I won’t speak up in politics. I won’t. You can hold me to it,” he said. “I’m not going to comment on elected officials. I’ll comment on policies, which is my purview. I have a certain degree of expertise and experience that I think enable me to make rational contributions to conversations about complex topics about war and peace. To make personal comments on certain political leaders, I don’t think that’s my place.”

Never?

“There are exceptions that can be made under certain circumstances,” he said. “But they’re pretty rare.”

It is hard to imagine Milley restraining himself if Trump attacks him directly—and it is as close to a sure thing as you can have in American politics that Trump will. At one point during his presidency, Trump proposed calling back to active duty two retired flag officers who had been critical of him, Admiral William McRaven and General Stanley McChrystal, so that they could be court-martialed. Mark Esper, who was the defense secretary at the time, says he and Milley had to talk Trump out of such a plan.

Trump has already threatened officials he sees as disloyal with imprisonment, and there is little reason to imagine that he would not attempt to carry out his threats.

During one conversation at Quarters Six, Milley said, “If there’s something we’ve learned from history, it’s that aggression left un­answered leads to more aggression.” He was talking about Vladimir Putin, but I got the sense that he was talking about someone else as well.

If Trump is reelected president, there will be no Espers or Milleys in his administration. Nor will there be any officials of the stature and independence of John Kelly, H. R. McMaster, or James Mattis. Trump and his allies have already threatened officials they see as disloyal with imprisonment, and there is little reason to imagine that he would not attempt to carry out his threats.

Milley has told friends that he expects that if Trump returns to the White House, the newly elected president will come after him. “He’ll start throwing people in jail, and I’d be on the top of the list,” he has said. But he’s also told friends that he does not believe the country will reelect Trump.

When I asked him about this, he wouldn’t answer directly, but when I asked him to describe his level of optimism about the country’s future, he said: “I have a lot of confidence in the general officer corps, and I have confidence in the American people. The United States of America is an extraordinarily resilient country, agile and flexible, and the inherent goodness of the American people is there. I’ve always believed that, and I will go to my grave believing that.”

I pressed him: After all you’ve been through, you believe that?

“There are bumps in the road, to be sure, and you get through the bumps, but I don’t want to overstate this. What did I do? All I did was try to preserve the integrity of the military and to keep the military out of domestic politics. That’s all I did.”

These assertions will be debated for a long time. But it is fair to say that Milley came close to red lines that are meant to keep uniformed officers from participating in politics. It is also fair to say that no president has ever challenged the idea of competent civilian control in the manner of Donald Trump, and that no president has ever threatened the constitutional underpinnings of the American project in the manner Trump has. The apportion­ment of responsibility in the American system—presidents give orders; the military carries them out—works best when the president is sane. The preservation of a proper civil-military relationship is hugely important to democracy—but so too is universal acceptance of the principle that political officials leave office when they lose legitimate elections.

As Milley cedes the chairmanship, he also cedes Quarters Six. I visited him there on a number of occasions, and almost every time he walked me out onto the porch, he would look out theatri­cally on the city before us—on the Capitol that was sacked but not burned—and say, “Rome hasn’t fallen!”

One time, though, he said, “Rome hasn’t fallen—yet.”

This article appears in the November 2023 print edition with the headline “The Patriot.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Atlantic · by Jeffrey Goldberg · September 21, 2023

9. Pentagon exempts Ukraine operations from potential government shutdown

Somehow I do not think this will go over well if there is a shutdown and the troops do not get paid.

Pentagon exempts Ukraine operations from potential government shutdown

By LARA SELIGMAN

09/21/2023 05:29 PM EDT

Updated: 09/21/2023 06:47 PM EDT

Politico

The decision means that training on American tactics and equipment can move forward uninterrupted if lawmakers don’t reach a funding deal by the end of the month.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin just hours before the DOD announced it will continue activities supporting Ukraine if government appropriations lapse. | Andrew Harnik/AP Photo

09/21/2023 05:29 PM EDT

Updated: 09/21/2023 06:47 PM EDT

The Pentagon will exempt its Ukraine operations from a potential shutdown if lawmakers can’t agree on a deal to fund the government by the end of the month, allowing key training and other activities in support of Kyiv’s forces to move ahead uninterrupted, according to a Defense Department spokesperson.

Washington is more resigned to the looming government shutdown every day. As the Sept. 30 deadline approaches, congressional leaders showed little progress this week in moving a stopgap funding bill to avert that scenario. The House was in chaos on Thursday as a group of GOP hardliners tanked a vote that could have offered a path to fund the government.

But if lawmakers fail to reach an agreement and government appropriations lapse, DOD has decided to continue activities supporting Ukraine, DOD spokesperson Chris Sherwood told POLITICO Thursday — just hours after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley and other senior leaders at the Pentagon.

“Operation Atlantic Resolve is an excepted activity under a government lapse in appropriations,” Sherwood said, referring to the named operation for DOD’s activities in response to the Russian invasion.

The move means that the U.S. military’s activities related to the war, such as training of Ukrainian soldiers on American tactics and equipment, as well as shipments of weapons to Kyiv, will continue despite any potential shutdown. As recently as Tuesday, Sherwood had said the shutdown could halt those activities, as POLITICO first reported.

It’s good news for Zelenskyy, as U.S. and European officials worry that international support for continuing to aid Ukraine could be waning. Zelenskyy also pleaded his case with lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday morning before heading to the White House to meet with President Joe Biden.

The Biden administration is also expected to announce a new package of military aid for Ukraine later on Thursday, including additional air defenses and artillery.

During the White House meeting, Biden announced a new $325 million package of aid for Ukraine, including more air defenses, artillery and additional cluster munitions. He also said that the first of the U.S. Army’s M1 Abrams tanks pledged to Kyiv are expected to arrive on the battlefield next week.

