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Quotes of the Day:
"The capacity of the human mind for swallowing nonsense and spewing it forth in violent and oppressive action has never yet been plumbed."
– Robert A. Heinlein - Revolt in 2100, Postscript (1953)
"Night is always darker before the dawn and life is the same, the hard times will pass, every thing will get better and sun will shine brighter than ever."
– Ernest Hemingway
"Pain and suffering are inevitable for a large intelligence and a deep heart."
– Fyodor Dostoevsky
1. The Last Heir? Kim Ju-ae And North Korea’s Succession - HRNK
2. Kim Ju-ae is a propaganda model
3. The U.S. Alliance With Seoul Could Go South
4. U.S. conservative preconceptions of the Lee Jae Myung government demand careful attention
5. South Korea’s strategic crossroads
6. From Berlin to Pyongyang: Principles for Humanitarian Influence Operations
7. Seoul rings alarm bells over Kim’s expanding nuclear arsenal
8. US sanctions 5 people, 1 group tied to N. Korea missiles
9. North Korea expert says US faces stark choice as Kim Jong Un rejects denuclearization
10. South Korea fires warning shots as North Korean vessel crosses sea border
11. Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations hit major impasse as Trump demands $350 billion investment 'up front'
12. Korea left behind as US lowers auto tariffs for Europe, Japan
13. Korea’s shipbuilders see big boost as SHIPS Act wins backing
14. FM Cho tells U.S. energy chief S. Korea needs nuclear fuel reprocessing, enrichment for commercial purposes
15. S. Korea, Saudi Arabia to expand cooperation in shipbuilding, automotive, AI industries
16. Navy flaunts maritime strength in fleet review marking 80th anniv.
17. Is Kim Koo's Dream Truly Realized?
18. Pyongyang enacts comprehensive labor law to eliminate private economic activity
19. N. Korea expands anti-Seoul propaganda with video production unit
20. Analysis: Kim Jong Un’s strategic gambit puts pressure on Trump and Lee
21. Why Xi Jinping now accepts Kim Jong Un at the grown-ups’ table
1. The Last Heir? Kim Ju-ae And North Korea’s Succession - HRNK
A very important report.
The 96 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Last-of-the-Paektu-Bloodline.pdf
I would like to call attention to this author. He is a journalist with Radio Free Asia. Please note his accomplishments. He ias representative of ao many great journalists in RFA and Voice of America.
About the Author
Jaewoo Park is a journalist specializing in North Korea. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and spent nearly five years reporting on foreign affairs and national security in South Korea before relocating to the United States. He is now in his third year as a reporter at Radio Free Asia (RFA), a U.S. government-funded news organization that delivers uncensored, independent journalism to countries in Asia where press freedom is restricted.
Founded in 1996 in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre, RFA broadcasts in nine Asian languages and covers sensitive topics that are often subject to censorship by authoritarian regimes. Park contributes daily reporting on North Korea, with the mission of expanding access to reliable information for the North Korean people.
In October 2023, Park made headlines with an investigative report analyzing the use of North Korean-made weapons by Hamas during its surprise attack on Israel. The report prompted direct condemnation from North Korean state media, which labeled him a “reptile media” journalist.
Following the public emergence of Kim Ju-ae, Park published exclusive interviews with a former classmate of Kim Jong-un from his school days in Switzerland, and the manager of former NBA star Dennis Rodman as well as Dennis Rodman himself, who visited North Korea. These reports—suggesting that Kim may not have a son—sparked significant public interest in South Korea.
Park has since continued to deepen his coverage of North Korea’s hereditary succession system through interviews with renowned North Korea experts, fashion analysts, and psychologists in both South Korea and the United States.
The Last Heir? Kim Ju-ae And North Korea’s Succession - HRNK
Can Kim Jong-un’s daughter become the next ruler of North Korea? Despite the ongoing debate about Kim Ju-ae’s succession, experts say gender is not an issue when it comes to North Korea’s leadership succession. They analyze that ultimately, it depends solely on the supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s decision.
North Korea’s constitution and the “10 Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Unitary Leadership System,” which justify the three-generation Kim family succession by emphasizing “the bloodline of Paektu Mountain,” do not explicitly prohibit a female leader.
Even if a woman takes power in a country like North Korea, experts predict little will change. Female leaders would likely adopt similar traits. Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s sister, has publicly demonstrated this: her statements are often harsher than her brother’s. While Kim Ju-ae may face limits modeling herself after previous leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, if she becomes leader, she is expected to rule as a dictator modeled on Kim Jong-un. The main difference would be the elevated status of women in North Korea.
Reports indicate North Korea’s younger generation increasingly opposes the fourth-generation succession. This cohort is skeptical of Kim Jong-un’s leadership and the regime, prompting sensitive responses from North Korean authorities. If the fourth-generation leadership does not present a more modern, sophisticated image, regime survival may face serious challenges.
In response, the Kim regime may be considering the “first female leader” card. If Kim Ju-ae rises as successor, she would become the world’s first female communist leader and add a new “refined” image to the North Korean regime. This can be seen as an attempt to modernize and soften the traditional communist leadership image.
However, it is unclear how effective this would be among North Korea’s youth, especially the so-called “jangmadang generation.” This group, born after the collapse of the socialist rationing system in the 1990s, grew up with market-driven capitalist activities. They feel they have received little from the government and show relatively weak loyalty. Having not experienced the socialist distribution system, ideological propaganda and loyalty demands have little impact on them.
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The Last Heir? Kim Ju-ae And North Korea’s Succession
2. Kim Ju-ae is a propaganda model
An important perspective from my friend and colleague from north Korea, Ms. Jihyun Park.
Here is a different perspective than we are reading from most analysts. We must seek to understand the internal regime dynamics that drive what we are seeing.
This is a result of outside information influence on women in north Korea and Kim must try to restore the female archetype. Not mentioned by Ms. Park but I wonder if this "problem" with women in north Korea began during and following the Arduous March of the Great Famine of 1994-1996. It was the women (mothers and wives) who saved the Korean people in the north as they began trading and establishing a black market that has evolved into 400 or so markets that are actually what provides resilience for the Korean people in the north. But this independent, entrepreneurial, capitalist mindset is a threat to the regime so KJU must re-establish the subservient female archetype who serves the regime.
What is the crisis that KJU is responding to? The growing internal resistance and the potential threats to the regime that may eventually emerge.
We must be as concerned with internal instability and potential regime collapse as we are with the indications and warnings of an attack.
Excerpts:
This isn’t just cultural preference. It’s the collision point between internal control and external influence.
The Kim regime can’t stop this tide. So it feels the need to construct a new internal role model for women. Kim Ju-ae’s rise is a symbolic emergency measure to fill that gap.
She’s being styled with increasing maturity and sophistication—appearing at military parades, diplomatic events, and state ceremonies.
Her appearances with Kim Jong-un emphasize the “socialist great family” ideal, demanding loyalty and filial piety from women. It’s a symbolic echo of Kim Jong-suk’s image, reinforcing a structure where women’s voices are only permitted when they serve the regime.
So no, Kim Ju-ae’s presence isn’t about succession. It’s a crisis response.
[블챌] 일상 포토덤프
김주애는 선전 모델
Kim Ju-ae is a propaganda model
https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/224022748484
Freedom88-
1 hour ago
freedom88-
1시간 전
이웃추가
본문 기타 기능
Kim Ju-ae isn’t a successor. She’s a revival of Kim Jong-suk—and a symbolic emergency measure for the regime.
For years now, many media outlets have confidently claimed that Kim Jong-un has no son. And as Kim Ju-ae began appearing on diplomatic stages, some rushed to interpret her presence as a sign of “fourth-generation succession,” spinning theories about dynastic power with breathless urgency.
But I don’t buy into that narrative.
Her emergence isn’t about passing down power. It’s about reconstructing the regime’s ideal female role model—and trying to hold onto young women who are increasingly swayed by outside information. She’s a symbolic patch for a system in crisis.
North Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship. What matters more than whether a successor exists—or whether they’re male or female—is how the regime manipulates and positions its symbols.
Kim Jong-un isn’t showcasing Ju-ae to signal bloodline succession. He’s reviving the image of a female leader.
For decades, North Korea promoted Kim Il-sung’s wife, Kim Jong-suk, as the model woman. A revolutionary heroine and mother of the “Paektu bloodline,” she remained the regime’s symbolic female figure well into the Kim Jong-il era.
Early in Kim Jong-un’s rule, there was an attempt to promote Ko Yong-hui, but that stopped once it became known she was a Korean-Japanese. Ri Sol-ju later appeared with a more public-friendly image, but her political symbolism remained limited.
In this context, Kim Ju-ae is a reimagining of Kim Jong-suk.
She appears at military events, on postage stamps, and alongside training exercises—imbued with the symbolism of “the future of the Paektu bloodline.” This isn’t succession training. It’s a restoration project for the regime’s preferred image of female leadership.
As markets open and outside information flows into North Korea, South Korean dramas, K-pop, fashion, and beauty content are quietly spreading—especially among young women. For them, South Korea increasingly represents freedom and beauty.
This isn’t just cultural preference. It’s the collision point between internal control and external influence.
The Kim regime can’t stop this tide. So it feels the need to construct a new internal role model for women. Kim Ju-ae’s rise is a symbolic emergency measure to fill that gap.
She’s being styled with increasing maturity and sophistication—appearing at military parades, diplomatic events, and state ceremonies.
Her appearances with Kim Jong-un emphasize the “socialist great family” ideal, demanding loyalty and filial piety from women. It’s a symbolic echo of Kim Jong-suk’s image, reinforcing a structure where women’s voices are only permitted when they serve the regime.
So no, Kim Ju-ae’s presence isn’t about succession. It’s a crisis response.
As young women become captivated by the outside world, and the old male-centric authority no longer holds sway, Kim Jong-un is recycling Kim Jong-suk’s symbolism to build a new female role model.
This isn’t just propaganda. It’s an attempt to once again turn women’s lives and voices into tools of the regime.
We must read this symbolic manipulation clearly—and stand with North Korean women in their pursuit of real choice, freedom, dignity, and the lives they truly want.
김주애는 후계자가 아니라 김정숙의 재현이며, 체제의 응급조치다.
몇년전부터 김정은에게는 아들이 없다고 딱 찍어서 이야기 하는 언론들이 많다.
그러면서 김주애가 외교 무대에 등장하며 일부 언론은 이를 두고 “4대 세습의 신호”라며 후계 구도에 대한 해석을 서로 서로 호들갑 떨면서 내놓는다. .
하지만 나는 이 선전에 동의하지 않는다.
김주애의 등장은 단순한 권력 승계가 아니라, 북한 체제의 여성 롤 모델 재구성 작업이며, 외부 정보에 흔들리는 젊은 여성층을 붙잡기 위한 상징적 응급조치다.
북한은 전체주의 독재국가다. 후계자의 존재 여부나 성별보다 중요한 것은 체제가 원하는 상징을 어떻게 조작하고 배치하는가다.
김정은이 김주애를 내세우는 이유는 단순한 혈통 계승이 아니라, 여성 지도자 이미지의 재활성화다.
북한은 오랫동안 김일성의 아내 김정숙을 여성 롤 모델로 선전해왔다.
항일 영웅이자 ‘백두혈통’의 어머니로서 그녀는 김정일 시대까지 체제의 여성 상징으로 기능했다.
김정은 시대 초반에는 고영희에 대한 선전이 시도됐지만, 그녀가 재일동포라는 사실이 외부에 알려지면서 선전은 중단됐다. 이후 등장한 리설주는 대중적 이미지로는 소비됐지만, 정치적 상징성은 제한적이었다.
이런 맥락에서 김주애는 김정숙의 재현이다.
그녀는 군 행사, 우표, 훈련 동행 등에서 등장하며, ‘백두혈통의 미래’라는 상징을 부여받고 있다. 이는 후계자 수업이라기보다, 체제가 원하는 여성 지도자 이미지의 복원 작업이다.
