Quotes of the Day:

"At least once every human should have to run for his life, to teach him that milk does not come from supermarkets, that safety does not come from policeman, that news is not something that happens to other people. He might learn how his ancestors lived, and that he himself is no different – in the crunch, his life depends on his agility, alertness, and personal resourcefulness.”

– Robert Heinlein

“Many who are self-taught far excel the doctors, masters, and bachelors of the most renowned universities.”

– Ludwig Von Mises

"The mark of an immature man is that he wants to die nobly for a cause, while the mark of a mature man is that he wants to live humbly for one."

– J.aD. Salinger

1. Why Are We Afraid of Women’s Rights—and Women’s Voices?

2. [Exclusive] Escapees Aid North Korean POW Youths in Ukraine - 프리덤조선

3. Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery

4. A short history of the Koreas, in eight maps

5. Seoul’s Ukraine concerns return

6. South Korea's Lee unveils 'END' initiative for peace on Korean Peninsula

7. 'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (2) The Roots of Heroism: How Does North Korean Education Brainwash People？

8. South Korea Warns US Projects Remain in Limbo Without Visa Fix

9. U.S., ROK Navies Conduct CONSOL During Freedom Edge 25

10. North and South Korea are ‘in reality’ two separate states: Unification minister

11. From 'Security and Economy with the U.S.' to 'Chaos in Both'?

12. Pursuing nukes would leave ROK vulnerable to North Korean strikes: Vipin Narang

13. N. Korea presumed to possess up to 2,000 kg of highly enriched uranium: unification minister

14. N. Korea's top diplomat to visit China from Sept. 27-30

15. N. Korea urges discipline among officials ahead of party anniversary

16. N. Korea opens large restaurant near borders with China, Russia

17. N. Korea trains propaganda army for party anniversary push

18. U.S. command ship arrives in Busan to replenish supplies

19. Nat'l Assembly passes resolution for successful APEC hosting, Korean peace

20. Lee’s U.N. proposal raises concerns over nuclear recognition

21. Why now is the time for a One Korea policy

1. Why Are We Afraid of Women’s Rights—and Women’s Voices?

​Another important essay from my friend and colleague at CAPS, Ms. Jihyun Park who is from north Korea na dnow a human rights activist and political leader in the UK.

When I think of an example of a person with the warrior spirit Ms. Park comes to my mind especially when you define the warrior spirit this way. She exemplifies every one of these traits:

The warrior spirit is a mindset characterized by courage, perseverance, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to one's values and goals, even in the face of adversity. 

​We must pay attention to Ms Park's writings.

[블챌] 일상 포토덤프

Why Are We Afraid of Women’s Rights—and Women’s Voices?

https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/224021690461 ​

​

freedom88-

1시간 전

 이웃추가

본문 기타 기능

Why Are We Afraid of Women’s Rights—and Women’s Voices?

​

Women’s rights are not a peripheral issue. They are the most precise measure of a nation’s human rights. Can women speak safely? Are their lives respected? Are their voices reflected in politics and institutions? The answers to these questions reveal the true state of justice and freedom in any society.

​

A Century of Political Participation—Still Too Short

​

It’s been barely a hundred years since women began participating in elections and entering political spaces. After World War II, during the Cold War era, feminism emerged as a new political language—but its voice was often diluted or absorbed by institutional power. Today, the term “gender” may seem inclusive, but in reality, it often confines women’s rights within abstract frameworks. Women’s lived experiences cannot be reduced to theory. They are physical, specific, and urgent.

​

The North Korean Case: Why the Reaction to Women’s Rights Was Immediate

​

On February 7, 2014, the UN Human Rights Council released a landmark report exposing North Korea’s human rights violations. Just seven months later, on September 13, 2014, North Korea issued its own rebuttal report titled “DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies.” Strikingly, the centerpiece of this report was women’s rights.

​

Why women? Why did North Korea respond to a wide range of human rights accusations by foregrounding women’s lives? Because women’s rights are the most powerful ethical benchmark. Women’s voices expose the deepest layers of state violence. And when that silence is broken, power trembles. North Korea used women’s rights as a shield to absorb international criticism—but in doing so, it placed itself directly under the scrutiny of that very standard.

​

That choice was paradoxical. By invoking women’s rights, North Korea stood before a moral threshold defined not by political rhetoric, but by the weight of lived testimony.

​

When Silence Is Enforced

​

Today, a space was meant to open for discussing North Korean women’s rights. But the event was abruptly canceled. I want to believe it was due to technical issues. I don’t want to assume pressure or interference. Yet when a woman’s voice is silenced, we must ask: was it coincidence—or another repetition of structural suppression?

​

Women’s rights are not a “sensitive topic.” They are a mirror that reflects the raw face of power. Especially in North Korea, women’s lives testify to the most intimate forms of state violence. And when those voices begin to surface—whether through technical glitches or political discomfort—the ground shakes. That tremor asks us: is this society ready to hear women speak?

​

Why Does North Korea Fear Women’s Rights?

​

North Korea’s constitution claims gender equality. But in reality, women exist within a deeply patriarchal system—as tools of revolution, not as full human beings. They are expected to bear children, support men, and conform to standards of appearance and obedience. One example is the infamous “Fifth Division” (5과), which selects women based on looks and docility, then forcibly assigns them to music troupes, overseas restaurants, and performance groups. These women are used for foreign currency generation and regime propaganda, often subjected to sexual service and exploitation. This is not cultural work—it is state-sponsored trafficking, a modern-day comfort women system.

​

Women are called “flowers” in North Korean songs and slogans. It may sound poetic, but it reduces women to decorative objects. From middle school, girls with attractive appearances are selected without consent and forced into national service. Under the guise of art and performance, they are exploited for loyalty funds and regime image-building.

​

Though the constitution promises freedom of education and employment, women are only mobilized when the state needs

댓글

댓글

​​

이웃추가

freedom88-

이웃101명

꿈을 이룬 사람은 다른 사람의 꿈이 된다! 매일 일상을 기록하고 나 만의 공간을 만들어간다. 중년의 나이 이지만 영어를 배우는 사람 #탈북자

2. [Exclusive] Escapees Aid North Korean POW Youths in Ukraine - 프리덤조선

​Photos at the link: http://fcs.news/View.aspx?No=3795166

[Exclusive] Escapees Aid North Korean POW Youths in Ukraine - 프리덤조선

Activists have launched a campaign to help the psychological crisis of Ukrainian prisoners of war who feel afraid and guilty under pressure from Pyongyang regime

MK Lee승인 2025.09.24 19:11 | 최종 수정 2025.09.24 19:28

fcs.news · MK Lee mkdkq7@gmail.com · September 24, 2025

The GyeoRe-Eol Nation Unifed FR CEO Seyul Jang and Mmembers / Photo = the GyeoRe-Eol Nation Unifed FR

(Seoul) - NGO Council for North Korean Human Rights(NGO CNKHR) will host the North Korean Human Rights World Congress in Seoul from Oct. 21 to 24. The group said its main focus will be a new initiative to support the safe return of young North Korean soldiers captured on the battlefield in Ukraine.

According to CNKHR, it has recently received reports from Ukrainian journalists and human rights activists describing dire conditions for the captured soldiers in prisoner-of-war camps.

The North Korean regime has branded POWs as “traitors,” leaving the young men in deep fear of reprisals against their families. Many reportedly suffer from guilt, suicidal thoughts, and self-harm.

Ukrainian forces have so far captured three North Korean soldiers. One took his own life shortly after capture, while the other two show severe anxiety and suicidal tendencies, local human rights officials said. Experts describe their state as “a serious psychological crisis.”

North Korean defectors and human rights activists in Seoul are talking to help Ukrainian prisoners of war / Photo = = the GyeoRe-Eol Nation Unifed FR

On Aug. 10, inmates in Ukraine held an emergency meeting to discuss ways to support the young soldiers’ mental health. They agreed to raise funds to purchase traditional North Korean food and deliver it through Ukrainian rights groups, hoping the familiar meals might provide comfort. Defectors also pledged to send handwritten letters and video messages of encouragement.

Young North Korean POWs captured by the Ukrainian military are suffering from severe suicidal thoughts because they fear their families will be oppressed for themselves. One North Korean officer, POW, has already committed suicide.

Former North Korean soldiers once dispatched to Russia, now living in South Korea, vowed to take an active role. They testified to the grim realities of the battlefield and urged the captured youth to choose freedom with courage.

On Sept. 24, the GyeoRe-Eol Nation Unifed FR(GNU, CEO Seyul Jang) delivered its first batch of aid—including 1.15 million won, 60 handwritten letters, video messages, flyers, and traditional gochujang—to a Ukrainian military press team, which will pass them to the prisoners. Organizers said the packages are meant to provide psychological relief and a sense of connection to home.

60 handwritten letters from North Korean defectors settled in South Korea to young North Korean prisoners of war in Ukraine / Photo = the GyeoRe-Eol Nation Unifed FR

GNU plans to continue working with defectors’ networks and Ukrainian rights groups to provide health food, counseling programs, and exchanges of letters and videos.

“Helping North Korean POWs return freely is more than a relief effort—it is a mission to restore human rights and dignity to those forced into battle,” a member of GNU said. “We urgently call for the international community’s attention and cooperation.”

Through voluntary solidarity and international cooperation, defectors and activists hope this initiative will open a path of hope for young North Koreans caught in war.

※ This article was translated into English with the assistance of ChatGPT. If you find any errors, please contact the Freedom Chosun editorial team at mkdkq7@gmail.com

프리덤조선 MK Lee mkdkq7@gmail.com

MK Lee의 기사 더보기

저작권자 ⓒ 프리덤조선 무단 전재 및 재배포 금지

fcs.news · MK Lee mkdkq7@gmail.com · September 24, 2025

3. Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery

​China is complicit in north Korean human rights violations.

Excerpts:

“Urgent and immediate action, which will run contrary to the prevailing politics of inter-Korean dialogue, is needed to save the lives of countless female North Korean refugees in China”. China has been complicit when it comes to perpetrating and helping cover up human rights abuses against North Korean escapees within its own borders. It has notably become a hub and a destination country for human trafficking. The usage of human trafficking, predominantly of vulnerable populations such as North Korean women, has been an unethical but easy remedy to the surplus of unmarried men left in the wake of the One-Child policy. China is notably a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons put forth by the United Nations. Refusing to implement the non-refoulment principle violates the North Korean escapees’ fundamental human rights, from the right to a fair trial to protection from torture. By denying North Korean escapees the right to asylum and refusing to grant them the status of refugees, the Chinese government is directly responsible for the vulnerability and exploitation of North Korean people, particularly when it comes to women and children in their own country.

