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Quotes of the Day:
“Be a free thinker and don’t accept everything you hear as truth. Be critical and evaluate what you believe in.”
- Aristotle
"The surest way to work up a crusade in favor of some good cause is to promise people they will have a chance of maltreating someone. To be able to destroy with good conscience, to be able to behave badly and call your bad behaviour 'righteous indignation' -- this is the height of psychological luxury, the most delicious of moral treats."
- Aldous Huxley
"Nothing in the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity."
- Martin Luther King Jr.
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 25 (Putin's War)
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (25.09.22) CDS comments on key events
3. China Could Decide Now Is the Time for War with America (book review)
4. China becomes ‘hothouse’ of intrigue ahead of crucial Communist party congress
5. Here's how rumours of Xi Jinping's 'arrest' and 'coup' started
6. Battlefield Hotlines Let U.S. Military Keep Ukraine’s Weapons Firing
7. The People's Liberation Army Conference: History, Highlights, and the Challenges Ahead
8. Big Tech Has No Constitutional Right to Censor
9. Musk says he's 'activating Starlink' in Iran as government shuts down internet
10. Putin May Have Decided To Mobilize To Avoid Threats From The Rise Of Private Military Companies – OpEd
11. Two Renovated Museums Offer a Peek at Spy Secrets — at Least for Some
12. Inside the Ukrainian Counterstrike That Turned the Tide of the War
13. Full transcript: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on "Face the Nation," Sept. 25, 2022
14. The End of Senior Politics in China
15. What Marcos Jr promised to America
16. What do Americans care about? Not a cold war
17. China’s state media turning on Putin’s war
18. Army's military adviser brigades see increased demand in Indo-Pacific, Europe
19. Hiding in the Noise: Preparing the Irregular Warfare Community for the Age of AI
20. Time, Space, and Material: Metrics for Assessing Irregular Warfare
21. Marcos is no silver bullet for the US–Philippines alliance
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 25 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 25
Sep 25, 2022 - Press ISW
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25
Special Edition on Russian Mobilization
Frederick W. Kagan
September 25, 6 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in Ukraine. The “partial mobilization” he ordered on September 21 will generate additional forces but inefficiently and with high domestic social and political costs. The forces generated by this “partial mobilization,” critically, are very unlikely to add substantially to the Russian military’s net combat power in 2022. Putin will have to fix basic flaws in the Russian military personnel and equipment systems if mobilization is to have any significant impact even in the longer term. His actions thus far suggest that he is far more concerned with rushing bodies to the battlefield than with addressing these fundamental flaws.
The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield. There are no rapid solutions to these problems.
The problems Putin confronts stem in part from long-standing unresolved tensions in the Russian approach to generating military manpower. Russian and Soviet military manpower policies from 1874 through 2008 were designed to support the full mass mobilization of the entire Russian and Soviet populations for full-scale war. Universal conscription and a minimum two-year service obligation was intended to ensure that virtually all military-age males received sufficient training and experience in combat specialties that they could be recalled to active service after serving their terms and rapidly go to war as effective soldiers. Most Russian and Soviet combat units were kept in a “cadre” status in peacetime—they retained a nearly full complement of officers and many non-commissioned officers, along with a small number of soldiers. Russian and Soviet doctrine and strategy required large-scale reserve mobilization to fill out these cadre units in wartime. This cadre-and-reserve approach to military manpower was common among continental European powers from the end of the 19th century through the Cold War.
The Russian military tried to move to an all-volunteer basis amid the 2008 financial crisis and failed to make the transition fully. The end of the Cold War and the demonstration in the 1991 Gulf War of the virtues of an all-volunteer military led many states to transition away from conscription models. The Russian military remained committed to the cadre-and-reserve model until 2008, when Putin directed his newly appointed Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov to move the Russian military to a professional model and reform it to save costs following the 2008 financial crisis.[1] One such cost-cutting measure reduced the term of mandatory conscript service to 18 months in 2007 and then to one year in 2008.
The Russian military ended up with a hybrid model blending conscript and professional soldiers. Professional militaries are expensive because the state must offer prospective voluntary recruits far higher salaries and benefits than it gives to conscripts, who have no choice but to serve. Serdyukov quickly found that the Russian defense budget could not afford to offer enticements sufficient to overcome the centuries-old Russian resistance to military service. The Russian military thus became a mix of volunteer professional soldiers, whom the Russians call kontraktniki, and one-year conscripts.
The reduction in the mandatory term of service for conscripts made Russia’s reserves less combat ready. Conscripts normally reach a bare minimum of military competence within a year—the lost second year is the period in which a cadre-and-reserve military would normally bring its conscripts to a meaningful level of combat capability. The shift to a one-year term of mandatory military service in 2008 means that the last classes of Russian men who served two-year terms are now in their early 30s. Younger men in the prime age brackets for being recalled to fight served only the abbreviated one-year period.
The prioritization of building a professional force and the de-prioritization of conscript service likely translated into an erosion of the bureaucratic structures required for mobilization. Mobilization is always a bureaucratically challenging undertaking. It requires local officials throughout the entire country to perform well a task they may never conduct and rehearse rarely, if at all. Maintaining the bureaucratic infrastructure required to conduct a large-scale reserve call-up requires considerable attention from senior leadership—attention it likely did not receive in Russia over the last 15 years or so.
Putin has already conducted at least four attempts at mobilization in the last year, likely draining the pool of available combat-ready (and willing) reservists ahead of the “partial mobilization.”
- The Russian military launched an initiative called the Russian Combat Army Reserve (the Russian acronym is BARS) in fall 2021 with the aim of recruiting 100,000 volunteers into an organization that would train them and keep them combat-capable while still in the reserves.[2] This effort largely failed, generating only a fraction of its target by the time of the Russian invasion in February 2022.
- The Russian Armed Forces conducted an involuntary mobilization of part of its regular reserve in preparation for the invasion and in parallel with the BARS effort. Details about the pre-invasion call-up are scarce, but Western officials reported that the Russian military had recalled “tens of thousands” of reservists to fill out units before rolling into Ukraine.[3]
- A third, smaller mobilization wave followed the invasion itself, as reports emerged of thousands of reservists being called up to make good Russian losses in early March 2022.[4]
- Putin launched a fourth effort at mobilizing his population for war in June 2022, accelerated in July, with a call for the formation of “volunteer battalions.”[5] This undertaking was an ad hoc attempt at crypto mobilization. The Kremlin directed all of Russia’s “federal subjects” (administrative units at the province level on the whole) to generate at least one volunteer battalion each and to pay enlistment and combat bonuses out of their own budgets. This effort has generated a number of volunteer battalions, some of which have fought in Ukraine, albeit poorly.
The most recent “partial mobilization” will draw mainly on Russians who have demonstrated that they do not wish to fight by their failures to join “volunteer battalions” or enter the BARS program. It may also be drawing on less-qualified involuntary reservists as well, assuming previous involuntary mobilizations pulled in the readiest individuals.
Conducting voluntary and involuntary mobilization efforts simultaneously is likely straining the bureaucrats responsible for these efforts. The military commissars, local officials who actual recruit and call up conscripts and volunteers, were likely responsible for the BARS effort and were certainly responsible for the pre-war involuntary reserve call-up, the smaller reserve call-up after the invasion, and the recruitment of the volunteer battalions. The pre- and post-invasion involuntary reserve call-ups likely helped military commissars exercise general reserve call-up procedures. The subsequent emphasis on generating voluntary recruits, however, likely distracted them from those procedures and forced them to concentrate on an entirely new and unplanned-for effort. The military commissars appear to be tasked now with conducting both efforts simultaneously, as emerging evidence indicates that the formation of “volunteer battalions” is continuing alongside the involuntary reserve mobilization.
The current “partial mobilization” also highlights structural tensions in Russia’s military manpower system resulting from the fact that the Ministry of Defense appears to share responsibility for mobilization with local government officials. The mobilization decree Putin signed on September 21 states that the Defense Ministry establishes quotas and deadlines for reserve mobilization by region, but military commissars are clearly responsible for actually fulfilling those quotas.[6] The commissars do not appear to report to the MoD, however, but are rather subordinates of local and regional political leaders. It is unclear whether statements made by Defense Minister Shoigu about eligibility for exemptions from reserve call-ups are binding on the military commissars—it seems, in fact, that they are not. Shoigu announced in an interview on September 21, for example, that students would not be mobilized, yet military commissars have been mobilizing them.[7] The MoD reportedly summoned military commissars on September 24 to upbraid them for violating its policies, but it seems that Putin had to issue a new decree to explicitly exempt students, which he did on September 24.[8] This confusion has contributed to the anger fueling protests against mobilization and is likely reflective of larger bureaucratic confusion in the mobilization system itself.
Protests and resistance to involuntary mobilization also reflect Putin’s repeated and surprising failures to prepare his population for a major war. Russian senior officials and Kremlin mouthpieces were ridiculing the idea that Russia would invade Ukraine right up to the start of the invasion itself. Putin had made no effort to prepare his population for a war—apparently, even some Russian military personnel involved in the invasion were surprised when what they had thought was a training exercise turned out to be an actual attack. Putin has steadfastly continued to refer to the invasion as a “special military operation” rather than a war, moreover, and has not been setting informational conditions in Russia to prepare his people for this involuntary mobilization.
Putin’s informational failures in this regard are especially important because there are no Ukrainian or NATO troops on Russian soil and no threat of any invasion of the Russian heartland. This is not 1812, 1914, or 1941. The factors that drove popular mobilization in previous Russian wars are simply absent in this aggressive war of choice, however Putin frames it to his people. The World War II example of Russians rallying to the flag is particularly inapposite. The Nazi invasion was a literally existential threat to the existence of Russia and part of an overtly genocidal campaign to enslave those Soviet citizens it did not kill. The current conflict is as far from that reality as any war could be, and no rhetorical sleight of hand can replace the brutal realities of the Nazi armored advances as a spur to fight.
Russia will mobilize reservists for this conflict. The process will be ugly, the quality of the reservists poor, and their motivation to fight likely even worse. But the systems are sufficiently in place to allow military commissars and other Russian officials to find people and send them to training units and thence to war. But the low quality of the voluntary reserve units produced by the BARS and volunteer battalion efforts is likely a reliable indicator of the net increase in combat power Russia can expect to generate in this way. This mobilization will not affect the course of the conflict in 2022 and may not have a very dramatic impact on Russia’s ability to sustain its current level of effort into 2023. The problems undermining Putin’s effort to mobilize his people to fight, finally, are so deep and fundamental that he cannot likely fix them in the coming months—and possibly for years. Putin is likely coming up against the hard limits of Russia’s ability to fight a large-scale war.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on September 25
ISW identified three small changes in control of terrain in the past 24 hours:
- Ukrainian forces likely liberated the town of Shevchenko in Donetsk Oblast.[9]
- Ukrainian forces likely control Maliivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[10]
- Ukrainian forces are contesting Russian positions around Karpivka, Nove, Ridkodub, and Novoserhiivka in Donetsk Oblast.[11]
- Russian sources claim that Russian forces hit Ukraine’s Operational Command South headquarters in Odesa with Shahed-136 drones on September 25.[12] Ukrainian Operational Command South reported Russian Shahed-136 drone strikes in Odesa, but not that its headquarters was a target of any of them.[13]
Key inflections in Russian force-generation efforts on September 25
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian contract soldiers in Zaporizhia Oblast have been informed that the terms of their contracts are no longer relevant and that they will have to continue to serve at the discretion of the military command.[14] The General Staff also claimed that Russian authorities are telling men mobilized in Sevastopol that they will serve for the duration of the ”special military operation,” and that the Russian military is sending mobilized men directly to combat units without additional training.[15]
[1] See RAND_RR3099.pdf for a quick overview; The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective (armywarcollege.edu), Chapter 7, for an overview of the Serdyukov reforms and their partial unwinding; and Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization 4 March 2022.pdf (understandingwar.org) for the state of play in early March 2022.
[2] Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization 4 March 2022.pdf (understandingwar.org)
[5] Russian Volunteer Units and Battalions | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
[6] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
[7] https://telegra dot ph/Intervyu-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-SKSHojgu-09-21
[8] https://t.me/readovkanews/42440; https://t.me/mod_russia/20158 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69430
[10] https://mobile.twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573926903534198787; https://t.me/volodymyrzolkin/4137; https://real-vin dot com/vsu-osvobodili-malievku-i-zahvatili-v-plen-treh-tankistov-vs-rf;
understandingwar.org
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (25.09.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (25.09.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
Russia holds 2,500 Ukrainians captive, including many civilians, said Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, Iryna Vereshchuk, in an interview with BBC News Ukraine. "Civilians have not been released for several exchanges in a row," she said. At the same time, she stresses that Russia should return civilians, not exchange them. She also emphasized that there are many women in Russian captivity.
Nine border guards released from Russian captivity as part of the exchange on September 21 are undergoing the necessary rehabilitation and treatment. "Doctors have already examined them. Their physical and psychological state of health is difficult. After all, every case confirms that the conditions in which the Russian Federation keeps our prisoners of war are terrible and inhumane," the State Border Service noted.
A paramedic from Azovstal, Maryana Mamonova, recently released from Russian captivity, gave birth to a daughter, reported the Association of Families of Azovstal Defendersin on its telegram account.
The head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, spoke with the released commanders from Azovstal, who are currently in Turkey. The defenders are undergoing medical examinations and will soon see their families.
According to the morning round-up of the regional military administrations, eight Oblasts of Ukraine were under shelling by Russian troops last night.
On Sunday morning, Odesa was again attacked by kamikaze drones. Drones hit the administrative building in the city center three times. One of the four drones was shot down by air defense. The rescue operation and fire extinguishing are ongoing.
During the day, two civilians were killed in the Donetsk Oblast, and eight civilians were injured. The mandatory evacuation of the population continues. The entire Oblast remains without gas and partially without water and electricity.
In the Zaporizhzhya Oblast, rocket strikes by Russian troops were recorded at midnight on several districts of Zaporizhzhya and the territory of a nearby village. According to preliminary data, there were ten strikes. According to the preliminary information, three people are wounded. In addition, infrastructure objects were destroyed due to enemy strikes. In one of the districts, a power substation was cut off.
In the Mykolaiv Oblast, the Russians once again hit Mykolaiv with rockets at night. Residential buildings and water supply were damaged. In the Bashtan district of the Oblast, 2 residential
buildings and non-residential utility facilities were damaged. Bereznehuvate station was also under fire. In addition, the enemy struck the Ochakiv coastal zone.
During September 24, the Russian troops shelled the Kupyanskyi (7 wounded), Bogodukhivskyi, Chuguyivskyi, and Krasnogradskyi districts of Kharkiv Oblast. An educational institution and an agro-industrial enterprise were damaged. In the Kharkivskyi district, a man blew up on a landmine.
In the Dnipropetrovsk region, Russian troops shelled the Nikopol district five times during the night, using heavy artillery and Grad rocket launchers. The communities of Nikopol, Marganets, and Chervonogrigorivka were under enemy fire, and more than 170 "Grad" shells were recorded. In Nikopol, houses and an electric substation were damaged. In the Chervonogrigorivka community - private houses, shops, a kindergarten, an outpatient facility, cars, a pharmacy, a club, a stadium, and a gas station. In Marhanets a gas line and electricity grid were damaged. Due to enemy shelling, more than 6.5 thousand households remained without electricity in three communities. Emergency crews are already working on restoration.
Occupied territories
Today, September 25, Ukrainian traitor and former MP from the Party of Regions Oleksiy Zhuravko died while staying in a hotel in the Russia-occupied Kherson. Allegedly, the hotel was hit by a Ukrainian artillery projectile. First, this information is being disseminated by the Russian media. Later, Yuriy Sobolevskyi, the first deputy chairman of the Kherson Regional Council, wrote about this on Facebook, reports Ukrinform. Oleksiy Zhuravko represented the Party of Regions in the 5th and 6th convocations of the Ukrainian parliament. In 2014 he moved to Russia; in 2022, he returned to Kherson and began cooperating with the invaders.
In the Donetsk Oblast, the Russian invaders are trying to form a "Cossack battalion" from Ukrainian prisoners of war held in the Olenivka colony. Also, as reported by the Disinformation Counteraction Center under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on Telegram, 57 Ukrainian prisoners of war registered in the Donetsk Oblast were forced to vote in a pseudo- referendum for the Obast's accession to the Russian Federation. It is emphasized that such steps on the part of the invaders are another manipulation aimed at spreading the Kremlin's narrative in the occupied territories about the alleged large number of "supporters" of the idea of joining the Russian Federation among the captured Ukrainian military.
In occupied Luhansk, no free beds are left in Luhansk hospitals; all wards are filled with wounded invading forces personnel. According to the head of the Luhansk Oblast Military Administration, Serhiy Gaidai, the situation is the same in other occupied cities. Ordinary citizens are hospitalized only for emergency surgical interventions.
Commenting on the sham "referendum," Gaidai noted, "if on the first day of the so-called "referendum" the armed [Russian] military only made rounds of apartments and forced people to vote in the yards, now, on weekends, people with assault rifles inspect places of mass gathering. In particular, markets; they check documents and direct them to the "polling station.
Operational situation
It is the 214th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on establishing full control over the territory of Donetsk Oblast and maintaining control over the captured territories, disrupting the Ukrainian troops' intensive actions in certain directions.
The enemy fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces along the contact line. The Russian military tries to restore their lost positions and constantly conducts aerial reconnaissance.
The Russian military continues destroying Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
Over the past day, the Russian forces launched 7 missile and 22 air strikes, and fired more than 67 MLRS rounds at military and civilian targets on the territory of Ukraine, violating the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws, and customs of war.
More than 35 Ukrainian towns and villages were affected by enemy strikes, including Zaporizhzhya, Ochakiv, Mykolaiv, Myrolyubivka, New York, Bilohorivka, Krasnohorivka, Pavlivka, and Mayorsk, and the border areas of Huta-Studenetska in Chernihiv Oblast and Bachivsk in Sumy Oblast were shelled.
Aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 26 strikes, hitting 20 enemy manpower and equipment concentration areas and 6 positions of anti-aircraft missile systems.
Ukrainian missile troops and artillery hit 5 enemy command and control points, 13 enemy manpower and equipment concentration areas, 3 positions of anti-aircraft missile systems, 3 guns and MLRS, among them "Uragan," and 2 warehouses with ammunition.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Because of the partial mobilization announced by the military-political leadership, the Russian command in the temporarily occupied territories is trying to limit the rights of servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces who have signed short-term contracts. For example, it was announced to the enemy units deployed in the Zaporizhzhya Oblast that the contract term would not matter, and the time of stay in the combat zone would depend on the command's decision. In addition, "partial mobilization" was named the reason for the delay of vacations and cash payments, which already led to a significant deterioration of the morale in the enemy's units.
Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the
90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
The enemy continues shelling from tanks, mortars, and barrel artillery in the areas of Strilecha, Huryiv Kozachok, Dvorichne, Kupyansk, and Kucherivka.
The efforts of the command of the 20th Army of the Russian Armed Forces to stop the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Svatove area are not successful; the enemy situation is deteriorating every day. The enemy's attempts to push Ukrainian forward units beyond the Oskil River in the Kupyansk region and to hold Lyman and Yampil at any cost led to the depletion of enemy reserves in this direction. In fact, during the week of fighting, the enemy lost the replenishment that arrived from the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (from among the mobilized residents of Donbas).
The remnants of two BTGs of the 144th motorized rifle division lost two-thirds of their personnel and combat equipment and now amount to no more than 2- 3 companies of shortened composition. They had to withdraw from the Pechihy reservoir to the northern part of the Luhansk Oblast as a result of several days of intensive counterattacks on the Ukrainian bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.
Two regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps (1.5-2 combat-capable battalions) are advancing to the Maliivka - Karpivka - Seredne - Shandrigolovo frontier to counterattack and push back the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Rubtsi - Krymka - Oleksandrivka
- Yarova frontier. However, this maneuver would not solve the tactical problem and would significantly weaken the ability of the Russian command to organize defenses in the northern part of the Luhansk Oblast.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out several effective strikes with long-range, high-precision weapons in the areas of Svatovo, Novoaidar, northwest of Starobilsk, in the Kreminna – Ridkodub – Svatovo – Starobilsk strip on targets of the enemy's rear infrastructure, command and control system, warehouses, accumulations of weapons and military equipment.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th
separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
The enemy fired at the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Sloviansk, Koroviy Yar, Bohorodychne, Yarova, and Ozerne.
During the day of combat, the enemy left Pisky, Podoly, Karpivka, Ridkodub, Katerynivka, Lypove, and Nove.
In Lyman, the enemy concentrated units of the 222nd rifle battalion and 208th rifle regiment of the mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps, the 16th and 20th "BARS" detachments; in Drobyshev - the 13th "BARS" detachment. The Russian troops are trying to regain their lost position. With units from the 200th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps of Nothern Fleet, the enemy carried out offensive actions in the north of Petropavlivka; had no success, and retreated.
Units of the 244th artillery brigade (Kaliningrad) of the 11th Army Corps of Baltic Fleet were transferred to the operational subordination of the 1st Tank Army of the Western Military District to strengthen fire capabilities in the Kramatorsk direction.
