Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Only passions, great passions, can elevate the soul to great things."

– Denis Diderot

"Our power is our ability to decide."

– Buckminster Fuller

"People demand freedom of speech to make up for the freedom of thought which they avoid."

– Soren Kierkegaard

1. Japan Gets a New Leader Who Wants to Remake the U.S. Military Alliance

2. China’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Sank, Setting Back Its Military Modernization

3. Ukraine Defends Kharkiv by Going on Offense

4. On the Front Lines With Ukraine’s Killer Drone Pilot

5. How Israel’s Spies Got Blindsided by Hamas but Still Hit Hezbollah Hard

6. DoJ Notified of Suspected Faulty Welds on Subs, Aircraft Carriers at Newport News Shipbuilding

7. Exclusive/Australian and New Zealand warships entered the Taiwan Strait today. The People's Liberation Army sent five warships to monitor the entire process.

8. Japan joins patrols through Taiwan Strait - reports

9. Fears of Weakness in Water Cybersecurity Grow After Kansas Attack

10. U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine

11. Xi Jinping Is Prioritizing Political Survival Over Economic Prosperity

12. War Books: The Operational Level of War

13. The Fight for a New Israel

14. Zelensky makes urgent in-person plea to Biden and Harris who highlights her contrasting approach to Trump

15. The Big Five - 27 September edition by Mick Ryan

16. Special operations forces face hurdles to DOD program for civilian transition, report says

17. A Crisis of Competence

18. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 27, 2024

19. Strategic Options to De-escalate the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict

20. How Defense Experts Got Ukraine Wrong By Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien

21. Has the Third Lebanon War Begun?

22. Stanley McChrystal: Why Kamala Harris Has Won Me Over

1. Japan Gets a New Leader Who Wants to Remake the U.S. Military Alliance

This may not bode well for the alliance.

Excerpts:

Ishiba, by contrast, chafes at the asymmetrical aspects of the alliance. Japan hosts some 55,000 U.S. troops on its territory, shouldering 75% of the operating costs of U.S. bases. A treaty obligates the U.S. to come to Japan’s aid if Japan is attacked, but doesn’t require Japan to do the same.

“I don’t think Japan is a truly independent nation yet,” Ishiba said in a book published in August.

During the campaign, Ishiba floated a number of ideas to redo the alliance. In a candidates’ debate in Okinawa, the southern island that hosts most of U.S. troops in Japan, he suggested that U.S. bases could be converted to joint U.S.-Japanese operations.

He has objected to treaty restrictions limiting Japan’s access to U.S. bases and equipment, such as when a U.S. military aircraft crashes in Japan.

...

In a 2018 interview with The Wall Street Journal, when Donald Trump was president, Ishiba said Japan would be ignored if it simply pledged total fealty to Washington.

“You don’t have to play golf with President Trump or go to Trump Tower. It’s important to make them think Japan is formidable and we need to have cards to play for a deal,” he said.

Japan Gets a New Leader Who Wants to Remake the U.S. Military Alliance

Former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, elected on fifth try, criticizes security treaty as unequal

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/japans-next-leader-shigeru-ishiba-pushes-to-remake-military-alliance-with-u-s-5da81109?mod=latest_headlines

By Peter Landers

Follow and Miho Inada

Sept. 27, 2024 2:42 am ET

Shigeru Ishiba narrowly won a vote in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to become party leader. Photo: Toru Hanai/Bloomberg News

TOKYO—Japan’s next leader will be a former defense minister who wants to reshape what he sees as an unequal alliance with the U.S., presaging possible tensions with Washington.

Shigeru Ishiba, 67 years old, narrowly won a vote in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on Friday to become party leader, and the LDP-controlled parliament will meet Tuesday to elect him prime minister.

Ishiba had lost four previous runs for the leadership and had said this would be his final try. In a crowded race with nine candidates, the maverick lawmaker rose to the top with promises to mend the ruling party’s image after financial scandals. He narrowly defeated economic security minister Sanae Takaichi, 63, who would have been Japan’s first female prime minister.

He enters office with Japan facing unprecedented security challenges including China’s fast-growing military, North Korean missile tests and an aggressive Russia that recently sent a plane into Japanese airspace.

“I will protect Japan,” Ishiba said at a news conference during his campaign. “Now is the time to use the experience I have accumulated over years to achieve this goal.”

Ishiba has objected to treaty restrictions limiting Japan’s access to U.S. bases and equipment. Photo: Toru Hanai/Bloomberg News

Although he is generally conservative and hawkish on defense, Ishiba represents a different strand of the LDP from the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the current leader, Fumio Kishida, who announced his departure in August. Abe and Kishida boosted defense spending and sought to deepen Japan’s alliance with the U.S. without changing its fundamental structure.

Ishiba, by contrast, chafes at the asymmetrical aspects of the alliance. Japan hosts some 55,000 U.S. troops on its territory, shouldering 75% of the operating costs of U.S. bases. A treaty obligates the U.S. to come to Japan’s aid if Japan is attacked, but doesn’t require Japan to do the same.

“I don’t think Japan is a truly independent nation yet,” Ishiba said in a book published in August.

During the campaign, Ishiba floated a number of ideas to redo the alliance. In a candidates’ debate in Okinawa, the southern island that hosts most of U.S. troops in Japan, he suggested that U.S. bases could be converted to joint U.S.-Japanese operations.

He has objected to treaty restrictions limiting Japan’s access to U.S. bases and equipment, such as when a U.S. military aircraft crashes in Japan.

Ishiba in 2018. Photo: Kentaro Takahashi/Bloomberg News

In his book, he proposed stationing Japanese troops permanently on U.S. soil, perhaps on the Pacific island of Guam, to make the alliance more equal. He also has advocated an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to boost deterrence against aggressors.

In a 2018 interview with The Wall Street Journal, when Donald Trump was president, Ishiba said Japan would be ignored if it simply pledged total fealty to Washington.

“You don’t have to play golf with President Trump or go to Trump Tower. It’s important to make them think Japan is formidable and we need to have cards to play for a deal,” he said.