As a signatory of multiple U.N. conventions to protect human rights and as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it is of the utmost importance that China adhere to the bylaws it agreed to as it sets a precedent for other nations. The Chinese government should grant North Korean escapees the right to asylum in China as well as refugee status. Banning the practice of forced repatriation is imperative to implementing the non-refoulement principle.

Suffering Behind Closed Doors:North Korean Women as Victims of Chinese Sexual Slavery

9/18/2025

NK Hidden Gulag Blog

NKhiddengulag.org

By Sloane Thor

Edited by Diletta De Luca

​​

Introduction

In recent years, dozens and hundreds of North Koreans have escaped their homeland and made the perilous passage across the Tumen River into China. Many North Korean escapees flee from conditions defined by a chronic lack of food and rights due to the songbun system that leaves them disadvantaged and at risk of political persecution. Others leave to seek an income to maintain and support their families in North Korea (often to pay for medical treatment for a relative), or to reunite with family that already left the country. Since the DMZ is full of landmines, the only way to reach freedom for these escapees is to go through China in order to eventually reach resettlement in South Korea.

North Korean escapees are also vulnerable due to their status as illegal immigrants in China. The Chinese government does not grant refugee status or asylum to North Korean escapees, as it instead considers them illegal economic migrants. This causes many North Koreans who cross the border into China to be subjected to exploitation due their undocumented status and the Chinese government’s refusal to implement the non-refoulement principle (outlined in the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention), meaning that escapees who are caught will be forcibly repatriated back to North Korea where they will be heavily punished. They are often tortured and sent to prison camps for their defection, as it is seen as “treachery against the nation” by the North Korean Ministry of People’s Security. North Korean escapees are not able to obtain working permits, or residency permits due to their “illegal”status in China. This makes them dependent on Chinese citizens in order to obtain housing or work. Coupled with the lack of Chinese language skills, this leaves them extremely exploitable.

North Korean female escapees are particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. They are easily manipulated due to age, status, risk of refoulment, and gender. The most prominent human rights abuses that befall North Korean women escapees are forced marriage, prostitution, and sexual slavery in the cyber realm.

The Vulnerability of North Korean Women

The vulnerability of North Korean women makes them particularly easy targets for traffickers and brokers. Korean NGOs estimate that up to 80% of the female escapees become victims of human trafficking. Victims are usually between the ages of 12 and 29 but some research reports victims as young as 9 years old. Being undocumented and at the risk of refoulement makes it easy for traffickers to control them through threats of exposure to officials if they do not comply with their demands. The risk of refoulement means that victims of human trafficking are unable to ask for help or report to officials as they risk being sent back to North Korea and thus being treated worse than prior to escaping.

The undocumented status of North Korean women in China provides an environment where physical, sexual, mental, and emotional abuse are used to control the women to mold them into complaisant sex slaves. In a recent report published by Korea Future it is noted that North Korean women are subjected to “supplementary violence designed to induce compliance and delivered in the forms of starvation, physical beatings, and verbal threats of repatriation”. This makes them easier to control and less likely to try to escape.

Arranged Marriages and the One-Child Policy

30% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into forced marriages with Chinese men, often in rural areas. This is because in China there is a high demand for young, sexually exploitable, and “marriage material” women as an effect of the “One-Child Policy”. This measure was enacted in 1979 and abolished in 2016, and it existed in a law that limited couples to only having one child as an attempt to curb a rapidly rising population. However, the policy resulted in a surplus of over 40 million boys due to the male-dominated culture. The families tended to favor boys over girls as it was preferred to “have a male child to carry on the family’s name and inheritance.” Thus, many Chinese women during this time were born in cities while few to none were born in rural areas as farm work was often carried out by men. This resulted in a high demand for brides in rural areas since the cities were far away and the Chinese women there were becoming educated and setting their sights on wealthier marriage partners This created a lucrative industry of “black-market brides” (trafficking victims from other countries) to remedy the vast gender imbalance, especially in rural areas of China.

Once a price is agreed upon by a broker and the soon-to-be Chinese husband, North Korean wives are relocated to the Chinese families who, fearing their escape, heavily restrict their freedom of movement for weeks or months by withholding access to a mobile phone, the internet, or the ability to travel outside the property without a family member. While in the village, North Korean women nevertheless are unlikely to be reported to the police or to other local authorities. Additionally, even if they are reported to local authorities, it remains highly unlikely that their presence is revealed to higher level officials. This can be due to bribes or the Chinese concept of guanxi, a system of social networks and relationships that facilitate deals and influence transactions. Guanxi, while an important part of Chinese culture, facilitates the trafficking industry by causing citizens to protect the illegal acts of others to gain favor or receive an advantage or benefit in return.

Prostitution and Brothels

While forced marriage has long been the predominant fate for trafficked North Korean women, it has quickly been overtaken by prostitution. Korea Future estimates that prostitution in general accounts for about 6% of China’s GDP. Currently, it is estimated that 50% of North Korean women who are trafficked in China are sold into brothels, karaoke bars, or other forms of forced prostitution. Prostitution in China seems to be managed by criminal organizations who remain reliant upon the guanxi system and rarely operate nationwide as they prefer to opt for small regions or cities. Many of these North Korean escapees work “in brothels masqueraded as entertainment or service venues, namely: bathhouses, saunas, karaoke bars, cafes, massage parlors, beauty parlors, barbershops, hair salons, small hotels, and restaurants”. It is estimated that North Korean women engage with 2 to 4 men a night and are subjected to multiple forms of rape. They are confined to the establishment and work under the instruction of a pimp or madam. In Shanghai, to avoid abduction by rival organizations and to signify ownership, some North Korean women are branded with tattoos, such as lions and butterflies.” Criminal organizations work closely with corrupt or bribed officials to prevent the escape by the abducted North Korean escapees.

The Chinese Cybersex Industry

With the emergence of the internet, North Korean women who become trafficking victims have been increasingly sold into the cybersex industry. These women are trapped in small apartments with a handful of other women and are sexually assaulted or forced to perform graphic sexual acts via webcam online for paying male clientele. “Unlike bars or brothels with a permanent address, cybersex trafficking victims can be moved to and abused in any location with an internet connection and a webcam, or just a mobile phone”. The cybersex exploitation of North Korean victims takes place on platforms that can be “rudimentary, deliberately inconspicuous, or simply well-known and widely available video-chat services”. The majority of clients utilizing these platforms, particularly chatrooms, tend to be from South Korea, where pornography and prostitution are illegal.

Off-camera, victims face “coercion, starvation, intimidation, and brutalization”. They are forced to cover up bruises sustained from the acts performed or from abuse by their handler with makeup and cover up hair loss with wigs. Many are often subjected to drug abuse in order to force them to work longer hours and “dull their shame”. Their handlers often dangle the chance of freedom in front of them, telling them that they can go free once they have paid off their debt or the money it took to buy them. However, the women will never see a cent from their work and will not obtain freedom as they remain trapped in a vicious cycle of abuse.

Concluding Remarks

“Urgent and immediate action, which will run contrary to the prevailing politics of inter-Korean dialogue, is needed to save the lives of countless female North Korean refugees in China”. China has been complicit when it comes to perpetrating and helping cover up human rights abuses against North Korean escapees within its own borders. It has notably become a hub and a destination country for human trafficking. The usage of human trafficking, predominantly of vulnerable populations such as North Korean women, has been an unethical but easy remedy to the surplus of unmarried men left in the wake of the One-Child policy. China is notably a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons put forth by the United Nations. Refusing to implement the non-refoulment principle violates the North Korean escapees’ fundamental human rights, from the right to a fair trial to protection from torture. By denying North Korean escapees the right to asylum and refusing to grant them the status of refugees, the Chinese government is directly responsible for the vulnerability and exploitation of North Korean people, particularly when it comes to women and children in their own country.

As a signatory of multiple U.N. conventions to protect human rights and as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, it is of the utmost importance that China adhere to the bylaws it agreed to as it sets a precedent for other nations. The Chinese government should grant North Korean escapees the right to asylum in China as well as refugee status. Banning the practice of forced repatriation is imperative to implementing the non-refoulement principle.

Sloane Thor is a recent graduate of Wittenberg University, majoring in East Asian Studies with minors in Chinese language and literature, political science, and international studies. During her time there, she completed a senior capstone project on Repression, Punishment, and Genocide: An Examination of Human Rights Violations in North Korea, which is currently being prepared for publication in the Wittenberg East Asian Studies Journal.

Her interest in North Korea stems from her time studying abroad at Yonsei University in South Korea. During her time there, she took a class on North Korean Human Rights, Human Security, the UN System and International Civil Society taught by HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu. Taking this class, along with reading North Korean escapee memoirs such as Escape from Camp 14: One Man's Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West and In Order to Live: A North Korean Girl's Journey to Freedom, motivated her to pursue North Korean human rights violations as her main topic for her senior capstone project.

Through her internship at HRNK, Sloane hopes to gain more background knowledge on the situation in North Korea from a human rights perspective. She also hopes to study more about China and the treatment of escapees there, potentially using her Mandarin Chinese language skills to do so.

King, Robert R. “Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades.” CSIS, January 27, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Washington, D.C.: U.S. (2009). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.

“World Report 2020: Rights Trends in North Korea.” Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/north-korea.

Ibid.

Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.

Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.” Forbes, July 1, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=1777b7187af0.

Yoon, Hee-soon. “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.” (2019). Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”

Lisa Cameron, Dan-dan Zhang, and Xin Meng, “China’s One-Child Policy: Effects on the Sex Ratio and Crime.” Institute for Family Studies, December 19, 2018.

Kathleen Davis, “Brides, Bruises and the Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Women into China.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 131-141, 133.

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”

Ibid.

Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China.”

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). “Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative. http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

“Cybersex Trafficking - International Justice Mission.” IJM, September 2016. https://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/IJM_2016_Casework_FactSheets_CybersexTrafficking.pdf.