In Makiivka (Luhansk Oblast), the command post of the 20th Army of the Western Military District has been deployed. As a result of fire damage on this post, the commander of the 144th motorized rifle division of the 20th Army, Major General Tsokov, was seriously injured (multiple shrapnel wounds) and is currently in intensive care at one of the St. Petersburg medical institutions.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The Russian military shelled the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Opytne, Yakovlivka, Nelipovka, Yuryivka, Bilohorivka, Rozdolivka, Avdiivka, Vodyane, Maryinka, and Paraskoviivka.
Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Soledar, Vyimka, Kurdyumivka, Zaitseve, Novomykhailivka, and Pervomaiske. They struck with an army aircraft in the Pivdenne area.
Enemy 6th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps, in cooperation with the "Wagner" PMC, attacked in the direction of Nova Kamianka, Soledar; with no success. A separate "Akhmat" regiment attacked the area of Mykolaivka, Vyimka, and PMC "Wagner" in Vershyna, Zaitseve; Mykolayivka, Kurdyumivka; Kodema, Odradivka; the battles continue.
The 100th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps attacked in the direction of Staromykhailivka, Pervomaiske; and the 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps of the Eastern Military District - in Solodke, Novomykhailivka. The enemy did not succeed in any of the directions and retreated.
Zaporizhzhya direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The enemy shelled the positions of Ukrainian troops with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Mykilske, Vuhledar, Zolota Nyva, Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, Velyka Novosilka, Bohoyavlenka, Novodonetske, Yehorivka, Pavlivka, Novoandriivka, Nesteryanka, Novopavlivka, Zatyshshia, Novosilka, Olhivske, Zaliznychne, Novopil, Biloghirya, Velykomykhailivka, Orihiv, Malynivka, Chervone, Temyrivka, Vremivka. In addition, they carried out an air strike at the Pavlivka area (with a pair of Su-25s).
The starting positions of the S-300/400 anti-aircraft missiles, which launched strikes on Zaporizhzhya and the Zaporizhzhya Oblast, were identified. In particular, up to three launchers in the Vladivka area, two in Tokmak, and up to four in Kutuzivka. After completing tasks in the Vladivka area, they are moved to the territory of an agricultural enterprise in the Sofiivka district (Zaporizhzhya Oblast), where a point for repairing and restoring damaged equipment and a warehouse for anti-aircraft missiles for the S-300 is deployed.
An advanced airfield of enemy army aviation (up to six helicopters are periodically based) has been deployed in the Mykhailivka area (Zaporizhzhya Oblast). They provide fire support to units of the Russian Armed Forces in the Orihiv direction.
In the area of Novooleksandrivka (Zaporizhzhya Oblast), the 1096th separate logistics battalion (from Vladikavkaz) of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Army of the Southern Military District is equipping a field depot of aviation weapons.
The enemy command has finished deploying two sufficiently effective tactical groupings in the Melitopol and Mariupol directions.
Melitopol grouping, consisting of 8-9 BTGs, concentrates in the triangle Vasylivka - Pology - Tokmak. It consists of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Army of the Southern Military District (four BTGs), the 29th and 36th Armies of the Eastern Military District (two BTGr from each), and at least 2 "assault battalions" from the composition of the PMC and the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps.
The Mariupol grouping with forces of up to 4-5 BTGs from the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Army (two BTGs) and the 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Army of the Eastern Military District (two BTGs) is concentrated in the Staromayorske - Makarivka - Urozhaine area.
The troops of the 41st Army (up to three BTGs) and the 3rd Army Corps (up to three BTGs from the 54th and 55th motorized rifle regiments of the 6th motorized rifle division) are concentrated in the operational rear of the 58th Army, mainly in the Mariupol direction.
In the Volnovaha direction, the 8th Army grouping of the Southern Military District is actively increasing its combat capability (approximately up to three BTGs), preparing for active actions in the direction of Kurakhovo from the south and east through Maryinka. In recent days, the grouping has been reinforced by two battalions of the 11th separate motorized rifle regiment and two "infantry-artillery" groups of the "Kalmius" artillery brigade of the 1st Army Corps.
Along the front line from Verkhnia Krynytsia to Volodymyrivka, there are at least three enemy joint tactical groups of the Russian Guard, mainly from the operational units and units from the North Caucasus, with the task of ensuring the stability of the defense (i.e., "Barrier" troops).
Kherson direction
● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd
motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.
The operational situation is unchanged. The enemy intensified the use of the "Shahed-136" UAV for striking civilian and military infrastructure.
On September 23, the enemy used four UAVs in Odesa (two against the "Pivden" headquarters, one against a civilian building, one was shot down) and one at the crossing over the Ingulets River in Velyka Artakove.
However, due to the lack of proper interaction between enemy units, the enemy lost three aircraft due to a "friendly" fire.
In the Tavriysk area, the enemy concentrated motorized rifle and tank companies (10 BMPs, 10 T-72 tanks, five trucks), probably in anticipation of a further crossing to the right bank of the Dnipro River, and established a pontoon crossing across the canal in the Ridne area (Kherson Oblast). More than 50 units of equipment, mainly anti-aircraft guns, are concentrated on the eastern bank.
Kherson-Berislav bridgehead
● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –
11.8 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th, and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.
Over 25 Ukrainian towns and villages along the contact line suffered fire damage. The enemy made more than 30 UAV sorties to conduct reconnaissance, adjust fire and launch strikes on civilian infrastructure objects.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.
Currently, there are 14 enemy warships at sea providing reconnaissance and blocking navigation in the Azov-Black Sea waters. Up to 24 Kalibr missiles can be ready for a salvo.
All four submarines of project 636.3, which are in the Black Sea, are in the port of Novorossiysk.
The combat coordination of ground units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continues: 126th separate mechanized brigade, 810th marine infantry brigade. Their use in amphibious operations is not excluded.
Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 9 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.
The enemy continues aerial reconnaissance and attempts to attack using unmanned aerial vehicles. Two UAVs of the Orlan-10 type were destroyed in the Beryslavsk district of the Kherson Oblast and the Bashtansk district of the Mykolaiv Oblast.
The Russian occupiers continue to carry out intensive missile, artillery, and air strikes on the objects of the civil and military infrastructure in the seaports of Ukraine. Information was received on the enemy shelling of Ochakiv (25.09 at 01:20, rocket strikes on the coastal zone), and Mykolaiv (4 explosions on 25.09 at 01:25).
Over the past week, the enemy has been systematically using Shahid-136 kamikaze drones in the coastal zone of Ukraine, including Odesa. The drones are launched from the occupied areas of the Kherson Oblast, particularly Skadovsk. There is information that Iranian instructors are training Russian operators there. Kamikaze drones are launched from vehicle trailers in pairs. One goes at a low altitude and acts as a decoy to find out the location of Ukrainian air defense systems. The second flies at a high altitude observes, and broadcasts the picture to the base. If the lower drone is affected, the upper one changes its trajectory.
On the morning of September 25, several drones struck and damaged a military administrative building in the center of Odessa. There is an assumption that later (after exposing the location of Ukrainian air defense systems), the enemy will practice more massive drone raids in the composition of up to 10 units simultaneously.
The intensity of the enemy moving its military equipment by road and rail transport from Crimea to the Kherson region remains active. Trains with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other armored vehicles regularly move from Crimea.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 25.09
Personnel - almost 56,700 people (+400);
Tanks – 2,275 (+13);
Armored combat vehicles – 4,832 (+25);
Artillery systems – 1,368 (+7);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 328 (+1); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 171 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,701 (+20); Aircraft - 259 (+4);
Helicopters – 220 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level - 966 (+10); Intercepted cruise missiles - 241 (+1);
Boats / ships - 15 (0).
Ukraine, general news
The Ukrainian energy industry is capable of compensating the EU for 5-6 billion cubic meters of Russian gas. The Minister of Energy of Ukraine, Herman Galushchenko, held a bilateral meeting with the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) Fatih Birol while on a working trip to the USA. During the discussion, the minister noted that after synchronization with ENTSO- E, the Ukrainian energy system demonstrates its stability, despite more than 200 days of operation in wartime conditions.
International diplomatic aspect
"Russia's referenda are a sham – a false pretext to try to annex parts of Ukraine by force in flagrant violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter. We will work with our allies and partners to impose additional swift and severe economic costs on Russia," stated the POTUS.
The Kremlin doesn't care about the international recognition of the so-called "referenda" in the Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine and their following annexation. This time, Russia didn't bother to create even the slightest appearance of international legitimacy, bringing "observers" from Belarus, Venezuela, Egypt, Brazil, and a couple of other countries. Even Russia's closest ally, Serbia, signals that it has no intention to recognize the annexation, for it would be in contradiction to its national interest on the issue of Kosovo. Still, one shouldn't be surprised if the annexation is recognized by Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.
The reason for such negligence on the Kremlin's part is that the main goal is to challenge the Biden Administration's core principles in its support of Ukraine, which is avoidance of a direct clash between the US and its allies and Russia and deter Russia from going nuclear. "The entire territory of the Russian Federation, which is enshrined and can be additionally enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is certainly under the full protection of the state; this is absolutely natural. All laws, doctrines, concepts, strategies of the Russian Federation apply to its entire territory," Sergey Lavrov answered the question of whether the nuclear doctrine of Russia will be extended to new regions if they vote in favor of joining Russia during referenda.
"We have communicated directly, privately, to the Russians at very high levels that there will be catastrophic consequences for Russia if they use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. We have been clear with them and emphatic with them that the United States will respond decisively alongside our allies and partners," said POTUS national security adviser.
The Kremlin likely aims to play a Caribbean missile crisis' moment precisely sixty years to the date. The thirteen days in October of 1962 were the most dangerous moment in humankind's history. So, Putin might calculate that such an escalation might get him out of the zugzwang.
Failing to achieve anything that might appear as a military victory, Putin may well choose to freeze the situation on the ground and buy some time to prepare for the next assault. It would be a challenge for the US and its allies, given the Biden Administration's self-restraining policy on the supply of specific weapon systems and German's cautious approach to help as little and as late as possible with the aim not to provoke a third world war. It appears that the West has reached its psychologically comfortable level of support. At the same time, Russia is set to escalate on the ground with a vast mobilization effort (way more than the stated 300,000) and nuclear blackmail.
Russia's Foreign Minister once claimed that Zelenskiy is a Nazi, and the Kremlin's propaganda has insisted that the Nazis have run Ukraine for years. However, the Jerusalem Post named President Volodymyr Zelensky the most influential Jew of 2022. The paper put him event before the current Israeli and French Prime Ministers. But whatever influence he enjoys, it falls short of granting tangible support to Ukraine from Israel itself. "I don't know what happened to Israel. I'm honestly, frankly - I am in shock because I don't understand why they couldn't give us air defenses," he said. He went on to say that his conversations with the Israeli leadership "have done nothing to help Ukraine."
Jews survived the Holocaust and several attempts by their belligerent neighbors to destroy their state. Now, Russia is waging a genocidal war and wiping off Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages daily. Though Russia doesn't pose a direct threat to Israel, it supports the most dangerous enemies of Israel. Iran provided Russia with kamikaze drones, which is a significant security risk for Ukraine, and Teheran's operating Hezbollah and backing Hamas. Moreover, with the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia could reestablish its foothold in the Middle East and increase its harmful activities there. Therefore, Russia's defeat and following changes in the Kremlin would also serve the Israeli interest.
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3. China Could Decide Now Is the Time for War with America (book review)
Of Hal Brands' and Michael Beckley's new book.
Excerpts:
We’ll see. Much depends on the character of the Chinese state, party, and society.
However things unfold, the recommendations put forth in Danger Zone are sound. For example, they urge U.S. leaders to set priorities “ruthlessly.” And indeed, setting and enforcing priorities while husbanding finite resources for what matters most is Strategy 101. They exhort Washington to be “strategically deliberate and tactically agile.” Tactical agility means devising stratagems to keep China off-balance, while deliberate strategy assures all stakeholders of American constancy. And, as in the late Cold War in particular, U.S. leaders should play some offense in the service of strategic defense.
The coauthors’ bottom line: “Think of danger-zone strategy as something that helps you win in the future by avoiding disaster in the here and now.”
But a measure of fatalism and a sense of urgency must propel U.S. policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific over the long haul, even if the next few years constitute the time of greatest peril. Even if China’s rise tops out, as Professors Brands and Beckley foretell, it has already put in place enough implements to make serious mischief for East Asia and the world into the indefinite future. An impressive People’s Liberation Army Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force exist now, and they will continue exist in the coming age of demographic downturn. A fraction of the U.S. armed forces will continue to face off against the whole of the Chinese armed forces bestriding their home ground. Danger will linger, then, even if Asia crosses safely through the danger zone.
Forewarned is forearmed. Read the whole thing.
China Could Decide Now Is the Time for War with America
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 25, 2022
Will a ‘Peak’ China decide now is the time for war with America: Hal Brands and Michael Beckley have breaking news from 1832! Namely that it sometimes makes sense for the weak to pick a fight with the strong. No less an authority than Carl von Clausewitz affirms it. Suppose, postulates Clausewitz, a weaker contender “is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its position to grow weaker every year. If war is unavoidable, should it not make the most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse? In short, it should attack . . . .”
Verily, Clausewitz is a man for all seasons. If you know important trendlines are turning against you—if you expect your strategic standing vis-à-vis your antagonist to be worse next year than this—then he advises you to strike now. Otherwise, you’ll get less than you might. Your window of opportunity might even slam shut by next year.
Such a now-or-never calculus makes for a combustible atmosphere. The challenge before America is to deter China from striking a match.
Brands and Beckley are professors at Johns Hopkins and Tufts, respectively. Though they don’t mention the sage of nineteenth-century Prussia in their lucidly written new book Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, they apply Clausewitzian logic to Communist China, arguing that the world is witnessing “peak China.” If China stands at the zenith of its power, and if Chinese Communist Party magnates know it, then they might reason that now is their best opportunity to use military might to settle longstanding grudges.
The next few years will be a time of temptation for Beijing—and thus a time of peril for the Indo-Pacific.
To buttress their case the coauthors catalog various factors that have turned negative after abetting China’s rise to great power. China, they observe, has been the beneficiary of a uniquely favorable political and strategic environment over the decades since party leaders resolved to reform the economy and open it to the world. But China’s surroundings are no longer so auspicious—in large measure because Beijing has squandered Asian and international goodwill through its bellicosity and mendacity.
There are externally imposed limits to China’s rise.
And then there are internal woes. It’s always tough to gauge how well a totalitarian society like Communist China is faring within its frontiers. Official figures out of Beijing are worth precisely what you pay for them. There’s no oversight over them, and the party has every reason to game them in its favor, in an effort to show the Chinese people it’s an indispensable steward of the common weal. Nevertheless, it does appear that key indices such as demographics, GDP figures, natural resources, and the environment are set to constrain Chinese power rather than fuel it.
If so, domestic travails will eventually drag down military budgets—and, potentially, martial adventurism with them.
In other words, it’s far from fated that China’s rise will track forever upward. The United States and China may never reach the crossover point envisioned by exponents of the “Thucydides Trap”—the point beyond which Chinese power outstrips American, giving Beijing the upper hand in the Western Pacific. But Brands and Beckley argue rightly that an impending stall in China’s rise doesn’t mean the coming years will be free from U.S.-China conflict. In fact, the opposite could well be true.
A China on the threshold of decline is a dangerous China—as Clausewitz might prophesy were he among the quick today.
Now, positing that the 2020s constitute a danger zone is nothing new. In 2010, for instance, a conference convened at the Naval War College in Newport to explore how demographic decline is transforming great-power politics. The organizers did the usual academic thing and bundled the conference papers into an edited volume. Gordon Chang, an analyst who always takes a gloomy view of China’s communist future, had the China portfolio for the project. Gordon made many of the same points Brands and Beckley do a decade-plus hence, forecasting that China will be easier to live with once its population size starts to wane—as it’s set to do sometime this decade.
Until then it might be a problem. An elderly populace is an expensive populace, and it’s hard to recruit a family’s only child—a legacy of the long-running “one-child” policy—for military service. If demographics threatens to muffle Beijing’s ambitions, party leaders might opt to act now.
For my part I surveyed the classical precedent, reviewing how ancient Athens and Sparta responded to demographic shocks. Sparta suffered a catastrophic earthquake in the 460s B.C., losing the flower of Spartan infantry to a natural disaster. Spartan rulers reacted cautiously and conservatively, as you would expect. The fewer your resources, the more precious they are. From a cost-benefit standpoint it makes sense that political and military leaders would be loath to hazard a diminished soldiery on the battlefield.
Rival Athens was another story altogether. Athens endured a demographic blow of its own, in the form of a devastating plague that felled some thirty percent of the populace early in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). But rather than hunker down, Athenians cast off all restraint. They jettisoned the prudent, resource-conserving, saltwater-oriented strategy preached by “first citizen” Pericles, who perished from the pestilence.
Athenians refused to abide by cost-benefit logic and conserve diminished manpower. Instead they went adventuring—and ended up weeping bitter tears in defeat.
Demographics is important, then, but it is not destiny. Extrapolating from that small sample size, I set forth the hypothesis that—rather than exert a uniform influence on all strategic communities at all times—population decline makes a contender more like itself. A shrinking populace, that is, primes a contestant to act in keeping with its ingrained character and reflexes. Spartans already inclined to conservative strategy; they were even more conservative following the earthquake. Athenians were known for enterprise and derring-do despite Pericles’ cautionary counsel; they veered from venturesome to reckless following the plague.
Will China tread a Spartan or an Athenian pathway in the coming years?
If Beijing reckons that now is as good as it gets for Beijing—if China’s strategic position has crested or stands poised to—Xi Jinping & Co. could well decide today is the day to take up the sword. China might try to conquer Taiwan, wrest the Senkaku Islands from Japan, or clamp down on Southeast Asian rivals in the South China Sea. If so it would follow the Athenian model, wagering everything on a bold gambit. Hence the danger zone Brands and Beckley espy.
Now-or-never logic could prevail among communist magnates, to the detriment of regional peace and security.
Or Beijing could take a Spartan tack, playing things safe while hoping circumstances boost its prospects in the future. That would be the prudent course of action. If that approach prevails—if the United States, its allies, and its friends can deter China from warfare for the next decade or so—then a prudent Spartan outlook might take hold. The strategic competition with China should prove more manageable over the long term. Brands and Beckley incline to something approximating this view, and cost-benefit logic backs them up.
We’ll see. Much depends on the character of the Chinese state, party, and society.
However things unfold, the recommendations put forth in Danger Zone are sound. For example, they urge U.S. leaders to set priorities “ruthlessly.” And indeed, setting and enforcing priorities while husbanding finite resources for what matters most is Strategy 101. They exhort Washington to be “strategically deliberate and tactically agile.” Tactical agility means devising stratagems to keep China off-balance, while deliberate strategy assures all stakeholders of American constancy. And, as in the late Cold War in particular, U.S. leaders should play some offense in the service of strategic defense.
The coauthors’ bottom line: “Think of danger-zone strategy as something that helps you win in the future by avoiding disaster in the here and now.”
But a measure of fatalism and a sense of urgency must propel U.S. policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific over the long haul, even if the next few years constitute the time of greatest peril. Even if China’s rise tops out, as Professors Brands and Beckley foretell, it has already put in place enough implements to make serious mischief for East Asia and the world into the indefinite future. An impressive People’s Liberation Army Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force exist now, and they will continue exist in the coming age of demographic downturn. A fraction of the U.S. armed forces will continue to face off against the whole of the Chinese armed forces bestriding their home ground. Danger will linger, then, even if Asia crosses safely through the danger zone.
Forewarned is forearmed. Read the whole thing.
A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 25, 2022
4. China becomes ‘hothouse’ of intrigue ahead of crucial Communist party congress
Excerpts:
China’s government has not responded to the rumours, but public security authorities were among those posting under the hashtag “the truth about large-scale cancellation of flights across the country”, disputing the significance of the cancellations which they said was normal for the pandemic.
The party congress begins on 16 October. The event, in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, is closed to the public but is the most important date on the CCP’s five-year political cycle. There is speculation that Xi could further consolidate power with the promotion of stronger allies to senior positions, and that the party will resurrect the “people’s leader” title, not used since Mao Zedong.
China becomes ‘hothouse’ of intrigue ahead of crucial Communist party congress
Swiftly debunked rumours of coups swirl as Beijing prepares to host critical meeting of elite, at which Xi Jinping is expected to be granted a third term
The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · September 26, 2022
Purges of senior officials and unfounded rumours of military coups in Beijing have fed into feverish speculation ahead of a key meeting of China’s ruling party next month, when president Xi Jinping is expected to be granted an unprecedented third term.
The jailing of a clique of senior security officials for corruption, followed by days of strange and quickly dispelled rumours of Xi being under house arrest, have fuelled what one analyst called a “hothouse” environment mired in secrecy and suspicion.
Last week, a Chinese court jailed the former vice-minister of public security Sun Lijun, the former justice minister Fu Zhenghua, and former police chiefs of Shanghai, Chongqing and Shanxi on corruption charges. Fu and the police chiefs had been accused of being part of a political clique surrounding Sun, and being disloyal to Xi.
The round-up was one of the biggest Chinese political purges in years, and came just weeks before the Chinese Communist party’s (CCP) most important political meeting – the twice a decade party congress – where the political elite are reshuffled around the various positions of power in the one-party state.
China ready for ‘fight’ over international action on Xinjiang human rights abuses
Read more
Xi is expected to be reappointed as leader of the party and military commission at the meeting, after he abolished the two-term limit in 2018 and waged a years-long anti-corruption campaign that also targeted many political opponents.