Typically, when the government shuts down, all military activities stop unless they are deemed critical to national security. For example, during the 2018 shutdown, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis said the U.S. military would continue hunting the Islamic State in the Middle East, but training for tens of thousands of Guard and Reserve forces was abruptly canceled.

By law, the Pentagon chief can make exceptions to activities suspended under a government shutdown, Sherwood said, noting that the decision to exempt Ukraine operations was just made.

Only military training and exercises “required to achieve and maintain operational readiness and to prepare for and carry out such operations” will be exempted from a potential shutdown this year, according to guidance issued by the Pentagon last week.

Sherwood noted that while DOD’s activities related to Ukraine will continue, furloughs and other activities halted under the shutdown could still have a negative impact.

“Training would happen, but depending on whether or not there were certain personnel that were not able to report for duty, for example, that could have an impact,” said Pentagon spokesperson Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder on Thursday.

The U.S. military is currently training hundreds of Ukrainians in Europe, from teaching them American battlefield tactics to how to use the Abrams. Several Ukrainian pilots and dozens of maintainers are also slated to start training on F-16 fighter jets at a U.S. base shortly.

As of Sept. 20, international forces had trained more than 84,000 Ukrainians on Western weapons and tactics, according to DOD spokesperson Col. Martin O’Donnell.

POLITICO

Politico

10. The Threat of an Authoritarian Century

I remain bullish on all three. And we surrender to the authoritarian ideas at our peril. The question is what is superior to democratic liberal political order, of multilateral international collaboration, and of liberal free-market capitalism?

The Threat of an Authoritarian Century

Across much of the world, the ideas of a democratic liberal political order, of multilateral international collaboration, and of liberal free-market capitalism are now in retreat.

The National Interest · by Azeem Ibrahim · September 21, 2023

The world is in turmoil. Only thirty years after the fall of the USSR and the collapse of its proxy network in Eastern Europe, a land war is being fought in Europe between a democracy and a dictatorship.

When the Cold War ended, we could have scarcely imagined that in just three decades we would be where we are now. We know now that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not bring about “the end of history” as prophesied. Instead, it bred complacency among the leaders of the Western democracies, great complacency which has sowed the seeds for the current global anti-democratic reckoning.

Across much of the world, the ideas of a democratic liberal political order, of multilateral international collaboration, and of liberal free-market capitalism are now in retreat. Challenged not by a socialism as an alternative global, and universalist vision, but by an atavistic retreat to nativist, nationalist, and populist politics. This has been affecting both mature democracies and those states that made tentative steps toward a liberal political order in the aftermath of the Cold War. The result has been both a rise of authoritarian regimes, often through the degeneration of what were previously more functional democracies, and the decline of multinational coordination among countries now more likely to stress the primacy of the nation-state as the focus for the formulation of practical policies.

It is thus that in India, Narendra Modi is taking his country closer to Hindu chauvinism. In China, the Chinese Communist Party is ruling with an iron fist and perpetuating a high-technological genocide against the Uyghur religious and ethnic minority. In Europe and its surrounds, Turkey is sliding into autocracy under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Poland removes guardrails to keep its Law and Justice rulers in constitutional check, and Hungary under Viktor Orbán becomes a backchannel for other dictatorships as they shape the continent, before the backdrop of media consolidation, executive corruption, and the destruction of ordinary civil society.

The perplexing development with this anti-liberal backlash, however, is that nation-first chauvinist autocrats are now working together remarkably effectively in order to sidestep or undermine international liberal norms and institutions. In my book, Authoritarian Century, I call this key concept “Multilateral Autocratisation.” The emergent dictatorial systems are more alike than they are different, and they are remarkably good at working together for mutual advantage. Tyrannies of a feather flock together.

But this development is no accident. This propensity among the autocrats and aspiring autocrats to cooperate with each other has not emerged purely organically. This has been a development that has been cultivated, coordinated, and even often sponsored (in direct cash terms) by powers that have decided that the post-Cold War liberal international order is a strategic threat to their own interests—above all by Vladimir Putin’s regime in Moscow, and the Communist regime in Beijing.

Now, the two powers are distinct, both in their mode of operation and in the nature of the threat they pose. Moscow’s methods are mostly subversion and destruction—and the most they can produce is chaos. They are no less dangerous for it, but Putin does not have a positive vision of the world to offer anyone else.

Beijing, on the other hand, does offer a path to an alternative, relatively well-ordered international settlement. It wishes to create a “multipolar world” in which the democracies of the Western alliance are overmatched by the world’s tyrannies. Beijing’s plans to reorientate the global economy along the Belt and Road Initiative are part of this process of building up the economies of the tyrannies and deepening their interconnection.

Beijing also puts special effort into wresting control of already existing international institutions, which give it authority over global rules and norms, as it seeks to mold these to fit its immediate interests and its vision of the future. It was thus that the World Trade Organization was not able to curb China’s unfair trade practices, that the World Health Organization could not censor China over false COVID data, and thus how the United Nations Law of the Sea could not stop China from expanding in the South China Sea.

The problem with the future offered by China is what it implies for the well-being of billions of people later this century: Beijing supports every kind of political repression that aligns with its interests and has no qualms about carrying out a genocide of its own in its western province in Xinjiang, at the same time as it has utterly crushed the democratic culture of Hong Kong, and it is planning the annexation of the democratic country of Taiwan. As the pressures of climate change will continue to mount as we proceed through this century, Beijing will be responding purely in terms of political advantage, with no regard for human rights or international justice—and this will have life or death repercussions for untold millions of people around the world.