장마당이 열리고 해외에서 북한으로 정보를 보내면서 북한 내부에서도 한국 드라마, K-pop, 패션, 뷰티 콘텐츠가 은밀히 유통되며 특히 젊은 여성층에게 한국=자유롭고 아름다운 삶 이라는 이미지가 확산되고 있다.
이는 단순한 문화적 선호가 아니라, 체제 내부의 통제와 외부 정보의 침투가 충돌하는 지점이다.
김정은 체제는 이 흐름을 통제할 수 없기에, 내부에서 새로운 여성 롤 모델을 구축할 필요를 느낀다. 김주애의 등장은 바로 그 균열을 메우려는 상징적 응급조치다.
김주애는 군 행사, 외교 무대, 열병식 등에서 등장하며, 점점 더 성숙하고 세련된 이미지로 연출된다.
특히 김정은과 함께 등장하는 장면은 ‘사회주의 대가정’ 모델을 강조하며, 여성에게 충성과 효성을 요구하는 상징으로 작동한다.
이는 김정숙의 이미지와 겹치며, 여성의 목소리를 체제에 봉사하는 방식으로만 허용하는 구조를 강화한다.
그러니, 김주애의 등장은 후계 구도라기보다, 체제의 위기 대응 전략이다.
젊은 여성층이 외부 세계에 매혹되고, 기존의 남성 중심 권위 이미지로는 더 이상 통제가 어려워진 지금, 김정은은 김정숙의 상징을 재활용하여 새로운 여성 롤 모델을 구축하고 있음을 보여준다.
이는 단순한 선전이 아니라, 여성의 삶과 목소리를 다시금 체제의 도구로 삼으려는 시도다.
우리는 이 상징 조작을 정확히 읽어내고, 북한 여성들이 진정으로 원하는 삶, 선택, 자유, 존엄을 지지해야 한다.
3. The U.S. Alliance With Seoul Could Go South
From our good friend and fellow traveler (but not the communist kind, rather the north Korea watcher kind), Dr. Nick Eberstadt.
Cautionary words.
The U.S. Alliance With Seoul Could Go South
An additional risk to the partnership now emanates from the South Korean president’s office, writes Nicholas Eberstadt.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-alliance-with-seoul-could-go-south-korea-north-china-9933b928#comments_sector
Sept. 14, 2025 10:57 am ET
Lee Jae Myung speaks during a news conference in Seoul, Sept. 11. Photo: kim hong-ji/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Karen Elliott House rightly warns that South Koreans are worrying about the reliability of their American ally (“Will South Korea Want a Nuclear Weapon of Its Own?,” op-ed, Sept. 10). Unfortunately, an additional risk to the U.S.-ROK alliance now emanates from Seoul.
President Lee Jae Myung, elected in June, comes from the far-left wing of the left-leaning Minju (Democracy) Party, a faction predisposed to appeasing the countries U.S. forces are stationed in South Korea to defend against: North Korea and China. Though the case has been postponed for the duration of his presidency, Mr. Lee faces criminal charges for allegedly instructing businesses to channel millions of dollars to the North while he was governor of Gyeonggi province in 2018-21.
Since assuming the presidency, Mr. Lee has welcomed back pro-North officials last seen in the bad old days of U.S.-ROK tensions 20 years ago.
South Korea’s new intelligence chief, former ringleader of a Blue House cadre dubbed “the Taliban” by the South Korean press, is a longtime proponent of the “self-reliance theory”: an ideology that aims to increase South Korea’s “autonomy” by hedging against its U.S. ally.
Seoul’s new unification minister, Chung Dong-young, held that job from 2004 to 2006. At the time he apologized to Pyongyang for taking in North Korean defectors who made it to the South via Vietnam, promising it wouldn’t happen again. Already he has cancelled his ministry’s annual report on human rights in North Korea. Last month Mr. Lee publicly pledged his administration will “affirm our respect for North Korea’s current system.” Which aspects, exactly, does he find most worthy of respect?
Even more troubling than the unrequited romancing of Kim Jong Un’s dictatorship is the impulse to kowtow before an increasingly menacing Beijing. Mr. Lee’s party raised its flag at the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 in Beijing. Earlier this month, the speaker of the ROK National Assembly—also of Minju—attended Xi Jinping’s military celebration, along with Vladimir Putin and Mr. Kim. Seoul police now threaten their own citizens for desecrating the PRC flag.
If Mr. Lee values the U.S.-ROK alliance, he should realize it might be placed at risk by a double game in Seoul.
Nicholas Eberstadt
American Enterprise Institute
Seoul
Appeared in the September 15, 2025, print edition as 'The U.S. Alliance With Seoul Could Go South'.
4. U.S. conservative preconceptions of the Lee Jae Myung government demand careful attention
A response to Dr. Nick Eberstadt.
Monday
September 22, 2025
dictionary + A - A
U.S. conservative preconceptions of the Lee Jae Myung government demand careful attention
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-22/opinion/columns/US-conservative-preconceptions-of-the-Lee-Jae-Myung-government-demand-careful-attention/2404248
Published: 22 Sep. 2025, 00:02
Korea JoongAng Daily
U.S. conservative preconceptions of the Lee Jae Myung government demand careful attention
5 min
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Choi Hoon
The author is the senior columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo.
Despite the outward success of the recent Korea-U.S. summit, unease lingered over a message from U.S. President Donald Trump just before the meeting. On social media, he wrote, “What is happening in Korea right now? It looks like a purge or a revolution.” Speaking to reporters, Trump accused Korea’s new administration of “attacking churches in a very vicious manner” and of “entering U.S. bases to seize information” connected to a special investigation. His comments suggested that his perception of the new government is far from positive.
Trump remains the central figure of the American conservative right. How do his allies view the government of President Lee Jae Myung? Two recent opinion pieces in the Wall Street Journal offer a glimpse into their thinking.
Korean President Lee Jae Myung, center, sits opposite to U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington during their first bilateral summit on Aug. 25. The photo was released by the Korean presidential office on Aug. 28. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]
The first, published on Sept. 14, was written by Nicholas Eberstadt, a Harvard Ph.D. and chair at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI is one of the most established conservative think tanks in Washington, long associated with figures such as former Vice President Dick Cheney and John Bolton, Trump’s first national security adviser. Its views often shape Republican administrations and overlap with Trump’s base.
Eberstadt’s column carried a blunt title: “Seoul and Washington’s Alliance Is Coming Unraveled,” with the subtitle, “The New Risk to the Alliance Comes From the Blue House.” He described Lee as a product of “the far-left wing of the left-leaning Minju [Democratic Party of Korea]” and raised the issue of the North Korea remittances scandal. For Lee, who has sought to emphasize pragmatism and at times identifies himself as a conservative, this framing is problematic.
Eberstadt characterized the Democratic Party of Korea as consistently conciliatory toward North Korea and China, the very powers U.S. Forces Korea are meant to deter. He argued that the new government’s appointments raised further doubts. According to him, the new director of the National Intelligence Service was once the leader of a group inside the Blue House dubbed “the Taliban,” and has long advocated for “self-reliance” in security matters. He also singled out Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, recalling that during an earlier term as minister, Chung apologized to Pyongyang for North Korean defectors who fled through Vietnam, and now plans to cancel the government’s annual North Korean human rights report.
Related Article
The skepticism echoes remarks made two decades ago by Bolton, who as a State Department official during the Bush administration dismissed the Roh Moo-hyun government by saying, “The one advantage of your government is that we never have to worry about what you are thinking.” For U.S. conservatives, Korea’s Democratic governments have long been coded as heirs to Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in — leaders associated with conciliatory policies toward North Korea and China.
Eberstadt was responding to another Wall Street Journal column by Pulitzer Prize winner and former publisher Karen Elliott House, who asked whether Korea would seek nuclear weapons. House argued that trust in the alliance is eroding, noting that 35 percent of Koreans say they no longer trust the United States, and 60 percent doubt Washington would use nuclear weapons to defend Seoul. She warned that Kim Jong-un is seeking a stockpile of 300 warheads and a secure second-strike capability, leaving many Koreans to believe that only an independent arsenal can guarantee security.
Eberstadt countered that while Korean concerns over U.S. reliability are valid, the greater danger now originates in Seoul itself. He concluded that if Lee truly respects the alliance, he must recognize that “a double game” with Pyongyang and Beijing would put it at risk. The phrase “double game,” increasingly heard from American officials, underscores the unease. Whatever its label — Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” Roh Moo-hyun’s “balancer” concept, or Moon Jae-in’s “peace regime” — to conservatives, it all looks like hedging between Washington and its adversaries.
Kim Jong-un, chairman of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission (left), and U.S. President Donald Trump met at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported on July 1. The photo, released on the agency’s website, shows the two leaders shaking hands across the Military Demarcation Line. [KCNA WEBSITE/YONHAP]
The response required from Seoul is clear. The new government must actively engage with America’s conservative leaders to dispel these preconceptions and demonstrate its pragmatic course. It must prevent economic disputes, such as tensions over Korea’s $350 billion in planned investments, from spilling into issues of military security, particularly the U.S. troop presence. Ideas circulating within some ruling-party circles — such as stirring anti-Trump or anti-American sentiment as a bargaining tactic — should be firmly set aside. Trump’s own defense officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, have long emphasized a flexible, evolving role for U.S. Forces Korea. Meanwhile, talk of an independent nuclear program is unrealistic.
Any move that could be portrayed in Washington as “playing both sides” with China or North Korea must be avoided. The wisest course may be a waiting game — moving half a step behind developments in U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea relations, adjusting carefully but never rushing ahead. All of this, too, will pass. That, in the end, is the nature of international politics.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
5. South Korea’s strategic crossroads
But no mention of "unification first, then denuclearization."
Excerpts:
Smart hedging, not crossing the line
Polls show rising South Korean support for indigenous nuclear weapons. But while an arsenal might satisfy domestic opinion, the strategic costs would be crippling: loss of US guarantees, diplomatic isolation, sanctions and a cascading regional arms race.
A smarter hedge is threefold:
- Invest in asymmetric non-nuclear deterrence (e.g., submarines, long-range strike).
- Build quiet technical and legal capacity for contingencies.
- Reaffirm publicly a non-nuclear stance to preserve alliance cohesion and global nonproliferation norms.
This keeps options open without inviting premature isolation.
...
In the coming months, expect Lee to:
- Press for a Trump-Kim summit at one of the upcoming regional forums such as APEC.
- Offer freeze-for-freeze talks tied to verifiable inspections.
- Propose symbolic confidence-building measures, such as hotlines or family reunions.
- Accelerate modernization of submarines, missile defenses, and survivable command systems.
- Quietly expand hedging capacity while maintaining public non-nuclear commitments.
Escalation is not inevitable. But avoiding it demands patience, discipline, and a willingness to trade short-term domestic applause for long-term stability. Seoul’s task is to lower the temperature without surrendering deterrence.
If Lee can engage Pyongyang with verification, modernize conventional defenses, harness Chinese and Russian leverage and resist domestic nuclear calls, South Korea can keep the peninsula from sliding into an uncontrollable arms race. The nuclear trap is real – but not yet inescapable.
South Korea’s strategic crossroads - Asia Times
Engaging, deterring, hedging, leveraging to avoid nuclear trap
asiatimes.com · Yujing Shentu · September 24, 2025
In the evolving security landscape of Northeast Asia, South Korea stands at a crossroads. For Seoul, the dilemma is stark: Embrace the popular nuclear impulse or sustain the US alliance and the global non-proliferation regime.
Complicating matters, President Lee Jae Myung’s first US visit – intended to consolidate alliance assurances – was overshadowed by controversy. During his trip, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement raided a Hyundai-LG battery plant in Georgia, detaining more than 300 South Korean workers.
