Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

PSA: If you receive an email message from david.maxwell181@proton.me please know that it is not from me. Please do not respond to it and please do not click on any links. Someone obviously is using my name with their all purpose sword.


Quotes of the Day:


“In politics, if you want anything said, ask a man. If you want anything done, ask a woman.” 
– Margaret Thatcher


“The brick walls are there for a reason. The brick walls are not there to keep us out. The brick walls are there to give us a chance to show how badly we want something. Because the brick walls are there to stop the people who don’t want it badly enough. They’re there to stop the other people.” 
– Randy Pausch, The Last Lecture, 2007

“If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties.” 
– Sir Francis Bacon


1. North Korea Is a Nuclear Weapons State. Here's What America Should Do About It

2. Defector speaks out: How North Korea's diplomatic maneuvers could isolate South Korea

3. <Lighting N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (1) Almost the Only Escape Route -The New Generation ‘Donju’ Who Crossed the Sea Tell About COVID-19, Chaos, and Social Change

4. N. Korean leader's sister vows to 'limitlessly' bolster nuclear war deterrent over U.S. submarine arrival

5. Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue

6. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to finalize trilateral secretariat when leaders meet this year

7. [Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Overseas workers and hacking units are the main sources of income"

8. President Yoon: “I don’t understand the ‘two-state theory’… I will pursue peaceful, free unification”

9. “North Korean smartphones purchased from Chinese manufacturers and modified”

10. Regime's currency controls backfire as N. Korean won weakens

11. Ryanggang farms told to meet quotas "no matter what" as harvest nears

12. The power of fiction: Why North Korea needs its own 'Moon is Down'

13. Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea

14. S. Korea, U.S. keep 'unwavering' readiness posture against possible N.K. provocations: ambassador





1. North Korea Is a Nuclear Weapons State. Here's What America Should Do About It


So much to parse here.  


First a peace treaty must be between the actual belligerents, the north and South. The US nor the Chinese declared war in Korea, The US intervened unter the UN mandate specifically to help South Korea defend its freedom from the north's attack.  


Second, an end of war declaration or a peace treaty that leads to the withdrawal of US troops will lead to two things - Kim Jong UN assessing his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies a success and then he will double down. Second, the most important condition Kim needs to successfully use force to dominate the peninsula is the withdrawal of US troops and an end to extended deterrence and the alliance. Conflict is most likely to occur with a significant reduction or total withdrawal of US forces.


The proposed live news feed showing the withdrawal of logistics forces from Camp Humphreys would not make Kim think we are serious about peace. It would simply make him think his political warfare strategy is working and he is successfully manipulating the Americans.


Canceling combined training (the author should know the difference between joint and combined training and he is talking about ending combined training between ROK and US forces). There is a lot more training that takes place and is necessary to ensure that the combined ROK and US forces are prepared to defend South KOran and defeat the north Korean People's Army. There is more to training tactical forces to be overtrained "pit bulls." Ending combined training would seriously impact the readiness of the component commands and the combined headquarters to defend the South. And this would have an impact on deterrence.


The idea that withdrawing US military logistics and support forces rather than the very few combat troops would somehow positively influence Kim Jong Un is mistaken. First, he will just continue to execute his political warfare strategy to further divide the alliance to try to drive off all US troops and thus undermine the US commitment to the defense of South Korea. Second, with all due respect to the rotational US ground combat brigade, the lostics, communications, and intelligence forces in Korea are more important than a single ground combat brigade. We need those supporting forces to support the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and to support follow-on reinforcing US forces. A single ground combat brigade will not bea war winner and will not have a role in the initial defense of the ROK. It is the ROK forces (some 26 divisions versus one US brigade) that will do the bulk of the fighting even when a handful of US divisions deploy after the war starts).


On the other hand, while I am vehemently opposed to Congressman Brad Sherman's overall "peace" legislation, I actually would like to see the requirement for the State Department to provide a roadmap to peace in Korea. Such a roadmap would include solving the Korea question by bringing about change in north Korea that would lead to new leadership who would seek peaceful unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea. The path to denuclearization and peace in Korea is through unification. The US has a historic opportunity to support Koreans in effort to achieve the reestablishment of a unified Korea with the new 8.15 Unification Doctrine. I would be happy to help State provide that roadmap (I already have it drafted).


If I were evaluating this paper I would ask Dr. Eastwood to rewrite it and describe his understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Without a clear understanding of those three elements you cannot propose an effective plan for peace in Korea.





North Korea Is a Nuclear Weapons State. Here's What America Should Do About It

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Brent M. Eastwood · September 23, 2024

North Korea Talk

North Korea Is a Nuclear Weapons State. Here’s What America Should Do About It




South Korea Artillery K9 Thunder. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Is It Time for a Peace Treaty on the Korean Peninsula?: North Korea is a nuclear power with an excellent ballistic missile program. Nothing is going to change that. No amount of financial sanctions, diplomatic haranguing, or military threats will help. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s mercurial leader, Kim Jong-un is wholly invested in nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles that can be launched from the ground or submarines. The DPRK has even tested hypersonic weapons. The North boasts of having intermediate-range and long-range nuclear missiles. The Hwasong-15 ICBM could put all of the continental United States in its sights.

Give Peace a Chance in Korea

It is time for the international community to face facts, treat North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power, and deal with it on equal terms.

This means first engaging in a peace treaty with the DPRK, the Americans, and the South Koreans. The original Korean War with the United States never had a peace treaty – only a cease-fire and armistice. The DPRK is convinced that the United States and South Korea will invade it, depose Kim Jong-un, and remake the North into a capitalist, democratic country.

Counting Dead Americans

It is difficult, if not impossible, to convince Kim that the Americans and South Koreans will never invade. The North Koreans are entirely anti-American. As Korean expert Victor Cha recounts in his book The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, North Korean school children learn arithmetic by counting “dead Americans.”

Congressional Efforts for Peace

But some American lawmakers in Congress still hold out hope for a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) is pushing his bill called the “Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act” (HR 1369) that has been referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It has several bipartisan supporters in the House.

One stipulation of the bill is that the “U.S. State Department must also report to Congress a clear roadmap for achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

There Is a New Way Forward

This is quite a heady goal, written vaguely to give the next American president latitude in developing a peace process.

I have my own peace plan, which I describe in my new book, that could possibly re-unite the South and North one day.

Is This a Dream or a Nightmare?

Admittedly, this peace plan of mine is transactional and aspirational. It requires a leap of faith in strategic and diplomatic thinking. So, hold on to your seats. You may think it highly imaginative and even naïve, but it is a place to start.

Stop the Joint Training Exercises

First, I want to end all joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea. Kim Jong-un and the North Koreans hate these drills between the two militaries. I served near the Korean DMZ in the U.S. Army, and I can assure you that both the Americans and the South Koreans are simply a group of over-trained pit bulls. Joint exercises are not needed. Both sides do well training on their own. Canceling these drills would help show Kim Jong-un that we have no intention of invading.

A Small Number of American Soldiers Need to Be Sent Home

Second, I want to send some American troops home. Yes, this is unpalatable to some, and President Jimmy Carter threatened to do so while president, and it was an unpopular proposal. The United States already has plenty of troops in South Korea. Camp Humphreys, the main military installation in the Republic of Korea, is 40 miles south of Seoul. It has 40,000 people and around 28,500 military personnel including elements of the U.S. Army Second Infantry Division and the headquarters of the Eighth U.S. Army. It is the largest American overseas base in the world.

There are many combat support and combat service support troops in that garrison. I do not want to reduce the number of Armored Brigade Combat Team personnel – the front-line troops that would fight the war – but I do call for reducing the number of rear-echelon personnel. It is time to reduce these forces by at least 1,000 troops. Have them pack up and go home. Show this troop reduction live on a news feed to Pyongyang and let Kim Jong-un see that the United States is serious about peace.

North Korea Must Play Ball

These two military stipulations come with a price. Before a peace treaty can be signed, The North Koreans must accept arms inspectors into the country to inspect the DPRK’s nuclear missile program. Kim Jong-un must also agree to freeze all missile tests. He would also have to curtail human rights abuses and stop murdering his citizens.

Bring Out the Skeptics

I know what you are saying. This would never work because you cannot trust Kim Jong-un. Former President Donald Trump found this out the hard way. But my peace plan, if successful, would allow Trump or Kamala Harris to win the Nobel Prize if it could be enacted.

Can You Trust Kim Jong-un?

Kim is the biggest obstacle. He is a lying, murderous scoundrel who routinely starves and kills his people. He would probably cheat on any deal. But it is time to take a new approach and enact the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act. Sanctions and jawboning do not work. The status quo is terrible. Multi-national military exercises between the Republic of Korea and the United States are not needed, and the Department of Defense could easily send some American troops home. This would go a long way to show the DPRK that there are no chances of an invasion and no plans to execute regime change against Kim. This potential state of affairs could lead to a lasting peace on the peninsula and even re-unification someday.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

In this article:


Written By Brent M. Eastwood

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.


nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Brent M. Eastwood · September 23, 2024




2. Defector speaks out: How North Korea's diplomatic maneuvers could isolate South Korea


Beware north Korean internal instability. Those of us who have planned for regime collapse never predicted when the regime would collapse. Only that if it does it will be with catastrophic consequences which we should prepare for. I am also reminded of what Kim Gum hyuk has told us: " Change is coming. Please take a human lights up front approach and keep your eye on Korea. And don't be disappointed or frustrated because has not yet come. Change is coming."


