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Quotes of the Day:
“The devil’s aversion to holy water is a light matter compared with a despot’s dread of a newspaper that laughs.”
– Mark Twain
“Censorship is the tool of those who have the need to hide actualities from themselves and from others. Their fear is only their inability to face what is real, and I can’t vent any anger against them. I only feel this appalling sadness. Somewhere, in their upbringing, they were shielded against the total facts of our existence. They were taught only to look one way when many ways exist.”
–Charles Bukowski
"All empty souls tend toward extreme opinions."
-- W.B. Yeats
1. South Korea’s Lee pans ‘submissive’ reliance on US troops in comments aimed at Washington
2. In South Korea, Trump’s US$350 billion demand threatens financial meltdown
3. Caught in a rip: South Korea and the Taiwan question
4. North Korea Summit? Trump and Kim Jong Un Could Meet at DMZ Again Next Month
5. North Korea's Nuclear Submarine Program Might Advance Thanks to Russia
6. Donald Trump's Tariffs Are Nothing But a Giant Mistake
7. Kim Jong-un Open to Talks if U.S. Drops Demand to Denuclearize
8. Seoul should push to revive North Korea tourism projects: Unification minister
9. UK warship carries out North Korean sanctions monitoring mission near Japan
10. US, allies back denuclearization after North Korea vows to never give up nukes
11. Defense Ministry Honors Soldiers for Refusing Unlawful Orders
12. Rhee Syng-man's Nuclear Drive vs. Lee Jae-myung's Reluctance
13. S. Korea, U.S. army chiefs discuss expanding exchanges between troops, military drills
14. Lee tells U.S. lawmakers that he hopes to prevent recurrence of detention of Korean workers
15. S. Korea, U.S., Japan reaffirm push for N.K. denuclearization after leader Kim rebuff
16. China reports exporting nearly 100,000 barrels of petroleum to N. Korea this year
17. Presidential office unveils offbook gov't fund details for 1st time
18. Kim Jong Un launches sweeping purge following Beijing trip
1. South Korea’s Lee pans ‘submissive’ reliance on US troops in comments aimed at Washington
Is anyone arguing that the ROK should be submissive to the US? That is right out of north Korean propaganda.
There are a number of ways to interpret these remarks.
First, since 2003 and the beginning of the OPCON transition process we have focused on the requirement for the ROK to develop independent warfighting capabilities. Perhaps Preisnt Lee is committing to that.
Second, we have long made the case that the US is more likely to support a strong self-sufficient partner than one who claims the need for a "US rescue" and is solely dependent on the US for its defense.
Third, this supports the case that the US sustains the alliance and lives up to its commitment in mutual defense treaty because it is in the US interests to do so. US forces remain in Korea not solely to defend the ROK but to protect US interests (the number one interest in northeast Asia being to prevent war). And because it is a mutual defense treaty and does not focus solely on north Korea, both countries are committed to the mutual defense against threats to either country in the "Pacific region."
Now this will be panned by the anti-Lee factions who say this is a move away from the ROK/US alliance. They will use this to argue that the ROK wants to be closer to China and wants to appease north Korea in return for peaceful co-existence.
Others within the US administration (the retrenchers) will misinterpret this and say that since the ROK wants to go it alone that we should withdraw troops.
I choose to interpret this positively and say that the ROK wants to develop independent warfighting capabilities as we have pushed for two decades and that this position allows the alliance to be one of equal partners and most importantly US troops remain in Korea not solely to defend the ROK but because it is in US interests to remain in the ROK for a number of strategic reasons while contributing to the defense eof the ROK.
South Korea
This Week in AsiaPolitics
South Korea’s Lee pans ‘submissive’ reliance on US troops in comments aimed at Washington
President Lee Jae-myung rejects claims that troop shortages would spark a defence crisis, amid tensions over cost-sharing for US forces
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 9:30am, 23 Sep 2025Updated: 3:50pm, 23 Sep 2025
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has slammed as “submissive” the notion that Seoul cannot defend itself without American troops, in a message aimed at both Washington and domestic audiences.
The remarks come as Seoul and Washington remain deadlocked over tariff talks and cost-sharing for United States forces, with the White House reportedly pressing for US$350 billion in South Korean investments and wider shouldering of the defence burden.
In a social media post written before departing for New York on Monday to attend the UN General Assembly, Lee rejected claims that troop shortages would spark a defence crisis.
“It is lamentable that some people have such a submissive notion that it would be impossible for us to defend ourselves without relying on foreign troops,” he argued, pointing out that South Korea’s technological edge compensated for its shrinking conscript pool.
“Fifty well-equipped soldiers with AI combat robots, armed drones, and ultra-precise missile systems can repel not just 100 but tens of thousands of enemies,” he said.
South Korean soldiers salute on a boat connected to a floating bridge during a South Korea-US joint river-crossing drill as part of the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise in Yeoju on August 27. Photo: AFP
Lee also stressed South Korea still had 2.6 million trained reservists, spent more than 1.4 times North Korea’s gross domestic product annually on defence, and ranked fifth globally in military power.
“The population issue is serious indeed, and enlisted soldiers are short in numbers, but troop numbers alone are no reason to doubt our defence capability,” he said.
Bong Young-shik, a research fellow at the Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies, said Lee’s statement was intended to show that Seoul would not bend to US pressure.
“This is a message that Seoul won’t compromise even if Washington uses a potential troop drawdown as a negotiating chip,” Bong told This Week in Asia.
He added that Lee was also preparing the Korean public for higher defence spending as a voluntary, self-driven measure.
South Korea’s 2025 defence budget is set at 61.2 trillion won (US$44 billion), or 2.32 per cent of GDP. The US has urged South Korea and Japan to increase defence spending towards 5 per cent of GDP by 2035.
During talks last month, Washington reportedly pushed Seoul to raise defence spending to 3.8 per cent of GDP and double its share of costs to host 28,500 American troops.
Under a deal reached last year, Seoul’s contribution next year will be about US$1 billion.
South Korean and US soldiers take part in a joint river-crossing exercise, which is a part of the annual Freedom Shield joint military training, in Yeoju, South Korea, on August 27. Photo: Reuters
Concerns about demographics and troop strength continue to shape political debates.
Opposition People Power Party (PPP) lawmaker Yoo Yong-won cited defence ministry data projecting that by 2040 South Korea’s armed forces could fall to about 270,000 – 150,000 enlisted and 120,000 officers – while North Korea maintained roughly 1.13 million, creating a nearly four-to-one imbalance.
Lee countered in his social media post by urging a shift towards a hi-tech, professional force: “Our military must move from outdated manpower-heavy forces to a professional, smart elite army built on combined manned-unmanned systems.”
He invoked former president Roh Moo-hyun, who in 2006 castigated generals opposing the transfer of wartime operational control from the US to South Korea.
Through the Combined Forces Command, the US has wartime operational control over South Korean troops – a legacy from the 1950-53 Korean war.
Roh called them “unworthy of their stars” for objecting to the transfer after having spent heavily on defence for decades.
“Building strong, autonomous self-defence is our most urgent task today,” Lee declared.
“On the foundation of economic recovery and national unity, I will press forward with bold defence reforms to establish a complete self-reliant posture so that our citizens can feel secure.”
The PPP sharply criticised Lee’s remarks, accusing him of undermining the alliance.
“This is an irresponsible, reality-blind ‘security gaffe’ that disparages the alliance and effectively calls for US troop withdrawal,” PPP spokesman Choi Eun-suk said.
Sung Il-jong, chair of the National Assembly’s defence committee, asked: “Is Lee calling for the dismantlement of the South Korea-US alliance? Then how could we deter North Korea’s nuclear threat?”
Trump and South Korea’s Lee ‘have a deal’ after White House meeting
Lee’s ruling Democratic Party of Korea defended him.
Deputy spokesman Boo Seung-chan said: “President Lee never said we should break the alliance. He spoke of building a smart, professional military, not dismantling ties.”
He also accused the PPP of hypocrisy for defending former president Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed December 3 martial law attempt, which he said harmed the alliance by mobilising troops for a “self-coup”.
Still, some experts fault Lee’s doctrine for lacking a nuclear deterrence component, as South Korea continues to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.
“The most significant role of US forces in Korea is to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat,” said Kim Dong-jung, a political-science professor at Korea University.
“While emphasising self-reliant defence, the government should also present a strategic plan to supplement nuclear deterrence.”
Doo Jin-ho, a research fellow at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, said Lee’s comments were ultimately aimed at strengthening Seoul’s hand.
“President Lee was encouraging South Korean officials to stand firm as they engage in economic and security talks with their US counterparts,” he said.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
2. In South Korea, Trump’s US$350 billion demand threatens financial meltdown
Had we not committed the "own goal" with the ICE raid debacle in Georgia would we be reading these comments now?
South Korea
This Week in AsiaEconomics
In South Korea, Trump’s US$350 billion demand threatens financial meltdown
US demands for a US$350 billion cash investment to avoid higher trade tariffs could send South Korea’s economy ‘belly up’, experts say
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 1:30pm, 16 Sep 2025
In Seoul, alarm bells are ringing. Washington is demanding an eye-watering US$350 billion in direct investment, a sum so vast that economists warn it could tip South Korea into a crisis unseen in its modern history.
US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick bluntly asserted last week that South Korea must accept the deal or face higher tariffs – pointing out that Japan had already agreed to similar terms.
Under a framework agreement reached in July, the United States offered to reduce proposed tariffs on South Korean imports from 25 per cent to 15 per cent, but only if Seoul pledged to invest the US$350 billion into sectors chosen by Washington and made additional concessions.
