"Perhaps the most central characteristic of authentic leadership is the relinquishing of the impulse to dominate others."
- David Cooper
"The young always have the same problem - how to rebel and conform at the same time. They have solved this by defying their parents and copying one another."
- Quentin Crisp
"Read, observe, listen intensely. As if your life depended upon it."
- Joyce Carol Oates
1. N. Korea shoots S. Korean official to death at sea, burns his body: defense ministry
2. Moon calls N. Korea's killing of S. Korean official 'shocking,' not tolerable for any reason
3. Inter-Korean ties thrown into abyss following N. Korea's killing of S. Korean citizen
4. New virus cases over 100 for 2nd day, sporadic cluster infections still worrisome
5. Unification ministry strongly condemns N. Korea's killing of S. Korean as 'inhumane act'
6. Unification Ministry suspends investigations into human rights in N. Korea
7. North Korean Provocations Likely Around U.S. Presidential Election
8. Missiles, Submarines and More: How North Korea Supplies Iran With Weapons
9. Kim Jong-un 'narrowly avoided assassination attempt' by North Korean foes
10. Moon pleads for UN to end the Korean War
11. Donald Trump's Second-Term North Korea Strategy: A Deal or Ignore Kim?
12. There Isn't A Military Solution to North Korea (And The American Public Agrees)
13. Pompeo to visit S. Korea next month
14. How Coronavirus Impacts North Korea's Nuclear Program
15. How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects Daily Life
16. Japan PM tells South Korea it's time to fix strained ties
17. Warner Bros. to Cut Operations in South Korea (Report)
1. N. Korea shoots S. Korean official to death at sea, burns his body: defense ministry
This is quite a response to President Moon's call for an end of war declaration and a peace process for the Korean peninsula.
(4th LD) N. Korea shoots S. Korean official to death at sea, burns his body: defense ministry | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS messages from President Moon, defense chief in paras 6-9; TRIMS) By Oh Seok-min and Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea shot and killed a South Korean official drifting at sea before dousing his body with oil and setting it on fire, the defense ministry said Thursday, prompting the country to erupt in outrage and casting a pall over the already frayed inter-Korean ties.
The 47-year-old official affiliated with the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries disappeared from the 499-ton boat before noon Monday while on duty aboard an inspection boat in waters off the western border island of Yeonpyeong.
"North Korea found the man in its waters and committed an act of brutality by shooting at him and burning his body, according to our military's thorough analysis of diverse intelligence," the defense ministry said in a statement.
"Our military strongly condemns such a brutal act and strongly urges the North to provide an explanation and punish those responsible," the statement read. "We also sternly warn North Korea that all responsibilities for this incident lie with it."
It is the first time since July 2008 that a South Korean civilian has been shot dead in North Korea. At that time, Park Wang-ja was shot and killed at the North's mountain resort of Kumgang while wandering into a restricted zone.
President Moon Jae-in expressed deep regret, calling the killing a "shocking incident that cannot be tolerated for any reason."
"The North Korean authorities should take responsible measures regarding the case," Moon said, according to Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Kang Min-seok, urging the military to further tighten its defense posture to protect the lives and safety of the people.
Moon's office earlier issued a statement to condemn the killing and demanded the North apologize.
Defense Minister Suh Wook also denounced "the unpardonable atrocities," and vowed efforts to prevent such an incident from happening again.
The case is expected to further deteriorate inter-Korean relations that have already been frayed badly, as the North angrily protested propaganda leaflets flying in from the South and blew up an inter-Korean liaison office building in June.
According to officials of the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff, the missing official is presumed to have jumped into the sea Monday in a suspected attempt to defect to the North and had drifted into North Korean waters.
The ministry earlier said that colleagues of the fisheries official found his shoes on the boat and reported his disappearance to the Coast Guard. But an intensive search operation failed to find him.
Upon spotting the individual at sea at around 3:30 p.m. Tuesday, sailors of a North Korean vessel put gas masks on and questioned him from a distance while leaving him in the waters. The South Korean was wearing a life jacket and relying on an unidentified floating item.
He was found in waters about 3 to 4 kilometers north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto inter-Korean maritime border, near Deungsangot, or Deungsan Cape, and the location was about 38 kilometers from where he went missing, according to the JCS.
During the questioning, the South Korean official appears to have expressed his desire to defect to the North, according to a JCS official.
"At around 9:40 p.m., the North Korean soldiers aboard their vessel shot him before pouring oil over his body and setting it aflame at around 10 p.m.," the JCS official said, adding that the act was believed to have been done in accordance with "orders from its superior authority."
South Korean surveillance equipment set up on Yeonpyeong Island also captured flames Tuesday night, which were later confirmed to have been from the North's burning of the body.
"We judge that North Korea appears to have done such acts against humanity of unconditionally shooting an individual as part of its COVID-19 quarantine guidelines," the official said.
North Korea has made all-out efforts to stave off the new coronavirus, though Pyongyang claims there has not been a single case there. The country closed its border with China in January and implemented the maximum emergency level against the virus in July.
Earlier this month, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Robert Abrams said that North Korea deployed special operations forces near its border with China and issued shoot-to-kill orders against those crossing the border. It has yet to be confirmed if the same orders are in place for cases near the inter-Korean border areas, military officials here said.
On Wednesday, South Korea sent a message to North Korea over the case via the communication channel between the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) and North Korea, but the North has not given any response, according to another official.
The unification ministry also denounced the killing as an inhumane act dampening peace efforts.
"We strongly condemn the North Korean military's shooting of an unarmed civilian and the burning of his body as an inhumane act that cannot be justified for any reason," Yoh Sang-key, the ministry's spokesperson, said in a press briefing.
Despite the shocking killing, the case does not appear to constitute a violation of an inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement signed on Sept. 19, 2018, which calls for halting all hostile acts against each other, officials said.
Under the pact, named the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), the two Koreas also agreed to set the maritime buffer zone, which spans around 135 kilometers in the Yellow Sea and around 80 km in the East Sea, to reduce tensions and prevent accidental clashes.
"True, the incident took place within the zone, but the agreement does not regulate each side's use of small firearms. It was about the suspension of artillery firings," the official said.
The JCS official said there is circumstantial evidence that the official tried to defect to the North.
"We see high possibilities of his voluntary border crossing, as he wore a life jacket and took off his shoes before leaving the boat, and our intelligence indicates that he expressed such an intention to the North Korean side," the official said. "Investigation is under way into his exact motives and other circumstances."
The fisheries official had served in his post since 2012 and was well aware of the geographical features in the Yellow Sea region, such as the sea current, another official said.
The ill-fated official had financial problems and once considered filing for bankruptcy due to debt, according to his colleagues. He, a father of two, reportedly divorced months ago.
Authorities launched an investigation of his colleagues and are searching the vessel "to secure items, if any, that belong to the official there to find any clues about the incident," according to a Coast Guard official.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
scaaet@yna.co.kr (END)
2. Moon calls N. Korea's killing of S. Korean official 'shocking,' not tolerable for any reason
President Moon please reassess your assumption that Kim Jong-un desires your vision of peace on the Korean peninsula. This is an indication of the true nature of the Kim family regime though I am sure the regime will blame this on "rogue elements." While that may be so in this case but they were acting in accordance with their training indoctrination. Would South Korean military personnel have done this? It is time to assess the Kim family regime as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.
SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in said Thursday that North Korea's killing of a South Korean fisheries official is a "shocking" incident that can't be tolerated for any reason.
He urged the North to take "responsible" measures in connection with the case, in which the 47-year-old man was shot dead by the country's military near the western sea border, according to Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Kang Min-seok.
The president ordered the military to further strengthen its security posture and get fully prepared to protect the lives and safety of the people, Kang said.
Moon issued the message after receiving a briefing on the results of the National Security Council (NSC) session earlier in the day.
According to the South's defense authorities, the 47-year-old South Korean man was shot dead by North Korea's military earlier this week. He was reported missing Monday from a South Korean fisheries patrol boat operating near the western sea border.