These two excerpts are not mutually exclusive. And somewhere in the north there is. "Mr. X" whom we cannot identify and will not know until he takes action.


Excerpts:


Is North Korea on the brink of collapse due to these high-level defections?
“People have been predicting North Korea’s collapse since Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, but it’s been 30 years. They said the same when Kim Jong-il died, and that Kim Jong-un wouldn’t last five years. But here we are, and North Korea is now a nuclear state, whether people acknowledge it or not. Waiting for North Korea to collapse is like standing under a tree, waiting for the fruit to fall.”
...
Is there any discontent among North Korean elites about a potential fourth-generation succession?
“Not really. The regime has been solidified for 80 years, creating a system of absolute loyalty to the Kim family. Through constant ideological education, the population has been conditioned to believe in the supreme leader as their savior. Even high-ranking officials know their homes are bugged, but they still show loyalty. The only way this regime collapses is if Kim Jong-un disappears. The moment he’s gone, the system will unravel.”



Defector speaks out: How North Korea's diplomatic maneuvers could isolate South Korea

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/09/22/JXU2OPZTIBHZ3JFTCX5GLDQY6I/?utm_source=pocket_saves

By Lee Dong-hoon,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.09.22. 13:45




Kim Kuk-song, a former senior official in North Korea’s General Reconnaissance Bureau who defected to South Korea in 2014./Weekly Chosun

In the lead-up to this November’s U.S. presidential election, tensions are mounting as North Korea continues to send propaganda-laden balloons across the border into South Korea. Adding to the unease, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida—both key figures, alongside South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, in the 2023 Camp David Declaration—are expected to leave office soon. This has sparked concerns in South Korea that its security alliances could be jeopardized.

There’s also speculation that if former U.S. President Donald Trump, who met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un three times during his first term, returns to the White House, he may pursue dialogue with North Korea while sidelining South Korea.

Kim Kuk-song, a former senior official in North Korea’s General Reconnaissance Bureau who gained attention in 2021 for a BBC interview alleging the presence of North Korean spies in the South Korean government, recently weighed in on the situation. He warned that if the U.S. and Japan establish direct contact with North Korea, “South Korea will be left in the cold,” and urged the South to take proactive steps toward engagement with the North.

Amid recent defections by high-ranking North Korean diplomats, including Ri Il-kyu, Kim expressed skepticism about rumors of the regime’s impending collapse. He pointed out that while over 34,000 North Koreans have defected, most are women and young people from border areas, and elite defections like his are exceedingly rare. He cautioned that viewing North Korea through a South Korean lens could lead to miscalculations.

Kim himself defected to South Korea in 2014, a year after the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un’s uncle and one of North Korea’s most powerful figures. Having been close to Jang for 30 years, Kim chose to flee when he became a target for purging. In North Korea, he had lived in considerable luxury, even driving a Mercedes-Benz gifted to him by Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s sister and Jang’s wife.

During a Sept. 9 interview with Weekly Chosun at a hotel in Seoul—coinciding with North Korea’s national foundation day—Kim remained under tight security, with a bodyguard standing watch outside.


Kim Kuk-song during a BBC interview in 2021./BBC

Is North Korea on the brink of collapse due to these high-level defections?

“People have been predicting North Korea’s collapse since Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, but it’s been 30 years. They said the same when Kim Jong-il died, and that Kim Jong-un wouldn’t last five years. But here we are, and North Korea is now a nuclear state, whether people acknowledge it or not. Waiting for North Korea to collapse is like standing under a tree, waiting for the fruit to fall.”

Who does Kim Jong-un favor in the upcoming U.S. election?

“Definitely Trump.”

What if Democratic candidate Kamala Harris wins?

“Frankly, North Korea no longer fears the U.S. They now have nuclear weapons, something neither Kim Il-sung nor Kim Jong-il had. With that power, Kim Jong-un doesn’t need to request talks; he demands that others come to him. Whether the U.S. imposes sanctions or not, North Korea remains unfazed, just as Kim Il-sung responded to Jimmy Carter during his 1994 visit: ‘Sanctions? Let them come if they want.’”

If Trump wins, will U.S.-North Korea talks resume?

“North Korea’s ultimate goal has always been to meet with the U.S. President and build a relationship. That hasn’t changed. Now, with nuclear weapons, they have the leverage to make it happen. If Trump wins, Kim Jong-un might invite him to Pyongyang, and knowing Trump, he’d likely go. If that happens, he’d be welcomed with overwhelming cheers.”

Could Japan also seek contact with North Korea under a new prime minister?

“Fumio Kishida has already expressed interest in meeting Kim Jong-un. Koizumi Shinjiro, son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, is a leading candidate to succeed Kishida, and he could also pursue this. Kim Jong-un might be inclined to engage with Japan, especially given that his mother, Ko Yong-hui, was a Korean-Japanese.”

Could South Korea be isolated if U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations improve?

“Kim Jong-un has already floated the ‘two-state theory,’ signaling that he might engage with the U.S. while sidelining South Korea. He sees himself as the leader of a sovereign state, and he wants to negotiate with the U.S. on equal terms. If this happens, South Korea risks being sidelined, like a dog chasing after a chicken but never catching it.”

What should South Korea do?

“We need to take the initiative. Now, while relations with North Korea are strained, is actually an opportunity. Political leadership means acting when others hesitate. South Korea can’t afford to rest on its laurels, thinking we’re ahead. We’ve only been prosperous for 30 years, and we shouldn’t let arrogance blind us. Without resolving the North Korean issue, South Korea’s future remains uncertain. North Korea is like a cancerous tumor or a ticking time bomb—we need to address it.”

How can South Korea open the door to negotiations?

“We need to identify the right people—those who truly understand North Korea and can directly engage with its leadership. A presidential task force should be created for this. North Korea doesn’t trust the National Intelligence Service (NIS), viewing it as a nest of intrigue. Nor do they trust the Ministry of Unification. But if a presidential team is formed, North Korea might see it as a serious effort and consider engagement.”

Do you think Kim Jong-un has chosen his daughter as his successor?

“I doubt it. Kim Jong-un parades his daughter around for three main reasons: to show that his successor will come from his family, to emphasize his role as a benevolent leader, and to highlight his fatherly image. But it’s too early for succession planning. He’s still young, and his daughter is only about 10. He also reportedly has a son, who is likely being groomed for the future.”

Is there any discontent among North Korean elites about a potential fourth-generation succession?

“Not really. The regime has been solidified for 80 years, creating a system of absolute loyalty to the Kim family. Through constant ideological education, the population has been conditioned to believe in the supreme leader as their savior. Even high-ranking officials know their homes are bugged, but they still show loyalty. The only way this regime collapses is if Kim Jong-un disappears. The moment he’s gone, the system will unravel.”



3. <Lighting N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (1) Almost the Only Escape Route -The New Generation ‘Donju’ Who Crossed the Sea Tell About COVID-19, Chaos, and Social Change


Some useful insights into north Korea.



<Lighting N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (1) Almost the Only Escape Route -The New Generation ‘Donju’ Who Crossed the Sea Tell About COVID-19, Chaos, and Social Change

asiapress.org

A North Korean boat patrolling downstream of the Yalu River in Sinuiju, wary of the influx of the virus and defection during the COVID pandemic. Old vessels can be seen in the distance. Photographed from the Chinese side in late July 2021 by ASIAPRESS

Sealed borders, severed human ties, closed societies... The COVID pandemic has made North Korea an even more incomprehensible enigma. It is estimated that fewer than 20 people have left North Korea and entered South Korea since 2020. In mid-July 2024, ASIAPRESS met three North Koreans in Seoul who managed to pierce the veil of secrecy. (JEON Sung-jun)

Kang Kyu-lin (female, 23, pseudonym) arrived at the meeting earlier than expected, checking her interview questions and forcing the reporter, who was eating kimbap, to quickly swallow the food he hadn't even chewed. The reporter's first impression of Kang was that of an ordinary Gen MZ girl, but once she started talking, she exuded charisma in near-perfect standard Korean.

Kang Kyu-lin

"I liked (doing) illegal (things)!" she said.

It's a fitting description for a woman who defected, a capital offense under North Korean law, not alone but at the risk of her family's lives. At 21, she ran a private fishing boat to make money in the East Sea, and she later described the various "illegal" businesses she ran in North Korea. From hiring a "wanted man" tracked by the secret police to engaging in North Korea's version of "unionization" (more on that in a follow-up article),

Kim Myung-ok

Kang's mother, Kim Myong-ok (female, 54, pseudonym), who believed in her daughter and crossed the line, joined us for the interview.

Kim Chung-yeol (male, 33, pseudonym) has a dwarfish build and piercing eyes reminiscent of General Nok Du. Perhaps it's because he looks like Chun Bong-joon that the reality of North Korea he describes resembles the old Korean world we read about in history books.

* General Nok Du(Jeon Bong-jun) was a revolutionary in the late Joseon Dynasty and the leader of the Donghak Peasant Movement.

Kim Chung-yeol

"I thought I could live well in my own country, but during COVID, it became a strange country.... I thought, 'I can't do this.'"