Yet follow-up talks, including during President Lee Jae-myung’s visit to Washington last month, have reached an impasse over the structure of the investment package, profit-sharing mechanisms and other conditions. “The devil is in the details,” as Lutnick put it on Thursday.
A protester holding US dollar banknotes wears a mask of Donald Trump during a rally in July against Trump’s tariff policy near the US embassy in Seoul. Photo: AFP
US President Donald Trump has been sharply critical of South Korea, calling it a rich “money machine” that exploits its alliance with America, citing trade surpluses he claims are evidence of unfair practices.
Analysts caution against drawing parallels with Japan, however. They note that South Korea’s economy is roughly half the size of Japan’s, with foreign exchange reserves of around US$416 billion – less than one-third of Tokyo’s US$1.32 trillion.
And unlike the yen, South Korea’s won is not freely convertible and lacks reserve currency status, leaving Seoul with far less room to manoeuvre.
“South Korea is being coerced to drink from a poisoned chalice. If we accept the US demand as it is, this country would simply go belly up,” said Hur Jung, an economics professor at Sogang University in Seoul.
“The country’s foreign exchange reserves would become depleted and the won’s value would plunge, sparking a foreign exchange crisis that would make the 1997 IMF bailout look mild by comparison.”
If we accept the US demand as it is, this country would simply go belly up
Hur Jung, Korean economics professor
The deal Washington is pushing would require the South Korean government to channel its investments into US-designated special purpose companies. Profits would be split 90-10 in Seoul’s favour until the investment principal is recouped, after which the US share would surge to 90 per cent.
US$350 billion amounts to 84 per cent of South Korea’s foreign reserves, compared with Japan’s US$550 billion pledge – just 41.6 per cent of its far larger holdings.
Crucially, Japan’s yen enjoys global convertibility, giving Tokyo access to virtually unlimited dollar liquidity through currency swaps with the US, a luxury not afforded to Seoul.
“This is an impossible demand for South Korea to accept in light of the size of its economy, its currency’s market status and foreign exchange position,” Hur said.
“In the face of this nonsensical demand that goes beyond international trade practices, it’s no surprise that negotiations can’t proceed.”
Liquidity issues
South Korea can raise no more than US$20 billion to US$30 billion annually from foreign exchange markets, according to senior presidential aide Kim Yong-beom.
Immediately after the July agreement was announced, Kim clarified that most of the US$350 billion would have to be raised through loans and guarantees from institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of Korea and the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation, with only a fraction as direct equity.
But Washington is reportedly pressing Seoul to follow Japan’s model and provide the entire US$350 billion sum in cash as direct investment.
Facing acute liquidity constraints, South Korea has appealed for dollar swaps with the US, a request American officials have so far rebuffed. “In fact, the negotiation has hit a stumbling block over this issue,” Kim told reporters.
A trader stands near screens showing the foreign exchange rate between the US dollar and South Korean won at a dealing room of Hana Bank in Seoul on Friday. Photo: AP
President Lee publicly vowed last week never to make a decision that undermined the national interest, dismissing speculation of a secret deal. Asked why he had not signed the agreement during the summit in Washington, unlike Japan, Lee replied: “Why would I sign when it’s not beneficial to do so? … We should aim to sign in the most reasonable way possible. Don’t criticise me for not signing it yet.”
The economic risks have not been lost on international observers. Economist Dean Baker, co-founder of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research think tank in Washington, noted that Trump had openly boasted about forcing Japan and South Korea to fork over billions of dollars in exchange for lower tariffs.
“If they are anywhere close to the way Trump describes them, the countries would be ungodly stupid to take the deal,” Baker wrote in an article published last week.
“But wait, it gets worse. Trump does not feel bound by any of his deals. He can easily come back and demand more money from Japan next year [or] the year after … As his business associates have learned the hard way, deals mean nothing to Donald Trump.”
The US demand is beyond the pale of market capitalism. It’s naked imperialism
Nah Won-jun, Korean economics professor
South Korea exported US$132 billion worth of goods to the US last year, equivalent to roughly 7.3 per cent of its gross domestic product. If US tariffs reduce exports by 5 per cent, the loss would amount to US$7 billion. Yet to protect these exports, Trump is demanding US$350 billion – an exchange analysts say defies economic logic.
The US$350 billion figure represents about 70 per cent of South Korea’s annual budget, according to Nah Won-jun, an economics professor at Kyungpook National University.
“The US demand is beyond the pale of market capitalism. It’s naked imperialism,” he said.
“If South Korea accepts this unfair deal, it would deal a fatal blow to its economy. If the invested US projects fail, in a situation where South Korea can’t recover its investments, Korean taxpayers would have to shoulder the burden and live like slaves.”
South Korea pledges $150 billion to help US restore its shipbuilding industry
Nah argued that Seoul would be better off absorbing the pain of higher US tariffs and accelerating efforts to diversify its export markets – no simple feat, as South Korea has already been pivoting away from China towards the US amid rising geopolitical tensions.
Still, the dilemma is acute. “We cannot afford to give up the US market, given its dominant size, enormous purchasing power and robust growth potential,” said Yang Joo-young, trade policy director at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade.
Meanwhile, South Korean corporations have separately announced US$150 billion in additional US investments, including Korean Air’s US$50 billion order for 103 Boeing aircraft.
But these commitments do little to ease Seoul’s looming financial squeeze.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
3. Caught in a rip: South Korea and the Taiwan question
Excerpts:
Swimming with the rip. Beneath the mainstream consensus—and largely invisible to most U.S. analysts—are a number of South Korean strategists who choose to swim with the rip to escape its full force, before circling back to shore. They understand that outright resistance is futile: the institutional current of the alliance is too strong, and the cost of open defiance too high. Yet they also recognize the danger of blind compliance.
By moving with the current, they conserve their energy, adopting the language of alliance solidarity and nodding along with Washington’s Taiwan framing, all the while waiting for the chance to angle sideways and reassert Korea’s priorities. They stress Korea’s role in supporting U.S. forces from the peninsula and frame Seoul as an enduring, existential threat to China through the instability of a collapsed or insecure North Korea.
All the while, they are biding their time. Whoever emerges dominant in the region—Washington or Beijing—it is better for Korea to be aligned with the winner. This is tactical navigation: an effort to avoid drowning while still seeking a path back to strategic ground that serves Korea’s own interests, rather than merely reinforcing America’s.
In the end, South Korea’s dilemma is not whether it can outswim the rip, but whether it even recognizes that it is caught in one.
The choice between fighting, surrendering, or navigating tactically will determine not just its role in a Taiwan contingency, but the very survival of its sovereignty as a middle power in an unraveling order.
For South Korea’s strategists, to swim blindly against the current is suicide, to drift passively is submission, and to swim with the rip requires foresight and courage that few in Seoul have yet shown. Debate on the topic is not readily welcomed. The tragedy is that by the time South Korea’s strategic community seriously debates the risk, the shoreline will have already disappeared from sight.
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Caught in a rip: South Korea and the Taiwan question
https://junotane.com/posts/caught-in-a-rip-south-korea-and-the-taiwan-question
Every Australian kid grows up knowing what to do when caught in a rip. When the weight of the Pacific crashes onto the beach and funnels back through a narrow channel, it drags everything with it out to sea. One moment you’re standing firm on the sandbar, the next your feet are swept away and you’re being pulled toward Vanuatu. In that moment you face three choices: fight the current head-on; surrender and let it carry you wherever it wants; or ride with it just long enough to slip free, before circling back to shore.
During the Biden Administration and now under the second Trump Administration, South Korea’s strategists have had their feet washed off the strategic sandbar and are caught in a rip.
The rip South Korea faces is the looming prospect of a Taiwan contingency. The prevailing current is Washington’s demand that allies fall into line should conflict erupt.
Given its geography, economic dependence on China, and its ever-troublesome neighbor to the north, South Korea has long played the role of the cautious child with floaties, splashing along the shoreline while others ventured deeper. Now, in a poor swimmer’s nightmare, the Biden and Trump administrations have tossed South Korea straight into the center of the rip. The full force of U.S. expectations is dragging it out to sea.
Should South Korea swim against the rip; let the rip decide its fate; or swim with the rip to escape its full force, before circling back to shore?
Swimming against the rip. For decades, there’s been activists who tried to swim directly against the rip—trade unionists, extreme leftists, and a handful of intellectuals who framed the alliance as the root of subordination and insecurity. They paddled hard, arms thrashing against the weight of the ocean, insisting that decoupling from Washington or pivoting toward Pyongyang or Beijing could deliver true autonomy. But like swimmers fighting the ocean, their strokes exhausted them. National security zealotry, tides of institutional dependence, elite consensus, and U.S. leverage was too strong.
Instead of escaping the rip, those who swim against it are left politically stranded—marginalized in mainstream discourse, dismissed as unrealistic, and ultimately too tired to mount serious resistance when the next wave of alliance orthodoxy crashed ashore. Don’t swim against the rip, you’ll drown.
Letting fate decide. The mainstream consensus in South Korea is that Seoul’s interests and Washington’s are not just aligned, but identical. Whatever the U.S. position, it becomes the Korean position—no questions asked. This mindset is the product of epistemic capture.
Epistemic capture occurs when a policy community so thoroughly internalizes the worldview, language, and priorities of a dominant partner that it loses the ability to generate independent perspectives. Unlike simple influence, which still leaves room for negotiation, capture predetermines the entire framework of debate: the categories of thought, the assumptions about threats and allies, even the very definition of “rational” strategy all mirror the stronger partner’s outlook.