Cheong Wa Dae, meanwhile, strongly condemned the North for the act against "humanity, international norms and humanitarianism."
However, Suh Choo-suk, deputy director of national security at the presidential office, said it's not a violation of "the specific clauses" of the Sept. 19 comprehensive military agreement between the two Koreas signed in 2018.
Nonetheless, it constitutes damage to the spirit of the accord aimed at easing border tensions and building mutual trust, Suh added.
lcd@yna.co.kr (END)
3. Inter-Korean ties thrown into abyss following N. Korea's killing of S. Korean citizen
north-South relations have been in an abyss for 7 decades or at least since the Pyongyang Declaration in 2018. Kim Jong-un has no intention of pursuing peace in accordance with President Moon's vision. Regardless of the olive branches the South offers the regime will always be the Scorpion - "because it is my nature."
(News Focus) Inter-Korean ties thrown into abyss following N. Korea's killing of S. Korean citizen | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's brutal killing of a South Korean official drifting near the maritime border is expected to throw the already-frayed inter-Korean relations into an abyss, possibly forcing the government to halt all envisioned reconciliation efforts amid public outrage, experts said Thursday.
They, however, urged the government to take a cautious approach, saying that revealing what exactly happened must come first before any decision on inter-Korean relations. Dialogue with the North is more necessary now than any other time, they said.
South Korea's defense ministry confirmed earlier in the day that North Korean soldiers fatally shot a South Korean official in their waters and burned his body earlier this week after he disappeared while on duty aboard an inspection boat in waters off the western border island of Yeonpyeong.
It is the first time that a South Korean citizen has been killed by North Korea since a female tourist was shot dead in July 2008 at the Mount Kumgang resort on the North's east coast, which led to the closure of the tour program at the scenic mountain known as one of the most symbolic inter-Korean cooperation projects.
The latest incident also came as inter-Korean relations remained frozen after the North's recent explosion of a liaison office in its border town in June over the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.
"The South Korean civilian's death could have a far-reaching impact on inter-Korean relations by undercutting any remaining momentum that the government has tried to utilize for various alternatives in improving relations with the North," Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said.
"The cooling period could last longer, as public sentiment could get worse against any cooperative projects without the latest situation being resolved," he added. "All projects that the government has sought to normalize inter-Korean relations could be put on hold altogether."
Inter-Korean relations have been stalled since the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump ended without a deal in February last year.
The relations chilled further recently after the North blew up a joint liaison office in its border town of Kaesong and cut off cross-border communication in protest of the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets by activists in the South. This comes in stark contrast with rapprochement created after three inter-Korean summits held in 2018.
In a bid to kick-start the long-stalled relations with the North, Seoul has sought to expand exchanges in areas not subject to global sanctions and offered to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea struggling with its antivirus campaign and damage caused by typhoons and flooding in recent months.
In his recent speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Moon Jae-in called for international cooperation to declare an end to the 1950-53 Korean War, one of the major demands that the North has made. Unification Minister Lee In-young has also vowed to push for "small-scale" exchanges with the North, especially in the humanitarian area.
Hong expressed worry that the latest border incident could be a repeat of a "swamp" that the death of the tourist in 2008 at Mount Kumgang created, as it is feared to cause a quagmire that cannot be solved without an apology from North Korea sincere enough to assuage anger and shock that South Korean people must feel about the death of one of their own.
"Public sentiment will get worse until the North makes an apology, but the problem is that it is uncertain the North will do so easily," he said. "To get the North to apologize, the government has to keep asking for it, and it could go on and on like that. Without the North's apology, things could fall into a swamp you cannot get out of when it comes to inter-Korean relations."
Some, however, cautioned against making any drastic decision on inter-Korean relations out of anger and called for a cool-headed approach until more information is available to better figure out what actually happened. They added that the two Koreas need dialogue more than ever to remove any possibility of understanding.
"To better figure out what actually happened, South Korea needs dialogue with the North more than ever," said Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korean studies professor at Dongguk University in Seoul. "This is the time that both sides should keep cool-headed and talk to each other, so as to clarify what actually happened and reduce the chances of misunderstanding."
Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, said it is shocking that the North killed a South Korean citizen, voicing support for the government's condemnation and demand for an apology. But he noted that the government's push for better ties with the North should not be off track.
"In consideration of the shock that people are feeling from the latest incident, it appears inevitable for the government to slow down its push for an improvement in inter-Korean relations for some time in terms of the frequency and intensity of relevant messages (to the North)," he said.
"But the spirit of building peace with the North should be maintained. Small-scale exchanges should also be pushed for separately from issuing condemnation on the deadly incident," he added.
kokobj@yna.co.kr (END)
4. New virus cases over 100 for 2nd day, sporadic cluster infections still worrisome
Cope, contain, and manage. The coronavirus is a virus like the Kim family regime. One that just will not go away and cannot yet be cured or eradicated.
(2nd LD) New virus cases over 100 for 2nd day, sporadic cluster infections still worrisome | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's daily new coronavirus cases stayed over 100 for the second straight day Thursday, as sporadic cluster infections continued to strain the country's virus fight ahead of major holidays.
The country added 125 more COVID-19 cases, including 109 local infections, raising the total caseload to 23,341, according to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA).
South Korea had reported less than 100 new virus cases for three straight days from Sunday before the daily tally bounced back to over 100 Wednesday.
The country's new daily infections had been in triple digits for more than a month since Aug. 14 due to cases tied to a church in Seoul and an anti-government rally before briefly falling below 100.
Of the additional locally transmitted cases, 92 came from the nation's capital area, with 39 reported in Seoul and 43 in the surrounding Gyeonggi Province. Incheon, located west of Seoul, added 10 more patients.
Other municipalities outside the greater Seoul area also reported additional infections. The southern port city of Busan added seven more cases, while northeastern Gangwon Province confirmed two more cases.
The number of cases tied to Severance Hospital in western Seoul reached 58, up eight from a day earlier. Infections linked to a sauna facility in southern Seoul increased by four to 20.
A psychiatric hospital located in Goyang, north of Seoul, added 10 more related cases, raising the total to 39.
The number of cases traced to a restaurant in Busan reached 16, up three from a day earlier. Three more cases were confirmed to be connected with a hospital in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province, raising the total to 12.
Cases with unknown transmission routes accounted for 24.7 percent of all cases reported in the past two weeks.
Health authorities are trying to curb the nationwide spread of COVID-19 ahead of the upcoming Chuseok holiday, which runs from Sept. 30 to Oct. 4.
Millions of South Koreans travel across the nation to meet their families and relatives during Chuseok, the autumn harvest celebration.
The country will also have a three-day break from Oct. 9 to 11, when Hanguel Day, which celebrates the Korean alphabet, is combined with the weekend.
Health authorities have been urging people to stay home over the holidays. They will announce special social distancing guidelines for the Chuseok holiday on Friday that could include enhanced virus curbs.
South Korea runs a three-tier social distancing system. Currently, the Level 2 distancing is taking place across the nation, which bans indoor gatherings of 50 or more people.
Meanwhile, the number of newly identified imported cases came to 16, with six cases from Uzbekistan and three cases from Turkey. The country's total number of imported cases is now at 3,129.
Health authorities said they are looking into the possibility of Uzbek arrivals handing in fake virus-free certificates following a rising number of COVID-19 cases traced to the Central Asian country.
Of the 421 Uzbek arrivals who submitted health certificates, 52, or 12.4 percent of them, tested positive for COVID-19 in South Korea, according to Lee Sang-won, who heads epidemiological investigation analysis at the Central Disease Control Headquarters.
Health authorities have caught two cases of doctored health certificates here, one from Pakistan and another from Kazakhstan.
South Korea currently requires foreign arrivals from six countries -- Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines and Uzbekistan -- to submit certificates proving they tested negative for COVID-19.
There were five additional deaths from COVID-19, raising the death toll to 393. The fatality rate was 1.68 percent.