Ishiba’s father was the governor of rural Tottori prefecture and later a member of parliament. His mother, a teacher, was a Christian, which is relatively unusual in Japan, and Ishiba was baptized when he was 18.

He entered politics under the influence of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, a friend of his father who taught the young Ishiba how to campaign. One of Tanaka’s lessons, according to Ishiba: You only get as many votes as the number of handshakes you exchange with voters.

Why Japan's Economy Is Stuck in the Past

China’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Sank, Setting Back Its Military Modernization

Pierside accident came as Beijing attempts to expand its navy

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-newest-nuclear-submarine-sank-setting-back-its-military-modernization-785b4d37?mod=search_trending_now_article_pos1

By Michael R. Gordon

Sept. 26, 2024 11:00 am ET

A satellite image of Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan, China, on June 13. Photo: Planet Labs PBC

WASHINGTON—China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank in the spring, a major setback for one of the country’s priority weapons programs, U.S. officials said.

The episode, which Chinese authorities scrambled to cover up and hasn’t previously been disclosed, occurred at a shipyard near Wuhan in late May or early June.

It comes as China has been pushing to expand its navy, including its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.

The Pentagon has cast China as its principal long-term “pacing challenge,” and U.S. officials say that Beijing has been using political and military pressure to try to coerce Taiwan, a separately governed island that Beijing claims as part of its territory.

China says its goal in building a world-class military is to deter aggression and safeguard its overseas interests. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Ukraine Defends Kharkiv by Going on Offense

The belated success shows the human cost of U.S. restrictions on the use of weapons against Russia.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/ukraine-defends-kharkiv-by-going-on-offense-human-cost-of-weapon-delays-774554f5?mod=latest_headl

By Jillian Kay Melchior

Sept. 26, 2024 5:08 pm ET

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(6 min)

A policeman inspects shelling damage in Kharkiv, Ukraine, May 26. Photo: sergey kozlov/Shutterstock

Kharkiv, Ukraine

Ukraine’s second-most-populous city is only 18 miles south of the Russian border. When the air-raid sirens go off, residents have at most a few minutes to race to shelter. Throughout the spring and summer, Russians launched between 30 and 60 strikes a day on Kharkiv oblast. In recent weeks that number has plummeted to three to five on most days and rarely more than 10, according to Oleh Syniehubov, head of the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration.

This partial respite offers a lesson for the West. By long restricting Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian territory using Western weapons, the U.S. effectively promoted an interception-only response to Russian aerial attacks. Ukraine, however, can’t keep its skies safe solely on the defensive. It has too little air-defense capability to shield its territory, and Russia is ramping up production of glide bombs and other weapons, in addition to getting drones and missiles from Iran and missiles from North Korea.

Kharkiv’s relative calm has come as Ukraine has shifted to the offensive on Russian territory along the northern front. Instead of merely trying to intercept the enemy’s arrows, it is trying to take out the archer with a series of attacks on missile launchers and weapons-storage facilities. Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region has further strained Moscow’s war resources and forced the Kremlin to make tough choices about how to use them.

That dynamic has changed fairly quickly. In May, the situation here looked bleak. As U.S. lawmakers slow-walked additional military aid, Russia took advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling arms and launched an offensive in Kharkiv. Washington’s weapons restrictions created a sanctuary for Moscow to attack with impunity. More than 320 civilians, including more than a dozen children, have died in the region this year, while more than 2,000 have been wounded, according to Mr. Syniehubov’s office.

Relief first arrived in late May, when the Biden administration allowed Ukraine to conduct short-range strikes on Russian territory. Days later, Ukraine took out four S-300 systems in Russia’s Belgorod oblast, north of Kharkiv. The Russians have repurposed these systems, typically used for air defenses, to conduct ground strikes against Ukraine, including in Kharkiv. “Undoubtedly, strikes on missile launch sites on the territory of Russia, including S-300 launch sites, create significant deficits for Russia and sharply weaken its logistical capabilities,” says Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The Russians were also “forced to move away their aviation with these glide bombs, and that was the main thrust of how they were attacking,” says Serhii Kuzan, head of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, a Kyiv think tank.

The scene of a shelling in Kharkiv, Ukraine, May 25. Photo: sergey kozlov/Shutterstock

In recent weeks Ukraine has also executed a series of strikes on weapons-storage facilities in Russia using domestically made weapons. An Aug. 3 attack on the Morozovsk airfield in Rostov hit a storehouse for glide bombs. On Aug. 24, Ukraine hit a depot in Russia’s Voronezh oblast that contained artillery and tank shells, surface-to-air missiles and other ammunition. A Sept. 7 strike, also on a storage facility in Voronezh, reportedly destroyed some North Korean ballistic missiles.

That was merely the beginning. On Sept. 18, Ukraine hit a storage facility near Toropets in Russia’s Tver oblast, creating a blast so big it registered on earthquake-monitoring systems. The head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center said Ukraine knocked out some 30,000 tons of munitions. That would “suggest the Ukrainian strike destroyed two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply,” the Institute for the Study of War noted. Ukraine followed this success on the night of Sept. 20 with additional strikes on Russian arsenals overnight that reportedly stored North Korean ballistic missiles, among other munitions, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

As Ukraine ramped up its attacks on weapons depots, it introduced another dilemma for Moscow with its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in early August. “We can see a big difference,” Vitalii Sarantsev, spokesperson for the Kharkiv Operational Tactical Group of Forces, says of the operation. The Institute for the Study of War has documented how Russia appears to be pulling some forces from the front in northern Kharkiv to Kursk. Russia has a border of about 600 miles with unoccupied Ukraine that it can no longer assume will be safe if left unprotected.

These Ukrainian moves have made Russia think more deliberately about where to conduct aerial attacks. Kharkiv’s respite comes as Moscow pummels Sumy, across from Kursk, and the eastern front, especially near Pokrovsk. But Russia is also unleashing glide bombs on its own territory in Kursk as it challenges Ukraine’s holdings there.

No one knows how long Kharkiv’s period of relative calm will last. The Russians still have “enough combat power” that “they can choose to prioritize almost any sector they want,” says Fred Kagan, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “But they’re increasingly facing trade-offs, whereas before, they were able to do everything.”