Kim, who operated a fishing boat in the West Sea, escaped last May with nine relatives on board, including his pregnant wife, his mother and his brother's family. It was the first escape by sea by a North Korean since November 2019.

Through these interviews with people who have dramatically escaped North Korea, we hope to lift the veil on the pandemic that has enveloped the country.

◆The "Black Box" of North Korea

Since the pandemic closed its borders in January 2020, North Korea has been a "black box." The four-year information vacuum that has persisted since then is the first of its kind in decades. It has been unprecedented in two ways.

First, the ability to observe North Korea from the inside has been drastically reduced. "Outsiders," including foreign journalists, Western diplomats, and officials of international organizations, were forced to leave Pyongyang.

Second, a humanitarian crisis likely occurred in North Korea during this period, but the world knows very little about it because of the information vacuum. In the past, during the "Arduous March," we were able to learn about North Korea through the testimonies of people who escaped to China, but during this pandemic, the borders were so tightly sealed that no one escaped even to China.

ASIAPRESS has been continuously investigating, analyzing and publishing local information through its reporting partners in North Korea. However, since our reporting partners are mainly based in the northern regions of North Hamgyong, Ryanggang, and North Pyongan provinces, and the information they have access to is limited, it is still difficult to get a holistic picture of the situation in North Korea as a whole.

◆A Ray of Light in the Darkness: Defection as a Gift

In 2023, nine North Koreans arrived in South Korea in May and four in October, traveling through the West Sea and East Sea, respectively. It is extremely rare for people who have experienced the COVID pandemic in North Korea to escape directly and arrive in South Korea.

According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, the number of North Koreans arriving in the South dropped from 1047 in 2019 to 229 in 2020, and from 63 and 67 in 21 and 22, respectively, when the COVID virus began to spread around the world. This year, as of June, the number was 105, similar to last year's 196. However, most of the arrivals are people who fled North Korea before the pandemic and were in third countries, and there have been very few cases of people fleeing North Korea directly in the past three to four years.

The majority of the entrants are those who escaped North Korea before the pandemic and stayed in a third country; apart from sea defections, there have been almost no cases of people directly escaping North Korea in the past 3 to 4 years.

Those who have managed to escape by sea are a gift to anyone who wants a glimpse into the mystery that is North Korea.

◆The MZ 'Donju' Decision

The two families who recently escaped North Korea have something in common. Both were members of the wealthy entrepreneurial class known in North Korean society as "donju," and both had boats as their means of escape. Notably, both families were led by younger members of the MZ generation.

North Korean defections have now become a matter of youth and wealth, in addition to courage and luck.

ASIAPRESS will continue its "Lighting N. Korea's Four Dark Years" series, which will shed light on the current situation in North Korea, including our existing understanding of North Korea during the COVID pandemic and new information learned through interviews. It aims to provide a broad yet specific understanding of the impact of the pandemic on the lives of North Koreans and the policies of the authorities, the tensions and conflicts between the Kim Jong-un regime's survival strategies and the aspirations of the people, and how these things manifest themselves in different regions.

asiapress.org



4. N. Korean leader's sister vows to 'limitlessly' bolster nuclear war deterrent over U.S. submarine arrival


The bad cop speaks out. The USS Vermont gets the north's attention.



N. Korean leader's sister vows to 'limitlessly' bolster nuclear war deterrent over U.S. submarine arrival | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 24, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, vowed Tuesday to "continuously and limitlessly" bolster the North's nuclear war deterrent against what it called U.S. threats, denouncing the arrival of a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine in South Korea.

The remark came a day after the 7,800-ton USS Vermont entered a major naval base in Busan, 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, to replenish supplies and provide rest for crew members.

"The DPRK's nuclear war deterrent to cope with and contain various threats from outside is bound to be bolstered up both in quality and quantity continuously and limitlessly as the security of the state is constantly exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail," Kim said in a statement carried by the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).


Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister and currently vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee, is pictured as she visits the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum in Hanoi, in this file photo dated March 2, 2019. (Yonhap)

Kim claimed that the visit is "proof that the U.S. ambition to often take up nuclear strategic assets, boast of its strength, increase its threat to the rival and 'enjoy' its hegemonic privilege by dint of its malicious strength at any cost is getting ever more extreme."

She still said "nothing will change," stressing that such nuclear-powered submarines can never be an "object of fear."

"The U.S. strategic assets will never find their resting place in the region of the Korean peninsula," Kim said.

In what appeared to be an attempt to boast about the North's surveillance capabilities, Kim said the North's Aerospace Reconnaissance Agency, an independent intelligence organ directly under the head of state, detected the submarine's arrival and reported it.

The KCNA did not carry photos supporting the surveillance report.

In November last year, Pyongyang successfully placed a spy satellite into orbit, and said it has a plan to launch three more such satellites in 2024. Its attempt to launch another satellite in May ended in failure.

Earlier this year, South Korea's National Security Advisor Shin Won-sik, who was then defense minister, told reporters that the North's Malligyong-1 spy satellite appears to be orbiting Earth without activity.


The nuclear-powered USS Vermont Virginia-class attack submarine arrives at a naval base in Busan, 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on Sept. 23, 2024. (Yonhap)



5. Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue


Sustaining the strength of the alliance.


Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue

defense.gov

The Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) held the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) from September23-24, 2024, in Seoul.

Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang Lae, led the ROK delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Anka Lee, led the U.S. delegation. Key senior ROK and U.S. defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue.

Both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three pillars of the "Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance": enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They acknowledged the importance of faithfully implementing the Defense Vision to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and reviewed implementation of specific tasks. In addition, the two sides noted progress to align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms under the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to effectively and efficiently support strengthening the Alliance through the implementation of the Defense Vision, and pledged to continue assessing them.

The two sides reaffirmed their common goal of the complete denuclearization of the DPRK, and concurred on the importance of the Alliance's close coordination to maintain a vigilant combined defense posture. Both sides exchanged views on ever-changing DPRK threats, as well as its advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, which are destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and the region. Both sides strongly condemned DPRK provocations and threats that undermine regional peace and stability, including its diversification of nuclear delivery systems and continuing space launch attempts.

Both sides commended the Alliance's efforts to enhance extended deterrence in an integrated manner since President Biden and President Yoon's April 2023 Washington Declaration and committed to continue strengthening extended deterrence cooperation through the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group.

The United States reaffirmed its enduring and ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities – including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities – and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime. Both sides affirmed that the full capabilities of the two countries would contribute to the Alliance's combined defense posture.

Both sides reviewed the progress from a joint study of the Alliance's comprehensive counter-missile strategy and also discussed future enhancements in information sharing through the U.S. Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) to respond to DPRK's advancing missile threats. The two sides pledged to continue developing response capabilities and posture through the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG).

The two sides expressed grave concern over the DPRK's continuing sending of filth balloons. They also recognized the need for closely coordinated responses to intensifying DPRK's gray zone provocations, such as cyber and electromagnetic attacks, and threats in the vicinity of the Northwest Islands and Northern Limit Line (NLL). Both sides noted that the NLL has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and the ROK side urged the DPRK to accept the practical value of, and abide by, the NLL.

The two sides shared assessments of the recent ULCHI FREEDOM SHIELD 24 (UFS 24) exercise, which included realistic threats such as DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile threats, GPS jamming and cyber attacks. They agreed that UFS further enhanced the Alliance's crisis management and strengthened deterrence and defense capabilities. In addition, they assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were more extensive than the past year in land, maritime and air domains, enhanced interoperability and combined capabilities to execute Alliance operations as well as demonstrated a robust ability to defend the ROK. Based on these achievements, both sides agreed to strengthen combined exercises and trainings in line with rapidly changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula.

The two delegations also discussed the danger of DPRK-Russian military cooperation following the signing of the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" between Russia and the DPRK. In particular, they expressed grave concern over illegal arms trade and transfer of high-technology between Russia and the DPRK that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and pledged to respond by working closely together with the international community. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including China and Russia, and concurred that such endeavors back the complete denuclearization of the DPRK.

The ROK and United States agreed to continue strengthening efforts made to date for further modernizing Alliance capabilities and evolving based on science and technology cooperation. The two delegations applauded the progress establishing a Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee under the SCM, and pledged to expedite efforts for practical cooperation under this consultative body within the year. In addition, based on such cooperation, they shared the understanding that areas of cooperation need to be expanded further, including artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, crewed-uncrewed teaming, and next-generation communications. In that vein, both sides consulted on a ROK proposal to hold a joint ROK-U.S. Defense Science and Technology Conference from the year 2025.

The two sides also pledged to continue expanding cooperative measures to enhance the defense industrial base and interoperability of both the United States and the ROK. The delegations agreed that cooperative efforts for a Regional Sustainment Framework being developed by the Defense Department would strengthen posture and capabilities of the Alliance. As such, they highly appreciated a ROK's participation in the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project, in an area of Air Force's aviation maintenance, and pledged to continue discussions for expanding cooperation into the Army aviation and naval vessels. The two sides also welcomed the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards for the conduct of MRO for U.S. vessels. In addition, both sides recognized the need to provide reciprocal market access to deepen defense cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and pledged to advance progress on a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP-A).