But the fight over our future this century is not yet settled. Moscow has stumbled in its appalling invasion of Ukraine, and is already greatly diminished internationally. Putin himself may fall, if the circumstances align just right. And Xi has made a number of missteps both in domestic management and in international diplomacy which have set China’s rise back by at least a decade, giving liberal democrats around the world time to regroup.

This then is the challenge that those of us who care about democracy and human rights have before us most acutely in the coming two decades, but really for the rest of this century: either we allow the international system to once again lapse into a state of complete anarchy, a state in which nations engage in a continuous “war of all against all” between empires and spheres of influence, with the notions of universal human rights and international law falling by the wayside; or we regroup and rebuild the postwar liberal international order which has enabled the most dramatic advancements in the human condition in our history as a species. As the threats of climate change and ecological collapse hang over us, the stakes could not be higher.

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is a Director at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington DC and Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College.

Image: LEE SNIDER PHOTO IMAGES / Shutterstock.com

The National Interest · by Azeem Ibrahim · September 21, 2023

11. China sentences Uyghur academic to life in prison in Xinjiang

China sentences Uyghur academic to life in prison in Xinjiang

By Lily Kuo

Updated September 22, 2023 at 7:53 a.m. EDT|Published September 22, 2023 at 4:06 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · September 22, 2023

Rahile Dawut, a prominent Uyghur academic who disappeared six years ago at the height of the Chinese government’s crackdown in Xinjiang, has been given a life sentence in prison, according to a human rights group that has worked for years to locate her.

Dui Hua, a California-based group that advocates for political prisoners in China, said in a statement Thursday that the 57-year-old professor — who was convicted in 2018 on charges of endangering state security by promoting “splittism” — had lost an appeal of her sentence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court.

At a regular press briefing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning said she was “unaware” of Dawut’s case. “What I can tell you is that China is a law-based country and handles relevant cases in strict accordance with the law.”

A former professor at Xinjiang University and leading scholar on Uyghur folklore, she is among more than 300 intellectuals, artists and writers believed to be detained in Xinjiang, amid a government campaign ostensibly aimed at better assimilating China’s Muslim minority and promoting ethnic harmony. Rights groups have accused the Chinese government of committing “cultural genocide” by wiping out previously vibrant local Uyghur culture.

“The sentencing of Professor Rahile Dawut to life in prison is a cruel tragedy, a great loss for the Uyghur people, and for all who treasure academic freedom,” said John Kamm, executive director of the Dui Hua Foundation.

Dawut’s daughter, Akeda Pulati, said in the statement from the group, “I worry about my mother every single day. The thought of my innocent mother having to spend her life in prison brings unbearable pain. China, show your mercy and release my innocent mother.”

Last year, after a visit to Xinjiang and months of interviews, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights concluded that the Chinese government had committed violations that may amount to “crimes against humanity.”

Dawut’s case underlines the reach of the government’s ongoing campaign, where even public intellectuals firmly part of the establishment have been targeted.

A member of the Chinese Communist Party for many years, she received awards and grants from China’s Ministry of Culture, according to Dui Hua. Her work at Xinjiang University, which included the founding of an Ethnic Minorities Research Center in 2007, was also funded by the government.

In 2014, another prominent academic, Ilham Tohti, who taught at Minzu University in Beijing, was sentenced to life in prison.

Dawut’s family announced her disappearance in 2018 and, in 2021, former co-workers told Radio Free Asia that she had been imprisoned and sentenced but that no details as to the length of her sentence were given.

“Confirmation of Rahile’s life sentence should give us pause to grasp the ruin visited on family lives of China’s genocide,” Uyghur Human Rights Project’s director of research, Henryk Szadziewski, said.

“The Chinese state has taken a wrecking ball to any expressions of Uyghurness outside of its purview. As a gifted academic documenting Uyghur knowledge, targeting Rahile is no coincidence.”

The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · September 22, 2023

12. Opinion | The all-volunteer force is dying. Here’s how to save it.

Excerpts:

With threats from China and elsewhere growing, we cannot ignore this issue. Most solutions will take years to bear fruit. But if we are to deter war, be victorious if it comes and safeguard our democracy, we will need to maintain a sizable high-quality force of volunteers. That means today’s leaders must act now to entice the next great generation of Americans to serve.

Opinion | The all-volunteer force is dying. Here’s how to save it.

The Washington Post · by Mark T. Esper · September 21, 2023

Mark T. Esper was defense secretary from 2019 to 2020 and is the author of “A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times.”

America’s all-volunteer force is slowly dying. And unless we take action soon to reverse the trend, we are putting our nation’s future security at risk.

This year, the all-volunteer force’s 50th, has been another tough one for military recruiting. The largest services will all miss their recruiting targets. The Army, which fell short last year by 15,000 recruits — 25 percent of its annual goal — expects to fall short by over 15 percent this year. The Navy and Air Force will also miss their marks by thousands.

Experts point to a variety of reasons, such as insufficient pay and benefits, a difficult work-life balance, fear of personal harm, and a relatively good job market. Some on the right say military “wokeness” is the problem; some on the left blame sexual assault and discrimination in the ranks.

Military professionals tell me all these factors are at play. But even if these issues were “fixed,” the all-volunteer force’s long-term decline would continue.

The fact is, the pool of Americans ages 17 to 24 who are qualified and interested in serving continues to shrink. When I was Army secretary in 2017, 71 percent of these 34 million young people could not meet the military’s entry requirements, mostly because of obesity, drug abuse, and physical and mental health problems. That number is even higher now. About half of the 23 percent remaining who are eligible to serve today decide to attend college. At the same time, the share of the entire cohort with a propensity to serve has dropped from 13 percent to 9 percent. That leaves fewer than 500,000 potential recruits. It’s hard to believe that a nation of 333 million people can’t produce a larger pool.