The U.S. can build on this momentum by removing restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Army Tactical Missile systems on Russian territory. The Institute for the Study of War last month documented “no fewer than 245” Russian targets that would be in range, including more weapons-storage facilities, as well as military bases, tank-repair facilities, logistics centers and other sites that support front-line operations. Kharkiv’s experience illustrates what a difference striking them could make.

Ms. Melchior is a London-based member of the Journal editorial board.

4. On the Front Lines With Ukraine’s Killer Drone Pilot

"Drones are the most important military invention since the bullet."

"It's changed all wars forever."

"We started making 10 drones per day."

"Now we make 100 drones per day"

A fascinating 13 minute video at the link: https://www.wsj.com/world/on-the-front-lines-with-ukraines-killer-drone-pilot-17a0d95d?mod=hp_lead_pos7

On the Front Lines With Ukraine’s Killer Drone Pilot

By Ben C. Solomon

Updated Sept. 27, 2024 12:02 am ET

On the Front Lines With Ukraine’s Killer Drone Pilot

How Israel’s Spies Got Blindsided by Hamas but Still Hit Hezbollah Hard

After dismissing signs of the looming Oct. 7 attacks, Israel now has the enemy it prepared for

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-israels-spies-got-blindsided-by-hamas-but-still-hit-hezbollah-hard-e630c176?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Rory Jones

Updated Sept. 27, 2024 12:03 am ET

Recent Israeli attacks in Lebanon have left Hezbollah reeling. Photo: Marwan Naamani/Zuma Press

A year ago, Israel suffered its worst-ever intelligence failure when Hamas launched a surprise attack, killing 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostages. Today, a wave of strikes against Hezbollah has Israel’s long-vaunted spies back on the front foot.

The turnaround reflects how Israel has invested its time and resources over the past two decades. Since fighting a war with Lebanon-based Hezbollah in 2006, Israel has rigorously prepared for another major conflict with the militant group—and potentially with its backer Iran.

Hamas, by contrast, was viewed as a far less potent threat. Even shortly before the Oct. 7 incursion from the Gaza Strip, top officials were dismissing signs of an impending attack. Last September, the Israeli military confidently characterized Gaza as being in a state of “stable instability,” and intelligence assessments concluded that Hamas had shifted its focus to stoking violence in the West Bank and wanted to limit the risk of direct Israeli retaliation.

“Much of our focus was on preparing for the confrontation with Hezbollah,” said Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and expert on the Lebanese militia. “We somewhat neglected the southern arena and the evolving situation with Hamas in Gaza.”

A series of Israeli attacks in Lebanon over the past two weeks have left Hezbollah reeling—shocked by Israel’s abilities to penetrate the group and struggling to close the gaps. Thousands of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies exploded virtually simultaneously on consecutive days last week, killing 37 and injuring around 3,000. Shortly afterward, an airstrike in Beirut killed a group of more than a dozen elite military leaders.

Lebanese at a coffee shop in Beirut watch a speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah this month. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ

Hezbollah’s security remains porous. On Tuesday, another Israeli airstrike in southern Beirut killed Hezbollah’s top missile commander.

The operations came almost two months after Israel demonstrated its penetration of Hezbollah by killing top commander Fuad Shukr, who had eluded the U.S. for four decades. He was killed by an airstrike on his apartment on the upper floors of a Beirut residential building, where he had been summoned by a phone call shortly before.

The intensified campaign by Israel’s foreign spy service, the Mossad, and military intelligence units devastated Hezbollah’s leadership and degraded its weapons arsenal. The country’s air force has followed up with a bombing campaign that hit more than 2,000 targets this week.

Israel’s military chief of staff said Wednesday that the stepped-up effort has been preparation for a ground invasion. The U.S. and its allies are pressing the two sides to pause the fighting, hoping to avoid war on another front or even a regional conflagration as the fighting in Gaza continues in its 12th month.

More than 600 people have been killed in this week’s strikes on Lebanon, and around 2,000 have been injured, the country’s health ministry says, adding to the heavy toll already in Gaza.

David Barnea, head of Israel’s foreign spy service, the Mossad, in Tel Aviv last year. Photo: Reuters

Israel’s success against Hezbollah compared with its failure regarding Hamas comes because the country’s security services are better at offense than defense, according to Avner Golov, a former senior director at Israel’s National Security Council who is now with MIND Israel, a national security advisory group.

“The core of Israeli security doctrine is to bring the war to the enemy,” Golov said. “With Gaza, it was totally different. We were surprised, so it was a failure.”

Israel has monitored the buildup of Hezbollah’s arsenal ever since the two sides signed a truce in 2006 after a monthlong war. At the time, many in Israel’s security establishment were disappointed with the army’s performance in the war, as it failed to significantly damage Hezbollah, which began rebuilding its position in the south.

The military, as a result, sought to better understand Hezbollah and throttle Iran’s military and financial support to the group, including via a campaign of airstrikes in Syria that became known as the “war between the wars.”

A 2006 funeral for an Israeli soldier who was killed while fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon. Photo: David Silverman/Getty Images

In Gaza, by contrast, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adopted a strategy of containing Hamas in recent years, thinking the Palestinian group was focused on governing Gaza and wasn’t interested in a war with Israel. The two sides had fought a series of short conflicts following Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, and the group’s leader in the enclave, Yahya Sinwar, appeared to be more interested in improving the economic conditions of the Palestinian people.

There were signs the U.S.-designated terrorist group was planning an attack, including military exercises that foreshadowed the ways it stormed into Israel on Oct. 7.

But Israel’s intelligence services discounted the exercises as saber-rattling for Hamas’s domestic audience. The military felt confident in the strength of the technologically advanced separation wall it had erected to divide Gaza from Israeli territory.

Gathering intelligence from human sources that might have warned of an attack had become more difficult after Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and turned it over to Palestinian control, said Uzi Shaya, a former Israeli intelligence official.

A demonstrator near a military base in southern Israel in July. Photo: ricardo moraes/Reuters

“The ability to create human intelligence in Gaza in a very dense and small area, in which everyone knows everyone, where a stranger pops immediately, makes life much more difficult,” Shaya said. Getting access to people in Lebanon or outside Lebanon connected to Hezbollah is easier, he said.