On Sunday state media announced the list of CCP central committee delegates, numbering almost 2,300, had been finalised. Xi’s inclusion on the list further refuted social media rumours that had been swirling since Saturday of a military coup. The unfounded claims – accompanied by unsourced videos of military vehicles and based mostly on mass flight cancellations – were debunked, but not before it began trending on Twitter.
There was no specific mention of the coup rumours on China’s social media, but a Weibo hashtag related to “airports across the country cancel flights” was viewed by more than 200,000 people over the weekend.
China Communist party’s 20th national congress explained – in 30 seconds
Read more
Some made fun of the rumours, noting the lack of any evidence of a political takeover on the ground in Beijing.
Drew Thompson, a scholar with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, said a coup in China wasn’t entirely implausible, and Xi had reportedly shown concern about the prospect in the past, but the weekend’s rumours looked more like “wishful thinking”. They appeared to originate in accounts associated with the Falun Gong movement, which Thompson said was “essentially not credible”.
“The rumour that Xi Jinping has been arrested has legs because it is such a sensitive political moment in China, and the recent trials (and convictions) of long-serving senior officials creates a hothouse atmosphere,” he said on Twitter.
Chinese president Xi Jinping Photograph: Sergei Bobylev/AP
Thompson, who is also a former US state department official, told the Guardian the Falun Gong media often exaggerated or highlighted their opposition to Xi and the CCP in their reporting. “In this case those themes they have highlighted and reported on for a long time suddenly broke into the mainstream.”
Other analysts like Sinocism author, Bill Bishop, said he thought the rumours were “BS” but the “inherent opacity” of the CCP mechanisms easily fuelled their spread.
The party congress is a secretive process of power distribution, with the most senior positions not announced until the final day. Government control of the domestic narrative and crushing of dissent has intensified in recent weeks as the meeting approaches.
Xi has been absent from the public eye since he returned to China from the SCO Summit in Uzbekistan last weekend. Observers said he is likely to be quarantining.
“I think the fact this rumour spread so far, and was considered plausible enough to analyse is really a reflection of an underlying shortcoming of Chinese governance,” said Thompson.
“It really is a story about the opaqueness and the uncertainty around high-level Chinese succession. If you look back through history, to 1949, succession between top leaders has been fraught. Hu Jintao was the first successful transition of power where no one was imprisoned or died … Xi Jinping has created an entirely new paradigm where no successor has been identified, which raises questions about what would succession look like if it was unplanned or uncontrolled?”
China’s government has not responded to the rumours, but public security authorities were among those posting under the hashtag “the truth about large-scale cancellation of flights across the country”, disputing the significance of the cancellations which they said was normal for the pandemic.
The party congress begins on 16 October. The event, in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, is closed to the public but is the most important date on the CCP’s five-year political cycle. There is speculation that Xi could further consolidate power with the promotion of stronger allies to senior positions, and that the party will resurrect the “people’s leader” title, not used since Mao Zedong.
The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · September 26, 2022
5. Here's how rumours of Xi Jinping's 'arrest' and 'coup' started
This seems to make sense to me.
Here's how rumours of Xi Jinping's 'arrest' and 'coup' started
Far from a ‘coup’, Xi Jinping was stomping out opposition. Within three days, at least six top officials were arrested or sentenced to prison under corruption charges.
AADIL BRAR
26 September, 2022 08:32 am IST
theprint.in · by Aadil Brar · September 26, 2022
The rumours of a ‘coup’ against Xi Jinping start a media frenzy. Former officers of the Red Army Division were selected as delegates to the 20th Party Congress – a signal to the border dispute with India. Xi wants the full support of the PLA. Beijing calls for a “peaceful resolution” in Ukraine at the UNGA. Chinascope separates the chaff of rumours from news in the week from China – and the world.
China over the week
Rumours about a ‘coup’ started circulating on Friday after a set of overseas Chinese media – especially Falun Gong-backed media – claimed that President Xi Jinping had been “arrested” after a “coup”.
The rumour started when a journalist named Zhao Lanjian, who is in exile in the US after escaping from China, made unsubstantiated claims on Twitter about mass flight cancellations because of ‘unexplained’ reasons. The claim was picked up by the Chinese spiritual movement Falun Gong-backed media networks, including New Tang Dynasty (NTDTV) and overseas Chinese YouTuber Jennifer Zeng. The latter added another layer of false credibility to the story by showing a clip of a military convoy travelling on an unknown road in China.
Further fuel to the rumour mill was added by pointing out Xi’s disappearance from the public eye after returning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan, which can be explained by Xi currently quarantined. NTDTV published an article citing that Xi wasn’t present at the national defence and military reform seminar, which fueled the rumour about a ‘coup’.
The jump from the claim about flight cancellation from the military convoy created a social media storm of rumours widely shared on Twitter by Indian handles.
I examined the flight data, and the minor cancellations can be attributed to the Covid-19-related lockdowns and restrictions in multiple regions across China. The political activities in Beijing went on as usual on 23 September when the rumour began to circulate with no signs of any political upheaval to be seen in the latest Chinese state media’s broadcast of Xinwen Lianbo.
Xi’s disappearance from public view has fueled many rumours in the past, and he usually steps back from a hectic schedule to return in a few days’ time. Unlike places in Myanmar, the PLA is firmly under the grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If there is ever a ‘coup’ against Xi, it would be led by the political leaders and not the military. A potential ‘coup’ will have very different signs of political upheaval; flight cancellations don’t reflect the chaos that will follow such a scenario.
To end the rumour, Georg Fahrion, German newspaper Der Spiegel’s reporter in Beijing, posted pictures of Tiananmen Square and other major venues in the city–with a satirical commentary on the ‘coup’–to show that there was no military mobilisation or turmoil in China.
Today in Beijing, I investigated the #chinacoup so you don’t have to. At considerable personal risk, I ventured out to some neuralgic key points in the city. Disturbing finds. Brace yourselves. /1 pic.twitter.com/z4CJYpQbbk
— Georg Fahrion (@schorselysees) September 25, 2022
Far from a ‘coup’, Xi was actually stomping out any opposition and sending a loud and clear signal. Within three days, at least six top officials were arrested or sentenced to prison under corruption charges.
Sun Lijun, former vice minister of public security, who has been accused of leading a ‘political clique’, was sentenced to death, which could be commuted to life in prison without parole after two years. Fu Zhenghua, the former justice minister, was imprisoned for accepting bribes. Liu Xinyun, former vice governor and head of the public security department in Shanxi province, was sentenced to 14 years for bribery and abuse. Gong Daoan, former deputy mayor of Shanghai and the city’s public security bureau, was sentenced to life in prison for accepting bribes worth 73.43 million yuan ($10.4 million). Gong Daoan, once a top police officer in Shanghai, was purged. The former police chief of Chongqing, Deng Huilin was given a 15-year sentence. Wang Like, former secretary of Jiangsu provincial political and legal affairs commission, was also sentenced to death with a potential life sentence after two years.
The sentencing of the officials is linked to the ‘coup’ rumours. Many members of the Chinese diaspora media have had links to the officials sentenced and are witnessing the demise of a network that could have countered Xi.
Meanwhile, ahead of the Party Congress, an updated version of the CCP code says officials could be demoted for “shaky ideals and beliefs, soft stances and vague attitudes on major issues involving the party’s leadership.”
Beijing isn’t shying away from underscoring the tensions with India by elevating soldiers from a key PLA division as delegates to the 20th Party Congress.
Thirty members from Western Theatre Command were selected, nine out of which were members from the Red Army Division (officially known as the 6th Division) which has a long history in the border areas near Ladakh – including the 1962 War. Qi Fabao, the regimental commander who negotiated with the Indian Army during the 2020 Galwan clash, was one of the 13 selected. A total of 304 representatives from the PLA will attend the Party Congress in October.
Jayadeva Ranade, President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, pointed out the significance of the move. “In this backdrop of continuing tension and deployment of 60,000-70,000 troops each by India and China in the high-altitude eastern Ladakh, what is interesting is that the number of delegates representing the PLA WTC at the 20th Party Congress is nearly double than that of the other four theatre commands. The WTC has selected 30 delegates for the 20th Party Congress. There are other signs of the leadership’s attention to the WTC,” Ranade wrote.
In the lead-up to the Congress, the PLA Daily has published multiple articles reminding the Chinese military to follow “party’s leadership”.
On Sunday, Xinhua News Agency reported the completion of selecting the final list of 2,296 delegates to the Party Congress.
On 19 September, Chinese state councillor and defence minister Wei Fenghe met Pakistan Army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa during the latter’s visit to Xi’an.
“No matter how the world situation changes, China and Pakistan will always be trustworthy and most reliable true friends and good brothers. The two sides should continue to improve their ability to jointly cope with various risks and challenges, and work together to safeguard the common interests of the two countries and regional peace and stability,” Wei said, according to the Chinese Military Network.
Bajwa wasn’t the only major foreign security official visiting China recently. Russian Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev was on a two-day visit to China, during which he co-chaired the 17th Round of Strategic Security Consultation between China and Russia with Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs.
China in world news
The United Nations General Assembly in New York acts as a global summit for leaders when they gather every year. The sessions of the UNGA saw a few multilateral and bilateral meetings, with many watching the interactions between foreign ministers of India, China, and Russia.
The Chinese state councillor and foreign minister Wang Yi met his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar at the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the 77th session of the UNGA.
India and China called for a “negotiated end to the Ukraine war”, signifying how fast Russia is losing support from its key allies.
“We call on all parties concerned to keep the crisis from spilling over and protect the legitimate rights and the interests of developing countries,” Wang Yi said in his remarks to the UNGA debate.
Wang Yi also met Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. “China will continue upholding an objective and just position to promote peace talks, and hopes that all parties refrain from giving up dialogue efforts and resolve security concerns through peace talks,” he said.
Despite China’s call for ending the Ukraine war, Beijing is unlikely to completely revamp ties with Moscow and support Putin in areas where it feels comfortable.
While at UNGA, Wang Yi met Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba in person for the first time since Russia’s offensive on Kyiv. Both have spoken over the phone since the Ukraine war started.
“China has always been committed to promoting peace talks, never stands idly by, never adds fuel to the fire, and never takes advantage of the situation for self-interests,” he said during the meeting with Kuleba.
Most recently, Putin made remarks about using nuclear weapons to protect Russia’s “territorial integrity.” China’s response was rather muted, calling for dialogue and engagement.
Prominent world leaders attended the funeral of Queen Elizabeth II. Wang Qishan, China’s vice president, was allowed to attend the funeral after a Chinese delegation led by ambassador Zheng Zeguang was barred from visiting the Queen’s coffin.
Must read this week
Pelosi’s visit spurs Chinese discussions on a two-front crisis – Antara Ghoshal Singh
Decoding the 20th Party Congress – Asia Society Policy Institute
As crackdown eases, China’s Xinjiang faces long road to rehabilitation – Eva Dou and Cate Cadell
Why Chinese Cinema Is Still Waiting on the Next Generation – Liu Qing
Experts this week
“In Russia’s ‘Empire Strikes Back’, we can also glimpse the changes in the historical dimension of the worldview of Russia’s top leaders and some ruling elites in the past 20 years. In such a worldview, the imagining of the future is increasingly presented as a ‘return’ to a point in the past. The point of return can be the so-called ‘1989 order’: the underlying understanding is that neither the Soviet Union nor Russia is a loser of the Cold War; what Russia needs to maintain is the 1989 Gorbachev era when the Cold War ended peacefully with the Western world. This is the ‘status quo’ that Russia needs to maintain the international order, not the post-1991 order that the United States is trying to maintain – in this sense, the United States is precisely the destroyer of the status quo,” writes Zhang Xin, Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, East China Normal University.
The author is a columnist and a freelance journalist, currently pursuing an MSc in international politics with a focus on China from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He was previously a China media journalist at the BBC World Service. He tweets @aadilbrar. Views are personal.
This is a weekly round-up that Aadil Brar writes about what’s buzzing in China. This will soon be available as a subscribers’-only product.
(Edited by Prashant)
theprint.in · by Aadil Brar · September 26, 2022
6. Battlefield Hotlines Let U.S. Military Keep Ukraine’s Weapons Firing
Perhaps gives new meaning to 'virtual warfare."
Battlefield Hotlines Let U.S. Military Keep Ukraine’s Weapons Firing
Himars and other American arms hitting Russian forces get constant fixes via secure chat groups
https://www.wsj.com/articles/battlefield-hotlines-let-u-s-military-keep-ukraines-weapons-firing-11664009094?utm_source=pocket_mylist
By Nancy A. YoussefFollow and Stephen KalinFollow
Sept. 24, 2022 7:00 am ET
ON A MILITARY BASE, Poland—Near where weapons and equipment donated by the U.S. and other allies cross the border into Ukraine, a group of 55 U.S. troops and translators on iPads fielded repair queries about weapons that are already on the battlefield, via secure chat apps.
There are 14 chats for each major weapon system, forming a makeshift wartime telemaintenance network for fighters who are using weapons well beyond the limits for which they were designed.
Photos of barrels worn down by repeated firings arrived over chat from Ukrainians asking how to make the ordnance more accurate even with rifling stripped away. Front-line soldiers sent videos asking how to salvage weapons that otherwise would be considered irreparable and what fixes were needed to keep them working.
Ukrainian forces also sent sketches showing how they reverse-engineered a part that would take too long to arrive from an allied partner, and asked if it would work even if the created part wasn’t perfect.
“What this is doing is quickly returning equipment to the battlefield,” said a lieutenant colonel in charge of the chats.
A Ukrainian officer fighting in the country’s eastern Donbas region showed video from his phone of an operation using a Himars launcher.
PHOTO: EMANUELE SATOLLI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Reporters weren’t allowed to use the names of troops leading the telemaintenance networks. Reporters who also met the troops agreed to not identify the type of app used for the chats, or where in Poland U.S. troops supporting the chats are based.
After seven months of war, U.S. and allied Western nations providing arms and other support to Ukraine and its soldiers have discovered that it isn’t enough to give Kyiv weapons. They also need to provide spare parts and access to experts who can help Ukrainians repair equipment or fabricate parts near the front lines.
“This war requires quick and nonstandard solutions,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said about the round-the-clock online technical consultations. “It gives a perfect opportunity to ensure permanent maintenance and combat-ready state of armaments and military equipment.”
Mr. Reznikov said that Ukraine has begun carrying out some complex repairs of Western-style armaments in Ukraine and mastered the production of around 10% of needed spare parts, sometimes even without technical documentation.
“Speed and quality are the defining criteria in this case,” Mr. Reznikov said.
While allies donated weapons, they didn’t provide the manuals that come with them, in part to protect proprietary information. Instead, parts of manuals arrive in the form of chat messages.
How Ukraine Uses U.S. Himars to Fight Russia–and Why It Wants Other Weapons
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When the war began, Ukrainian repair and maintenance specialists received accelerated training from Western allies and are now passing on that knowledge to their colleagues, Mr. Reznikov added.
U.S. troops supporting the chats said it is unclear whether the chats are enough to keep all the weapons operable, or whether contractors or other support personnel will eventually have to enter Ukraine. Proponents of using government-funded contractors argue that the weapons supplied would last even longer if experts could repair them from Ukraine.
The chats began unofficially after the first nine Ukrainian troops who were trained to keep the weapons running returned to Ukraine and started contacting their teachers for advice via text messages. By June, the U.S. military codified the chats, arranging for troops from Army Materiel Command, which is responsible for the U.S. Army’s equipment, and Ukrainian translators to talk to Ukrainian fighters from inside a building near where the donated weapons entered Ukraine.
As of earlier this month, the U.S. said all 16 Himars—the mobile rocket systems that Ukrainians have said were key in their reclaiming of territory—remain operational. One reason, soldiers here said, is that through the chats they have saved damaged Himars that otherwise would have come off the battlefield.
Ukrainian fighters fired a howitzer from their front-line position in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region last month.
PHOTO: SERGEY BOBOK/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
A Ukrainian Himars operator said the ability to communicate in real time with American trainers had proven extremely helpful for quick troubleshooting in the field.
During a recent firing mission, the advanced weapon system’s computer displayed an error message that the Ukrainian didn’t know how to resolve. The army lieutenant initiated a video chat with a U.S. instructor, who then used Google Translate to send back instructions in Ukrainian.
“Ukrainians are going to identify a need, the experts are going to diagnose a fault or what’s needed and either walk them through it or put parts on order,” the U.S. lieutenant colonel said. “And then we use the American supply system to get that part here to transfer right down.”
The use of both secure and widely available apps has become increasingly common between local forces and the U.S. troops supporting them. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. troops and Afghans often communicated over WhatsApp, at times using their phones to ask for U.S. air support on ongoing missions.
U.S. officials have said they don’t always know where the weapons and equipment they donate end up in Ukraine. The chats have become one way to find out, U.S. troops in charge of the chats said.
Army Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the support facility earlier this month, in part to meet the troops who created the chats.
“Our ability to innovate, adapt and integrate technology through telemaintenance to meet the current demand in this environment has been extremely successful,” Army Col. Dave Butler, a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said.
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The chats also have taught the U.S. military about how much wear a weapon can take. Barrels that usually take U.S. troops years to wear down have taken weeks in Ukraine, because fighters are firing rounds so frequently. That information is going back to defense weapons manufacturers, in some cases to determine which parts need to be made fastest, U.S. military officials said.
Often, requested parts are basic. Early on, Ukrainians most frequently asked for spare tires. Now, fuel and oil filters are in high demand.
Of the 14 chats, those supporting Himars and howitzers are considered priorities, the lieutenant colonel said. Soldiers here said every request—there have been roughly 650 so far—has been answered within minutes. Spare parts usually have left the nearby airfield within days.
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But even that isn’t fast enough, and the supply of many parts can’t meet the demand. In response, Ukrainians have created their own production systems.
The U.S. lieutenant colonel said Ukraine’s support network includes welding, machining and fabrication that tops U.S. abilities in Poland.
The maintenance app and chat numbers were first shared through word-of-mouth and then through newly-trained personnel who had headed back to Ukraine. Now, Ukrainian commanders have the chat numbers so they can get them to their fighters, the lieutenant colonel said.
The need to help Ukrainians salvage what has already been donated is likely to increase, as allied members say they are running out of stockpiles to donate. Some worry that fatigue could lead to fewer donations, particularly during winter, when limits on Russian oil and gas could lead to fuel shortages across Europe.
U.S. commanders said they are no longer planning only how to ship weapons but also how to create a network to deliver parts so the big guns can keep shooting.
“War is a test of logistics,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe.
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com
7. The People's Liberation Army Conference: History, Highlights, and the Challenges Ahead
Interesting history and important analysis.
Conclusion:
Finally, the available evidence suggests that these questions will take a long time to answer. Indeed, as with most things related to China, what the PLA will become poses a generational challenge. At the very least, the PLA’s own 2027/2035/2049 timeline and associated goals reveal a military that is thinking over the longer haul. Although China’s meteoric rise also contains the possibilities of catastrophic decline—demographic challenges unseen in human history, environmental depredation, and uneven development, among others—the system has nonetheless proved itself resilient and adaptive. It would seem imprudent to base future plans on the wishful thinking that these factors might conspire to fundamentally derail China’s development in ways that become fundamentally less challenging. Rather, it is incumbent that we take the firm, yet not escalatory, steps that resist PLA coercions at every turn and leverage traditional strengths of allies and partners so that China’s transition to a fully modern, even world-class, military is not accompanied by catastrophic impacts in the Indo-Pacific.
The People's Liberation Army Conference: History, Highlights, and the Challenges Ahead
by Roy D. Kamphausen
September 24, 2022
https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-peoples-liberation-army-conference-history-highlights-and-the-challenges-ahead/
This essay by NBR president Roy Kamphausen offers a short history of the PLA Conference, examines the regional and strategic environment that has been the backdrop for the conference series, and concludes with key questions going forward.
nbr.org
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) began its partnership with the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) on the PLA Conference in the spring of 2005, when retired U.S. Army colonel Larry Wortzel invited NBR to assume the role of SSI’s conference partner from the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. As an institution, NBR leaped at the opportunity, as the chance to work on the premier conference studying the People’s Liberation Army was one not to be missed. And for me, a retired U.S. Army China foreign area officer (FAO), the ensuing fifteen years would prove to be a professional privilege of the highest order.
The end of this partnership—and era—with the 2020 conference and accompanying edited volume Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA, published in July 2022, provides an opportunity to assess developments in the PLA and the field of PLA studies over that intervening period. This essay begins with a short history of the Carlisle PLA Conference, details the changes the conference has experienced over the past decade and a half, examines the regional and strategic environment that has been the backdrop for the conference series, underscores some of the highlights of the work, and concludes with key questions going forward as the PLA Conference enters a new era.
A SHORT HISTORY
The Carlisle PLA Conference was largely due to the vision of Ambassador Jim Lilley. From his perspective, the PLA—an organization that had forcibly cleared Tiananmen Square on June 3–4, 1989, while he was U.S. ambassador in Beijing, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Chinese in the process—merited intensive study by Western observers. Lilley’s initiative was infused with his indefatigable drive and built on earlier and smaller-scale efforts in the Washington, D.C., area organized by PLA specialists from academia, the military, and intelligence organizations. In gratitude for his seminal role, we dedicated the 2010 volume, The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, to him after he passed away in 2009, with a foreword written by the president he served so well, George H. W. Bush.