Both sides commended the work of the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG), including ROK's participation in the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) led by the U.S. Space Force. They emphasized that such cooperation contributes to enhancing interoperability and information sharing for space domain awareness of the Alliance and strengthens joint response capabilities against increasing space threats. Furthermore, the two sides welcomed the work of the Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG), including the Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag exercise.

The two sides reviewed the progress on the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) agreed upon by the ROK and the United States through Conditions-based OPCON Transition Working Group (COTWG). They exchanged views on this year's bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems required for OPCON transition, pledged to pursue OPCON transition in a systematic and stable manner, and reaffirmed the two nations' commitment to strengthening combined defense posture of the Alliance.

DEPMIN Cho and DASD Lee also reviewed the regional and global security environments and pledged to deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to achieve shared security goals. They acknowledged that the 2nd ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Seoul in early September reaffirmed the commitment and resolve of the UNC Member States to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. They reviewed the work of the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG) aimed at enhancing peace and stability in the region, and pledged to strengthen cooperative efforts based on the respective Indo-Pacific strategy of both countries. In that vein, they closely discussed measures for regional cooperation to pursue expanded cooperation with the ASEAN members and Pacific Islands Countries, and agreed to report the outcomes of the discussions at the 56th SCM.

In addition, both sides concurred that ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation should continue to be strengthened to achieve shared security goals on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. They pledged to intensify cooperation to respond to regional security landscape based on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), including high-level policy consultations, information sharing, and trilateral multi-domain exercises. To this end, the two sides resolved to continue efforts for the implementation of cooperative tasks agreed through the Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) held in early September.

DEPMIN Cho and DASD Lee agreed that the 25th KIDD reaffirmed a robust solidarity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and provided guidance to strengthen the Alliance's cooperation in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Based on these outcomes of the Alliance's cooperation, the two sides pledged to continue efforts to achieve meaningful progress at the 56th SCM, to be hosted in late 2024.

On the occasion of this meeting, both sides visited a General Outpost along the central front, reviewing increasing DPRK military activities in the vicinity of the border region and assessing our response. They expressed appreciation to service members of the ROK and the U.S. for maintaining an overwhelming combined defense posture to respond to any DPRK provocations.

defense.gov




6. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to finalize trilateral secretariat when leaders meet this year


Another positive step forward to institutionalize Camp David and trilateral cooperation.



(2nd LD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan to finalize trilateral secretariat when leaders meet this year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 24, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout; CHANGES headline, lead)

By Song Sang-ho and Kim Seung-yeon

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan have reaffirmed their commitment to establishing a trilateral cooperation secretariat, to be finalized when their leaders meet later this year, a State Department spokesperson said.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met trilaterally on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on Monday, reiterating their efforts to "institutionalize" the three-way partnership.

Their emphasis on cementing cooperation among their countries came amid lingering questions over whether their trilateral partnership can endure regardless of political transitions in Washington and Tokyo.

"They concluded by reaffirming our shared commitment to creating the U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Secretariat, to be finalized by the three leaders when they meet before the end of the year," Matthew Miller, the spokesperson, said in a readout, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

"This step will help institutionalize this crucial partnership into the future," he added.

Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have been working on establishing the secretariat to maintain forward momentum for their growing cooperation on security, technology and other areas.

During their talks, Cho, Blinken and Kamikawa also discussed the need for close coordination to respond to deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, which they believe threatens stability in both Northeast Asia and Europe, according to Miller.

In addition, they affirmed their "strong" opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an "indispensable" element of security and prosperity in the international community, Miller said.

The meeting took place as Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have been deepening their collaboration to counter threats from North Korea, which has heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula with its recent disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility, continued weapons tests and launches of trash-carrying balloons into the South.

The three sides expressed concerns over the North's unveiling of the uranium enrichment facility and its expanding illegal military cooperation with Russia, Seoul's foreign ministry said in a press release Tuesday (Korea time).

"They agreed to continue close coordination to lead efforts to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions while responding sternly to any provocations from Pyongyang," the ministry said.

In his opening remarks, Blinken said that trilateral cooperation will continue to remain crucial regardless of leadership changes in the U.S. and Japan.

"We have political transitions in Japan and the United States, but this trilat, irrespective of those transitions, will remain vital to the future of all three of our countries -- a future that we are working to shape together," he said, according to a transcript released by the State Department. Trilat is short for a trilateral gathering.


Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul (from L to R) pose for a photo at their trilateral talks in New York on Sept. 23, 2024, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

He cast the trilateral relationship as one of the "hallmarks" of President Joe Biden's administration, saying that it is "stronger," "more effective" and "more important" than it has ever been given the challenges and opportunities that the three countries face.

Cho said that the trilateral gathering demonstrated their common resolve to cooperate "closely" and respond "steadfastly" to any provocation by the North. He also underscored that three-way cooperation remains "unwavering" regardless of domestic political changes.

"Since the historic Camp David summit in August last year, we have made tremendous achievements in our trilateral cooperation, and I think at all levels and in many areas," Cho said.

He was referring to the first standalone trilateral summit at Camp David in Maryland in August last year. It produced a series of landmark agreements, including the "Commitment to Consult" in the event of a shared threat.

Kamikawa also underscored the importance of trilateral security cooperation in the midst of regional and global security challenges.

"The security environment surrounding us is becoming increasingly severe, and the free and open international order based on the rule of law is facing serious challenges, and that is making our strategic collaboration more important than ever," she said.

"We would like to further strengthen our coordination in dealing with North Korea and in a wide range of fields."

Three-way cooperation among the U.S. and its Asian allies gained traction after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol offered a solution in March last year to address the issue of compensating Korean victims of Japan's colonial-era forced labor.

On the back of warming ties between Seoul and Tokyo, the three countries have bolstered security cooperation through joint exercises, the sharing of ballistic missile warning data and other efforts.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 24, 2024



7. [Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Overseas workers and hacking units are the main sources of income"


Important insights that can really only be gleaned from north Korean escapees and first hand experience and knowledge.




[Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Overseas workers and hacking units are the main sources of income"

https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/office39_northkorea-rijongho-09242024100408.html

WASHINGTON-Noh Jeong-min nohj@rfa.org

2024.09.24


North Korean workers work at a large construction site in downtown Vladivostok, Russia.

/Yonhap News



00:00 / 00:00

 

 

[“ Hello . I am Ri Jeong-ho, a former high-ranking official from Room 39 , Daehung General Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea .”  Based on the experience of a former high-ranking official from North Korea, we dig into the secrets of the Kim Jong-un regime and its core power circles , analyze the truth and lies of North Korea’s policies today, and analyze politics , economy , and society through ‘ Ri Jeong-ho’s Eyes from Room 39 ’, with Ri Jeong-ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center (KPDC) .] 

 

“ Many organizations are mobilized to make money , and Kim Jong-un spends it as he pleases . Most of this money is deposited into Kim Jong-un’s revolutionary fund, which he uses to develop nuclear missiles or buy luxury goods .”

 

North Korea continues to develop nuclear missiles and make provocations despite international sanctions . Where does the money come from? It is pointed out that the foreign currency earned by North Korean workers still working overseas and the funding of North Korean hacking groups are important sources of income for the Kim Jong-un regime .

 

“ An elite official stationed overseas even expressed his discontent, saying, ‘ We don’t even get food from nuclear weapons , so why are we conducting nuclear tests and receiving sanctions instead of developing the economy ?’ ”

 

The Kim Jong-un regime is flaunting its nuclear weapons to show off that North Korea is a nuclear power , but even high-ranking North Korean officials are expressing dissatisfaction with this . According to Representative Lee Jeong-ho, no one believes the idea that having nuclear weapons will make you prosperous anymore .

 

Mobilizing all agencies to make money … Spending is at Kim Jong-un’s discretion

 

[ Reporter ] Hello ,  Mr. Lee Jeong-ho .  It's nice to be with you on the program [Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes ] .  From now on, you will meet with many North Korean listeners and readers through this time slot every week .  First, please give us a brief introduction . 

 

Ri Jeong-ho, KPDC representative, former high-ranking official of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers' Party

[ Lee Jeong-ho ]  Hello, listeners. I am very happy to meet you. Through this program, I would like to look into what Kim Jong-un is thinking , where his policies are headed, and what is happening in his power circle. In each broadcast, I will analyze and evaluate the policies and actions currently taking place in the North Korean regime, using my special experience, and I will address the issues you are curious about.

 

[ Reporter ] Mr. Representative, you were a high-ranking official in North Korea . Could you briefly explain what you did in North Korea and why you left North Korea and went into exile ? 

 

Lee Jung-ho ] Yes , I was once a North Korean 'hero of hard work' and devoted myself to my country. Then, in 2013 and 2014 , when the young dictator Kim Jong-un came to power and I witnessed the horrific atrocities of brutally executing his uncle Jang Song-thaek and hundreds of other officials, my thoughts changed 180 degrees . At that time, Pyongyang turned into a city of bloody terror . I had to witness the brutal executions of my close colleagues . North Korea was no longer a safe land for me , and the moment my patriotism turned to hatred , the determination that this tyrannical regime had to change began to eat away at my heart, and eventually , in October 2014, I went into exile with my family . 