Feats of intelligence only go so far. Ultimately, Israel’s success against either group will be determined on the battlefield. In the tight confines of the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military has battered Hamas and laid waste to the urban landscape. It will face a different enemy in the hills of Lebanon.

Despite Israel’s long effort to degrade Hezbollah’s military buildup, the Lebanese militia managed to amass a vast arsenal it can deploy in a war. The group is now weighing how to respond to the series of devastating Israeli attacks. Hezbollah fired its first missile ever at the commercial capital of Tel Aviv on Wednesday, its boldest response yet, but it hasn’t come close to implementing all its capabilities.

Valensi, the senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, said there was a danger Israel’s recent successes leave it overconfident. Invading Lebanon with troops could give Hezbollah the opportunity to demonstrate its military advantage on the ground, she said.

“We saw how challenging and difficult it is to eliminate such a complex organization like Hamas,” she said. “Hezbollah is a different story.”

Write to Rory Jones at Rory.Jones@wsj.com

6. DoJ Notified of Suspected Faulty Welds on Subs, Aircraft Carriers at Newport News Shipbuilding

Oh no. Is someone conducting Unrestricted Warfare against us?

Excerpts:

Guertin told SECNAV and CNO the workers did not follow proper techniques to weld the suspect joints with an early indication that some of the welding errors were intentional. Based on the Newport News assessment of the welds, the shipyard notified the Department of Justice over the issue.

DoJ Notified of Suspected Faulty Welds on Subs, Aircraft Carriers at Newport News Shipbuilding - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · September 26, 2024

Newport News Shipbuilding on Feb. 19, 2024. HII Photo

Shipuilder Newport News Shipbuilding, Va., informed the Department of Justice of faulty welds that may have been made intentionally on non-critical components on in-service Navy submarines and aircraft carriers, USNI News has learned.

HII reported to the Navy that welds on new construction and in-service submarines and Ford-class aircraft carriers were made not following welding procedure, according to a Tuesday memo from Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Nickolas Guertin to Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti.

Guertin told SECNAV and CNO the workers did not follow proper techniques to weld the suspect joints with an early indication that some of the welding errors were intentional. Based on the Newport News assessment of the welds, the shipyard notified the Department of Justice over the issue.

Portions of Guertin’s memo were first circulated on social media sites on Thursday.

Newport News acknowledged their internal quality assurance systems discovered production problems in a Thursday statement to USNI News

“We recently discovered through internal reporting that the quality of some welds did not meet our high-quality standards. Upon this discovery, we took immediate action to communicate with our customers and regulators, investigate, determine root cause, bound these matters and insert immediate corrective actions to prevent any recurrence of these issues,” reads the statement.

“HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding is committed to building the highest-quality aircraft carriers and submarines for the U.S. Navy. We do not tolerate any conduct that compromises our company’s values and our mission of delivering ships that safeguard our nation and its sailors.”

The Navy acknowledged the ongoing look into the scope of the welding problem in a Thursday statement to USNI News.

“The Navy is aware of the issue and a thorough evaluation is underway to determine the scope. The safety of our Sailors and our ships is of paramount importance. We are working closely with industry partners to address this situation and will provide additional information when available,” reads the statement.

The Department of Justice did not immediately respond to a request for additional information from USNI News on Thursday on the probe into the welds.

Newport News is one of two nuclear shipyards in the U.S. The yard builds the Ford-class aircraft carriers and the bow and stern sections of the Virginia-class attack submarines and the Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines in cooperation with General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Shipbuilders across the country have been wrestling with ongoing workforce problems due in part to a green labor pool that was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · September 26, 2024

7. Exclusive/Australian and New Zealand warships entered the Taiwan Strait today. The People's Liberation Army sent five warships to monitor the entire process.

This is a Google translation of a Chinese language report from RW News.

Exclusive/Australian and New Zealand warships entered the Taiwan Strait today. The People's Liberation Army sent five warships to monitor the entire process.

https://rwnews.tw/article.php?news=17372&oref=d_brief_nl&utm

Australian and New Zealand warships entered the Taiwan Strait today, and the People's Liberation Army dispatched five warships to monitor the entire process. Take a look at the Australian Navy website.

A A A

2024-09-25 20:30

(Reporter Wang Jionghua/Taipei report) A missile destroyer of the Royal Australian Navy and the supply ship HMNZS Endeavor (A11) of the Royal New Zealand Navy entered the Taiwan Strait from north to south today (25th). The People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China sent five warships to The entire process of the pincer attack was monitored. This was also the first time that Australian and New Zealand warships passed through the Taiwan Strait in a fleet manner after the German warships passed through the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 22 years.

The German Navy "Baden-Wurttemberg" (F222, Baden-Wurttemberg) frigate fleet passed through the Taiwan Strait on the 14th of this month, and the AIS ship dynamic system was activated throughout the process, allowing the world to see it. However, this time Australia and New Zealand The warship is suspected to have not turned on its AIS, so it is impossible to accurately grasp its sailing speed and current position.

However, according to people familiar with the matter, the Royal Australian Navy's missile destroyer entered the northern entrance of the Taiwan Strait after noon today, and then entered the Taiwan Strait and sailed east of the center line of the strait. The People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China dispatched five warships early in the morning to sail along the center line of the strait. After the Royal New Zealand Navy warship entered the Taiwan Strait, five CCP warships surrounded the two Australian and New Zealand warships for close surveillance.

As the People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China has recently carried out intensive missile shooting and other training activities, the generals of the Ministry of National Defense emphasized that the national army uses joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods to closely control the situation.

8. Japan joins patrols through Taiwan Strait - reports

Japan joins patrols through Taiwan Strait - reports

BBC

Japan's government has declined to comment on the ship, citing military operation discretion.

But China on Thursday confirmed its military had responded to "the activities of a Japanese Self-Defence Force ship entering the Taiwan Strait".

"China is highly vigilant about the political intentions of Japan's actions and has lodged stern representations with Japan," foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said.

