Quotes of the Day:

“He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.” 

- Thomas Paine

“It is wonderful how much time people spend fighting the devil. If they would only expend the same amount of energy loving their fellow men, the devil would die in his tracks of ennui.” 

- Helen Keller

“Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect although in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage, thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work; able to endure hunger and cold and to put up with shame and ignominy.”

-Sun Tzu, The Art of War

1.  Military closely watching North Korea for signs of submarine missile launch

2. Yoon's overseas trip marked by rare summit with Japan, embarrassing hot mic

3. 5 takeaways from Biden’s speech to the world

4. Can U.S. Navy Drills Deter a North Korean Nuclear Test?

5. The Case for a South Korean Nuclear Bomb

6. Korea-US-Japan top diplomats: DPRK’s legislation effort for nuclear weapons use is a grave concern

7. S.Korea Gets Behind UN's N.Korea Resolution Again

8.  Joint Chiefs of Staff "North Korea launches unknown ballistic missile into East Sea"

9. Strengthening Integrated Air and Missile Defense for the Japan-US Alliance

10. Yoon and Kishida meeting not a summit – but a start

11. Did Russian pride nix North Korea arms deal?

12. When 'Macho Man' met 'Mr. Status quo' (Yoon- Kishida)

13. [WHY] Is the prestige of Seoul National University all it's hyped up to be?

14. A dive into N. Korea’s world of multiplayer gaming

15. South Korean delegation coming to US seeking to build peace

16. Two money changers in Pyongsong arrested for manipulating exchange rates

17. N. Korea fires unspecified ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military

1.  Military closely watching North Korea for signs of submarine missile launch

A response to the USS Ronald Reagan in theater? Coincidental? Is it really a threat? Hardly. But the timing may be used by critics to claim it is the alliance that is responsible for increasing tensions.

(2nd LD) Military closely watching North Korea for signs of submarine missile launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · September 24, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS South Korean defense minister visit to U.S. aircraft carrier in penultimate para)

SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military has detected activities in North Korea that suggest it may be preparing to fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) off its eastern coast, officials said Saturday.

The suspicious signs came as South Korea and the United States are set to hold joint military drills involving a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at the end of this month. U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris also plans to visit Seoul on Thursday for talks with President Yoon Suk-yeol.

"We are closely monitoring North Korea's SLBM-related facilities and activities, and maintaining a thorough readiness posture," a military official said.

The military has recently detected possible signs of preparation for an SLBM test in the North's eastern coastal city of Sinpo, according to sources.

Yoon was briefed on the situation earlier Friday by Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup on the flight back from Ottawa, after his weeklong visit to Britain, the United States and Canada, the presidential office said.

The president instructed the military to respond immediately in the event Pyongyang makes a provocation, the office said.

On Wednesday, 38 North, a U.S.-based think tank, said recent satellite imagery of Sinpo showed possible preparations to launch a new submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles.

The satellite imagery, taken Sunday, showed six barges and other vessels gathered around the submarine launch quay at Sinpo South Shipyard, according to 38 North.

"While barges and a dry dock have been occasionally observed around the submarine launch quay at the main construction hall, the presence of six vessels and barges in this area has not been observed before," it said.

The report concluded that the activity suggests preparations to launch a submarine.

Sinpo has production, development and testing facilities for submarines and SLBMs.

North Korea test-fired an SLBM in waters off Sinpo on May 7, three days before Yoon's inauguration. It also launched a mini-SLBM there in October last year.

A senior U.S. official said Friday it is possible for the North to conduct a nuclear test during U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris' trip to South Korea and Japan next week.

Officials in Seoul and Washington have warned Pyongyang has completed the preparation to resume a nuclear test for the first time since 2017 amid stalled denuclearization talks with the U.S.

Harris is scheduled to make a four-day visit to Japan from Monday, leading a presidential delegation to the funeral of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and then visit Seoul on Thursday to hold a meeting with Yoon.

On Friday, the nuclear-powered USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier arrived in South Korea's eastern port city of Busan to join the allies' combined military drills later this month.

Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera jointly visited the aircraft carrier later Saturday, in an apparent indication of the solid alliance between the two nations.

The nuclear-powered USS Annapolis submarine is also expected to take part in the two countries' first major joint exercises involving a U.S. aircraft carrier since 2017.

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · September 24, 2022

2. Yoon's overseas trip marked by rare summit with Japan, embarrassing hot mic

Two steps forward, one step back or one step forward, two steps back?

On the least important issue, the hot mic, President Yoon shows he is human.

(News Focus) Yoon's overseas trip marked by rare summit with Japan, embarrassing hot mic | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · September 24, 2022

By Lee Haye-ah

OTTAWA, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol wound up his second overseas trip amid embarrassment over the use of foul language caught on hot mic, but the trip was marked by one unmistakable outcome: the first summit with Japan in nearly three years.

Yoon began the trip with a stop in London to attend the state funeral of Queen Elizabeth II, an occasion that also provided the president with the opportunity to meet with new King Charles III and mingle with other leaders who had flown in from across the world.

Despite the solemnity of the events surrounding the funeral, Yoon, whose approval ratings tumbled to the 20 percent range in the summer, took another hit from critics at home after he was forced to postpone signing a condolence book for the queen.

Yoon's office said the signing was postponed from Sunday to Monday, the day of the funeral, per the instructions of the British royal family, given traffic conditions in London that made it difficult for all the visiting foreign leaders to travel to Westminster Hall at the same time.

But critics claimed Yoon had been snubbed by the British royal family and that leaders from the Group of Seven nations had received proper care in accordance with diplomatic protocol.

Yoon's second stop was New York, where the president spent the largest portion of his seven-day trip to attend the U.N. General Assembly, hold a series of bilateral summits on the sidelines, and meet with diverse groups of people, including students, Korean American scientists and global business leaders.

In previewing the trip, the presidential office had picked three highlights: Yoon's first address to the U.N. General Assembly, the first bilateral summit between South Korea and Japan in nearly three years, and a second summit between Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden.

The South Korea-Japan summit, in particular, raised hope of a breakthrough in relations badly frayed over wartime forced labor and other issues related to Tokyo's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

The summit with Biden was also seen as an opportunity to deliver South Korea's concerns about the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which is feared to put Korean carmakers at a disadvantage in the American market, and move forward discussions on a potential currency swap deal that could help stabilize financial markets.

What played out, however, was a tug of war between South Korea and Japan over whether the summit would be held at all, with the end result being a 30-minute meeting described by South Korea as "informal talks."

The summit took place suddenly, as the details had been kept under wraps for days, in the form of Yoon visiting the venue of an event hosted by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in New York.

Yoon and Kishida "agreed on the need to improve bilateral relations by resolving pending issues," South Korea's readout of the meeting said. The two agreed to instruct their diplomats to accelerate talks to that end.

Yoon and Kishida also "shared serious concern about North Korea's nuclear program," including its recent legalization of nuclear arms and the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, and "agreed to cooperate closely with the international community to respond to it," according to the readout.

A presidential official hailed the summit as "the first step toward producing tangible results."

"After two years and 10 months, despite the existence of various disputes between South Korea and Japan, the two leaders met and took the first step toward a resolution. That is why it was highly significant," the official told reporters in New York.

Meanwhile, the summit with Biden did not materialize as planned due to scheduling issues caused by the U.S. president's unforeseen attendance at Queen Elizabeth's funeral and U.S. domestic political events, according to Yoon's office.

Instead, the two had three brief encounters, at a reception hosted by King Charles III in London, at a fundraiser hosted by Biden in New York and again at a reception hosted by the U.S. president.

"President Yoon explained our businesses' concerns about the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and asked that the U.S. administration cooperate closely with South Korea in the process of enforcing the IRA so as to resolve our concerns," Yoon's office said in a press release summarizing the three encounters.

"In response, President Biden said he is well aware of our concerns, and that South Korea and the U.S. should continue to hold serious consultations," it added.

On a potential currency swap deal, the presidential office said the two leaders agreed to "cooperate closely to implement liquidity facilities for financial stabilization if needed."

On security issues, they "assessed the consultations under way between South Korea and the U.S. over extended deterrence, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation to deter North Korea's attacks and to come up with joint response plans against North Korea's provocations," it said.

The biggest news of the day, however, emerged after video circulated of Yoon apparently using foul language during the Global Fund's Seventh Replenishment Conference in New York.

In the clip, Yoon could be heard telling aides in vulgar language that it would be embarrassing if the National Assembly did not approve of something unspecified,

It was initially thought that he was referring to Biden's pledge to contribute another US$6 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the embarrassment if Congress refused to endorse it.

Critics at home, including the main opposition Democratic Party, accused Yoon of creating a diplomatic disaster, sending the presidential office scrambling to come up with a plausible explanation.

"He wasn't speaking publicly on the stage but in passing, and although I don't know who recorded it and how, I actually think it should be verified," a senior presidential official told reporters in New York.

"I think it's highly inappropriate to draw a link between private remarks and diplomatic accomplishments," the official added.

Hours later, Yoon's senior secretary for press affairs, Kim Eun-hye, said the president made no mention of Biden and that the actual word he used was the Korean word for "throw out" because he was talking about how he would be embarrassed if the opposition-controlled National Assembly rejected his pledge to contribute $100 million to the Global Fund over the next three years.

The gaffe likely left an indelible stain on the president's trip, which was planned around his mantra of freedom and solidarity, with both concepts featuring prominently in his U.N. speech, and sought to honor the three nations that sent the most troops to fight alongside South Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War.

On his final stop, Yoon visited Canada to hold a summit with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on securing stable supply chains for the production of electric vehicle batteries.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · September 24, 2022

3. 5 takeaways from Biden’s speech to the world

I wonder if President Yoon and President Biden coordinated their remarks.

President Yoon did not mention north Korea. President Biden said the following but did not specifically mention nuclear weapons:

Despite our efforts to begin serious and sustained diplomacy, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to blatantly violate U.N. sanctions.

I think it was smart of both of them not to mention north Korean nuclear weapons. On the other hand some might argue that by not making Kim Jong Un a major focal point of their speeches that it might drive him to act out because he needs the recognition.

Excerpts:

1) All for U.N. and U.N. for all

2) What, no regime change?

3) Don’t forget China

4) A lack of vision for seemingly hopeless conflicts

5) Are we cool with North Korea now?

5 takeaways from Biden’s speech to the world

Politico

Russia loomed large in the president's address, but there were other lines worth paying attention to.

President Joe Biden address the 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Wednesday, Sept. 21, 2022, at U.N. headquarters. | Julia Nikhinson/AP Photo

09/21/2022 02:08 PM EDT

NEW YORK — Leave it to Vladimir Putin to rain on Joe Biden’s parade of nations.

The U.S. president’s speech Wednesday to the United Nations General Assembly was always going to have Russia’s war on Ukraine as its top focus.

But the Russian autocrat’s announcement that he will escalate the war through new troop mobilizations and support for referenda leading to annexations of Ukrainian territory — all delivered alongside a barely veiled nuclear threat — prompted some last-minute tweaks to Biden’s address, according to a senior Biden administration official.

The result was a more pointed rebuke of Putin, who, for what it’s worth, doesn’t seem all that scared of pointed rebukes.