 

I worked for North Korea's central government for about 30 years . During that time , I founded the ' Daeheung Shipbuilding Company ' and served as its president. I also served as the director of the trade management department of the ' Daeheung General Bureau ' , North Korea's largest trade organization , and was awarded the title of ' Hero of Labor ' . In 2007, I served as the chairman of the ' Geumgang Economic Development Corporation ' of the National Defense Commission , and before defecting, I also served as the director of the Dalian, China branch of the ' Daeheung Trade Corporation ' . 

 

[ Reporter ]  Yes . I look forward to once again analyzing the Kim Jong-un regime and North Korea's politics , economy , and society based on your career and experience . The first story we'll be discussing today is that on the 13th,  North  Korea 's state-run media revealed a highly enriched uranium manufacturing facility for the first time . And on the  18th , they launched a short-range ballistic missile .  Despite international sanctions against North Korea, North Korea's nuclear missile development and provocations are continuing .  In particular, with the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign currency earnings are not what they used to be , so I'm curious about where the money for developing nuclear missiles comes from .

 

[ Lee Jeong-ho ]  I believe that the strong UN and US sanctions against North Korea have effectively blocked major exports such as coal, minerals, and textiles . However, China and Russia have not properly implemented the sanctions against North Korea regarding the income earned by approximately 100,000 workers and thousands of IT ( information and communication technology ) technicians dispatched overseas. It is known that the highly enriched uranium production facility that North Korea revealed was completed in the early 2000s when Kim Jong-il invested heavily with support from the South Korean government to import special equipment including centrifuges. At that time, North Korea also imported a lot of cutting-edge CNC ( computer numerical control ) machinery . I know this because my colleagues were involved in the imports at the time . In October 2002, North Korea disclosed that it was operating a uranium enrichment program during a visit by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. I believe that such facilities have been in operation since then . Also, since North Korea was not subject to strong sanctions until 2016 , it has steadily strengthened the material and technological base of its nuclear missile production base since the Kim Jong-il era. In other words , I believe that the highly enriched uranium production facility did not suddenly appear, but was already completed .

 

Reporter ]  You said that North Korea's nuclear facilities were already completed . Even now, expansion work is steadily taking place around the nuclear facilities , and astronomical amounts of money are being spent to maintain them and manufacture and launch missiles . So , is there a department that is in charge of these costs more specifically ?  I'm also curious about how the funds are procured .

 

Lee Jung-ho ]  No specific department in Room 39 is in charge of expenses . Many organizations are mobilized to make money , and once the money is collected in Room 39 ’s finance department , Kim Jong-un spends it however he pleases . The Kim Jong-un regime secures funds through domestic resource development, including gold production . And the money earned by the 100,000 or so workers dispatched overseas and the net profit earned by thousands of IT technicians is estimated at about $ 300 million annually . I know the basis for this because I calculated how much overseas workers earn per month and how much the country takes in while I was in North Korea .

 

Most of this money is deposited into Kim Jong-un's revolutionary fund, and he uses it to develop nuclear missiles or buy luxury goods . It is also used to live a luxurious life for him and his family . If necessary, some of it is used to build a city called Pyongyang for his own achievements . There are also recent rumors that the money from selling weapons to Russia is being used to strengthen nuclear weapons .

 

Reporter ] A little while ago , you said that the net profit earned through workers dispatched overseas is approximately 300 million USD . Could you give us more specific evidence ?

 

Lee Jeong-ho ] The monthly salary of workers dispatched to China is about 20,000 to 25,000 yuan . It is about 300 US dollars . Of this , 200 dollars is paid to the government and the remaining 100 dollars is paid to the workers . However, the managers exploit the money paid to the workers. That alone amounts to 240 to 250 million dollars . There are about 20,000 to 30,000 IT technicians in China and Russia . It is said that they earn 50 to 100 million US dollars every year . I think this figure is relatively accurate . American experts have also told me that it is true . And the person who is in charge of this overall is Cho Yong-won, the party's organization secretary . So you could say that he is close to General Secretary Kim . 

 

First 'North Korean Workers' Dispatched to China Since Corona

North Korean Residents' Visits to Russia Surge: "Possibility of Dispatch of Workers"

$6 Million Hacking Incident… Experts: “North Korea Behind It”

 

Illustration of cyber attacks by North Korean hackers / RFA Graphic

 

Missile equipment , luxury goods, etc. are imported through China, which has loose sanctions on North Korea.

 

[ Reporter ]  However, with the sanctions against North Korea and the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea's foreign currency earnings will not be the same as before , and there are also circumstances where they are committing various illegal acts to secure funds . A representative example , as is continuously reported , is cyber hacking to secure funds . Aren't there many internal concerns within North Korea to secure funds like this ?  What efforts and concerns are there ?

 

Lee Jung-ho ]  North Korea has always tried to find a way around sanctions . When the international community's policy toward North Korea is introduced, North Korea comes up with a plan . In North Korea, they say that when a " policy " is introduced, a " plan " is introduced . Since 2017, when Kim Jong- un's financial flow was cut off due to sanctions on North Korea , he has committed cyber hacking crimes targeting the international financial system and cryptocurrency exchanges, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars every year . This is an important source of funds for the Kim Jong-un regime , and it is invested in nuclear and missile programs.

 

North Korea's hacker group is a state-level criminal force that targets global financial networks and cryptocurrency exchanges like a pirate group under the direct direction of Kim Jong-un. They hack the financial system with professional and sophisticated tactics to steal large amounts of money . They use the anonymity of cryptocurrency to avoid global financial surveillance and launder and move the money . A strong response is needed . I think sanctions against the Kim Jong-un regime should be strengthened . 

 

Reporter ]  Then, when you evaluate it objectively ,  do you think the international community’s sanctions against North Korea are effective ?

 

Lee Jeong-ho ]  Despite sanctions on North Korea, there have been reports that Mercedes-Benz's " Maybach " luxury vehicle used by Kim Jong-un is being smuggled into North Korea , which has led some to question the effectiveness of the sanctions . Electronic equipment used in missiles and parts for mobile launch vehicles (TELs) are also smuggled into North Korea . I think this is because China has relaxed sanctions on North Korea so far . Since such luxury goods are transported in several containers, they can be transferred from ship to ship at sea . I have seen this . Therefore, it is difficult to crack down on them unless Chinese customs authorities keep a close eye on them . Nevertheless, the sanctions are making North Korea suffer and isolating it internationally, so the effect cannot be ignored . 

 

In particular, the effect of the UN sanctions on North Korea announced in 2017 was enormous . It completely banned North Korea's major exports, such as coal, iron ore, marine products , and textiles , and prohibited joint investment with North Korea. These sanctions are still strong . According to my data, North Korea's exports in 2013 were 4.1 billion dollars , but in 2023, they would only be 290 million dollars . This shows that the impact of sanctions on North Korea is significant . However, when COVID-19 broke out, didn't all UN member states abandon the order to repatriate North Korean workers ? It has been maintained for five more years , and I believe that this is the main source of income flowing into Kim Jong-un's slush funds .

 

North Korean ship suspected of illegal maritime transfers photographed by Planet Labs, a U.S. commercial satellite / RFA photo

 

North Korean high-ranking officials also said , “ It’s not like food comes from nuclear weapons …”

 

[ Reporter ]  The problem is that this astronomical amount of money is not being used for economic development or  improving the quality of life of North Korean citizens, but is being poured into developing nuclear missiles . In fact, North Korean citizens are expressing their discontent, saying, "  How much better would it be if the money used for developing nuclear missiles were spent on buying food? " Are the key powers aware of this discontent among the citizens ? 

 

[ Lee Jeong-ho ]  That's right . How great would it be if the money used for nuclear development were used to buy food for North Korean citizens ? Regarding nuclear development , North Korean officials have also had a strong stance that economic development should be prioritized since the second nuclear test in 2009. Jang Song-taek also opposed the third nuclear test in 2012 and said, "Let's focus on the economy," and this led to a falling out with Kim Jong - un . In 2014 , an elite official stationed overseas expressed his dissatisfaction, saying, " Nuclear weapons don't produce food , so why are we conducting nuclear tests and receiving sanctions instead of developing the economy ?" This is the feeling of most North Korean officials . Also, in 2014 , a cabinet official complained to me, saying , " If we use the money spent on national defense to import fertilizer, we won't have to worry about farming . " As he said, if Kim Jong-un diverts the money he is pouring into strengthening his nuclear arsenal to buying food and fertilizer, he believes that North Korean citizens will be freed from hunger and the suffering of everyday life .

 

In 2013 , early in his presidency, General Secretary Kim Jong-un said, " If we have nuclear weapons, we can protect peace , prosper the country, and have a happy life for our people . " However, the more nuclear weapons they produce, the stronger sanctions against North Korea are , international isolation deepens, the economy collapses, and the people's lives become more difficult . Even now, it is said that many people are starving in North Korea, just like during the " Arduous March . " No one believes the story that having nuclear weapons will make you live well anymore . The entire people are being sacrificed for Kim Jong-un's personal power and regime stability . 

 

North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un inspected a nuclear weapons research institute and weapons-grade nuclear material production facility, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 13th. /Yonhap News

 

[ Reporter ]  It is impressive that the North Korean high-ranking officials are thinking the same way . Lastly, the Kim Jong-un regime has revealed the inside of a nuclear facility for the first time . Why do you think it was revealed ?