The number of seriously or critically ill COVID-19 patients came to 126 as of midnight, down 13 from a day earlier.
The total number of people released from quarantine after making full recoveries stood at 20,832, up 182 from the previous day, with 2,116 people isolated for COVID-19 treatment, down 62 from a day ago.
The country has carried out 2,268,999 coronavirus tests since Jan. 3.
kdon@yna.co.kr (END)
5. Unification ministry strongly condemns N. Korea's killing of S. Korean as 'inhumane act'
Pro forma from the MOU. But is this a human rights abuse?
(LEAD) Unification ministry strongly condemns N. Korea's killing of S. Korean as 'inhumane act' | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with more info)
SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry on Thursday strongly condemned North Korea's killing of a South Korean fisheries official, saying the "inhumane act" amounts to pouring cold water over Seoul's efforts for inter-Korean reconciliation.
"We strongly condemn the North Korean military's shooting of an unarmed civilian and burning of his body as an inhumane act that cannot be justified for any reason," Yoh Sang-key, the ministry's spokesperson, said in a press briefing.
"This act by the North Korean military amounts to pouring cold water over our consistent patience and efforts for inter-Korean reconciliation and peace and runs directly counter to the yearning of our people," the official said.
The ministry also strongly urged North Korea to "clearly reveal who committed the incident and take all measures to prevent such an incident from happening again."
Earlier in the day, the defense ministry confirmed that the North shot and killed the 47-year-old official after he drifted into North Korean waters earlier this week. The ministry also said it sent a message to the North via the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC), but it received no response.
The unification ministry said it has no means to communicate with the North with regard to the killing after Pyongyang cut off all inter-Korean communication lines earlier this year in anger over the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets into the North from the South.
julesyi@yna.co.kr (END)
6. Unification Ministry suspends investigations into human rights in N. Korea
I want to reprise this article to emphasize how the Ministry of Unification views human rights in north Korea. Human rights in north Korea is a moral imperative and a national security issue and cannot be overlooked, sidelined, minimized, or neglected.
Unification Ministry suspends investigations into human rights in N. Korea
Unification Ministry suspends investigations into human rights in N. Korea. September. 16, 2020 07:32. by Oh-Hyuk Kwon hyuk@donga.com. It has been reported that the Ministry of Unification has unilaterally suspended the 21-year-old investigations of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), a non-profit private organization, into human rights in North Korea. As a result, South Korea's only white paper on the North Korean human rights issue that has been published annually for 14 years is at the risk of discontinuation.
According to the NKDB on Tuesday, the Ministry of Unification gave the notice to stop the investigations into human rights in North Korea conducted since 1999 with North Korean defectors at Hanawon, a settlement support center for North Korean refugees. From the 1990s to last year, the NKDB identified 78,798 human rights violation cases in North Korea and 48,822 people involved in them based on the testimonials of North Korean defectors who recently entered South Korea. These figures are the largest in South Korea.
However, the Ministry of Unification requested the reduction of North Korea defectors subject to in-depth investigations in January prior to the signing of a survey project agreement, which had been signed annually until this year. The ministry cited the reasons that the number of North Korean defectors declined and the Center for North Korean Human Rights Records under the ministry, which was launched with the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, conducts similar research. However, a member of the NKDB said that the ministry notified of survey suspension as the deadline to sign a consignment contract has passed after the center agreed to the request of the ministry in March even though the ministry had not mentioned the deadline at all.
"The Ministry of Unification has not disclosed any information about its research without publishing any reports or white papers on the North Korean human rights issue for the last four years," said Yoon Yeo-sang, chief executive director of the NKDB. "The government is turning away from North Korean human rights investigations, which are necessary for preparation for the Korean unification."
Beyond Parallel conducted a new study looking at whether there are patterns to North Korean behavior around U.S. elections. Is there truth to the narrative often found in the media and expert analysis that the North uses provocations to capture the attention of the United States? If so, do the North Koreans have something in the works for the U.S. presidential election on November 3, 2020?
Beyond Parallel cross-tabulated U.S. presidential and congressional midterm elections, with our original dataset on North Korean provocations. This dataset comparison allowed us to evaluate how close (in number of days or weeks) the North Korean provocations occurred in relation to U.S. elections.
Over the course of 32 elections since 1956, Beyond Parallel measured the "provocation window"- defined as the period of time before or after an election in which a North Korean provocation happens.
The provocation window has grown more narrow over time. That is, North Korean provocations have clustered increasingly closer to U.S. presidential and congressional midterm elections.
This trend has been especially evident in the last few election cycles under Kim Jong-un. The average window for a North Korean provocation bracketed around all U.S. national elections (i.e., before or after), is 4.5 weeks.
This correlation represents a more focused window than in previous periods. During Kim Jong-il's regime, the window was an average of 5.5 weeks, and during Kim Il-sung's rule, the average was 13 weeks.
This number does not include the 2018 midterm congressional election, where there was a prolonged and anomalous period of no provocations as a result of the Trump-Kim Singapore summit.
We expect that if North Korea rescinded its self-imposed moratorium, then a pattern similar to Kim Jong-un's nine years of office will emerge.
If North Korea does not resume its traditional pattern of behavior, this could suggest a desire to maintain the Singapore Summit moratorium, or it could suggest that internal matters are holding sway.
Beyond Parallel created a dataset of U.S. election events, incorporating both presidential and congressional midterm election years, and cross-tabulated this information with our original dataset on North Korean provocations over the same period. The graph below illustrates how close (in number of days or weeks) North Korean provocations have occurred in relation to U.S. elections. This is one of the first studies to look at whether there are patterns to North Korean behavior around U.S. elections.
On use of graph note following:
The red triangle represents the day of the election. Points to the left and right of the red triangle represent North Korean provocations before and after an election.
When a user hovers on a particular point they can view the amount of days before or after an election and the specific date and type of provocation.
Other Findings
There is a step change in the provocation window after Kim Il-sung's death. In the first 40 years of the study, the provocations window hovered around 9 to 16 weeks (when looking at solely at the average of all national elections every two years). In the last 25 years, the window has narrowed to between 4.5 to 5.5 weeks.
One anomaly is the relatively hostile period of 1965 to 1975, when North Korea greeted U.S. elections with a surprisingly short provocation window of 8.4-days, or a little more than one week.
There are three instances in the past where North Korea had welcomed U.S. elections with a provocation on the same day-the 1978 midterm election, the 1980 presidential election, and the 1996 presidential election.
Correlation only: Our study indicates a pattern in North Korean provocations around U.S. elections. We do not suggest that elections cause the provocations. Our findings also do not deny that there may be multiple causes for the timing of North Korean actions, including scientific/military variables as well as domestic-political ones.
North Korean Provocations and U.S. Elections since 1956
Under Kim il-Sung
Window for presidential elections = 116 days / 16.5 weeks
Window for mid-term congressional elections = 67 days / 9.5 weeks
Total average = 91 days / 13 weeks
Number of elections = 19
Under Kim Jong-il
Window for presidential elections = 30 days / 4.5 weeks
Window for mid-term congressional elections = 49 days / 7 weeks
Total average = 39 days / 5.5 weeks
Number of elections = 9
Under Kim Jong-un
Window for presidential elections = 48 days / 7 weeks
Window for mid-term congressional elections = 16 days / 2 weeks
Window for mid-term congressional elections (without 2018) = 16 days / 2.5 weeks
Total average = 73 days / 10.5 weeks
Total average (without 2018) = 32 days / 4.5 weeks
Number of elections = 4
Additional considerations
Sample size: The sample size for the Kim Jong-un period is small (two presidential and two mid-term congressional election).
Excluding 2018: We decided to provide a provocation window for Kim Jong-un with and without the 2018 congressional midterm election because it was significant that there was a moratorium on missile testing by North Korea during the unprecedented Trump-Kim Singapore summit in 2018.