Chinese state newspaper Global Times, citing an unnamed source, said the Chinese military "conducted tracking and monitoring throughout [the vessels'] entire course and had the situation under control".

There has been an increase in patrols by the US and its allies to assert their freedom of navigation in the 180km (112-mile) Taiwan Strait.

Both the US and Taiwan say it is a key shipping and trade route through which about half of the global container fleet passes, and is part of international waters and is open to all naval vessels.

Beijing, which claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the strait, disagrees.

For decades the US Pacific fleet was the only foreign navy that regularly transited the strait. But recently, it was joined by Canada and Australia, Britain and France. Two weeks ago Germany sailed two navy ships through the strait for the first time in decades.

China's military accused Germany of increasing security risks by sailing though the strait on 13 September, but Berlin said it acted in accordance with international standards. It was the first time in 22 years for a German naval vessel to traverse the strait.

These transits are highly political and designed to show China that America and its allies do not accept Beijing’s claims.

For Japan, it is also another big step away from its long-held policy of not directly challenging China.

On Thursday, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary did not confirm details of the naval operation, but he said Japan felt a strong sense of crisis after repeated airspace violations by the Chinese military, which he said had occurred one after another over a short period of time.

Taiwan has not commented on the passage, but its defence ministry said on Wednesday that it saw a surge in the number of Chinese military planes operating around the island.

Bec Strating, an international relations professor at La Trobe University in Australia, said Japan's reported transit is "part of a broader pattern of greater naval presence by countries in and beyond Asia that are concerned about China's maritime assertions".

"Japan in particular has been dealing with China's 'grey zone' tactics in the East China Sea," she told AFP news agency.

Grey zone warfare tactics are aimed at weakening an adversary over a prolonged period of time, analysts say.

Last week, Beijing sent an aircraft carrier between two Japanese islands near Taiwan for the first time. In August, a Chinese spy plane flew inside Japan's airspace, prompting Tokyo to condemn the incursion as "utterly unacceptable" and a "serious violation of sovereignty".

The leaders of the Quad group of nations - Japan, Australia, India and the US - said last week that they would expand cooperation on maritime security to counter China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

BBC

9. Fears of Weakness in Water Cybersecurity Grow After Kansas Attack

At the risk of being both chicken little and the boy who cried wolf I will be the boy who cried: "Unrestricted Warfare."

Fears of Weakness in Water Cybersecurity Grow After Kansas Attack

White House plans a new push to boost cybersecurity in water sector after an aborted attempt last year

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fears-of-weakness-in-water-cybersecurity-grow-after-kansas-attack-67ca2dd2?mod=latest_headlines

By James Rundle

Sept. 26, 2024 4:41 pm ET|WSJ Pro

The security of water and wastewater systems across the U.S. has long been a concern for cybersecurity experts and government officials. Photo: Giannis Papanikos/Associated Press

A cyber event at the water plant serving Arkansas City, Kan., adds to growing concerns about the security of U.S. water facilities, as the White House mulls a second attempt at cyber regulations for the sector.

The Arkansas City facility switched to manual operations out of caution after detecting a “cybersecurity issue” Sunday. City manager Randy Frazer said the incident didn’t disrupt service and that the water supply remains unaffected. The city had a population of about 12,000 residents, according to the 2020 U.S. Census.

“Residents can rest assured that their drinking water is safe, and the city is operating under full control during this period,” he said in a statement. The city hasn’t released details on the nature or suspected origin of the attack, but said it is working with government authorities. Frazer didn’t respond to a request for further comment.

The White House has previously attempted to enforce security standards for water systems. The Environmental Protection Agency added cybersecurity assessments as part of its mandatory annual sanitary surveys in a March 2023 memorandum. The move, however, sparked an immediate backlash.

Industry lobby groups, along with the attorneys general of Iowa, Arkansas and Missouri, sued the agency, saying the effort would be onerous and expensive. An appellate court halted the new provisions in July of that year. The EPA withdrew them in October.

Anne Neuberger, deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, said the White House is still concerned about the lack of baseline security standards in water facilities.

“Water is the only sector where we’ve seen three different countries attack water facilities in the U.S.,” she said, speaking at the Billington CyberSecurity Summit in Washington, D.C., in early September, referring to cyberattacks on facilities attributed to Russia, Iran and China.

The U.S. government is working on a second attempt to tackle water security, Neuberger said.

The White House, in conjunction with the EPA, sent a joint letter to the governors of all 50 states earlier this year, asking for vulnerability assessments in water systems, she said. They have received around 40 responses, which the EPA has finished summarizing.

“We will be getting a briefing on what they’ve learned, so that we can build a national plan to really work on rapidly improving the cybersecurity of water systems across the country,” Neuberger said, adding that the White House is focusing on water systems serving 15,000 to 30,000 people and above.

The security of water and wastewater systems across the U.S. has long been a concern for cybersecurity experts and government officials. In May, the EPA issued an enforcement alert, warning that nation-state hackers were targeting water systems.

The screen of a device that was hacked at the Municipal Water Authority in Aliquippa, Pa., in November 2023. Associated Press

That alert followed multiple attacks on water facilities in November, including one in Aliquippa, Pa., in which hackers disabled a device that regulated water pressure in pumps at the Municipal Water Authority. Hackers also struck the North Texas Municipal Water District in November, but neither attack resulted in disruptions to the water supply for their respective areas. Officials later blamed the attacks on Iranian-backed hackers.

In February 2021, hackers breached systems at a water-treatment plant in Oldsmar, Fla., and briefly raised the amount of lye used to treat water to dangerous levels. An employee noticed the change and immediately reversed it, officials said.

Part of the problem with tackling water security is simply making the roughly 153,000 drinking water and 16,000 wastewater-treatment systems in the U.S. aware that they are targets, and that help is available. For instance, the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, a nonprofit that provides threat intelligence to the sector, has around 600 members. By contrast, the nonprofit Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which offers cyber threat intelligence and information within the financial services industry, has around 7,000 members.

“There are still so many small utilities out there, water and wastewater utilities, that we just don’t know and we just haven’t been able to reach,” said Jennifer Lyn Walker, director of infrastructure cyber defense at WaterISAC.