In fairness to Biden, his remarks were not all “Russia, Russia, Russia.” Like his predecessors, the American leader used his U.N. platform to tackle an array of topics, from the importance of stopping climate change to the bravery of Iranian women burning their veils in protest of the regime in Tehran. Still, it was hard for those present to escape the chill emanating from Moscow.

Here are a few thoughts on what Biden said, and what he didn’t.

1) All for U.N. and U.N. for all

One theme that Ukrainian leaders keep hitting this week is the need for seemingly neutral countries — the Indias and South Africas of the world — to take Kyiv’s side in the war with Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy likened it to choosing between “good and evil, light and dark.”

Biden made a similar call but in a more veiled manner. He appealed to other nations to uphold the ideals of the United Nations — the ones that say a country can’t take another’s territory by force. “The U.N. Charter’s very basis of a stable and just rule-based order is under attack,” Biden warned.

It’s a clever tactic. Smaller countries in particular view the United Nations as a venue where they can exercise significant power. Even the tiniest island nation, after all, gets a vote in the General Assembly. And U.N. institutions and legal bodies are places where such countries — which often feel bullied by the great powers, including the United States — can be heard.

But the United States itself doesn’t have the most amazing track record of upholding U.N. standards. It drags its feet on recognizing U.N.-negotiated agreements, invaded a country unprovoked less than 20 years ago and tortured numerous terror suspects, some of whom are still being held without trial. Why should other countries listen to Washington when it comes to the ideals of the United Nations?

2) What, no regime change?

Remember when Biden, apparently unscripted, called for Putin to be toppled? “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power,” the U.S. president said in March. On Wednesday, standing before the world, Biden made no such statement.

It doesn’t mean he doesn’t believe it, and there’s a very strong argument that the war in Ukraine will not truly end so long as Putin remains atop the Kremlin. But the stakes feel even higher now than they did a few months ago. Putin seems rattled by Ukraine’s recent gains on the battlefield. His announcement this week, especially the line that he’s not bluffing about using nuclear weapons, suggests he’d rather fight than back down.

It’s an age-old story if there ever was one: A man refusing to let go of power. But Biden, or at least his speechwriters, may have calculated that poking Putin with a call for regime change wouldn’t be especially helpful right now.

3) Don’t forget China

Memo to Xi Jinping: You may have skipped UNGA this week, but Biden isn’t skipping over you.

The U.S. leader didn’t dwell too much on China and its increasingly powerful leader. In fact, compared to the sections on Russia or climate change, the direct references to Beijing were minimal. Still, Biden’s words were just pointed enough to make clear that, Russia or no Russia, he knows it is China that is the bigger long-term threat to American global dominance.

The trick was to talk about it in a way that didn’t alienate many less-powerful countries who feel like the proverbial grass under two fighting elephants. So Biden, as he has before, framed the rivalry as a contest, not a fight, in which Washington is offering fair partnerships, not a future of economic dependency, to nations watching on the sidelines.

“Let me be direct about the competition between the United States and China,” he said. “As we manage shifting geopolitical trends, the United States will conduct itself as a reasonable leader. We do not seek conflict. We do not seek a Cold War. We do not ask any nation to choose between the United States or any other partner. But the United States will be unabashed in promoting our vision of a free, open, secure and prosperous world.”

4) A lack of vision for seemingly hopeless conflicts

Sometimes it’s as if there’s a mathematical formula to what gets mentioned in a U.S. president’s UNGA speech and how long he dwells on it. That formula: The longer-lasting and more hopeless your conflict seems, the less attention the speech will give it, if it gives it any attention at all.

That’s why, in a matter of just seconds, Biden rapidly ticked off the following: the war in Ethiopia (“We support an African Union-led peace process.”); the crisis in Venezuela (“We urge the Venezuelan-led dialogue and return to free and fair elections.”); the disasters in Haiti (“We continue to stand with our neighbor … We have more to do.”); the war in Yemen (“We’ll continue to back the U.N.-mediated truce.”); and, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (“We will continue to advocate for lasting negotiated peace.”).

And then he moved on.

5) Are we cool with North Korea now?

A few years after then-President Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy” nuclear-armed North Korea during a speech at UNGA, Biden barely mentioned the regime in Pyongyang. He spoke of it glancingly in the context of promoting nuclear non-proliferation, but in mild terms.

Maybe it’s a capacity issue. Biden obviously has plenty of other crises to tackle, including an ongoing war involving a nuclear power. It also could be a reality issue: Nobody seems to have a bright new idea for ending the North Korean nuclear threat, and attempts to restart negotiations appear to have stalled.

Biden may have decided it was better just not to dwell too much on Pyongyang — why provoke it now? But, whether it’s through harsh rhetoric or missile tests, North Korea often seeks attention precisely when it feels ignored.

POLITICO

Politico

4. Can U.S. Navy Drills Deter a North Korean Nuclear Test?

Not likely. It is a policy decision for Kim Jong Un. Does he simply need to test to advance his program or will he use a test for blackmail diplomacy in support of political warfare? The presence of the USS Ronald Raegan will not deter a provocation.  

However, what it does deter is an attack on the South. Our strength and resolve deters war (unless Kim has no choice and is threatened with his survival). But he is always trying to shape the conditions to make military employment more effective - that is why he is trying to split the ROK/US alliance and use exercises as a concession - not because he wants a "security guarantee" but because he wants to weaken military readiness and force US forces off the peninsula.

The deployment of the USS Ronald Reagan shows that Kim Jong Un's political warfare, blackmail diplomacy and war fighting strategies will fail. We will not back down. We will not make concessions, and we will defend South Korea alongside and in support of the ROK military which will defeat the nKPA.

Strategic reassurance. Strategic resolve.

Can U.S. Navy Drills Deter a North Korean Nuclear Test?

The U.S. Navy is flexing its military muscles at sea to reassure South Korea.

The National Interest · by Caleb Larson · September 21, 2022

The U.S. Navy’s Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group will sail to the Korean peninsula at the end of this week and conduct joint exercises with the Korean Navy. The impetus for the exercises? The looming possibility of a North Korean nuclear test.

In a recent statement, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy explained that “by conducting combined drills, the navies of the two countries plan to strengthen their military readiness and demonstrate the firm resolve of the South Korea - U.S. alliance for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”

Earlier this week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks met with South Korean vice minister of national defense Shin Beomchu at the Pentagon to reaffirm the “importance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the mutual commitment to maintaining a strong combined defense posture,” a U.S. Department of Defense statement explained.

The statement added that the two countries also “discussed the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and committed to continuing regional cooperation that upholds a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Although North Korea’s last nuclear weapons test occurred in 2017, Pyongyang has launched an intercontinental ballistic missile with the range to hit the United States, violating an agreement reached in 2018 with former President Donald Trump in which North Korea appeared to pause weapons testing in exchange for a major reduction of joint military exercises with South Korea.

The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group’s deployment comes on the heels of a North Korean parliamentary decision that authorized preemptive nuclear strikes in defense of the North Korean regime.

The U.S. Navy and the South Korean Navy have worked in tandem quite recently. This summer, the Republic of Korea Navy sent naval vessels to participate in the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise.

The world’s largest maritime exercise, the biennial drill involves over twenty countries and focuses on interoperability with the U.S. Navy. In addition to the surface vessels the Republic of Korea Navy sent to the Rim of the Pacific, Seoul also sent several fixed-wing aircraft.

South Korea is investing in its navy in a big way and has signaled its intent to purchase a light aircraft carrier, which would greatly expand Seoul’s ability to launch strikes on North Korea in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula.

The Asian democracy is also preparing for a significant purchase of American F-35 stealth fighters while also going forward with its own indigenous stealth fighter design, which has likely been significantly aided by American technology.

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. Follow him on Twitter @calebmlarson.

Image: Flickr/U.S. Navy.

The National Interest · by Caleb Larson · September 21, 2022

5. The Case for a South Korean Nuclear Bomb

Do not "criminalize the ROK survival instinct." I have spoken with a number of Koreans this week in Seoul who both ask if the US will re-deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and if not, advocate for the ROK to develop its own capability.

On the other hand some of the government officials (military and foriegn affairs) I spoke with seem very confident in the renewed emphasis on extended deterrence.

Excerpts;

Acquiring independent nuclear weapons is a choice of last resort, and it would not be a panacea for all the problems that South Korea faces in security, diplomacy, and unification. It is also not likely that the United States would quickly tolerate Seoul’s nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there is always a nuclear disparity between haves and have-nots, and even the strongest conventionally-armed forces can’t match nuclear weapons. Realistically, South Korean nuclearization is the best means of deterrence and security reassurance for the ROK-U.S. alliance in light of the existential threats posed by North Korea and the PRC. Seoul’s determination to nuclearize itself would address this issue and support America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Peace without strength is crippled. Those who criminalize South Korea’s survival instinct to build its own nuclear arsenal seem to be obsessed with the naïve and weak logic that staying as a non-nuclear free-rider that completely relies on the United States could permanently guarantee East Asian security. Doing so would only put South Korea in a more dangerous position.

The Case for a South Korean Nuclear Bomb

Acquiring independent nuclear weapons is a choice of last resort, and it would not be a panacea for all the problems that South Korea faces in security, diplomacy, and unification.

The National Interest · by Daehan Lee · September 24, 2022

Nuclearization has long been a taboo inside the South Korean government. When analyzing arguments against South Korea’s development of independent nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that they have overlooked or intentionally ignored the security benefits that South Korea would acquire through nuclear arms while exaggerating the risks of intangible losses. It is now questionable whether South Korea should still be shy to raise its voice about nuclear weapons, given the military rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea’s development of advanced weapons of mass destruction, which the United States and the West couldn’t stop. All major arguments against South Korean nuclearization lose their persuasiveness when considering that South Korea could initiate its own nuclear program under the frames of “controlled proliferation” and “conditional nuclearization.”

The NPT and Nuclear Domino Theory

The most common concern about nuclearization is that South Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would bring severe economic sanctions from the UN Security Council. North Korea withdrew from the treaty, but it wasn’t the actual reason why the UN sanctioned Pyongyang. Also, the NPT guarantees signatories the right to exit when their supreme interests are threatened. Thus, the South Korean government can leave the treaty based on the justification that the increase of nuclear threats from North Korea undermines Seoul’s supreme security interests. South Korea can even avoid sanctions, as Seoul would not need public nuclear tests because it already has more developed nuclear technology than North Korea. More importantly, if South Korea suggests it will exit from the treaty, it can send a clear message to the PRC and the North that Seoul is open to all available options, increasing South Korea-U.S. influence over Kim Jong-un’s nuclear arsenal.

It is possible that Washington might oppose South Korean nuclearization at first, but it is likely to accept it to deter both Pyongyang and Beijing. If sanctions are ever imposed on South Korea, a global economic power, for developing its nuclear weapons, they wouldn’t last long if Seoul’s nuclear weapons supported the United States’ efforts to deter the PRC. When India conducted its fifth nuclear test in 1998, U.S.-led sanctions only lasted for three years. Then, when President George Bush visited India in 2005, both states signed a nuclear pact in order to check the PRC. As was the case with India, a democratic state that accepts International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and non-proliferation obligations as a nuclear-armed power can be an exception from the NPT and Washington’s nuclear policy. Democratic South Korea passes this test, and its nuclear armament would eventually serve U.S. interests.