Provocation: We define a provocation as an intentional military action by North Korea that breaches the sovereignty of a third country such as the South Korea or the United States, causes personal injury or damage to property, and/or constitutes a serious violation of international law for the attainment of specific military, political, or diplomatic objectives. Outside of the terms of this definition, and for the purposes of this study, we do not assign a numeric metric that is determinate of the intensity of each individual provocation.
Averages: The calculations for the average provocation window for each leader have been revised as of September 2020 to reflect updates in the database. The averages have also been rounded to facilitate the absorption of information by the reader.
8. Missiles, Submarines and More: How North Korea Supplies Iran With Weapons
It is good the author is linking to Dr. Bruce Becthol's work.
Missiles, Submarines and More: How North Korea Supplies Iran With Weapons
Over time, Pyongyang has even supplied ballistic missiles, submarines, and possibly nuclear secrets to Tehran.
The U.S. State Department is stepping up its efforts to tighten the sanctions regime arrayed against Iran, drawing renewed attention to the thriving arms trade between Pyongyang and Tehran.
The lucrative military partnership between Iran and North Korea began in the 1980's, when North Korea first established itself as a legal arms exporter across the third and developing world. North Korea became a major weapons supplier to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, shipping a wide range of small arms, tanks, artillery systems, and heavy ordnance. Tehran also solicited the aid of North Korean military advisors to train Iran's armed forces in the use of portable surface-to-air missile systems and other advanced weaponry. It has been estimated that, by the war's end in 1988, around 300 North Korea military advisors were operating in Iran. To be sure, Pyongyang was not particularly invested in that conflict's outcome; even as they openly aided Tehran, North Korean diplomats were quietly making overtures to Baghdad. As with its many ongoing weapons sales in Africa, North Korea was primarily driven by the profit motive- particularly, the need to maintain its foreign currency reserves.
In the following decade, the trade relationship shifted to missile technology. The precise extent of Iran-North Korea missile cooperation remains unclear, but there is widespread consensus that technology transfers and direct missile sales played a seminal role in helping to get Iran's nascent missile program off the ground. A 1993 U.S. intelligence assessment called Iran "one of North Korea's best customers for ballistic missiles and related technology." Tehran was an early client for North Korea's Hwasong-7 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), later using it as the design foundation for their homegrown Shahab-3 MRBM. Even as it continued to purchase North Korean missile technology, Iran developed a growing interest in midget submarines. It is widely believed that Iran's infamous Ghadir-class submarines- a crucial part of the Iranian Navy's presence in the Persian Gulf and capacity to stage anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations across the Hormuz Strait-are a licensed copy of North Korea's Yono-class vessels, several of which were purchased by Iran in the early 2000's.
The Pyongyang-Tehran arms trade has only ballooned with the gradual implementation of international sanctions against North Korea since 2006. The two rogue states have allegedly exchanged nuclear secrets, including the relevant mathematical formulas and key testing data. There is also mounting, though largely circumstantial, evidence that they are exploring a potential deal for centrifuges and enriched uranium transfers.
Most recently, the State and Treasury Departments have accused Iranian defense conglomerate Shahid Movahed Industries of cooperating with North Korea on unspecified "long-range missile development projects." These developments come on the heels of Korea experts' well-grounded suspicions that North Korea proliferated Hwasong 12/14/15 IRBM and ICBM technology to Iran in recent years.
The United States has made little progress in stemming the ongoing arms trade and robust technical-military cooperation between Iran and North Korea. The State Department promises more sanctions, but both states have proven remarkably adept at skirting the international sanctions regime. Over the past decade, Pyongyang has established an elaborate network of foreign proxies and elaborate ship-to-ship transfers that have kept North Korean arms flowing across the developing world. Meanwhile, a diplomatic solution is even more dubious. With the 2015 Iran deal all but dead and normalization talks with North Korea on prolonged hiatus until at least after the U.S. presidential election, Washington seemingly lacks the leverage to either drive a wedge in North Korea-Iranian military cooperation or to impose meaningful costs on it.
Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to the National Interest and serves as a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a Ph.D. student in History at American University.
Image: Reuters
9. Kim Jong-un 'narrowly avoided assassination attempt' by North Korean foes
A sensational report from the UK Daily Star that should be taken with a big grain of salt. This is also being reported by the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
If we are going to think about possible assassination of Kim Jong-un I would call attention to the research and analysis of Dr. Sungmin Cho. This is a less likely scenario.
North Korea dictator Kim Jong-un reportedly narrowly swerved an assassination attempt after a fishing boat was found carrying rebels who were trying to kill him.
The vessel was located by the South Korean authorities and it was discovered with dissidents on board, according to the former chief of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.
Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano claimed the ship was carrying North Korean military officers who had tried to kill Kim.
The former chief of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, told the Japanese magazine Shukan Gendai about the assassination attempt.
He explained the ship was carrying North Korean military officers who had tried to kill Kim in December 2018.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is thought to have narrowly avoided an assassination attempt by military enemies(Image: via REUTERS)
At the time the incident was not widely reported as other issues dominated the headlines including the dispute between a South Korean warship and a Japanese patrol aircraft.
Japan insisted the South Korean ship had targeted the Japanese aircraft with a radar.
Mr Kawano claims the assassination attempt happened in the Wonsan-Kalma region, on the opposite coast to the capital Pyongyang and on the Sea of Japan.
He said the South Koreans deployed a guided missile destroyer after receiving information on the plot from the North via the newly established inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, near the border.
The would-be assassins were discovered on a fishing boat(Image: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP via Getty Image)
The North Koreans requested the boat to be returned but those on board were fleeing the regime following a foiled plot.
Mr Kawano said: "Attempts by the North Korean military to assassinate chairman Kim Jong-un in the Wonsan-Kalma region had been unsuccessful. Four people escaped that day and were headed to Japan by sea."
North Korean dictator Kim used to regularly visit the Wonsan-Kalma region of the country where a beach resort was being built before the coronavirus pandemic begun.
It is believed the tubby tyrant has a constant fear of being assassinated by one of his many enemies.
His paranoia has seen him order the executions of many real and perceived foes, including relatives.
10. Moon pleads for UN to end the Korean War
I doubt the UN will move on this. And I think the only way to bring an end to the Korean war is for the north and South to negotiate an end to the war. Perhaps the UN could offer to facilitate negotiations but we should keep in mind the UN Security Council Resolutions 82-85 which are still in effect. The UN identified north Korea as the aggressor who attacked the sovereignty of the South and the UN called on members states to come to the defense of the Republic of Korea's freedom. The two belligerents are the north and South. The UN provided a UN Command and member states to help defend the South under UN authority and the UN flag. The PRC provided the Chinese People's Volunteers to support the north. The US did not declare war on north Korea. So an end of war declaration should be concluded between the north and South. And the only effective way for that to occur should be through a peace treaty properly negotiated and approved by the north and South. (which of course poses constitutional problems for both north and South since they do not recognize the existence of the other and both claim sovereignty over the entire peninsula and all Korean people_.
Moon pleads for UN to end the Korean War
South Korean leader's call won't likely be answered as North Korea girds for ratcheting of tensions after the US election
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · September 23, 2020
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, speaking before the United Nations' 75th General Assembly, called on the UN and international community to bring to an end the long and lingering Korean War.
While Moon's plea to conclude a war that started in 1950 may appear sound and reasonable, there appears to be little appetite for it among the key combatants - Pyongyang and Washington.
Indeed, even if such a declaration were made, it promises to bring minimal tangible change on the troubled peninsula.
Still, the timing of Moon's high-profile plea may reflect rising concerns in Seoul. As a result of US political processes and North Korean calculations, tensions - largely dormant on and around the Korean peninsula for three years - could reignite with a vengeance at the end of this year.
With Pyongyang-Washington negotiations frozen in stasis, North Korea, now besieged by Covid-19, has spent 2020 refraining from major provocations such as nuclear or long-range missile tests, restricting itself instead to tactical weapons tests.