Wortzel played a critical role in the early years after he became director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College and positioned SSI as the home of the Carlisle PLA Conference. His energy and insights, good humor, and deep network of contacts made an indelible imprint on the conference. Wortzel’s approach consisted of three essential components: emphasizing original, Chinese-language sources; seeking observers and analysts with deep, in-country experience to provide context for developments; and focusing on relevance for decision-makers. These principles have guided the work of conference organizers until today.
Two legends of PLA studies were indispensable to the success of the conference series. First, Paul Godwin, the towering Brit and former U.S. Marine, lent gravitas to our work based on his stature as the leading analyst of the PLA at the National Defense University. He held those seeking to understand the PLA to high standards, even as his gentle nature endeared him to those same rising analysts. Second, Ellis Joffe, for whom NBR named the Ellis Joffe Prize for PLA Studies, an award for rising specialists in Chinese security, also had a deep impact on the Carlisle PLA Conference. Cynthia Watson, recently retired provost at the National Defense University, captured the essence of Joffe in her remembrance of him in The People of the PLA 2.0 (2018), recounting that “Joffe was an extraordinarily perceptive analyst of Chinese intentions and the ways in which China intended to use the PLA to achieve its goals.” The wisdom, collegiality, and grace exemplified by Godwin and Joffe set the tone for all conference participants.
Over these last fifteen years, the distinguished Asia experts at SSI, including Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and most recently Roger Cliff, have been tremendous collaborative partners. Doug Lovelace, longtime director of SSI, gave strong support to our efforts, enabling us to do good work, unimpeded by bureaucratic concerns.
U.S. Pacific Command (now U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) joined the Carlisle PLA Conference in 2010 as a partner on the initiative of the inaugural head of the PACOM China Strategic Focus Group, David Dorman. Dorman was succeeded by retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general David Stilwell, Lukas Filler, and Brigadier General Brian Davis. For nearly a decade, Strategic Focus Group deputy director Chad Sbragia provided vision and practical guidance to the conference efforts.
With the arrival of Brigadier General Davis as head of the Strategic Focus Group in 2021, NBR’s relationship with INDOPACOM deepened as we together focused on the priorities of the combatant commander, giving a fresh sense of urgency to the work of the conference. New director, Erik Quam, brings deep expertise and a similar commitment to this critical work.
CHANGES IN THE CONFERENCE
The perspective of fifteen years’ hindsight yields several observations about the conference and its attendees. First, the number of participants grew significantly over this period. In 2011, recognizing both the demand for more specialists in the field and the imperative to broaden and diversify participants, we opened attendance to a larger group of experts while encouraging a “senior scholar/rising analyst” approach to the selection of chapter authors. Attendance nearly doubled from 60 participants in 2006 to more than 110 in 2018 at the last in-person conference before the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, we sought to open the conference to new participants. At the 2018 conference, more than 30% of participants were attending for the first time.
The composition of conference attendees has changed as well. U.S. Army China FAOs and intelligence community analysts had long been conference stalwarts, dating back to the earliest days of the conference series. They represented a generation with deep experience in China and direct exposure to the PLA. Over the years, a younger, civilian generation of attendees has emerged, one with exceptional language skills and enhanced research abilities along with research experience in China. And a new generation is emerging—one that is much more diverse and has even more advanced linguistic abilities.
The focus of the conference has evolved as well. We intentionally shifted from an analytical emphasis in the early years on a very detailed, bottom-up, nuts-and-bolts tactical approach to an approach that sought to understand the impact of PLA modernization at the operational and strategic levels. That process mirrored the PLA’s own evolution from a rudimentary garrison force that was very much focused on internal and border security into a modernizing, joint, and even “incipient” expeditionary force. This resulted in a natural shift toward examining the consequences of this modernization efforts for the United States and its allies. In short, we directed our efforts toward moving beyond the question, “What are the developments in the PLA?” to the question, “What do the developments in the PLA mean for the United States?”
This broader approach to studying the PLA was certainly consistent with the U.S. Army’s long-standing contribution on China work to the broader joint force—a contribution also reflected in the U.S. Army’s provision of many of the China FAOs that have filled critical joint duty positions at INDOPACOM, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Conference volumes also reflected the commitment to understanding the evolving nature of PLA modernization and its implications for the United States. Volume titles include Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (2011), Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (2012), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (2014), The People’s Liberation Army in 2025 (2015), and Securing the China Dream: The PLA’s Role in a Time of Reform and Change (2020).
STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL BACKDROP
The strategic and regional environments provide an essential context for appreciating the developments in the conference. First, the twin wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated the United States’ national security priorities in the first two decades of the 21st century. Consumed as the U.S. national defense enterprise was by those wars—China, for example, was only named a “strategic competitor” in the 2018 National Defense Strategy—finding policy audiences that were receptive to the real and growing challenges to the United States and its allies from PLA modernization, and had the time and resources to do anything in response, was rare, especially in the early years. To be sure, policy efforts along the way, such as the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, contributed to modest improvements in force structure and capabilities. Yet the oft-stated rhetorical commitment by successive U.S. administrations to a force structure for the Indo-Pacific region befitting the region’s importance has simply not been matched by reality.
Even now, with the PLA termed the “pacing threat” for the Department of Defense, the most recent Global Posture Review makes only very modest changes to force posture in the region. Moreover, the calls by senior U.S. military leaders for new bases to be established in Eastern Europe in light of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine seem likely to forestall future improvements in Indo-Pacific posture, resources being as limited as they are. Once again, the urgent threatens to supplant the strategically important.
The PLA’s own dramatic changes since 2006 are a second important development and also a critical part of the strategic context. Sharp increases in naval ship production, the construction of military facilities on reefs in the South China Sea, the enormously consequential impacts of the 2016–17 reforms and reorganization, and hypersonic capabilities and intercontinental ballistic missile silos are indicative of a military that seeks to achieve a self-proclaimed “world-class status” by midcentury, attain regional security dominance and deny U.S. access in a crisis, and use its power to shape, if not dictate, broad regional norms. These marked improvements in capabilities occurred during the period when U.S. attention was directed elsewhere, effectively granting the space for the PLA to modernize as it wished, unconstrained by any contemporary military challenge and without the desperate need to respond to operational environments in which soldiers were dying.
Third, the context of broader global dynamics—a global financial crisis, China’s economic miracle, and judgments in Beijing about the secular decline of the United States, among other factors—seemed to accelerate China’s rise and suggested an unfolding shift in the global balance of power. In the region, an emboldened PLA has been more assertive near China—through the militarization of the South China Sea, heightened pressure on Japan around the Senkaku Islands, and the coercion of Taiwan. These developments have hastened a debate about whether the PLA is already a global military, or even a near-peer of the United States. Despite the PLA’s obvious shortcomings—such as weak and untested command and control, still-evolving joint logistics, and questions about mission command—these developments nevertheless push and challenge the United States as has never before been the case.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CONFERENCE VOLUMES
The conference volumes generated sophisticated analysis that took into account the strategic and regional analysis and offered insights to specialists and policymakers alike. Three chapters in particular stand out for their unique, impactful, and durable findings.
The first is David Finkelstein’s revelation in 2007 that the strategic guidelines for the PLA in 1993 detailed a reorientation from ground force–intensive preparations to defend China’s northwestern border from Soviet invasion to a focus on securing the maritime domain off China’s eastern littoral. The new priority reoriented the PLA toward the first island chain, and importantly Taiwan, and presaged the tensions in the East Asian littoral space that are now so prevalent.
Second, in 2007, Ellis Joffe asked and answered the question: “What type of military does China want?” “A military commensurate with China’s status and aspirations for itself” was his answer at the conference. Subsequently, he wrote a more formal answer: “The most basic, long-range, and unalterable objective of the Chinese leadership has been both to obtain recognition for China as a great power and to gain from the other great powers the respect and standing that come with this status.” This answer, both beguilingly imprecise and yet somehow exactly evocative of Chinese thinking, reflected Joffe’s unique ability to anticipate new developments in the PLA. The language became more widely used within PLA circles after Xi Jinping came to power—first in the defense white paper of 2013 and again in 2015 and 2019. Today, however, Joffe’s answer strains to explain the naked ambitions that characterize Xi’s China, as well as the much more assertive use of the PLA Navy in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, around the globe.
Third, in a summary for Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and I concluded that in a four-decade era in which the PLA has not fought a foreign foe, the PLA’s analysts have prioritized the proxy effort to understand and learn lessons from how other militaries have prosecuted wars. Despite unsurprising constraints on how freely their judgments can range, a clear sense nevertheless emerges that “Chinese strategic planners place a high priority on an accurate pre-conflict strategic assessment.” This emphasis on understanding how the use of Chinese force might yield strategic outcomes before forces are committed may well both arise from and contribute to a risk aversion perspective on the part of the PLA, to be sure. But the emphasis also provides a useful counterpoint to arguments that the PLA is hellbent on preemptive war. This difference bears further attention.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
So what does fifteen years of conference work inform us about what lies ahead? I think several judgments are in order. First, it seems clear that the principal challenge in understanding the PLA is in reconciling the reality of a military that possesses some elite, high-end niche capabilities yet is still very much in the process of transition to a joint force capable of sustained, out-of-region operations. Some judge that the PLA must be a global power because China itself is one, especially economically. Pockets of excellence are easy to find: missiles, naval ship production, and cyber capabilities, to name a few. But the PLA is still very focused on security concerns in China’s near periphery, saddled with untested and overly complicated bureaucratic structures and command and control, and consumed with political work of various types (anticorruption, studying Xi Jinping Thought, and so on). Meanwhile, outdated equipment surely occupies many second-tier unit motor pools because upgrading the entire force is fiscally unfeasible. Moreover, the organization’s oft-cited lack of combat experience demands judgments about how PLA units might actually perform in a fight. And finally, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have their own misgivings about the PLA, perhaps best captured by Xi’s discussion of the aspects of mission command that he judges the PLA incapable of performing (the “five incapables”) and the very real concern that the organization suffers from peace disease after 40-plus years without combat.
Second, the PLA is very much still a work in progress. Far-reaching changes in structure, operational concepts, and deployment patterns are underway simultaneously, raising questions about the trajectory of the process. Is there a grand design for PLA development that is discernible and predictable? If there is, will China and its modernizing military draw lessons from the historical patterns of previous rising regional powers and threaten the broader region once its capabilities are ready? Alternatively, does the road to modernization more accurately reflect the iron demands of five-year planning in which future activity builds iteratively on past success, with strategy only an occasional partner? And what roles do the CCP leadership and the general secretary play in either case, mitigating irregularities or underlining idiosyncrasies? The implications of these questions regarding future trajectories are enormous.
Third, the PLA faces a looming question regarding the use of force. One point of view suggests that the bloody altercations with the Indian Army on the Galwan Plain in June 2020 show that the PLA has crossed a decision threshold about the deadly use of force, belying past hesitancies. Another perspective suggests that the PLA will engage in “practice wars” so that it has combat experience under its belt before a face-off with the United States and its allies over Taiwan. In short, will the PLA become a warfighting military that achieves its aims through the overt use of force? The highly escalatory moves the Chinese national security system has taken in recent years suggest a greater willingness to use deadly force, enabled by newer and enhanced capabilities that increase the lethality of those potential efforts, and further suggesting that a fundamental conceptual shift is underway.
If it decides that warfighting is in its future, will the PLA fully abandon highly successful, and less escalatory, efforts to intimidate weaker neighbors to achieve its security goals, especially in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, without resorting to the deadly use of force? Or might it continue to innovate, perhaps combining gray-zone activities with conventional forces and potentially even nonmilitary means? Yet other implications appear unaddressed. Is the PLA, and Chinese society writ large, ready for the prospect of significant military casualties from conflicts China chooses to fight? Perhaps more importantly, is there more sophisticated understanding about the escalatory risks of such a transition than appears to be the case among PLA thinkers? The urgency of understanding the implications of this transition looms large.
Finally, the available evidence suggests that these questions will take a long time to answer. Indeed, as with most things related to China, what the PLA will become poses a generational challenge. At the very least, the PLA’s own 2027/2035/2049 timeline and associated goals reveal a military that is thinking over the longer haul. Although China’s meteoric rise also contains the possibilities of catastrophic decline—demographic challenges unseen in human history, environmental depredation, and uneven development, among others—the system has nonetheless proved itself resilient and adaptive. It would seem imprudent to base future plans on the wishful thinking that these factors might conspire to fundamentally derail China’s development in ways that become fundamentally less challenging. Rather, it is incumbent that we take the firm, yet not escalatory, steps that resist PLA coercions at every turn and leverage traditional strengths of allies and partners so that China’s transition to a fully modern, even world-class, military is not accompanied by catastrophic impacts in the Indo-Pacific.
Roy D. Kamphausen is President of the National Bureau of Asian Research.
Note: This commentary is adapted from Roy Kamphausen, “Afterword,” in Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA, ed. Roger Cliff and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press, 2022), 175–84.
Endnotes
[1] David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press, 2007), 97, 126.
[2] Ellis Joffe, “The ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: To What Ends,” Asia Policy, no. 4 (2007): 58.
[3] Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, “Introduction,” in Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press, 2011), 22–23.
[4] Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Weaknesses and Xi’s Concerns about PLA Capabilities,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 7, 2019, 3.
nbr.org
8. Big Tech Has No Constitutional Right to Censor
Big Tech Has No Constitutional Right to Censor
That’s the upshot of recent court cases in Texas and Florida, testing state bills that curb such activity.
By Allysia Finley
Sept. 25, 2022 3:58 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-tech-has-no-constitutional-right-to-censor-free-speech-twitter-texas-first-amendment-fifth-circuit-social-media-platforms-11664132080?utm_source=pocket_mylist
Social-media stocks have taken a beating this year, but it’s nothing compared with the smack-down their companies have recently received in court. “We reject the idea that corporations have a freewheeling First Amendment right to censor what people say,” the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals declared in its Sept. 16 decision upholding Texas’s anticensorship law.
The legal fight over whether states can restrict such behavior could soon be headed to the Supreme Court, as Florida last week appealed an 11th Circuit ruling that struck down its anticensorship law.
Social-media companies are also asking the justices to provide desperately needed constitutional clarity. They argue, in short, that removing user content from their platforms is an exercise of editorial judgment and expression protected by the First Amendment. Ergo, states can’t tell them they can’t censor.
Not so fast, writes the Fifth Circuit’s Judge Andrew Oldham for a divided three-judge panel in an excoriating 90-page opinion. Texas’ law prohibits large social-media platforms from blocking speech based on viewpoint. So users couldn’t be deplatformed by Twitter for professing skepticism of vaccines or climate change. Nor could YouTube demonetize such videos.
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The law, however, excludes speech that isn’t protected by the First Amendment, such as incitement, as well as speech that is covered by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act—i.e., speech considered to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”
Users who believe they were illegally discriminated against could sue the companies. While they wouldn’t be eligible to receive damages, they could be reinstated if they prevail. Many users would nonetheless lose if a court determines their expression is “objectionable” under Section 230’s catchall. But social-media companies wouldn’t be the final arbiters of what is objectionable.
Judge Oldham stresses that Texas’ law seeks to regulates business conduct—not speech—under the “common-carrier doctrine,” which holds that government can impose nondiscrimination obligations on businesses “affected with the public interest.” During the 19th century, states imposed common-carrier obligations on telegraph companies. “Western Union, the largest telegraph company, sometimes refused to carry messages from journalists that competed with its ally, the Associated Press—or charged them exorbitant rates,” Judge Oldham notes.
States, and later Congress, intervened to prohibit telegraph companies from discriminating against dispatches. The Supreme Court in 1896 rejected a constitutional challenge to a state common-carrier law.
Justice Clarence Thomas last year wrote that “the long history in this country and in England of restricting the exclusion right of common carriers and places of public accommodation may save similar regulations today from triggering heightened scrutiny” under the First Amendment, “especially where a restriction would not prohibit the company from speaking or force the company to endorse the speech.” Texas’ law does neither.
The Fifth Circuit cites two high-courts precedents that support the constitutionality of Texas’s law. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) a mall challenged a California law that required privately owned shopping centers to permit the distribution of pamphlets on their premises. The mall argued that a “private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others.” The court disagreed.
More recently, law schools in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (2006) challenged a federal law that denied funding to schools that didn’t give military recruiters “access to students that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access provided other potential employers.” The court unanimously held the law didn’t violate the schools’ speech rights.
Social-media companies cite Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974), which struck down a Florida law requiring newspapers to print candidates’ rejoinders to critical editorials. But in asserting a right to editorial control, they’re trying to have it both ways. As Judge Oldham notes, “they’ve told courts—over and over again—that they simply ‘serv[e] as conduits for other parties’ speech.’ ”
Newspapers and broadcasters exercise strict control over the content they promulgate and are legally liable for defamation. Social-media platforms don’t and aren’t. Section 230, in protecting platforms’ right to block and screen objectionable material, specifies that they shall not “be treated as the publisher or speaker” of content generated by users.
Social-media companies want to be able to censor speech they don’t like without bearing legal risks and responsibilities attendant to being a publisher. But why should courts let them?
Judge Oldman points out that Texas’ law differs from Florida’s in a few key respects that may make the latter more legally vulnerable. For one, Florida’s law specifically prohibits platforms from censoring candidates for public office or content about them as well as “journalistic enterprises.” This content-based regulation could trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
Both Texas and Florida laws are innovative solutions to tech censorship, and they may not get it entirely right. But state laboratories of democracy are meant for experimentation.
WSJ Opinion: Biden Says the Pandemic Is Over. Spending On It Is Not.
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WSJ Opinion: Biden Says the Pandemic Is Over. Spending On It Is Not.
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Journal Editorial Report: Democrats have turned the emergency into a policy opportunity. Image: Joshua Roberts/Getty Images
Appeared in the September 26, 2022, print edition as 'Big Tech Has No Constitutional Right to Censor'.
9. Musk says he's 'activating Starlink' in Iran as government shuts down internet
Musk says he's 'activating Starlink' in Iran as government shuts down internet
BYNICHOLAS GORDON
September 26, 2022 at 6:07 PM GMT+9
Fortune
Iranians are suffering widespread internet outages as Iran’s government tries to quell widespread antigovernment protests. Authorities have blocked access to services like Instagram, WhatsApp, and Skype. (Other foreign social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok were already blocked.)
Iran’s protests began on Sept. 16 after the death in police custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested by the country’s “morality police” for violating rules on dress code. Amini’s death sparked widespread demonstrations, as Iranians vented frustrations with the country’s dress code, limits to personal freedoms, and economic stagnation.
Protests have turned into deadly clashes between police and demonstrators: Iranian state media say that 41 people have died in the demonstrations thus far, while foreign NGOs give higher figures.
Sanctions exemptions
On Friday the U.S. said companies providing cloud computing, social media, and video conferencing would be exempt from sanctions. Sanctions bar most foreign businesses from operating in Iran.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Twitter that the exceptions were meant to “advance internet freedom and the free flow of information for the Iranian people,” and to help them “counter the Iranian government’s censorship.”
Musk said he would activate Starlink to Iran in a reply to Blinken’s tweet. Musk first suggested that he wanted a sanctions exemption for Starlink on Sept. 19.
Activating Starlink …
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) September 23, 2022
Starlink is not the only service trying to restore internet access to Iran. Signal, whose app has been blocked in Iran since January, asked its users to set up proxy servers, allowing Iranians to bypass internet controls and access Signal.
Previous Strarlink use
This is not the first time the SpaceX CEO has offered to turn on satellite internet for other communities in emergency situations. In late February, Musk activated Starlink in the Pacific Island of Tonga after a massive volcanic eruption cut off the country’s internet access. Musk also delivered thousands of Starlink terminals to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion. Ukrainians, including soldiers, have used Starlink to keep communication lines open even as the war takes out internet and mobile networks.
But while the Ukrainian government publicly solicited Musk’s help, the Iranian government is unlikely to cooperate with ordinary Iranians trying to import terminals to connect with SpaceX’s satellite internet network. “Iran’s regime wants to keep the Internet off so it can repress people in the dark,” tweeted Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sadjapour also tweeted that Musk confirmed to him that Starlink is now active for any Iranian with a Starlink terminal.
SpaceX did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Nuclear negotiations
Washington’s reaction to the protests may affect ongoing negotiations between U.S. and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program, which U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman characterized as a “stalemate” last week to the Washington Post. On Thursday, the U.S. placed sanctions on the Gasht-e-Ershad—Iran’s “morality police”—freezing their U.S.-based assets.
On CBS’s Face the Nation on Sunday, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that an offer to end some sanctions on Iran in exchange for a halt to the country’s nuclear program was still on the table, despite the protests.
“The fact that we are in negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program is in no way impacting our willingness and our vehemence in speaking out about what is happening on the streets of Iran,” said Sullivan.
Fortune
10. Putin May Have Decided To Mobilize To Avoid Threats From The Rise Of Private Military Companies – OpEd
Putin May Have Decided To Mobilize To Avoid Threats From The Rise Of Private Military Companies – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Paul Goble · September 26, 2022
Less than a week before Vladimir Putin announced his partial mobilization to fill the ranks of the Russian army in Ukraine, Moscow analyst Mikhail Pozharsky suggested one reason that the Kremlin leader might decide to so now: concern about the political implications of private military formations for his own political future.
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As the Russian analyst points out, at least since Max Weber, it has been common ground that the state having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is part of what defines modernity. Most governments seek to maintain that monopoly as long as they are can lest these forces turn on them (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6324036D25933§ion_id=50A6C962A3D7C).