 

Lee Jung-ho ]  General Secretary Kim's disclosure of the nuclear facility may have been intended to show off to the world, but to me , it seemed like he was cornered . Has any other country's leader ever visited and disclosed a highly enriched uranium facility ? This can be interpreted as Kim Jong-un trying to show hope to his people as the recent floods have worsened the economic and food shortages . However, the people have not been interested in nuclear weapons for a long time . Also, it is absurd to show off to the outside world . The United States has known for a long time that North Korea has a uranium enrichment facility . On the contrary, his disclosure of the nuclear facility to the outside world could urge the international community to wake up and lead to strong sanctions and military responses. As the Kim Jong-un regime strengthens its nuclear threat, the international community, including the United States, will respond more strongly , which could increase the possibility of a direct attack on the North Korean leadership .

 

Reporter ]  Yes ,  so far , we have been looking at the topic of “ Where does the money for North Korea’s nuclear missile development come from?” with Lee Jung-ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center and former high-ranking official of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers ’  Party . This was the first hour today . Thank you for speaking with us today ,  Lee Jung-ho .  

 

This is Jeongmin Noh of RFA Radio Free Asia . 

 

Editor Park Bong-hyeon ,  Web Editor Han Deok-in 


8. President Yoon: “I don’t understand the ‘two-state theory’… I will pursue peaceful, free unification”


There is only one path to peace, prosperity, and denuclearization and that is through a free and unified Korea.




President Yoon: “I don’t understand the ‘two-state theory’… I will pursue peaceful, free unification”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/092424hw-09242024045354.html


Seoul - Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org

2024.09.24


South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol speaks at a Cabinet meeting held at the Blue House in Yongsan, Seoul on the 24th.

Yonhap News



00:00 /04:35

 

Anchor : South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol has repeatedly criticized the so-called " two-state theory " advocated by North Korea , saying it is an unconstitutional idea that abandons the duty to pursue peaceful unification . This is his position on recent calls in some quarters in South Korea to accept the " two-state theory . " Reporter Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul .

 

South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol strongly criticized the so-called " two-state theory " put forward by North Korea during his opening remarks at a Cabinet meeting held at the Blue House on the 24th .

 

President Yoon stated that the argument that we should accept two countries, South and North Korea, instead of pursuing unification is a betrayal of the duty to pursue peaceful unification as stated in the South Korean Constitution .

 

[President Yoon Seok-yeol of South Korea ] Recently, some in the political world have suddenly started to call for us not to pursue unification and not to even talk about unification . This is an unconstitutional idea that abandons the duty to pursue peaceful unification under liberal democracy as mandated by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea .

 

This statement dismisses the recent argument in some circles of Korean politics to accept the ' two-nation theory ' .

 

Former Chief of Staff to the President under the Moon Jae-in administration, Lim Jong-seok, said on the 19th , “ Let’s let go of the obsession that the South and the North must unify and accept the existence of two countries ,” and there has been a series of criticisms in Korean political circles regarding this .

 

President Yoon pointed out that those who make such claims are saying, " Let's give up unification and choose peace, " and are even calling for the abolition of the Ministry of Unification and the deletion of territorial provisions and peaceful unification promotion provisions from the South Korean Constitution .

 

He then asked whether it was possible to put forward the so-called “ peaceful two-state theory” in a situation where North Korea was asserting the “two hostile states theory ” by saying , “ We will not hesitate to use nuclear attacks , ” and emphasized that giving up on unification would only increase security risks .

 

[South Korean President Yoon Seok- yeol ] If we give up on unification, conflict and confrontation between the South and the North will increase, and the security risks on the Korean Peninsula will also increase . The government will build true peace through strong power and principles , not empty words and rhetoric .

 

President Yoon stated , “ The Korean government has always advocated peaceful, free unification, ” and “ We will continue to pursue peaceful, free unification in the future , ” making it clear that this is by no means unification by force .

 

He also said , “ We will prepare for a unified Republic of Korea where the freedom and human rights of all individuals are respected and where future generations can have dreams and hope . ”

 

<Related Articles >

Korean political circles criticize former officials' 'two-nation theory' every day

US Expert Amid Controversy Over 'Two-State Theory': "Unification Discussions Must Continue"

 

Meanwhile, South Korean and U.S. defense authorities held the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) meeting over two days and agreed on the need for close cooperation to respond to new types of provocations, such as North Korea's trash balloons .

 

At the meeting in Seoul, the two sides reaffirmed their common goal of “ complete denuclearization of North Korea, ” while the United States reaffirmed its commitment to defend South Korea using the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear and conventional forces .


Cho Chang-rae (right), director of the Defense Policy Office at the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, and Anka Lee, deputy assistant secretary of defense for the United States / Courtesy of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea

 

In particular, they expressed concern over the continued spread of trash balloons by North Korea, and agreed on the need for a close and coordinated response to North Korea's " gray zone provocations , " such as threatening acts in the northwestern islands and the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area , and cyber and electromagnetic attacks .

 

Gray zone provocation refers to acts of tangible and intangible aggression that are not overt military actions but are ambiguous enough to make it difficult for the other party to respond actively .

 

The two countries also noted the risks of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia and reaffirmed the importance of the international community, including China and Russia, fully implementing all UN Security Council resolutions .

 

The foreign ministers of South Korea, the United States , and Japan also met and agreed to push for a trilateral summit within the year and to respond resolutely to North Korean provocations .

 

According to South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-youl , and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa reached this agreement at a trilateral foreign ministers' meeting held in New York, U.S., on the 23rd (local time) .

 

The three ministers expressed concern over North Korea's recent disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) mobile launcher , as well as attempts at illegal military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, and agreed to promote the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions by the international community through close cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan .

 

This is Hong Seung-wook of RFA's Radio Free Asia in Seoul .

 

Editor Yang Seong-won


9. “North Korean smartphones purchased from Chinese manufacturers and modified”


Can this knowledge and understanding be exploited? 



“North Korean smartphones purchased from Chinese manufacturers and modified”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/north-korean-smartphones-purchased-from-chinese-manufacturers-and-modified-09242024144742.html

WASHINGTON-Park Jae-woo parkja@rfa.org

2024.09.24


A man uses a smartphone while sitting in front of portraits of President Kim Il Sung and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang.

 /AP



00:00 /03:08

 

Anchor : In North Korea, the number of new smartphones , or smart phones, has increased since the coronavirus pandemic , and most of them are made by Chinese manufacturers and have North Korean software installed, according to analysis . Reporter Park Jae-woo reports .

 

Martin Williams, a researcher at the Stimson Center in the United States, held a ' North Korea 2024 Smartphone ( Intelligent Mobile Phone ) Seminar ' on the 24th .

 

At the meeting, he said that as North Korea's borders, which had been closed due to the coronavirus, gradually open in 2022 , new smartphones will start to appear .

 

He also pointed out that at the ' Light Industry Products Exhibition ' held in Pyongyang late last year, a new company's mobile phone devices appeared , and they appeared to be mobile phones made by a Chinese company with North Korean software installed .

 

[ Researcher Williams ] These are brands that buy their phones from big Chinese manufacturers . The Chinese companies then give the phones to the North Korean companies, who then put their name on them and install their software .

 

It was assumed that the device was Chinese-made because North Korea does not have the ability to manufacture smartphones and the Chinese devices have similar functions and appearance .  

 

He said the number of companies providing services in North Korea has doubled since the coronavirus pandemic .

 

He explained that there are currently 10 mobile phone service providers in North Korea , including Arirang , Cheongsong , Hwawon , Gildongmu , Jindallae , Pureunhaneul , and Samtaesong .

 

In particular, the ' Cheongsong ' cell phone is popular in North Korea because of its excellent photo-taking function , and it is said to be quite similar in appearance to the cell phone of Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications equipment company .

 

[ Researcher Williams ] It is possible that Huawei, which is known to have made inroads into North Korea, is the supplier that manufactured this phone for Cheongsong .

 

“North Korea introduces 4G communication network… shows confidence in controlling residents”

Smartwatches are also seen being used inside North Korea

 

In 2020 , Huawei was indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for allegedly violating sanctions against North Korea by secretly supporting its telecommunications network .

 

In addition, according to Chinese social media, a Huawei store was found in a commercial district called the 'Ryugyong Golden Commercial Center' in Pyongyang, which opened in July of last year .

 

Researcher Williams recently analyzed that North Korea appears to have introduced a 4th generation communication network that is faster than the existing 3rd generation communication network .

 

In particular , it was expected that the 4th generation communication network would have spread not only to Pyongyang but also to other regions .

 

However , even with smartphones, in North Korea, only limited content such as encyclopedias and weather information can be accessed, not the Internet .

 

Researcher Williams explained that this could actually allow the government to do a lot of propaganda through news and videos it publishes .

 

He estimated that the fourth generation network would provide improved connectivity between electronic devices such as surveillance cameras and cell phones, allowing for additional surveillance of users .

 

Editor Park Jeong-woo ,  Web Editor Han Deok-in


10. Regime's currency controls backfire as N. Korean won weakens


The regime cannot control its money.