In South Korea, epistemic capture has been cemented by decades of alliance management, educational exchanges, youth programs, and institutional dependency on U.S. security thinking. To comment on strategy is to depend on think tanks, corporate partners, academia, or government funding—most of which come from entities unwilling to back anyone who strays too far from the alliance line.
The result is a strategic community that rarely asks whether Taiwan is vital to Korea’s survival. They debate only the modalities of support, never the premise. Compliance is achieved without coercion, narrowing the scope of imagination before genuine debate can even begin.
The danger is that this consensus comes at a moment of profound upheaval. U.S. primacy is eroding, Washington’s interests in the region are declining, China’s role as a cornerstone of the future regional and multilateral order is expanding, Japan is rearming, and middle powers from India to Indonesia are reassessing their strategies.
Even the U.S.–ROK alliance is no longer stable; American politics now treats alliances as transactional, subject to tariffs, troop withdrawals, or demands for cash. To bet everything on alliance solidarity in such a moment is a high-risk strategy.
After years of sidestepping the U.S.–China confrontation, South Korea now finds itself in the center—indeed, on the frontline. It’s as if Seoul showed up late to the party, already drunker than everyone else, and picked a fight with the biggest man in the room. Should war break out over Taiwan, South Korea would face massive Chinese retaliation—economic, cyber, and potentially military. Deterrence against North Korea would collapse overnight.
In the face of a nuclear threat from the North or a wider conflict with China, U.S. assurances are meaningless. Korea, as it exists today, would cease to exist. Think Ukraine, add Gaza, and multiply it by ten.
And yet, these risks are barely discussed in Korean policy circles. The epistemic capture is so complete that letting the rip wash the country out to sea feels like the only choice.
Swimming with the rip. Beneath the mainstream consensus—and largely invisible to most U.S. analysts—are a number of South Korean strategists who choose to swim with the rip to escape its full force, before circling back to shore. They understand that outright resistance is futile: the institutional current of the alliance is too strong, and the cost of open defiance too high. Yet they also recognize the danger of blind compliance.
By moving with the current, they conserve their energy, adopting the language of alliance solidarity and nodding along with Washington’s Taiwan framing, all the while waiting for the chance to angle sideways and reassert Korea’s priorities. They stress Korea’s role in supporting U.S. forces from the peninsula and frame Seoul as an enduring, existential threat to China through the instability of a collapsed or insecure North Korea.
All the while, they are biding their time. Whoever emerges dominant in the region—Washington or Beijing—it is better for Korea to be aligned with the winner. This is tactical navigation: an effort to avoid drowning while still seeking a path back to strategic ground that serves Korea’s own interests, rather than merely reinforcing America’s.
In the end, South Korea’s dilemma is not whether it can outswim the rip, but whether it even recognizes that it is caught in one.
The choice between fighting, surrendering, or navigating tactically will determine not just its role in a Taiwan contingency, but the very survival of its sovereignty as a middle power in an unraveling order.
For South Korea’s strategists, to swim blindly against the current is suicide, to drift passively is submission, and to swim with the rip requires foresight and courage that few in Seoul have yet shown. Debate on the topic is not readily welcomed. The tragedy is that by the time South Korea’s strategic community seriously debates the risk, the shoreline will have already disappeared from sight.
China
Commentary
Taiwan
4. North Korea Summit? Trump and Kim Jong Un Could Meet at DMZ Again Next Month
Excerpts:
Conclusion: History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Rhymes
We’ve seen this movie before. In 2019, the DMZ meeting created political space for technical talks, even if the follow-through faltered. In 2025, the conditions are arguably better: Kim is advertising the lane he’ll accept; Seoul is validating a freeze-first step; and Trump will already be on the peninsula. If the goal is fewer tests, tighter caps, and a sturdier deterrent while keeping the long game alive, then a DMZ reboot is not a stunt.
It’s the one move that matches the moment—and it could happen again. I hope it does. And knowing Trump, even if it’s just to test Kim’s intentions on a deal, I think it happens.
North Korea Summit? Trump and Kim Jong Un Could Meet at DMZ Again Next Month
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Harry Kazianis · September 22, 2025
The DMZ, Again? Why a Trump–Kim Meeting Is Back on the Table
North Korea has said it’s ready to talk with Washington if denuclearization isn’t on the table anymore. Seoul’s new line now treats a nuclear weapons production freeze as a realistic interim step. And Donald Trump is set to visit South Korea next month for the APEC summit.
Those three signals, taken together, recreate the narrow diplomatic geometry we last saw in 2019—when Trump invited Kim Jong Un to the Demilitarized Zone and diplomacy briefly rebooted.
The setting, the incentives, and the politics are aligning for an encore.
Kim’s Message—and What It Really Means
Kim’s latest speech made two points that matter. First, Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Second, the door to dialogue opens if Washington shelves disarmament demands and negotiates around peaceful coexistence.
Critics will call this a stall. It is also the only lane that has produced even temporary restraint: freezes on missile and nuclear testing, fewer surprises, and lower odds of a crisis spiraling out of control.
If your objective is risk reduction in the near term, you meet North Korea where the leverage is—on caps, pauses, and verification, not utopian disarmament.
Seoul’s Pivot Changes the Math
Seoul’s new posture—publicly blessing a freeze-first bargain as an “interim emergency measure”—is the underappreciated breakthrough.
The South Korean president is telling Washington and Pyongyang that a pause in production is not capitulation but triage while the long-term goal of denuclearization remains alive.
That matters for two reasons. It removes a perennial wedge that Pyongyang exploits to divide allies. And it gives Trump cover to pursue a transaction that can be defended as practical, measurable, and immediately stabilizing.
Summitry That Fits the Moment
The DMZ is more than a backdrop. In 2019, it enabled leader-level improvisation—exactly the channel that matters in a system where only Kim can trade on nuclear issues.
The lesson from that episode is not to chase TV theatrics; it’s to use leader-level optics after the staff have quietly boxed in a deal’s contours. If Trump wants a win that sticks, he can reprise the formula but with more polish: appear at the DMZ once a technical freeze and verification annex are essentially locked, using the moment for last-inch trade-offs and to announce a tightly defined first phase.
The timing will be tight, but if anything is possible when it comes to Trump and North Korea, as history has shown us.
But even if an interm deal isn’t possible right off the bat, there are clearly reasons for both leaders to meet at the DMZ and at least hammer out what is possible, and see if Kim is truly serious after all.
What a Realistic First Phase Looks Like
No op-ed should pretend there’s an instant fix. But there is a defensible opening trade: Freeze fissile-material production and long-range flight tests.
Stand up continuous monitoring at declared sites with fast-reaction dispute resolution. Offer narrow, reversible relief—humanitarian channels insulated from regime skimming; limited non-dual-use economic lanes that shut off automatically if inspectors are blocked or missiles fly. Pair the give with a published “penalty ladder” so the cost of non-compliance is known in advance.
The point isn’t trust; it’s predictability and leverage.
Why Trump, Why Now
Trump still carries unique leader-to-leader equity with Kim; even Pyongyang’s latest messaging nods to “good memories” of prior summitry. Combine that with Seoul’s explicit openness to a freeze and a crowded regional calendar that already has Trump landing in South Korea, and the logic of a DMZ encounter writes itself.
The White House can frame it as disciplined realism: reduce risk today, preserve options tomorrow, and keep allies glued to the process rather than watching from the sidelines.
The North Korea Alliance Test
None of this works if Seoul or Tokyo feel blindsided. The surest way to kill a DMZ gambit is to treat it as a U.S.–DPRK two-hander.
The opposite is required: fold allies into verification, sanctions sequencing, and the penalty architecture; expand real-time warning links; and pre-commit that any liaison “goodies” turn off the moment compliance falters. If Kim tries to bypass Seoul, the response should be to tighten trilateral coordination, not freelance for headlines.
The Payoff—and the Risk
A production freeze won’t end the North Korean nuclear problem. It will, however, slow the worst-case arithmetic—especially if South Korea’s estimate of 15–20 additional warheads a year is in the ballpark.
Slowing that curve, and stopping long-range test theatrics while improving allied readiness, is not a small thing. The risk is obvious: Kim pockets optics and cheats. That’s why every incentive must be modular, time-boxed, and instantly reversible—and why the “penalty box” has to be public before a single handshake.
Conclusion: History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Rhymes
We’ve seen this movie before. In 2019, the DMZ meeting created political space for technical talks, even if the follow-through faltered. In 2025, the conditions are arguably better: Kim is advertising the lane he’ll accept; Seoul is validating a freeze-first step; and Trump will already be on the peninsula. If the goal is fewer tests, tighter caps, and a sturdier deterrent while keeping the long game alive, then a DMZ reboot is not a stunt.
It’s the one move that matches the moment—and it could happen again. I hope it does. And knowing Trump, even if it’s just to test Kim’s intentions on a deal, I think it happens.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is Editor-In-Chief and President of National Security Journal. He was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master’s degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Harry Kazianis · September 22, 2025
5. North Korea's Nuclear Submarine Program Might Advance Thanks to Russia
"I get by with a little help from my friends?"
Excerpts:
Experts believed that Russia lifted its prior self-restraint on providing these technologies to North Korea because Moscow believed that the capacities provided to Pyongyang would still not allow it to roll out its nuclear submarine in the near future. This is because a nuclear reactor is the most limiting item in building a nuclear submarine, and thus far, the DPRK has been unable to develop its own small nuclear reactor for those purposes.