The numbers are all heading in the wrong direction, driven by broader cultural and lifestyle trends and a society unfamiliar with the 0.5 percent of their fellow citizens who defend them. When the draft ended in 1973, many young people had a family connection to the armed forces, someone who could explain military life. Today, that number is far lower, creating a “knowledge gap” that inhibits most from even considering serving. It also explains why nearly 80 percent of today’s recruits have a relative who has served. A military caste seems to have emerged over time, further isolating the military from society and undermining civilian-military relations.

The scope and scale of these trends are beyond the means of the Pentagon alone to remedy. Given the consequences, this is a challenge to our national security that must be addressed at the highest levels.

The White House and Congress need to work together to reverse the slide. They should begin by setting up a bipartisan commission of esteemed leaders, much as was done in 1969 to create the all-volunteer force — but this time, the mission would be to save it. To do that, commissioners would have to focus on two key issues: increasing the pool of young people qualified to serve and raising their interest in doing so.

For reasons that also extend beyond the military’s needs, such a commission should look at ways to improve the health and fitness of the nation’s youths, from resurrecting the long-abandoned Presidential Fitness Test to ensuring that physical education classes are part of every student’s daily schedule. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, fewer than 30 percent of today’s high school students exercise on a daily basis

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, the military’s enlistment test for academic eligibility, should be overhauled to ensure that it’s appropriate to the occupational specialties the military needs and that young people are allowed more time, tools and attempts to pass it. Medical requirements for service, such as allowing more waivers for kids with allergies, long-past conditions and old sports injuries, should be simplified.

JROTC, a proven program that not only helps teenagers develop important life skills but also familiarizes them with the military, should be expanded nationally with its own funding to ensure better geographic representation and opportunity for all. Fewer than 20 percent of high schools offer JROTC. At the same time, Congress must once and for all give military recruiters the same access to U.S. high schools that colleges and prospective employers enjoy. This is not happening, and many young adults are being denied a credible career path as a result.

While these initiatives and others are being explored, the Pentagon must steer away from lowering standards, reducing the military’s size, and creating hollow — i.e., undermanned — combat formations. We must field the force we need to win our nation’s wars, not take shortcuts.

Our elected leaders must also educate and inspire our youths by addressing their concerns and misconceptions, extolling the virtues of military duty and discussing the benefits and opportunities that come with service. They should also seek the assistance of sports figures, entertainers and others who exert influence over young Americans to help promote these messages.

With threats from China and elsewhere growing, we cannot ignore this issue. Most solutions will take years to bear fruit. But if we are to deter war, be victorious if it comes and safeguard our democracy, we will need to maintain a sizable high-quality force of volunteers. That means today’s leaders must act now to entice the next great generation of Americans to serve.

The Washington Post · by Mark T. Esper · September 21, 2023

13. The Black Box of Moscow

Excerpts:

More than a year and a half into this war, Western analysts and policymakers have accumulated tremendous amounts of robust data on the impacts of adding new weapons systems to the battlefield and defending Ukrainian airspace. They have solid evidence that policies to support Ukraine’s economy and weaken Russia’s financial capacity to prosecute war are effective, and they know what adjustments could make them even more effective.

Alas, those same analysts—this author included—remain flummoxed by events within Russia itself. Over time, this problem will be addressed, and the gap between awareness and analysis will narrow. Until it does, however, Western policy should focus on the things Westerners understand rather than the things they do not.

The Black Box of Moscow

The West Struggles to Understand Russia—but Can Still Help Ukraine Win

By Sam Greene

September 22, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sam Greene · September 22, 2023

Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin is dead, but the West’s desperation to interpret the larger meaning of his final weeks lives on. Western policymakers and pundits are still sifting through the details of Prigozhin’s odyssey from mercenary to mutineer to apparent murder victim, looking for the clues that would crack the mystery of the Kremlin’s behavior during the Ukraine war and help guide the West’s responses.

Many analysts see evidence that the Russian regime is brittle and that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power is tenuous. According to this analysis, Prigozhin’s beef with the Defense Ministry signals a deeper rot within the Russian military. The fact that the mutiny ended only when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko intervened signifies Putin’s inability to manage conflicts within his own regime. And the fact that Prigozhin met with Putin a few days after he marched on Moscow suggests that Putin is no longer invincible.

Other analysts point to the fact that the head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Sergei Surovikin, was apparently sacked in August, after Prigozhin praised him; numerous lower-ranked officers faced a similar fate. And thus they conclude the opposite: that the whole mutiny was a false flag, designed by Putin to smoke out disloyal officers. With this mission accomplished, the story goes, Prigozhin was either killed to cover Putin’s tracks or perhaps was not killed at all.

But this hunt for meaning obscures the real lesson Westerners should take from Prigozhin’s arc: that they understand very little about Russian politics today. Despite a glut of intelligence and information, the truth is that the Western analytical establishment—both within and outside governments—was at a loss to illuminate Prigozhin’s motives to march on Moscow; the Kremlin’s immediate, forgiving response; and the ensuing weeks’ twists and turns.

If the lack of analytical clarity on the Prigozhin affair were an outlier, it might be acceptable. Unfortunately, it is symptomatic of a much bigger problem. Western decisionmakers have had reasonable visibility into the inner workings of the Kremlin: Washington gathered and shared high-quality intelligence about Russian intentions in the run-up to the February 2022 Ukraine invasion, and U.S. intelligence broke the story of Putin’s post-putsch parley with Prigozhin.

But the availability of such information is not systematically leading to reliable analysis, which in turn undermines wartime policymaking. Facing a drawn-out war in Ukraine, many Western officials and their advisers cling to the notion that the swiftest route to peace runs through Moscow. They are very unlikely, however, to engineer a change of heart in the Kremlin—or a change of leadership—by reading the same tea leaves that have failed them over and over. They would do much better to instead focus more urgently on helping Ukraine.