Despite widespread concern, the NPT won’t collapse if South Korea develops nuclear weapons, and an additional “nuclear domino” effect would not occur, as the treaty is in effect despite controversies about AUKUS and an NPT regime that tolerates de facto nuclear-armed states. There has always been concern about proliferation and instability whenever a new nuclear state appears, but proliferation has not surged, and the international order has not collapsed. It is a luxury for non-nuclear South Korea to care about the vested interests of nuclear-armed states when Seoul is still incapable of taking proportional countermeasures against Kim Jong-un’s nuclear threats.

Strictly speaking, the nuclear domino effect has already come to Asia’s Eastern bloc. The two driving factors for this phenomenon are North Korean nuclear weapons—developed with the connivance of the PRC and Russia—and the nuclear imbalance that comes from the lack of equivalent strategic weapons among U.S. allies in East Asia. Countries like South Korea and Japan that need to protect themselves in such an uneven playground should not be held accountable for a nuclear arms race.

Fears that other countries would proliferate if South Korea nuclearized are exaggerated. Most countries do not meet the conditions necessary for nuclear armament because they lack economic power, developed nuclear technology, enriched uranium or plutonium, and nuclear delivery platforms. Since Southeast Asian states are also not economically stable, they are more tempted to position themselves as advanced developing countries, rather than abandoning economic development for nuclear armament. Taiwanese nuclearization is also not realistic given that Taipei faces the PRC. It would be a red line, breaking the “One China” policy and prompting Beijing to take over Taiwan.

South Korean nuclearization would not necessarily be followed by Japanese proliferation, given the very strong anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public, cumulatively fostered by previous nuclear experiences. However, even before the development of North Korean nuclear weapons, Japan acquired dual-use space rockets that could be used as intercontinental ballistic missiles and ready-to-use plutonium. Therefore, Seoul’s nuclear arms would not drive changes to Japan’s national nuclear capacity, which is already complete.

There is a very slight chance that Japan could go nuclear first, but the United States and South Korea should not be wary of this. Even though the ROK-Japan relationship has been influenced by historic and nationalistic animosity, the two states share common democratic values and security interests in deterring both the PRC and North Korea, which the United States supports. If Tokyo decided to support nuclear burden-sharing in the region to impose a siege against Pyongyang and Beijing, Seoul and Washington might have to welcome Japan, or even Australia, to create a collateral security system such as an “Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance,” as nuclearized South Korea itself would still need to cooperate with them to confront Chinese military and economic assertiveness.

Convincing the World

Considering that Europe is so distant from Pyongyang, the European Union (EU) would not care very much about South Korean proliferation and would only express diplomatic concern. Thus, South Korea could elicit the EU’s connivance as long as the West was convinced by the justification that Seoul’s nuclearization could be an effective countermeasure to prepare for Chinese and North Korean nuclear threats. Then, this leaves only the United States as Seoul’s most important partner to persuade. Before long, North Korea’s growing nuclear forces, the PRC’s military rise and acquiescence to Kim’s illegal activities, and South Korea and Japan’s concerns would limit Washington’s options, possibly leading the White House to secretly welcome the nuclearization of its key partner. By agreeing to let the IAEA and the United States monitor Seoul’s nuclear proliferation through a third party, South Korea could still respect the non-proliferation principle and the nuclear control of the White House, addressing the concern that the ROK-U.S. alliance would be weakened in nuclear and security cooperation.

Contrary to common perceptions, eliciting the PRC’s toleration of South Korean nuclear armament is quite simple. If the PRC needs to choose between a non-nuclear South Korea that does not have any option but to accept America’s demands and a nuclear-armed South Korea that can act more flexibly with nuclear leverage, Beijing is likely to prefer the latter based on its wishful thinking that Seoul would continue hedging against the United States.

In addition, the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. influence in the region would not be weakened by South Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it wouldn’t harm the nuclear cartel enjoyed by the great powers. With nearly nine out of ten South Koreans holding a favorable view of the United States, South Korea is well aware of the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Moreover, with hostile states making up more than half of East Asia, friendly relations between the United States and a nuclearized South Korea are essential, which means Washington would be able to tacitly accept Seoul’s nuclear deterrent to check anti-U.S. states in the region.

Extended Deterrence and Cost-efficiency

Some still contend that improved extended deterrence through NATO-style nuclear sharing or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is a solution. However, the need for U.S. authorization for nuclear use would make such solutions symbolic and would not bring nuclear parity. Also, American nuclear weapons in the region would only provoke Beijing and Pyongyang to backlash against the consolidation of U.S. influence, and they would not see South Korea as a nuclear-armed state. It is notable that the PRC economically retaliated against South Korea for deploying the U.S. THAAD air-defense system but did not move when Seoul revealed new ballistic missiles. Thus, a nuclear umbrella is an outdated stopgap measure that was effective only when North Korea was in the early phase of its nuclear program. It provides temporary deterrence and cannot be a permanent security solution for the nuclear standoff in the Korean Peninsula.

Regrettably, the United States has publicly pledged to consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of itself and its allies. But even the recent high-level deterrence dialogue failed to clarify what its declared “overwhelming and decisive” response to a nuclear strike would be. There has never been a clear or documented standard that defines when and how nuclear retaliation would be immediately executed.

In terms of budget concerns, nuclear development and maintenance costs are not astronomical. Considering the political message and deterrence provided by nuclear arms, nuclearization is a much cheaper strategic asset than conventional forces, as South Korea has already acquired the ground-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and fighter bombers necessary for the nuclear triad. South Korea’s well-established safety management of nuclear facilities has also provided ample technical experience. Additionally, as the purpose of South Korean nuclear development would be to deter the neighboring Eastern bloc, it would not necessitate long-range ballistic missiles or costly strategic bombers.

Also, given that Seoul allocates a defense budget of $46 billion to defend against North Korean threats and North Korea has spent only $642 million for its nuclear program, industrialized South Korea possesses economic and defense technological capabilities that would allow it to nuclearize for considerably less than it has spent on conventional arms. As a result, a nuclear arsenal is essential for a financially sound and efficient defense.

The Nuclear Strategic Difference

Another concern raised by advocates for non-proliferation is that South Korea would face counterattacks from the East Asia bloc, which geographically dominates Northeast Asia and possesses an overwhelming number of nuclear weapons. However, as nuclear confrontation puts players in a “kill or be killed” situation, the classic law of mutually-assured destruction, which has prevented nuclear war for decades, is valid in the case of South Korea. If a nuclear arsenal does not hold any strategic or tactical meaning, as idealists argue, why does the United States provide nuclear deterrence capabilities to its NATO allies and why has this prevented wars?

As everyone understands, a nuclear-armed South Korea would not use its destructive strategic weapons as a means of sending aggressive messages to intimidate the PRC or the North. Sending polished and managed messages, even to hostile neighbors, is the standard operating procedure in a normal, democratic government. Seoul is aware that Kim’s frequent nuclear blackmail and bellicose rhetoric cause blowback and that the purpose of South Korean nuclear weapons would be to hold leverage through a defensive posture. The isolation that Pyongyang has imposed on itself can happen to Seoul only if South Korea has no grand nuclear strategy, not because of justified nuclear stockpiles.

The criticism that South Korean nuclearization would justify the North’s nuclear arsenal is logically flawed. A proportional response to a first strike or an imminent threat from an opponent does not justify the first mover’s misbehavior, and such a counteraction falls under the category of self-defense. If South Korea maintained its firm stance on denuclearization and Kim respected it, then there would be no reason for Seoul to acquire nukes. Since North Korea seeks to advance its nuclear arsenal for the regime’s survival by adopting a nuclear first-use doctrine and refusing to denuclearize, it is not a reasonable choice for Seoul to stick to a one-sided denuclearization principle.

Acquiring independent nuclear weapons is a choice of last resort, and it would not be a panacea for all the problems that South Korea faces in security, diplomacy, and unification. It is also not likely that the United States would quickly tolerate Seoul’s nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there is always a nuclear disparity between haves and have-nots, and even the strongest conventionally-armed forces can’t match nuclear weapons. Realistically, South Korean nuclearization is the best means of deterrence and security reassurance for the ROK-U.S. alliance in light of the existential threats posed by North Korea and the PRC. Seoul’s determination to nuclearize itself would address this issue and support America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Peace without strength is crippled. Those who criminalize South Korea’s survival instinct to build its own nuclear arsenal seem to be obsessed with the naïve and weak logic that staying as a non-nuclear free-rider that completely relies on the United States could permanently guarantee East Asian security. Doing so would only put South Korea in a more dangerous position.

Daehan Lee is a political and security affairs researcher regularly writing for Defense News and Naval News. He previously worked for the U.S. and Belgian embassies in Seoul, the People Power Party, and election camps. Lee also served as a translator for the Republic of Korea Navy. His interests are Asia-Pacific security, (non)proliferation, defense acquisition, South Korean politics, and foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter @DaehanKorea and connect on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Daehan Lee · September 24, 2022

6. Korea-US-Japan top diplomats: DPRK’s legislation effort for nuclear weapons use is a grave concern

Yes it is a grave concern because Kim may in effect be cutting off any chance of diplomacy and negotiations unless we acquiesce and accept the north as a nuclear armed state.

I wonder if this is an effort to drive the ROK and US into an arms control negotiation process which is what Kim wants and a number of pundits have long advocated.

Korea-US-Japan top diplomats: DPRK’s legislation effort for nuclear weapons use is a grave concern

donga.com

Posted September. 24, 2022 07:25,

Updated September. 24, 2022 07:25

Korea-US-Japan top diplomats: DPRK’s legislation effort for nuclear weapons use is a grave concern. September. 24, 2022 07:25. journari@donga.com,chaewani@donga.com.

South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin had a trilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi on Thursday in New York. They reaffirmed that North Korea’s nuclear tests should be met with a strong and resolute response from the international community. In addition, they discussed ways to strengthen the trilateral cooperation to address pending issues on economic security including reorganizing supply chains.

In the joint statement among the three countries, “The Foreign Ministers and Secretary condemned North Korea’s numerous ballistic missile launches this year, each of which violated multiple UN Security Council resolutions and posed a serious threat to the region.” In addition, they reaffirmed that a North Korean nuclear test would be met with a strong and resolute response from the international community. Furthermore, they also “expressed their serious concern over the North’s escalatory and destabilizing messaging related to nuclear weapons use, including its adoption of a new law on nuclear policy.”

This is their warning message to North Korea for increasing the level of nuclear threats against South Korea as the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that its parliament legislated a new law related to nuclear forces. Secretary Blinken reaffirmed the U.S.’s steadfast commitments to the defense of South Korea and Japan. They stressed the importance of serious and sustained dialogue and urged North Korea to return to negotiations

They also reaffirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation in promoting prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world. They agreed to work closely together to respond to crises on economic security amid mounting new challenges including reorganizing supply chains and competition for achieving cutting-edge technologies. The joint statement used the phrase “strengthen the rules-based economic order” to clearly state their determination to keep China in check.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Park expressed South Korea’s concerns over the Inflation Reduction Act and told Secretary Blinken that discriminatory factors should be resolved through the spirit of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Secretary Blinken told Minister Park that the U.S. is well aware of the concerns and effective solutions to this could be found through mutual cooperation.