The same held true in 2018 and 2019 as North Korea embarked upon a diplomatic offensive that saw leader Kim Jong Un engaging in a surprise bromance with US President Donald Trump.
Experts fear, however, that this quiet period may end once the winner of the US presidential election is announced in November.
China was North Korea's chief ally during the three-year Korean War, but Russia's Stalin was a key player. Photo: US Army/Wikipedia Commons
"This year marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War," Moon, speaking in a pre-recorded video message, told the UN General Assembly early on Wednesday morning Seoul time. "The time has come to remove the tragedy lingering on the Korean Peninsula."
Five years after the division of the peninsula by great power fiat in 1945, the Korean War started with North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950. The US and its allies swiftly committed troops to defend the South, then counter-invaded the North. That led to massive Chinese and semi-secret Soviet intervention on the North Korean side.
Combat ended with an armistice, but no peace treaty, in July 1953.
Since then, multiple incidents have flared up, from commando raids to assassinations, from naval clashes to artillery strikes. With tens of thousands of US troops still stationed in the South, full-scale fighting has never resumed, and North Korea went nuclear in 2006.
"The war must end, completely and for good," the South Korean president continued.
In a possible sign of frustration at the failure of North Korea-US and intra-Korean dialogs to generate progress, he implored outside actors to step in. "I hope that the UN and the international community provide support so that we can advance into an era of reconciliation and prosperity through the end-of-war declaration," Moon said.
And in apparent outreach to the US, which has led the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions upon North Korea to compel it to denuclearize, Moon said: "The end of war declaration will indeed open the door to complete denuclearization and permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula."
It was not the first time Moon had spoken about ending the war. He made the same call at the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018.
South Korean soldiers at the Joint Security Area facing the North Korean side of the border. Photo: iStock
It synchs with his stalled policy of advocating cross-DMZ economic engagement and peace initiatives on and around the peninsula. After Moon's government took power in 2017, it made inter-Korean relations a central policy platform, but has been deeply disappointed by a freeze in relations that has reversed earlier gains.
In 2018, hopes soared. With Pyongyang sticking to a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests, North Korea made a last-minute decision to attend the Winter Olympics, held in the South. That kick-started cross-border diplomacy.
Moon and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un held three chummy summits, the last in September 2018. Kim also met US President Donald Trump in an unprecedented summit in Singapore that year.
In 2019, following the failure of Kim and Trump to narrow their differences over North Korean denuclearization in a summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam, US ally Moon became a collateral victim of North Korea-US relations.
In June 2020, North Korea dramatically blew up an inter-Korean liaison office - arguably the biggest tangible fruit of 2018's diplomacy. North Korea has since ignored various South Korean engagement entreaties, from humanitarian aid to Covid-19 assistance.
Experts see potential pros and cons to an end-of-war declaration and subsequent peace treaty.
On the pro side, Pyongyang would have a piece of paper that might dampen its paranoia and compel it to pivot away from its decades-long prioritization of the military and refocus on the economy, though few expect the regime to disarm.
A general view of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, reportedly one of the largest US military bases on foreign soil. Photo: AFP/Jung Yeon-je
Moreover - and this seems to be a belief among Moon's aides - the process of getting a declaration made and signing a peace treaty would create opportunities for a relationship reset and trust-building steps. That process could feasibly result in some UN sanctions being waived.
And it is not a terribly difficult task.
"It is a low bar to clear to move the diplomatic process forward," said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at Seoul think tank the Asan Institute. "I think Moon is trying to bring the process back to the drawing board and realign everyone."
On the con side, cynics expect it to grant added leverage to a long-standing North Korean aim, the removal of US troops from the peninsula.
And its impact looks minimal. Even if a peace treaty were signed, stamped and sealed, it would not necessarily change Korean affairs substantively. There would still be two competing states, run under two very different systems, and two large armies facing off against each other over the same old DMZ.
A key stumbling block is Washington. With North Korea having proved its nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, the US is now prioritizing its own national security interests over South Korea's.
"The problem is the Americans are not particularly interested in a symbolic declaration as they worry about real matters like ICBMs and nuclear warheads," Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Seoul's Kookmin University, told Asia Times.
"Such a declaration would not change anything about ICBM or nuclear potential, so I don't see why the US should change its attitude toward sanctions," he said.
Kim Jong-un looks at a rocket warhead tip after a simulated test of atmospheric re-entry of a ballistic missile, at an unidentified location in this undated photo released March 15, 2016. Photo: Reuters/KCNA
And in pragmatic Pyongyang, where North Korean watchers like Lankov believe there is little appetite for the kind of symbolic inter-Korean declarations beloved of South Korean engagers, interest appears minimal.
Former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton wrote in his recent memoir: "The North had told us they didn't care about (the end-of-war declaration), seeing it as something Moon wanted."
Despite fears among some Pyongyangologists that North Korea would launch a satellite or test a submarine-launched ballistic missile this year, so far the regime has stuck to a self-applied moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests.
It has remained particularly quiet this year - possibly due to Covid-19, possibly to await the outcome of the US presidential election before deciding what card it should play next.
Its hibernation may end in November or January, as it signals its relevance to the next president and kick-starts a new or renewed process with the United States. And that kick-start could be kinetic.
"North Korea understands that the election in the US is a very important timing as they have to reset their relations," said Go. "They understand if they don't do anything then they lose an opportunity."
So how does Pyongyang likely see the candidates?
"Trump is a threat and an opportunity ... he is probably the only US president who is capable of authorizing a military strike against North Korea while completely ignoring a North Korean counterstrike on Seoul," said Lankov.
US President Donald Trump shakes hands with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un at the start of their historic US-North Korea summit in Singapore on June 12. Photo: AFP/Saul Loeb
"On the other hand, because he is so despising of US allies, he can give North Korea concessions no other president is likely to consider."
The more conventional Biden, conversely, could trigger a bigger North Korean bang.
"If Biden is elected he is not likely to be a strong, aggressive or innovative president - he will likely continue Obama policy," Lankov suggested, referring to so-called "strategic patience."
"They will be less afraid of the consequences, so under Biden it is possible to see more ICBM or nuclear tests," Lankov said.
However, given that North Korea has played its engagement card with both South Korea and the United States to no long-term effect, and with its economy heavily impacted by the closure of border trade with China, pressure on the leadership is mounting for a new strategy.
And there may be uncertainty about how to proceed at the very heart of the regime. Go opines that Kim was more invested in his dalliance with the US than was his sister and close aide, Kim Yo Jong, who has taken on higher-profile roles in both the Politbureau and state media this year.
"The lack of action [in 2020] is explained as North Korea does not know what to do next," Go suggested.
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11. Donald Trump's Second-Term North Korea Strategy: A Deal or Ignore Kim?
A pessimistic view from Professor Kelly. Either broad possibility is problematic and I hope we will find a more effective way forward (whomever wins the election).
Donald Trump's Second-Term North Korea Strategy: A Deal or Ignore Kim?
From the author: In the end, nothing much will happen here, just as nothing much happened over the past four years. For all of Trump's threats and then blandishments toward North Korea, the empirical situation on the ground in Korea is unchanged, as is U.S. force structure in the region (and that of the two Koreas too). Maybe Trump will actually put some teeth on his Korean sound and fury, but so far, it has signified nothing, and it seems safe to predict that in the future too.
Editor's Note: The following is part of a new symposium here in Korea Watch that will analyze potential U.S. policy options towards North Korea should Donald Trump win reelection. Check back soon for more contributions in the coming days.