The incident was seen in Seoul as a breach of trust, with lawmakers and media questioning whether Washington values its partnership beyond the military dimension. Lee denounced the raid as “harsh” while noting Trump’s later intervention to let the workers stay. The episode underscored the vulnerability of South Koreans abroad and the importance of safeguarding economic as well as security interests in alliance diplomacy.
Meanwhile, North Korea has accelerated its weapons programs, conducting a successful ground test of a solid-fuel engine for long-range missiles and declaring its intent to “simultaneously develop nuclear and conventional forces.” Pyongyang frames these moves as defensive against “nuclear war drills” by Washington and Seoul, but they amount to an unapologetic bid for permanent nuclear status. Public opinion in South Korea is tilting toward nuclearization in response.
Kim’s overture, Lee’s response
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has unexpectedly expressed willingness to resume talks with US President Donald Trump, provided Washington abandons its demand for full denuclearization. He emphasizes he will never give up the North’s arsenal.
Lee, by contrast, has outlined a pragmatic, stepwise roadmap: freeze, downscaling and eventual dismantlement. In remarks to the press, he signaled that even a verified production freeze would be useful in the medium term. His gestures – such as disassembling border loudspeakers – signal a careful balancing act: deterrence paired with engagement, public reassurance without escalation to a nuclear standoff.
Calibrated engagement, with guardrails
Lee’s three-step proposal is explicitly transactional.
A “freeze-for-freeze” arrangement – Pyongyang suspending certain nuclear or missile activities in return for reversible South Korean concessions like humanitarian aid or agricultural trade – could be the most modest, verifiable way to reduce tensions. But engagement without verification is empty; Seoul must insist on monitoring mechanisms, ideally with third-party or multilateral oversight.
Flexible deterrence without escalation
Engagement alone cannot secure the peninsula. While Lee gestures toward reconciliation, his administration is also strengthening South Korea’s conventional defense posture and tightening coordination with US forces.
A policy of “flexible deterrence” emphasizes precision strike, missile defense and resilient command systems while deepening interoperability with the US. This reassures the public without triggering a nuclear spiral. Seoul should also press Washington for tangible crisis consultation mechanisms that bolster extended deterrence credibility without resorting to dramatic nuclear threats.
Smart hedging, not crossing the line
Polls show rising South Korean support for indigenous nuclear weapons. But while an arsenal might satisfy domestic opinion, the strategic costs would be crippling: loss of US guarantees, diplomatic isolation, sanctions and a cascading regional arms race.
A smarter hedge is threefold:
- Invest in asymmetric non-nuclear deterrence (e.g., submarines, long-range strike).
- Build quiet technical and legal capacity for contingencies.
- Reaffirm publicly a non-nuclear stance to preserve alliance cohesion and global nonproliferation norms.
This keeps options open without inviting premature isolation.
Leveraging multilateral pressure
South Korea cannot stabilize the peninsula alone. It must coordinate with allies to align sanctions and inducements, while pressing China and Russia – whose leverage through trade, energy, and political cover is indispensable – to enforce credible freezes. Cooperation will be uncomfortable but essential.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge lies at home. Lee must persuade South Koreans that restraint, backed by deterrence and diplomacy, is safer than a rush to nuclearization. Internationally, Seoul must reassure Washington and Tokyo that its goal remains stability and eventual denuclearization – not a new arms race in Northeast Asia.
In the coming months, expect Lee to:
-
Press for a Trump-Kim summit at one of the upcoming regional forums such as APEC.
- Offer freeze-for-freeze talks tied to verifiable inspections.
- Propose symbolic confidence-building measures, such as hotlines or family reunions.
- Accelerate modernization of submarines, missile defenses, and survivable command systems.
- Quietly expand hedging capacity while maintaining public non-nuclear commitments.
Escalation is not inevitable. But avoiding it demands patience, discipline, and a willingness to trade short-term domestic applause for long-term stability. Seoul’s task is to lower the temperature without surrendering deterrence.
If Lee can engage Pyongyang with verification, modernize conventional defenses, harness Chinese and Russian leverage and resist domestic nuclear calls, South Korea can keep the peninsula from sliding into an uncontrollable arms race. The nuclear trap is real – but not yet inescapable.
asiatimes.com · Yujing Shentu · September 24, 2025
6. From Berlin to Pyongyang: Principles for Humanitarian Influence Operations
A very interesting and important comparative case study.
Of course NGOs and international organizations would argue that you never use humanitarian assistance for influence (political) purposes.
Excerpts:
Conclusion
In the 1940s, the Allied approach to the Soviet blockade presented a blueprint for the use of humanitarian assistance as a tool for influence operations. Now, the same principles present an opportunity to alleviate human suffering and degrade the iron grip of the North Korean government on its people. Kim perceives the citizens of his country as a great threat that must be contained, and by providing critical assistance alongside targeted messaging, the West can begin to slowly turn North Koreans away from their oppressors. As the population’s sentiment towards the rest of the world warms in association with the assistance, their perception of their government will cool in response. In a crisis or reunification scenario, a population that is more amenable to the West will pose less resistance, be better poised to support new governing efforts, and ultimately be a key component of the conditions required for a safe, stable Korean peninsula. While a humanitarian influence campaign akin to the Berlin Airlift will not be the solve-all solution to the North Korean problem, it will be a strategically beneficial step in a direction that makes the world safer from the threat posed by the Kim regime.
To this conclusion I ask if you know there will be resistance to outside forces in a post regime scenario (post conflict or post regime collapse) what would you do now to mitigate that resistance?
Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula
https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/Confronting Security Challenges. On The Korean Peninsula.pdf?utm
Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/
From Berlin to Pyongyang: Principles for Humanitarian Influence Operations
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/26/from-berlin-to-pyongyang-principles-for-humanitarian-influence-operations/
by C.B. Duncan
|
09.26.2025 at 06:00am
Abstract
This article compares the environments of West Berlin in 1948 to modern-day North Korea, with a focus on humanitarian abuses and the information environment. The author posits that humanitarian assistance can be leveraged as an effective psychological influence operation, drawing on the principles and successes of the Berlin Airlift. Policy and strategy recommendations are made for applying these principles to North Korea in 2025 and beyond.
Introduction
North Korea, under the Kim family regime, has suffered decades of humanitarian abuses, with nearly half the population undernourished and millions dead from famine and starvation. Despite the crisis facing his people, Kim Jong-Un has pursued nuclear ambitions over care for his citizens and utilizes sweeping propaganda campaigns to retain his grip on power in the DPRK. The West, in response, has sought to approach the North Korean problem set in a wide spectrum of ways in recent history. For example, the U.S., South Korea, and other nations have experimented with strict approaches (sanctions and military force) and more conciliatory efforts (humanitarian assistance and the multilateral ‘Six-Party’ talks) to reign in the DPRK’s nuclear program, but to no avail. If the West seeks to make progress in stabilizing the Korean peninsula, policymakers must consider different means of applying pressure to the DPRK. One potential avenue could be through targeted influence operations aimed at the population of North Korea; specifically, pro-Western messaging delivered via humanitarian assistance.
While difficult to accomplish, the goal of influencing a starving population in a closed society is not untrodden territory for Western policymakers. For example, in 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to use hunger as a political maneuver by shutting off food, water, and energy support to the citizens of West Berlin, Germany, with the aim of turning the populace against the Western bloc. In response, Western allies, including the United States and Great Britain, airlifted humanitarian supplies into West Berlin for nearly a year, providing critical food, water, and medical aid to the struggling population. In addition to humanitarian support, the Berlin Airlift provided a unique psychological benefit to the citizens of West Berlin that had impact when reunification occurred half a century later. The integration of principles from the Berlin Airlift into modern North Korea policy offers a powerful influence tool to undermine the Kim regime while simultaneously addressing the grave humanitarian issues in the DPRK.
The Berlin Airlift: A Case Study
On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded the land routes leading into Allied-occupied West Berlin, cutting off supplies of food, water, and fuel, seeking to consolidate power in the city and absorb it into the Soviet-occupied territory of East Germany. The crisis arose from tensions between the occupying powers and disagreement as to the implementation of post-war governance plans by the various involved parties. Recognizing that the Soviet Union sought to influence the civilian population and force them to reject the Allied occupation, the U.S. and Great Britain launched Operation Vittles and Operation Plainfare with the goal of providing humanitarian supplies to the citizenry while simultaneously showing goodwill and securing political support for the Allies. The psychological reaction weighed heavily in planning; General Lucius Clay famously wanted “assurance that the people will be heavily in approval” before launching the operation. Believing in the Berliners’ will to resist Soviet oppression, the first deliveries of the Airlift launched on June 26, 1948.
Over the next year, Allied aircraft delivered over two million tons of humanitarian assistance to West Berlin. In addition to critical supplies, the operation provided psychological benefits that benefited the Allies. First, the combined efforts of Allied forces demonstrated commitment and resolve to the citizens of West Berlin; notably, Operation Little Vittles leveraged “candy bombers” that would drop candy for the children of West Berlin, which humanized the Allied effort and presented a narrative to challenge Soviet propaganda. Moreover, memoirs from residents of West Berlin during the Airlift reflect the sentiment that the Allies stood by Berlin in a time of crisis for the sake of “freedom and democracy”. In one of the most public displays of support for the airlift, nearly 300,000 citizens gathered in protest of the Soviets’ actions, despite heavy-handed propaganda blaming the West for the blockade. The efforts of the Allied approach to the crisis – humanitarian assistance transformed into an influence operation – solidified a positive view of the West in the eyes of the Berliners and paved the way for a smoother reunification process in the 1990s. This approach contains myriad lessons that can inform a similar approach to influencing the situation on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea in 2025: Humanitarian Crisis and Regime Propaganda
Akin to Cold War-era West Berlin, North Korea finds itself in a state of starvation under a repressive government and barraged by anti-Western propaganda, all for the sake of the regime’s consolidation of power. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union and exacerbated by a widespread famine, North Korea has faced three decades of lasting food insecurity. Estimates of North Koreans who died during the “Arduous March”, the period of famine from 1995-2000, range from 240,000 to 3.5 million and nearly half of the population in 2025 is considered undernourished. While various government and non-governmental organizations have contributed vast amount of humanitarian assistance, the regime fails to follow transparency regulations and siphons the supplies for the elites, stripping off markings identifying the assistance and claiming credit for themselves. As a result, North Koreans turn to alternative food sources or trade commodities such as rice on the black market. Even so, the regime continues to leverage larger foreign assistance shipments to extort loyalty from the populace, thus perpetuating its control over the country.
Moreover, Kim seeks to place the blame for self-imposed problems squarely on the shoulders of the West. Via propaganda, the relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons is sold as a response to imperialist aggression, and famine is merely a ‘food shortage’ resulting from improper adherence to regime doctrines. By allowing only minimal access to information through strict controls on media consumption (only state-run radio and television channels are legal), DPRK-internal internet use, and DPRK-only cell phone networks, the government can amplify its own narratives while limiting external sources of information from other countries. However, some outside information trickles in from South Korea and China via radio, foreign cell phone networks, and digital materials smuggled into the country.
Cross-border short-wave radio broadcasts have been a staple of counter-DPRK information operations for decades, with some of the most popular programming including stories from defectors sharing messages about their new lives abroad. Moreover, recent increases in access to computers, phones, and tablets have allowed for digital media to enter the DPRK. SD cards and USB sticks smuggled into the country and sold on the black market, at the rate of tens of thousands per year, are one of the most popular means of accessing Western books, movies, music, and television shows. This has greatly increased the knowledge of the outside world across North Korea, and while a TV show may not be enough to single-handedly encourage defection or revolution, it does present a unique opportunity to shape perceptions of the West amongst the populace. Leveraging digital media can be used to amplify awareness of humanitarian assistance and further shape positive sentiment towards the West while drawing the citizenry out from under the thumb of their oppressors. Despite occurring in the pre-digital age, the Berlin Airlift’s principles can still be applied in the more modern North Korea.