한국어

donga.com

7. S.Korea Gets Behind UN's N.Korea Resolution Again

Very important. This is good to see. It is absolutely necessary for a human rights upfront approach. However, I remain disappointed and concerned that the Yoon administration would ask escapees to not send information into the north. We need to remember that the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry noted one of the many human rights abuses is the forced isolation of the Korean people in the north and the UN called on the international community to get information into the north. That effort should be led by the South. 

S.Korea Gets Behind UN's N.Korea Resolution Again

english.chosun.com

September 23, 2022 13:31

South Korea will co-sponsor UN's semi-annual resolution condemning North Korea's human rights abuses for the first time in four years.

The previous administration pointedly refrained from taking any leading role in the forlorn hope of appeasing the renegade North.

A government official on Thursday said, "It is very important for President Yoon Suk-yeol to condemn crimes against human rights in North Korea and urge the regime to make improvements as he values freedom, democracy and human rights."

The resolution is being drafted by the EU, which aims to have it ready by the end of October. It is expected to be adopted for the 18th consecutive year by the UN General Assembly at the end of the year.

The international community has welcomed South Korea's return as a co-sponsor.

"Demonstrating international unity is critical in urging [North Korea] to respect and protect human rights. We would, therefore, welcome co-sponsorship of the resolution by as many UN member states as possible," including South Korea, the EU said Wednesday.

In addition to expressing concerns over systematic and serious human rights violations in the North, the resolution calls for their immediate cessation and access for humanitarian organizations.

S.Korea Declines to Sponsor UN's N.Korea Rights Resolution

N.Korea's Army Minister Blacklisted for Rights Abuses

EU Sanctions N.Korean Officials over Human Rights Abuses

• Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com

8.  Joint Chiefs of Staff "North Korea launches unknown ballistic missile into East Sea"

This is an initial report in the Korean language media. No reporting in English yet.

[1 report] Joint Chiefs of Staff "North Korea launches unknown ballistic missile into East Sea"

2022-09-25 06:59

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Report on KakaoTalk okjebo

https://m.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220925003700504

9. Strengthening Integrated Air and Missile Defense for the Japan-US Alliance

South Korea needs to get onboard with this. We need trilateral integrated missile defense.

China fears this (along with a trilateral alliance even more).

Excerpt:

The Japan-U.S. alliance has made steady and incremental progress toward preparing for future crises and contingencies. However, with the current and future threat advancement, preparing to go it alone on IAMD is not truly viable for either country. Therefore, concrete actions should be taken without delay, including substantive changes to the Japan-U.S. alliance posture and presence for IAMD (including counterstrike) and other capabilities. These actions must focus on immediate steps to enhance comprehensive IAMD, C2, and other capabilities with Japan, which remains the United States’ most important and capable ally in the Indo-Pacific while living under the constant threat of PLA missiles.

Strengthening Integrated Air and Missile Defense for the Japan-US Alliance

The Japan-U.S. alliance has made steady and incremental progress toward preparing for future crises and contingencies. More needs to be done.

By Carl Rehberg, Chris Bassler , and Herbert Kemp

September 23, 2022

thediplomat.com · by Carl Rehberg · September 23, 2022

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The risk of potential conflict in East Asia is increasing, and the Japan-U.S. alliance must be ready to defend against attacks from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese missiles launched in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan highlight the need for Japan-U.S. alliance actions such as expanded integration of alliance integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems.

Over the course of decades, the PLA has fielded a complex array of air and missile threats against Japanese and U.S. forces in Japan and increased their range to now extend along the first and second island chains in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA is developing and fielding more and more capabilities to launch complex salvo attacks consisting of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including swarms of small UAS.

China recently stoked tensions with a mock blockade of Taiwan, and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) unleashed a barrage of missiles into the waters around Taiwan and Japan. For the first time, Chinese missiles landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ). With the continued erosion of the security situation with China, the United States and Japan have recently discussed counterstrike and long-range missiles. Additionally, the alliance should establish two standing combined joint task forces (CJTFs) — a Japanese-led one for alliance IAMD of the main Japanese islands and an American-led one for the multi-domain combined force in the geographic area around Okinawa, the Southwest (or Ryukyu) islands, and the second island chain. These two CJTFs could be the cornerstones of new combined “sword and shield” efforts for the alliance.

Alliance efforts to enhance IAMD date back to 1985, when Japan signed a license agreement to produce the Patriot PAC-2 missiles to replace Nike-J missiles. Over the last two decades, Japan has made great strides in advancing its missile defense capabilities. Nevertheless, these efforts have not kept pace with the PLA’s growing capability to launch large salvos of complex threats coming from multiple directions in the Western Pacific. Standard materiel approaches to enhance IAMD — with new systems, better missiles, new command centers, and more of all of them — will not be enough for either Japan or the United States. IAMD must be layered, comprehensive, resilient, and distributed.

When it comes to salvo threats and complicated threats, eliminating single points of failure is the sine qua non of effectiveness. Comprehensive IAMD includes multiple effectors (e.g. kinetic and non-kinetic, such as directed energy weapons) for weapon-target pairing and the ability to discriminate threats and determine when engagement is necessary. Layered IAMD includes multiple rings of defense. As an example, one could have an outer ring (e.g. long-range surface-to-air missiles or SAMs), an inner ring (e.g. medium-range SAMs), and a close-in ring for terminal engagements (e.g. short-range air defense or SHORAD systems).

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A holistic vision of IAMD should consider four broad elements: 1) left of launch; 2) active defenses, 3) passive defenses, and 4) offensive counterair (OCA) attack operations, or retaliatory strike (or, in Japan’s nomenclature, counterstrike). “Left of launch” and counterstrike efforts include capabilities to prevent hostile missile launches through delay, degradation, or denial of an enemy’s ability to launch threats. Active defense defeats an adversary’s aircraft or missiles after an attack is launched, which is the most common conceptualization of IAMD. Passive defenses use hardening (both physical and cyber) to boost survivability of aircraft, IAMD systems, munitions stockpiles, and personnel shelters, coupled with early warning about incoming attacks. This allows forces to avoid damage through dispersal with the U.S. Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO); minimize damage (through camouflage, concealment, and deception); and rapidly recover through runway and other repairs. Counterstrike capabilities are intended to limit or prevent attacks by degrading or eliminating adversary “shooters.” These “shooters” include ground-based missile forces, aircraft, ships, or submarines, all of which launch weapons that represent air and missile threats to Japan and U.S. forces in Japan. To provide options against the growing array of threats, all four IAMD elements must be integrated both within and across the alliance for synergy and effectiveness.

Japan’s geography means that it cannot avoid confronting the growing array of PLA threats. Japan is near China’s doorstep with thousands of PLA missiles at the ready. However, more than any other U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has made significant progress with its IAMD capabilities. Japan’s integrated air and missile defense systems comprise capabilities from all three of Japan’s armed forces, including sea-based long-range missile defenses, airborne interceptor aircraft, and ground-based missile defenses, all of which are integrated into a single command and control battle management and communications (C2BMC) architecture coordinated by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF).

The current ballistic missile defense (BMD) consists of two layers – the outer layer comprises Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Aegis-equipped destroyers, while the inner layer comprises some 28 fire units of JASDF Patriot PAC-3MSEs. In addition, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force has cruise missile defense with Chu-SAMs (Type 03) and advanced (modified) Chu-SAMs and some point defense with Tan-SAMs (Type 81). The JASDF also has the new Kichi-Bouku (KB) or Type 11 SAMs for point defense.

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In addition to its land-based surveillance capabilities and interceptor capabilities, Japan also has the ability to extend its radar detection ranges and its missile intercept capabilities westward over the East China Sea. Beyond JMSDF ships, Japan’s E-767 AWACS and E-2C/D aircraft are available to extend airborne surveillance forward for the detection of hostile aircraft and missiles. Further, surface surveillance will also be enhanced with the addition of three RQ-4B aircraft and some RC-2 SIGINT aircraft that will complement the radar surveillance of the E-767 aircraft.

Even with these sophisticated capabilities against ballistic missiles, the Japan-U.S. alliance needs to develop layered, comprehensive, and distributed IAMD concepts, especially focused on non-ballistic missile threats, including UAS, swarms of small UAS, and cruise missiles. Advances in critical technologies, especially high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwaves (HPMs), guided projectiles, as well as electronic warfare (EW), and other non-kinetic capabilities across all the layers, promise to provide vastly enhanced magazine depth to engage and defeat large numbers of threats. These technologies could be fielded from Japanese advancements, as well as through the deployment of systems with these capabilities to U.S. forces in Japan.

In response to the growing threat from China, the U.S. and Japan should work on three major priorities to enhance alliance capabilities. First, the alliance should develop a new “Defend Tonight” approach by establishing a new Japan-U.S. IAMD standing CJTF in Japan. Each of the military service branches for the U.S. and Japan should move from stove-piped peace-time command structures toward a specific Japan-U.S. combined command that comprises the units, organizations, and headquarters required for a standing, ready, and operational Japan-U.S. IAMD capability for the defense of Japan and U.S. forces in Japan. This new Japan-led standing CJTF should be focused on IAMD and its four critical elements. This “Defend Tonight” approach will also require a different mix of U.S. personnel (e.g. more counterstrike, space, and IAMD personnel) in the main islands of Japan and changes to posture and presence, accompanied by regular exercises of integrated Japan-U.S. IAMD systems and supporting capabilities.

Second, the alliance should upgrade the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base into an alliance Combined All-Domain Operations Center (CADOC) that would include a Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Command and Control Center. The development of a fully operational CADOC would provide the capability for command and control of both defensive operations and carefully calibrated counterstrike operations as appropriate. Using and fusing Japanese and U.S. sensor data would provide both direct sensing and warning capabilities as well as access to over-the-horizon sensor data.

Third, the alliance should develop a “Fight Tonight” approach for Okinawa and the Southwest Islands and U.S. forces in the second island chain, including Guam. Central to this approach is establishing a new standing Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) for Okinawa with the necessary new standing All Domain Operations Centers (ADOCs). The new operations centers would share data in real-time with the CADOC at Yokota and other key command and control resources. This new U.S.-led alliance CJTF model will require a different mix of personnel than are currently based in Okinawa and the Southwest Islands, with changes to the current force structure, laydown, and posture resiliency of all forces. This model could follow many of the critical principles and logic already seen in the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s “Fight Tonight” construct with North Korea, but applied to the Japan-U.S. alliance, with a primary focus on counterstrike or retaliation against attacks from China and North Korea, and critical scenarios in close geographic proximity (e.g. Taiwan or the East China Sea).

As early as 2016, CSIS recommended a maritime-focused CJTF. However, we believe this standing Japan-U.S. CJTF needs to go beyond only the maritime domain to include all domains and focus on the defense of the geographic area. As a start, there could be combined standing coordination cells that can further mature and evolve more rapidly into full CJTFs during contingencies or wartime.

Historically, the United States has only accomplished modest goals toward integrating IAMD capabilities with allies. For the above-proposed initiatives, we assume that for now, under the current Japanese constitutional interpretations, the overall JSDF and U.S. military command and control structures would remain parallel, while using the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). The ACM strengthens Japan-U.S. alliance coordination in several areas (such as the BJOCC), but so far lacks deepened integration necessary for rapid response to future threats.