If Donald Trump is re-elected as president of the United States, then the possibilities for his Korea policy are wide open. But if Joe Biden is elected as president, then Americans can expect him to take a fairly establishmentarian approach. Biden has already signaled a traditional hawkishness on North Korea-alliance reassurance, no summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, no Trumpian claims to a unique personal relationship with Kim, and so on. With Trump, as so often, unpredictability reigns. There are two broad possibilities:
1. Trump goes for a deal with his "friend" Kim Jong-un.
Trump and his team have hinted here and there this year that a re-elected Trump would strike a deal with Kim. The logic here is that Trump will be free from re-election pressures and can express himself more fully in a second term. Also, Trump wants a deal because he deeply craves the expected adulation, including a Nobel Prize Peace perhaps, and cares little for the Korean peninsula. So he would comfortably sign even a balance-negative deal for the exciting imagery of a breakthrough on a long-standing problem.
A corollary of this approach is that Trump is a nationalist retrencher at heart. He would gladly trade away U.S. Forces Korea for a deal with Kim, and if the South Koreans and U.S. foreign policy community do not like it, well, who cares? Trump does not listen to foreigners or the American Deep State; he defends America First.
This describes a maximalist Trumpism, where Trump genuinely follows through on his transactional foreign policy impulses to abandon U.S. allies as troublesome free-riders and cut deals with dictators whom he somewhat admires for their unchecked authority.
The problem with this scenario is that Trump would run into a wall of bureaucratic resistance in Washington, DC. Washington strongly supports the U.S. alliance network. A bad deal with North Korea, particularly one which abandoned South Korea, would spark massive resistance in Congress, the Defense Department and State Department, and the wider foreign policy community of think-tanks and analysts focused on East Asia. The criticism on U.S. op-ed pages would be crushing, just as it was throughout 2018 and 2019 when Trump met Kim the first time. Then Trump's efforts were widely derided as photo-op diplomacy, and in Hanoi in 2019, Trump admitted that he abjured a deal in part because of the domestic criticism he would face.
It is worth recalling that President Jimmy Carter also tried to pull USFK out of South Korea and collided with widespread resistance. In time, he simply gave up and only 3,000 US soldiers were withdrawn. A Trump deal with North Korea - likely burdened by the widespread perception that it is a bad deal struck solely out of Trump's lust for publicity and a Nobel - would be met with the same fierce resistance. Trump, notorious for his laziness and inability to stay focused on issues over the long term, likely does not have the focus and self-discipline to fight a protracted battle with the rest of Washington.
2. Trump simply ignores Korea as not worth the trouble.
Given that Trump probably does not want to fight alone against the entire Washington establishment over a mid-size issue like Korea-if only because it is too much work for someone who would rather watch TV or surf Twitter. It is likely that he will simply drop the issue as he already has for the last year or so.
Perhaps he will have a summit with Kim, but at this point, everyone knows that those are not meaningful. They do not cap a long process of bureaucratic work with a treaty-as, for example, the Camp David Accords of 1978 did. Instead, Trump-Kim summits are better described as made-for-TV visits. So if Trump meets Kim again in 2021, without the requisite preparation yet again (which is likely), then that summit will be irrelevant despite the inevitable hyperventilating TV coverage.
In the end, nothing much will happen here, just as nothing much happened over the past four years. For all of Trump's threats and then blandishments toward North Korea, the empirical situation on the ground in Korea is unchanged, as is U.S. force structure in the region (and that of the two Koreas too). Maybe Trump will actually put some teeth on his Korean sound and fury, but so far, it has signified nothing, and it seems safe to predict that in the future too.
Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University.
Image: Reuters
12. There Isn't A Military Solution to North Korea (And The American Public Agrees)
First of all there is always a military solution. There are multiple military solutions to north Korea; however, it is unlikely we want to expend the blood and treasure to implement them unless the north forces our hand.
But it is this kind of analysis that undermines diplomacy and peaceful solutions because it undermines deterrence. Kim Jong-un must know that we are always preparing military options and depending on the conditions that we have the capability and the will to execute them.
There are pundits who claim the north wants security guarantees and to be left alone which is why it has built the 4th largest army in the world and developed nuclear and ICBM capabilities. That is only half right. While it claims deterrence and the desire for its own security, it wants to be left alone so that it can have its way with South Korea and dominate the entire peninsula.
One of the basic traits of the Kim family regime is that it exploits weakness and respects strength. And strength deters the regime. It is arguments such as this that undermines that strength and shows weakness that will be exploited by the regime.
But let me be clear as to my personal beliefs:
I support peace on the Korean peninsula
I support a diplomatic solution to the north Korean nuclear threat
I support ROK engagement with the north
I do not support a weakening of the ROK and ROK/US defensive capabilities
I believe there cannot be success for US, ROK, and Japanese interests without strong ROK/US and Japan/US alliances
Despite the above I think we have to accept that north Korea may have a continued hostile strategy and therefore while we prioritize diplomacy we have to remain prepared for the worst cases.I hope I am wrong here and that Kim Jong-un will dismantle his nuclear weapons and seek peaceful co-existence.
There are no "experts" on north Korea - it is the most difficult intelligence target - the proverbial "hard target"
At best we are students trying to understand the nature of the regime and the security problem on the Korean peninsula
Anything I say can and should be challenged
However, now that I am retired I am no longer constrained by doctrine, funding, or a chain of command so I can tell you how I really feel
There Isn't A Military Solution to North Korea (And The American Public Agrees)
If Trump wins re-election, he should focus on fullfilling his goal of ending the Korean War.
Editor's Note: The following is part of a new symposium here in Korea Watch that will analyze potential U.S. policy options towards North Korea should Donald Trump win reelection. Check back soon for more contributions in the coming days.
Despite America's pivotal role in the conflict-and its lasting impact on American democracy-the Korean War is a forgotten chapter in American history. Five million soldiers and civilians died from the war, which began in 1950 and never officially ended. The fifty-five boxes of remains of missing Korean War service members that North Koreans returned to the United States in 2018 is a stark reminder of the absence of closure from that original forever war.
Why hasn't it ended? For the United States, establishment policymakers in Washington stand in the way. But prospects for peace have a powerful ally: American voters.
Whoever is elected as president this November should follow through on President Trump's commitment to transform U.S.-North Korea relations. The first step is declaring the Korean War over and taking concrete steps to establish peace between the main actors of the conflict: the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China. But to surpass the stronghold in Washington, which binds America to policies of confrontation on the Korean peninsula, there has to be a domestic constituency big enough that says no to these endless wars and yes to strong diplomatic engagement. Luckily, that base is growing, and it is bipartisan.
President Trump's historic, although sporadic, negotiations with North Korea are in line with U.S. public opinion. A new poll by the Eurasia Group Foundation shows Americans favor diplomacy, especially when it leads to an avoidance of war. Majorities of both Trump (56.1%) and Biden (62.8) supporters believe "the U.S. should negotiate directly with adversaries to try to avoid military confrontation, even if they are human rights abusers, dictators, or home to terrorist organizations." The foreign policy orthodoxy of never negotiating with dictators is second in line to the American people's priority: avoiding war.
Americans are also increasingly skeptical of the decades-old "peace through strength" approach to foreign affairs, which has defined much of Washington's policy toward the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War's inconclusive end. It gave birth to the present-day military industrial complex and what historian and Quincy Institute's non-resident fellow Nikhil Pal Singh described as an "addiction to militarism."
While many in the foreign policy community believe global stability is best maintained by the U.S. financing a strong military or promoting democracy overseas, a plurality of Americans from both political parties believe peace is best achieved and sustained by "keeping a focus on the domestic needs and the health of American democracy, while avoiding unnecessary intervention beyond the borders of the United States."
And, while President Trump debates withdrawing U.S. troops from America's largest overseas military based in South Korea, a plurality supports reducing the overall number of troops stationed in countries across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. A gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, in close consultation with both Koreas, would better serve American national security interests than endlessly seeking dominance in a region that should be led by the Korean people.
If reelected, President Trump has a mandate to revive the peace negotiations he started, mindful of an increasingly pro-diplomacy and anti-war public. Not only will a peace agreement benefit America's interests in the region and reduce the threat of war that looms large over millions, it will also democratize foreign policy by taking seriously the preferences of American voters.