Comparative Analysis: Berlin Airlift vs. North Korea’s Humanitarian Landscape
Similarities abound between the current North Korean situation and West Berlin in the 1940s. Both scenarios feature an oppressive government leveraging hunger and humanitarian abuses as a means of political control, with substantial propaganda campaigns supporting the regime’s party line. Political tensions in the global arena make each situation incredibly sensitive, with escalation to nuclear conflict a very pressing risk. Finally, both scenarios include external Western actors seeking to aid the affected populace while hoping to undermine regime messaging with their own narratives.
That said, the DPRK problem set presents many differences from Berlin that make humanitarian influence operations more challenging. First, North Korea’s extreme isolation makes it burdensome to deliver supplies, ensure their delivery to the intended recipients, and to use assistance as a means of messaging to the rest of the populace. West Berlin was an area that Allied forces could easily access. North Korea, on the other hand, has exercised complete control over its borders for seventy years, all while promoting an anti-Western narrative at every possible opportunity. Coupled with the challenges of delivering assistance in the first place, strong anti-Western sentiments may present a psychological barrier to changing perceptions, even if assistance is provided and attributed to Western partners.
All considered, the following key takeaways from the Berlin Airlift could inform a humanitarian assistance-focused campaign to influence attitudes and perceptions towards North Korea:
- The combination of logistical assistance and messaging should seek to directly address the needs of the North Korean populace. While large-scale assistance may be impossible, rice, medication, or other health or dietary supplements could provide an economical inroad to messaging opportunities. Themes to emphasize in such an operation could include the beneficence of the West and willingness to assist the people of North Korea, or how the populace can rely on each other and external actors for survival, but not the government.
- This project should be undertaken by multiple state- and non-state actors for maximum effect. Much of the benefit provided by the Berlin Airlift came from the perception of the Western bloc as an allied, cohesive conglomerate. Rather than seeing assistance from the American government alone and assuming imperialist intent, seeing a push from multiple nations and NGOs could assuage skepticism and make the messaging more palatable.
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Finally, delivery of assistance should be consistent and easily attributable to the source, which historically has been hampered by the DPRK’s unwillingness to comply with international assistance regulations. Delivering organizations should limit assistance amounts and types to those that can be provided on a regular schedule and with minimal interference by the regime. This may mean exploring nonstandard approaches to assistance delivery, such as smuggling across borders or working with other entities that have access to the country. While this will limit the overall quantity of assistance that can be delivered, that should not deter policymakers from leveraging this approach. Indeed, the effectiveness of Operation Little Vittles – in terms of psychological impact – demonstrates that even small offerings, like candy for children, can have a disproportionately large effect in comparison to their cost. In the North Korean context, deliveries of snacks or medication can have a similar impact; the Choco-Pie black market run from the Kaesong Industrial Complex is a perfect application of these principles. Moreover, the goodwill of the delivering organization must be readily apparent and the primary focus of narrative development. The emphasis must be on trust-building, rather than anti-regime messaging that could alienate the population. While some information regarding the government’s willingness to let its people starve is certainly called for, it should be delivered carefully, and only once global goodwill has been more strongly established. Simply promoting a more positive view of the West will serve to challenge Kim’s authority without the need to explicitly attack the government in messaging.
Strategic Applications for North Korea in 2025
Policymakers seeking to approach the North Korea problem-set in a way similar to the Berlin Airlift must translate Cold War lessons into modern-day solutions. Rather than an influx of military aircraft, drones and balloons can be leveraged to deliver supplies and messages to areas close to the borders, both from South Korea and China. To penetrate more deeply into the country, grassroots networks of smugglers regularly bring foreign supplies and materials to the North Korean black market and can reach otherwise inaccessible areas.
As mentioned above, the messaging that accompanies supplies should most heavily emphasize Western support for the North Korean population and provide a sense of solidarity with their humanitarian struggles. Only once a higher degree of trust has been built will the population be receptive to messaging that highlights regime failures in a more explicit light. Of course, such a campaign does not come without risk; any action by the international community that Kim perceives as threatening to the regime runs a risk of escalation and retaliation, which often comes in the form of military demonstrations or withdrawal from international discussion. However, Kim tends to take this approach regardless of whether the West concedes to his desires; the risk of inaction in this regard outweighs the risk of action. There is also a risk that the government cracks down on and punishes those who distribute and receive the assistance shipments, but historically, this approach has been minimally deterrent. The sheer number of individuals who regularly consume illegal Western media is a testament to this point.
Finally, the West should keep strategic goals in mind when approaching humanitarian assistance. As mentioned, the DPRK has historically accepted assistance while walking back on diplomatic promises made in exchange. Any assistance program should be considered for its ability to open avenues to build the population’s relationship with the West, rather than purely humanitarian reasons that the regime could exploit. The benefits of this approach are numerous; as mentioned previously, building goodwill with the citizens of North Korea offers a counter-messaging opportunity against regime propaganda and sets conditions for a more Western-friendly cognitive environment during a potential conflict or reunification. Even if tensions remain below the threshold of conflict, any societal shifts away from the Kim regime force the government to adjust their strategy, which, at the very least, could mean better humanitarian outcomes, if not larger-scale political benefits. Secondly, coordinated efforts between multiple governments and non-governmental organizations elevate readiness in the case of conflict, regime collapse, or reunification. These entities must have standing relationships to allow them to work together effectively, and cannot be expected to form them once a crisis emerges. This legwork must be done as early as possible. The best means to accomplish this is working towards smaller, more achievable targets on the way to larger goals, building coordination efforts, and developing multilateral relationships now rather than later.
Conclusion
In the 1940s, the Allied approach to the Soviet blockade presented a blueprint for the use of humanitarian assistance as a tool for influence operations. Now, the same principles present an opportunity to alleviate human suffering and degrade the iron grip of the North Korean government on its people. Kim perceives the citizens of his country as a great threat that must be contained, and by providing critical assistance alongside targeted messaging, the West can begin to slowly turn North Koreans away from their oppressors. As the population’s sentiment towards the rest of the world warms in association with the assistance, their perception of their government will cool in response. In a crisis or reunification scenario, a population that is more amenable to the West will pose less resistance, be better poised to support new governing efforts, and ultimately be a key component of the conditions required for a safe, stable Korean peninsula. While a humanitarian influence campaign akin to the Berlin Airlift will not be the solve-all solution to the North Korean problem, it will be a strategically beneficial step in a direction that makes the world safer from the threat posed by the Kim regime.
Tags: humanitarian, humanitarian aid, Influence, influence operations, irregular warfare, North Korea, Strategic Influence
About The Author
- C.B. Duncan
- C.B. Duncan is a student of international relations, concentrating on North Korea policy and defense strategy.
7. Seoul rings alarm bells over Kim’s expanding nuclear arsenal
After reading this we should ask what makes us think that Kim Jong Un will negotiate away his nuclear capability?
Seoul rings alarm bells over Kim’s expanding nuclear arsenal
New realism in South over difficulties of denuclearization
washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Thursday, September 25, 2025
SEOUL, South Korea — Seoul’s point man on North Korea warned Thursday that Pyongyang possesses enough fissile material for potentially hundreds of nuclear devices and has plans for more.
“Even at this very hour, uranium centrifuges at four locations are running, probably accumulating nuclear materials,” Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told a press conference in Seoul. “It is urgent to stop [the programs].”
He said it would be “desirable” for Pyongyang-Washington talks to “take place as soon as possible.”
Mr. Chung’s briefing Thursday followed President Lee Jae-myung’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday, where he called for resuming relations in order to eventually denuclearize.
This points to realism prevailing in Seoul’s policy.
Also Thursday, Mr. Lee, in New York, said, “Wouldn’t there be considerable security benefits if we could just halt the production of nuclear warheads or the development and export of intercontinental ballistic missiles?”
Liberal Mr. Lee won office after conservative predecessor Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached after declaring martial law last December. That led to Mr. Lee’s electoral victory in June.
Unlike Mr. Yoon, Mr. Lee has a strong interest in engaging with North Korea.
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Since 2000, a trend has emerged. A liberal Seoul administration opens relations with Pyongyang; relations are then downgraded when a conservative administration succeeds it; the process repeats.
North Korean denuclearization may not be feasible.
Pyongyang has witnessed the fate of nations including Iraq, Libya, Ukraine and Iran that have abandoned, or failed to develop, weapons of mass destruction.
“The world already knows well what the United States does after forcing other countries to give up their nuclear weapons and disarm,” Mr. Kim told his Supreme People’s Assembly on Sept. 22– an apparent reference to regime collapses in Iraq and Libya.
Mr. Kim has backers on the U.N. Security Council. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine War, Moscow and Beijing have blocked U.S.-led efforts to punish North Korea in the U.N.S.C.
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When Mr. Kim joined Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for end-of-World War II commemoration events in Beijing on Sept. 3, there were no calls for him to disarm. Some speculate that Beijing and Moscow now recognize Pyongyang as a de facto nuclear state.
Some suspect Seoul now seeks to engage Pyongyang, rather than disarm it. Others warn that doing nothing — “strategic patience” — has failed, and simply allows North Korea to expand its threat portfolio.
Kim guns up
Mr. Chung said that, per analyses, North Korea possesses some 2,000 kgs of highly enriched uranium, or HEU.
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Uranium enriched to the point where 90% of the material is uranium 239 – the number relates to the isotope of the element — is considered “weapons grade.”
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, depending upon the sophistication of the weapon the fissile material is used in, between 6kg and 60kg of HEU is needed for nuclear devices.
Per Mr. Chung’s estimates, that formula means North Korea possesses between 33 and 333 uranium-based devices.
It also possesses a separate, plutonium-based fissile materials program and diverse delivery systems.
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North Korea first tested an intercontinental ballistic missile able to strike the U.S. mainland in 2017 and has continued tests and research while deploying multiple missile classes ranged in on South Korea and Japan.
It has demonstrated survivable launch assets, ranging from trains and transporter erector launchers that can hide in tunnels, to missile platforms underwater in lakes.
Some believe Pyongyang could use asymmetric delivery assets — such as nuclearized mini submarines or disguised trawlers that could infiltrate South Korean or Japanese harbors.
This threat array has sparked high-profile diplomatic initiatives, including the China-sponsored “Six Party Talks” and bilateral leader-level diplomacy by the United States.
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However, high-level negotiations broke off after then-President Donald Trump and Mr. Kim failed to reach an agreement in a 2019 summit in Vietnam.
New administration, new plan
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, Mr. Lee laid out his master plan.
“Through comprehensive dialogue centered on ‘Exchange,’ ‘Normalization,’ and ‘Denuclearization,’ in other words, “E.N.D.,” we must end the era of hostility and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence and shared growth,” he said.
Calling denuclearization “undoubtedly a grave task,” he called for “rational solutions” that “cannot be achieved in the short term.”
He suggested a “stop” in development, followed by a “reduction” and finally “dismantlement.”
Experts question whether North Korea will ever disarm.
They point to the immense national efforts and sacrifices it has made to go critical in the face of global pressures and sanctions, and its own security concerns. Pyongyang repeatedly references its pride in its WMD, both internally and externally.
If the Lee administration’s focus is on restarting relations with Pyongyang, verbalizing the endgame of denuclearization may be a useful sweetener for overseas publics concerned about North Korean nukes.
“I don’t think denuclearization is possible,” said Chad O’Carroll, who heads Seoul-based Korea Risk Group. “But trying to get the ball [of negotiations] rolling with talk of denuclearization may be necessary for convincing people in Japan and the U.S.”
North Korea has declared its disinterest in talking to South Korea, but not the U.S.
Mr. Kim said on Monday that there is “no reason not to” resume talks with the U.S. if Washington, “…abandons its delusional obsession with denuclearization.”
Mr. O’Carroll suggested that Mr. Trump may need to offer a quid pro quo for a limited deal.