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The Japan-U.S. alliance has made steady and incremental progress toward preparing for future crises and contingencies. However, with the current and future threat advancement, preparing to go it alone on IAMD is not truly viable for either country. Therefore, concrete actions should be taken without delay, including substantive changes to the Japan-U.S. alliance posture and presence for IAMD (including counterstrike) and other capabilities. These actions must focus on immediate steps to enhance comprehensive IAMD, C2, and other capabilities with Japan, which remains the United States’ most important and capable ally in the Indo-Pacific while living under the constant threat of PLA missiles.

The article is based on an upcoming monograph, titled “Strengthen the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific.”

thediplomat.com · by Carl Rehberg · September 23, 2022

10. Yoon and Kishida meeting not a summit – but a start

Small victory. Baby step forward. A key point is in the subtitle – "outside right wing circles"

Yoon and Kishida meeting not a summit – but a start

Outside rightwing circles, many Japanese favor a compromise and are critical of Kishida’s cautious approach

asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · September 24, 2022

The meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on September 21 was notable mainly for the fact that it took place.

It was a brief exchange – some 30 minutes – taking place on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. The two governments could not even agree on how to describe the talks – the Japanese terming it a “chat” and the Koreans a “meeting.” According to an account in the Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun, President Yoon did most of the talking and, substantively, the two leaders could only agree in principle on the need to repair the tattered ties between Korea and Japan.

Nonetheless, this meeting was a minor breakthrough. It has been almost three years since Korean and Japanese leaders met face to face. Since the South Korean presidential election, bringing into office a conservative administration pledged to reverse the downturn in relations, there has been an intensifying pace of contacts between the two governments. The two foreign ministers have held substantive talks in Japan, and again in New York prior to the meeting of the two leaders.

But there is no substitute for establishing personal contact at the leadership level.

On a strategic level, both Korea and Japan have drawn closer, sharing broad agreement on how to handle the North Korean threat, on the response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and on an Indo-Pacific regional framework defined by common values of democracy and rule of law.

In this, they are aligned with the Biden administration which has pushed at every opportunity, including in New York, the importance of trilateral cooperation.

True trilateral cooperation, even with the strategic imperatives, depends on resolving the profound disputes over wartime history and justice.

The nosedive reflected the decision of the previous Korean government of Moon Jae-in to effectively dismantle the 2015 agreement on compensation and apology for the Korean women forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese Imperial Army, the so-called ‘comfort women.’ This was further complicated by the decision of Korean courts to compel Japanese companies to compensate Korean forced labor used during the wartime period.

The sword of Damocles now hanging over the efforts by President Yoon to normalize ties is a pending decision by Korean courts to seize the assets of the Japanese firms in Korea to pay compensation. The Japanese government has made it clear that such a move would bring relations to a virtual freeze. It insists that this issue was resolved by the 1965 treaty on normalization of relations and the accompanying agreement on settlement of claims which provided loans and grants to Korea, tied to compensation for forced laborers.

Korean forced laborers. Photo: University of Leicester staff blogs

The Japanese government’s position has been to demand that South Korea make a proposal based on the 1965 agreement and effectively block the seizure of assets.

President Yoon came into office prepared to take those steps, including reaffirming the 1965 agreement and pressing the courts not to move ahead on the asset seizure order. The Yoon administration created an advisory panel earlier this summer, including outside experts and representatives of the laborers who filed suit, with the aim of coming up with fresh ideas.

The panel has met four times, so far with no clear outcome. It has been stalled mostly on the insistence of the victims that Japanese firms demonstrate remorse, at least with some symbolic payments. One idea that the Korean government has been pursuing is the creation of a compensation fund, initially funded by Korean firms that received money from the original 1965 agreement, such as the steel firm Posco, an engine of Korean industrialization fueled by Japanese funding.

There has been serious discussion, perhaps even preliminary negotiation, at the foreign ministry level. Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa seem to be working hard to find a formula that satisfies both sides.

What is missing, so far, is political leadership at the highest level. Both leaders face considerable opposition at home to efforts to improve relations.

President Yoon was assailed for seeming to be overeager to hold the New York meeting, with the opposition Democratic Party and progressive media assailing him for “humiliating diplomacy.”

Prime Minister Kishida was clearly reluctant even to hold a brief meeting. He reportedly was irritated by the Korean government’s premature announcement of a summit, but he also faces resistance from Japanese conservatives to any compromise.

Both Yoon and Kishida have limited political maneuvering room. For domestic reasons in both cases, their popularity ratings have plummeted.

Yoon is dealing with a series of missteps managing domestic and foreign policy, once seen as his strong suit, and complaints about his political style.

Kishida has been hammered by the controversy surrounding revelations of close ties between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Unification Church, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo due to his ties to that organization. The decision to hold a state funeral for Abe is also unpopular.

Despite these constraints, there is a pathway out of this apparent impasse. It is possible to imagine an agreement on forced labor – and it must involve not only Korean concessions but also Japanese movement, in the form of giving Japanese companies free rein to contribute to a compensation fund. That can then form the basis for a true summit later this year, perhaps when the two leaders will attend regional gatherings.

Outside of Japanese rightwing circles, there is considerable opinion in Japan favoring a compromise and critical of Kishida’s cautious approach so far, which has only made Yoon’s efforts more difficult.

“It would not be a good idea to drive the Yoon administration into a corner as it tries to work out a ROK-led resolution to the issue,” the business daily Nihon Keizai Shimbun editorialized on September 23.

“The two leaders should not allow their domestic political calculations and motivations to dictate their policies for dealing with the relationship,” admonished the Asahi Shimbun.

And there is some small evidence that the brief encounter in New York – however it is described – may have had some impact. According to the Asahi, Kishida told aides after the meeting: “They showed that they are willing to resolve the issues. We will have to see what they can come up with in the future.”

For Koreans, the shoe is largely on the Japanese feet. “We urge Japan to face up to its history squarely and reflect on its wartime atrocities,” the Korea Times opined.

The next few months are an opportunity for leadership – or its failure.

Daniel Sneider is a lecturer in East Asian studies and international policy at Stanford University and a Korea Economic Instiutute non-resident distinguished fellow. This article originally appeared on The Peninsula blog of KEI and is republished with permission. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · September 24, 2022

11. Did Russian pride nix North Korea arms deal?

If the Russians killed the deal because it was exposed by US intelligence, then we should understand the value of exposing and attacking the enemy's strategy.

​Excerpts:

Still, it seems likely that the highly militarized nation maintains a vast supply of usable munitions. If North Korea did supply Russia, Western intelligence could – very feasibly – identify it. But short of unlikely covert action, the West would be powerless to prevent its shipment.

Politically, both Moscow and Pyongyang are well-practiced at sanctions resistance. Geographically, direct cross-border rail lines link northeastern North Korea to the Russian Far East. From there, lines run onto the Trans-Siberian Express, from which supplies can be conveyed to European Russia and into the battlespace.

This trans-Eurasia land route invalidates the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – a low-profile, US-led multinational naval force that monitors and sometimes interdicts North Korean shipping on the high seas.

Currently in Russia, the nascent call-up of 300,000 reservists – who are likely unfit, of questionable motivation and certainly unformed into units – looks like a desperate ploy given how roughly Russia’s professional warriors have been handled in Ukraine.

All these factors argue for a potential resurrection of the North Korean arms deal, if Russia’s emergency attempt to regain battlefield traction fails. It would provide a lifeline for Russia, a win for North Korea and would showcase Western impotence.

“There is nothing that could prevent it,” Go, the Seoul-based analyst said. “And for North Korea, it would become a source of prestige.”​

Did Russian pride nix North Korea arms deal?

Militarily-isolated Moscow may have killed deal when revealed by US but if policy changes the West would be powerless to stop it

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · September 23, 2022

SEOUL – North Korea has indignantly refuted a widely-reported US intelligence analysis alleging that it is engaged in supplying Russia with artillery ammunition.

“We have never exported weapons or ammunition to Russia before and we will not plan to export them,” an unnamed vice director general within Pyongyang’s General Bureau of Equipment said via the Korean Central News Agency, as monitored in Seoul yesterday.

“We condemn the US for thoughtlessly circulating the rumor against [North Korea] to pursue its base political and military aim,” the unnamed source in the statement said.

Still, there is no question that isolated North Korea has used the Ukraine war to edge closer to Russia. And since unleashing its invasion in February, Russia is experiencing the kind of international isolation and widespread condemnation of which North Korea is very, very familiar.

These factors argue for the veracity of the US report – though, of course, it is possible the US analysis was plain wrong. It is also possible that Pyongyang’s response is disinformation.

However, there is a third possibility: Despite its dire situation in Ukraine, Russia felt compelled to withdraw from the deal once it was uncovered and revealed by US intelligence.

Expanding ties vs Russian pride

Since the war erupted in February, Pyongyang has supported Russia with media statements and in global fora, notably by recognizing the breakaway republics in Donbas in July – the third nation to do so after Russia and Syria.

It also used joint Chinese-Russian air drills in Northeast Asia as cover to test-launch ballistic missiles in both March and May, raising the possibility that trilateral cooperation may, feasibly, be underway.

Russian officials have hinted at importing North Korean laborers to help rebuild the Donbas republics – and military pundits have even suggested they could join the fight on the frontlines.

The latter seems highly unlikely, though, given North Korea’s minimal recent experience in expeditionary combat and its army’s near total lack of interoperability training with external forces in recent years.

Yet North Korea has won some payback for its support for Russia’s “special military operation.”

North Korean rockets may or may not have been headed for Russia. Photo: iStock

In May, Moscow, together with Beijing, vetoed a US draft resolution to add further sanctions on North Korea at the UN Security Council for its heavy program of missile testing – cracking prior unity in the UNSC.

And as North Korea is chronically undersupplied with energy, a barter trade of arms and ammunition for oil or gas from the Russian Far East would make sense for both sides.

These factors underpin the US intelligence analysis from earlier this month, which has been widely covered by global media, with a US State Department claim that Moscow was in the process of buying “millions of rockets and artillery shells” from Pyongyang.

So were the Americans wrong? Or is North Korea spreading disinformation?

One analyst told Asia Times that he reckons a trade was, in fact, in place – but Russia was compelled to back out.

“What happened in my view is that Russia got cold feet,” said Go Myong-hyun, an analyst with the Seoul-based think tank the Asan Institute. “I think Russia wanted to conduct this trade secretly and the reason is obvious: The sanctions that prevent North Korea from selling arms to any other country in the world were agreed to by Russia.”

Moscow enjoys global permanent membership of the UN Security Council – a position that many anti-Russia voices are now questioning amid the Ukraine War.

“I think Russia takes its position on the UNSC seriously and does not want to give the impression that it is undermining it,” Go continued. “That would strengthen the voices demanding Russia’s expulsion from it, so when it was revealed that the US learned about it, it compelled Russia to rescind the trade.”

Another negative for Moscow would be, in Go’s words, “bad optics” for its own public: That mighty Russia is turning for help to decrepit North Korea.