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

Ji-an, Son Hyeon-yoo & Seo. “Attention for Digital Sex Crimes: A Push for Reform in South Korea.” 한양저널, June 1, 2020. https://www.hanyangian.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=992.

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

Sang-hun, Choe. “After Fleeing North Korea, Women Get Trapped as Cybersex Slaves in China.” The New York Times, September 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/asia/north-korea-cybersex-china.html#:~:text=With nowhere to turn for,in a report in May.

Zaugg, Julie. “These North Korean Defectors Were Sold into China as Cybersex Slaves. Then They Escaped.” CNN, June 10, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html.

Yoon, Hee-soon. (2019). Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China’. London: Korea Future Initiative . http://web.archive.org/web/20190614191603/https://www.koreafuture.org/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf

Micallef, Etienne. “China, EU Work to Combat Human Trafficking.” International Organization for Migration, November 15, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/china-eu-work-combat-human-trafficking.

4. A short history of the Koreas, in eight maps

​Graphics at the link: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2025/09/23/a-short-history-of-the-koreas-in-eight-maps?giftId=8cfb2045-acbb-4640-bce8-a10384cf5cce&utm_campaign=gifted_article

A short history of the Koreas, in eight maps

To understand the two countries, you have to understand that they are one nation

Sep 23rd 2025

|

6 min read

W

hether born in the prosperous capitalist democracy of the south or the communist monarchy of the north, every Korean learns that their country came to be because bears have a higher tolerance for garlic and boredom than do tigers. Now barbed wire and landmines divide the country. But until very recently Koreans were taught that they were a single people, the hanminjok. These eight maps trace Korea’s history from its mythic beginnings to the present day.

According to legend, Korea’s history begins when a deity told a bear and a tiger to spend 100 days in a cave eating only garlic and mugwort, a herb. The tiger quit. The bear lasted and the god turned her into a woman as a reward. She bore him a son, Dangun, who founded Gojoseon, the first Korean kingdom, in 2333BC. The horse-riding, bronze-weapon-wielding people of Gojoseon prospered until clashes with the Han, the Chinese people to the north, caused its fall in 108BC.

Three kingdoms—Baekje, Silla and Goguryeo—then rose and fought for control. Warring between these proto-Korean powers kept the borders moving. Goguryeo was the mightiest. By the fifth century AD it stretched into what is now China and Russia. But by the late-600s Silla had vanquished its rivals and driven out the Chinese. For the first time, Koreans were united.

Silla controlled the peninsula for almost three centuries. But by the ninth century its power had waned. Small, rebellious states emerged, the strongest being Goryeo, from which “Korea” comes, founded in 918. It took control of the peninsula in 936 and ruled until the Mongols invaded in the 13th century. In the 14th Goryeo expelled the invaders and, in an act of hubris, its king ordered Yi Seong-gye, his general, to attack China. Yi rebelled instead, seizing the throne in 1392, and became King Taejo, the first king of the Joseon dynasty.

Among Joseon kings, Sejong, who reigned from 1418 to 1450, was the greatest. He ordered the creation of hangul, Korea’s elegant writing system. He also fixed the northern border on the Yalu and Tumen rivers, where it remains. By the mid-15th century Korea as we know it was whole, protected by oceans on three sides and rivers on the fourth.

The Joseon dynasty reigned for 500 years with brief interruptions, caused by invasions from Korea’s neighbours. In the 19th century Japan, which had been forced by America to open itself to trade, sought to control Korea, in part to use it as a buffer against outside forces on the mainland. In 1910 Japan annexed the peninsula.

Colonial rule was brutal. But resistance to Japan also fostered a sense of nationhood. Both Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president, and Kim Il Sung, his North Korean counterpart, cut their teeth in the struggle against Japan.

On August 15th 1945 Japan announced its surrender to the Allies, ending the second world war (and Japan’s occupation of Korea). The Soviet army had already entered Korea; American forces were 600 miles away. To stop the peninsula falling into Russian hands, the Americans proposed dividing it along the 38th parallel. The Soviets, to America’s surprise, agreed.

Korea had been a unified country for almost 1,300 years. Now, at the stroke of a pen, it was divided along a line with no historical, cultural or geographical significance to Koreans.

Neither the Americans nor the Soviets intended the division to last. But as Kim returned home from the Soviet Union and Rhee from lobbying the Americans in Washington, DC, each sought to bring the peninsula under his rule. In 1948 the United Nations (UN) called for elections in Korea. The North Koreans objected, so elections were only held in the south. These led to the foundation of the Republic of Korea on August 15th, the third anniversary of Japan’s defeat. The North held elections ten days later, forming the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Soviets and Americans largely withdrew, leaving two Koreas that both claimed the entire peninsula.

On June 25th 1950 North Korea invaded the south. Within three days its troops had captured Seoul, the capital city. The UN authorised American intervention. The first American troops arrived in July, only to be beaten back, along with the South Korean army, to Busan, in the far south-east. On July 27th the UN created the United Nations Command (UNC), an American-led coalition that 22 countries would contribute to throughout the war.

A daring UNC gambit turned the tide. On September 15th Douglas MacArthur, the force’s American commander, landed 80,000 marines and 260 ships at Incheon, near Seoul. Within two weeks they had retaken the capital, and soon the rest of the peninsula south of the 38th parallel.

Restoring the pre-war borders was not enough for MacArthur. Defying Harry Truman, the American president, he crossed the dividing line, taking Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on October 19th. MacArthur pushed all the way up to the two rivers that divide North Korea from China. Had he stopped at the 38th parallel, the war would have caused just over 100,000 military and civilian casualties. Instead, the fighting that ensued after his push north left as many as 2.5m Koreans dead or wounded, around 8% of the population.

Mao Zedong, China’s leader, wanted North Korea as a buffer between it and South Korea, a Western foothold on the mainland—a wish Chinese leaders still have. MacArthur’s assault spurred him to act. On November 27th the Chinese attacked, forcing back the UN troops. Pyongyang fell on December 6th, and Seoul on January 4th.

The Chinese and North Koreans pushed on, getting about 50km beyond the South’s capital before the UNC stopped them. On March 15th the South Koreans and their allies retook Seoul. It was the fourth time the city had changed hands in less than a year.

The war came to a near stalemate. On July 27th 1953 the UN, China and North Korea signed an armistice. South Korea did not sign—Rhee did not want to end the war until he controlled the whole peninsula. The deal ended the fighting but not the hostilities. The two Koreas remain, technically, at war.

The armistice allowed a scab to grow over the gash across the peninsula. The border between the two Koreas became the Military Demarcation Line. Each army withdrew by 2km, creating a demilitarised zone (DMZ). The only point of contact is the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, where the two sides can meet for talks and exchange prisoners. The DMZ, ringed with barbed wire and landmines, has been the site of numerous skirmishes. Disputes over the nautical boundary have led to clashes at sea. But near as the two sides have sometimes come, the war has never resumed.

The south grew rich and, after a period of dictatorship, became democratic, though not always content; competition for school places, jobs and housing is fierce. The north’s economy collapsed in the 1990s after the Soviet Union fell. Its rulers held on, building nuclear weapons and amassing wealth while ordinary people starved. North Koreans have exploited gaps in the regime’s power to survive. Few on either side know more of the other than propaganda allows.

The north recently renounced the idea of one Korean people—they believe that South Koreans have been so corrupted by American thinking that they are no longer part of the hanminjok. Yet for many Koreans old lessons, like old wounds, are hard to forget. ■

5. Seoul’s Ukraine concerns return

Junotane

Seoul’s Ukraine concerns return

https://junotane.com/posts/seouls-ukraine-concerns-return

Donald Trump’s recent statement that Ukraine could “WIN all of Ukraine back” signals a remarkable departure from his earlier skepticism. For years, he questioned NATO, disparaged Kyiv, and suggested that European wars were not America’s problem. Now, eight months into his presidency, he is publicly voicing confidence in Ukraine’s battlefield prospects and NATO’s role in sustaining them. This carries direct implications for U.S. allies - particularly South Korea.

There are three broad reasons why South Korea is in a particularly difficult position. First, the neocons that are rapidly filling the intellectual and policy vacuum of the Trump Administration sustain a sense of bottled anger towards South Korea and its lack of support under the Biden Administration. Second, South Korea’s continuing economic and security dependence on the U.S. leaves it as “low-hanging fruit” to a president that loves to punch down. Third, but more remotely, in Trump’s egocentric brain-fart logic, the notion that Putin was able to draw in North Korean support, but the U.S. couldn’t draw in South Korean support, is a slap - not in the face, but in a more painful part of the male anatomy. Each of these reasons should concern Seoul.

The first reason lies in Washington itself. The neocons who are quickly consolidating influence within Trump’s administration never forgave South Korea’s hedging under Biden. Seoul gave humanitarian aid; tightened export controls; provided sold artillery shells indirectly through the U.S; and it expanded its arms sales to European states—but it refused to donate lethal arms directly to Ukraine. South Korea suffered less blowback and profited more than the neocons. It was more neocon than the neocons. In certain quarters, this has been rhetorically expressed as “freeloading”.

Now, with Trump embracing a narrative of Ukrainian victory, these voices will argue that the only way to demonstrate a revitalized coalition is to close the gaps left under Biden. South Korea will sit near the top of that list: a democratic ally with a powerful arms industry, yet one that has so far refused to cross the line. In their eyes, it is time for Seoul to be forced into line.

The second reason is South Korea’s structural vulnerability. Trump has always preferred to target allies that can be bent easily under pressure. South Korea fits this pattern perfectly.

Economically, Seoul depends heavily on access to the U.S. market. Tariffs, export restrictions, or revived trade disputes could quickly inflict pain. Militarily, the country is inseparable from the U.S. alliance system: tens of thousands of American troops remain stationed on the peninsula, and Washington provides the extended deterrence guarantee against Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal.

This dependency makes South Korea low-hanging fruit. Trump does not need to wrestle with the complexities of NATO’s internal politics or the domestic resistance of larger European states. By squeezing Seoul, he can claim a quick victory: another ally forced to shoulder the burden of Ukraine, another demonstration of his ability to bend the international order to his will. Another negotiating coin in his purse for the next time he talks with Putin.

The third reason is less about policy and more about Trump’s peculiar worldview. North Korea has already provided military support to Russia. For Trump, this creates a crude but powerful contrast: if Putin can pull Pyongyang into his war effort, why can’t Washington pull Seoul?