NUCLEAR CALVINBALL

The model of Russian politics that most Western analysts worked with before the war assumed that severing Russian elites from their assets in the West would weaken political coordination in Russia. Since the mid-2000s, shelves of academic research have been generated that study Russian kleptocracy, the idea that Russia is ruled by a clique of people primarily interested in illicitly extracting wealth from the state and the economy. This research implies that Putin’s overriding goal is to keep the kleptocrats rich and the population silent. And that idea, in turn, suggested that Russian elites would react explosively to sanctions that crimped their bank accounts.

While this understanding of kleptocracy was a reasonable description of Russia in the recent past, it has broken down since February 2022. Severing Russian elites from their assets has not seemed to weaken Putin. The same models assumed that ordinary Russian citizens would speak up after seeing pictures of atrocities and body bags coming home from Ukraine. They have not.

And thus millions of Western dollars spent to ensure that Russians become aware of the war’s depredations have had little effect. Similarly, early in the war, protests in ethnic-minority regions motivated Western donors to shell out for campaigns encouraging self-determination and “decolonization” as a way of stoking internal divisions. But these ethnic-minority protests have since fizzled out.

Instead of prompting humility, this confusion has fed Western analysts’ and policymakers’ determination to ferret out the motives behind Russian behavior. Russia watchers have sought to predict whether the Kremlin will ramp up or draw down its military recruitment drives; this scrutiny has, in the end, yielded few useful predictions. Bouts of high-level rhetoric from Moscow about the possibility—and even the desirability—of using nuclear weapons have mainly reinforced analysts’ prior beliefs, either that the West should fear Russian escalation or that the Kremlin dangles the prospect of escalation as a red herring.

These failures highlight the difference between information and understanding. Precisely why Western analysts are failing to understand the causes behind the phenomena they observe in Russia is the subject of academic debate, but it likely has to do with the overwhelming focus, in recent years, on studying the country by way of statistical modeling rather than in-depth field research. Until researchers can get back into the field and build a new approach, their analyses will remain poor.

NO CLEAR DETERRENCE

Nonetheless, much of the West’s Ukraine policy—including calculations on military aid to Kyiv, sanctions policy, and the definition of a Ukrainian victory itself—remains predicated on the assumptions about decisions that will or will not be made in Moscow. Take the piecemeal way in which the United States has doled out military support to Ukraine. The Biden administration has, over time, delivered most of what Kyiv has asked for, but at a pace slower than Ukrainian leaders requested—a delay that may well have contributed to Ukraine’s slow progress in its summer 2023 counteroffensive.

Motivating this slow pace was a concern about escalation and a theory that any Russian decision to use a nuclear device would most likely result from panic. That theory is grounded in decades of research and analysis on Russian nuclear doctrine. But it is not clear that this research applies now, if it ever did. The chorus of foreign policy thinkers in Moscow who call for the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine do not seem to be guided by any of the ideas that Western analysts believe guide Russian foreign and security policy. In fact, their arguments seem to draw from another purported Russian doctrine, namely the idea of “escalating to de-escalate”—using a nuclear or other similarly catastrophic attack to shock an opponent into submission.

A similar confusion besets sanctions policy. To be sure, a major motive for sanctioning Russia is to diminish its ability to prosecute war by depriving it of revenue and technology, increasing the cost of raising capital, and decreasing liquidity. Although imperfect, Western sanctions on Russia’s technology and financial sectors have broadly achieved these objectives.

The West has taken a Moscow-centric approach to handling the Ukraine war.

But Western sanctions are also designed to impose costs on specific individuals linked to the regime or to the war. The United States and the European Union have, by now, sanctioned more than 2,000 Russian individuals and entities, cutting them off from their villas and bank accounts in the West, barring them from travel, and so on. These sanctions are designed to drive a wedge between Putin and Russia’s ruling elite and induce the kleptocrats to challenge the Kremlin. But Russia’s billionaires are now approximately $100 billion poorer than they were before the war, and they have yet to mount any visible challenge to Putin.

Ultimately, the West has taken a Moscow-centric approach to handling the Ukraine war. Washington, in particular, has put the strategic defeat of Russia ahead of achieving a complete Ukrainian victory. Both the U.S. government and the Washington think-tank world now spend considerably more time debating the finer points of Kremlinology than they do examining strategies for a Ukrainian victory, leading to a warped perception of both where the war stands and what could end it. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN in July, “In terms of what Russia sought to achieve, what Putin sought to achieve, they’ve already failed, they’ve already lost.”

But Russia keeps fighting. The trouble for Washington, and more important, for Ukraine, is that the Russia that might have been strategically defeated by the West’s moves is not the same Russia with which Ukraine is at war. Blinken and others assume that Russian leaders care about the national interest and might be held accountable for harming that national interest. The fact that Russia keeps fighting despite its losses suggests that a different logic is at work.

Unfortunately, Westerners’ inability to travel to Russia and conduct new research means that they are unlikely to arrive at a better understanding of the cost-benefit analysis guiding Kremlin decision-making. And so the sobering truth is that Western countries’ attempts to achieve their policy aims by modulating—or even responding to—events in Russia and the decisions of the Russian leadership are doomed to be ineffective at best.

A WISER GAME

The good news, however, is that Washington and its allies still maintain considerable leverage. First and foremost, they can strengthen Ukraine’s ability to make progress on the battlefield. The West may be unable to affect Russia’s military decision-making with any degree of reliability. But it has shown that it can improve Ukraine’s ability to hold and retake territory.