Jessica J. Lee is a senior research fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Image: Reuters
13. Pompeo to visit S. Korea next month
What is on the agenda? China? Quad Plus? Special Measures Agreement? north Korea?
Pompeo to visit S. Korea next month | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will likely visit South Korea next month, government sources said Wednesday.
"I heard Pompeo will come to Korea early next month," a source said. "It will be probably a two-day visit starting Oct. 7."
He will also travel to Japan to meet with new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, according to another source.
Seoul and Washington are in talks to set up Pompeo's South Korean schedule, including meetings President Moon Jae-in and Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha.
It will be his first trip to South Korea since October, 2018.
brk@yna.co.kr (END)
14. How Coronavirus Impacts North Korea's Nuclear Program
How Coronavirus Impacts North Korea's Nuclear Program
No one is immune to the pandemic and it is creating a new normal that leaders must live and negotiate in.
North Korea's nuclear issues seem almost like a distant memory in light of how dramatically the world has changed since the 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi. Since then, the looming threat and daunting consequences of unchecked nuclear weapons displaced in the interim by the imminent challenges and loss of life wreaked by the coronavirus.
Countries have found themselves vulnerable as the pandemic strains global supply chains, revealing an unforgiving, chaotic facet of globalization that seriously disrupted the availability of necessary supplies such as masks. The simmering rivalry between China and the U.S. has quickly escalated to become overtly confrontational. A new need for international cooperation has emerged, but the international situation has become less conducive to realize it.
It is quite clear though that as the volatile ebb and flow of the pandemic settles in as an inevitable fact of life, the United States and the rest of the world will again face ongoing nuclear issues, including North Korea's. Yet the domestic impact of the pandemic on North Korea has direct bearing upon the resolution of its nuclear issues. Most damaging was the dampening impact on North Korea's display of flexing its nuclear muscle. The pandemic coupled with disastrous floods shifted Pyongyang's priorities to immediate survival, in turn considerably diminishing the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons.
North Korea's nuclear strategies have been closely related to its domestic agenda. Kim Jung-il, the current leader's father, envisaged nuclear development as a form of leverage to create an environment favorable to domestic systemic change; such hopes have been dashed so far and have now been exacerbated by the pandemic.
Intensifying U.S.-Chinese competition and confrontation will only continue to fan North Korea's effort to signal its strategic importance to Washington. So far, the United States has not responded to North Korea's appeals. Ultimately, the effectiveness of such signaling amidst tension between the China and America will set the tone for nuclear negotiations.
As it stands, North Korea is more likely to negotiate than any time in the past, yet at the same time will amplify its presence as a threat in order to convey that they are not desperate. In the meantime, the new U.S. administration that will emerge in 2021 may seriously contemplate military options given the frustrations from the inefficacies of the prior two summits. If this happens, it will be déjà vu of early 2017.
There are two important legacies of the Trump presidency in handling North Korea: One is the summit formula, and the other is the fact that the United States, for the first time, approached North Korea with North Korea's agenda for domestic reforms. If negotiations with North Korea are to yield any possibility of success, the latter legacy demands further attention. The blueprints for North Korea's reforms should be more specific and acceptable to North Korea with the realization that the immediate priority of North Korea is system renewal and survival. At the same time, more judicious preparatory work is needed before any sort of negotiation is launched.
Yong-Chool Ha is the Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Social Science at the University of Washington's Jackson School of International Studies and a Professor Emeritus of Seoul National University. He served as a member of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning and on advisory committees to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Unification, and the Ministry of National Defense.
Image: Reuters
15. How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects Daily Life
How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects Daily Life | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
The North Korean people have faced truly extreme humanitarian challenges in 2020. Before this summer, the DPRK was dealing with high levels of chronic malnutrition and severe economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 shutdowns and ongoing sanctions. The multiple typhoons that have hit over the past few weeks causing widespread flooding around the country exacerbate an already difficult year. Even after decades of visiting the North, it is devastating to witness the array of grave humanitarian difficulties that the North Korean people must endure. Sadly, humanitarian assistance for relief, recovery and rebuilding is unlikely to be delivered any time soon.
The Tyranny of Geography
The topography of the Korean Peninsula, featuring steep mountains and narrow valleys, makes it vulnerable to flooding; every mid-summer, it receives significant rainfall. In a normal season, as much as half of the annual rainfall can come during the roughly month-long "rainy season" that ordinarily begins in late June and ends by mid-July. As long as the rain showers are gentle, the hillside vegetation and natural drainage system of creeks, lakes, reservoirs and rivers can absorb and remove the excess water without widespread damage. But if the rainy season is prolonged, or if typhoons bring high winds and dump large amounts of rainfall in a short period of time, the system is quickly overwhelmed, causing mudslides, large-scale flooding and crop damage, loss of homes and infrastructure, and lives.
2020 Has Been a Bad Year
The rainy season of 2020 was prolonged and heavy, and was followed by three typhoons that struck different parts of the country in a two-week period: Bavi (August 26-27), Maysak (September 2-3) and Haishen (September 7). These storms brought further damage to already hard-hit communities, and new levels of hardship to other cities and regions that were spared mass flooding earlier in the season. Meanwhile, the risk from more typhoons continues into the fall.
According to a September 16, 2020 Pyongyang Times article, the summer of 2020 brought the second-highest level of precipitation recorded in the DPRK in the last 25 years. During the typhoons, the North Korean government issued emergency warnings and permitted unusual live, on-the-scene reporting showing significant flooding in Wonsan (North Korea's fifth-largest city) and other areas. Yet so far, although the current flooding is likely much worse and more widespread than prior years, North Korea has neither publicly requested outside assistance nor shared precise damage estimates or casualty figures. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the fight against the pandemic has been the government's top priority, meaning tight quarantine measures and travel and economic restrictions remain in place. These priorities were further reiterated on August 14 when Kim Jong Un reportedly said at a Politburo meeting, "The worsening coronavirus situation around the globe calls for tighter border closures and stricter virus prevention measures, and not allowing any outside assistance whatsoever regarding the flood damage." However, even though detailed casualty and damage figures are not available, much can be gleaned from the broadcast footage and experience gained from extensive United Nations (UN) and NGO travel and prior humanitarian engagement in the country.
The View From Ground Zero
The Korean Peninsula north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) ranges from coastal rice-growing areas and lowlands planted with corn, soybean, vegetables, fruit trees and other crops, to mountainous areas. Steep mountain slopes are drained by small creeks running down narrow valleys, feeding into larger rivers that meander through agricultural areas, villages and towns to the sea. On previous visits to the North, aid workers have seen firsthand the widespread devastation that happens when too much water falls in these vulnerable areas in too short a time. Homes, schools, clinics and other buildings rim the edges of the narrow valleys, and when heavy rains hit steep slopes, the small creeks that drain these valleys turn into rushing torrents that soon sweep away everything in their path. Mountainsides lacking in cover vegetation can quickly become saturated and slough off, burying buildings below in mud. Standing water around the base of mud-brick buildings can cause them to "melt" and collapse. Outhouses and open waste channels are soon overrun, contaminating the floodwaters. Perimeter walls built for security collapse. Phone and electric lines are severed. Rural dirt roads turn into mud, making the surface impassible. Bridges break as abutments wash away.
As the ground becomes saturated and rivers overflow, nearby croplands are inundated. Crops like corn, soybean and rice that were weeks away from being harvested instead risk rotting in the fields. Farmers and community members will do what they can to try to salvage crops by tying them up, to hopefully allow them time to finish ripening for harvest. But if the damage is too widespread, it is simply an overwhelming task.
Swollen rivers inundate towns, uproot trees and vegetation, wash away topsoil, and deposit rocks, refuse and waste that have been pulled into the churning waters. Entire towns can be swept away, the landscape forever changed once the waters recede. It will take months of backbreaking work to rebuild homes, roads, rail lines and bridges and to remove debris from agricultural fields. With topsoil buried or washed away, the productivity of affected fields is often reduced going forward, making life even harder for those working the ground.