“North Korea has had a very bad reputation inside Russia – it is seen as a crazy Oriental dictatorship – for decades,” Andrei Lankov, a Russian-born North Korean expert who teaches at Seoul’s Kookmin University told Asia Times in August. “It is a kind of symbol of everything which can go wrong about a country.”

Conversely, any sale to Russia would, for the same reason, elevate North Korea’s stature.

“The sale would strengthen North Korea’s position as a client state that is not at the mercy of China or Russia – Russia would become a peer,” Go said. “And [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un has been pushing for the idea that North Korea, China and Russia should work together and it wants to be part of this emergent bloc of authoritarian Eurasian states.”

Go added, “If this trade had happened, it would have strengthened the case for North Korea being part of a bloc with China and Russia.”

The statement by the North Korean quartermaster branch does hold some possibility of a u-turn.

“Not only the development, production, possession of military equipment, but also their export and import are the lawful right peculiar to a sovereign state,” the KCNA report read. “We have never recognized the UN Security Council unlawful ‘sanctions resolution’ against the DPRK, which was cooked up by the US and its vassal forces.”

A North Korean propaganda poster. The country is using the Ukraine war to try and edge closer to an embattled Russia. Photo: AFP / Eric Lafforgue / Hans Lucas

Isolated and under-manned

Regardless of Pyongyang’s stance, all indications are that Russia is in dire need of any help it can get.

Traditionally close Russian ally Belarus has declined to join the hostilities, Kakazhstan has spoken up against the invasion and Uzbekistan has ordered its citizens not to volunteer for the war. Early rumors that Syrian and African volunteers might join the fight were misplaced.

Moreover, no proof has emerged that Russia’s economically powerful senior partner China is dispatching weaponry to Moscow. Thus far, the only evidence of third-party military aid – in the form of reported Ukrainian shootdowns – is of Iranian drones.

Meanwhile, the situation facing Moscow’s high command on maps and manpower tables is dire. In what has been an up-and-down war, Russia’s fortunes in Ukraine are currently at their lowest ebb.

Russian troops have, it is true, bounced back from previous defeats. In the first phase of the war, unable to besiege Kiev, Russian troops were forced to retreat from the north. In the south, the Russian Navy was pushed back from Ukraine’s littoral.

Yet Russia still won a grim, hard-fought battle for Mariupol in the south and conducted a slow, but largely successful offensive in the Donbas in the east. Now, though, its degraded forces appear to have surrendered the operational initiative across Ukraine.

They have been terribly mauled. Official figures made public this week, of almost 6,000 dead, suggest, given modern dead-wounded ratios that its total casualties are, at a minimum, 66,000. That is crippling for a force of around 200,000 strong.

And they are on the back foot. Russia has lost thousands of square kilometers, strategic cities and vital supply lines to a surprise Ukrainian counteroffensive in the northeast, close to the Russian border and Luhansk. It is holding firm, but on the defensive, around Kherson in the south.

Seven months after Kiev astutely ordered a general mobilization, Moscow this week finally ordered a partial mobilization. That is a long-overdue acknowledgment that its vaunted professional military is under-strength.

Now, ammunition to feed Russia’s ravenous artillery is particularly vital.

Russia’s expedition was weak in infantry from the start and poor tactical deployments saw its once-feared armored arm decimated. It has since failed to conduct any of the deep-penetration maneuver operations Russia’s forces are famed for.

Finally, the Russia Air Force’s close-air support arm has proven to be a surprise under-performer.

In the face of these setbacks, Russia has turned to its traditionally powerful artillery arm to lead the battle. That proved formidable in Mariupol and Donbas, but now even this superiority is eroded.

While Russia retains massed, frontline, “dumb” artillery, Ukraine is using smaller stocks of long-range, networked “smart” artillery and rocket systems to take out enemy ammo dumps.

This would explain why Russia needs ammunition for its big guns and rocket launchers – and why North Korea could assist.

A burning Russian tank is emblematic of the problems Moscow is facing in its war in Ukraine, where its undermanned forces have lost the initiative. Photo: war.ukraine.ua

Korea supply, Eurasian routes, Western impotence

North Korea is armed with Warsaw Pact heritage equipment. Granted, the country’s creative arms industry has tweaked and upgraded this kit, adding range to tube artillery and building a formidable tactical and strategic missile force from older designs.

But most of its massed artillery uses the same calibers and propellants as Russia’s armed forces. Interoperable systems include Grad rocket launchers, 152mm howitzers, 122mm howitzers and 120mm mortars, a German report notes.

Pundits have questioned the maintenance and stability of North Korea’s ammo stockpile given that some three-quarters of the projectiles fired during a brief but intense artillery duel on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 failed to hit their target.

Still, it seems likely that the highly militarized nation maintains a vast supply of usable munitions. If North Korea did supply Russia, Western intelligence could – very feasibly – identify it. But short of unlikely covert action, the West would be powerless to prevent its shipment.

Politically, both Moscow and Pyongyang are well-practiced at sanctions resistance. Geographically, direct cross-border rail lines link northeastern North Korea to the Russian Far East. From there, lines run onto the Trans-Siberian Express, from which supplies can be conveyed to European Russia and into the battlespace.

This trans-Eurasia land route invalidates the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – a low-profile, US-led multinational naval force that monitors and sometimes interdicts North Korean shipping on the high seas.

Currently in Russia, the nascent call-up of 300,000 reservists – who are likely unfit, of questionable motivation and certainly unformed into units – looks like a desperate ploy given how roughly Russia’s professional warriors have been handled in Ukraine.

All these factors argue for a potential resurrection of the North Korean arms deal, if Russia’s emergency attempt to regain battlefield traction fails. It would provide a lifeline for Russia, a win for North Korea and would showcase Western impotence.

“There is nothing that could prevent it,” Go, the Seoul-based analyst said. “And for North Korea, it would become a source of prestige.”

Follow this writer on Twitter @ASalmonSeoul

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · September 23, 2022

12. When 'Macho Man' met 'Mr. Status quo' (Yoon- Kishida)

When 'Macho Man' met 'Mr. Status quo'

The Korea Times · September 23, 2022

From left, Bill Gates, Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President Joe Biden, Connie Mudenda (RED) ambassador, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Global Fund Executive Director Peter Sands pose for a photo during the Global Fund's Seventh Replenishment Conference, Wednesday, in New York. AP-Yonhap

Korea touts Yoon-Kishida meeting as 'summit,' while Japan downplays it as 'informal talks'

By Kang Hyun-kyung

There was much back and forth between South Korea and Japan up until the moment their leaders actually met in New York on Wednesday (local time) for a meeting.

Days before President Yoon Suk-yeol's second official overseas trip to three nations ― namely Great Britain, the United States and Canada_ since he was inaugurated on May 10, the presidential office told reporters in a confident tone that Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida would meet on the sidelines of their speeches at the U.N. Kim Tae-hyo, deputy director of the National Security Office, emphasized that the two leaders happily agreed to meet during their visits in New York.

Soon, Japanese media outlets released information about the Yoon-Kishida meeting that was not consistent with what South Korean reporters were told. "Nothing has been confirmed yet," Japanese media reported, citing Japan's powerful chief cabinet secretary.

The prospects for a much-anticipated summit had been foggy up until Yoon and Kishida eventually met Wednesday, because the two sides released contradictory information.

It was early Thursday morning (KST) when the Korean media learned that the meeting was indeed being held, as the presidential office confirmed it in a text message sent to the reporters.

"The South Korea-Japan summit has started just now. Journalists are good to report about the event immediately," it read.

The two sides are still in a tug of war even after the event. Now, they are poles apart regarding what to call the Yoon-Kishida meeting. South Korea describes it as a "summit," whereas Japan downplays it as "informal talks," rather than formal summit talks.

Hosaka Yuji, a professor in the liberal arts department at Sejong University in Seoul, said that President Yoon's foreign policy advisors crossed the line and broke international norms concerning diplomacy.

"When the officials of two countries sit down to prepare for a summit, they discuss a lot of things. Not only do they discuss and agree on when and where the summit will be held, but they also try to narrow their differences on how and when they are to release the information about the summit to the media," he told The Korea Times. "Once these things are sorted out, then, the two sides announce the summit simultaneously."

He claimed South Korea didn't play by these rules when it announced President Yoon's summit with the Japanese prime minister. "I understand that the South Korean government made public information that had not been agreed upon, hence, the problem," he said, adding that this is what he read in Japanese media outlets. "This is unusual and (indeed) unprecedented as South Korea has never done that before."

Hosaka said Kishida had summit talks with some 30 world leaders during his U.N. visit this time, noting that he would have found it difficult to squeeze in another summit with South Korea into his already busy summit schedule. Kishida's busy schedule at the U.N. seems to be one reason why the Japanese leader had informal talks with Yoon.

President Yoon Suk-yeol shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida before they sit down for a summit in New York, Wednesday (local time).

 Yonhap

Shin Kak-soo, former South Korean ambassador to Japan, said Japan seems to have been displeased with what the South Korean government did.

"Although they agreed to have a summit, there would have been some minor details that were not agreed upon. These could be about the venue or the format of the summit. But the presidential office went ahead and made public the summit plan. So, the Japanese side would have felt displeased when South Korea publicly announced the event, which was still in progress at that time, while there were issues that were yet to be resolved. They also seemed to be annoyed by the expression that the two sides happily agreed upon the summit," he said.

Shin shared the same view as Hosaka that the presidential office had acted inappropriately when handling the press briefing on the Yoon-Kishida summit. "In the case that there are still issue areas that remained unresolved, neither side is supposed to make a summit public," he said.

The political backgrounds of the two leaders also seem to have played a part in creating tension between the two countries.

Yoon had a long career as a prosecutor before he declared his bid to run in Korea's presidential election last year. He spent less than a year in politics before he was elected in the March 9 election. Since he joined the prosecution as an entry-level prosecutor at the age of 31, he had lived his entire life as a prosecutor before being elected president. His decades-long involvement in the law enforcement field likely trained him to be tough, decisive and persistent. But his scant experience in politics is seen as his decisive weakness, as he has had few chances to develop his political acumen.

On the contrary, Kishida is portrayed as a "dovish moderate" in the Japanese media. He is calm, honest and risk-averse, and these traits helped him earn the nickname, "Mr. Status quo."

"Kishida is seen as a weak and indecisive leader who answers most questions and proposals by saying, 'Kentosuru (I will consider it).' It has become his nickname," said Jeff Kingston, a professor of history and Asian Studies at Temple University Japan.

Kishida has years of experience in the Cabinet, becoming the longest-serving foreign minister of Japan. His years of training as a top diplomat would have sharpened his diplomatic awareness and made him feel uncomfortable about undiplomatic behavior.

So when Yoon, a politician who is criticized by feminists and others for his macho tendencies and often crude, off-the-cuff style, works with a dovish man like Kishida, whose personal traits are almost the opposite, a clash seems to be inevitable.

"Japanese Prime Minister Kishida is depicted as a passive politician in Japanese media outlets. Compared to him, President Yoon is a man who pushes (people) around to make things work," said Shin.

Nonetheless, he said such personal differences seemed not to have much to do with the pre-and post-meeting tug of war between the two sides. Shin said Kishida is losing ground at home as public opinion about his leadership has worsened since he decided to hold a state funeral for former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan's ties with the Unification Church has also played a part in his falling approval ratings, Shin said.