Similarly, the United States and its allies have not been able to deter Russia from bombarding Ukrainian civilians, but they can bolster Ukraine’s air defenses to prevent Russian missiles and drones from hitting their targets. None of these actions can force Russia to stop fighting, but they can help Ukrainians stay alive.

In the absence of any ability to gauge how Moscow will behave, the G-7 security guarantees promised after the July NATO summit in Vilnius should be focused tightly on increasing military impacts in Ukraine. Western countries should privilege developing and enforcing sanctions that squarely target the war effort rather than attempting to induce political change in Russia. In practice, that means closing the loopholes that have kept cash and technology flowing to Russia. And as the West saps Russia’s resilience, it should focus on increasing Ukraine’s resilience by fast-tracking the country’s progress toward European integration and spurring investment in the infrastructure and technology Ukraine will need to get its economy back on its feet.

More than a year and a half into this war, Western analysts and policymakers have accumulated tremendous amounts of robust data on the impacts of adding new weapons systems to the battlefield and defending Ukrainian airspace. They have solid evidence that policies to support Ukraine’s economy and weaken Russia’s financial capacity to prosecute war are effective, and they know what adjustments could make them even more effective.

Alas, those same analysts—this author included—remain flummoxed by events within Russia itself. Over time, this problem will be addressed, and the gap between awareness and analysis will narrow. Until it does, however, Western policy should focus on the things Westerners understand rather than the things they do not.

• SAM GREENE is Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London and Director of the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Foreign Affairs · by Sam Greene · September 22, 2023

14. The Case Against Containment

Excerpts:

Given China’s many weaknesses, a policy of containment is scarcely called for. Indeed, it would likely fuel, not allay, the common motivating belief among Chinese leaders that Washington is out to stop their country’s economic growth—something that many fear might cause them to lash out. Most of China’s expansionist moves have nothing to do with force, however. As the former U.S. diplomat Chas Freeman has put it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a nonviolent expansion of commerce and navigation.”

The alternative is to wait (perhaps for a rather long time) for China to mellow; although currently in eclipse, there is a substantial liberal element in China. This policy of patience could be pursued while warily seeking to profit from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible. The United States should also continue to maintain the decades-long charade in which Taiwan is effectively independent as long as it doesn’t say so. It might also humor China by welcoming it into the global leadership club as if that had some tangible meaning. If the United States can declare itself to be the one indispensable nation (suggesting that other nations are, well, dispensable), why should China be denied the opportunity to wallow in such self-important and essentially meaningless proclamations?

The lesson of the Cold War is not about the value of persistent containment in breaking your adversary’s will and sapping its power. It is about the wisdom of standing back, keeping your cool, and letting the contradictions in your opponent’s system become apparent. In a 2018 article in Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner (both now members of the Biden administration) opened by observing that “the United States has always had an outsize sense of its ability to determine China’s course.” Instead of repeating that misguided approach, policymakers might keep in mind an apt maxim from Napoleon Bonaparte: “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”

The Case Against Containment

The Strategy Didn’t Win the Cold War—and It Won’t Defeat China

By John Mueller

September 21, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by John Mueller · September 21, 2023

In the great debate over how the United States should respond to an increasingly assertive China, many commentators have advocated a ready-made solution: containment. Under this Cold War policy, Washington pushed back against Soviet (and Chinese) political and military advances wherever they appeared, seeking to prevent international communism from spreading. According to this accepted wisdom, containment won the Cold War, allowing the United States to check the power of the Soviet Union without engaging in a direct war with it.

With a track record like this, many argue that it is time for the United States to dust off the containment playbook and apply it to today’s rival superpower. The historian Hal Brands, for example, has contended that this “elegant” and “winning” strategy would prove effective against Beijing, writing, “To succeed against a rising China, the U.S. must relearn the lessons of containment.” In Foreign Affairs, the political scientist Michael Mandelbaum likewise deemed Cold War containment a “success” and argued that it should be applied “once again, now to Russia, China, and Iran” although “modified and updated.”

Such calls are certainly overconfident and probably misguided. Containment was not particularly successful during the Cold War, and it is also unlikely to work well against China today. In reality, more than anything else, it was the Soviet Union’s own errors and weaknesses that caused its downfall. The main problem with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was that it tried to do too much, not too little. And like the Soviet Union yesterday, China today is its own worst enemy. As with last time, the key now is not so much to search for ways to balance against the rising hegemon. It is to let this troubled and perhaps declining country make its own mistakes.

AN OVERRATED STRATEGY

The quintessential intellectual presentation of containment remains “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in Foreign Affairs in 1947 under the byline X, a pseudonym for George Kennan, then the State Department’s director of policy planning. Although concerned about Soviet military strength, he argued that what made that strength threatening was that it was paired with a fundamentally expansionist ideology. Yet he concluded that there was a “strong” possibility that Soviet power “bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.”

These seeds included the exhaustion and disillusionment of the Soviet population, “spotty” economic development, difficulty maintaining control over the peoples of East Europe, and looming uncertainties in the impending transfer of power that would follow the death of the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin (something Kennan predicted might “shake Soviet power to its foundations”). Accordingly, Kennan argued that the “main element” of U.S. policy “must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” In the long run, he hoped, the Soviets would grow frustrated in their drive for ideological expansion and become less hostile and more accommodating.

How long would this take? It was impossible to predict, of course, but in his article, Kennan opined that the process might take 10 to 15 years, strongly suggesting that things would change with the transfer of power in the Kremlin: Stalin was nearing 70 at the time. As it turned out, however, the Soviet regime managed to survive Stalin’s death (which took place in 1953) quite well, and for decades, it was able to maintain its control at home and over people in the middle of Europe.

Containment was not particularly successful during the Cold War, and it is also unlikely to work well against China today.