Regime's currency controls backfire as N. Korean won weakens - Daily NK English


High-level money changers, protected by corrupt officials, evade prosecution and drive up exchange rates despite government bans on private currency trading

By Seulkee Jang - September 24, 2024

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · September 24, 2024

FILE PHOTO: A market official on patrol in Sunchon, South Pyongan province. (The Daily NK)

The U.S. dollar traded for 16,100 North Korean won in Pyongyang on Sept. 15, down slightly from a record high of 16,500 won on Sept. 2. The regime’s attempts to restrict private currency exchange appear to be backfiring as the won continues to weaken against foreign currencies.

While the Pyongyang won-to-dollar market rate has fallen by about 400 won since the beginning of the month, this also means that the rate has remained above 16,000 won for two weeks.

Similar fluctuations have been seen in exchange rates in other areas. On Sept. 15 the rate of won to dollar in a market in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, was 16,200 won, or 100 won higher than in Pyongyang.

In the previous survey on Sept. 2, the market rate was 16,700 won. That was the highest rate since the North Korean government introduced currency reform in 2009, according to The Daily NK’s market price data.

North Korea’s won-to-dollar exchange rate had hovered in the 8,000-8,999 won range until the pandemic. But demand for foreign currency fell as the country’s border closures restricted trade, and the exchange rate fell below 5,000 won in late 2021.

North Korean authorities, however, have sent in enforcement forces to crack down on private currency exchange, with the dual goal of confiscating privately held dollars and promoting a transition to state-monitored financial transactions. As a result of this campaign, the exchange rate has soared since June.

Despite the soaring exchange rate, demand for foreign currency has not waned as the authorities push forward with the “20×10 regional development policy,” which requires the import of large quantities of raw materials, parts and machinery. And with the won-dollar exchange rate now more than double its pre-pandemic level, private demand for dollar holdings has risen accordingly.

Yuan exchange rate also increasing

In Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan, the exchange rate of the North Korean won to the Chinese yuan has also been on the rise, though not as steeply as the dollar.

The Daily NK’s survey showed that one yuan was traded for 1,900 won at a market in Pyongyang on Sept. 15. This is 52% higher than the rate (1,250 won) in The Daily NK’s survey in early January this year.

While exchange rates in North Korean markets have risen significantly since January (the won-to-dollar rate has increased by 94% and the won-to-yuan rate by 52%), the price of goods has been less volatile. The price of North Korean rice is now 30.7% higher than at the beginning of the year, while the price of corn is up 41.6%.

But these prices are similar to those in mid-September last year, when the won-dollar exchange rate was in the range of 8,000 to 8,999 won and the won-yuan exchange rate was in the range of 1,200 to 1,299 won. This suggests that market exchange rates do not directly affect the price of rice and corn in North Korean markets.

Despite the North Korean government’s ban on private money changing, they are unable to prosecute the large-scale money changers who control market exchange rates. These money changers tend to be in league with high-ranking law enforcement officials.

Ultimately, the North Korean government’s efforts to restrict money changing have the unintended effect of driving up exchange rates.

“The money changers at the top are so wealthy that they’re basically untouchable. In fact, law enforcement agencies call them a ‘protected species,’ a source told The Daily NK recently. “When enforcers are sent out, they just catch the small fry, which only drives up the exchange rates.”

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · September 24, 2024



11.


What do you do when crops fail? Increase quotas.


I can hear us at SERE school (during the Cold War when the curriculum was communist threat based) when we were forced to do work and provide "chanters" to extol us to "Work Harder. Work Faster. Work More "Quicklier."). They must have learned from the Koreans in the north.



Ryanggang farms told to meet quotas "no matter what" as harvest nears - Daily NK English

Farm managers in several cities and counties had appealed for a quota adjustment due to crop damage caused by natural disasters, including heavy rains and flooding this summer


By Jeong Seo-yeong - September 24, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · September 24, 2024

A farm in North Korea's Anbyon county. (The Daily NK)

Ryanggang province’s agricultural management committee has informed all farms that the government will not adjust their allotted crop quotas for the upcoming fall harvest. The directive was issued in early September through subordinate committees in each city and county, reaching individual farms throughout the province.

The committee stressed that these orders came from the highest levels of authority, and insisted that the distribution and collection of the harvest in Ryanggang province would proceed as planned without any quota reductions, regardless of actual crop yields.

“The orders are aimed at preventing farms that are struggling to meet quota due to natural disasters and other challenges from asking for an adjustment before the harvest,” a source in the province told The Daily NK on Monday. “It is also aimed at ensuring that the government receives its planned quota even if the harvest is small.”

The source said farm managers in several cities and counties have already appealed for a quota adjustment due to crop damage caused by natural disasters, including heavy rains and flooding this summer.

Ignoring those appeals, the provincial farm management committee said farms must provide the government with their allotted quota, even if that means distributing less to workers and setting aside less feed for animals.

In addition to emphasizing the government quota, city and county agricultural management committees told farms to set aside the government quota and seed grain for the next planting before distributing the remainder to farm workers. North Korean farms face a chronic shortage of seed grain, which is needed to ensure stable agricultural production.

City and county farm management committees ordered farmers to make a thorough accounting of unregistered fields and to be “diligent in small things” to meet the government quota. The committees also encouraged farmers to show their patriotism by working hard to exceed this year’s quota.

The committees noted that some farmers are misreporting their crops so they can set aside more food for themselves, and warned that prosecutors would be assigned to investigate such behavior. During the fall harvest, many farmers are desperate to keep enough of their crops to pay back money they borrowed in the spring to buy seed grain and other needed materials.

City and county farm management committees observed that farm managers were more likely than ordinary workers to take a share of the harvest for themselves, and warned that anyone caught doing so would be severely punished.

“The organizations that supervise farm labor tend to put government quotas ahead of the practical difficulties faced by farms. This attitude is causing discontent among farm managers and workers,” the source said.

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · September 24, 2024


12. The power of fiction: Why North Korea needs its own 'Moon is Down'


This could be one element of an information campaign. The question is can we find a "Kim-si John Steinbeck?"




The power of fiction: Why North Korea needs its own 'Moon is Down' - UPI.com

upi.com


A novel inspired by John Steinbeck's "The Moon is Down," but written for and by North Koreans, could be a powerful tool for change and an impetus for a United Republic of Korea (UROK). Photo by Pixabay/Pexels

Sept. 23 (UPI) -- One of the things that perplexes most Americans is why the Korean people in the north don't resist the three generations of Kim family totalitarian rule. Korean escapees offer two reasons: First is the incredible suppression mechanisms that are in place, from the Songbun social classification system to the most brutal security organizations in the world. Second is they simply do not know what to do. They have no frame of reference for resistance. Therefore, they need information and inspiration to develop the capability to resist oppression. Can a historical western war novel offer a way forward?

During World War II, the renowned American author John Steinbeck wrote the short novel The Moon is Down at the request of General William J. Donovan of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. This work of fiction was designed to inspire resistance against Nazi occupation in Europe. Translated into multiple languages and covertly distributed, it helped fuel underground resistance movements.

Today, North Korea faces a similarly oppressive regime, and a similar literary work could play a crucial role in empowering the North Korean people to seek self-determination, a universal human right. The Kim family regime maintains an iron grip on power through a combination of brutal repression, isolation, and indoctrination. For over 70 years, the North Korean people have been cut off from the outside world and subjected to relentless propaganda.

As a result, many lack the knowledge and inspiration to imagine alternatives to the existing system or to act against it. This is where literature could be a game-changer. A novel in the spirit of The Moon is Down, written by a North Korean author intimately familiar with the country's culture and circumstances, could have profound effects, such as:

Providing a framework for resistance: Many North Koreans may desire change but lack practical knowledge of how to resist. A novel could illustrate methods of non-violent resistance and collective action tailored to the North Korean context.

Offering hope and inspiration: By depicting characters standing up to oppression in actual locations in North Korea, a story could inspire courage and show change is possible, even in the face of a seemingly all-powerful regime.

Countering regime propaganda: Fiction can subtly challenge the regime's narratives and expose its lies in ways that may be more palatable and less dangerous than overt political statements.

Educating about rights and democracy: Through its plot and characters, a novel could introduce concepts of human rights, democratic governance, land ownership and self-determination that are necessary to support the unification process.

Creating shared understanding: A widely read story could provide common reference points and ideas, potentially helping to unify people in their desire for change.

Offering a vision of a post-Kim future: The novel could paint a picture of what life in a free and unified Korea might look like, giving people something concrete to aspire to.

The impact of such a work could be amplified through modern technology and information dissemination. While physical books smuggled into North Korea would play a role, the story could also be shared via USB drives, SD cards, and other digital means. It could be adapted and serialized into radio broadcasts, podcasts, or even video formats like K-dramas that could be smuggled across the border.

Importantly, this novel must be written by a North Korean author, ideally someone who has escaped the regime and can write from both personal experience and a broader perspective. This authenticity is essential for several reasons:

Cultural resonance: A North Korean author can craft a story that truly speaks to the experiences, values, and aspirations of the North Korean people.

Credibility: Readers are more likely to trust and relate to a story written by one of their own, rather than perceiving it as foreign propaganda.

Accuracy of details: An author with lived experience in North Korea can provide authentic details that make the story more believable and impactful.

Emotional connection: A North Korean writer can tap into shared cultural touchstones and collective experiences to create a deeper emotional resonance.

The challenge lies in identifying and supporting such an author. Who can be the "Kim-si John Steinbeck?" Might it be Mr. Do Myung-hak, who wrote a novel challenging Kim Il Sung?