On the other hand, Hosaka is skeptical about the impact of personality differences on summit diplomacy. He said that there is an international system in place and it is this system that enables leaders to improve relations with other countries.

South Korean President, Yoon Suk-yeol, addresses the 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York City on Tuesday. AFP-Yonhap

The Korea Times · September 23, 2022

13. [WHY] Is the prestige of Seoul National University all it's hyped up to be?

For those interested in understanding South Korea it is useful to understand the university system.

Saturday

September 24, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

[WHY] Is the prestige of Seoul National University all it's hyped up to be?

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/09/24/why/Korea-Seoul-National-University-SNU/20220924070013928.html

The main entrance to Seoul National University's Gwanak Campus in Gwanak District, soutern Seoul. [SHUTTERSTOCK]

“This guy here graduated from Seoul National University,” says Gi-hun, the main character in the smash hit Netflix series “Squid Game,” (2021) referring to his best friend Sang-woo. Sang-woo's attendance at Seoul National University (SNU) is mentioned constantly throughout the show, so much so that memes spread online.

Whenever Gi-hun introduces Sang-woo as an SNU graduate, people respond with reverence and awe, while Sang-woo himself seems embarrassed or doesn’t want to talk about it.

Lee Jung-jae, center, and Park Hae-soo, right, play Gi-hun and Sang-woo in the Netflix series "Squid Game." [NETFLIX]

Foreign viewers might have been confused at the constant SNU babble, but to Koreans, Gi-hun ranting on about SNU and people being so impressed with Sang-woo are perfectly ordinary scenes. Most Koreans at one point in their lives would have had their parents or adults around them pestering them to study harder so they can get into SNU, lamenting that they hadn’t gotten accepted to SNU or comparing them to someone who had.

So why is SNU such a big deal and why are Koreans obsessed with this one particular university?

SNU everywhere

Fans new to Korean dramas may have heard about SNU for the first time through “Squid Game,” but the university has been popping up in various shows and movies since, well, since shows and movies started being made in Korea.

Most recently, in the popular legal drama “Extraordinary Attorney Woo” aired on channel ENA this year, the titular protagonist Woo Young-woo, a young lawyer fresh out of law school, is introduced as a SNU graduate. In the first episode of the series, Woo’s new boss, the head partner at the firm, reads off Woo’s resume and comments that she is a top candidate who graduated from SNU and SNU Law School.

A long list of other television shows and movies feature SNU graduates, too, including “Penthouse” (2020-2021), “The King” (2017) and “Misaeng” (2014), to name a few that were commercially successful. In most of these shows and movies, SNU students or graduates have one thing in common — they are depicted as exceptionally smart and apt at climbing the social ladder, although they may appear nerdy or lacking in social skills at times.

"SKY Castle," a 2018 television series from JTBC that centered on helicopter moms who aim to get their children into Seoul National University. [JTBC]

One television show even dealt with the craze surrounding SNU as its main plot point, JTBC’s 2018 drama “Sky Castle.” The show’s title refers to the acronym “SKY,” which groups together the top three universities in Korea — SNU, Korea University and Yonsei University. It told the story of helicopter moms who shepherd their children to private tutoring and extracurricular activities in order to get them admitted to SNU, especially SNU Medical School.

In the show, some of the mothers go to extreme lengths to achieve their goal, spending millions of won on tutors, plotting against the other kids and moms and even getting involved in illegal activities. This may sound over-the-top, but many viewers praised the show for reflecting reality, including the Minister of Education at the time. “Sky Castle” ultimately broke viewership records and received numerous accolades at end-of-year award shows.

A student sits studying at a desk in a hagwon in Mapo District, western Seoul, on July 28. [YONHAP]

So what’s with the craze?

One word: prestige.

SNU is by reputation, ranking and output the undisputed top university in Korea. Its graduates dominate almost all sectors of Korean society, from politics and business to academia and the arts, and there is an obvious expectation that attending the school will open up career paths and access to a coveted network of alumni.

“When I got accepted, the first thing I thought was that the work was over,” said a current SNU undergrad, who did not want to be named. “My parents and teachers always used to tell me that once I get in, it will be a free pass to life. Of course I found out that that’s not the case, but that’s what I was told.”

It would be easy to believe such coaxing, since evidence is abundant that SNU graduates fly high. In a 2020 report by Job Korea, an employment information platform, 10.8 percent of 3,753 corporate executives in Korea were SNU graduates, taking up the most executive positions from a single university. SNU undergrads took up 36.1 percent of those who passed the notoriously difficult public service exam last year, according to data compiled by the Law Journal.

President Yoon Suk-yeol, an SNU graduate himself, was criticized even before his term officially started for favoring fellow SNU alumni when appointing people to his transition team, where over half of those initially named were graduates of the university.

Yoon’s administration was not the first to show such preference. The proportion of SNU graduates in government has been consistently high in past administrations, at one point reaching 33.7 percent of all senior civil servants in 2016 during the Park Geun-hye administration, according to the Ministry of Personnel Management.

Studies have even showed that a SNU diploma gets you more money. A study by the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) in 2012 measuring the “university prestige” effect on wages earned by graduates, found that the prestige effect for SNU results in wages was 12 percent higher on average than that of other universities in the country.

“It’s all wrapped into the same phenomenon of social recognition,” said Hwang Kyung-moon, professor of Korean Studies at Australian National University. “Educational certification determines social status in Korea.”

Parents read through information packets at a college admissions presentation hosted by Jongno Academy at Konkuk University Alumni Hall in Gwangjin District, eastern Seoul, on Nov. 19, 2021. [JANG JIN-YOUNG]

How hard is it to get into SNU?

It’s very difficult — just how difficult is reflected in the sheer size of the private education industry in Korea and the amount of time students spend in private academies, or hagwon.

Last year, total spending on private education in Korea was more than 23.4 trillion won ($16.6 billion), according to Statistics Korea and the Ministry of Education. There are arguments that the actual total spending could be even larger, because spending through cash is not tracked. In a survey by the KEDI in 2020, 94.3 percent of parents with children in elementary, middle or high school replied that they felt financially burdened by sending their kids to hagwon or tutoring.

A whopping 75.5 percent of all students in Korea are put through private education, spending time in hagwon and tutoring in addition to regular schooling. On average, Korean students spent around 6.7 hours a week studying in private institutions, academies or tutoring last year, according to Statista, a global market and consumer data company.

The pinnacle of private education and the competition to get into SNU is embodied by a certain neighborhood in Gangnam District in Seoul — Daechi-dong. One of the most expensive places to live in Korea, the neighborhood is famous as the mecca of private education, home to over a thousand hagwon, according to the Korea Education Statistics Service operated by KEDI.

A street in Daechi-dong, a neighborhood famous for private education, in Gangnam District, southern Seoul. [YONHAP]

Desperate parents are known to relocate their families entirely so that they can be closer to Daechi-dong, while even more kids flock from all over the city, and even from different parts of the country, to attend hagwon in the neighborhood.

“My family moved to Daechi-dong when I was in middle school,” said the SNU undergrad student. “It was only because of the hagwon that we moved there — after my younger brother finished high school we moved out again. I think most people at SNU have gone to hagwon in Daechi-dong at one point.”

Despite all these resources and effort spent to get into SNU, only an infinitesimal number of students get accepted each year — around 0.05 to 0.3 percent of the total number of students in the country, according to Jongno Academy, one of the oldest hagwon in Korea.

Places like Jongno Academy cater to those who take the risk of investing another year or two into studying to get into SNU after they get rejected the first time around. Applying for a second time is called jaesu, and the third time is called samsu. This is parallel to students in Japan taking second and third shots at getting accepted to the University of Tokyo, or Chinese students to Peking University. 

Basically, getting a spot at SNU is a very, very long shot.

Students attend a job fair at Seoul National University's Gwanak Campus in Gwanak District, southern Seoul, on September 6. [NEWS1]

Is graduating from SNU really a free pass?

It may have been in the past, but not so much anymore.

“There are urban legends among SNU students about how in the 80s and 90s, you could walk into your department’s student office, grab an application form for the top companies in the country and just sign your name and get accepted,” said the SNU undergrad. “It’s not like that at all these days. I guess more people go to university now and the economy’s bad in general, but I’ve heard people complaining that our diploma isn’t worth what it used to be.”

In a survey conducted by the university and published last month, over 40 percent of current SNU students, alumni and faculty responded that they expected the prestige and reputation of the school to decline in the next ten years.

Because even an SNU diploma won’t guarantee the same successful career or high salary that it used to, more students are opting to drop out of the university than ever before. Last year, 330 students dropped out of SNU, according to data compiled by the university and made public by the office of Rep. Moon Jeong-bog of the Democratic Party. It marked the largest number of students to drop out in 23 years since the university started collecting related data.

New restrictions barring applicants from revealing which university they graduated from in application processes to a number of government organizations, put in place as criticism about elitism surfaced in recent years, have also muddled up prospects for graduates from universities like SNU.

But experts point out that the prestige of SNU isn’t likely to plummet too drastically, despite how students and alumni may feel.

“Unless companies also take part in disregarding the name on diplomas when they hire people, not much will change,” said Hwang. “And it’s hard to make meaningful reforms to the system now because the people who have the power to make such decisions are those who benefit from the system — they are SNU graduates.”

“There is no evidence to prove that the premium enjoyed by SNU graduates in the labor market has declined,” said Choi Seong-soo, professor of sociology at Yonsei University. “If indirectly inferred based on the fact that income inequality among college graduates has hardly changed between the 1990s to the present, it’s unlikely that the premium of SNU or other prestigious universities has changed either.”

New graduates of Seoul National University pose for photos at Gwanak Campus on Aug. 27, 2021. [YONHAP]

Perks and burden

Free pass or not, SNU students and graduates enjoy a lot of perks, and along with them, a burden, too, apparently.

“It’s a two sided coin,” said the SNU undergrad student who requested anonymity. “I feel I get treated specially and sometimes that’s a plus, but then again everyone around me expects me to do well in everything and it can be suffocating.”

An academic article by Jeon Eun-hee, an educational researcher who also lectures at SNU, examined how SNU students formed cliques within the university and their own academic identities. Students from the university were found to enjoy a “halo effect” of SNU, and “favorable overvaluation” from the fact that they attended the school. But there were also negative aspects of “sociocultural prejudice with the label of SNU.”

Another study by Kim Myeung-chan that specifically looks into SNU students who experienced failure in the form of academic probation, revealed that such students blamed themselves for “not living up to the name of an SNU student” and failing to get “careers that fit the status of an SNU student.”

While this all sounds quite grandiose, it’s a reflection of just how loaded the name of SNU is in Korea.

“Usually, I intentionally curb around the question of which university I go to because I don’t want to label myself,” said the SNU undergrad student. “It’s all just too complicated.”

No wonder Sang-woo in “Squid Game” never mentioned it himself.

BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]

14. A dive into N. Korea’s world of multiplayer gaming

I go back on my critique of covert information warfare. This is where we can learn from the Chinese. They are investing huge efforts to manipulate and control world wide gaming. We should consider what kind of games we can develop and send into north Korea. The Chinese are using games to plant subtle seeds of influence about the strength and "goodness" of China trying to influence the youth to develop the right attitudes toward China in the future. We should be developing games that will plant seeds for future Korean unification.