In Trump’s mind, this is not just a question of strategy—it is a question of ego. The idea that the U.S. president cannot extract from Seoul what Putin has extracted from Pyongyang becomes, for him, an intolerable insult. 

The refusal to directly arm Ukraine, let alone send troops, is not merely a slap in the face, but in a more painful part of the male anatomy. Such a perception, however irrational, increases the likelihood that Trump will escalate demands beyond what Biden ever attempted.

AND escalation is the name of the game. Whether South Korea ever actually comes close to directly arming or sending troops to Ukraine is not the issue. In just floating the suggestion in an awkwardly worded un-diplomatic social media post with random capital letters and pre-school level sign-offs, Trump will have in one instant cornered Seoul in the next negotiations on how much investment they’re undertaking in the U.S. and how much more money they’re going to pay for U.S. troops in South Korea.

Taken together, these three factors create a precarious situation. Neocon resentment primes Washington’s intellectual climate for harsher demands. South Korea’s economic and military dependence makes it a tempting and convenient target. Trump’s own ego ensures that Moscow’s success with Pyongyang will be used as leverage to shame Seoul into compliance.

If Trump’s confidence in Ukrainian victory hardens into policy (and this is in no way certain), Seoul will face enormous pressure to provide lethal arms directly to Ukraine. Refusal will be framed as betrayal, damaging Korea’s reputation with both the U.S. and Europe and undermining its standing as a reliable supplier to NATO states. Compliance will trigger retaliation from Moscow, further tightening the Russia–North Korea axis and worsening security on the peninsula.

The warning is simple: South Korea is positioned as low-hanging fruit for Trump’s Ukraine strategy. His rhetoric should not be dismissed as passing bravado. It must be watched carefully, because if his words solidify into demands, Seoul may soon find itself trapped in a contest it cannot win. The choice will be to go down with the sinking boat, or swim to the distant shore. 

Commentary

South Korea

Trump

6. South Korea's Lee unveils 'END' initiative for peace on Korean Peninsula

​I wonder if we can get Jim Morrison's Doors song, "The End" for the theme song for the new doctrine.

"This is the end

Beautiful friend

This is the end

My only friend, the end"

(Especially relevant with the scenes from Apocalypse Now).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epjS8JLYe-4

On a more serious note, the Lee administration has built this strategy for the international community by emphasizing the English words for the acronym END. - engagement, normalization, denuclearization. 

Will this moniker catch on?

I fully support the END. (i.e., the end of the division of the peninsula and the end of the Kim family regime.)

World News Sept. 24, 2025 / 4:55 AM

South Korea's Lee unveils 'END' initiative for peace on Korean Peninsula

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/09/24/korea-Lee-Jae-Myung-United-Nations-General-Assembly-speech-END-peace-North-Korea/9391758702092/

By Thomas Maresca

Lee Jae Myung unveiled his 'END initiative' for peace on the Korean Peninsula during an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Tuesday. Photo by Peter Foley/UPI | License Photo

Sept. 24 (UPI) -- South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Tuesday pledged "to end the vicious cycle of unnecessary inter-Korean military tension and hostile acts," while unveiling a peace initiative that includes a "phased solution" to denuclearizing North Korean.

Lee made the remarks during his debut address before the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

While highlighting his administration's efforts to improve relations with the North, Lee proposed a new dialogue initiative centered around "exchange, normalization and denuclearization," which he described with the acronym "END."

South Korea "will end the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula through the END initiative and fulfill its responsibility and role to contribute to world peace and prosperity," Lee said.

Related

• Trump to U.N.: 'Your countries are going to hell'
• North Korea's Kim has 'fond memories' of Trump, is open to talks
• North Korea says nuclear weapons status 'irreversible'

"The first step will be to restore broken inter-Korean trust and shift to a stance of mutual respect," he said.

Lee's administration has made efforts to reduce tensions between the two Koreas since he took office in June, with conciliatory gestures such as removing propaganda loudspeakers from border areas. Last month, Lee pledged to "respect" North Korea's political system and said Seoul would not seek unilateral reunification or engage in hostile acts.

"Going forward, the government of the Republic of Korea will consistently seek a path to reduce military tensions and restore inter-Korean trust," Lee said Tuesday. "The most certain peace is a state where there is no need to fight."

His remarks about the END initiative were short on details, but Lee said that Seoul would work to expand inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation while encouraging dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

"We will provide our active support and cooperation for efforts to normalize relations with the international community, including between the United States and the DPRK," Lee said, using the official acronym for North Korea.

He also called for a "pragmatic and phased solution" to North Korea's nuclear program, starting with a halt to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development. The next step would be a reduction of the arsenal before its final dismantlement, Lee said.

"Denuclearization is undoubtedly a grave task, but it is time to seek realistic and rational solutions based on a cool-headed perception that denuclearization cannot be achieved in the short term," he said.

On Sunday, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un rejected any phased approach toward disarmament, saying the country would never relinquish its nuclear weapons.

"The concept of 'denuclearization' has already lost its meaning," Kim said. "The world already knows what the United States does after making a country give up its nuclear weapons and disarm."

However, Kim said that he has "fond memories" of his previous meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and indicated he would be open to holding new talks if denuclearization were off the table.

Trump said last month he planned to meet with Kim again, but did not mention North Korea in his own lengthy address to the General Assembly on Tuesday.

7. 'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (2) The Roots of Heroism: How Does North Korean Education Brainwash People？

​Life in north Korea is so unimaginable to us.

'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (2) The Roots of Heroism: How Does North Korean Education Brainwash People？

asiapress.org

Propaganda poster with Lee Su-bok's image and memoir. North Korean senior middle school 2nd year "Socialist Morality and Law" textbook. (Published in 2014)

Kim Jong-un's regime's ongoing creation of "new heroes" is closely linked to North Korea's education system. This article examines the massive propaganda apparatus in schools—based on the experiences of a journalist educated in North Korea and analysis of North Korean textbooks obtained by ASIAPRESS—and explores how extensively schools indoctrinate youth with heroism, creating a desire for everyone to become heroes. (JEON Song-jun / KANG Ji-won)

'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (1) Creating a ‘new hero’ myth through propaganda

◆Distorted Heroes Carved into Young Hearts

Regardless of culture, heroes are captivating figures that capture children's hearts. Children who need role models while forming their identity learn moral ideals and courage from heroic figures, gaining motivation to apply these lessons to their daily lives.

What makes the North Korean regime so vicious is that it exploits children's pure admiration for heroes as fodder for brainwashing to maintain the state system. The heroes the state presents as models are "suicide warriors" who unhesitatingly sacrifice their lives for the leader.

Children sing nursery rhymes like "I want to be a hero child, I want to be a hero soldier" while forming their identity based on distorted heroic images of those who died burning in fires, exploding themselves, and jumping into water for their leader.

At the building entrance is the slogan "Let us defend with our lives the Party Central Committee headed by beloved comrade Kim Jong-un!" Hyesan photographed from the Chinese side of the border in October 2024 (ASIAPRESS)

◆Death-Praising Poems Memorized by the Entire Population

North Korean classrooms are key venues for systematically instilling heroism in children. The journalist writing this article, having gone through that system, is also a victim of it.

There's a poem supposedly left in the notebook of 18-year-old Lee Su-bok, who allegedly died blocking an enemy gun position with his chest during the Korean War. Known as "Hero Lee Su-bok's Memoir," the poem goes:

"I am a youth of liberated Korea. Life is precious too. The brilliant hope of tomorrow is precious too. But my life, my hope, my happiness— These are not more precious than the fate of my homeland. For my one and only homeland, Though I have but one irreplaceable life, Just as I dedicate my youth, Where else could there be such noble life, beautiful hope, great happiness!"

This poem, so famous in North Korea that not knowing it would make you a spy, had to be memorized repeatedly from school entrance to graduation. The brainwashing effect was considerable—even the journalist himself recalls times during his school years when he and his classmates recited this poem together with swelling hearts.

asiapress.org

8. South Korea Warns US Projects Remain in Limbo Without Visa Fix

​Karma and blowback are a bi*tch.

South Korea Warns US Projects Remain in Limbo Without Visa Fix

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-24/south-korea-says-us-projects-will-remain-in-limbo-until-visa-fix?utm

By Soo-Hyang Choi, Shery Ahn, and Heesu Lee

September 24, 2025 at 6:00 PM EDT

Updated on September 25, 2025 at 1:24 AM EDT

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

• South Korea’s investment projects in the US will remain in limbo until visa issues are resolved, according to Prime Minister Kim Min-seok.
• The visa issue arose after hundreds of South Koreans were taken into custody in a raid on a Hyundai Motor Co. and LG Energy Solution Ltd. battery plant under construction in Georgia.
• The visa issue and investment plans are part of trade deal negotiations between South Korea and the US, which also include a $350 billion investment fund and a 15% tariff on South Korean goods.

South Korea’s investment projects in the US will remain in limbo until visa issues are resolved, the nation’s prime minister said, urging Washington to act quickly to reassure Koreans concerned about getting detained for working there.

“Without resolving the visa issue, meaningful progress remains virtually impossible,” South Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Min-seok told Bloomberg News in Seoul on Wednesday in an exclusive interview that also touched on defense spending and North Korea.

“Although the projects have not been entirely halted or formally placed on hold, it will be very difficult for a large number of workers to enter or re-enter the US until this problem is resolved,” Kim said, referring to the visa issue, which also casts a cloud over an additional $350 billion investment fund agreed in a July trade deal.

The prime minister’s office later said in a statement that his remarks are unrelated to the $350 billion investment scheme under discussions with the US.

The two countries are working to revise the visa system after hundreds of South Koreans were taken into custody in a raid on a Hyundai Motor Co. and LG Energy Solution Ltd. battery plant under construction in Georgia earlier this month.

The detainees were released and returned home about a week after the raid but the incident has rattled South Korea where images of shackled workers have circulated widely and fueled public anger, raising questions about the hefty US investment plans of Korean conglomerates.

“In the absence of firm assurances regarding their safety, both they and their families are understandably reluctant to enter the US again while this matter remains unresolved,” the prime minister said.