“For a meeting, there will have to be some kind of ‘nudge nudge’ from Trump to Kim — ‘We are going to focus on a freeze, and on low-hanging fruit, for the foreseeable future,’” he said. “Denuclearization would have to be framed as some kind of global disarmament to be discussed.”
Choi Jong-kun, formerly a deputy foreign minister under the liberal Moon Jae-in administration, insists that non-communication generates failure.
“We have had a vicious circle of doing nothing,” he said. “That essentially strengthens North Korea’s nuclear capability.”
Long-term, pragmatic approaches are essential.
“There is no one-shot deal here,” Mr. Choi said. “An incremental approach that begins with a freeze or exchanges or whatever is the most realistic way forward.”
Even Mr. Lee, in his speech to the U.N., acknowledged that the challenges facing his “E.N.D.” initiative are towering.
“It may sound like a rosy, dream-like vision,” he said - but added, “It is by no means an impossible dream.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon
8. US sanctions 5 people, 1 group tied to N. Korea missiles
US sanctions 5 people, 1 group tied to N. Korea missiles - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Yonhap
- Published Sep 26, 2025 2:24 am KST
The United States on Thursday sanctioned five people and one entity for their role in generating revenue for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, despite growing expectations for the resumption of dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.
The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added two North Koreans, three Myanmarese nationals and one Myanmarese company to the sanctions list, after U.S. President Donald Trump voiced his hope to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this year, with Kim having expressed openness to conditional dialogue with the U.S.
"North Korea's unlawful weapons programs are a direct threat to America and our allies," Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley was quoted as saying as the department announced the sanctions. "At Treasury, we will continue to dismantle the financial networks that sustain them."
The latest action involved a key network facilitating weapons deals between North Korea and Myanmar's military regime.
Those sanctioned included Kim Yong-ju, the Beijing-based deputy representative of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Also known as "221 General Bureau," KOMID serves as the North's primary arms dealer and exporter, according to the department.
Also added to the sanctions list was Royal Shune Lei Company Ltd., a Myanmarese arms procurement company accused of having brokered weapons sales with KOMID for the Burmese military, according to the department. Its CEO Tin Myo Aung and employees Kyaw Thu Myo Myint and Aung Ko Ko Oo were also put on the list.
"Since the Burmese military's Feb. 1, 2021 coup ... the military regime has relied on indiscriminate aerial and artillery attacks during its military operations against resistance groups. Consequently, military airstrikes affecting infrastructure -- including schools, religious sites, and hospitals -- have led to many civilian deaths," the department said.
"Today's action disrupts these weapons sales to Burma, cutting off an important funding stream for the DPRK regime." DPRK is short for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Another North Korean national on the sanctions list was Nam Chol-ung, a representative of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the North's key military intelligence agency involved in overseas revenue generation schemes.
Nam has built a sprawling network of multiple companies and restaurants in Laos and Thailand, which he uses to launder foreign currency earnings for the regime, according to the department.
This week's measure came days after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un told a key parliamentary session that he is open to engaging in dialogue with the U.S. if Washington drops its demand for the North's denuclearization, noting that he personally has a "good" memory of Trump.
His statement added to expectations for a potential resumption of summitry between Trump and him as Trump has repeatedly expressed his openness to reengaging with the North Korean leader.
Speculation has persisted that Trump could attempt to meet Kim when he visits South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit set to take place in the southeastern city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31-Nov. 1.
Despite the North's rejection of any negotiations on its nuclear program, U.S. officials have reaffirmed the Trump administration's commitment to the "complete" denuclearization of North Korea.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
9. North Korea expert says US faces stark choice as Kim Jong Un rejects denuclearization
We should not be deterred from the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. It is the only solution as all others have been tried.
Excerpts:
Town, the director of Stimson’s Korea program and 38 North, a website focused on peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, said the U.S. is left with only two options.
“I think the bottom line here is that what North Korea is doing is essentially forcing the U.S. and its allies to decide whether they want a relationship with North Korea or whether they just want to neutralize the nuclear threat that North Korea poses,” she said.
...
If the U.S. decides that a peaceful relationship and normalization of diplomatic ties is the objective, “that goal is possible,” Town said.
However, if Pyongyang perceives attempts at establishing a relationship as just a precursor to denuclearization or the unification of North Korea and South Korea, then “it’s not welcome,” she said.
The U.S. view of North Korea complicates the question, Town added.
“The U.S. has at times been willing to improve relations with North Korea, but really only in the context of denuclearization and disarmament and lowering the threat to our allies,” she said.
A relationship between the U.S. and Pyongyang has “very little perception of intrinsic value” due to North Korea’s small size and lack of resources, she added.
“But the reality is, you know, North Korea can put this challenge out there to the United States and its allies because it simply has no urgency right now to really change the relationship with the U.S. or South Korea,” Town said.
North Korea expert says US faces stark choice as Kim Jong Un rejects denuclearization
Stars and Stripes · Alex Wilson · September 26, 2025
Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center and director of 38 North, speaks to reporters at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan in Tokyo, Sept. 26, 2025. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)
TOKYO — North Korea has no intention of surrendering its nuclear weapons, which leaves the United States to either to neutralize a nuclear threat or develop something like a normal relationship with Pyongyang, an expert in international affairs said Friday.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has declared his communist regime a nuclear state “whether the world likes it or not,” Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., told reporters at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo.
North Korea in 2022 also declared a right to use a pre-emptive nuclear strike to protect itself.
Rather than court the U.S. and its allies to alleviate sanctions designed to force North Korea to denuclearize, Kim is pursuing economic and strategic partnerships with China and Russia, Town said.
“There’s no more of this constant need to try and justify why they need nuclear weapons,” she told reporters. “Instead, really, the rhetoric has changed to simply accept the idea that they have nuclear weapons; they are a nuclear-armed state.”
Town, the director of Stimson’s Korea program and 38 North, a website focused on peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, said the U.S. is left with only two options.
“I think the bottom line here is that what North Korea is doing is essentially forcing the U.S. and its allies to decide whether they want a relationship with North Korea or whether they just want to neutralize the nuclear threat that North Korea poses,” she said.
Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center and director of 38 North, speaks to reporters at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan in Tokyo, Sept. 26, 2025. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)
If the U.S. decides that a peaceful relationship and normalization of diplomatic ties is the objective, “that goal is possible,” Town said.
However, if Pyongyang perceives attempts at establishing a relationship as just a precursor to denuclearization or the unification of North Korea and South Korea, then “it’s not welcome,” she said.
The U.S. view of North Korea complicates the question, Town added.
“The U.S. has at times been willing to improve relations with North Korea, but really only in the context of denuclearization and disarmament and lowering the threat to our allies,” she said.
A relationship between the U.S. and Pyongyang has “very little perception of intrinsic value” due to North Korea’s small size and lack of resources, she added.
“But the reality is, you know, North Korea can put this challenge out there to the United States and its allies because it simply has no urgency right now to really change the relationship with the U.S. or South Korea,” Town said.
Pyongyang has instead focused on expanding cooperation with Russia on a variety of fronts, including economic and military, she said. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has sent around 11,000 troops to fight for Russia, The Associated Press reported March 27.
Kim has also leveraged his relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as evidenced by his appearance alongside the two during China’s military parade on Sept. 3.
“Certainly, China’s portrayal in highlighting Kim Jong Un during that V-Day parade really sent a strong message that the three of them — even if there isn’t formal trilateral cooperation — they have shared values, shared goals, shared interests,” Town said. “That at the end of the day, the three of them make a powerful cornerstone to this anti-Western resistance.”
Stars and Stripes · Alex Wilson · September 26, 2025
10. South Korea fires warning shots as North Korean vessel crosses sea border
As we know the Northern Limit Line is not an internationally recognized border and was never intended to be one; it was established as an administrative control measure after the Armistice to limit South Korean vessels from straying too far north.
World News Sept. 26, 2025 / 12:33 AM
South Korea fires warning shots as North Korean vessel crosses sea border
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/09/26/South-Korea-fires-warning-shots-NLL-North-Korean-vessel-maritime-boundary/4751758858808/
By Thomas Maresca
South Korea's military fired warning shots after a North Korean vessel crossed the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea Friday morning, Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff said. In this 2021 image, a South Korean military observation post in Gimpo looks toward nearby North Korea. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, Sept. 25 (UPI) -- South Korea's military fired warning shots after a North Korean merchant vessel crossed the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea early Friday morning, Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
"At approximately 5:00 a.m. today, a North Korean merchant vessel violated the Northern Limit Line in the area northwest of Baengnyeong Island," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.
"Our military broadcast a warning and fired warning shots," the JCS said. "The vessel subsequently left our jurisdictional waters."
The South's military remains in a heightened state of readiness, the JCS added.
Related
North Korea does not officially recognize the Northern Limit Line, or NLL, which was drawn unilaterally by the U.S.-led United Nations Command after the Korean War. The boundary area has been the location for a handful of naval skirmishes in the decades after the 1950-53 war, including the North's 2010 torpedo attack on a South Korean warship that left 46 dead.
In January 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called the line "illegal" and warned that even the slightest violation of the North's territory would be considered a "war provocation."
Kim later repeated the threats, saying the boundary was a "ghost ... without any ground in the light of international law or legal justification."
He stressed the need for North Korea to "thoroughly defend the maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions, not by any rhetoric, statement and public notice."
The two Koreas exchanged warning shots near the NLL in October 2022, after Seoul accused a North Korean vessel of intruding into its territorial waters in the Yellow Sea.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has attempted to reduce inter-Korean tensions since he took office in June, with conciliatory gestures such as removing propaganda loudspeakers from border areas.
On Tuesday, Lee outlined a peace initiative built around exchange, normalization and denuclearization -- or "END" -- during his address at the U.N. General Assembly.
Pyongyang has consistently rebuffed any efforts at engagement by Seoul. Kim Jong Un recently appeared to open the door to renewed diplomacy with Washington, however, saying earlier this week that he has "fond memories" of U.S. President Donald Trump.
11. Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations hit major impasse as Trump demands $350 billion investment 'up front'
sigh... Korea is already the largest foreign direct investor in the US. Why is this demand only being made only of Korea?
Who is going to help us out of our shipbuilding dilemma?
Who is going to keep backfilling 155mm ammunition that we are sending to Ukraine and that our defense industrial base cannot produce at scale?
And the list could go on.
Asking for a friend.
My priority is on the importance of the ROK/US alliance in achieving US national security interests.
Friday
September 26, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations hit major impasse as Trump demands $350 billion investment 'up front'
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-26/business/economy/KoreaUS-tariff-negotiations-hit-major-impasse-as-Trump-demands-350-billion-investment-up-front/2409229
Published: 26 Sep. 2025, 18:57
U.S. President Donald Trump looks on, with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick standing by his side, in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 19. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
The Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations have hit a major impasse over the structure and conditions of a $350 billion investment package that Seoul has pledged in exchange for lowering Washington's tariffs. The two sides remain divided over whether the funds will be paid in cash or guarantees, whether Washington will grant an unlimited currency swap line, and how profits from the investment will be shared.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday that the United States will get $350 billion from Korea "up front." The same day, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick asked Korea to slightly increase its commitment, proposing that the amount be brought closer to Japan’s $550 billion deal agreed upon in July.
Related Article
Lutnick also pressed Korea to deliver more of the pledged funds in cash, not in the form of loans or guarantees, according to WSJ.
Washington is reportedly wary that a more lenient deal with Seoul could undermine its nonbinding memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Japan. Korean trade officials have denied receiving such a request.
Earlier this month, Japan reached an agreement with Washington to provide $550 billion, mostly in cash, under what officials have called a “blank check” arrangement. Tokyo also gave Washington effective control over investment decisions and agreed to split profits 50-50 until principal recovery, after which the United States would take 90 percent and Japan 10 percent. Korean officials warn that adopting a similar model could destabilize the won and drain reserves.