But a bigger problem was to assume that opposing Soviet power everywhere would be feasible and effective. In the decades after the X article, containment, beyond inspiring such failures as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vietnam War, seems to have prevented few countries from turning communist. It may have made a difference here and there—for example, when the CIA supported coups bringing down leftist governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. But it is difficult to determine whether such perceived successes actually prevented a left-leaning country from toppling into the communist camp. Indeed, covert regime change has a lousy track record. As the political scientist Lindsey O’Rourke has found, most efforts have failed, very few worked out as planned, and most of the successes proved to be short-lived.

The clearest case of containment’s success was when the United States and its allies turned back the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, in a war that then grew costly and ended in stalemate. At the time, the communists’ invasion was almost universally held to be part of a grand Soviet scheme to dominate the world, rather than the opportunistic foray it really was. With the West’s seeming success on the Korean Peninsula, containment policy became much more military, a development Kennan viewed with dismay. Central to this was military deterrence, leading the United States to make massive weapons expenditures focused on Europe. But as Kennan had already concluded, the Soviets did not need to be deterred: they sought to aid and inspire revolutionary movements around the world, but they never had an interest in waging anything like a repeat of World War II. After scouring the Soviet archives, the historian Vojtcch Mastny observed that all of Moscow’s plans were defensive and that the huge military buildup in the West “was irrelevant to deterring a major war the enemy did not want to launch in the first place.”

It is worth noting that containment played little role in communism’s three biggest setbacks during the Cold War; each was substantially self-inflicted. In 1948, Stalin tried and failed to bring Yugoslavia, led by a loyal but independent Communist Party, under tighter control, resulting in a fracturing of the communist camp. In 1965, the Indonesian military cracked down violently on Chinese-linked communists who were apparently attempting to seize control, thereby preventing Indonesia from falling into the Soviet camp; the development undercut a chief justification for the entry of the United States into the war in Vietnam, given that Indonesia had been viewed as a prime domino. And in the 1960s, the communist movement was split by a self-induced and self-destructive theological dispute between China and the Soviet Union. In none of these setbacks was there an American hand.

SOVIET SELF-DESTRUCTION

As the Cold War neared its end, Soviet expansionism mellowed. But that change of heart owed less to containment’s success than to its failure. If the Soviet system was as rotten at the core as Kennan said, logic might have dictated not containing it but letting it expand so that it might more readily self-destruct. To a degree, that actually happened. In 1975, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos abruptly toppled into the communist camp. Then, partly out of fear of repeating the Vietnam experience, the United States went into a sort of containment funk as the Soviet Union, in a remarkable fit of absentmindedness, opportunistically gathered a set of willing Third World countries into its embrace: Angola joined in 1976, Mozambique and Ethiopia in 1977, South Yemen and Afghanistan in 1978, and Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979.

At first, the Soviets viewed these acquisitions with glee—“the correlation of forces,” as they called it, had finally shifted in their direction. But almost all these states soon became economic and political basket cases. Fraught with dissension, financial mismanagement, and civil warfare, they turned expectantly to Moscow for sustenance. Most disastrous for the Soviets was the experience in Afghanistan. In December 1979, they sent a large contingent of troops there to establish order and to quash an anticommunist rebellion but soon found themselves bogged down in a protracted war.

With this array of disheveled dependencies, the Soviets were soon to realize that they would have been better off contained. The breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991 can hardly be credited to containment. By that time, Washington had long deemed the Cold War to be over and had officially deserted the policy. Moscow, too, had called it quits.

Logic might have dictated not containing the Soviet system but letting it expand so that it might more readily self-destruct.

Forty-one years after Kennan wrote his article, the Soviets, plagued by economic, social, and military disasters, abandoned their threatening ideology as he had hoped. In late 1988, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, called for “de-ideologizing relations among states.” The next year, when the Soviets still controlled most of eastern Europe, President George H. W. Bush reciprocated. In a series of speeches about going “beyond containment,” he announced that the goal now was to integrate “the Soviet Union into the community of nations,” to welcome it “back into the world order.” In 1989 and 1990, Eastern European states left the Warsaw Pact and worked their way toward democracy and capitalism. The United States welcomed this change, but it also made a considerable effort to keep the Soviet Union itself from collapsing. Most notably, in 1991, Bush gave a speech in Ukraine in which he essentially urged the various Soviet republics to work it out and to remain within the country. If there was a Cold War raging at that time, the United States and the Soviet Union were on the same side.

Shortly after Bush’s speech, however, communist hard-liners in Moscow, intent on keeping the Soviet Union from falling apart, staged a coup attempt to remove Gorbachev. The attempt failed, but it shifted sentiment toward dissolution, particularly in Ukraine, and it resulted in exactly the breakup the conspirators were seeking to prevent. Without that development, it is possible that with some economic reform, including cuts in defense spending, the Soviet Union might have survived more or less intact.

As the analyst Strobe Talbott put it, the Soviet system went “into meltdown because of inadequacies and defects at its core, not because of anything the outside world has done or not done or threatened to do.” The historian Odd Arne Westad agreed: it came about primarily “because of weaknesses and contradictions in the Soviet system itself.”

PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE

In determining whether to apply something like containment to China, it’s worth asking first if the country is anywhere near as menacing as the Soviet Union. China, now in second place in total GDP (although 78th in per capita GDP), does seem to be seeking a spot at center stage. As part of this quest, it is building up its military and has sought to gain influence by lending money through its Belt and Road Initiative to an array of other countries and by engaging in “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” using economic and military muscle to badger and bully. Meanwhile, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been adept at working his way into unchallenged one-man rule in China and at embedding himself at the center of a compliant echo chamber.