• More on South Korea’s economy:Korea Should Keep Easing Policy, Push for Structural Reform: IMF
• Korea Consumer Confidence Dips First Time Since March on Tariffs
• TSMC’s Rise to Push Taiwan Past South Korea in Key Wealth Gauge
• Korea-US Trade Talks Remain in Deadlock After Raid Fuels Tension
• South Korea Scraps Capital Gains Tax Plans After Retail Backlash

The visa issue hit the allies just as South Korea and the US are engaged in intense negotiations to finalize a trade deal that sets a 15% tariff on South Korean goods including automobiles. Finalizing the agreement has proven difficult as the two sides remain divided over how to structure and execute the $350 billion investment package, a central pillar of the agreement.

A South Korean presidential official said Seoul had expected the fund to be structured mainly as loans and loan guarantees rather than direct capital injections when they agreed on the framework in July. But the US has been demanding more equity investment as they look to sign a memorandum of understanding.

Explainer: Why Trump Immigration Raid Snared South Korea Workers Over Visas

The dollar value of the investment pledge with Washington amounts to more than 70% of South Korea’s foreign reserves, and the shock to the Korean economy would be severe without a currency swap agreement with the US, Kim said.

President Lee Jae Myung recently said in a Reuters interview that a swap agreement is needed to avoid an economic crisis similar to what South Korea experienced in 1997 during the Asian Financial Crisis if the nation tries to meet all the US demands.

Lee met with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York on Wednesday and said he hopes the trade talks will move forward in a mutually beneficial way.

Kim declined to go into details of ongoing negotiations but said a deal that puts a significant fiscal burden on South Korea may require parliamentary approval. He said he hoped talks over the deal wouldn’t extend into next year.

“There’s the feeling that it’s difficult for us to accept that, not just the negotiating team but also among the public,” Kim said, referring to US demands similar to those set out in Japan’s $550 billion investment pledge.

The Japanese deal gives Donald Trump the option to raise tariffs on Tokyo if it chooses not to fund projects he puts forward, or doesn’t provide funding within 45 days.

Read more: Japan Risks Tariffs Hike If It Shuns Trump Investment Picks

On security, South Korea is looking to raise its defense spending to 3.5% of its GDP over the next 10 years as part of a broader push to strengthen its independent national defense, Kim said.

“Recently, we mentioned 3.5%, and we did so because we judged that this is a level we are capable of sustaining,” he said. South Korea plans to spend 2.32% of its GDP on defense this year.

Kim’s office later said that raising the country’s defense budget is still under discussion and that a decision hasn’t been made.

The nation’s overall budget also continues to grow, with the Lee administration’s efforts to stimulate the economy adding to the fiscal burden.

South Korea’s debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to climb to the high-50% range within five years from about 51% now, the prime minister said, calling the level still manageable compared with advanced economies that run ratios above 70%.

“While debt management is important, the more urgent priority is to restore growth that has fallen below potential,” Kim said. “That requires investment to lift the growth rate, which is why we’re focusing policy on fiscal expansion.”

Kim flagged the nation’s low birthrate as the biggest structural challenge for the economy, noting that repeated spending programs have failed to reverse the trend, leaving demographic pressures as the toughest long-term hurdle for economic growth.

Kim Min-seokPhotographer: Woohae Cho/Bloomberg

In the more immediate future, the drawn-out negotiations over the trade deal and the visa issue may inject awkwardness into another expected meeting between Lee and President Trump next month when the US leader visits South Korea to join a gathering of APEC leaders in Gyeongju.

As South Korea prepares to host the regional event, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has floated a potential meeting with Trump saying he has “good memories” of the US leader and could talk with him again if Washington drops its denuclearization demands.

Read more: Kim Jong Un Touts Good Trump Memories, Rejects Denuclearization

Asked about a potential meeting between Trump and North Korea’s Kim, the prime minister said he was not aware of concrete communications taking place between the US and North Korea. “Since unexpected events can always occur, I believe we can leave open the possibility.”

— With assistance from Jaehyun Eom, Kazunori Takada, Katria Alampay, and Andy Hung

(Updates with statement from Kim’s office clarifying his comments in 4th paragraph.)

9. U.S., ROK Navies Conduct CONSOL During Freedom Edge 25

​Logistics. The key to victory. 

U.S., ROK Navies Conduct CONSOL During Freedom Edge 25

https://seapowermagazine.org/u-s-rok-navies-conduct-consol-during-freedom-edge-25/?utm

Posted on September 24, 2025 by Seapower Staff

AT SEA (Sept. 18, 2025) – Republic of Korea’s Cheonji-class fast combat support ship ROKS Daecheong (AOE-58) connects its fuel line to Military Sealift Command’s commercial charter oiler MT Allied Pacific during a consolidated cargo replenishment (CONSOL) at sea, Sept. 18, in support of Freedom Edge 2025. CONSOL capability is when a specially outfitted MSC-controlled tanker conducts underway refueling operations, transferring fuel and/or cargo to combat logistics-force ships at sea. (Courtesy photo) 

by Grady T. Fontana, Sept. 24, 2025 

AT SEA – Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) commercial charter oiler motor tanker (MT) Allied Pacific conducted a consolidated cargo replenishment (CONSOL) at sea with Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Cheonji-class fast combat support ship ROKS Daecheong (AOE-58), Sept. 18, in support of Freedom Edge 25. 

Freedom Edge highlights trilateral defense cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, demonstrating their ability to achieve peace through strength on the Korean Peninsula and across the Indo-Pacific. 

“Every CONSOL with allies and partners demonstrate not just technical proficiency, but the trust and interoperability at the heart of our alliance,” said U.S. Navy Capt. David L. Reyes, commodore, MSC Far East. “It’s important that we continue to build on these efforts—each evolution strengthens our ability to operate together and ensures the fleet remains lethal, resilient and ready in the Indo-Pacific.” 

A CONSOL allows a specially outfitted MSC-controlled tanker to conduct underway refueling and cargo transfer operations with combat logistics force (CLF) ships at sea. This capability reduces the need for CLF ships to return to shore for resupply, cutting costs and maximizing time on station to support the fleet. 

According to contracted mariner Capt. Edward Markuske, master of MT Allied Pacific, his crew appreciated the opportunity to work with ROK allies. 

“They were very professional and committed to completing the mission while alongside our vessel,” said Markuske. “I hope we get more opportunities to work together with our allies in the Far East, because these joint exercises are integral to our ability to work together going forward. Our ship’s crew appreciates the sense of purpose that comes from being on mission and a job well done.” 

This evolution builds on a previous CONSOL between Allied Pacific and Daecheong in June 2025, expanding the ROK Navy’s capacity to sustain fleet operations at sea with fuel, cargo, and stores. 

“Collaborating with our international partners to conduct CONSOL exercises enhances the training of our commercial chartered vessels,” said Peter P. Bok, marine transportation specialist, MSC Far East. “The professional development provided to civilian mariners ensures they are prepared to address any potential challenge and maintain peak operational readiness, thereby supporting our Navy’s effectiveness during times of conflict, and help ensure their lethality.” 

MSC Far East supports the U.S. 7th Fleet and ensures approximately 50 ships in the Indo-Pacific Region are manned, trained, and equipped to deliver essential supplies, fuel, cargo, and equipment to warfighters, both at sea and on shore. U.S. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. 

10. North and South Korea are ‘in reality’ two separate states: Unification minister

This is so disappointing to read.​ north Korea has already been sufficiently recognized. It is a member of the UN. 

Mr. Minister: Please focus on solving the "Korea question" - the unnatural division of the peninsula. 

​However, it is interesting to see how the Minister is trying to walk the tightrope between fantasy world of peaceful coexistence (and the sustained suffering of 25 million Koreans in the north) and maintaining the alliance by not including the cancellation of combined ROK/US exercises.  But the sad truth is that the efforts with the CMA and any one sided tension reduction measures will not result in any substantive change in north Korean behavior. Kim assesses every one of the ROK proposals as a n indicator of success of his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. 

Excerpts:

The unification minister also said the Lee administration is discussing measures to follow up on the president’s pledge to halt hostile acts toward North Korea and his Aug. 18 order for step-by-step implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements.

“It is appropriate to suspend live-fire and field training exercises that resumed after the Sept. 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) was temporarily suspended. We are consulting with the defense ministry on related matters,” Chung said.

But he emphasized that exercises involving the U.S. would not be included. 

“The U.S.-ROK joint exercises and our alliance fall within the realm of our sovereignty,” he said, noting they are not under consideration for suspension despite North Korea’s sensitivity to such drills.

North and South Korea are ‘in reality’ two separate states: Unification minister

Chung Dong-young says 'temporarily' recognizing DPRK statehood does not mean abandoning unification

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/north-and-south-korea-are-in-reality-two-separate-states-unification-minister/

Joon Ha Park September 25, 2025

South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks at a ministry-hosted forum on North Korea’s “two-state theory” and the direction of an inter-Korean basic agreement in Seoul on Sept. 24, 2025. | Image: ROK Unification Ministry

Seoul’s unification minister said North and South Korea function “in reality” as two separate states, stating that acknowledging this reality “does not mean accepting permanent division.”

Chung Dong-young’s remarks at a press conference on Thursday came days after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to enshrine in law that the two Koreas are separate states and said unification is impossible “unless one of them ceases to exist.”

“North and South are, in fact, two states — already two states, even in international legal terms,” the minister said.

Citing a survey by Seoul National University, Chung noted that “more than 50 percent of the people answered that North Korea is a state.”

But he rejected the idea that recognizing this reality amounts to abandoning unification.

“Acknowledging North Korea’s statehood does not mean permanent division,” he said. “This is a realistic, practical perspective and a flexible way of looking at inter-Korean relations. It is a temporary recognition of statehood within the special relationship formed on the way toward unification.”

He argued for shifting the debate away from “unproductive and one-dimensional arguments over statehood” toward practical steps, including restoring dialogue and exchanges with Pyongyang.

South Korean media have suggested that Chung’s remarks could put him at odds with the presidential office, highlighting a long-running policy divide between a “pro-autonomy” faction that favors independent engagement with Pyongyang and a “pro-alliance” faction that prioritizes coordination with the U.S. on DPRK diplomacy.

On Wednesday, ROK National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac reportedly told journalists that “the government does not support or recognize the two-state theory.”

He said Seoul’s position remains rooted in the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, which defined North-South relations as a “temporary special relationship” until unification is achieved.

Lee reiterated South Korea’s stance on North Korea in his address to the U.N. General Assembly, saying it will “respect the other side’s system, will not pursue any form of unification by absorption and has no intention of engaging in hostile acts.”