Write to James Rundle at james.rundle@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 27, 2024, print edition as 'Cyber Issue At Water Plant Adds To Concerns'.

10. U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine

The US national security "prime directive:" prevent escalation.

U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine

Intelligence agencies concluded that granting Ukraine’s request to use Western missiles against targets deep in Russia could prompt forceful retaliation while not fundamentally changing the course of the war.

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Ukrainian firefighters battled a blaze at an apartment building after a Russian bombardment in Kharkiv, Ukraine, last month. Ukraine is seeking permission from President Biden to use long-range missiles supplied by Western allies to strike targets deep inside Russia.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

By Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes

Reporting from Washington.

Sept. 26, 2024

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U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Russia is likely to retaliate with greater force against the United States and its coalition partners, possibly with lethal attacks, if they agree to give the Ukrainians permission to employ U.S., British and French-supplied long-range missiles for strikes deep inside Russia, U.S. officials said.

The intelligence assessment, which has not been previously reported, also plays down the effect that the long-range missiles will have on the course of the conflict because the Ukrainians currently have limited numbers of the weapons and it is unclear how many more, if any, the Western allies might provide.

The assessment highlights what intelligence analysts see as the potential risk and uncertain rewards of a high-stakes decision that now rests with President Biden, who met with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at the White House on Thursday.

The findings may help explain in part why the decision has been so difficult for Mr. Biden to make, and show the internal pressures on him to say no to Mr. Zelensky’s request. U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters and internal deliberations, said it remained unclear what Mr. Biden would decide to do.

Mr. Zelensky has publicly and privately lobbied for the authority to use the missiles to bring the war farther into Russia.

Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, has frequently employed threats to deter the United States and its coalition partners from providing more advanced weapons systems to the Ukrainians.

Critics of Mr. Biden and his advisers say they have been too easily intimidated by Mr. Putin’s hostile rhetoric, and they say that the administration’s incremental approach to arming the Ukrainians has disadvantaged them on the battlefield. Proponents of their approach say that it had largely been successful at averting a violent Russian response, though that may no longer be the case.

British leaders have been less risk averse. They have voiced support for allowing the Ukrainians to use the long-range missiles that they have supplied for strikes deep inside Russia, but they have been waiting for Mr. Biden to take a position on the matter before authorizing strikes since the potential Russian response could have implications for security for the coalition as a whole.

The intelligence assessment describes a range of possible Russian responses to a decision to allow long-range strikes using U.S. and European-supplied missiles — from stepped up acts of arson and sabotage targeting facilities in Europe, to potentially lethal attacks on U.S. and European military bases.

U.S. officials say the G.R.U., Russia’s military intelligence agency, has been responsible for most of the acts of sabotage in Europe that have taken place thus far. If Mr. Putin decides to expand the shadowy campaign in response to the use of U.S. and European missiles deep inside Russia, U.S. officials believe the Russians will continue to do so covertly, rather than conduct overt attacks on U.S. and European facilities and bases, to reduce the risk of a wider conflict.

Mr. Putin’s rhetoric has been especially bellicose in recent days in anticipation of a decision on long-range strikes, and at least some of Mr. Biden’s top advisers believe that he is likely to respond with lethal force if the decision goes Mr. Zelensky’s way.

A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment on the assessment. A spokeswoman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.

The United States and its coalition partners have provided the Ukrainians with three types of long-range missile systems — American-made Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as ATACMS; British-made Storm Shadow missiles; and French-supplied SCALP missiles.

Some of these missiles have already been used by the Ukrainians to strike Russian military targets in and around the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow annexed in 2014.

Those in the U.S. military and the Biden administration who support the Ukrainians’ use of the missiles for strikes up to 190 miles inside Russia say it would allow them to target more distant Russian bases and ammunition storehouses.

That would make it harder for Russia to supply its forces on the front lines inside Ukraine and potentially help the Ukrainians halt Russian advances. They say it would also demonstrate strong Western support for Ukraine at a moment of uncertainty about its prospects on the battlefield.

But in their assessment, U.S. intelligence agencies express doubt that, even if the Ukrainians were permitted to use the long-range missiles, they would have enough of them to alter the course of the conflict in a fundamental way.

Moreover, after the first strikes, they said, the Russians will likely relocate ammunition depots, command posts, attack helicopters and other vital battlefield functions out of range of the missiles.

At Mr. Biden’s direction, the U.S. military could provide more ATACMS (pronounced “attack ’ems”) to the Ukrainians. But officials say the U.S. military itself has a limited supply of the missiles and needs to keep a reserve for its own potential military needs.

Adam Entous is a Washington-based investigative reporter focused on national security and intelligence matters. More about Adam Entous

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 27, 2024, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks of Using Long-Range Missiles Against Russia. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

11. Xi Jinping Is Prioritizing Political Survival Over Economic Prosperity

Excerpt:

China’s economic struggles have continued through Xi’s crackdowns at home and increasingly aggressive stance toward Taiwan and the Philippines. Xi will continue to face trade-offs between his nation’s prosperity and his total control. Based on the recent signals, we should not expect changes in the PRC’s government, economic priorities, or foreign policy any time soon.

Xi Jinping Is Prioritizing Political Survival Over Economic Prosperity

China is missing out on growth because the Communist Party comes first.

By Raja Krishnamoorthi, a Democrat from Illinois and the ranking member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

Foreign Policy · by Raja Krishnamoorthi

Geopolitics
Economics
China

September 26, 2024, 4:42 PM

If the citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were asked, “Are you more hopeful for the future now than you were before Chairman Xi came to power?” the answer for most, if they were able to answer freely, would likely be a resounding “no.”

China’s economy is facing its gravest challenges since the Maoist era amid a collapse in public confidence. Growth has slowed, the unemployment rate is high, and the housing market is tumbling. But at the recent Third Plenum, a meeting of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials held roughly every five years and centered on economic policy, President Xi Jinping made clear that he has decided to stay the course and is doubling down on state control of the economy. At the same time, Xi has been baselessly claiming that the economic reform goals set at 2013’s Third Plenum were met.