In the immediate aftermath of flooding, those who have lost their homes and personal belongings may be housed in the small apartments or residences of family or friends, or find shelter in community buildings, while communities try to rebuild housing. In some cases, "shock troops" of soldiers or organized volunteer laborers from various sectors of the society may be sent by the government to quickly reconstruct devastated homes and other buildings in larger communities. But in poorer areas, it seems that local communities and even individual families are left to try to rebuild and repair on their own-with few resources, an already overburdened workload and with winter just around the corner.
Inundated or partially inundated homes must be repaired; mounds of mud must be removed and belongings cleaned-yet in most cases, the only water available for cleaning is contaminated. Kitchen gardens that individual households heavily depend on must be immediately replanted, but that may be impossible if seed stocks have been lost in the flooding. People who are already malnourished and suffering will struggle even more for basic survival in the coming weeks and months from increased incidence of diarrhea caused by contaminated water sources, the sudden loss of food stocks, garden produce, or fuel, and the hugely increased workload.
Help Is Not on the Way
The damage to the roads alone makes it very difficult for relief supplies, if available at all, to be delivered. Remote communities can be entirely cut off for days or weeks while mudslides are removed, often by hand, and roads are repaired enough to restore even basic travel. Furthermore, under normal circumstances, September and October are some of the busiest months in the DPRK as they are critical for harvesting the main food crops of corn, rice and soybean. Roads must be passable in order for crops to be harvested and moved from the fields to the threshing areas and out for distribution, and electricity lines and supply must be restored in order to run the threshing machines.
The virtual closure of the border with China and the halt in nearly all external relief shipments since January 2020 out of concern for COVID-19 will make longer-term recovery efforts even more difficult. Vehicles of all kinds are needed for rebuilding efforts-to transport building materials like sand, gravel and concrete. But the parts and tires needed to keep these vehicles operational usually come from China. With trade cut off due to COVID-19 quarantines, many of these vehicles will break, further limiting transportation and supply networks. Similarly, while greenhouses have greatly expanded food production in the shoulder seasons between late fall and early spring, the supply of replacement greenhouse plastic is critical-which has also very likely been significantly curtailed due to border closures related to COVID-19 measures.
People injured during the flooding or the rebuilding effort have no option but to seek treatment at clinics or hospitals that are overwhelmed and ill-equipped to feed or house them, let alone provide them with significant medical help. Besides those already at the margins of society and highly vulnerable to shocks of any kind (children under five, pregnant and nursing women, the elderly, the disabled, those who are sick, etc.), those who lost their homes to the flooding, and communities most affected will be particularly vulnerable to increased rates of malnutrition. As people crowd together in small spaces due to the loss of shelter, there is not only the potential for the spread of COVID-19, but also the transmission of more common communicable diseases like tuberculosis or multidrug-resistant tuberculosis.
Perhaps most devastating is the emotional impact and disruption caused by the loss of loved ones, homes or livelihoods on people already on a knife-edge of survival, and the overwhelming workload. Usual tasks must be completed (on top of urgent flood restoration duties at both the community level and at the household level) before the cold of winter sets in. For millions of North Koreans, the challenge is formidable but help will not be on the way until outside humanitarian assistance and related travel is again facilitated by North Korea, a reality recognized on September 11 by US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in remarks to the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK):
We recognize that North Korea is facing an unusually severe set of challenges this year that perhaps is making it more difficult for Pyongyang to make the decision to engage. But I can assure you we will be ready when the DPRK is ready. In the meantime, it is critical that we and the international community remain focused on the humanitarian challenges faced by the North Korean people.
Conclusion
Even after visiting the DPRK over two decades, it is heartbreaking to witness the damage and setbacks caused by floods. This year, it is even more difficult to see the devastation on communities and lives from afar without being able to lend a helping hand.
16. Japan PM tells South Korea it's time to fix strained ties
It takes two to solve this problem. Are Moon and Suga willing to pledge that they place national security and national prosperity first priorities while pledging to manage the historical issues.
Japan PM tells South Korea it's time to fix strained ties
TOKYO (AP) - Japan's new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on Thursday held his first telephone call with his South Korean counterpart since taking office, telling President Moon Jae-in that the neighbors should work to resolve their strained relations.
The talks, proposed by South Korea, were the first contact in nine months between leaders of the two countries. Relations between Japan and South Korea deteriorated to their worst levels in years under Suga's predecessor, Shinzo Abe, a military hawk viewed by some as not apologetic enough over Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945.
"I told President Moon that relations between the two countries are in a very severe condition right now and we should not leave this unresolved,(asterisk) Suga told reporters. "Japan and South Korea are extremely important neighbors to each other. In dealing with North Korea and other issues, I believe Japan-South Korea and Japan-U.S. cooperation are crucial."
Their current dispute stems from South Korea's demands for compensation for Korean laborers abused by Japanese companies during World War II. South Korea's Supreme Court in 2018 ordered Japanese companies to compensate the aging Korean plaintiffs. Japan insists that all compensation matters were settled under a 1965 treaty.
The dispute spilled over into trade and military issues, complicating cooperation between the two key American allies. Moon accused Abe's government of weaponizing trade to retaliate over the legal dispute.
Suga did not give any details Thursday about steps Japan would take to improve the relationship. He appeared to indicate Japan's position on the compensation was unchanged and he put the burden of easing tensions on South Korea.
"Based on Japan's consistent positions on the various problems, I plan to continue to strongly urge South Korea to take appropriate actions," Suga said.
Asked if there was any sign of a thaw, Suga declined to comment.
Suga took office last week after Abe stepped down due to poor health.
He has been holding telephone talks with other global leaders, including a call with U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday. A call with Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected Friday.
Suga, who was Abe's chief cabinet secretary, is largely expected to carry on Abe's diplomatic and security policies.
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Follow Mari Yamaguchi on Twitter at https://www.twitter.com/mariyamaguchi
17. Warner Bros. to Cut Operations in South Korea (Report)
Warner Bros. is to halt its investment and production in local films in South Korea, after completing its current slate of movies.
"We've already stopped making fresh investments in Korean films," an official from Warner Bros Korea told the Yonhap news agency on Wednesday. "We will also wrap up projects that are in post-production or in production."
The move would appear to be part of a review of business operations currently being conducted by WarnerMedia and its parent company AT&T. It has consolidated production operations elsewhere in the world and has now begun shaking up distribution.
The scale of the South Korean market makes the country attractive. It was the world's fourth largest theatrical market in 2019, behind North America, China and Japan. But the strength of local movies means Hollywood studios have to be satisfied with fighting over only half the market, or be prepared to dive in to the local production scene.
Warner Bros. Korea kicked off its venture into the Korean production sector in 2016 with Kim Jee-woon-directed period thriller "The Age of Shadows." The film was a critical and commercial success that grossed $55 million worldwide and was selected to represent South Korea in the foreign-language Oscar race.
But films it has made since have disappointed. They include another Kim-directed effort "Illang: The Wolf Brigade" and drama "A Single Rider."
Among its three remaining local titles is "Josee," a remake of the 2003 Japanese drama "Josee, The Tiger And The Fish," which is expected to be released in November.
It is not clear whether the pullback also affects Warner's distribution efforts in South Korea, which the studio handles through its own local releasing office. Warner executives have not responded to Variety's inquiries.
The Hollywood studios have also taken different approaches to distribution in the country at different times. Joint venture United International Pictures was Hollywood's first direct distribution effort in the country. Sony got into a joint venture with Disney between 2006 and 2014, before splitting away and handing over its releasing to Universal. It then went solo in 2017. Paramount currently sees its studio movies sub-distributed by Lotte CultureWorks, having previously gone through CJ Entertainment. And Disney now has two studios' output to handle following its takeover of 20th Century Fox.
In recent days, it has emerged that Warner Bros. will halt its theatrical sub-distribution deal with Roadshow Pictures in Australia and New Zealand. It is expected to replace that arrangement with a new one with Universal.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Key Findings