Despite this, Chung said Thursday that the administration remains united as “one team.”

Cho Han-bum, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told NK News that the significance of Chung’s remarks depends on where the emphasis is placed, arguing that emphasizing “statehood” risks validating Pyongyang while focusing on the “special relationship” aligns with Seoul’s long-standing policy.

Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, similarly suggested that Chung’s remarks do not point to a split with the presidential office.

“The real challenge is building national consensus on unification policy rather than debating abstract notions of statehood,” he said.

Kim Jong Un declared South Korea a “belligerent state” in Dec. 2023, formally abandoning Pyongyang’s decades-old pursuit of unification.

Kim Jong Un walks past rows of centrifuges at a uranium enrichment site. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 13, 2024)

URANIUM AND THE CMA

Meanwhile, Chung also spoke about North Korea’s continued enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons, emphasizing the need to halt the country’s production of nuclear weapons.

Citing assessments from the Federation of American Scientists, the minister said the DPRK has stockpiled as much as 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), a figure that aligns with estimates by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

“Even at this moment, uranium centrifuges are spinning at four sites in North Korea,” he said, without elaborating.

North Korea is currently believed to operate centrifuge plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and Kangson. In June, the International Atomic Energy Agency said Pyongyang was building a new facility at Yongbyon that appeared similar to an existing enrichment site.

The unification minister also said the Lee administration is discussing measures to follow up on the president’s pledge to halt hostile acts toward North Korea and his Aug. 18 order for step-by-step implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements.

“It is appropriate to suspend live-fire and field training exercises that resumed after the Sept. 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) was temporarily suspended. We are consulting with the defense ministry on related matters,” Chung said.

But he emphasized that exercises involving the U.S. would not be included. 

“The U.S.-ROK joint exercises and our alliance fall within the realm of our sovereignty,” he said, noting they are not under consideration for suspension despite North Korea’s sensitivity to such drills.

Edited by Bryan Betts

11. From 'Security and Economy with the U.S.' to 'Chaos in Both'?

​We are at another new inflection point in the ROK/US alliance.

From 'Security and Economy with the U.S.' to 'Chaos in Both'?

[Yang Sang-Hoon Column] Trump's Demands and Economic Realities Challenge U.S.-South Korea Alliance and Trade Ties

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/09/24/UP2533QCOVEX3ADAFEXKF2I6FY/

By Yang Sang-hoon

Published 2025.09.24. 23:55

Updated 2025.09.25. 09:44

On the 25th of last month, local time, President Lee Jae-myung and U.S. President Donald Trump hold a South Korea-U.S. summit meeting at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. /Newsis

At one point, it was common to think of South Korea’s approach as “security with the U.S., economy with China.” The perception was that aligning with the U.S., an ally, on security was natural, while the rapidly expanding Chinese market was too significant to ignore economically. Some argued this phrase would provoke the U.S., which is in a hegemonic competition with China. Observing the U.S. response, it seems there was some truth to that.

During the Yoon Suk-yeol government, the phrase “security with the U.S., economy with the U.S.” emerged. As the Biden administration moved to contain China, there was a sense of relief that we, being chased by Chinese industries, had some breathing room. When the U.S. offered massive subsidies to our companies and requested investments in the U.S., it seemed South Korea was entering a new era of full alignment with Washington. These were all dreams dreamed before Trump’s return.

Trump’s approach to Europe, Japan, and South Korea differs slightly. While Europe agreed to invest 600 billion dollars in the U.S., the burden is shared among 27 countries. Japan’s 550 billion dollars is manageable given its unlimited currency swap agreement with the U.S. and its vast overseas net assets. However, we have no currency swap agreement and our overseas net assets are not substantial. 350 billion dollars does not align with our GDP level. Compared to Japan, around 200 billion dollars would be more appropriate for us.

Trump engages in give-and-take deals with strong powers but is harsh on those with weaknesses. Initially, the tariff bombs seemed aimed at China, but over time, tariffs on Chinese goods have weakened like sand slipping through fingers. While it was expected that the Korean shipbuilding industry would benefit from additional costs imposed on Chinese vessels entering U.S. ports, this too has now become vague. On the other hand, Trump remains inflexible with U.S. allies. It seems that to Trump, the very fact of being an ally to the U.S. is a significant “weakness.”

From an economic scale perspective, a 350 billion dollar cash investment is beyond our capacity, but to Trump, this might be the “right price.” It is said that Trump asked President Lee Jae-myung, “Without U.S. troops, can South Korea defend against North Korea?” The implication is that a South Korea “occupied by North Korea without U.S. troops” should pay an additional 100 billion to 200 billion dollars in security costs.

No matter how we think about it, there is no way to invest 350 billion dollars in cash in the U.S. Although we have foreign exchange reserves of 410 billion dollars, they are not like bank deposits that can be withdrawn at any time. Even if they could be withdrawn, the country cannot pour out all its foreign currency. The initial promise to invest 350 billion dollars was misguided, but now we cannot back down. Ultimately, breaking the promise would be our fault, and we must brace for Trump’s retaliation.

First, “economy with the U.S.” will fade to some extent. In particular, Hyundai-Kia, facing 25% tariffs, may lose the U.S. market to Japanese cars. This is a market built with blood, sweat, and time. Other products, large or small, will also find it difficult to avoid damage. If this happens, even if we do not want it, the center of gravity may gradually shift from “economy with the U.S.” to “economy with China.” If the U.S. closes its market, chains workers sent to build factories, and increases professional visa costs by 100 times, psychologically, “economy with the U.S.” will also drift away.

Many Korean companies are now re-evaluating China and accepting the fact that they must engage with both the U.S. and China, not just the U.S. This is due to China’s remarkable growth rather than the Trump issue. There is a growing sense that the U.S. will ultimately fail to contain China. While unfortunate, the U.S. is bringing this upon itself, and agile companies are moving first. It remains to be seen how this trend in Korea will further anger Trump.

There are many uncertainties regarding “security with the U.S.” From the U.S. perspective, South Korea has strategic value as a frontline base against China. Therefore, they are unlikely to abandon us outright, but “security with the U.S.” could be shaken in various forms, such as a significant increase in defense cost-sharing, forced purchases of unnecessary U.S. weapons, redeployment and reduction of U.S. troops in Korea, downgrading the status of U.S. forces in Korea, scaling down joint military exercises and excessive cost claims, and possibly excluding South Korea from negotiations with Kim Jong-un.

Even if we can adjust our economic focus toward China, relying on China for security is impossible. China would treat South Korea as a subordinate state. Therefore, we have no choice but to maintain security through the U.S. alliance while also strengthening our own self-reliant defense. This means keeping the ROK-U.S. alliance as a foundation, but ensuring the nation does not falter every time American policy shifts. To achieve this, our conventional military must clearly surpass North Korea’s capabilities.

South Korea already possess conventional weapons and equipment that exceed North Korea’s. The problem lies with the politics and the military personnel. In a low-birthrate country, continuously reducing service periods will result in the army falling below 300,000 in 10 years. Even more alarmingly, a friend’s son, who served as a mortar operator, reportedly never fired a live round during his entire service. The unit commander likely prioritized “zero accidents” over combat readiness. These trends raise concerns that both security and economic strategies could fall into confusion.

12. Pursuing nukes would leave ROK vulnerable to North Korean strikes: Vipin Narang

​Really? north Korea is likely to attack South Korea whether or not it has nuclear weapons. But we never answer the questions of what actually deers Kim Jong Un?

Pursuing nukes would leave ROK vulnerable to North Korean strikes: Vipin Narang

Ex-US nuclear official says extended deterrence using US submarine-based assets provides best security for South Korea

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/pursuing-nukes-would-leave-rok-vulnerable-to-north-korean-strikes-vipin-narang/

Alannah Hill September 25, 2025

Vipin Narang visits the South Korean missile command on June 11, 2024 as head of the U.S. delegation for the third NCG meeting. | Image: ROK defense ministry

South Korea would put itself at serious risk if it pursues nuclear weapons to counter North Korea, a former U.S. nuclear official has warned, suggesting Pyongyang or even Beijing could carry out preemptive strikes during the development process.

Dr. Vipin Narang, former U.S. acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy, told NK News that Seoul would face a dangerous period of vulnerability before completing an indigenous nuclear program, which he said would “provide very little deterrence value” against the DPRK’s growing arsenal.

Instead, he argued that U.S. nuclear weapons provide the strongest security guarantee to South Korea, emphasizing that Seoul now has a structured role in deterrence planning under the allies’ joint Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

“I believe President Lee also shares the view that indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons are not in [the ROK’s] security interest. The U.S. shares that view,” said Narang, who previously served as co-chair of the NCG.

“We believe that security and stability in Northeast Asia, and on the Korean Peninsula in particular, is best served by a robust extended deterrence relationship which includes the extension of U.S. nuclear deterrence to South Korea.”

Beyond the military risks, Narang said South Korea could face severe economic sanctions if it violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by acquiring nuclear weapons, potentially harming major industries such as semiconductors and automobiles. 

“That would have a huge impact on the South Korean economy, including marquee brands like Samsung and Kia and Hyundai and LG,” he said in an interview on the NK News podcast.

He also warned that Seoul going nuclear could undermine the global nonproliferation regime, setting off a cascade of nuclear development in countries like Japan or Saudi Arabia.

Narang pushed back against calls to re-station U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, suggesting that such proposals come from people “who don’t understand U.S. nuclear force posture well, which is that the nuclear weapons we were talking about are gravity bombs.”

B-61 bombs account for the majority of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and are already deployed in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. But while they can be mounted on B-2 stealth bombers and F-15, F-16 and F-35A fighter jets, Narang explained that South Korea’s F-35s aren’t certified for that role.

“And if you deploy them on the geography of the peninsula, they would be a prime target for a North Korean first strike,” he said.

Narang said he strongly believes U.S. nuclear submarine-based capabilities — both strategic ballistic missiles and the new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile — provide a far more effective deterrent as they are able to operate off both coasts of North Korea and are less vulnerable to preemption.

Support in Seoul for acquiring nuclear weapons has surged in recent years, especially on the South Korean political right, as North Korea has pushed forward development of both tactical nuclear weapons targeting the ROK and long-range ballistic missiles that can strike the continental U.S.