Xi believes in the central role of the CCP in everything—including the economy. The CCP has taken an increasingly direct hand even in private businesses, and using this leverage, his government has pursued a policy of prioritizing the expansion of manufacturing capacity through massive subsidies, embracing an export-driven economy rather than one linked to expanding domestic consumption in China. With this excess capacity, Xi hopes to gain market share by driving foreign competitors out of business through dumping the subsidized goods below cost.

Xi’s plan has alarmed foreign political and business leaders while leaving the Chinese public and even local officials resigned to the fact that they have no ability to impact central policymaking. By doubling down on this policy, the Third Plenum crushed any lingering hope that the PRC would be able to break out of sputtering growth or address long-standing economic imbalances that leave it increasingly at odds with the rest of the world.

Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the CCP has maintained its power not only through force, but also through an implicit compact with its citizens that the party would deliver economic growth as long as its primacy remained unquestioned. With the current slowdown, the CCP is failing to uphold its end of that political bargain. Protests in China over labor issues and housing have become more frequent as the unemployment rate ticks up; meanwhile, the PRC has seen the largest exodus of high-net-worth individuals from the country in its history.

The path to strengthening the PRC’s economy and restoring confidence in increasingly skeptical Chinese consumers is clear: loosen the CCP’s political stranglehold over the economy, acknowledge the severe problems that China is facing, and offer a realistic plan for addressing the needs of the Chinese people. Instead, Xi has chosen to tighten his grip, consolidating powerful state-owned enterprises, elevating CCP ideology, ignoring the drivers of demand and consumption, and prioritizing his political control over China’s prosperity.

The Third Plenum painfully confirmed what we already know: The PRC under Xi lacks the ability to self-correct because Xi does not allow it. Xi’s centralization of power has minimized opportunities for expert dissent and public discourse, sharply curtailing considerations of alternative economic policies. The results of the Third Plenum made clear that Xi believes China’s economic policies are already on the right track and that better results will come when officials better implement his directives.

According to one recent analysis, party cadres and economists were demonstrably less willing to speak up and provide comments during this Third Plenum drafting process for the conference’s central “decision” policy document than they were at the Third Plenum held in 2013. Xi was also less willing to listen. According to the Asia Society Policy Institute, there were 25 percent fewer written suggestions submitted for the text by cadres during this year’s session than in 2013, and of those suggestions, only a meager 12 percent were accepted in the final document as 88 percent were rejected.

One of China’s most loyal “wolf warriors” and CCP propaganda insiders, former Global Times editor Hu Xijin, was recently banned from Chinese social media for incorrectly interpreting the Third Plenum decision as signaling more support for the private sector. In this environment, why would any official stick their neck out to propose significant reform, no matter how necessary they believed it to be?

Xi believes that China must dominate the advanced technologies of the future, and he remains committed to that priority, even as it comes at the expense of the public good. In Xi’s economic vision, social welfare programs, which would decrease the current trend of Chinese people saving more than a third of their income, would divert resources away from the PRC’s pursuit of technological dominance that would support its military capacity.

In Xi’s worldview, national security is based on political security, which means the security of the party. As an unfortunate result, we should expect the CCP’s grip to tighten. Xi will continue to view the economy through the lens of national security even at the expense of the PRC’s sagging economy and the wealth of its people. It also means that Xi will double down on nationalism, censorship of discontent, and international bellicosity to distract from domestic challenges.

China’s economic struggles have continued through Xi’s crackdowns at home and increasingly aggressive stance toward Taiwan and the Philippines. Xi will continue to face trade-offs between his nation’s prosperity and his total control. Based on the recent signals, we should not expect changes in the PRC’s government, economic priorities, or foreign policy any time soon.

Foreign Policy · by Raja Krishnamoorthi

12. War Books: The Operational Level of War

War Books: The Operational Level of War - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kevin Benson

Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

This week’s installment comes from Kevin Benson, a retired US Army colonel and former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies who was the Coalition Forces Land Component Command J5 (Plans) at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We gave him the following prompt: What books would you recommend for readers who want to better understand the operational level of war, where tactics and strategy meet? Kevin originally compiled this list for us in 2023, but we’re highlighting it again and taking the opportunity to introduce his newly published book, Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War, one of the most readable descriptions available of real-world military planning at the operational level of war.

The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age, edited by Hal Brands (2023)

A truly superb new generation of this famous work carries on in the grand tradition of previous editions. Brands assembled a stellar group of scholars who also have experience in the art of policy, strategy, and operational art. This new edition is a must-read for policymakers, strategists and professional soldiers. Sound strategy is the first step toward the execution of operational art.

War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory, by Nadia Schadlow (2017)

Schadlow’s book is a tour de force, featuring case studies of how combat success was and was not consolidated into political victory. Schadlow highlights what she calls the “American Denial Syndrome,” wherein Americans do not learn from the past. Operational art ties tactical successes to policy objectives and Schadlow’s book will illuminate this path.

The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, by General Rupert Smith (2007)

Rupert Smith reinforces the vital requirement that the use of force must be placed within the correct political context. Policymakers and commanders must remain engaged as the situation will change and conditions will demand altering the means and ways to achieve the desired ends. The ends might even change as the situation changes. A superb book that remains relevant today.

Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945, by Field Marshal Sir William Slim (1956)

This is one of the finest senior commander memoirs of World War II. Slim acknowledges errors he made in planning and execution, all while ensuring his actions are viewed in the context of the time. His description of the vital requirement for a commander to write his own intent and ensure it is understandable is brilliant. Slim commanded at the operational level of war.

Command Missions: A Personal Story, by Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr (1954)

This volume is by far the finest memoir written by an American field commander from World War II. Truscott had never been in battle before he went to North Africa. He details his personal study, how time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted, and how he built the 3rd Infantry Division into a superb fighting division. This is a book about how a leader evolves and operates at each level from task force, division, corps, and field army.