A dive into N. Korea’s world of multiplayer gaming

“Women in their 30s and 40s sit in the market and play smartphone games when they are not selling anything or have time to kill,” a source told Daily NK

By Mun Dong Hui - 2022.09.23 10:00am

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: A North Korean businessperson using a cell phone at a local market. (Daily NK)

North Koreans have access to dozens of genres of multi-player games, with some people even paying for features that are downloaded separately from the main games, Daily NK has learned.

A source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Friday that there were about 30 kinds of multiplayer games available in the country, including horse racing, driving, Tetris, fishing, shooting, space exploration and school trips.

“People can play together using Bluetooth in a single classroom or a single room [within 10 to 15 meters of each other],” he said.

“Driving games are most popular with teens, space exploration games with those in their 20s, horse racing games with those in their 30s, and fishing games with people in their 40s,” the source added.

As more and more North Koreans have smartphones, the country has intensified its efforts to develop a range of applications, too. North Korean developers continue to create game apps, which are reportedly quite popular among smartphone users.

The source said people cannot simply download and install good game apps on their phones. Instead, he said it is “faster and better” to install the apps at “places where you can purchase them, such as mobile phone service centers or e-game service centers.”

In fact, some North Koreans are paying for downloable content (DLC) to increase the fun they can have with their games.

DLC refers to items, clothing, episodes and other content you can download in addition to the original game. Game companies sell DLC to earn additional profits over those from the original game. North Korean authorities, too, appear to be generating profits through the DLC model.

The source said in the case of fishing games, the base game costs USD 7, but to add more kinds of fish, users pay an extra USD 1 for each additional kind, or USD 2 for bass weighing 10 kilograms or more, not to mention other types of “high-end fish.”

As smartphone-based games grow in popularity in North Korea, this has led to the rise of various social issues, however.

“Teenagers are looking at their phones when they walk on the road, when they’re on the bus for field trips to revolutionary historic sites or revolutionary battle sites, and even when the guides at revolutionary battle sites are giving their lectures,” said the source.

“Since they are looking at their phones, they don’t greet local elders even when they run into them,” he added.

Based on the source’s report, it appears that “smartphone zombies” – people absorbed in their smartphones at the expense of everything around them – are commonplace in North Korea.

“Women in their 30s and 40s sit in the market and play smartphone games when they are not selling anything or have time to kill,” said the source. “They often ask one another what they are playing, and the trend these days is to try each of the latest games for fun.”

The source said several companies in Pyongyang and the provinces take a leading role in developing game apps.

“Research labs under the State Affairs Commission, research labs under the Ministry of Information Industry, Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, the Institute of Natural Science’s Automation Department, computer science universities and Pyongyang University of Science and Technology’s Programming and Information Lab are able to develop apps once they get state approval,” he said.

In short, the source’s report suggests that institutions other than existing specialized developers can make game apps as long they get permission from the state.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

​15. South Korean delegation coming to US seeking to build peace

I will attend this next week.

South Korean delegation coming to US seeking to build peace - UCA News

ucanews.com

World

South Korean delegation coming to US seeking to build peace

The Oct. 5-6 peace conference at The Catholic University of America hopes to overcome some of the deep distrust of the North

Kim Gunn, South Korea's new special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs and his US counterpart Sung Kim shake hands during their meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul on June 3. (Photo: AFP)

Published: September 23, 2022 05:40 AM GMT

Updated: September 23, 2022 05:46 AM GMT

South Korean Catholic leaders will be part of a 40-member delegation that will meet with U.S. bishops and government representatives in early October to explore ways to build closer relations with North Korea.

The Oct. 5-6 peace conference at The Catholic University of America is the sixth in an annual series and the first on U.S. soil since 2017.

Conference planners told Catholic News Service their hope is to overcome some of the deep distrust of the North in the hope of establishing new lines of communication, opening pathways for wider delivery of humanitarian aid, fostering regular opportunities for family reunions, and eventually reversing widespread human rights abuses.

"The idea is to expand the options (for peace)," said Maryann Cusimano Love, associate professor of international relations at The Catholic University of America.

"There have been very few policies given much consideration (in the United States), primarily military options and sanctions, and they haven't been working. The idea that you keep doing the same thing and expect different results is what this delegation intends to question," Cusimano Love said.

The issues the conference will explore have been around for decades. Among the most apparent is the separation of families. While there have been short periods when families could cross the most highly militarized border in the world, no consistent policy allowing longer intervals of family reunification exists.

South Korea's new government opened the door to the possibility of resuming reunions of long-separated families Sept. 8 by proposing a meeting with North Korea. Such reunions are seen as a humanitarian issue, because many of those who have been separated are aging and desperately want to reunite with relatives before they die.

Technically, the three-year war that led to the division of Korea into North and South has never ended. Military fighting terminated with the signing of an armistice July 27, 1953, but no formal peace agreement exists between North Korea and South Korea.

Underlying the questions the conference will address is North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Given North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's stance that he has no intention to reverse its development of such weapons, tensions are continuing to rise in the region.

"North Korea sees nuclear weapons as their ticket to guaranteeing security," said Andrew Yeo, professor of politics and director of Asian studies at The Catholic University of America. "Most policymakers wouldn't care about North Korea if they didn't have nuclear weapons."

He said the last meaningful engagement between the two nations occurred in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020 led to a self-imposed lockdown of North Korea that has restricted efforts to bridge the divide that exists.

He credited Korean Catholic leaders for "always looking for avenues of engagement" and for making clear that "isolating North Korea is not going to get us anywhere and that, most likely, it's going to make the situation worse."

The peace conference emerged within the Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace, founded by Bishop Peter Lee Ki-heon of Uijeongbu, South Korea, chairman of the Korean bishops' Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People.

Love said the institute, known as CINAP, is attempting to "build more constituents for peace."

This year's conference will include a pair of sessions examining ways to advance peace on the Korean peninsula. One session will include a review of the 2015 visit by South Korean bishops to the North and subsequent efforts to engage North Korea.

Beyond the formal program, the most important message-sharing will occur as members of the Korean delegation meet with U.S. officials at the State Department, the National Security Council and on Capitol Hill.

Archbishop Timothy P. Broglio of the U.S. Archdiocese for the Military Services, past chairman of the U.S. bishops' Committee on International Justice and Peace, will accompany the Koreans during the meetings. Also joining them will be Bishop David J. Malloy of Rockford, Illinois, current chairman, and Bishop Frank J. Dewane of Venice, Florida, a committee member.

The face-to-face encounters will allow church leaders to impress upon U.S. policymakers their views for alternatives beyond military-first options and economic sanctions against North Korea.

"I hope the message comes out that some initiative for peace is possible," Archbishop Broglio told CNS.

The archbishop, who will join one of the panel discussions, said dialogue is important to pursue with North Korea, and he hopes the U.S. government will hear that message from the Korean representatives.

"It's clear that new ideas are necessary. If in some way or another we (U.S. bishops) can be the vehicle that opens other possibilities, well, then I think that's a very positive thing," said Archbishop Broglio, who has visited South Korea numerous times.

Still, he expressed that caution is necessary in dealing with Kim, saying that "while we'd like to see peace happen," it's important for both North and South to agree on the substantive steps to take.

"I don't have a great deal of information about the willingness of the North to do that," he said.

Jesuit Father Dennis McNamara, the Park professor of sociology and Korean studies at Georgetown University, said solutions to the issues confronting South Korea and North Korea will be difficult to achieve, but not impossible.

He will join the conference to offer suggestions on how to broach the divide between the two nations. Father McNamara also suggested that it may be "civic diplomacy" by leaders within the Catholic Church, universities and nongovernmental organizations that guide the way to improved cross-border relations.

"Peace building is what we are looking for," the priest said. "The conference can become something of a model for peace building. Specifically, the real significance is getting the U.S. involved on the North Korean issue without the military running the process.

"For the State Department, this is a boon," he added. "They're getting a dialogue in which they don't have to be running the dialogue. I think that's very important."

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16. Two money changers in Pyongsong arrested for manipulating exchange rates

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Two money changers in Pyongsong arrested for manipulating exchange rates

The two had a very disruptive impact on market exchange rates in Pyongsong, a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un - 2022.09.23 9:23am

dailynk.com

Pyongsong's city center. (Bjørn Christian Tørrissen)

North Korea’s Ministry of State Security recently arrested two money changers in Pyongsong for manipulating exchange rates, Daily NK has learned.

“Two sisters in their forties who were moving large amounts of foreign currency in Pyongsong were arrested by the Ministry of State Security on Sept. 15. The sisters, surnamed Kim, had swayed exchange rates and market prices in Pyongsong for the last decade,” a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Wednesday.

According to the source, the Kim sisters, who got their start selling cigarettes on the street in 2011, had eventually made a name for themselves as major financiers and money changers who handled large sums of money.

When the Kim sisters divvied up a 10-ton delivery of cigarettes from a Pyongyang factory to wholesalers and retailers in Pyongsong, for example, they would pocket extra by accepting foreign currency at less than the market rate and charging more for Korean won. Then they would turn around and sell the foreign currency they had brought in for more than the market rate.

The Kim sisters’ behavior had a very disruptive impact on market exchange rates in Pyongsong, the source said.

Such circumstances have convinced the North Korean government that major entrepreneurs and financiers are largely responsible for market disruptions, leading to tighter controls and stricter enforcement against figures moving around large sums of money.

Along the border with China and in major cities such as Pyongyang, Pyongsong and Hamhung, the authorities are reportedly keeping constant watch on figures who impact market prices by distributing goods or manipulating exchange rates.

But since entrepreneurs and financiers who get caught can still avoid punishment through bribery, law enforcement agencies are unable to effectively crackdown on them, the source said.

When North Korea adopted emergency pandemic measures following its acknowledgement of a COVID-19 outbreak in the country, the Kim sisters were accused of violating pandemic rules on several occasions by the health authorities and the unified command on non-socialist and anti-socialist behavior, but they were able to grease enough palms to avoid punishment.

But the Kim sisters were finally arrested, the source said, after a person who had been following their behavior for several years went above the heads of the municipal and provincial branches of the Ministry of State Security and reported the matter directly to the national headquarters.

“The details of the Kim sisters’ arrest by the Ministry of State Security haven’t been released. However, their downfall seems to have been triggered by multiple complaints from people who were sick of seeing them flaunt their wealth,” the source said.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

​17. N. Korea fires unspecified ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military

First English language report.

N. Korea fires unspecified ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military

The Korea Times · September 25, 2022

A news report on North Korea's launch of a missile is aired on a television at Seoul Station on May 7. Yonhap

North Korea fired an unspecified ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Sunday, South Korea's military said, two days after a nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier arrived here for allied drills.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided no further details immediately.

The launch followed reports that Pyongyang seems to be preparing to fire a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

It marked the North's fifth missile firing since the Yoon Suk-yeol administration took office in May.

Pyongyang last fired eight short-range ballistic missiles in June.

The USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group arrived in the southeastern port city of Busan on Friday to stage its first combined drills with the South Korean Navy in five years. The joint drills are set to take place in the East Sea later this month. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · September 25, 2022

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com