Seoul has made it clear that it cannot accept the United States' terms unless Washington extends an unlimited currency swap line. Such a facility allows two central banks to exchange currencies and provides a vital foreign exchange safety net.
Kim Yong-beom, the director of national policy, said on Wednesday in New York that “the draft MOU the United States delivered differs greatly from our understanding” and stressed that “an unlimited swap line is the minimum requirement.”
President Lee Jae Myung told Reuters earlier this week that without a swap line, withdrawing and investing the full $350 billion in cash could push Korea into a crisis similar to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
The $350 billion commitment amounts to 84 percent of Korea’s $410 billion in foreign exchange reserves, underscoring why Seoul views a currency backstop as a nonnegotiable safeguard. Without the unlimited currency swap line, Korean officials have drawn a red line, warning that a deal would be off the table.
Still, Reuters, citing analysis by Citigroup, reported that the U.S. Federal Reserve is unlikely to approve an unlimited swap line with the Bank of Korea.
Instead, Washington may propose access to the FIMA repo facility, which allows foreign central banks holding U.S. treasuries to borrow dollars using those securities as collateral, Reuters reported.
Introduced in 2020, the program has been rarely used and is viewed as a limited liquidity measure for countries lacking swap agreements.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during the Korea Investment Summit at the New York Stock Exchange on Sept. 25. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Profit-sharing remains another sticking point. During a meeting on Wednesday with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, President Lee said he hoped discussions would progress “in a way that reflects commercial rationality and serves both nations' interests.”
The remark was widely interpreted as a call for a fairer split. Washington is insisting on a 90-10 profit division in its favor, while Seoul argues that such terms are one-sided and is pushing for a 90-10 split in Korea’s favor until the principal is recovered.
Seoul is also seeking U.S. government guarantees to protect against investment losses, though Washington has not signaled whether it will accept that demand.
Analysts say that under the current proposal, Korea would bear most of the financial burden without having meaningful control over investment decisions or returns. But as time passes, Seoul may face growing pressure. The United States has already formalized tariff cuts for Japan and the EU, lowering auto duties from 25 percent to 15 percent, potentially putting Korean automakers at a disadvantage.
Market uncertainty is rising as talks drag on. On Friday, the Kospi fell 2.45 percent, or 85.08 points, to 3,386.03, slipping below 3,400 for the first time in nine sessions.
The Korean government hopes to finalize negotiations before or around the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju in late October, though officials say they will not sacrifice core principles for the sake of speed.
“The gap between the two sides is too wide to bridge quickly," said Lee Jae-min, a law professor at Seoul National University. "It will likely take several weeks of intensive negotiations, and a deal before the APEC summit seems unrealistic.”
Jang Sang-sik, the head of the Korea International Trade Association’s international trade research division, said Seoul is working to build support through Cabinet and congressional channels in Washington, recognizing the limits of direct appeals to President Trump.
“Japan’s deal has emboldened the United States to press harder, and Korea needs to offer additional justification for its position,” he said.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY KIM WON [kim.juyeon2@joongang.co.kr]
12. Korea left behind as US lowers auto tariffs for Europe, Japan
Why the disparity?
Korea left behind as US lowers auto tariffs for Europe, Japan - The Korea Times
By Jane Han
- Published Sep 25, 2025 3:07 am KST
- Updated Sep 25, 2025 10:05 am KST
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
WASHINGTON — The U.S. has finalized agreements to cut tariffs on imported cars from both Europe and Japan, leaving South Korea as the only major auto exporter still facing a hefty 25 percent duty.
The U.S. Commerce Department confirmed this week that tariffs on European cars and auto parts will drop to 15 percent, retroactive to August 1, under a trade deal reached in July. Japan secured the same rate earlier this month after wrapping up its own negotiations with Washington.
The moves significantly improve the competitiveness of European and Japanese automakers in the world’s second-largest car market.
South Korea, by contrast, has yet to benefit.
Seoul reached a preliminary understanding with the U.S. in July to cut tariffs to 15 percent, but follow-up talks have stalled. As a result, Korean automakers — led by Hyundai and Kia — continue to pay 25 percent on vehicles shipped to the U.S., a key market that accounts for a major share of their global sales.
Industry analysts warn the gap could hurt Korean firms’ pricing power at a time of slowing demand and fierce competition from electric vehicle makers.
With Europe and Japan now enjoying lower tariffs, the Lee administration faces growing pressure to move swiftly. The longer negotiations drag on, the greater the risk that Korea’s top exporters lose ground in their most critical overseas market.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
13. Korea’s shipbuilders see big boost as SHIPS Act wins backing
And good for the US. - MASGA.
Excerpt:
Hanwha Group announced a $5 billion investment in Hanwha Philly Shipyard last month when President Lee Jae Myung visited the site after his first summit with US President Donald Trump. With the investment, Hanwha said it plans to install two additional docks and three quays to increase the shipyard's production capacity.
For the MASGA initiative, Seoul in July pledged a $150 billion shipbuilding cooperation fund for Korean shipbuilders to invest in the US and support the American shipbuilding sector's revitalization, which the Korean government leveraged during tariff negotiations with the US.
Korea’s shipbuilders see big boost as SHIPS Act wins backing
koreaherald.com · Kan Hyeong-woo · September 24, 2025
Plan to build 250-ship US fleet could open doors to Korean shipyards
HD Hyundai Heavy Industries' shipyard in Ulsan (HD Hyundai)
Korea’s “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” initiative -- better known as MASGA -- is gaining steam as several US labor unions have upped the pressure on lawmakers to pass legislation that would allow the American commercial fleet to include foreign-built vessels.
According to a Reuters report on Wednesday, five labor unions, including the United Steelworkers and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, sent a letter to lawmakers urging them to “support and schedule action” for the bipartisan Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America Act introduced in April.
US senators, including Todd Young, a Republican from Indiana, and Mark Kelly, a Democrat from Arizona, were among the sponsors of the SHIPS Act, which aims to revive US maritime infrastructure and commercial vessel prowess. Lawmakers, however, have not yet taken tangible action on the bill.
As the SHIPS Act aims to create a fleet of 250 US-flagged vessels within the next decade under the Strategic Commercial Fleet Program, US ship carriers and operators are inevitably going to have to turn to American allies, according to shipbuilding industry sources.
“Right now, the US accounts for less than 1 percent of global commercial ship production,” said an official at a Korean shipyard. “With China taking up more than 50 percent of the world’s shipbuilding, the US will have to turn to allies with competent shipbuilding capabilities like Korea and Japan.”
Over the past 10 years, China has built 6,765 commercial ships and Korea has built 2,405 commercial ships, while the US has built only 37 commercial ships, according to the United Steelworkers.
In order to increase the US fleet rapidly, the SHIPS Act states that carriers are allowed to submit a bid to bring a foreign-built vessel into the fleet and reflag it. According to the legislation, a foreign-built vessel may serve as an “interim vessel,” meaning it remains in the fleet only until it can be replaced by a US-built vessel or if under a full-term operating agreement. However, foreign-built vessels other than “interim vessels” will not be allowed to enter the fleet after fiscal year 2029.
“The SHIPS Act has the potential to open up more contracts for Korean shipbuilders,” said another shipbuilding official.
“Considering that the US recognizes that its domestic shipyards have limitations and it needs to utilize the shipyards of its allies, we are closely monitoring the legislation’s progress as Korean firms could be beneficiaries of the US Navy’s maintenance, repair and overhaul sector.”
Noting the recent merger between HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and HD Hyundai Mipo, the official added that HD Hyundai’s expanded production capacity of combat vessels will be able to capitalize on the SHIPS Act.
Hanwha Group announced a $5 billion investment in Hanwha Philly Shipyard last month when President Lee Jae Myung visited the site after his first summit with US President Donald Trump. With the investment, Hanwha said it plans to install two additional docks and three quays to increase the shipyard's production capacity.
For the MASGA initiative, Seoul in July pledged a $150 billion shipbuilding cooperation fund for Korean shipbuilders to invest in the US and support the American shipbuilding sector's revitalization, which the Korean government leveraged during tariff negotiations with the US.
hwkan@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · Kan Hyeong-woo · September 24, 2025
14. FM Cho tells U.S. energy chief S. Korea needs nuclear fuel reprocessing, enrichment for commercial purposes
(LEAD) FM Cho tells U.S. energy chief S. Korea needs nuclear fuel reprocessing, enrichment for commercial purposes | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 26, 2025
By Park Boram
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout; CHANGES headline; ADDS byline)
SEOUL, Sept. 26 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun has told the U.S. energy secretary that South Korea needs nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment for commercial purposes, the foreign ministry said Friday.
Cho delivered the message to U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright during their meeting the previous day on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, the ministry said in a statement.
Cho told Wright that South Korea, as an operator of 26 nuclear reactors, needs to secure a complete cycle of nuclear fuel, including enrichment and reprocessing, for energy security, the ministry said.
Cho stressed that this would be solely for the commercial purpose of ensuring the stable operation of the country's nuclear power reactors.
In response, Wright said he would discuss this issue with other government bodies, taking Cho's request into consideration, the ministry said.
Seoul has been seeking a relaxation from the "123 Agreement," a bilateral nuclear energy pact with Washington that bans it from spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Cho and Wright recalled the "meaningful" discussions on nuclear energy cooperation between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump during their summit last month, agreeing to continue consultations between the two governments to specify the details.
They also shared the view that companies from both countries need close partnership to capitalize on the growing international demand for nuclear power plants, including in the United States, and agreed to expand communications and cooperation to enhance private-level collaboration.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (2nd from L) and U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright (2nd from R) hold a meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on Sept. 25, 2025, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 26, 2025
15. S. Korea, Saudi Arabia to expand cooperation in shipbuilding, automotive, AI industries
(LEAD) S. Korea, Saudi Arabia to expand cooperation in shipbuilding, automotive, AI industries | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · September 26, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 5-7; CHANGES photo)
SEOUL, Sept. 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Saudi Arabia have agreed to expand their bilateral cooperation to include advanced industries, such as shipbuilding, automotive and artificial intelligence (AI), Seoul's industry ministry said Friday, pledging support for joint cooperation projects between the two countries.
Seoul and Riyadh developed 11 new cooperation projects and reviewed the implementation status of 46 projects under way during the Korea-Saudi Vision 2030 Committee meeting held in Seoul, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.
The new projects include a plan to jointly develop technologies for reducing carbon emissions in the shipbuilding process, as well as automobile engine and hybrid car technologies.
They also include digital transformation and AI innovation, as well as cooperation in the entertainment sector, including the film, e-sports and tourism industries, the ministry said.
In detail, Korean internet giant Naver Corp. plans to apply various AI technologies to its digital twin platform for major Saudi Arabian cities, such as Makkah, Madinah and Jeddah, to provide smart city solutions for the Middle Eastern country.
Major Korean shipbuilder HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. and Saudi's Aramco are working to complete the construction of the biggest shipyard in the Middle East in Saudi Arabia by the end of this year.
Hyundai Motor Co. is also working with Saudi's Public Investment Fund to build a car manufacturing plant in King Abdullah Economic City.
South Korea will operate a regular communication channel with Saudi Arabia to "faithfully" implement the projects and expand the cooperation between the two countries to key industries with growth potential, such as AI, and soft power, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said.
South Korean Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (L) shakes hands with his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Khalid Al-Falih, during the Saudi-Korea Vision 2030 Committee meeting held in central Seoul on Sept. 25, 2025, in this photo provided by Kim's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · September 26, 2025
16. Navy flaunts maritime strength in fleet review marking 80th anniv.
(2nd LD) Navy flaunts maritime strength in fleet review marking 80th anniv. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 26, 2025
(ATTN: CHANGES photos)
By Lee Minji
BUSAN, Sept. 26 (Yonhap) -- A P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, escorted by two F-15K fighter jets, dashed across skies over waters off the southeastern port city of Busan on a mild autumn afternoon and dropped 80 flares into the sea.