But China doesn’t present the same kind of ideological challenge as the Soviet Union. It has sought to aid other authoritarian kleptocracies to better maintain their hold on power, but that is hardly the same thing as spreading an ideology. Moreover, China does not seem to have much in the way of territorial ambitions beyond reincorporating Taiwan at some point and settling disputes over parts of its border and over the seas around it.

Most troubling for China, as it was for the Soviet Union, is its growing set of domestic difficulties. Most of them derive from Xi’s determination to prioritize control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Chinese Communist Party over economic development. The list of resulting problems is nearly endless: endemic corruption, environmental degradation, slowing growth, capricious shifts in government policies (including the abruptly canceled “zero COVID” policy), inefficient enterprises, fraudulent statistical reporting, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, huge youth unemployment, increasing debt, a housing bubble, restive minorities, protectionist policies, the alienation of Western investors, and a clampdown on civil liberties. There also seems to be something of a decline in confidence in, and in the credibility of, the Communist Party’s dictates, a change that could have dire long-term consequences for the regime.

Moreover, China’s efforts in recent years to be treated as a great power have been remarkably unproductive. Rather than generating admiration or obedience from countries that once wished it well, resentment and wariness have soared not only in the West but also in Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, pushing some of these important neighbors further into the arms of the United States. And the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative is wallowing in unpaid debt, with loan outlays cut from $75 billion in 2016 to $4 billion in 2019.

The Cold War’s lesson is to stand back, keep your cool, and let contradictions in your opponent’s system become apparent.

Given China’s many weaknesses, a policy of containment is scarcely called for. Indeed, it would likely fuel, not allay, the common motivating belief among Chinese leaders that Washington is out to stop their country’s economic growth—something that many fear might cause them to lash out. Most of China’s expansionist moves have nothing to do with force, however. As the former U.S. diplomat Chas Freeman has put it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a nonviolent expansion of commerce and navigation.”

The alternative is to wait (perhaps for a rather long time) for China to mellow; although currently in eclipse, there is a substantial liberal element in China. This policy of patience could be pursued while warily seeking to profit from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible. The United States should also continue to maintain the decades-long charade in which Taiwan is effectively independent as long as it doesn’t say so. It might also humor China by welcoming it into the global leadership club as if that had some tangible meaning. If the United States can declare itself to be the one indispensable nation (suggesting that other nations are, well, dispensable), why should China be denied the opportunity to wallow in such self-important and essentially meaningless proclamations?

The lesson of the Cold War is not about the value of persistent containment in breaking your adversary’s will and sapping its power. It is about the wisdom of standing back, keeping your cool, and letting the contradictions in your opponent’s system become apparent. In a 2018 article in Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner (both now members of the Biden administration) opened by observing that “the United States has always had an outsize sense of its ability to determine China’s course.” Instead of repeating that misguided approach, policymakers might keep in mind an apt maxim from Napoleon Bonaparte: “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”

• JOHN MUELLER is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Ohio State University, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and the author of The Stupidity of War.

Foreign Affairs · by John Mueller · September 21, 2023

15. ted arms supply agreement - The Korea Times

koreatimes.co.kr

Russian President Vladimir Putin, second from left, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un examine a launch pad during their meeting at the Vostochny cosmodrome outside the city of Tsiolkovsky, about 200 kilometers from the city of Blagoveshchensk in the far eastern Amur region, Russia, on Wednesday, Sept. 13. AP-Yonhap

South Korea’s foreign ministry on Friday called on Russia to “transparently explain” its recent dealings with North Korea amid growing speculation of an arms supply deal at last week’s bilateral summit.

“If it (Moscow) will not engage in such worrisome military cooperation with North Korea, Russia should transparently explain (its dealings with North Korea) so that the international community could find it acceptable,” a ministry official said.

Russia lodges protest to S.Korean envoy over Yoon’s UN speech

The comments were made in response to a statement made by the Russian Embassy in Seoul on the previous day upon President Yoon Suk Yeol’s speech condemning military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow at the United Nations General Assembly this week.

In a Facebook message in English, the embassy expressed “deep regret” that Yoon “joined the propaganda campaign initiated by Washington and picked up by the American and South Korean media aimed at discrediting Russian-North Korean cooperation.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a summit at the Vostochny space center in Russia’s Far East last Wednesday, raising concerns the North may have reached a deal to supply ammunition for Russia’s war in Ukraine in exchange for food aid and the transfer of weapons technology. (Yonhap)

koreatimes.co.kr

16. Putin vows to strengthen support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Putin vows to strengthen support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative

donga.com

Posted September. 22, 2023 08:35,

Updated September. 22, 2023 08:35

Putin vows to strengthen support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. September. 22, 2023 08:35. by Ki-Yong Kim kky@donga.com.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his strong support for the Belt and Road Initiative, a priority project of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Belt and Road is China's project for economic and territorial expansion.

As reported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Putin held a meeting with Wang Yi, Director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office and Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on Thursday. “Russia highly acclaims and actively supports the BRI, and it opposes any distortions and smearing that target the initiative,” Putin said at the meeting. Additionally, Putin accepted China's invitation to attend a forum in Beijing next month commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Russia has overcome the impact of unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S.-led West, and the Russian economy has resumed growth," Putin said. "We look forward to further strengthening cooperation with China." "The two sides should strengthen multilateral strategic collaboration, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of both countries and work towards making the international order more just and reasonable," Wang responded.

In particular, the Chinese foreign minister aimed at the U.S., stating, “Hegemony does not win people's hearts. China and Russia, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, share a crucial responsibility in advancing global development and progress.” The minister's remarks come as a hint amid calls for reform of the 'non-functioning Security Council,' which has faced criticism for its failure to respond to allegations of North Korea-Russia arms deals through exercising its veto power.

한국어

donga.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com