However, the situation could ultimately change. This module, which Russia has provided the DPRK, might not allow Kim to independently secure the core technology necessary for a nuclear submarine reactor design, as the engineering techniques are not the same as those Pyongyang has developed for its nuclear weapons program.
According to both Ukrainian and Russian sources, this is why the DPRK had been aggressively demanding nuclear submarine propulsion technology from Moscow in exchange for its sending troops to the Ukraine war. Although the DPRK has been supplied with used reactors, this could still be an enabling technology.
Lee Chung Geun, an honorary research fellow at the Korea Institute for Science and Technology Policy, told Japanese and South Korean news agencies that “North Korea could reverse-engineer a Russian reactor [by disassembling it and creating blueprints] and operate it on land, thereby acquiring the relevant technology.”
If this nuclear submarine module was indeed transferred to the DPRK, it would mean Russia crossed a red line and has fundamentally undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. In this event, additional international sanctions against North Korea and Russia are almost inevitable.
North Korea's Nuclear Submarine Program Might Advance Thanks to Russia
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Reuben Johnson · September 22, 2025
Key Points and Summary – South Korean intelligence reports say Russia has provided North Korea with two to three nuclear-submarine propulsion modules—reportedly lifted from decommissioned Russian boats—containing a working reactor, turbines and cooling systems.
-If true, the transfer would vastly extend DPRK submarine endurance and reach, edging Pyongyang toward a true sea-based nuclear deterrent and potentially violating the global non-proliferation regime.
-Analysts see the move as payback for North Korean munitions and manpower sent to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
-Even if initially limited, experts warn Pyongyang could reverse-engineer the tech. The handoff would likely trigger additional sanctions on both Moscow and Pyongyang.
North Korea: Getting Help from Russia on Nuclear Submarines?
WARSAW, POLAND – Russian President Vladimir Putin has reportedly provided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with their first nuclear-powered submarine propulsion system. If the reports of this transfer of technology are accurate, it would represent a violation of international conventions on nuclear proliferation.
This propulsion technology appears to be the first payoff for Pyongyang for having supplied Moscow with an endless stream of munitions, missiles, gunpowder, and soldiers sent to die on the front in Russia’s war with Ukraine. According to the reports based on information from South Korean intelligence services, Russia has provided North Korea with two or three modules containing small nuclear reactors that are for use in nuclear submarines.
These South Korean military intelligence reports state that Seoul has received and is currently investigating information that Russia has supplied North Korea with this nuclear propulsion technology for use in their latest-model submarines. The publication Korea JoongAng Daily reported on Wednesday that Russia is believed to have handed over “two to three nuclear submarine modules” to North Korea in the first half of this year, which included a working reactor.
These modules form the core of a nuclear submarine’s propulsion system, comprising the reactor, turbine, and cooling system. This would provide North Korea with an entire nuclear submarine propulsion configuration.
Increasing Operational Range for North Korea Nuclear Subs
According to the same leaked South Korean intelligence reports, these modules were not newly manufactured. Instead, they were taken from decommissioned Russian nuclear-powered submarines, the South Korean intelligence report reads.
The significance of the DPRK being handed this technology is the extended range it provides for Pyongyang’s submarine fleet. Unlike conventional diesel-electric submarines, nuclear-powered submarines enjoy unlimited endurance, speed, and range.
Freed from needing to refuel their diesel fuel tanks, food supplies become their only operational limitation. This would give the DPRK subs more than double their current range, a capability only the US, UK, France, and Russia can boast of – the only other nations that operate nuclear-powered submarines.
The DPRK has for some time made the construction of nuclear submarines a strategic priority. As such, having strategic nuclear submarines in their fleet that would be capable of striking the Continental United States is the “missing component” of their nuclear force.
“North Korea’s nuclear submarine construction is a national project … Concerns [are] that it could be developed in a short period of time,” according to the South Korean intelligence sources quoted in both Seoul and Tokyo dailies.
“Pyongyang do have nuclear weapons—yes. But they have little to no ability to launch those weapons against another country due to the limited capacity and unreliability of their land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force,” said a former senior US Naval Intelligence official. “Having a submarine that could approach the cost of Japan, or South Korea or the US and not have to be bothered about its range or loiter time limitations solves that problem,” he said.
On March 8, the DPRK Rodong Sinmun newspaper published what is believed to be the first footage ever of the Korean Workers’ Party Chairman Kim Jong Un inspecting the construction of a naval vessel. The images seen are believed to be those of a “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.”
No More Restrictions?
The same South Korean government source reported that “North Korea has been persistently requesting Russia to provide nuclear submarine technology as well as new fighter jets since last year. Russia was initially reluctant but appears to have decided to provide them this year.”
Experts believed that Russia lifted its prior self-restraint on providing these technologies to North Korea because Moscow believed that the capacities provided to Pyongyang would still not allow it to roll out its nuclear submarine in the near future. This is because a nuclear reactor is the most limiting item in building a nuclear submarine, and thus far, the DPRK has been unable to develop its own small nuclear reactor for those purposes.
However, the situation could ultimately change. This module, which Russia has provided the DPRK, might not allow Kim to independently secure the core technology necessary for a nuclear submarine reactor design, as the engineering techniques are not the same as those Pyongyang has developed for its nuclear weapons program.
According to both Ukrainian and Russian sources, this is why the DPRK had been aggressively demanding nuclear submarine propulsion technology from Moscow in exchange for its sending troops to the Ukraine war. Although the DPRK has been supplied with used reactors, this could still be an enabling technology.
Lee Chung Geun, an honorary research fellow at the Korea Institute for Science and Technology Policy, told Japanese and South Korean news agencies that “North Korea could reverse-engineer a Russian reactor [by disassembling it and creating blueprints] and operate it on land, thereby acquiring the relevant technology.”
If this nuclear submarine module was indeed transferred to the DPRK, it would mean Russia crossed a red line and has fundamentally undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. In this event, additional international sanctions against North Korea and Russia are almost inevitable.
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.
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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Reuben Johnson · September 22, 2025
6. Donald Trump's Tariffs Are Nothing But a Giant Mistake
Excerpts:
By adopting a mercantilist approach to international relations and abandoning America’s past commitment to shared values, principles, and objectives, President Trump has eroded allies’ trust in Washington as an economic and security partner.
President Trump’s overreliance on tariffs as an economic, diplomatic, and security tool appears akin to a toddler with a hammer—everything looks like a nail—resulting in significant destruction. Washington may have done irreparable damage to its reputation and ability to convince its allies and partners toward reducing their trade dependence on Beijing and susceptibility to Chinese economic coercion.
The US may also have degraded military deterrence by undermining the perception—in the minds of both allies and opponents—that the US is a dependable security partner that sallies forth to fulfill its treaty obligations and defend the common good.
Donald Trump's Tariffs Are Nothing But a Giant Mistake
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Bruce Klingner · September 22, 2025
Published
3 hours ago
President Donald Trump participates in the swearing-in ceremony for U.S. Ambassador to China David Purdue, Wednesday, May 7, 2025, in the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Molly Riley)
United States President Donald Trump touts his trade deals as victories against foreign countries, but it will ultimately be American businesses and consumers who pay the price. Trump’s tariffs are capricious protectionist measures ostensibly imposed to retaliate against other nations’ trade barriers, but were instead based on US trade deficits. Moreover, the US has now weaponized economic penalties to remedy non-economic issues such as immigration, drug trafficking, and election results.
The Truth About Tariffs
Despite President Trump’s repeated claims, foreign businesses and governments do not pay for tariffs on goods imported into the United States. Instead, it is the American importing firm that pays the tariff, which in turn decides to either absorb the additional cost as reduced profit or pass it along to American consumers as increased prices. So, every increased tariff imposed by the Trump administration is a tax on the American people, perhaps the most significant tax increase in history.
In addition, American firms manufacturing goods in the United States will now be paying significantly higher prices—up to 50 percent more—for some metals and components necessary for making their products. This, in turn, will raise the prices that US consumers will have to pay for American-made products. US car manufacturers are complaining that, because of Trump’s tariffs, they are now more disadvantaged against foreign competitors than before the tariffs.
President Donald Trump is joined by Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Vice President JD Vance, British Ambassador Peter Mandelson, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, and Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins, while announcing a trade agreement with the U.K., Thursday, May 8, 2025, in the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Emily J. Higgins)
Tariffs Go Against Existing “Deals” and Agreements
The US tariffs on South Korea violate the 2012 South Korea-US (KORUS) free trade agreement that the first Trump administration renegotiated in 2018, and which Trump hailed at the time as “a great deal for American and Korean workers.” Trump’s tariffs also violate the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which the first Trump administration renegotiated and he hailed as a “wonderful new trade deal” that “greatly opens markets to our farmers and manufacturers [and] reduces trade barriers to the US”
Suppose Trump is unwilling to abide by formal treaties approved by Congress or his own personal agreements. Why would countries trust that these new minimalist, less formal trade deals will be upheld or that there won’t be additional arbitrary tariff changes in the future?
There are serious doubts about the legality of Trump’s tariffs. The US Court of International Trade and the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have both ruled against most of the Trump administration’s tariffs by determining that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Supreme Court has indicated it will review the issue.
Trump’s tariff tantrums left nations with a decision to either reject American economic extortion and risk further retaliation or become supplicants by providing outsized pledges of future investments in the United States. Foreign nations now see themselves stuck between two abusive trading partners, with the US being the more immediate danger to their economies.