The commemorative move signaled the beginning of the first fleet review in seven years to mark the 80th anniversary of the Navy, the first branch of the military to be established in South Korea.
Alongside the P-8A, dubbed the "submarine killer," the ceremony showcased some of the Navy's most recently deployed and advanced assets -- ranging from an 8,200-ton Aegis destroyer to a homegrown 3,000-ton submarine.
The Jeongjo the Great destroyer, a core asset of the country's maritime three-axis deterrence system, took on the role of the command ship for the fleet review that also involved 30 other warships and 18 aircraft.
Also among the assets that took part in the event were unmanned weapons systems, such as a V-BAT vertical take-off and landing drone and an unmanned surface vehicle.
A fleet review organized by the Navy takes place in waters off the southeastern port city of Busan on Sept. 26, 2025, in this photo provided by the Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Following an hourlong showcase, participating assets demonstrated an anti-submarine operation simulating enemy threats, involving the P-8A, the MH-60R Seahawk multi-mission chopper as well as the Lynx helicopter.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, who presided over the event along with Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Kang Dong-gil, underscored the importance of maritime capabilities given South Korea's export-reliant economy.
"Maritime security is directly linked to a country's survival," Ahn said. "Considering that 99.7 percent of our country's trade is conducted through the sea, the maritime transportation channel is equivalent to a state lifeline."
"Our Navy has emerged as a globally strong force that is armed with various maneuvering assets encompassing surface ships, submarines and aircraft," he said.
The defense chief specifically noted the growing importance of incorporating manned and unmanned assets for maritime operations.
"There is a need to supplement policies for manned and unmanned teaming of assets, as there are difficulties in implementing them at sea compared with on the ground," he said.
A fleet review organized by the Navy takes place in waters off the southeastern port city of Busan on Sept. 26, 2025, in this photo provided by the Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Friday's fleet review marked the sixth such event since the Navy was established in November 1945.
"The ceremony was organized to mark the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Navy with the public and raise awareness on the importance of maritime security and the country's vision for maritime strength," a Navy official said.
The Navy had initially planned to hold the event in May to mark the double anniversaries of the Navy's establishment as well as the 80th anniversary of South Korea's liberation from the 1910-45 Japanese colonial rule.
But the event was postponed due to political turmoil triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol's botched attempt to impose martial law in December, and was scaled down to a domestic ceremony without foreign warships.
The last international fleet review took place in waters off the southern resort island of Jeju in 2018.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back speaks during a fleet review organized by the Navy, held in waters off the southeastern port city of Busan on Sept. 26, 2025, in this photo provided by the Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 26, 2025
17. Is Kim Koo's Dream Truly Realized?
The paradox is that the K-Culture, the Korean Wave, and the Korean left (which ignores them) could not exist today without the success of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee and their "foundational contributions."
Is Kim Koo's Dream Truly Realized?
[Expert Reporter's Window] K-culture's success overlooks Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-hee's foundational contributions
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/09/25/RVUT7UV6QBDZJMLL3EJKQB3YLI/
By Yoo Seog-jae
Published 2025.09.25. 23:35
Updated 2025.09.26. 09:17
Baekbeom Kim Koo Garden in Namsan Park, Seoul. It is established in 1969 during the tenure of Park Chung-hee, the 6th president. /Chosunilbo DB
“Mr. Kim Koo, are you watching?” “At last, Mr. Kim Koo’s wish has come true!” These are the words many people have written in posts and comments with emotional tones as the Hallyu (Korean Wave) and ‘K-culture’ gain significant global attention.
In 1947, in the essay ‘My Wish’ appended to his autobiography “Baekbeom Ilji,” Kim Koo wrote: “Our wealth should suffice to enrich our lives, and our strength should be enough to repel invasions. What I desire boundlessly is the power of a high culture. For the power of culture makes us happy and brings happiness to others.”
The claim is that the ‘cultural powerhouse’ Kim Koo dreamed of is now being realized. Upon closer inspection, such statements often imply that the paths taken by Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-hee—who fixated on military strength, economic power, division, and dictatorship in South Korea’s political reality—were misguided.
However, those who venerate Kim Koo while opposing Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-hee overlook certain facts. First, Kim Koo and Rhee Syng-man were nationalist anti-Japanese activists who shared the same stance on independence, anti-communism, and opposition to foreign trusteeship for most of their lives. They only diverged in their final 1–2 years over how to approach North Korean communists.
What about Park Chung-hee? The Baekbeom Plaza in Namsan was developed in 1968, and the statue of Kim Koo there was erected in 1969—both during Park Chung-hee’s era. Kim Koo’s son, Kim Sin, served as ambassador to Taiwan, Minister of Transportation, and a member of the National Assembly under Park Chung-hee’s government. Strangely, few Kim Koo followers seem to mention this. Are they unaware?
A more critical point about ‘Kim Koo’s dream’ remains: Could a nation lacking the military and diplomatic strength to defend its liberal democratic system, or the economic power to produce and distribute cultural content, truly become a ‘cultural powerhouse’?
A liberal democratic system that guarantees imagination and expression is essential for cultural creation. If ten representative North Korean films and dramas were streamed on Netflix today, how many global viewers would watch them? Even if curiosity drove clicks, few would last beyond 10 minutes.
What about economic power? Focusing solely on dramas, South Korea produced about 100 shows last year, with an average budget of 3 billion won. This means at least 200 million dollars was invested in ‘K-dramas’ annually. In 1953, South Korea’s GDP was 1.3 billion dollars. Last year, South Korea’s GDP of 2,556 trillion won converted to approximately 1.8 trillion dollars.
Kim Koo’s aspiration for a high culture was a noble vision. Yet, it was Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-hee—who defended the liberal democratic system and achieved the Han River Miracle—that paved the way for its realization. Surprisingly, many fail to recognize this obvious truth.
18. Pyongyang enacts comprehensive labor law to eliminate private economic activity
KJU is deathly afraid of the spread of capitalism (which is the foundation for the resiliency of Korean people in the north).
This is an indicator of the potential for resistance and internal instability.
Pyongyang enacts comprehensive labor law to eliminate private economic activity
The law "restricts people's freedom to choose their jobs and hinders the informal economic activities they rely on for survival," an expert said
By Mun Dong Hui - September 26, 2025
dailynk.com · September 26, 2025
A screenshot of part of the "Labor Management Law" adopted May 29, 2025, as Decree No. 1929 by the Standing Committee of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly. (Daily NK)
North Korea has enacted a comprehensive labor management law aimed at bringing all work activities under state control, including targeting people engaged in illegal informal labor activities outside the socialist planned economy.
Daily NK recently obtained portions of the “Labor Management Law” adopted May 29 as Decree No. 1929 by the Standing Committee of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly.
The law exhibits a fundamental contradiction between its stated objectives and actual mechanisms. Article 1 presents the legislation as aimed at ensuring workers enjoy autonomous and creative employment experiences, but the substantive provisions establish a framework for comprehensive state oversight of labor management.
The documentation system outlined in Articles 14 and 15 creates mandatory state intermediation in all worker placements. Government agencies must issue official dispatch orders for labor assignments, while receiving organizations are required to complete employment processing based on these state-issued documents. This administrative structure effectively ensures that all labor allocation flows through official channels, providing authorities with systematic control over workforce distribution and worker mobility.
The regulatory framework suggests that despite proclaimed commitments to worker independence, the law’s primary function is to establish centralized state management of the labor market through required documentation and procedural oversight.
Hwang Hyun-wook, a senior researcher at Daily NK’s AND Center, described the law as consolidating scattered regulations into a comprehensive statute addressing deployment, mobilization, organization, and punishment. He explained that it reflects an intent to centralize labor management authority and reinforce control through legal justification.
Targeting informal market activities
According to Hwang’s assessment, the law functions as a mechanism for reinforcing institutional control over the population’s movement and economic activities. The legislation particularly impacts individuals who opt for entrepreneurial or market-based work rather than traditional state employment – a group commonly referred to as money earners.
“Money earners” refers to people who keep their names on workplace rosters while paying set amounts to engage in private economic activities. A similar concept is “8.3 workers.” Daily NK reported in March that North Korea was strengthening controls to completely eliminate “8.3 labor” this year. This law provides legal grounds for such control measures.
The law also includes separate provisions for labor mobilization, bringing even temporary work under state control.
Article 16 establishes that labor can be mobilized for national construction projects and regional or sectoral development work when such needs arise, following prescribed procedures. Articles 17 and 18 mandate that mobilization demands must be accurately calculated based on work volumes and available labor sources to create scientifically sound and practical mobilization plans.
The law requires proper authorization for labor mobilization, with Article 20 stipulating that labor mobilization orders are mandatory before any labor can be organized. Article 22 places responsibility on receiving organizations to provide adequate working conditions, living arrangements, and safety protections for mobilized workers, while ensuring accurate payment of compensation.
Article 23 outlines that state planning agencies, grain management agencies, transportation agencies, and other related institutions, enterprises, and organizations are required to ensure the provision of food, fuel, transportation, and other essential resources for rural mobilization in accordance with established plans. Additionally, relevant farms and banking institutions are obligated to ensure the accurate payment of wages to rural mobilization workers.
This appears intended to thoroughly manage and control even temporary labor mobilization under state guidance. North Koreans become subordinated to state directives not only at their assigned workplaces but also during temporary mobilization.
According to international standards, cases where individuals cannot voluntarily choose and accept jobs or freely quit employment constitute “forced labor.” North Korea appears to be institutionalizing forced labor by establishing legal grounds for both regular and temporary mobilization work.
Punishment for violations
The law also includes separate punishment provisions for labor deployment and mobilization violations.
Article 40 mandates warnings or severe warnings for failing to properly conduct labor deployment work that hinders business activities, delaying labor deployment procedures, or illegally mobilizing workers without obtaining mobilization certificates.
Article 41 specifies stronger penalties including up to three months of unpaid labor or labor training for: causing social problems by failing to properly conduct deployment and mobilization work; illegally issuing dispatch or mobilization certificates in exchange for money or goods; failing to process procedures without justification; or illegally using labor under pretexts of material or funding support.
The Labor Management Law goes beyond simply institutionalizing overall labor management by providing punishment grounds for directly penalizing North Koreans and institutions. Despite claims of guaranteeing “independent and creative working life,” it likely functions as new legal shackles institutionalizing forced labor under the banner of a socialist planned economy.
Hwang observed that “going forward, labor movement will be virtually impossible without dispatch or mobilization certificates, placing North Koreans in a structure where they are forcibly tied to state-designated locations.” He pointed out that the law “restricts people’s freedom to choose their jobs and hinders the informal economic activities they rely on for survival.”
The portions of the law obtained by Daily NK can be read in English here.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · September 26, 2025
19. N. Korea expands anti-Seoul propaganda with video production unit
An existential threat to the regime: the "example" of the free and prosperous Republic of Korea - a real republic, that is actually democratic, and where the people are free to determine their own government unlike the lie that is the people's democratic republic of Korea in the north.
N. Korea expands anti-Seoul propaganda with video production unit
The Institute of Enemy State Studies jointly analyzes South Korean diplomatic movements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and weapons systems with the Munitions Industry Department
By Lee Sang-yong - September 25, 2025
dailynk.com · September 25, 2025
North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported on March 21, 2025, that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un posed for a commemorative photo with participants of the Third National Meeting of Active Neighborhood Unit Leaders the previous day. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
North Korea’s Institute of Enemy State Studies is solidifying its role as the regime’s main vehicle for promoting the “hostile two-state theory” and creating internal propaganda about South Korean social problems.
The institute, formerly known as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, has undergone a complete transformation since its renaming, according to a Daily NK source recently. It now functions as a specialized strategic research institution focused on confronting South Korea as an enemy.