This has fueled doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and Washington’s willingness to risk a DPRK nuclear strike on American cities to defend South Korea in a military contingency.

In part to address these concerns, U.S. President Joe Biden and his ROK counterpart Yoon Suk-yeol signed the Washington Declaration in 2023, under which the U.S. agreed to give South Korea a greater role in extended deterrence planning under the NCG and Seoul reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

Narang described the NCG as “born out of North Korea’s continued expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in the late 2010s,” and he said the body institutionalizes secure communications, regular working groups and realistic tabletop exercises to prepare for potential North Korean nuclear scenarios.

While he said cooperation with Russia could accelerate DPRK nuclear development, he expressed confidence that Washington and Seoul will sustain a durable deterrence architecture despite uncertainty in U.S. politics and crises around the world.

Narang served as U.S. principal deputy and then acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy from 2022 to 2024. He is now the Frank Stranton professor of nuclear security and the inaugural director of the Center for Nuclear Security policy at MIT

Edited by Bryan Betts

13. N. Korea presumed to possess up to 2,000 kg of highly enriched uranium: unification minister

(2nd LD) N. Korea presumed to possess up to 2,000 kg of highly enriched uranium: unification minister | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

By Park Boram

(ATTN: UPDATES with more info throughout)

SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is presumed to possess up to 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, as the country has sought to dramatically expand its nuclear weapons capabilities in recent years, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Thursday.

The minister disclosed the assessment during a press conference, citing publicly released estimates by experts, highlighting the urgency of stopping North Korea's nuclear programs.

This file photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 29, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L, top) inspecting a nuclear material plant. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

"It is urgent to stop (it). Even at this very hour, uranium centrifuges at four locations (in North Korea) are running, probably accumulating nuclear materials," Chung said.

"Estimates (by experts) suggest North Korea possesses up to 2,000 kg of highly enriched uranium at 90 percent and higher," he said, adding that uranium between 10 to 12 kg is enough to produce one bomb.

Chung assessed that it is now impossible to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program through international sanctions, saying that the resumption of North Korea-U.S. talks could instead serve as a "breakthrough" in stalled denuclearization efforts.

"It will be desirable for (North Korea-U.S. talks) to take place as soon as possible," the minister noted.

Their resumption, once realized, could also help reopen stalled inter-Korean ties, and the government will do its "utmost" to foster an environment for talks between Pyongyang and Washington, he said.

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a debate in Paju, Gyeonggi Province on Sept. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)

His remarks came days after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in a recent speech to a key parliamentary meeting, reiterated the regime's interest in resuming talks with Washington, on condition that the long-standing call for denuclearization be dropped.

Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed hope to meet Kim this year, sparking speculation that the two leaders could hold a meeting during Trump's planned attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, scheduled for Oct. 31-Nov. 1 in Gyeongju, South Korea.

Kim, however, ruled out talks with Seoul and rejected the possibility of unifying the two Koreas.

Despite Pyongyang's resistance, the Lee Jae Myung administration remains committed to pursuing peace with North Korea through dialogue and exchanges.

In his address to the U.N. General Assembly earlier this week, Lee stressed that the era of hostility and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula should end, declaring that Seoul has no intention of engaging in hostile acts.

In a recent interview with the BBC, Lee also said Seoul would accept a possible deal between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim to freeze the North's nuclear programs as a "realistic alternative" on the path toward the ultimate denuclearization.

Meanwhile, Chung disclosed that his ministry is in discussion with the defense ministry about suspending live-fire drills and military field training near the inter-Korean border.

"It is the unification ministry's position that it is fair to suspend shooting drills and field trainings in regions near the Demilitarized Zone even before the restoration of the Sept. 19 agreement," he said, referring to the now-suspended inter-Korean pact aimed at reducing border hostility.

Chung cast a negative outlook on bringing two North Korean soldiers, captured by Ukrainian forces in the war with Russia, to South Korea, saying he had been told that Kyiv is opposed to the idea.

Currently, South and North Korea are internationally recognized as two separate nations, but this does not imply a "permanent" division of the two Koreas, the minister added, reaffirming the official policy of ultimately seeking unification with the North.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 22, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un delivering a speech at a key parliamentary meeting held the previous two days. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

14. N. Korea's top diplomat to visit China from Sept. 27-30

Closer than lips and teeth.

(LEAD) N. Korea's top diplomat to visit China from Sept. 27-30 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead para; UPDATES throughout with more info; CHANGES dateline)

SEOUL/BEIJING, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui will visit China this week for a four-day trip, China's foreign ministry said Thursday, weeks after leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Beijing to attend a military parade.

The trip will take place at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi from Saturday to next Tuesday, Guo Jiakun, spokesperson at China's foreign ministry, said.

North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency also reported on Choe's planned trip, saying she will visit China "soon."

The planned trip comes as North Korea prepares a large-scale military parade to mark the 80th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea on Oct. 10. The North is reported to be inviting state leaders to the event.

The trip follows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's high-profile attendance at China's military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3 and his subsequent talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping the next day. Choe accompanied Kim on the latest trip to China.

Whether Xi will reciprocally attend the upcoming North Korean military parade is drawing keen attention ahead of the party's founding celebration.

This image, captured from the Korean Central Television, shows North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

15. N. Korea urges discipline among officials ahead of party anniversary

​Read between the lines. This is an indicator of KJU's weakness and his concern for internal threats and challenges: i.e., resistance.

N. Korea urges discipline among officials ahead of party anniversary | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday urged discipline among ruling party officials, calling on them to earn the people's trust as the country prepares to mark a key party anniversary next month.

The Rodong Sinmun, the country's most widely read newspaper, made the call in an article as the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is set to mark the 80th founding anniversary on Oct. 10.

"Coercion or allurement cannot win the people's hearts and minds," the article said, warning that a long-term rule or deviation from the party's fundamental mission could erode public support for a party founded to serve the people's interest, eventually leading to its demise.

The article followed North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's criticism of officials for irresponsibility and incompetence in his speech to a two-day key parliamentary meeting this weekend.

Such efforts to reinforce discipline among officials come as North Korea seeks to appease public opinion and strengthen internal unity ahead of the party anniversary.

High-handed attitudes by officials and bribery are reportedly widespread in the country, a latent source of public discontent.

Pyongyang is reportedly preparing a large-scale military parade, including mass games, to celebrate the anniversary.

During his inspection of a general hospital under construction in Pyongyang on Tuesday, Kim also reprimanded officials, blaming them for delays in completing the project.

He accused officials of collecting donations from residents to pay for the construction instead of using state funds and ordered that the donations be returned.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 22, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un delivering a speech at a key parliamentary meeting held the previous two days. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

16. N. Korea opens large restaurant near borders with China, Russia

​While 25 million people suffer.

N. Korea opens large restaurant near borders with China, Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has opened a large restaurant in the northeastern city of Chongjin near the borders with China and Russia, state media reported Thursday, as the country seeks to attract foreign tourists.

The opening ceremony for the namesake restaurant, Chongjingwan, in North Hamgyong Province was held the previous day, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

Constructed in the traditional Korean style and equipped with dining rooms and a banquet hall, the restaurant serves various tasty and highly nutritious dishes, the KCNA said.

Chongjin, a border city once frequented by foreigners, is located near China's Hunchun and Russia's Khasan. The city is also home to Chinese and Russian consulates general.

North Korea also recently opened a large beer bar in Rason, another border city near Russia.

This image, captured from North Korea's Korean Central Television on Sept. 1, 2025, shows a beer bar that went into service in Rason, a border city close to Russia. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 25, 2025

17. N. Korea trains propaganda army for party anniversary push

​But you cannot eat ideology and propaganda.

(and "let them eat cake" is not a good message in north Korea)

N. Korea trains propaganda army for party anniversary push

The training aimed to show lecturers how to effectively communicate each lecture's ideological message and maximize their propaganda impact

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-trains-propaganda-army-party-anniversary-push/?tztc=1

By Jeong Seo-yeong - September 25, 2025

Propaganda posters in Samjiyon extolling the completion of the city's modernization project by Oct. 10. / Im

North Korea’s North Pyongan province has launched an intensive propaganda training program to prepare lecturers for the ruling party’s 80th anniversary celebrations.

The provincial party committee held a week-long training session starting Sept. 4, designed to equip lecturers with materials promoting Kim Jong Un’s “self-sufficiency” ideology ahead of party Foundation Day on Oct. 10.

“Lecturers received group training with the clear political goal of ensuring the public is ideologically ready for the 80th anniversary of the party’s establishment,” a source in the province told Daily NK recently.

The training focused on teaching lecturers how to “inspire voluntary support from the masses” by promoting Kim Jong Un’s leadership and his self-reliance policies, according to the source.

Party officials provided lecturers with prepared materials for five weekly propaganda lectures to be delivered through Oct. 10. The lecture topics include:

(1) “Self-sufficiency is our eternal method of struggle, embodying the patriotic ideals and autonomous ideology of the Workers’ party of Korea.”

(2) “Let us learn from the indomitable fighting spirit exhibited by soldiers in our overseas operations who courageously blew themselves up while shouting, ‘Long live Marshal Kim Jong Un!'”

(3) “On the path of self-sufficiency, let us raise the Juche banner while remembering the greatness and dignity of our state and nation.”

(4) “Regarding an energetic campaign for a meaningful celebration in October and giving all the glory to our great invincible party”

(5) “Self-sufficiency is the only way to survive! On the 80th anniversary of the party’s foundation, let’s make this a global slogan as we take the lead over the world.”

Beyond mere messengers

The training aimed to show lecturers how to effectively communicate each lecture’s ideological message and maximize their propaganda impact, the source explained.

Provincial party officials emphasized that lecturers should be more than just messengers—they must serve as “propagandists who light the way for the Korean people” and act as leaders in promoting socialism.

The committee instructed lecturers to emphasize that self-sufficiency is North Korea’s only viable path forward and to ensure the anniversary becomes “a great celebration for the victors.”

While lecturers publicly endorsed the training, many privately expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the self-sufficiency approach and questioned how long North Korea can continue on this path, according to the source.

18. U.S. command ship arrives in Busan to replenish supplies

​My CSM and I spent a weekend aboard the Blue RIdge when it was in the Philippines.