The US trade diktats dispensed with any consideration of treaty commitments, loyalty, or previous economic and security contributions to the United States. Reliance on US markets has now become a vulnerability. Even when the tariffs were eventually reduced, the damage had been done to America’s reputation and any goodwill that allies and partners used to have for the United States.
Tariffs Have an Unseen Cost
Treating friend and foe alike and showing disregard for America’s partners undermines trust in the United States, which is the foundation of economic, diplomatic, and security relationships. It will also exacerbate growing doubts among US allies about the US commitment to uphold its pledges to defend them. That will not go unnoticed by America’s opponents.
Trump’s tariffs have severely undermined Washington’s strategic objective of forming an international coalition against China’s predatory business practices and coercive diplomacy. The US goal to reduce Beijing’s ability to bully its neighbors should have first prioritized augmenting regional economic cooperation and integration amongst potential coalition partners rather than initiating trade wars against them. Just as security alliances are military force multipliers, trading partners are economic force multipliers.
The new US tariffs will negatively impact partners’ economies, which could cause anti-American resentment as well as degrade their ability to devote a greater percentage of their GDP towards augmenting defense requirements. Indo-Pacific nations may now be more tempted to seek alternative trade opportunities, forge non-US trade coalitions, and reduce their exposure to the whims of US tariff policy.
President Donald Trump meets with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Tuesday, May 6, 2025, in the Oval Office. Vice President JD Vance attends. (Official White House Photo by Emily J. Higgins)
By adopting a mercantilist approach to international relations and abandoning America’s past commitment to shared values, principles, and objectives, President Trump has eroded allies’ trust in Washington as an economic and security partner.
President Trump’s overreliance on tariffs as an economic, diplomatic, and security tool appears akin to a toddler with a hammer—everything looks like a nail—resulting in significant destruction. Washington may have done irreparable damage to its reputation and ability to convince its allies and partners toward reducing their trade dependence on Beijing and susceptibility to Chinese economic coercion.
The US may also have degraded military deterrence by undermining the perception—in the minds of both allies and opponents—that the US is a dependable security partner that sallies forth to fulfill its treaty obligations and defend the common good.
About the Author: Bruce Klingner
Bruce Klingner is a senior fellow at the Mansfield Foundation. He previously served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea. You can follow him on X: @bruceklingner.
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In this article:
Written By Bruce Klingner
Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Klingner’s analysis and writing about North Korea, South Korea and Japan, as well as related issues, are informed by his 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Klingner, who joined Heritage in 2007, has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He is a frequent commentator in U.S. and foreign media. His articles and commentary have appeared in major American and foreign publications and he is a regular guest on broadcast and cable news outlets. He is a regular contributor to the international and security sections of The Daily Signal. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Bruce Klingner · September 22, 2025
7. Kim Jong-un Open to Talks if U.S. Drops Demand to Denuclearize
Political warfare and blackmail diplomacy. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
I wonder if KJU thinks he has us (the ROK/US alliance) right where he wants us?
Kim Jong-un Open to Talks if U.S. Drops Demand to Denuclearize
The North Korean leader’s comments came days after President Trump said he would travel to South Korea in late October for a regional summit.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/22/world/asia/kim-north-korea-trump-talks.html?utm
Listen to this article · 4:47 min Learn more
President Trump set foot in North Korea in 2019, the last time he met Kim Jong-un.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times
By Choe Sang-Hun
Reporting from Seoul
Sept. 22, 2025
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, said he had “good memories” of President Trump and saw no reason not to meet him again — as long as the United States stops insisting on dismantling his country’s nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Kim’s remarks — contained in his speech before the North Korean Parliament on Sunday and reported by state media on Monday — came days after Mr. Trump said he would travel to South Korea in late October for a regional summit meeting.
Mr. Trump, who met Mr. Kim three times in 2018 and 2019, has repeatedly since his return to the White House expressed a willingness to meet Mr. Kim again, boasting of his “good relationship” with the North Korean dictator. North Korea too has reported that Mr. Kim’s relations with Mr. Trump were “not bad.” But the speech on Sunday marked the first time since the American leader began his second term that Mr. Kim personally commented on their relationship.
“Personally, I still have good memories of U.S. President Trump,” Mr. Kim said during his speech on Sunday. “If the U.S. drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the U.S.”
Mr. Kim saved some of his harshest words for South Korea, snubbing calls from the South’s leader, Lee Jae Myung, for inter-Korean dialogue. He said the North would never sit down with the South for talks or discuss the reunification of the divided Korean Peninsula.
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“We will never unify with a country that entrusts its politics and defense to a foreign power,” he said, referring to South Korea’s military alliance with the United States.
Image
U.S. and South Korean soldiers during a river-crossing drill in Yeoju, South Korea, last month.Credit...Lee Jin-Man/Associated Press
South Korea helped mediate the three meetings during Mr. Trump’s first term. But they ended without an agreement on how to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program or when to lift international sanctions imposed on the country.
In his negotiations with Mr. Trump, Mr. Kim had proposed to dismantle part of his country’s nuclear facilities if Washington lifted the most devastating sanctions, like the ban on North Korea’s key exports, such as coal, iron ore, textiles and fishery products. Mr. Trump wanted a broader rollback in the North’s nuclear program.
Since the collapse of the negotiations, Mr. Kim has doubled down on producing fuel for nuclear weapons and developing more nuclear-capable missiles. He has dismissed South Korea as a dialogue partner. He has vowed never to put his country’s nuclear arsenal on the negotiating table — a stance he reiterated more emphatically on Sunday than before.
“I affirm that there will never, never be denuclearization for us,” he said, calling his country’s status as a nuclear weapons power “irreversible” and not tradable for sanctions relief.
Image
A photograph provided by North Korean state media last year showed Mr. Kim touring a plant producing weapons-grade nuclear materials at an undisclosed location.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters
Some analysts in South Korea noted the timing of Mr. Kim’s comments. Mr. Trump said on social media on Friday that he would travel to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and meet with President Xi Jinping of China there.
South Korean officials said that Mr. Kim was not expected to join the APEC meeting in the city of Gyeongju. But Mr. Kim and Mr. Trump met on short notice in 2019 in Panmunjom, a village straddling the border between North and South Korea.
It would be difficult for the two leaders to pull off such a meeting this time, given the tense relationship between the two Koreas, said Lee Byong-chul, an analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul.
But the friendly exchange between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim increased the chances of resuming diplomacy. If the two were to meet again, Mr. Kim would likely insist that Washington ease sanctions on North Korea in return for a freeze on its nuclear weapons program, analysts said. Such a deal would essentially recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons power.
“It would be a huge trophy for Kim,” Mr. Lee said.
Mr. Kim has more leverage than he had during his first round of negotiations. Washington’s growing tensions with Beijing and Moscow have helped him, as both China and Russia have vetoed U.S.-led attempts to place new sanctions on the North. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Kim has strengthened ties with President Vladimir V. Putin by supplying North Korean troops and weapons to aid Mr. Putin’s war efforts.
Last year, Russia and North Korea signed an alliance treaty. Earlier this month, Mr. Kim stood side by side with Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin watching a military parade in Beijing.
On Sunday, Mr. Kim said that in his country’s confrontation with the United States, “time is on our side.”
Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 23, 2025, Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: Kim Open to Talks if U.S. Drops Nuclear Demands. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
8. Seoul should push to revive North Korea tourism projects: Unification minister
Naivete? Wishful thinking?
Seoul should push to revive North Korea tourism projects: Unification minister
Chung Dong-young’s proposal comes as the DPRK shuns all inter-Korean ties and dismantles ROK tourism assets
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/seoul-should-push-to-revive-north-korea-tourism-projects-unification-minister/
Joon Ha Park September 23, 2025
From left: South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and the opening ceremony for North Korea’s Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Area on June 24 | Image: ROK Unification Ministry, Rodong Sinmun (June 26, 2025), edited by NK News
Seoul should push to revive joint tourism projects with North Korea that shut down nearly 20 years ago, South Korea’s unification minister said Monday, endorsing a proposal to link the DPRK’s Mount Kumgang resort and its new Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Area.
But Chung Dong-young’s comments appear to fly in the face of Pyongyang’s repeated rejection of all inter-Korean engagement and its repudiation of unification as a policy goal, with North Korea dismantling key ROK tourism assets in recent years.
Chung made the remarks during a meeting with Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun, where the two discussed prospects for cross-border cooperation and the future of inter-Korean tourism.
The unification minister recalled that inter-Korean engagement gained momentum in 1998, when the late Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung sent 50 trucks carrying 500 head of cattle across the border at Panmunjom in a symbolic gesture moment widely seen as opening the door to civilian exchanges.
“That was the starting point of bold private-sector cooperation,” he said. “Now, nearly 30 years later, I believe it is time to inherit the spirit of generosity and vision demonstrated by Chairman Chung Ju-yung.”
Hyundai managed the Mount Kumgang tourism program, which saw around a million South Koreans visit the scenic North Korean area, until its suspension in 2008, and Hyun said she hoped to revive the project in tandem with tours to the DPRK’s newly opened Wonsan Kalma beach resort.
Seoul halted tours to Mount Kumgang after North Korean soldiers shot and killed South Korean tourist Park Wang-ja, who strayed into a restricted military zone in July that year.
“Even after the shutdown, we visited Mount Kumgang for commemorative events, and the North expressed regret and a strong desire for the tours to resume,” Hyun said.
She added that Hyundai has already prepared programs and secured cruise ships capable of reaching Wonsan, noting that sea routes would likely be the only option since North Korea demolished cross-border roads on the east coast.
Chung welcomed the idea, noting that North Korea itself has described the Wonsan project as “a long-cherished wish of the people.”