In most cases, in fact, Pozharsky says, states who do turn to the widespread use of private military companies at home or abroad do so either because they want to remain covert or because they are too weak to maintain the monopoly of force modern countries do. When maintaining cover isn’t the goal, then the use of such forces is a sign of weakness.
Intriguingly, Ukraine in 2012-2014 offered Moscow an object lesson on just how dangerous it can be if a government relies to heavily on private military formations rather than on regular army ones. And even though Putin has launched a broad attack on modernity, he cannot be insensitive to the implications of the rise of such forces.
When he has wanted to use force covertly, of course, Putin has been quite prepared to use such units. But since February 24, the dangers of such units have become more obvious, not only in the increasingly independent actions of some units but their de facto multiplication by creating regionally based battalions.
With his declaration of a partial mobilization then, the Kremlin leader has signaled not only that he will do whatever it takes to gain victories in Ukraine but also that he is increasingly skeptical about the formation of units who whatever their declared intent may come to stand outside the chain of command.
eurasiareview.com · by Paul Goble · September 26, 2022
11. Two Renovated Museums Offer a Peek at Spy Secrets — at Least for Some
Photos at the link.
Two Renovated Museums Offer a Peek at Spy Secrets — at Least for Some
The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency both recently overhauled their showcases of espionage.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/us/cia-nsa-museums.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm_source=pocket_mylist
By Julian E. Barnes
Sept. 24, 2022
WASHINGTON — Two of the United States’ intelligence agencies have completely renovated their museums of spycraft, displaying dramatic stories of notable U.S. spies and informants, as well as paraphernalia from intelligence work. But one of the museums will remain off limits to the public.
In time for its 75th anniversary this year, the Central Intelligence Agency has overhauled and refurbished its museum of secrets. It features spy gadgets both successful (a Tabasco sauce-covered dead rat in which to hide messages) and not (a pigeon-mounted camera and a mini spy drone designed to look like a dragonfly). It has fascinating, beautifully arranged artifacts from significant espionage operations.
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An exhibition on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis at the C.I.A. Museum.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
However, the C.I.A. Museum is on the agency’s heavily protected campus in Langley, Va., a location that is not open to members of the public — unless they find themselves summoned to its headquarters. The C.I.A. opened the renovated museum to family of personnel one weekend and to members of the news media Saturday.
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Many of the artifacts are celebrations of the agency’s triumphs. The museum has a model of Osama bin Laden’s compound and a brick taken from the site. There is art made by the great comic book artist Jack Kirby, used by the C.I.A. as props for a fake movie production company in an operation to rescue diplomats in Iran (depicted in the 2012 movie “Argo”). And there are disguises worn by people while working to salvage the wreck of a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles from the ocean’s floor.
There is a reconstruction of the tunnel under East Berlin that allowed the United States to tap into Soviet communications for roughly 18 months.
One of the newest additions to the collection of artifacts is a model of the building in Kabul where Ayman al-Zawahri, the Qaeda leader, was hiding when he was killed by a U.S. drone strike in July. The C.I.A. placed the model in a wooden box when it was brought to President Biden to discuss the operation, and the bottom of the box can be seen in the C.I.A. display case.
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A model of Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, used to target and kill the Qaeda leader.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
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A model of the compound in Kabul, Afghanistan, where Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahri, was killed in a U.S. drone strike.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
Perhaps in part because it is restricted from the general public, the C.I.A. Museum does not shy from the agency’s failures: operatives caught by governments, moles who give away informants, the groupthink of the Iraq war, the Bay of Pigs.
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“A big part of this museum is for our officers, and for them to know the lessons of the past,” said Robert Byer, the director of the C.I.A. Museum. “For that reason, we cannot just be sugarcoating our history or touting our successes. We really have to make sure this is a full history of the C.I.A. so they can understand their history and do a better job because of it.”
Among the museum’s carefully crafted exhibits is the story of Martha Peterson, the first female case officer sent to work in Moscow. Her assignment was to collect and pass information to an operative who was a Soviet diplomat, to whom she would also provide a suicide pill to use if he was captured. The diplomat ultimately was seized and died by suicide, leading to Ms. Peterson’s arrest while she was placing a message in a dead drop.
While the C.I.A. gathers intelligence, conducts analysis and executes covert operations, the National Security Agency focuses on collecting electronic communications and making and breaking codes. That is the focus of its reimagined showcase at the National Cryptologic Museum in Annapolis Junction, Md.
The museum of the N.S.A., sometimes called “No Such Agency” in a nod to its secretive practices, was designed to be accessible to the public, a contrast with the C.I.A. Museum.
“It’s a wonderful paradox that ‘No Such Agency’ has the only museum in the U.S. intelligence community that’s completely open to the public,” said Vince Houghton, the museum director.
The cryptological museum closed in 2020 amid the Covid pandemic and Dr. Houghton, a former historian and curator at Washington’s popular International Spy Museum, used the time to renovate the building and meticulously search the National Security Agency’s archives of equipment.
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“There are things that people didn’t know existed, and there are things that people had thought had been lost for decades,” Dr. Houghton said.
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Robert Byer, director of the C.I.A. Museum, says its purpose is to teach officers “the lessons of the past.”Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
In the museum, which reopens Oct. 8, Dr. Houghton emphasizes unique artifacts amid exhibits filled with strangely fascinating code-making and code-breaking machines. Its collection extends from the United States’ earliest days to the present. From World War II, there is the machine that broke Japan’s diplomatic encryption, and another that broke the German naval codes. There is also an Enigma machine used by Adolf Hitler, displayed behind glass; there are other ones that visitors can touch and use.
Dr. Houghton said almost all the artifacts he displays meet one of three criteria: They are the only remaining object of their kind; they are the first of something; or they were used by a specific person.
“I call it the holy trinity of artifacts,” he said.
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Clothing worn during a Cold War operation to salvage the wreck of a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
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Intelligence operatives found the body of a dead rat, covered in Tabasco sauce, to be a good place to conceal messages.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
The museum sticks to its mission of explaining cryptology to a broad section of the public. It acknowledges some losses: There is a memorial wall and displays that tell the stories of cryptologists killed in combat. But for the most part, the focus is on the machines and the code breakers who ran them.
There’s not much on the turncoats, however. One exhibit shows the tools that John Walker, a Navy warrant officer and Soviet spy, used to try and steal American codes for the Russians. But there is no mention of Edward Snowden, the N.S.A. contractor who revealed many of the agency’s secrets and then fled to Russia. (Because the Snowden case is an ongoing Justice Department investigation, the museum is limited in what it can say.)
The C.I.A. Museum, on the other hand, has multiple examples of spy games ending in failure or tragedy. It highlights the stories of C.I.A. officers wrongly accused of being spies and lays out the damage done by Soviet moles.
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A display about counterintelligence at the C.I.A. Museum, which also highlights the stories of C.I.A. officers wrongly accused of being spies and lays out the damage done by Soviet moles.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
Among the collaborators whose work is celebrated is Adolf Tolkachev, an aviation electronics engineer. He reached out multiple times to the C.I.A. to offer his help, angered at the persecution of his wife’s parents under Joseph Stalin. In 1978, he got through to the Americans and used miniature cameras to pass on images of Russian secrets.
The value of Mr. Tolkachev’s intelligence, which vastly expanded American knowledge of Soviet missiles and fighter planes, earned him the moniker “the billion dollar spy.” While he was good at getting documents, he was not good at taking pictures. The museum includes a camera the C.I.A. built for Mr. Tolkachev, with a fixed focal length to ensure his pictures would be less blurry.
But his story also ends badly. Aldrich Ames and Edward Lee Howard, C.I.A. officers working for the Russians, gave up Mr. Tolkachev’s identity. He was arrested in June 1985 and executed in 1986.
“I feel I have a responsibility: It cannot be a rah-rah version of history,” Mr. Byer said. “Museums need to tell the truth.”
Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal. @julianbarnes • Facebook
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 25, 2022, Section A, Page 29 of the New York edition with the headline: 2 Museums With Spy Secrets, But One’s for Some Eyes Only. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
12. Inside the Ukrainian Counterstrike That Turned the Tide of the War
Photos and graphics at the link: https://time.com/6216213/ukraine-military-valeriy-zaluzhny/?utm_source=pocket_mylist
Inside the Ukrainian Counterstrike That Turned the Tide of the War
https://time.com/6216213/ukraine-military-valeriy-zaluzhny/?utm_source=pocket_mylist
BY SIMON SHUSTER AND VERA BERGENGRUENSEPTEMBER 26, 2022 7:00 AM EDT
TIME · by Simon Shuster
It would be easy to underestimate Valeriy Zaluzhny. When not in uniform, the general prefers T-shirts and shorts that match his easygoing sense of humor. When he first heard from aides to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in late July 2021 that he was being tapped to lead the country’s armed forces, his stunned response was, “What do you mean?” As it sank in that he would become commander in chief, he tells TIME in his first interview since the Russian invasion began, he felt as if he had been punched “not just below the belt but straight into a knockout.” George Patton or Douglas MacArthur he is not.
Yet when the history of the war in Ukraine is written, Zaluzhny is likely to occupy a prominent role. He was part of the Ukrainian brass who spent years transforming the country’s military from a clunky Soviet model into a modern fighting force. Hardened by years of battling Russia on the eastern front, he was among a new generation of Ukrainian leaders who learned to be flexible and delegate decisions to commanders on the ground. His dogged preparation in the run-up to the invasion and savvy battlefield tactics in the early phases of the war helped the nation fend off the Russian onslaught. “Zaluzhny has emerged as the military mind his country needed,” U.S. General Mark Milley wrote for TIME of his counterpart last May. “His leadership enabled the Ukrainian armed forces to adapt quickly with battlefield initiative against the Russians.”
Photo illustration by Neil Jamieson for TIME (Source Photo: Gleb Garanich—Reuters Pool Photo/AP)
That initiative has now taken a key turn in Ukraine’s favor. In Kyiv’s biggest gains since the war began in February, a lightning counteroffensive in the country’s northeast in early September stunned Russian troops, who fled in disarray and ceded vast swaths of occupied territory. Combined with a second operation in the south, Ukrainian forces say they wrested back more than 6,000 sq km from Russian control in less than two weeks, liberating dozens of towns and cities and cutting off enemy supply lines. The Ukrainian army’s deft game of misdirection, touting a counter-offensive in the south before attacking in the northeast, caught Russia off guard. And it validated the Ukrainians’ arguments that intelligence collaboration and billions of dollars in weapons and materiel supplied by Western allies would yield results on the battlefield.
The sudden victories came at a critical point in what had become a grinding war of attrition. As the economic pressures built across Europe and around the world, skeptics were beginning to doubt whether Ukraine could endure a protracted fight. The dramatic rout rattled Moscow, forcing Kremlin propagandists to admit the setback and upping the military and political pressures on Russian President Vladimir Putin. On Sept. 21 he responded by announcing the first mass conscription since World War II, a partial mobilization of up to 300,000 citizens.
Ukrainian and U.S. officials alike believe the war will be longer and bloodier than most imagine. Putin has shown he’s willing to sacrifice his troops and commit atrocities to exhaust his adversary. In a menacing speech, he warned that he was “not bluffing” when he threatened to use everything at his disposal to defend Russia—an allusion to nuclear weapons. The recent Ukrainian offensive may be a turning point, but it is not the decisive blow. “In hindsight, we’ll look at this like the Battle of Midway,” says Dan Rice, a U.S. Army combat veteran and leadership executive at West Point who serves as a special adviser to Zaluzhny, referring to the pivotal 1942 clash that preceded three more years of war.
A woman rides a bicycle on a street in Izyum, Sept. 14.
Juan Barreto—AFP/Getty Images
Zaluzhny is just one of many Ukrainians responsible for the grit and progress of the nation’s outmanned army. Other key officers include General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces, who led the defense of Kyiv and, more recently, the counteroffensive in the east, and Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service. But after the President, Zaluzhny has become the face of the war effort. His persona is omnipresent on Ukrainian social media. One widely shared image shows the “Iron General” kneeling in front of the sobbing mother of one of his soldiers, head bowed in grief in front of a casket. In another he flashes a grin presiding over the wedding of one of his servicemen during a lull in the fighting. Fan channels on Telegram have hundreds of thousands of followers, with many changing their profiles to a photo of the general with his hands held in the shape of a heart. “When Zaluzhny walks into a dark room he does not turn on the light, he turns off the darkness,” one viral TikTok video jokes.
It’s hard to predict where the war is headed or the part Zaluzhny will play in the end. But perhaps for the first time, it now seems possible that the army he commands could achieve victory.
Zaluzhny was drinking a beer at his wife’s birthday party when he stepped outside to take a cell-phone call and learned about his new job. The 48-year-old general’s rank and stature at the time were far below the position Zelensky was offering him. Commander in chief of the armed forces of Ukraine is the nation’s top military title, outranked only by the President himself. The height of that perch induced a feeling like vertigo. “I’ve often looked back and asked myself: How did I get myself into this?” Zaluzhny told TIME in a June interview.
To some, the choice seemed rash. While he had earned a reputation as an aggressive and ambitious commander, Zaluzhny was also considered a bit of a goofball, better known for clowning around with his troops than disciplining them. Born on a Soviet military garrison in northern Ukraine in 1973, he says he had dreams of becoming a comedian, much like Zelensky himself. Instead, he followed in the footsteps of his military family, entering the academy in Odessa in the 1990s as the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine descended into crisis.
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny attends a meeting with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Kyiv on April 24, 2022.
Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Reuters
Zaluzhny rose through the ranks with a new generation of officers that bridged very different eras: raised in Soviet Ukraine, but eager to shed USSR military dogma. For a master’s thesis, Zaluzhny analyzed U.S. military structure. Seeing how Ukrainian forces were still weighed down by the Soviet model that relied on rigid, top-heavy decision-making, he began to implement changes to mirror the forces of U.S. and NATO partners.
Zaluzhny worked his way from commanding a platoon to leading the country’s forces on the eastern front following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In that role, he developed junior officers and encouraged more agile decision-making, pushing down authority to commanders on the ground. Unlike in the Russian army, sergeants would not be “scapegoats,” but rather real deputies meant to create a pipeline of military talent, he said in a 2020 interview published by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. “There is no going back,” he said, to “the army of 2013.”
But Zaluzhny also respected and admired the institutions of his Russian counterparts. In his office, he keeps the collected works of General Valery Gerasimov, the head of the Russian armed forces, who is 17 years his senior. “I was raised on Russian military doctrine, and I still think that the science of war is all located in Russia,” Zaluzhny says. “I learned from Gerasimov. I read everything he ever wrote … He is the smartest of men, and my expectations of him were enormous.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attends a flag hoisting ceremony in Izyum after the Ukrainian forces took back control of the city from the Russians.
Metin Aktas–Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
When Zelensky took office in 2019, the war in eastern Ukraine was already in its fifth year, and Zaluzhny was acting commander in the war zone. It fell to him to brief the new President on military operations and command structures. He knew Zelensky had never served in the military, and had no plans to school him in the tactical details of warfare. “He doesn’t need to understand military affairs any more than he needs to know about medicine or bridge building,” Zaluzhny says. To his surprise, Zelensky seemed to agree. “This has turned out to be one of [Zelensky’s] strongest features,” says Oleksiy Melnyk, a former Ukrainian Assistant Defense Minister. He has allowed his generals to run the show “without direct interference into military business.”
In 2020, Zaluzhny oversaw an ambitious set of military exercises, which included a test of the Javelin anti-tank missile. With the President watching from the observation deck, the demonstration failed, and pundits went on Ukrainian TV to debate the bad omen for the nation’s military. Zaluzhny was sure he would be known in the President’s office as “the loser with the faulty Javelins.”
Yet Zelensky has shown a determination to jettison an older generation of officials in search of new blood, and a habit of elevating leaders with whom he feels a rapport, regardless of rank. In July 2021, with the Russians hauling tanks to the border and the Americans warning that Ukraine could soon face a full-scale attack, the President decided to put Zaluzhny in charge. “I gave my opinion that he strikes me as a fairly professional, smart person,” says Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff. “But the President made the call.”
Unlike Zelensky, who was skeptical of intelligence reports that a mass-scale Russian invasion was imminent, Zaluzhny was part of a corps of Ukrainian officers who viewed it as a matter of time. Within weeks of taking up his post, he began to implement key changes. Officers would be free to return fire “with any available weapons” if they came under attack, with no need for permission from senior commanders. “We needed to knock down their desire to attack,” Zaluzhny says. “We also needed to show our teeth.”
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By early February, the pressure of his new role was starting to show. The launch of an ambitious set of military exercises involving thousands of Ukrainian troops had been a disappointment, with basic maneuvers meant to simulate a Russian attack exposing cracks in Ukraine’s defenses. In Zaluzhny’s view, the drills were a centerpiece of Ukraine’s defensive strategy, its best chance of survival, and the commanders were not taking them seriously enough. “I spent an hour yelling,” he recalls. “I lost it.” The men seated around the table were mostly older and more experienced than Zaluzhny, who did not have a reputation for losing his cool. “I explained to them that if they can’t pull this off, the consequences will not only cost us our lives, but also our country.”
After the outburst, the generals picked up their preparations. They relocated and camouflaged military hardware, moving troops and weapons out of their bases and sending them on tours around the country. This included aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles, as well as the antiaircraft batteries Ukraine would soon need to maintain control of its skies. “There’s no mistaking the smell of war,” Zaluzhny says, “and it was already in the air.” But when it came to the details of his strategy, Zaluzhny held them close. “I was afraid that we would lose the element of surprise,” he says. “We needed the adversary to think that we are all deployed in our usual bases, smoking grass, watching TV, and posting on Facebook.”
When the invasion started on the morning of Feb. 24, the general had two strategic goals for Ukraine’s defense. “We could not allow Kyiv to fall,” he said. “And, on all the other vectors, we had to spill their blood, even if in some places it would require losing territory.” The aim, in other words, was to allow the Russians to advance and then destroy their columns in the front and supply lines in the rear. By the sixth day of the invasion, he concluded it was working. The Russians had failed to take airports around Kyiv and had advanced deep enough to begin straining supply lines, leaving them exposed.
Milley, Zaluzhny’s U.S. counterpart, was in some ways astounded when he saw the Ukrainians holding out. He asked Zaluzhny whether he planned to evacuate to safer ground. “I told him, ‘I don’t understand you,’” Zaluzhny says. “For me the war started in 2014 … I didn’t run away then, and I’m not going to run now.”
He too was surprised by Russia’s blunders. When the enemy faced heavy resistance or lost the ability to resupply, they did not retreat or shift to a different approach. “They just herded their soldiers into the slaughter,” Zaluzhny said. “They chose the scenario that suited me best of all.”
Even as the U.S. and allies continued to flood the country with billions in military aid, the news was grim. Russia pounded the strategic port city of Mariupol, killing thousands of civilians. In May, hundreds of Ukrainian fighters who had defended the last stronghold in the city, the Azovstal steel plant, surrendered. (More than 150 were returned Sept. 21 in a prisoner swap, including five top Ukrainian commanders.) Mass graves were discovered in towns and villages occupied by Russian troops. Still, Ukrainian officials insisted they could win. “We will fight until the last drop of blood,” Zaluzhny told TIME.
A few weeks later, Ukraine began to do something that struck military analysts as unusual. From the top of the government, Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky and Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, began to publicly tout their preparations for a large-scale operation to retake territory in the south. In anticipation of an attack, Russia began to reposition troops, including some of its most elite units from other regions to reinforce its positions in the south. On Aug. 29, the Ukrainian military announced that the long-anticipated southern offensive had begun.
A Ukrainian soldier assists a wounded comrade on Sept. 12 in the Kharkiv region.
Kostiantyn Liberov—AP
But there were indications something else was afoot. “We have a war on, not only in the south,” Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, told TIME on Sept. 1. “The front line is 2,500 km long.” Many experts doubted that Ukraine would be capable of mounting a counter-offensive on one front, let alone two.
Five days later, Ukrainian troops launched a surprise strike in the country’s northeast. The Russians were caught off guard. Many fled in disarray, leaving behind weapons and equipment. Local reports painted a humiliating picture of retreat, describing soldiers stealing civilians’ clothes, bicycles, and cars to escape.
In six days, the Ukrainian military retook an estimated 3,000 sq km of Russian-held territory, including strategically important rail hubs used to resupply its forces. The strike stunned the Kremlin, U.S. officials, and even top Ukrainians. “I taught myself to moderate my expectations, so as not to be disappointed later,” Reznikov tells TIME. “Some breakthroughs occurred a little faster than planned.”
Intelligence and advanced weaponry provided by the West also helped. “They gave us the location of the enemy, how many of them are at that location, and what they have stored there,” Reznikov says. “Then we would strike.” The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided by the Pentagon allowed Ukraine to destroy warehouses of ammunition, fuel, and command posts. Lighter vehicles like U.S.-donated humvees, as well as trucks and tanks sent by the U.K., Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Czech Republic, allowed them to outmaneuver the Russians. “Ukrainians have demonstrated much better distributed tactical-level operations,” says Jeffrey Edmonds, a former CIA analyst and Russia director on the National Security Council. “They’re much more disciplined.”
Also crucial, Ukrainian officials say, was the flexible command structure that allowed them to exploit the quick Russian collapse. “The Ukrainian army has the freedom to make decisions at every level,” Reznikov says, likening it to NATO standards. “They do it quickly, unlike the Russians.”