(LEAD) U.S. command ship arrives in Busan to replenish supplies | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 25, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with photo)

SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- The command ship of the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet arrived in the southeastern port city of Busan on Thursday to replenish supplies and provide rest for crew members, South Korea's Navy said.

The South Korean and U.S. navies will conduct activities aimed at boosting exchange during the port visit by the 19,600-ton USS Blue Ridge, the armed service said.

Commissioned in 1970 and based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS Blue Ridge is the flagship of the 7th Fleet, whose area of responsibility includes the western Pacific and Indian oceans.

The warship most recently took part in the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise, jointly conducted by South Korea, the United States and Japan in international waters off South Korea's southern island of Jeju from Sept. 15-19.

The 19,600-ton USS Blue Ridge, the command ship of the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet, arrives at a naval base in the southeastern city of Busan on Sept. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 25, 2025

19. Nat'l Assembly passes resolution for successful APEC hosting, Korean peace

APEC has the potential to be a very historic event this time.

Nat'l Assembly passes resolution for successful APEC hosting, Korean peace | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Shim Sun-ah · September 25, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- The National Assembly on Thursday unanimously adopted a resolution to provide full national support for the country's successful hosting of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, pledging to use the high-profile event to advance peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

The resolution passed with a rare show of cross-party unity, securing a unanimous 260-0 vote among members present.

Drafted by the National Assembly Special Committee for Supporting the 2025 APEC Summit, the measure formally "resolves to mobilize all national capabilities and provide full support, together with the government, local governments and the public, for the successful hosting of the APEC summit."

Daegu Metro Line 3 unveils a monorail train wrapped with promotional materials for the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit at a vehicle depot on Sept. 22, 2025, as part of an event wishing for South Korea's successful hosting of the summit. The train will remain in service until Nov. 1, the last day of the two-day summit in Gyeongju, 330 kilometers southeast of Seoul. (Yonhap)

The resolution also underscores a commitment to use the international gathering to reaffirm South Korea's dedication to peace on the Korean Peninsula, promote stability in Northeast Asia and strengthen the nation's global standing.

It further highlights goals to showcase South Korea as a reliable investment destination and enhance national prestige by promoting the country as a cultural powerhouse on the global stage.

The special committee had passed the resolution earlier at its plenary meeting Monday. The committee was launched in April to support the hosting of the 32nd APEC summit, scheduled to be held in the historic tourist city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31-Nov. 1.

sshim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Shim Sun-ah · September 25, 2025

20. Lee’s U.N. proposal raises concerns over nuclear recognition

​As it should. Recognition will be a catastrophic success for Kim Jong Un and political warfare and blackmail diplomacy.

Lee’s U.N. proposal raises concerns over nuclear recognition

Posted September. 25, 2025 07:59,   

Updated September. 25, 2025 07:59

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250925/5868985/1

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said on Sept. 23 local time that President Lee Jae-myung’s “E.N.D. Initiative,” presented in his keynote address to the U.N. General Assembly, would be pursued as a framework in which three elements — Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization — reinforce one another through inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue. His remarks suggested that South Korea is open to normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang, including the establishment of diplomatic ties, even before North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement is complete, to create momentum for denuclearization.

Speaking at a press conference in New York, Wi said, “There is no priority or sequence among the three elements.” This indicates Seoul could accept a U.S. approach that initiates normalization with Pyongyang, such as establishing diplomatic relations, even without a denuclearization agreement. Since North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has said there is “no reason not to stand face-to-face” with U.S. President Donald Trump if denuclearization is excluded from the agenda, Seoul’s position suggests support for dialogue that omits the nuclear issue. Washington has previously linked normalization with Pyongyang to different formulas: as the final reward for denuclearization during the six-party talks, and as part of a comprehensive settlement tied to complete denuclearization at the Singapore summit.

Shortly after his address, Lee met with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres and explained the E.N.D. Initiative, urging the U.N. to help create a platform of dialogue and cooperation that goes beyond conflict and confrontation between the two Koreas.

Concerns are growing, however, that the initiative could weaken the goal of denuclearizing North Korea. Allowing normalization before Pyongyang abandons its nuclear arsenal could effectively amount to recognizing the North as a nuclear power. In an earlier interview with the BBC, Lee was asked whether he would accept a U.S.-North Korea agreement without a denuclearization pledge. He replied that he could accept the Trump-Kim agreement in which North Korea would freeze production rather than fully dismantle its nuclear weapons.

A South Korean presidential office official rejected suggestions that the policy recognizes North Korea as a nuclear state, saying, “Exchange and normalization do not mean accepting the North’s nuclear status or abandoning denuclearization.” A U.S. State Department spokesperson reaffirmed on Sept. 23 that the United States’ policy remains the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

On Sept. 24, South Korea's People Power Party criticized the initiative, calling it “an approach that will end with tolerating North Korea’s nuclear program.” Party leader Jang Dong-hyuk wrote on Facebook that it is a fake peace initiative that gives away everything, gains nothing, and brings destruction to the Korean Peninsula through nuclear weapons.

Hoon-Sang Park tigermask@donga.com

​21. Why now is the time for a One Korea policy

I do not think this is the "END" policy (engagement, normalization, denuclearization) President Lee envisions.

Voices Sept. 24, 2025 / 1:22 PM

Why now is the time for a One Korea policy

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/09/24/perspective-maxwell-One-Korea/2741758731480/

By David Maxwell

The Tongil Bridge, once symbolic of inter-Korean connectivity, now serves as a stark emblem of division and military tension. File Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA

Sept. 24 (UPI) -- Editor's note: These remarks were provided Tuesday at the Thirty-Ninth International Security Conference: Challenges and Opportunities for the ROK-U.S. Alliance, jointly presented by the Hudson Institute and the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies.

For more than 70 years, the Korean peninsula has remained divided, an unnatural separation described in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice as the unresolved "Korea question."

For decades, United States and alliance policy has centered on deterrence and denuclearization. But today, we face a new reality. Kim Jong Un has abandoned even the pretense of peaceful unification, declared South Korea his "main enemy" and tied his regime's survival to nuclear weapons, repression and fear.

This moment calls for strategic clarity. It is time to adopt a One Korea Policy, a policy rooted in moral truth, strategic necessity and the shared values of the Republic of Korea and the United States.

What is a One Korea policy?

A One Korea policy begins with a simple recognition: There is only one Korea and one Korean people. The division of the peninsula is not natural, not permanent and not legitimate. It exists solely because of the will of the Kim family regime to rule a Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State, which maintains power through blackmail diplomacy, crimes against humanity and nuclear coercion.

Just as the United States adopted a "One China" policy, we must now declare openly: North Korea is not the permanent future of the Korean people. The Republic of Korea, a resilient democracy and global pivotal state, is the sole legitimate guardian of Korean identity and destiny.

The acceptable, durable political arrangement we seek is clear: a secure, stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, liberal constitutional Korea -- what we call the United Republic of Korea, or U-ROK.

Why do we need a One Korea policy now?

Kim Jong Un has crossed the Rubicon. His abandonment of peaceful unification and branding of South Korea as the "enemy" is not an act of strength, but a confession of weakness. It reveals desperation and fear of his own people, as they awaken to the possibility of freedom and the prosperity that exists in the South.

For too long, our policies have been reactive, a constant cycle of responding to Pyongyang's provocations, hoping for engagement, and settling for management, never resolution.

The absence of a clear vision has allowed strategic paralysis to set in. Some claim unification is a fantasy, that the Korean people no longer desire it, or that it's only a Korean problem. These views are not just mistaken, they are dangerous. They blind policymakers to the root causes of nuclear threats, instability and humanitarian tragedy. The only path that truly resolves these crises, rather than perpetuating them, is a One Korea policy.

How does a One Korea policy support ROK-U.S. Alliance strategy?

The One Korea Policy strengthens, not undermines, the alliance. It does so in two ways:

• Clarifies strategic purpose: For decades, denuclearization was our stated goal, but we now know Kim will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons. A One Korea policy reframes the alliance mission: unification first, then denuclearization. Only a unified Korea can end the nuclear threat.

• Anchors a "two-plus-three strategy." The alliance rests on two enduring pillars: strong military deterrence to prevent war and strategic strangulation through sanctions and pressure to constrain the regime.

But these alone are not enough. We must add the three new pillars:

• A human rights-up-front approach that empowers Koreans in the North to claim their universal rights. Just as President Reagan did with the Soviets, we must always place human rights on the agenda.

• A comprehensive information and influence campaign to break Pyongyang's monopoly on information and propaganda.

• Support for the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they solve the Korea question and pursue freedom.

Builds moral and political legitimacy

By declaring unification as our shared objective, the ROK-U.S. alliance speaks not just to governments, but to people, Koreans in the North yearning for freedom, Koreans in the South seeking peace, and allies who support democratic values worldwide. It makes clear that our struggle is not against a people, but against a regime that holds them hostage.

Countering opposition: End policy paralysis

Let's be clear: it is the naysayers who dismiss unification, cling to failed engagement policies, and urge arms control with a cult-like crime family regime that have perpetuated instability. Every other strategy has been tried and has failed. No negotiation has moved Pyongyang off its nuclear path. Denuclearization is unattainable as long as Kim rules north Korea. The refusal to imagine and strive for a united future is what stops progress.

History shows us that change can come from within -- from the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the USSR to the end of apartheid, civil society and international solidarity will defeat entrenched tyranny. The Korean peninsula is no different. It is time to reject pessimistic thinking and embrace a vision that matches the courage and aspirations of the Korean people.

Call to action: for policymakers and civil society

Governments alone cannot achieve this goal. Civil society, scholars, defectors, diaspora, human rights activists and free citizens in Korea and abroad must lead, pressuring governments to adopt One Korea as doctrine, not just sentiment. We must consistently reframe every discussion of peninsula security toward unification as the only real solution.

The alliance must empower Korean escapee voices, break the regime's information monopoly and organize international solidarity. Legislatures should pass resolutions affirming One Korea. Diaspora communities must launch campaigns to keep unification on the agenda in Seoul, Washington and global capitals.

Conclusion: One Korea, one future

Kim Jong Un's new policy should mark the end of our misguided illusions. We must meet this moment not with resignation, but with resolve. A One Korea policy is a moral and strategic necessity. It is the pathway to peace, justice, and liberty, a united Republic of Korea (U-ROK). If you can only take away one thing from this presentation, please embrace these 14 words:

"Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights."

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com