“For the zone to fully operate, linking tourism with Kumgang is the most realistic option. I hope the day will soon come when this becomes a reality,” the minister said.
Despite Chung’s optimism, the prospects for any revival of inter-Korean tourism remain bleak.
Pyongyang declared South Korea a “hostile state” in Dec. 2023 and has cut off nearly all channels of inter-Korean exchange. At Sunday’s session of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un said the North would codify into law that the two Koreas are separate states, resoundingly rejecting any future dialogue with Seoul.
A more concrete obstacle is that the DPRK has systematically dismantled ROK-built tourism infrastructure in recent years, including a floating hotel and other resort facilities owned by Hyundai Asan and a $75 million golf resort built by the South Korean company Anati.
More recently, North Korea began tearing down an ROK-government owned hotel used for inter-Korean family unions at Mount Kumgang.
Edited by Bryan Betts
9. UK warship carries out North Korean sanctions monitoring mission near Japan
It is good to see this but we do not hear enough about these international efforts.
UK warship carries out North Korean sanctions monitoring mission near Japan
Royal Navy says HMS Richmond frigate tracked DPRK ship-to-ship transfers of contraband in September
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/uk-warship-carries-out-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring-mission-near-japan/
Shreyas Reddy September 23, 2025
HMS Richmond | Image: U.K. Royal Navy
The U.K. recently deployed a warship to the waters around Japan to monitor North Korea’s illicit maritime activities to circumvent U.N. sanctions, the British navy announced on Monday.
The HMS Richmond carried out sanctions surveillance operations including tracking DPRK ship-to-ship transfers of contraband from early to mid-September, the Royal Navy said in a press release.
The British surveillance operation came as part of an ongoing Indo-Pacific tour by the U.K. Carrier Strike Group, which is led by the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales.
The Type 23 frigate paid a visit to Busan in South Korea last month before embarking on patrols around Japan, which also supported Japan’s information gathering activities on vessels suspected of violating U.N. sanctions, the Royal Navy said.
“It is all part of work to uphold several U.N. sanctions targeting the Pyongyang regime and the unlawful generation of revenue, aimed at the dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes,” the press release said.
The frigate’s recent mission marked the 14th time since 2018 that a British vessel has participated in U.N. sanctions monitoring activities, with the patrol ships HMS Spey and HMS Tamar — part of the Royal Navy’s permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific region — usually carrying out such operations.
The visit highlights the U.K.’s continuing focus on North Korea’s weapons development, and comes after London’s latest defense strategy classified the DPRK as a “regional disruptor” intent on pursuing nuclear modernization to “guarantee regime survival and coerce its neighbours.”
Since 2018, countries including the U.S., U.K., Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Italy and New Zealand have regularly deployed aircraft and vessels to monitor North Korea’s ship-to-ship transfers, which are prohibited under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2375 adopted in Sept. 2017.
The sanctions are aimed at obstructing North Korea from exporting coal and importing oil and other contraband via these illicit transfers, which Pyongyang has long relied on to trade such items beyond U.N.-designated limits.
These sanctions monitoring visits have often drawn condemnation from North Korea, which rejects international sanctions as a U.S.-led initiative infringing on its sovereignty.
China has also previously objected to such operations as an alleged violation of its airspace, and has reportedly harassed an Australian helicopter and Canadian surveillance aircraft during past monitoring visits.
These surveillance operations have in the past contributed intelligence to reports by the U.N. Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK.
However, Moscow vetoed the extension of the panel last year, and the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team established by the U.K. and others to replace the panel did not cite evidence from the maritime patrols in its inaugural report in May, which focused mostly on DPRK-Russia cooperation.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. US, allies back denuclearization after North Korea vows to never give up nukes
Kim Jong Un has crossed the Rubicon. His abandonment of peaceful unification and branding of South Korea as the “enemy” is not an act of strength, but a confession of weakness. It reveals desperation and fear of his own people, as they awaken to the possibility of freedom and the prosperity that exists in the South. For too long, our policies have been reactive, a constant cycle of responding to Pyongyang’s provocations, hoping for engagement, and settling for management, never resolution.
The absence of a clear vision has allowed strategic paralysis to set in. Some claim unification is a fantasy, that the Korean people no longer desire it, or that it’s only a Korean problem. These views are not just mistaken, they are dangerous. They blind policymakers to the root causes of nuclear threats, instability, and humanitarian tragedy. The only path that truly resolves these crises, rather than perpetuating them, is a One Korea Policy (HERE)
“Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights.”
US, allies back denuclearization after North Korea vows to never give up nukes
Top diplomats of US, ROK and Japan sidestep Kim Jong Un’s demand to drop denuclearization as condition for talks
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/us-allies-back-denuclearization-after-north-korea-vows-to-never-give-up-nukes/
Shreyas Reddy September 23, 2025
Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (left to right) held a trilateral meeting in New York. | Image: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sept. 23, 2025)
The foreign ministers of the U.S., South Korea and Japan reaffirmed their “resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization” of North Korea on Monday, just a day after Kim Jong Un said the DPRK will only entertain diplomacy if the U.S. abandons that goal.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya pledged to maintain close coordination on DPRK policy while “upholding the principle of denuclearization” and maintaining joint deterrence, Seoul’s foreign ministry said in a press release following their meeting in New York.
At the same time, the three sides backed the pursuit of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue with Pyongyang in order to make “tangible progress” toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
In an accompanying joint statement, the ministers emphasized the need to work together against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and cooperate with other countries against North Korea’s violations of U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions.
The allies’ emphasis on denuclearization alongside dialogue runs counter to Kim’s declaration over the weekend that “‘denuclearization’ will never, ever occur with us,” doubling down on Pyongyang’s unyielding rhetoric in recent years about its “irreversible” nuclear status.
The North Korean leader appeared to open a window for dialogue toward “peaceful existence” with the U.S. if Washington abandons the goal of denuclearization, but Monday’s statement instead underscores Washington, Seoul and Tokyo’s continuing focus on this objective, though President Donald Trump has at times appeared less bound to this goal.
In Monday’s statement, the U.S. also reiterated its “ironclad commitments” to the defense of Japan and South Korea through “America’s unmatched military strength, including its nuclear capabilities.”
The three sides also pledged to enhance defense and deterrence through “robust security cooperation,” including regularly conducting the trilateral multi-domain exercise “Freedom Edge” and independent efforts to strengthen their respective military capabilities.
The trilateral partnership’s emphasis on continuing regular military exercises and military advances is likely to anger Pyongyang, which last week slammed Freedom Edge as an “offensive war drill for aggression” and typically paints Japanese and South Korean defense development as an existential threat to the DPRK.
Rubio, Cho and Iwaya expressed “serious concerns” over North Korea’s increasing military cooperation with Russia, which has seen Pyongyang send soldiers and weapons in support of Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
In particular, the joint statement highlighted the possibility of Russian support for North Korea’s long-range missiles and other military capabilities in violation of U.N. sanctions, urging the two countries to immediately halt such activities.
The three top diplomats also voiced concern about North Korean cybercriminals and IT workers’ “malicious cyber activities,” and backed closer coordination between the three governments as well as the private sector against these threats.
The allies have increasingly emphasized the need for cyber coordination in recent years, and the ministers reaffirmed the significance of their recent cooperation through a joint statement on DPRK IT workers and the Trilateral Diplomatic Working Group on North Korean Cyber Threats.
Finally, the three sides pledged to continue working toward the immediate resolution of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, South Korean detainees and unrepatriated prisoners of war and families separated by the Koreas’ division.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. Defense Ministry Honors Soldiers for Refusing Unlawful Orders
Defense Ministry Honors Soldiers for Refusing Unlawful Orders
Soldiers recognized for upholding constitutional values during martial law, Marine death incident
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/09/23/B3ZEYVBMNBDMRHJL5SP7SJOLAI/
By Yang Ji-ho
Published 2025.09.23. 19:59
Updated 2025.09.23. 20:16
The Ministry of National Defense announced on the 23rd that it will award government commendations to 11 military personnel who upheld their duties as soldiers by refusing to carry out unlawful or unjust orders during the "December 3 Emergency Martial Law" and the "Marine Corps member’s death in the line of duty incident," recognizing them as "individuals who protected constitutional values."
Park Jeong-hoon, Marine Corps Investigation Unit Commander, attends the 6th summons investigation as a reference person at the Special Prosecutor's Office for the Deceased Marine Lee Myung-hyun in Seocho-gu, Seoul, on the 4th morning. /Newsis
Recipients of the government commendations include Marine Corps Colonel Park Jeong-hoon, Army Colonels Cho Seong-hyeon and Kim Moon-sang, and Army Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hyung-gi (all recipients of the Order of National Merit Sam-il Medal), among others.
Colonel Park was acknowledged for his contribution to upholding constitutional values such as freedom of conscience by refusing a superior’s order to delay transferring the investigation results of the death of Corporal Chae to civilian police during the incident. The ministry evaluated that Colonels Cho and Lieutenant Colonel Kim contributed to preventing national chaos by avoiding clashes with citizens from the early stages of the December 3 Emergency Martial Law declaration. Colonel Kim was recognized for delaying or rejecting emergency flight approvals three times, thereby delaying the entry of Special Forces troops into the National Assembly for 42 minutes.