Organizations working with North Korean refugees should play a key role in this effort. They could identify talented writers among the escapee community, provide them with resources and support, and help distribute the finished work back into North Korea.

It's important to note this approach is not about imposing outside ideas on North Korea, but rather empowering Koreans themselves to envision and work toward a different society based on universal human rights. The goal is to provide the information and inspiration that allow the Korean people in the north to determine their own future.

In conclusion, a novel inspired by The Moon is Down, but written for and by North Koreans, could be a powerful tool for change. By providing a framework for resistance, offering hope, countering propaganda, and educating about human rights and democracy, it could play a vital role in the long-term transformation of North Korea.

As we've seen throughout history, literature has the power to change hearts and minds. In the case of North Korea, it might just help change a nation. The result of which could be a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

upi.com


13. Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea



While we focus on the nuclear threat and conventional war (as we should and must), we must not forget about the very real threats of irregular warfare in north Korea.



Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · September 24, 2024

North Korea Talk


Published

3 hours ago


A M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank in 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division fires at a prop target during a live fire exercise on Feb. 17, 2023 in Petrochori Training Area, Greece. American armored units along with Greek armored units spent the past couple days training force-on-force and other combat simulation exercises.

The complex nature of the North Korean regime and its potential collapse presents a unique challenge that cannot be addressed through conventional military strategies alone. The ROK/U.S. alliance must plan for the eventuality of North Korea’s destabilization by developing an irregular warfare (IW) campaign. Such planning may also be valuable in informing planning for a post-war situation as well. This approach is crucial for ensuring regional stability, mitigating the potential for continued conflict, and facilitating the acceptable durable political arrangement (or end state) that will protect, sustain, and advance the interests of the ROK/U.S. Alliance.

Understanding Irregular Warfare in the North Korean Context

Most policymakers and strategists ignore irregular warfare in the context of North Korea, and some may argue the new definition of irregular warfare (as of 2023) does not apply to North Korea:

IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.

However, by delving deeper into Joint Publication 1, Warfighting an important paragraph provides the description for why IW applies in North Korea:

Asymmetric activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner when a gross disparity in relative comprehensive power causes the weaker party to resort to irregular methodologies (e.g., disinformation, terrorism, insurgency, resistance to occupation) to erode or exhaust their opponent’s power, influence, and will. However, a stronger party may target opponents asymmetrically when the risks and cost associated with a direct, symmetric approach are unacceptable.

Elements remaining in North Korea in post-collapse or post-conflict conditions are likely to resort to irregular warfare to resist occupation by South Korean and international forces. This is because IW emphasizes indirect and asymmetric approaches, utilizing a full range of military and other capabilities to erode an adversary’s power and influence. In the North Korean context, the collapse of the Kim Family Regime is likely to trigger a violent struggle involving remnants of the North Korean military, Communist Party elements, and a population indoctrinated with the regime’s ideology. They will likely fight each other, and they may fight any intervening forces.

The Potential for an Insurgency

The North Korean regime has inculcated a “guerrilla mindset” among its people, rooted in anti-foreign sentiment (deriving from anti-Japanese partisan warfare and of Kim Il Sung as a great guerrilla leader) and the glorification of self-reliance (Juche ideology). This indoctrination makes the North Korean population and military potentially hostile to external forces, including those from South Korea. A defeated North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and regime loyalists may choose to resist rather than surrender, potentially leading to an insurgency.

North Korea’s extensive asymmetric capabilities, including its large special operations forces, weapons of mass destruction, and illicit global networks, further complicate the situation. These capabilities could support an insurgency that is more complex and dangerous than those encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Therefore, the ROK/U.S. alliance must prepare for the possibility of irregular warfare emerging in the aftermath of regime collapse or war.

The Rationale for an Irregular Warfare Campaign

1. Countering Complex Threats: The nature of the threats posed by a post-collapse North Korea necessitates an irregular warfare approach. The possibility of an insurgency, the presence of WMDs, and the potential for rogue elements within the North Korean military to continue hostilities all underscore the need for a strategy that goes beyond conventional warfare.

2. Mitigating Regional Instability: North Korea’s collapse could lead to significant instability not only on the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia. The ROK/U.S. alliance must be prepared to manage the situation to prevent conflict spillover, control the flow of refugees, and secure WMDs to avoid regional destabilization.

3. Facilitating Peaceful Reunification: An effective irregular warfare campaign can pave the way for a more stable and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. By addressing the potential for an insurgency and ensuring the security and stability of the region, the ROK/U.S. alliance can create conditions more conducive to a unification that is peaceful and legitimate.

Components of an Irregular Warfare Campaign

1. Establishing a Clear End State: The ROK/U.S. alliance must define a clear end state to guide their irregular warfare strategy. A viable end state would be “a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.”

2. Influence Campaigns: An influence campaign targeting second-tier North Korean military leaders and the population is essential. This campaign should focus on persuading military commanders to maintain control of their units and refrain from engaging in insurgent activities. Simultaneously, efforts must be made to inform the North Korean population about the benefits of unification and reduce the decades-long indoctrination against external forces.

3. Maintaining the North Korean Military: To avoid the mistakes made in Iraq with the disbanding of the Iraqi military, the ROK/U.S. alliance should aim to keep the remnants of the North Korean military intact. As the only functioning institution in North Korea, it could play a role in maintaining internal stability and contributing to support and stabilization operations. Maintaining a functional military chain of command can also mitigate the risk of an insurgency by preventing soldiers from striking out on their own to support a resistance.

4. Developing Expertise and Coordination: The ROK/U.S. alliance must develop a dedicated cadre of North Korea experts who can plan and execute an irregular warfare campaign effectively. These experts should possess a deep understanding of North Korean culture, military structure, and potential irregular warfare and insurgent tactics. Their expertise will be crucial in formulating policies and strategies that are culturally informed and operationally effective.

5. International Coalition Building: Engaging with regional powers, especially China, is crucial for the success of an irregular warfare campaign. The ROK/U.S. alliance must find common ground with China to manage the regional implications of North Korea’s collapse and prevent potential conflicts. Building an international coalition can provide the necessary support and resources for a comprehensive irregular warfare campaign. The existing United Nations Command could play a key role.

Challenges and Considerations

Implementing an irregular warfare campaign in North Korea to counter the likely resistance presents significant challenges. The alliance must navigate the complexities of a deeply indoctrinated population, the potential for Chinese intervention, and the risks associated with North Korea’s WMDs. However, the absence of such preparation could lead to greater instability and conflict, underscoring the necessity of this approach.

Conclusion

As Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote in their seminal work, Military Misfortune, all military failures result from a failure to learn, a failure to adapt, and a failure to anticipate. The ROK/US Alliance continues to learn from conflicts around the world and is adapting appropriately. However, it is imperative that it anticipate what might come next on the Korean peninsula. While deterrence must remain paramount and the ability to fight and win remains the supreme concern, the alliance must anticipate what may come next. And it must plan and prepare now.

The collapse of the North Korean regime poses one of the most complex and dangerous challenges for the ROK/U.S. alliance, as do the likely post-conflict conditions. The potential for irregular warfare threats, including an insurgency and the use of asymmetric capabilities, requires a comprehensive irregular warfare strategy in addition to nuclear and conventional war plans. By preparing for the full range of these challenges now, particularly in the information domain, the ROK/U.S. alliance can mitigate the risks of regional destabilization and create a pathway toward a peaceful and stable unification of the Korean Peninsula. The development and implementation of an irregular warfare campaign are not just strategic imperatives but necessary steps in ensuring long-term peace and security in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, the alliance must keep its eye on the prize: a free and unified Korea or a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

In this article:


Written By David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.


nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · September 24, 2024




14. S. Korea, U.S. keep 'unwavering' readiness posture against possible N.K. provocations: ambassador



S. Korea, U.S. keep 'unwavering' readiness posture against possible N.K. provocations: ambassador | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 25, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is maintaining an "unwavering" readiness posture "around the clock" against potential North Korean provocations through close cooperation with the United States, Seoul's top envoy to Washington said Tuesday, amid concerns over Pyongyang's growing nuclear and missile threats.

Ambassador Cho Hyun-dong made the remarks as the North has ratcheted up tensions with its rare disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility, display of a new road-mobile launcher for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and continued weapons tests.

"As there have been significant North Korean provocations during periods of government changes in Washington, our government has been keeping an unwavering response posture around the clock through watertight information sharing and coordination on responses (to contingencies) between South Korea and the U.S.," Cho said during a meeting with reporters.


South Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong speaks during a meeting with reporters in Washington on Sept. 24, 2024. (Yonhap)

His remarks came amid concerns that Pyongyang could engage in major provocations, including an ICBM launch and a nuclear test, near the U.S. presidential election in November to draw attention, demonstrate its military power and bolster its leverage.

Commenting on the U.S. election, Cho assessed that a tight race between Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris and her Republican rival Donald Trump is continuing as anticipated.

He said that the embassy will make its own preparations to ensure close policy cooperation with Washington regardless of who wins the White House.

South Korean policymakers have been closely watching developments in the U.S. election season as who occupies the Oval Office would affect America's policy on the South Korea-U.S. alliance, North Korean threats and other key issues in the bilateral relations.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 25, 2024



De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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