A boy rides a bicycle near an armored tank with a Ukrainian flag in the town of Izyum on Sept. 19.
Oleksii Chumachenko—SOPA Images/LightRocket/ Getty Images
Ukrainian officials are careful to spread the credit for the military successes so far. “It’s not a story of one star, but a constellation of our military elite,” Reznikov says, naming a long list of celebrated officers from the armed forces—the infantry, navy, air force, medical corps and others.
There are rumors of tensions between Zelensky and his top military commander, though the President and his aides have dismissed them. “The so-called conflict with Zaluzhny was invented by our opposition from start to finish,” says Oleksiy Arestovych, a Zelensky aide and veteran of Ukraine’s military intelligence service. “On the one hand, it’s obviously made up. On the other, it has a painful effect, because stirring up conflict between the military commander and the commander in chief is a catastrophe.”
Hardened by war, Ukrainian leaders know the recent successes have only bought time. “Russia has staked everything on this war,” says Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council. “Putin cannot lose. The stakes are too high.”
Ukraine’s operations in the south have moved slowly. As winter approaches, Kyiv must take care not to overextend its forces. And there are forces at play outside Ukraine’s control. The looming energy crisis could sap Western military support, with Russia already cutting its gas supplies to Europe from 40% to 9%.
For his part, Zaluzhny is girding for a long and bloody slog. “Knowing what I know firsthand about the Russians, our victory will not be final,” he told TIME. “Our victory will be an opportunity to take a breath and prepare for the next war.” —With reporting by Leslie Dickstein and Simmone Shah
More Must-Read Stories From TIME
Write to Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@time.com.
TIME · by Simon Shuster
13. Full transcript: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on "Face the Nation," Sept. 25, 2022
Full transcript: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on "Face the Nation," Sept. 25, 2022
CBS News
The following is the full transcript of an interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that aired Sunday, Sept. 25, 2022, on "Face the Nation."
MARGARET BRENNAN: We turn now to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. Mr. President, thank you for talking to us. I want to ask you right away about these referenda that are happening in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. says they're a "sham" and intended to take about 15 percent of your territory away. What happens to Ukrainians living in these areas if they respond 'no' when they are asked if they want to be part of Russia?
PRESIDENT VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Thank you very much for your question. Thank you for an opportunity to talk to you today and with American people. Thank you very much for a very strong position from the White House and Joe- President Biden. The referendum can lead to very tragic moments. You started your question with an answer that is correct. Those people who don't come to referendum, you know, Russians can turn off their electricity and won't give them an opportunity to live a normal human life. They force people, they throw them in prisons. They force them to come to these pseudo-referenda. And also, they also announced mobilization. They're forcing people to fight, people from the temporarily occupied territories. A lot of people will be forced to do this. However, it's a very low percentage of people: even among those who are forced to show up to vote to this sham referendum, we see that there is no support in the society for this referendum. However, I see other threats when they complete, if they succeed with these referenda. The ballots have been- had been already prepared. The Russia of- the Russian government can officially announce that the referendum had been completed, and the results will be announced. This would make it impossible, in any case, to continue any diplomatic negotiations with the President of Russian Federation, and he knows it very well. I have spoken about it publicly. I think it's a very dangerous signal from President Putin that tells us that Putin is not going to finish this war. That is what's going on.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Biden administration has built its entire policy around avoiding direct conflict with Russia. Once this annexation happens, does it change that dynamic?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Where the- the dynamic will change, what specifically do you mean, what kind of dynamic? The dynamic of the support from the United States?
MARGARET BRENNAN: Is Russia using this as an excuse to say that it is being attacked, because the West is providing Ukraine with weapons if it is seizing Eastern Ukraine to annex it?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Yes, that's exactly so. That is correct. Look, he knows. He feels it, and his military leadership reports to him. He knows that he's losing the war. In the battlefield, Ukraine has seized the initiative. He cannot explain to his society why, and he is looking for answers to these questions. His society does not understand what kind of second army in the world it is that is not capable to win and to defeat Ukraine. Yesterday, President Putin said they will win Ukraine in three days, but now it's seven months. Today, it's seven months since Russia occupied- tried to occupy Ukraine, but they couldn't. And now he has to justify. He has to take steps to justify. He says, 'See, let's look at it. I am not afraid of Ukraine. It was a special operation, but now it's Russia. It's our territory. Look, we conducted referenda. Now, it's the West who attacks Russia. Now, the West attacks our territories. We have let the society join Russia, the society that wanted to be with Russia. And you see that he has completed he has announced the mobilization. It used to be hidden. Now, you see that it has been announced publicly. For several months, they've been secretly mobilizing. But now, they admitted that their army is not able to fight with Ukraine anymore. Their top level officers have been killed in Ukraine on our battlefield. They did not expect the resistance that they received from us.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Vladimir Putin continues to dangle the threat of nuclear weapons use. You've called this nuclear blackmail. Do you think he's bluffing right now?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Look, maybe yesterday it was bluff. Now, it could be a reality. Let's look, what is a contemporary use of nuclear weapons or nuclear blackmail? He targeted and occupied our nuclear power plant and the city of Enerhodar. This nuclear station has six blocks. And on top of that, a few days ago, apart from this station, he- blackmails, he continues his blackmail related to us exporting electricity to Europe. I have mentioned before in Enerhodar, we have six- the size of six of Chernobyl nuclear plants. Several days ago, they started shooting at another nuclear power plant. It's called Pivdenna, or Southern Nuclear Power Plant. The missile hit the area that was 300 meters from the nuclear plant. The nuclear plant lost all the windows and doors, etc. So, he wants to scare the whole world. These are the first steps of his nuclear blackmail. I don't think he's bluffing. I think the world is deterring it and containing this threat. We need to keep putting pressure on him and not allow him to continue.
MARGARET BRENNAN: For seven months, the strategy of the West has been to put sanctions on Vladimir Putin. President Biden says more are coming. What kind of financial punishment would make a difference now?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Would you explain what financial punishment means? What kind of sanctions?
MARGARET BRENNAN: President Biden has said more sanctions are coming.
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: I see. Let me explain this. I think that there's sanctions that must be implemented towards the very end, completely. I respect the leadership of the United States and the position of President Biden. If we cut Russian banks from SWIFT, we need to cut all Russian banks from SWIFT, but we need to make sure and I will repeat this, some countries do not follow and they are not completely involved in these sanctions. So Russian banks, the whole system, the whole Russian banking system must be cut from SWIFT. Also, if we talk about an embargo for energy, we need not to look for compromises, or we need to make sure that this embargo will be working and all the prices would be implemented according to the embargo because the profits from these imports support the Russian army and fund the war. We see that it's a very expensive toy for Putin. It's a very bloody toy. So he needs more money, all the money and super profits from oil and gas Russia's using, and we need to limit that. We need to stay united, the United States and Europe together implement these sanctions and they have to be implemented not only by the United States, but by the whole democratic world. We cannot say that one country has implemented it, the other country has partially implemented it, and in the third country- the society doesn't support sanctions. And what can the United States do? We would love that- after the de-occupation, we see a very cruel, horrible picture; we see torture, we see killings of our civilians; and I'll give you more detail, but after Bucha, it's not the first case we see- the United States could show its leadership position and recognize Russia as a sponsor of terrorism. I understand there will be implications. These implications will make diplomatic negotiations impossible, however, they are terrorists, and we cannot let them do it out of fear. They will not surrender. We need to keep applying pressure. Again, they do not want any dialogue. We see referenda, we see mobilization, that's emphasizing their will. The United States can help the whole world. The sanctions are fair, 100 percent fair. We de-occupied Kharkiv region. We see many journalists, journalists came back and they will show their videos. We started exhumations, we lifted 500 bodies. The whole families were tortured and killed. Their families were buried together. Adults, men and women, and little children with bullets in their heads. Some of their body parts were missing. They are terrorists, we need to recognize them. Who they are, they will only understand dialogue, when they will feel that somebody supports them if they feel someone's weakness. However, if the world is ignoring them, not supporting them, not dealing with them because they are terrorists, they don't have honor. They cannot keep their word. They do not kill military personnel. They rape, torture and kill civilians. Imagine, I was there a few days ago. We found a big mass grave of half of a thousand people. Today I received more information. The journalists are on their way. They found two more mass graves, big graves with hundreds of people. Also and we're talking about a little town of Izium. Do you know? There are two more mass graves in a small town. This is what's going on. The sanctions need to continue. These sanctions will have political impact, as well as financial impact.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The U.S. has released intelligence about Russia's filtration centers that it is putting Ukrainians into, and estimate that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children are being taken to Russia. Does forcibly separating kids from their families constitute genocide?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: These are horrible elements of genocide of the Ukrainian population. The tortures that I've mentioned. Unfortunately, we have not de-occupied the full territory of Ukraine that has has been occupied by Russia since February 24. So a lot of these tortures and other events are still ahead of us. And we're talking about big cities. Right now, in small towns, we find graves of hundreds and thousands of people. Could you imagine when we will come to de-occupy a city that had a population of 300,000 or half a million before the Russian occupation? I can't even imagine what happens there. We have all the information about filtration camps, isolation camps, people are being tortured with various means. They apply pressure, they torture with electric current and so on. And apart from that there's deportation, I can't say exact numbers. I don't want to lie, I want you to know all the truth. I can't say, or confirm that hundreds of thousands of children have been deported because families have been separated. Partially, some people have been forced to stay in the occupied territory. Some families have been separated and children have been forced to leave into Russia. We do not - cannot confirm the number of children and have been able to stay in the occupied territories or were forced to go to Russia. But it's absolutely true that there are thousands of these children, we have confirmed that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Offensive operations are more expensive than defensive operations. The White House is asking Congress for $12 billion more to provide to Ukraine. What do you need this money for? What is essential right now?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: I don't know if we talk- If you talk about the whole amount that will be given specifically to Ukraine. I'm not sure. God bless you, if you're right. I have not received the details from this new development. I can tell you for sure what's the most vital for us right now. This should be an offensive that will result in the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories. De-occupation is very important for us to, as fast as possible, save our civilians. Do you see what happens within the seven months of occupation? Thousands of people have been killed, raped, tortured. That's why we need this help to de-occupy our territories to make sure that more people survive. I don't think that this is the highest price in the world to save thousands of lives. I'm so thankful for the people of (unintelligible) for the U.S. Congress, to President Biden, that you work on this issue. And I also would like to see this issue supported. So as of today, number one, we're very thankful for HIMARS and other MLRSs that give us an ability to conduct our offensive. Our army seizes the initiative, cuts the technical capabilities of Russia. Second, artillery. Artillery helps us to save the lives of our warriors, our fighters, they need an opportunity to get supplies of tanks from the United States as well as Europe. If the US will be able to show its leadership and will be able to get the tanks, then the Germany- then Germany and other European countries will follow. I think if we get tanks from the US, European allies will also help us to de-occupy Ukrainian cities with tanks. And don't follow Russian false narratives that say that tanks will be given to Ukraine in order to shoot or target Russia, it's not true. Even if we wanted this. Our task is to protect our own territory. We do not need a foreign country, we do not need a foreign nation. We want to protect our land and save our people. That's why tanks are very important as an example for the whole world.
Third, and very important. It's air defense. For this, we also need that the U.S. showed its leadership character and gave Ukraine an opportunity for air defense. A positive decision has already been made. I thank the president and Congress, and both parties that the decision has been made to give Ukraine NASAMs. It's air defense but it won't be nearly enough in order to protect schools, universities, education infrastructure, hospitals and medical infrastructure and to protect homes of Ukrainians.*
Why do we need this? We need the security in order to attract our Ukrainians to come back home. If it's safe, they will come, settle, work here and will pay taxes and then we won't have a deficit of $5 billion in our budget. So it will be a positive for everybody. Because as of today the United States gives us $1.5 billion every month to support our budget to fight- fight this war. However, if our people will come back- and they do want to come back very much, they have a lot of motivation- they will work here. And then the United States will not have to continue, give us this support. I'm sorry, I'm using this language about the war, but it will be a win-win for everybody. For the United States, it will be significant savings, but for us, it will be an opportunity to secure our territory and make it safe for our population.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
We're heading into those cold winter months, and a possible global economic crisis. Do you trust that the West will provide that financial support you need?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY:
We all need to live through this winter. It's the most complicated winter. And I'm convinced that if we talk about Ukraine, you see what's happening. They blocked the ports to prevent our grain to leave for Africa, Asia, some countries of Europe to create chaos there, political chaos and famine. They want to cause famine. And that's why- and therefore instability in some countries. The second crisis that Russia created is energy. they have created it before the full scale invasion. The world has no right to listen to Russia's false narratives. They say that because of the war and sanctions, the energy prices are going up. It's untrue. Remember, before the full scale invasion, Russia had already done that. Russia had- has done that, and the energy prices have been inflated. The second risk- risk and now they understood that Ukraine is capable- because Ukraine has been connected to the European grid- to help Europe, Poland, Romania, our neighbors, Moldova, we have started negotiations with Germany, everybody sees that we have a surplus of electricity. Because we have a well developed nuclear power system. We have 15 power- stations, 15 blocks, and they understood that we will export our electricity to Europe. It means that Europe will have a big volume, enough volume, but also the price will be different. So it won't hurt Europeans, and Europeans will be satisfied and leaders in Europe know about that. And then they decided to attack our nuclear power plant. Now, it's been disconnected, six units out of 15 do not work but our country has enough electricity. So we see that 1/3 of our capacity could be working for Europe right now. That's what Russia is doing. Yes, of course, winter will be very difficult. September 11th. They did it on purpose, you know what a symbolic, tragic symbol it is. 11th of September, and specifically on this day, they attacked our electric infrastructure. They left 1.5 million people without power, you understand? All infrastructure is interconnected: the pumps, the water control systems. So they created this crisis. We have corrected it. We worked so hard, over the three weeks and we fixed everything. Nevertheless, you see what they do. So in cold winter, of course, they will shoot missiles, and they will target our electric grid. This is a challenge, but we are not afraid of that. We will fight, and we will not surrender. It's very important that they won't force other countries, United States of America and Europe to suffer. Now we suffer. We fight and we give our lives for the future of democracy and of the open world.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
Can there be stability in Europe if Vladimir Putin remains in power?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY:
No.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
No?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: I don't have anything to add. My opinion is no. We have observed this over the years, we don't see stability. Specifically, we see challenges and risks, political, economic, food crisis. Obviously, it is not- COVID-19 was not enough for them. COVID took so many lives, caused economic consequences. This is life. Unfortunately, it did take place. However, simultaneously, we see Russia creating, artificially, other kinds of crisis and they are very openly discussing the threats to the rest of the world. They started threatening us with nuclear weapons. Will the world depend on one country or one person? The world has to make a decision. We have made our decision. We will not depend on one person, who is not a citizen of our country.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
Mr. President, thank you for your time today. I do want to ask before I let you go, you have kept Ukraine united during this war. Have you seen evidence that Vladimir Putin will now come and target you in this moment of desperation?
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY:
I think that the military strategy of military and political leadership of Russia has not changed: its occupation of our country. And of course, they want to destabilize our country from inside. You are very right in saying that we are united. We have become even more united now than ever, over the 31 years of our independence from the Soviet Union. So he does everything possible to destabilize our country to make sure we're weaker. And for that he wants to divide us of course, I'm one of the targets, of course, it goes without saying. It's not because of my personality, just because- because the President is a leader of their country.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
Mr. President, thank you for your time. And good luck to you, sir.
PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY:
Thank you very much. We will need it. We wish you peace and everything. Thank you very much for your support, the United States.
MARGARET BRENNAN:
And Face the Nation will be back in one minute. Stay with us.
*Editor's note: The original version of this transcript of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's interview on "Face the Nation" this past Sunday, Sept. 25, 2022, had an error in translation, implying that the NASAMS weapons systems have been delivered. They have not.
CBS News
14. The End of Senior Politics in China
Excerpts;
The case of senior politics in Meiji Japan serves as a useful comparison. Japanese seniors (genro) were heroes of the Meiji Restoration. Their influence in politics started in 1892 when the genro group picked a new prime minister following the sudden departure of Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi. The genro shared a similar political role with seniors in China. First, they maintained the power to select prime ministers to ensure stability during the power transition. Second, they sat above narrow bureaucratic and party interests to guide domestic and foreign policies based on national objectives. Third, they adjusted the difference between political parties, bureaucracy, and the military to maintain centralized control.
The genro group faded out of Japanese politics in the 1920s due to their age. As a result, Japanese politics fell into deep chaos. Fanatic military officers seized power following genro’s departure through coups and pursued aggressive foreign policies, which the genro group abhorred. The military government’s unchecked power led Japan to World War II and its eventual defeat.
The parallel is not exact, of course. The PLA certainly is not in a position to seize power; in fact, Xi has strengthened the CCP’s command over the gun. However, seniors provided an additional check on the top leader. They also forestalled any political deviation from reform and opening in the past 40 years. Furthermore, they stabilized the decision-making process by guarding political norms. Without seniors, Xi might run into the mistake of pursuing extreme policies with unchecked power. The nationalistic foreign policies and the zero-COVID policy only confirm this danger.
The End of Senior Politics in China
Xi Jinping is the first leader since 1978 not to be constrained by powerful elders in the CCP.
thediplomat.com · by Zhuoran Li · September 26, 2022
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Many China watchers consider institutionalization as the key to China’s political stability at the elite level since the 1980s. Andrew Nathan identified the institutionalization of power transitions as one of the main reasons behind China’s authoritarian resiliency. However, as Joseph Fewsmith has noted, what China scholars defined as political institutions in China are nothing more than norms. Since the Deng Xiaoping era, these norms have been constructed and guarded by senior figures in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who are the main stabilizing force within the Party.
These seniors (元老) are retired national leaders who remain politically influential through their networks and proteges. They have historically played a significant role in Chinese politics by mediating elite conflicts, forging factional consensus, and setting the direction of policy. They played a vital role in personnel affairs by promoting followers, designating successors, and even deposing the top leader.
The first generation of seniors emerged during the 1980s. They were Mao’s comrades who were purged during the Cultural Revolution and later revived by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. Among them, the eight most powerful figures – known as the Eight Immortals – enjoyed unrivaled political influence. These seniors played an essential role in shaping economic policies during the 1980s.
Two seniors in particular, the conservative Chen Yun and reformer Deng Xiaoping, led the struggle over China’s future between a planned economy with a market as a supplement and a socialist market economy. Hu Yaobang, the CCP secretary during this period, complained about being sandwiched between the two elderly strongmen, while also facing complaints from Li Xiannian, arguably the third most powerful senior in China, that Hu only followed Chen and Deng while ignoring Li.
During the turbulent five years between 1987 and 1992, senior politics reached a new dimension: Seniors, especially Deng Xiaoping, played the role of kingmaker and king-breaker. They deposed two party secretaries due to what they perceived as “political mistakes” before bringing Jiang Zemin, the party secretary of Shanghai, to Beijing.
When facing the student protests in December 1986, Hu Yaobang took a conciliatory approach. He believed that rather than suppressing the movement, the party leadership should address student concerns and pursue democratic reform. However, Deng and other conservative seniors considered Hu “not forceful enough” to counter this bourgeois liberalism. After several meetings in Deng’s house, seniors forced Hu to resign.
After Hu’s fall from grace, Deng and the seniors had to pick his successor. Two candidates stood out for the next CCP general secretary: The liberal-minded Premier Zhao Ziyang and Deng Liqun (no relation to Deng Xiaoping), a stubborn conservative and one of the CCP’s best political theorists. Deng Xiaoping worried that Deng Liqun might jeopardize the economic reform process. After receiving a criticism letter, Deng Xiaoping decided to strip Deng Liqun from all his positions, a move that received consent from conservative seniors such as Bo Yibo and Chen Yun. The fall of Deng Liqun paved the way for Zhao Ziyang’s ascension.
In the end, however, Zhao shared a similar fate to his predecessor. During the Tiananmen protests in 1989, Zhao supported a conciliatory approach toward protestors and vehemently opposed military suppression, which contradicted Deng’s strong-fisted approach. When Zhao admitted to the public that Deng still made all major decisions, Deng viewed it as a personal betrayal, effectively throwing him under the bus. Ultimately, Deng and other senior leaders deposed Zhao for “splitting the party” and placed him under house arrest for the rest of his life.
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Following the downfall of Zhao, the seniors picked Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zemin as the next leader, because of his deft handling of student protests in Shanghai. Jiang was an acceptable figure for both conservatives and reformers.
Deng’s final demonstration of his political influence was his Southern Tour in 1992. Following the Tiananmen protest and the bloody crackdown, many conservatives within the CCP believed that economic reform had brought political chaos. Therefore, the national priority shifted from economic reform to political struggle. In his speech on the 70th Anniversary of the CCP in 1991, Jiang declared that “class struggle will exist in China for a long time.” He emphasized the importance of ideological campaigns, especially the struggle against “peaceful evolution” and “bourgeois liberalization.” Following the speech, many observers claimed that Jiang might assault, even destroy, China’s infant market economy. Thus, Deng believed that he must take action to stop Jiang and conservatives from reversing the “reform and opening up” process.