Cho Seong-hyun, 1st Security Battalion Commander (Colonel) of Capital Defense Command, testifies at the 8th hearing of the impeachment trial of President Yoon Suk-yeol held at the Constitutional Court in Jongno-gu, Seoul, on February. /Constitutional Court
Additionally, one Army sergeant major (anonymous hereinafter) will receive the Patriotic Service Medal, two Army majors and one Army sergeant first class will receive the Presidential Citation, and one Army major, one Army captain, and one Army sergeant major will receive the Prime Minister’s Citation. The ministry explained that these individuals protected citizens’ lives and safety by avoiding clashes with the public or passively performing duties during the martial law period, and by delaying ammunition distribution to deployment units, causing them to deploy without ammunition.
The ministry stated that for four additional individuals (two Army majors and two Army master sergeants) whose contributions were confirmed, it plans to award the Minister of National Defense Commendation at the military level. Among the total 15 recipients of government and military commendations, 14 are related to the emergency martial law, excluding Colonel Park.
Earlier, on July 18, the ministry announced its intention to identify and commend service members who contributed to protecting citizens’ lives and safety by refusing unlawful or unjust orders during the December 3 Emergency Martial Law.
The ministry emphasized, “We will continue to discover and commend true soldiers who can firmly refuse even unlawful or unjust orders in accordance with constitutional values and reject injustice, striving to become a military trusted by the public.”
A ministry official clarified that this commendation is separate from special promotions. The official added, “The ministry will comprehensively review (special promotions) if there are recommendations from the military.”
The ministry previously implemented an amendment to the Enforcement Decree of the Military Personnel Management Act on the 19th of this month, allowing special promotions for service members below the rank of colonel. If Colonels Park Jeong-hoon and Cho Seong-hyeon are included in the special promotion candidates, they will be promoted to brigadier general.
※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI. Share your
12. Rhee Syng-man's Nuclear Drive vs. Lee Jae-myung's Reluctance
Rhee Syng-man's Nuclear Drive vs. Lee Jae-myung's Reluctance
Rhee's 20-year vision built Korea's nuclear foundation; Lee dismisses 10-year timeline as unfeasible, risking future energy security
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/09/22/SV5V5K5MABEUJH4NN2FJ55XEMA/
By Han Sam-hee
Published 2025.09.22. 23:50
President Rhee Syng-man’s significant interest in nuclear energy is well known. However, the extent of his commitment went beyond mere curiosity. Based on two reports published in 2007 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of South Korea’s nuclear energy (2008)—the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s *Review of the 50-Year Development of Nuclear Energy* and the Nuclear Safety Academy’s *Review of the Early Development of Nuclear Energy in Korea*—and testimonies from four senior nuclear forums held between 2006 and 2007, it becomes clear that President Rhee was deeply engrossed in nuclear energy.
The Rhee Syng-man administration established the Atomic Energy Division under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture in March 1956. In August of the same year, it dispatched a three-member delegation to the *International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* in Geneva, Switzerland. For a war-torn nation ranked among the world’s poorest, sending representatives to an international nuclear conference was no small feat. This was a period when the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States were completing their first nuclear reactors, sparking a global nuclear boom. Fifteen young Korean scientists began studying nuclear engineering by typing and mimeographing copies of *Introduction to Nuclear Engineering*, a textbook provided by a U.S. military officer, and forming a Saturday study group.
Starting with two members of the study group in April 1956, the Rhee administration sent a total of 24 individuals to the International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering (ISNSE) at the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory for training by 1959. Including other programs, 234 people were dispatched to the U.S., the U.K., and other countries for nuclear training between 1956 and 1964. While some received support from the U.S. and international organizations, 127 were government-funded trainees. These individuals became the pillars of South Korea’s nuclear energy revival.
At the time, the cabinet operated a decision-making system called the *Ministerial Meeting of Five Departments Related to Atomic Energy* (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Reconstruction, and Education). This structure drove the enactment of the Atomic Energy Law (March 1958), the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission (January 1959), the opening of the Atomic Energy Research Institute (March 1959), and the groundbreaking of a research reactor (July 1959). The head of the Atomic Energy Commission held ministerial-level status, while the director of the research institute held vice-ministerial rank. President Rhee reportedly attempted to elevate the commission head to deputy prime minister level but faced opposition. With around 40 first-class or higher officials in the government at the time—including ministers and vice ministers—eight of them were in the nuclear sector (as testified by Yoon Se-won, former head of the Atomic Energy Division). Researchers at the Atomic Energy Research Institute earned three times the salary of regular civil servants. In response to the government’s bold nuclear promotion, a nuclear engineering department was established at Hanyang University in 1958 and at Seoul National University in 1959. South Korea’s eventual export of nuclear reactors and core equipment to the U.S., the birthplace of nuclear technology, traces back to President Rhee’s foresight and determination.
A famous anecdote involves Walker Cisler, president of an American power company, who met President Rhee on July 8, 1956. Cisler reportedly advised, “Nuclear energy is extracted from the human mind, so resource-poor countries like Korea must cultivate nuclear talent.” When President Rhee asked how long it would take to utilize nuclear energy if they started now, Cisler replied, “Twenty years.” President Rhee was 81 years old at the time—too old to reap the fruits of nuclear energy himself. Twenty-two years later, in July 1978, Korea’s first nuclear power plant, Kori Unit 1, was completed. Rhee sowed the seeds, and Park Chung-hee nurtured them to fruition.
If South Korea’s current power consumption is set at 100, solar and wind account for 10, nuclear for 30, and the remaining 60 is supplied by coal and gas power plants. To achieve carbon neutrality, power production must increase to 250. Most of this must come from carbon-free energy: expanding solar, wind, and nuclear from a combined 40 to over 200. Excluding nuclear, can solar and wind alone—currently at 10—generate 200 units of power? A “total mobilization of carbon-free energy” is essential. Maximizing solar and wind while expanding nuclear to feasible levels is the only way to glimpse a possibility of carbon neutrality.
At a press conference on the 11th, President Lee Jae-myung stated, “Even if we start building nuclear plants now, it will take at least 10 years to see results. Is that a viable plan? … If sites and safety are secured, we might proceed, but I see almost no feasibility.” If the president deems it “unfeasible,” no minister or official will push for it. Seventy years ago, a president of a poor nation laid the foundation for nuclear energy revival, aiming 20 years ahead. Today’s president, perhaps deterred by the inability to see results within his term, is skeptical of new nuclear construction, dismissing 10–15 years as “too distant.” South Korea will not cease to exist in a decade or two. If the current direction is misguided, future generations will face regret and irreversible consequences.
※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI. Share your feedback here.
13. S. Korea, U.S. army chiefs discuss expanding exchanges between troops, military drills
I hope they were able to discuss these two issues:
Why America and South Korea Need a Combined Multi-Domain Task Force
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-america-and-south-korea-need-a-combined-multi-domain-task-force
‘Back to the Line’: Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/back-to-the-line-why-american-soldiers-should-be-on-the-korean-dmz/
S. Korea, U.S. army chiefs discuss expanding exchanges between troops, military drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 23, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- Army Chief of Staff Gen. Kim Gyu-ha has met with his U.S. counterpart, Gen. Randy A. George, to discuss ways to increase exchanges of high-level army officers and expand joint military drills, officials said Tuesday.
Kim held talks with U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George on Monday at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, according to the armed services.
The two sides concurred on the fact that the Seoul-Washington alliance has evolved as the linchpin of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
"We will maintain and expand close cooperation with the U.S. Army by revitalizing joint trainings and sharing visions for military innovation to overcome impending challenges and to prepare for the future," Kim said.
This photo, provided by the Army, shows South Korea's Army Chief of Staff Gen. Kim Gyu-ha (L) shaking hands with his U.S. counterpart, Gen. Randy A. George (R), at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on Sept. 23, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 23, 2025
14. Lee tells U.S. lawmakers that he hopes to prevent recurrence of detention of Korean workers
I think President Lee is accepting responsibility for misuse of visas by Korean businesses.
(LEAD) Lee tells U.S. lawmakers that he hopes to prevent recurrence of detention of Korean workers | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 23, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details from 6th para)
By Kim Eun-jung
NEW YORK, Sept. 22 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung told U.S. lawmakers Monday that he hopes to prevent a recurrence of the detention of South Korean workers following an immigration raid at a battery plant in Georgia.
Lee made the remarks in his talks with four lawmakers -- Rep. Young Kim (R-CA), Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) and Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) -- during his trip to attend the U.N. General Assembly.
"President Lee stressed the recent detention of South Korean professionals in Georgia should not be repeated," the presidential office said in a release.
U.S. lawmakers agreed on the need to improve the visa system and expressed hope that bilateral efforts to enhance visa procedures would help advance the passage of the "Partner with Korea Act," which seeks to provide high-skilled visas for Korean nationals, according to the office.
In July, Kim and Rep. Sydney KamlagerDove (D-CA) reintroduced the bill that seeks to create an allotment of 15,000 E-4 visas for Korean nationals with specialized education or expertise.
President Lee Jae Myung (C) meets with U.S. lawmakers in New York on Sept. 22, 2025, ahead of his attendance at the U.N. General Assembly. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Their meeting came at a time when the two nations have continued to hammer out details of South Korea's US$350 billion investment pledge, made to secure a reduction of U.S. tariffs on Korean goods from 25 percent under a framework deal reached in July.
Lee noted that ongoing tariff negotiations could create instability in South Korea's foreign exchange market but said he believed the two sides would ultimately find solutions that ensure "commercial viability," according to his office.
In an interview with Reuters, he said that the $350 billion pledge would not be feasible without financial mechanisms, such as a currency swap arrangement.
On North Korea, Lee welcomed the U.S. playing the role of "peacemaker" on the Korean Peninsula and reaffirmed his commitment to serve as a "pacemaker" to facilitate U.S. President Donald Trump's talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the pursuit of lasting peace.