The institute now employs video editors, sound technicians and other technical workers alongside political researchers to process footage from South Korean media and YouTube into audiovisual materials.
These materials focus on South Korean social conflicts including protests, strikes, youth crime and unemployment, and are used to educate North Koreans – particularly young people – that South Korean society is corrupt and its youth are trapped in despair. The institute has found that audiovisual content resonates more effectively with young audiences than written materials and can be repeatedly shown at educational sessions.
The institute’s expanded role reflects a strategic shift by the Workers’ Party’s 10th Bureau away from abstract concepts like “nation” or “unification” toward redefining South Korea as an enemy that must be confronted. This approach aims to erase unification concepts from North Korean consciousness while cementing the “hostile two-state theory.”
The institute now coordinates with multiple government departments, jointly analyzing South Korean diplomatic movements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and weapons systems with the Munitions Industry Department. It also collaborates with the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Department on materials highlighting South Korean social problems.
The source said that North Korea’s leadership views this video production work as a strategic mission rather than simple propaganda, designed to eliminate what it sees as illusions about unification by showcasing South Korean social contradictions.
Meanwhile, Daily NK recently reported that North Korea issued instructions to replace maps of the entire Korean Peninsula attached to government agencies nationwide with “half maps” for the regime founding day of Sept. 9.
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dailynk.com · September 25, 2025
20. Analysis: Kim Jong Un’s strategic gambit puts pressure on Trump and Lee
Political warfare.
Analysis: Kim Jong Un’s strategic gambit puts pressure on Trump and Lee
Kim's comments on time favoring North Korea, rejecting reunification, and adopting offensive nuclear posture serve as hardline rhetoric backing his "two hostile states" doctrine
By Gil-sup Kwak - September 26, 2025
dailynk.com · September 26, 2025
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivered a policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on Sept. 21, right after strengthening his international support with his multilateral diplomacy debut at China’s Victory Day celebrations on Sept. 3. If images of Kim stepping off the train in Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, standing atop the viewing platform at Tiananmen Square alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, and displaying his global leadership through summit meetings amounted to a dramatic “visual show,” his policy speech was a vivid “vocal message.”
In the speech, Kim outlined results in various sectors, including the five-year plan for developing basic industries, improving people’s lives and strengthening defense, as well as policy directions. He particularly emphasized the 80th anniversary of the ruling party’s foundation in October and the Ninth Party Congress set for around the new year.
However, the most important aspect was Kim’s documented response to calls by U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to return to the negotiating table — namely, his refusal to abandon either his “two hostile states” doctrine or his nuclear weapons.
First, he justified his policy to bolster his nuclear arsenal based on the two hostile states doctrine, saying he would never waver. This represents a strategic choice to achieve absolute dominance in potential negotiations with the United States by developing nuclear capabilities based on direct and indirect support from China and Russia, which he strengthened by sending North Korean troops to the Russia-Ukraine war and participating in China’s Victory Day celebrations.
Second, to realize this hardline strategy, Kim emphasized his close personal relationship with Trump while making clear there would be no more “denuclearization” negotiations and drawing a line in the sand — he said the only solution was for Trump to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state and participate in disarmament talks. We could sense Kim’s calculations when he emphasized in his policy speech that “time was on North Korea’s side.”
Psychological warfare against S. Korea
Third, Kim brought more into the open his cognitive warfare against South Korea aimed at bringing the current South Korean government to heel, generating tensions within South Korean society and igniting anti-Americanism by continuing to ignore the Lee Jae Myung government’s preemptive olive branches toward Pyongyang and its three-stage plan to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue (freeze, reduction, denuclearization) while demanding foundational changes in South Korea, including constitutional revisions, scrapping the National Security Law and suspending combined military exercises with the United States. Kim’s remarks about time being on North Korea’s side, about how there would be no reunification, and about the so-called second mission of nuclear weapons (moving from defensive to offensive) could be seen as hardline rhetoric to support his “two hostile states” doctrine and his refusal to abandon nuclear weapons.
In his speech, Kim justified his nuclear policy based on the “two hostile states” doctrine while demanding that North Koreans endure more austerity. To Trump and Lee, he sent this ultimatum — “Time is on my side. Don’t hope for me to change. You must change. No, you must completely surrender.”
This could be seen as an expression of his confidence that he can lead North Korea with a new blueprint, rather than simply muddling through, having succeeded in getting Russia and then China on his side. Kim will likely focus on advancing his nuclear capabilities and energizing his economy while accelerating legal, systemic and propaganda efforts to solidify his “two hostile states” doctrine, previously pursued cautiously.
The Ninth Party Congress, scheduled around the New Year, is likely to provide key momentum for this. Regarding stipulating the “two hostile states” doctrine in North Korea’s socialist constitution, I predict that following the country’s presumed addition of articles defining its territory behind closed doors last October, the authorities will use Kim’s latest speech to move beyond their cautious approach toward broad efforts to indoctrinate the public ideologically while launching diplomatic offensives abroad. Finally, during the Ninth Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting set immediately after, they will stipulate the doctrine in the ruling party rules and national constitution and make those changes public.
Through this long game, as well as his precision tactics and strategy, Kim is taking the lead. Perhaps he is already looking toward the next five years (2026 to 2030). He is likely staring intently at two politicians for whom elections are everything — Lee Jae Myung, who faces local elections in June 2026, and Donald Trump, who faces midterm elections in November 2026. We must confront reality. Kim could take the shirts right off our backs right now. If we too narrowly interpret Kim’s words, or if divisions in public opinion or tensions with the United States are exposed, the only winner will be dictator Kim Jong Un. We must think and act like a free South Korea.
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dailynk.com · September 26, 2025
21. Why Xi Jinping now accepts Kim Jong Un at the grown-ups’ table
Emphasis on "grudgingly."
Although there is a lot of "negativity" in this analysis, one benefit of north Korea is that it creates dilemmas for the US and the ROK/US alliance.
China | Toxic neighbours
Why Xi Jinping now accepts Kim Jong Un at the grown-ups’ table
China is grudgingly mending ties with North Korea
https://www.economist.com/china/2025/09/25/why-xi-jinping-now-accepts-kim-jong-un-at-the-grown-ups-table
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Summary
Photograph: Reuters
Sep 25th 2025
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TUMEN
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HERE IS AN unusual buzz of activity in Tumen, a small Chinese city on the border with North Korea. When The Economist visited in recent days, builders and cranes could be seen working on customs and immigration centres at the end of a new cross-border bridge. Elsewhere on the frontier, similar endeavours began in the months before Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, attended a military parade in Beijing in early September. And work has continued apace in the weeks since, as China prepares to revive cross-border trade, despite UN sanctions to curb North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programme.
These and other signals suggest that China and North Korea are feeling more friendly after a fractious decade in which Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, tightened enforcement of those sanctions under American pressure. China treated Mr Kim with unprecedented respect at the parade, allowing him and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, to flank Mr Xi. To much of the world, that suggested that the three are closing ranks in an anti-Western alliance.
Yet Mr Xi’s re-engagement with North Korea also reflects his discomfort at the new power dynamics within the trio. The Kremlin was North Korea’s main sponsor throughout the cold war. Then, for most of the time since the Soviet Union’s collapse, China took on that role. It remains North Korea’s biggest economic partner, accounting for more than 90% of its global trade and vast quantities of its oil (although much of North Korea’s trade with China and Russia is unreported).
In the past two years, however, Mr Kim and Mr Putin have drawn closer. North Korea has sent troops and weapons to help Russian forces in Ukraine and Russia has provided fuel, food and military technology in return. Last year the two countries signed a mutual-defence treaty. Mr Putin also appears to have provided North Korea with military assistance that China will not supply, including anti-aircraft missiles and drone technology. He is reported to have signed an agreement to deliver Russian fighter jets.
That is all troubling for Mr Xi, even if China’s relations with Russia have also strengthened as a result of the war in Ukraine. China shares Russia’s concerns that a collapse of the North Korean regime could lead to a unified, democratic, pro-Western Korea. That development could bring American troops (of which there are 28,500 in the South) to China’s eastern land borders. At the same time, Chinese leaders have sought to avert North Korean military aggression against the South, which is one of China’s biggest trade partners and foreign investors.
China also still hopes to prevent North Korea from acquiring a fully functional nuclear arsenal, fearing that it could prompt Japan and South Korea (both American allies) to do the same. Russia seems less interested in curbing North Korea’s military ambitions, conventional or nuclear. Some officials even suspect that Russia may have helped North Korea to achieve recent advances in its atomic-weapons programme.
To discourage Mr Kim from swinging further towards Russia, Mr Xi now seems to be relaxing some of the trade curbs with North Korea that he imposed during President Donald Trump’s first term. Reported bilateral commerce plunged by roughly half to $2.4bn in 2018 after China began to enforce new UN sanctions. It then dropped further during the covid-19 pandemic. But in the first eight months of 2025 it has bounced back to pre-pandemic levels, increasing by 28% year-on-year to $1.6bn.
There have been signs, too, of North Korean workers returning to Chinese factories and of North Korea ramping up coal exports to China—despite UN sanctions targeting both activities. South-east of Tumen, satellite images show that China is building a giant new customs facility near the point where the Chinese, Russian and North Korean borders meet. Further south, work has resumed at China’s end of another new cross-border bridge.
Mr Xi has also started publicly to play down his concerns about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s official readout of his recent meeting with Mr Kim did not mention Chinese support for “denuclearisation” of the Korean peninsula, despite including such wording in statements on previous meetings, in 2018 and 2019. North Korea did not object to the wording back then, but denounced it as “a grave political provocation” when it appeared in a joint declaration at a summit between China, Japan and South Korea in May last year.
China still advocates a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons, according to Chinese experts. But given the strengthening ties between Messrs Putin and Kim, progress is unlikely without a resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, argues a recent paper by experts from two Chinese universities and a think-tank linked to China’s state-security ministry. China, they contend, should focus instead on preventing a military clash between North and South Korea, and on exploiting tensions between America and its Asian allies.
China‘s other concern is that Mr Trump might resume efforts to negotiate a deal with Mr Kim. Mr Trump met him three times in his first term and has publicly suggested a fourth meeting. Mr Kim said on September 21st that he was open to that, if America dropped denuclearisation demands. The chances of him giving up his nukes are even slimmer than before. Progress in its nuclear programme aside, North Korea fears relinquishing weapons that it believes can guarantee its regime’s survival. Even so, if the war in Ukraine ends any time soon, China fears being isolated as Russia and North Korea re-engage with America. On September 23rd Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, told the UN Security Council that China could force Russia to end the conflict if it wanted. (China counters that it is impartial on the war.)
Ultimately China’s efforts to build economic leverage with North Korea may not pay off. It struggled to influence North Korea even when it had more sway. Mr Kim well understands that China would never let his country collapse. Chinese leaders have tried in vain to encourage market-opening reforms, hoping that regional integration would reduce military tensions. And on the occasions when China applied more direct pressure, North Korea usually shrugged it off. In 2009 a Chinese deputy foreign minister likened North Korea to a “spoiled child” after it fired a rocket over Japan. A few weeks later, China publicly condemned a North Korean nuclear test.
It is not even clear that North Korea will reciprocate China’s efforts to expand connections across the border. In contrast to its effusive rhetoric towards Russia, North Korea sounded lukewarm in its statements on Mr Kim’s recent meeting with Mr Xi. China may have to offer benefits not just on trade “but on a larger political scale, because that’s what Russia is doing”, says Jenny Town of the Stimson Centre, an American think-tank. She suggests that Mr Kim may seek formal involvement in multilateral groupings involving China, such as the BRICS.
That might explain the lack of activity opposite Tumen when The Economist visited. The Chinese authorities suggest that the new facilities around the bridge will be finished by next year. At North Korea’s end, however, there were no signs of construction. Meanwhile, about 80 miles away, work has been under way since May at both ends of the first road bridge between Russia and North Korea. ■
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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