During the winter of 1992, Deng toured the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and gave a speech in which he threatened Jiang, saying that “whoever refused to reform will step down.” According to Li Rui, who was closely connected to the power center, Deng was so worried about the trajectory of reform that he had even decided to depose Jiang. However, other senior leaders like Chen Yun, Li Xiannan, and Bo Yibo stopped him. Bo reportedly told Deng ,“You took down Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang; you can’t have it your way more than three times (事不过三).” Deng agreed, but Jiang got the message. A year later, Jiang announced that reform and opening “must not change in a long time.”
Deng’s final political legacy was to designate a young Hu Jintao as Jiang’s successor, which started the tradition of a retired top leader appointing the successor of the current leader.
Between 1992 and 1995, Jiang Zemin quietly consolidated his power as influential senior members passed away. He wrestled away his primary political opponents, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, by manipulating the retirement age. By 2002, he demonstrated his power by expanding the Politburo Standing Committee and filling it with his proteges, notably his long-term confidant Zeng Qinghong. The expansion made sure that Jiang maintained his political influence after his retirement. Jiang capitalized on his influence to nurture a relatively open political environment and a wave of political reform during the mid-2000s. The rise of Xi Jinping as Hu Jintao’s successor was also Jiang’s decision.
Meanwhile, Hu was considered a weak leader who ruled under Jiang’s shadow. He could not consolidate power effectively like Jiang, had trouble controlling the Jiang-supporting People’s Liberation Army, and did not even receive the title of “leadership core.” Hu’s weakness was further demonstrated when he failed to promote his protege and the head of the Organization Department, Li Yuanchao, into the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012.
Xi’s consolidation of power was the result of consensus among senior leaders. Many seniors believed Hu’s “first-among-equals” leadership style had hindered policy implementation because power was too fragmented. They thought China needed a more “presidential” top leader with centralized power to push through difficult reforms. They also concluded from the Bo Xilai case that weak leadership led to unchecked corruption and elite power struggle. Therefore, as Fewsmith argued, seniors supported Xi’s power consolidation and the anti-corruption campaign. Both Cheng Li and Fewsmith have pointed out that Xi must have gotten approval from Jiang Zemin and other seniors in Jiang’s faction to purge Jiang’s protégé, Zhou Yongkang.
However, the seniors certainly did not expect Xi’s power consolidation to go this far, with Xi taking down all political rivals regardless of their factional background.
Today, China is in a new era. For the first time since 1978, China has no senior who can constrain Xi. Jiang Zemin is 96 years old and rumored to have severe health problems; his absence from the CCP’s 100th-anniversary celebration confirmed these rumors. Hu Jintao was never a powerful figure, and his influence further dwindled after Xi purged many members of the Communist Youth League faction, Hu’s traditional power base. Other seniors, such as Zeng Qinghong and Wen Jiabao, have kept a low profile to avoid the anti-corruption campaign. Xi’s constitutional amendment in 2018, paving the way for his incoming third term as CCP general secretary and China’s president, demonstrate that no senior figure can constrain Xi’s attempt to obstruct party norms.
What does the lack of seniors mean for Chinese politics?
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The case of senior politics in Meiji Japan serves as a useful comparison. Japanese seniors (genro) were heroes of the Meiji Restoration. Their influence in politics started in 1892 when the genro group picked a new prime minister following the sudden departure of Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi. The genro shared a similar political role with seniors in China. First, they maintained the power to select prime ministers to ensure stability during the power transition. Second, they sat above narrow bureaucratic and party interests to guide domestic and foreign policies based on national objectives. Third, they adjusted the difference between political parties, bureaucracy, and the military to maintain centralized control.
The genro group faded out of Japanese politics in the 1920s due to their age. As a result, Japanese politics fell into deep chaos. Fanatic military officers seized power following genro’s departure through coups and pursued aggressive foreign policies, which the genro group abhorred. The military government’s unchecked power led Japan to World War II and its eventual defeat.
The parallel is not exact, of course. The PLA certainly is not in a position to seize power; in fact, Xi has strengthened the CCP’s command over the gun. However, seniors provided an additional check on the top leader. They also forestalled any political deviation from reform and opening in the past 40 years. Furthermore, they stabilized the decision-making process by guarding political norms. Without seniors, Xi might run into the mistake of pursuing extreme policies with unchecked power. The nationalistic foreign policies and the zero-COVID policy only confirm this danger.
GUEST AUTHOR
Zhuoran Li
Zhuoran Li is a Ph.D. candidate in China studies and a research assistant at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. His work has been featured in The Diplomat and the National Interest, and he has appeared on Vox News.
thediplomat.com · by Zhuoran Li · September 26, 2022
15. What Marcos Jr promised to America
Excerpts;
Ahead of the Marcos-Biden meeting, Philippine ambassador to the United States Jose Manuel Romualdez signaled a possible major foreign policy shift. The Filipino diplomat, who is also a relative of the president, said that the Philippines is ready to grant US forces to Philippine bases in an event of conflict over Taiwan “if it is important for us, for our own security.”
The Philippines has naval bases just miles off Taiwan’s southern coast, which will likely be a major site of military operations in the event of any Chinese invasion of the self-ruling island.
Key bases in Subic, Clark and Pampanga, which are also on the northern Philippine island of Luzon, will also be crucial to any major US intervention in Taiwan.
The two allies are also pressing ahead with the full implementation of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which would grant US forces rotational access to several vital bases across the Philippines, including the Basa Airbase on northeastern Luzon and the Bautista Airbase on the southwestern island of Palawan, which juts strategically into the South China Sea.
Romualdez, the Philippine diplomatic chief, is optimistic that “in the next three years” the two allies “can have all [identified projects finalized in] these areas that we have identified already.”
What Marcos Jr promised to America
Philippine leader’s meeting with US counterpart Biden marked a bilateral reset that could see greatly enhanced military tiesPhilippine leader’s meeting with US counterpart Biden marked a bilateral reset that could see greatly enhanced military ties
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · September 26, 2022
MANILA – After six years of disruptive relations under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the US and its oldest ally in Asia have formally reset and restored their historically strong ties. US President Joe Biden held his first in-person meeting with new Filipino leader, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting last week.
Acknowledging “rocky times” in bilateral relations in recent years, including Duterte’s repeated threat to end his country’s alliance with Washington, Biden vowed to prioritize bilateral relations with the Philippines. He also thanked Marcos Jr’s balanced stance on international security issues, especially on the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The British-educated Filipino president has eagerly embraced traditional partners and, during his week-long visit to New York, met a number of Western leaders, including former United Kingdom prime minister Tony Blair. In stark contrast, Duterte cussed at American leaders and refused to visit a single Western capital throughout his six-year term in office.
Marcos Jr’s new strategic orientation is music to the ears of Washington, which views the Philippines as a critical partner in dealing with simmering conflicts over Taiwan and in the South China Sea. For his part, the new Filipino president is eager to rehabilitate his family’s notorious past as well as “reintroduce” his country as a vital and dynamic player in the Indo-Pacific.
While projecting neutrality on the Ukraine conflict, and emphasizing the dangerous disruptions to global food and energy supply, Marcos Jr has dramatically scaled back the Philippines’ strategic relations with Russia. Recently, Manila nixed its single major military helicopter deal with Russia in favor of American replacements.
The new Filipino president has also taken a far tougher stance on the South China Sea disputes than his Beijing-friendly predecessor. In a speech at the Asia Society in New York, Marcos Jr categorically rejected the legitimacy of China’s claims across Philippine waters by emphasizing that the Asian power is “claiming territory that belongs to the Philippines.”
Since winning the presidency in May, he has also consistently emphasized the finality of the 2016 arbitral tribunal award at The Hague, which rejected the bulk of Beijing’s expansive claims across the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
A US V-22 Osprey takes off from the USS Wasp, a US Navy multipurpose amphibious assault ship, during annual joint US-Philippines military exercise on the shores of San Antonio town, facing the South China Sea, on April 11, 2019. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe
And while he has expressed openness to joint exploration agreements with Chinese companies in the disputed area, the new Filipino president has made it clear that any resource-sharing arrangement would have to be consistent with his country’s sovereign rights.
It marks a major departure from the stance of his immediate predecessor, Duterte, who dismissed the arbitral award as “just a piece of paper” and, describing China as his personal “protector”, publicly advocated for “co-ownership” of contested resources in the South China Sea.
During his trip to New York, Marcos Jr and his top officials arranged several in-person meetings, including with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who vowed to double down on burgeoning bilateral strategic relations.
According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the two sides underscored their commitment to continuing to convene the high-level joint committee on infrastructure development and economic cooperation “in order to elevate the bilateral cooperation to a higher level.”
In the past decade, Japan has consistently been a top source of development aid and public infrastructure investments in the Philippines. In response to China’s rising assertiveness, the two US allies have also been expanding defense and strategic relations in recent years.
During their meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the Japanese leader told Marcos Jr that “the international community needs to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Sea, as well as economic coercion.”
Back in April, foreign and defense ministers from the Philippines and Japan held their first-ever “two-plus-two” meetings, where they “underscored the importance of each country’s respective treaty alliance with the United States and that of enhancing cooperation with regional partner countries.”
The two US allies have been seeking to finalize a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to enhance logistical interoperability and defense acquisition cooperation. To enhance the Philippines’ intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), Japan has supplied its Southeast Asian partner with a dozen multirole patrol vessels and a TC-90 reconnaissance aircraft.
The two sides have also signed agreements on the provision of an advanced radar system, which will be built and delivered by the Mitsubishi Electric Corp in 2023. In recent years, Japan, along with Australia, has also regularly participated in massive Philippine-US war games, which have increasingly focused on contingency plans in the South China Sea.
Ahead of his planned visit to the White House next year, the first by a Filipino leader since 2015, Marcos Jr also arranged a personal meeting with the US president. So eager was Marcos Jr’s spokesman to underscore the “special” nature of the meeting that she even incorrectly claimed that the Filipino president was the only world leader granted an in-person meeting with Biden.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and US President Joe Biden meet in New York, September 22, 2022. Image: Pool / Malacanang Palance
“We’ve had some rocky times, but the fact is it’s a critical, critical relationship from our perspective. I hope you feel the same way,” Biden told his Filipino counterpart during their much-anticipated meeting.
Given the historical notoriety of the Marcoses, Biden, who has vowed to speak up for democracy, did raise human rights issues in his meeting with the new Filipino president.
“So we want to talk about human rights – several whole range of things. But I’m mainly, I’m interested to know what’s on your mind and how we can continue to strengthen this relationship,” Biden told Marcos Jr.
Yet the US leader was careful to place any potential disagreement within the broader context of the Philippine-US alliance. “Today, I look forward to discussing the opportunities for a wide range of issues including Covid-19 recovery, energy security, renewable energy. I expect we’ll discuss the South China Sea and disputes in [the] critical global throughway,” the US leader added.
For his part, Marcos Jr has tried to distance himself not only from his father’s checkered legacy but also from his immediate predecessor. During an interview in New York, the Filipino president openly criticized Duterte’s controversial drug war, signaling a more humane and evidence-based public policy under his watch.
“His people went too far sometimes,” Marcos told The Associated Press a day after meeting Biden. “We have seen many cases where policemen, other operatives, some were just shady characters that we didn’t quite know where they came from and who they were working for. But now we’ve gone after them,” he added.
The new Philippine government has also welcomed tighter defense and military cooperation with the US in light of growing Sino-American tensions in the region, especially over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Ahead of the Marcos-Biden meeting, Philippine ambassador to the United States Jose Manuel Romualdez signaled a possible major foreign policy shift. The Filipino diplomat, who is also a relative of the president, said that the Philippines is ready to grant US forces to Philippine bases in an event of conflict over Taiwan “if it is important for us, for our own security.”
Philippine and US Marines during a surface-to-air missile simulation as part of exercise KAMANDAG on October 10, 2019. Photo: Lance Cpl. Brienna Tuck / US Marine Corps
The Philippines has naval bases just miles off Taiwan’s southern coast, which will likely be a major site of military operations in the event of any Chinese invasion of the self-ruling island.
Key bases in Subic, Clark and Pampanga, which are also on the northern Philippine island of Luzon, will also be crucial to any major US intervention in Taiwan.
The two allies are also pressing ahead with the full implementation of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which would grant US forces rotational access to several vital bases across the Philippines, including the Basa Airbase on northeastern Luzon and the Bautista Airbase on the southwestern island of Palawan, which juts strategically into the South China Sea.
Romualdez, the Philippine diplomatic chief, is optimistic that “in the next three years” the two allies “can have all [identified projects finalized in] these areas that we have identified already.”
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @richeydarian
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · September 26, 2022
16. What do Americans care about? Not a cold war
This is important. This is the huge disconnect between the Washington Beltway insiders (the "blob") and the rest of America. We need to understand America's common sense.
Conclusion:
A cold war against Russia and China might empower the foreign-policy elite, enrich the military-industrial-congressional complex and excite our bellicose media, but it ignores the American people’s common sense.
What do Americans care about? Not a cold war
The foreign-policy ‘blob’ may be gearing up for a global cold war, but Americans are focused on security at home, polls show
asiatimes.com · by More by Katrina vanden Heuvel · September 26, 2022
US President Joe Biden’s administration will soon release its National Security Strategy, which is being revised in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The document will no doubt trigger a renewed debate about how the United States should gear up for a new cold war against Russia and China.
But before we plunge into a global great-power competition, it’s worth recalling Biden’s promise to create a “foreign policy for the middle class” and take a look at what most concerns Americans.
The US Congress is about to add tens of billions of dollars to the military budget. Unrepentant hawks scorn this as inadequate, urging a 50% increase, or an additional $400 billion or more a year.
Aid to Ukraine totals more than $40 billion this year, and counting. A new buildup is under way in the Pacific. Biden summons Americans to the global battle between democracy and autocracy, implying that US security depends on spreading democracy – and, implicitly, regime change – worldwide.
Americans, it is safe to say, have different – one might suggest more practical – concerns, as revealed in a recent Quinnipiac University poll. Asked about the most urgent issue facing the US today, 27% of respondents – the highest number – ranked inflation as No 1, while only 2% ranked Ukraine at the top. In a range of Economist-YouGov polls over the past month, the top foreign-policy concerns included immigration and climate change.
The foreign-policy “blob” may be gearing up for a global cold war, but Americans are focused on security at home. According to a survey by the nonpartisan Eurasia Group Foundation, nearly half of Americans think the United States should decrease its involvement in other countries’ affairs; only 21.6% would increase it. Nearly 45% would decrease US troop deployments abroad; only 32.2% would increase them.
Polls, of course, are merely snapshots, and war fever can transform opinion. However, a 2021 report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs reported many of the same priorities.
Far more Americans (81%) said they were concerned about threats from within the country than from outside the country (19%). Among foreign-policy goals, more than 75% of respondents ranked protecting American workers’ jobs and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, respectively, as very important.
Ranked lowest were “helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations” (18%) and “protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression” (32%).
A different model
What would a sensible strategy for the middle class look like? A recent paper from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Managed Competition: A US Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World,” offers a good start. The author is George Beebe, a former head of the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Russia analysis unit who is currently director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute.
Beebe argues that over the past three decades, “yawning gaps” have emerged not only between “America’s ambitions in the world and its capacity for achieving those goals,” but also between a “Washington foreign-policy elite too focused on promoting US primacy” and “ordinary Americans yearning for greater stability and prosperity at home.”
He echoes the priorities of most Americans, arguing that “the chief strategic challenge Washington faces today is not to win a decisive battle between freedom and tyranny but to gain a breathing spell abroad that will allow the country to focus on desperately needed internal recovery.”
He then outlines the core of a strategy for this time: a “managed competition” with Russia and China. Recognizing that America’s economic health is intertwined with China’s, and that Russia’s nuclear arsenal demands prudence, he would “avoid promoting regime change” or otherwise “undermining political and economic stability in Russia and China.”
Instead, in a managed competition, America’s rivals would be countered not only by US power and alliances, but also by rebuilding “agreed rules of the game,” beginning presumably with efforts to revive nuclear arms agreements and create cyber agreements to limit these growing security challenges.
For this to occur, he notes elsewhere, there must be an agreed end to the war in Ukraine. Beebe concedes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack required a strong American-led response. But as when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Beebe would distinguish between repelling Putin’s aggression and efforts to foster regime change in Moscow or to bring Ukraine into the Western orbit.
In the current euphoria over Russian reversals in Ukraine, this caution is likely to fall upon deaf ears. But a foreign policy for the middle class must find a way to curb adventures abroad so that we Americans can rebuild our democracy and strength at home.
A cold war against Russia and China might empower the foreign-policy elite, enrich the military-industrial-congressional complex and excite our bellicose media, but it ignores the American people’s common sense.
Find Katrina vanden Heuvel on Twitter @KatrinaNation.
This article is distributed by Globetrotter in partnership with The Nation.
asiatimes.com · by More by Katrina vanden Heuvel · September 26, 2022
17. China’s state media turning on Putin’s war
I would think state controlled media might be providing an indication of a policy change. Or is it providing us the message they think we want to hear? All warfare is based on deception.
Excerpts;
In the same critical vein, a Chinese website published a translated version of a US-based NBC News report, which cited several Western academics who said they don’t believe Putin will use nuclear weapons. The article was headlined “Putin talks about using nuclear weapons again but academics say he is bluffing.”
Other articles noted many young Russian men had fled the country as they did not want to join the army and fight in Ukraine. The Chinese state media articles said it was understandable that they wanted to escape from the troop call-up as the Russian army might not give them enough food or sufficient weapons when deployed to Ukraine.
Under China’s strict online censorship, it is rare for articles with anti-Russia angles and messages to be circulated online.
On September 20, a Chinese article with the title “The war lets people know that Russia has only two real friends in the world” was widely circulated by mainstream news websites.
In it, Grigory Karasin, chair of Russia’s Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs, was quoted as saying in the Pravda newspaper that Russians now know that Russia only has two real friends: Iran and North Korea. Karasin said only Iran was willing to sell military drones to Russia while North Korea had offered to send workers to help rebuild the Donbas region.
This Chinese article also said it was good that Russia had not referred to China as a “true friend.” But the article had been completely removed by state censors from China’s internet as of Monday.
China’s state media turning on Putin’s war
A distinct shift in editorial tone is apparent as Russia moves to mobilize reservists and threatens to use nuclear arms
asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · September 26, 2022
China’s censored media is being allowed to take a surprising critical line on Russia’s recently announced mobilization of as many as 300,000 reservist troops and latest threats to use nuclear weapons, marking a distinct shift in editorial tone from earlier cheerleading in support of Moscow’s war on Ukraine.
Chinese political commentators, quoted in usually tightly censored state outlets, said even if Moscow could recruit substantially more soldiers it would only gain a marginal advantage over the Ukrainians on the battlefield in the coming winter season.
They claimed Russian troops were suffering from poor food supplies, outdated weapons and low morale – echoing much of the Western media reporting on the war that is often slanted in favor of the Ukrainians over the Russians.
Significantly, perhaps, the change of Chinese media tone came after President Xi Jinping raised questions and concerns about Russia’s military operations in Ukraine during a face-to-face meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Uzbekistan on September 15.
Moreover, at a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last Thursday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said all countries deserve respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In the first few weeks after Russian troops launched a full-scale attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Chinese media reported only positive news about Russia’s military operations and predicted that Russia would quickly and handily win the war.
But after widespread reports of rising casualties suffered by the Russian army, Chinese media gradually started to change its tone to report both positive and negative news about the war beginning in late March.
To avoid Western sanctions, China has, at least officially, stayed neutral on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and called on all parties to resolve the conflict through negotiations.
After Xi and Putin met on September 15, the Chinese government’s official statement did not mention that the two leaders had even discussed Ukraine during the meeting.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin don’t completely see eye-to-eye on the Ukraine war. AFP via Getty / Dominique Jacovides
According to Russian state news agency TASS, Putin said he highly appreciated “the balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis.” Putin even said the Russian side understood China’s questions and concerns on the matter.
On September 21, in another threatening volley, Putin said he was prepared to use nuclear weapons as the West had threatened to do so against Moscow. He stressed this time that “I’m not bluffing.”
Last Friday, Russia initiated referendums in the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson on whether they should join Russia. Western commentators have said if the four regions officially become a part of Russia, the Kremlin would have a legitimate reason to escalate the war or even use nuclear weapons if they were attacked.
Most Chinese commentators in recent state media articles expressed doubts that Putin will really use nuclear weapons.
Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief and party secretary of the Communist Party-run Global Times, said while Russia would definitely gain an advantage in Ukraine by detonating tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, their use would also jeopardize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and world peace generally.
The influential, nationalistic commentator wrote that “if Putin believes that without the use of tactical nuclear weapons, Russia will lose the war in Ukraine, his government will fall and Russia will face disintegration, then the likelihood that he will order the use of nuclear weapons increases dramatically.”
Hu wrote: “No matter whose fault it is, the US, the West, and Russia should not push the situation to such a life-and-death limit. Humanity is at peace, and peace always needs some room for maneuver and compromise.”
Jin Canrong, professor and associate dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University in China, said Putin would need to think deeply about whether he should use nuclear weapons, which he opined would be a disaster for the wider world.
He wrote in a critical assessment that even if Russia could mobilize and deploy 300,000 reservists to Ukraine, it would only improve the defense in Russia’s occupied areas but would not likely change the situation further.
Zhou Ming, a military columnist at Phoenix TV, wrote in an article that Putin would not likely use nuclear weapons unless he faced an extreme situation.
Zhou said it could not be justified for Russia to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine, which had completely fulfilled its promise to turn over thousands of atomic weapons in 2001, especially when Moscow was among those who agreed to provide security guarantees to the country.