The lawmakers expressed congressional support for Lee's efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and promote peace on the peninsula, and pledged congressional support for strengthening industrial and technology ties in shipbuilding, biotechnology and defense, it noted.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 23, 2025
15. S. Korea, U.S., Japan reaffirm push for N.K. denuclearization after leader Kim rebuff
My 14 words:
“Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights.”
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan reaffirm push for N.K. denuclearization after leader Kim rebuff | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 23, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details throughout; RECASTS headline, lead)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan have reaffirmed their "resolute" commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea, a joint statement showed Tuesday, after the North's leader urged Washington to drop that goal as a condition for resuming talks with Pyongyang.
The statement was released after Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya met on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on Monday for talks on their partnership and other shared issues, including North Korea's nuclear threats.
The statement came a day after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un suggested he is open to engaging in dialogue with President Donald Trump's administration if Washington drops its denuclearization demand, saying he has no intention of relinquishing his nuclear stockpiles.
"The Secretary and Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their resolute commitment to the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, while continuing to make efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy," the statement read, referring to North Korea by its official name.
"They emphasized the need to address together the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs and to maintain and strengthen the sanctions regime against the DPRK by responding firmly and in cooperation with other countries to violations and evasions of the relevant UNSC resolutions."
(From R to L) Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya pose for a photo during their trilateral talks held on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22, 2025, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
In the speech during the parliamentary meeting, Kim warned it would be a mistake to think North Korea could be pressured or subdued through sanctions or shows of force.
In Monday's talks in New York, Cho called for "active cooperation" from Washington and Tokyo to resume dialogue with Pyongyang, and "make tangible progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula and resolution of the nuclear issues," the foreign ministry said in a separate press release.
In the joint statement, the U.S. reaffirmed its extended deterrence commitments to its two Asian allies, which are "critically important" to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and broader Indo-Pacific region.
They "reaffirmed their resolve to bolster defense and deterrence by advancing robust security cooperation, including through the regular conduct of the trilateral multidomain exercise 'Freedom Edge,' and to strengthen their respective defense capabilities," the statement said.
The statement included phrasing suggesting a united front against China's assertiveness as they voiced opposition to "unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea" under constant disputes between Beijing and neighboring countries, like the Philippines.
Also drawing attention in the statement was the Taiwan Strait, where the three voiced concern over increasingly frequent destabilizing actions around Taiwan.
They "encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo."
They also reiterated serious concerns over North Korea's deepening military cooperation with Russia, including Moscow's support for Pyongyang's military capabilities, particularly its long-range missiles.
They shared concerns over the North's malicious cyber activities using its information technology workers and the need to deepen three-way collaboration on blocking such activities.
The three sides also reaffirmed a commitment to advancing trilateral cooperation on economic security fronts, including supply chain resilience, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence.
Regarding the recent mass detention of South Korean workers in Georgia, Cho stressed the need to introduce a new visa system and called for Washington to take due steps so as to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.
"Secretary Rubio said although it is a bilateral matter, he noted that the U.S. will work closely with South Korea for an early resolution in light of the alliance," the ministry said in the release.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 23, 2025
16. China reports exporting nearly 100,000 barrels of petroleum to N. Korea this year
The CRInK is why north Korea does not need sanctions relief.
China reports exporting nearly 100,000 barrels of petroleum to N. Korea this year | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 23, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- China exported a total of nearly 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum to North Korea in the first five months of this year, reports the country filed to the United Nations showed Tuesday.
China was the only country to report its refined petroleum exports to North Korea to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions committee, listing 99,220 barrels so far this year, according to the committee's website.
The export volume reached 14,385 barrels in January, 5,519 barrels in February, 15,358 barrels in March, 23,652 barrels in April and 40,304 barrels in May. No further records were posted on the website.
In 2017, the UNSC adopted a resolution capping petroleum exports to North Korea at 500,000 barrels per year, in response to its internationally prohibited intercontinental ballistic missile launch earlier that year.
Countries supplying petroleum to North Korea, such as China, have since been required to report their exports monthly, but China has not been fully compliant.
The petroleum exports China has reported so far account for nearly 20 percent of the UNSC's annual limit, although much more is widely believed to be shipped to North Korea under the radar.
Since January last year, Russia, another key petroleum exporter to North Korea, has entirely skipped its mandatory reports to the UNSC.
According to a report in May by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, Russia provided the North with more than 1 million barrels of fuel between March and October last year.
An image about restrictions on refined petroleum exports to North Korea (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 23, 2025
17. Presidential office unveils offbook gov't fund details for 1st time
Presidential office unveils offbook gov't fund details for 1st time | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 23, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office said Tuesday it is disclosing spending details of offbook government funds that have long been a source of controversy in high-profile political scandals under past administrations, in a move to boost public transparency.
The Lee Jae Myung government launched a website showing expense details of "special activity funds," along with expenditures for other operations and specific tasks, the first such disclosure by any government, the presidential office said in a release.
Special activity funds refer to confidential spending of government funds for state affairs, such as diplomacy and national security, and related information on their execution had never been made public.
The dubious nature of the funds sparked controversy under the Park Geun-hye administration in 2018, when three former spy chiefs were tried and later convicted of illegally diverting them to support Park's office. The court ruled they amounted to bribes.
This undated photo shows President Lee Jae Myung presiding over his first Cabinet meeting in the central city of Sejong. (Yonhap)
Lee, who took office in June, had pledged to use the funds responsibly and provide proper accountability.
"While the very nature of special activity funds lies in confidentiality, which inevitably limits disclosure, we have decided to release the information in respect of past court rulings and to demonstrate that taxpayers' money is being spent properly," the office said.
Previous administrations only disclosed spending amounts by category and examples of usage, but the Lee government will release daily records to enhance transparency, it said.
But some highly classified matters related to national security will remain undisclosed due to the sensitivity, the office added.
"This unprecedented disclosure will expand the public's right to know, encourage citizens' participation in governance and serve as an important milestone for greater transparency in state administration," it said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 23, 2025
18. Kim Jong Un launches sweeping purge following Beijing trip
Hmmm... I guess the trip did not go as well as it seemed. I guess the Propaganda and Agitation Department was not ready for the global stage.
Kim Jong Un launches sweeping purge following Beijing trip
The party's propaganda and agitation department suffered the most dismissals during this round of purges
By Seulkee Jang - September 23, 2025
dailynk.com · September 23, 2025
Rodong Sinmun reported on Sept. 6, 2025, that Kim Jong Un returned to Pyongyang the previous day (Sept. 5) after completing his visit to China. (Rodong Sinmun)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has launched a sweeping purge of party and government officials following his recent visit to China, with punishments extending from the workers’ party to the foreign ministry, according to sources familiar with the situation.
A high-ranking source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Monday that Kim initiated comprehensive “cadre inspections” led by the party’s organization and guidance department immediately after returning from China on Sept. 5.
The inspections evaluate whether department heads faithfully performed their duties without incidents while Kim was abroad. Officials undergo written reports and individual interviews as part of the review process.
The party’s propaganda and agitation department suffered the most dismissals during this round of purges, sources said.
Criticism over documentary editing
Officials who edited documentary footage of Kim’s China visit faced criticism for producing content deemed “lacking in enthusiasm and sincerity.” The edited scenes showing Kim’s arrival at Beijing station and his reception by senior Chinese officials, including Cai Qi, secretary of the communist party of China central secretariat, and Wang Yi, director of the party’s central foreign affairs commission, appeared “meager and shabby” compared to Chinese media coverage.
Documentary editors also drew fire for including footage of Kim waiting in line with other world leaders during China’s 80th anniversary victory day celebrations. While Kim received second-to-last reception from Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan — directly before Russian President Vladimir Putin — indicating China’s highest-level treatment, showing Kim waiting in line was deemed damaging to the supreme leader’s image.
“Kim scolded them, saying ‘When I was making diplomatic efforts for the people under the scorching sun in Tiananmen square, you comrades were not fulfilling your duties. Even in capturing the propaganda canvas, you failed to carefully reveal each ideological will of our party,'” the source said. “As a result, many workers in the korean central television video editing department and party propaganda and agitation department received job suspensions or ‘revolutionization’ (forced labor) punishments.”
Military industry targets
Defense sector officials from the party’s munitions industry department and second economic committee also faced punishment during the inspections. Vice department-level officials from the munitions industry department and second economic committee, battalion-level officials from the missile general bureau, and deputy director and section chief-level officials from defense research institutes received dismissals or revolutionization sentences.
Kim accelerated weapons development and military-technical cooperation with China after witnessing advanced weaponry during China’s military parade, making the defense sector a primary target of the current purge.
North Korean authorities agreed to cooperate with China on machinery parts and materials following Kim’s visit, but related departments including the munitions industry department and missile general bureau failed to submit properly prepared working-level plans to superiors within the deadline, drawing severe criticism.
“Kim sacrificed everything and achieved results during his China visit, but the workers who should have immediately put those results into practice were lazy and didn’t do their jobs properly, ultimately leading to punishment,” the source said.
The munitions industry department faces particular pressure as it approaches comprehensive evaluation of the “five-year defense development plan” presented at the Eighth Party Congress, further intensifying the inspection atmosphere.
The foreign ministry also saw three officials dismissed, including one deputy director-level official, due to protocol failures during the China visit.
“Currently, officials in any organization are not making a sound,” the source said. “The cadre inspections are being conducted comprehensively across all sectors.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · September 23, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