Russian President Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Image: Facebook
He opined that the US and NATO would have cause to attack Russia directly, rather than through proxy in Ukraine, if Putin used nuclear weapons. Zhou said once Putin pressed the nuclear button, he would no longer have deterrence vis-a-vis the West.
In the same critical vein, a Chinese website published a translated version of a US-based NBC News report, which cited several Western academics who said they don’t believe Putin will use nuclear weapons. The article was headlined “Putin talks about using nuclear weapons again but academics say he is bluffing.”
Other articles noted many young Russian men had fled the country as they did not want to join the army and fight in Ukraine. The Chinese state media articles said it was understandable that they wanted to escape from the troop call-up as the Russian army might not give them enough food or sufficient weapons when deployed to Ukraine.
Under China’s strict online censorship, it is rare for articles with anti-Russia angles and messages to be circulated online.
On September 20, a Chinese article with the title “The war lets people know that Russia has only two real friends in the world” was widely circulated by mainstream news websites.
In it, Grigory Karasin, chair of Russia’s Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs, was quoted as saying in the Pravda newspaper that Russians now know that Russia only has two real friends: Iran and North Korea. Karasin said only Iran was willing to sell military drones to Russia while North Korea had offered to send workers to help rebuild the Donbas region.
This Chinese article also said it was good that Russia had not referred to China as a “true friend.” But the article had been completely removed by state censors from China’s internet as of Monday.
Read: Pipeline politics prominent at SCO summit
Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3
asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · September 26, 2022
18. Army's military adviser brigades see increased demand in Indo-Pacific, Europe
Army's military adviser brigades see increased demand in Indo-Pacific, Europe - Breaking Defense
The Army's 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade has been training Ukrainian troops in Germany since May.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · September 26, 2022
A member of the Maldives National Defense Forces conducts a live fire exercise with 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) at Central Area Command, Kahdhoo, Maldives, May 22, 2022. (Spc. Jacob Núñez/US Army)
WASHINGTON — As China shows increasing aggression toward Taiwan and Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine, the US Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades in those regions are seeing more countries request aid from the US, according to their commanders.
The Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigade effort began in 2017 to advise and train foreign militaries, an effort that strengthens the US’s relationship with foreign nations, in direct competition with China or Russia. The service now has six Security Force Assistance Brigades, each regionally focused, with the exception of the globally focused National Guard SFAB. Advisers from the SFABs train partner forces on battlefield maneuver, artillery, engineering and logistics.
“Based off of the the presence of SFAB advisers in Europe, we have seen an increase in the demand signal for our adviser teams,” said Col. Robert Born, commander of the 4th Security Force Assistant Brigade, told reporters during a media call on Thursday.
“We absolutely know that there’s other competitors within this region,” said Col. Jonathan Chung, the 5th SFAB commander said Thursday during a separate media roundtable.
Stationed at Fort Carson, Colo., the 4th SFAB began operations in Europe last October. It currently has 19 teams in 10 countries in Europe: Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, Georgia, Slovakia, North Macedonia, Hungary, Romania and “episodic” visits to Finland, Born said.
In Europe, the SFAB is training soldiers on a variety of equipment. For example, the 4th SFAB recently trained a Romanian missile brigade on the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System platform. The Polish Army, Born said, recently asked for fires support training for one of their howitzer battalions. The North Macedonian military has requested logistics and sustainment training for Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and Stryker vehicles.
“We have a running estimate of emerging missions. We also are very focused on identifying transition criteria, so that the Allied partners that we are training with, once they have achieved the goals …. we then have the opportunity to optimize adviser teams transition to new opportunities,” Born said.
The 4th SFAB has been directly involved in helping the Ukrainians fight off the invading Russians. While the US has sent billions of dollars of weapons to Ukraine, Born said today that advisers with the 4th SFAB have been training Ukrainian soldiers in Germany, but declined to provide any examples of that training.
“4th SFAB advisers have supported training to Ukrainian Armed Forces outside of Ukraine,” Born said. “And the plan now is to continue that until we are given instructions to change mission.”
Pacific Demand
Meanwhile, the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade out of Joint Base Lewis McChord, Wash., is focused on the Pacific, where “we continue to see the increased demand for more and more increased partnerships,” Chung told reporters.
He added that the demand is coming from across the Pacific, from Oceania to Southeast Asia to Northern parts of Asia, including Mongolia, Japan and South Korea.
In the Pacific, Chung said the SFAB’s advisers are deployed at 14 different “locations,” working with regional partners such as Indonesia. The Army is making a push in the Pacific to position itself as the partner of choice through its Pacific pathways initiative, which aims to expand US engagement with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
The 5th SFABs units are across the Indo-Pacific working with foreign militaries in three different ways, Chung said. First, advisers are working with foreign rotation units, from platoons to battalions, and working with them on tactical training. Its advisers are also integrating into partners’ military institutions to help professionalize their militaries. The last effort, Chung said is “enhancing our posture” by providing equipment to partners.
“We’re trying to make sure based on the invitation of the partner or what they’re asking us to do, that we have the equipment available so we can help meet their desired needs based on what they’re asking to partner with at that training event,” Chung said.
Thailand is an example of a nation that’s asking for more help, Chung said, noting that Bangkok has taken notice of China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific and acquired Strykers through foreign military sales.
“They’ve asked for increased opportunities of touchpoints, training, logistics, partnerships to move [their] organization to really become a showcase of modernization,” Chung said.
Chung also noted that the recent flare-up of tensions between Taiwan and China, especially following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s trip to the island nation, has not impacted how the SFAB is operating.
“The everything that has happened within the region, and then specifically … in those recent events, we’ve not changed anything in terms of our operations, activities, investments, everything is still aligned and invested to the desire and the pace of our partners,” Chung said.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · September 26, 2022
19. Hiding in the Noise: Preparing the Irregular Warfare Community for the Age of AI
Conclusion:
Machine learning and big data can improve how the SOF community conducts irregular warfare operations at scale. More data will allow SOF practitioners to better support resistance movements around the globe. However, these efforts will take time and require dedicated leaders who prioritize integrating data scientists and cyber practitioners into the force in a meaningful capacity. The world economy is only getting more addicted to data, and US adversaries are using this to advance new forms of authoritarian governance. The need for irregular warfare will increase as these tools make conventional warfare harder to conduct. Irregular warfare operators will have to learn to hide in the noise to defeat these new instruments of power. By adapting its doctrine, training, and mindset, the US military can ensure that it is ready to operate and engage its enemies now in the competition space.
Hiding in the Noise: Preparing the Irregular Warfare Community for the Age of AI - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · Matthew Moellering | 09.26.22
According to the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, the United States is underprepared to counter irregular warfare; the dawn of the AI age compounds this problem. As AI continues to transform human society by fundamentally changing how people experience reality, US adversaries are already using it to augment their forces, conventional and unconventional alike.
To win, the United States will need to both combat AI-enabled adversaries and find creative ways to get its forces running at machine speed using AI. To effectively conduct irregular warfare in the AI age, the US military must adapt its doctrine and training to address these AI-enabled threats.
AI Has Already Changed Irregular Warfare
The AI age is here, and the technologies associated with it are already making it harder to conduct irregular warfare. China has outpaced current US ability to integrate defense and AI by coercing civilian companies to develop dual-use technologies through “military-civil fusion.” As the US Department of Defense makes critical bets on how it will support a high-tech conventional war with emerging technologies that do not yet exist, the US irregular warfare community is already feeling the impact of AI in the competition phase. AI-enabled facial recognition technology, for example, has affected the intelligence community’s ability to protect informants, challenging one of its core competencies.
Seasoned irregular warriors like former commander of US Army Special Operations Command Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles Cleveland have observed that the advent of AI provides new avenues for irregular warfare. Special Operations Command efforts to bring more data to the warfighter through Project Maven and similar plans demonstrate a willingness to adapt in ways the special operations forces (SOF) community prides itself on, but most meaningful steps toward integrating AI into special operations remain years away. Although new AI-enabled tools, like Project Maven, have the potential to improve SOF operations, practitioners must understand that they cannot sit and wait for these tools to arrive. The SOF community must concentrate on changing its current tactics, techniques, and procedures to account for how adversaries are already using AI to counter irregular warfare activities.
Adversarial Artificial Intelligence
The most easily recognizable subset of AI is machine learning (ML), which uses mathematical modeling to draw connections in large data sets at speeds impossible for humans to replicate. People experience this every day within tools like Google Maps. ML models are built on the assumption that the training data is accurate, and this assumption can be exploited through “data poisoning.” By corrupting the data ML algorithms use to learn, data poisoning can prevent these algorithms from working properly.
Researchers from UC Berkeley are working on a specific type of data poisoning—the “backdoor attack”—that requires no knowledge of the underlying algorithm, only access to the databases controlling the training data. With only fifty poisoned training examples, they were able to defeat a facial recognition deep learning algorithm. Data poisoning is only one of several adversarial techniques that can attack AI systems in ways analogous to existing irregular warfare practices. The difference between these and other cyberattacks will be indistinguishable to most practitioners, but understanding their different effects is essential to operational success.
Adding Information Systems to the Targeting Cycle
Allied commandos in World War II did not need PhDs in nuclear fusion to successfully sabotage the German atomic program’s most critical facility. Similarly, a PhD in Bayesian statistics is not required to understand how existing ML algorithms might be stopped. Since the days of the Office of Strategic Services, SOF have been using concepts like CARVER to sabotage complicated technology. The United States needs a new digital CARVER matrix today.
One way to help SOF adapt to AI is to start treating information systems as just that—an ecosystem that contains sensors, servers, people, and algorithms. Mapping AI-enabled information systems in this way will enable practitioners to better visualize the system, transforming it into something easily digestible. This digital terrain analysis will help SOF identify, avoid, and, if possible, exploit these technologies when properly incorporated into the intelligence planning process.
Although targeting command and control systems is a time-honored tradition, the new ways in which data, technology, and algorithms work have outpaced doctrine and cultural understanding of how these modern systems function. Russian forces learned this lesson the hard way when their commanders destroyed the Ukrainian 3G and 4G towers needed to run their encrypted Era communication systems, a critical mistake that forced them to report flag officer casualties on unsecure cell phones. The F3EAD cycle—find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate—should incorporate information systems to compel practitioners to consider these factors, especially in the competition phase. Tactical units should prioritize efforts to increase their competency targeting AI systems, and these skills should be tested through partnerships with industry and the intelligence community.
Adversarial Artificial Intelligence as a Cyber Irregular Warfare Operation
The horrors of an AI-enabled police state are on display in places like Xinjiang, and China is selling this same AI to build a network throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa via the Belt and Road Initiative. These efforts contest the United States’ ability to conduct irregular warfare, making it more difficult and more expensive. SOF can use AI to undermine government surveillance and support resistance movements. Adversarial AI, for example, is an offensive cyber operation that could accomplish this task and shape the battlefield by generating temporary glitches that allow operators freedom to maneuver in a highly surveilled environment. SOF practitioners may also find human analog hacks to be effective, through practices like changing outfits and deliberately fooling deep learning algorithms with irregular markings. Taking these precautionary measures will be essential to most irregular warfare operations’ future success.
Capable advisors can also help local forces use open-source ML tools that are readily available online. Using organizations like Bellingcat as models for collecting intelligence to support resistance movements, Green Berets and other practitioners can leverage these widely available tools and technologies to provide comprehensive support to allies standing up to techno-authoritarian entities. Protestors in Hong Kong, for example, were able to combat Chinese facial recognition technologies with laser pointers.
The ability to defeat enemy information systems does not lose its relevance as warfare transitions to the conflict phase. Practitioners will have to put adversarial systems offline to allow for freedom of maneuver, and such efforts will become a modern form of traditional sabotage operations. There are ample opportunities for ML algorithms to fight other ML algorithms in an operational context. For example, data poisoning techniques used to shape an operation may be sniffed out by enemy algorithms that will adjust after detecting deception methods. How adversarial algorithms adapt to the techniques the United States employs, and vice versa, will be a constant concern in all stages of conflict going forward.
Changing the Culture with SOF Operators
US special operations forces have already made great strides in understanding cyber, specifically how to reduce digital signatures during operations, but a similar approach will not be enough to sufficiently integrate AI into these forces. Although AI is accessed in the cyber domain, it is important to clarify that it is not cyber. Instead, its impact will be felt most at the intersection of intelligence and operations. This makes AI inherently different and more difficult to comprehend, and the average practitioner will need to understand it more completely than they currently understand cyber. If SOF operators continue to deal with cyber by holding up burner phones and virtual private networks as magical talismans that protect them from the new digital mages, they will remain unprepared for operations in theaters with AI systems. US Special Operations Command should consider adding courses that equip leaders and planners to identify and beat rival information systems in an operational context.
In order to be effective in this space, the US military must change how it thinks about its operating environments, which requires integrating digital exhaust training into all exercises. This will help those on the ground better visualize how adversaries use their data against them and will create a culture that understands the importance of AI and how it can work for them. It will also help translate what operating in this new environment looks like for the experienced combat veteran who is well versed in irregular warfare but reluctant to adapt to the rapidly changing technologies that now permeate the operational space. And it will give operators a distinct advantage as the United States integrates its own AI tools into its intelligence and operations processes, as they will already be familiar with the benefits and vulnerabilities of AI.
Irregular Warfare in the AI Age
Machine learning and big data can improve how the SOF community conducts irregular warfare operations at scale. More data will allow SOF practitioners to better support resistance movements around the globe. However, these efforts will take time and require dedicated leaders who prioritize integrating data scientists and cyber practitioners into the force in a meaningful capacity. The world economy is only getting more addicted to data, and US adversaries are using this to advance new forms of authoritarian governance. The need for irregular warfare will increase as these tools make conventional warfare harder to conduct. Irregular warfare operators will have to learn to hide in the noise to defeat these new instruments of power. By adapting its doctrine, training, and mindset, the US military can ensure that it is ready to operate and engage its enemies now in the competition space.
Captain Matthew Moellering is currently in the second cohort of Army Artificial Intelligence Scholars at Carnegie Mellon University. He is pursuing a Master of Information Systems Management / Business Intelligence and Data Analytics from Heinz College. He is a Special Forces officer with deployments to the Middle East and Afghanistan.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
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mwi.usma.edu · by John Amble · September 26, 2022
20. Time, Space, and Material: Metrics for Assessing Irregular Warfare
The podcast is at this linK https://mwi.usma.edu/time-space-and-material-metrics-for-assessing-irregular-warfare/
CW5 "Duc" Duclos is one of the nation's experts on irregular warfare. He is an active duty scholar practitioner. He has written extensively about IW and has a long career putting theory into practice. I had the honor of serving with him in 1st SFG,
Time, Space, and Material: Metrics for Assessing Irregular Warfare - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Benjamin Jebb · September 25, 2022
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Episode 62 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the diverse concepts that undergird irregular warfare (IW) as a whole. These theoretical structures offer innovative ways to conceptualize and envision the wide array of unconventional activities that comprise IW.
Our guests begin by addressing the various ways the US government defines irregular warfare, drawing from their unique areas of expertise. They continue by discussing the interplay between nations and nonstate actors—and how sovereign states are increasingly adopting methods traditionally employed by irregular actors to achieve their larger geopolitical aims. Finally, they conclude by reflecting on different frameworks that strategic- and operational-level professionals can use to plan, implement, and evaluate IW campaigns more effectively.
Dr. Thomas Marks is a distinguished professor and serves as the Major General Edward G. Lansdale chair of irregular warfighting strategy at the National Defense University. He has authored hundreds of publications on warfare and in July 2020 published a monograph entitled Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action. This piece, which serves as the foundation for our conversation, offers an analytical construct for planning irregular warfare operations.
Chief Warrant Officer (CW5) Maurice “Duc” Duclos enlisted in the Army in 1985. Over his career he has served in various positions in the 75th Ranger Regiment and at 1st Special Forces Group. Mr. DuClos has deployed in support of multiple combat operations including Panama, Somalia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He also holds a PhD in social psychology with a focus on civil resistance and revolution and helped stand up Joint Task Force INDOPACOM (Indo-Pacific Command) in Singapore, which synchronizes competition efforts in the Pacific. He now serves at US Special Operations Command, working on several high-profile programs including the command’s comprehensive review of its culture and ethics and the implementation of the command’s Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2021.
Ben Jebb and Laura Jones are the hosts for Episode 62. Please reach out to Ben and Laura with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.
Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
Image credit: 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek, US Army
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mwi.usma.edu · by Benjamin Jebb · September 25, 2022
21. Marcos is no silver bullet for the US–Philippines alliance
Excerpts:
After positioning himself as the rightful successor to the previous administration, Marcos has inherited the Duterte administration’s political machinery. That will make it difficult for the United States to influence the Philippines’ foreign policy through executive, legislative and public diplomatic efforts.
Under these conditions, the United States may be spared the chronic threats to alliance institutions that it faced under the Duterte administration. But without the diplomatic means to incentivise President Marcos to reduce the Philippines’ foreign policy hedging, expectations for future discussions concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty and other alliance agreements will yield modest and likely disappointing results for the United States.
Marcos is no silver bullet for the US–Philippines alliance | East Asia Forum
eastasiaforum.org · by Luke Lischin · September 25, 2022
Author: Luke Lischin, University of Toronto
After six years of uncertainty under former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, the election of President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr has been met with cautious optimism in Washington regarding the future of the US–Philippines alliance.
President Marcos extols the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and the Philippines. He characterised discussions with Washington involving the Mutual Defense Treaty as a means of improving bilateral relations to meet new challenges. Marcos also expressed his intention to expand trade and economic relations with the United States through initiatives including the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
But the pro-US rhetoric espoused by the Marcos administration is not a reliable indicator of the President’s commitment to the alliance. Marcos may not share Duterte’s animus towards the United States but his politics, domestic and foreign, closely resemble his predecessor’s and bode just as poorly for strengthening the alliance.
Just as President Duterte sought to cultivate strong economic and political ties with China while seeking a compromise over the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea, Marcos is similarly appealing to Beijing. Before assuming office, Marcos described China–Philippines relations in comparable terms to US–Philippines relations. He pledged that his administration would commit to what Duterte first termed as an ‘independent foreign policy’.
Economic cooperation with China is a clear priority for Marcos, with the Philippines’ Department of Transportation set to begin renegotiating US$4.9 billion worth of loan agreements with China. The loans are for the construction of railways as part of the former Duterte administration’s ‘Build, Build, Build’ infrastructure program.
While China is an obvious economic partner for the Philippines, the roots of Marcos’ vision for economic cooperation with China likely trace back to the years of Chinese diplomatic outreach and investment in Ilocos Norte where Marcos family members have served as governors since 1998. Through investment in the home province of the Marcos dynasty, China cultivated personal relationships — with President Marcos, Senator Imee Marcos and her son Governor Matthew Manotoc, among others — that will be useful for influencing the administration’s China policy.
The political and personal relationships between China and the Marcos family may have shaped Ferdinand Marcos’ perspective on the Philippines’ territorial conflict with China in the West Philippine Sea. During his election campaign, Marcos dismissed the importance of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration as a means of enforcing Philippine sovereignty.
Marcos reversed his stance on 26 May 2022 when he described the Philippines’ disputed maritime borders as ‘a right’ rather than a claim he would defend. Since that volte-face, both the Department of National Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs have pledged to defend the Philippines’ sovereignty in line with the President’s messaging.
Yet the Marcos administration appears willing to sidestep issues of national sovereignty in order to strengthen the Philippines’ economic relations with China. Working-level talks with China on joint oil and gas developments in the West Philippine Sea have continued despite official negotiations terminating in June 2022.
The Marcos administration’s foreign policy flexibility is often explained as a hedging strategy. It seeks to maximise the amount of trade, assistance and political support the Philippines can receive from China and the United States without alienating either power.
As long as the Marcos administration continues to hedge, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to convince the Philippines to advance geopolitically sensitive projects that are critical to the alliance. One such project is extending US access to military bases in the Philippines under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
While the United States competes with China for diplomatic influence over Philippine foreign policy, Washington faces a distinct obstacle in pushing its agenda despite the pro-US policy preferences of the majority of Filipino citizens. Not only did Marcos secure a political mandate from the public after his landslide victory in the polls, but his administration also enjoys supermajorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate, where the president’s allies and relatives occupy key posts.
The Marcos administration also actively manages dissenting public opinion and political opposition through a massive disinformation campaign, targeting left-wing political groups and activists while using lawfare to censor critical media outlets.
These conditions first posed major obstacles for the US–Philippines alliance under the Duterte administration. They enabled Duterte to pursue a heavily personalised foreign policy agenda that drew the Philippines closer to China while extorting the United States to preserve even the most basic elements of the alliance.
After positioning himself as the rightful successor to the previous administration, Marcos has inherited the Duterte administration’s political machinery. That will make it difficult for the United States to influence the Philippines’ foreign policy through executive, legislative and public diplomatic efforts.
Under these conditions, the United States may be spared the chronic threats to alliance institutions that it faced under the Duterte administration. But without the diplomatic means to incentivise President Marcos to reduce the Philippines’ foreign policy hedging, expectations for future discussions concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty and other alliance agreements will yield modest and likely disappointing results for the United States.
Luke Lischin is a PhD student in the Political Science Department at the University of Toronto and an independent consultant on political violence in Southeast Asia.
eastasiaforum.org · by Luke Lischin · September 25, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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