Kevin Benson, PhD, is a retired US Army colonel who commanded from company to battalion level and served as a general staff officer from corps to field army. He was the CFLCC J5 (Plans) at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the director of the School of Advanced Military Studies.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Pfc. Katelyn Myers, US Army

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kevin Benson

13. The Fight for a New Israel

Excerpts:

The consequences of not doing so could be dire. If Israel chooses to remain on its current path of conquest and annexation and commits itself to opposing Palestinian statehood—as Netanyahu repeatedly has done—it will consummate the destruction of Israel as a democratic state. It will face the de facto incorporation of millions of noncitizen Palestinians under Israeli rule; and in such a scenario, it would never be able to recognize this huge population, because it would pose a threat to Israel’s Jewish identity. (At present, an approximately equal number of Jews and Palestinians—seven million each—live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.)

Such an outcome will affect every Israeli citizen and subject. To avoid international isolation, Israel will increasingly rely on authoritarian and nondemocratic states, and on nondemocratic forces within the United States. Israel will find it difficult to retain the support of longtime democratic allies. Already, numerous key Western partners have constrained weapons exports to Israel over the past year, including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy—Israel’s third-largest arms supplier. The United States itself has delayed shipments. If Israel no longer manifests the “shared values” that have notionally bound it to the liberal democratic order, pressure on Western governments to limit their aid to Israel will deepen.

After a decade in which populism has surged all over the world, it has become clear how easy it is for political leaders to undermine democratic norms in service of their own pursuits of power, especially during large-scale wars. Democracy must always be defensive, but first it must be built. Israel must end the war and start building.

The Fight for a New Israel

To End the War and Build a Lasting Peace, the Country Must Reinvent Its Own Democracy

By Dahlia Scheindlin

November/December 2024

Foreign Affairs · by The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled · September 27, 2024

In late July 2024, Israel experienced one of the biggest shocks to law and order in its history. For several hours, dozens of Israeli protesters were able to infiltrate two military compounds largely unimpeded, starting with Sde Teiman, a recently established base in the Negev desert where thousands of Palestinian detainees have been held since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack. For months, journalists and nongovernmental organizations had reported systematic abuses at the base, and on July 29, Israel’s military police detained ten Israeli reservists on suspicion of raping one of the prisoners. But the protesters, among them several far-right elected officials who are members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, were not decrying the mistreatment of Palestinians. They were furious that the military was taking such a step against its own, and were trying to block the arrests.

Although the riots at Sde Teiman and Beit Lid, the base where the suspects were taken, were unusual in their extremity, they were not isolated events. Since the war in Gaza began, there have been proliferating signs that Israel’s institutions of state are under severe stress. Netanyahu has ignored repeated warnings from Israel’s attorney general that his government’s actions have violated the law; in response, government ministers have called for the attorney general’s dismissal. Israel’s legal system is in disarray. For over a year, the government held up dozens of judicial appointments, including on Israel’s Supreme Court; and in September, Netanyahu’s justice minister escalated his efforts to stymie the appointment of a chief justice to the Supreme Court, even defying a court order requiring that the position be filled.

Israeli law enforcement has become highly erratic. The murder rate among Israel’s Arab community has more than doubled under the current government, largely because of organized crime, yet in 2023, only 17 percent of such murders were solved. Even worse is the situation in the West Bank: despite soaring attacks by settlers against Palestinians, the state is now detaining only a quarter of the number of Jewish suspects it did in 2022. The Israeli military—which is responsible for enforcing the law in occupied territories—has ignored or even participated in the violence.

At first glance, this accelerating lawlessness, including from Israel’s own government, may appear to reflect the extraordinary pressures of a country mired in the longest and most challenging war since the war of independence. As of late September, Israel was not only continuing its year-old, devastating war against Hamas in Gaza amid dimming prospects for more than one hundred Israeli hostages still held there. It was also embarking on a precipitous escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, even as it confronted growing threats from the Houthis in Yemen, militants in the West Bank, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and from Iran itself.

But the assault on Israel’s institutions began long before October 7, 2023. At the time of Hamas’s attack, Israel had been racked for months by a huge protest movement that aimed to stop the Netanyahu government’s sweeping effort to weaken judicial independence. This plan was crafted to allow the ruling coalition to fill the courts and other key civil offices with ideologically aligned justices and political loyalists. Along with consolidating its own power, the government was seeking to institutionalize higher status for Jewish citizens and strengthen the influence of Jewish religion in public and private life. But perhaps above all, the reforms were designed to give the government unfettered power to extend sovereignty—a euphemism for annexation—over the West Bank, a longtime goal of Israel’s far right.

A Palestinian woman inspecting a vehicle destroyed by Israeli settlers, near Qalqilya in the West Bank, August 2024

Raneen Sawafta / Reuters

When Israelis began protesting the judicial overhaul in January 2023, they were stunned by the government’s extreme plans and blatant power grab. But they were at least as shocked to realize that Israel’s institutional checks and balances were so vulnerable, or even absent, a problem that stems directly from the country’s incomplete democratic foundations. Foremost is the lack of a constitution. Despite repeated attempts since the country’s founding, Israel has consistently failed to adopt a formal constitution that defines the balance of powers and a complete bill of rights that guarantees fundamental human rights, civil liberties, and the equality of all citizens. Instead, it has relied on piecemeal legislation, court rulings, and ad hoc arrangements that have evolved through custom or committee. The country has only the most tenuous human rights legislation, anchored in hotly contested laws passed in the early 1990s. As recently as 2018, a controversial law gave Jews alone the right to self-determination in Israel. Unlike with almost any other democracy in the world, many of the country’s borders are not concretely defined. Israel also maintains control over millions of Palestinians who have few basic rights.

For decades, various Israeli lawmakers—along with generations of legal scholars—have recognized the core defects in Israel’s democratic foundations and have sought to address them through a constitutional process. It has also long been acknowledged that Israel faces a growing crisis of legitimacy as a result of its occupation of Palestinian lands and control of a large population of noncitizens, policies that the International Court of Justice has ruled illegal. Today, the problem is intensified by the devastating human cost of Israel’s war in Gaza. Yet even now, Israelis tend to treat these two issues—the country’s lack of constitutional order and its ongoing military occupation of Palestinian people and territories—as wholly separate phenomena. In reality, they are inseparable: it is Israel’s weak or missing democratic foundations that have enabled successive Israeli administrations to pursue and continually expand the occupation.

Throughout a terrible year of war, many observers have urged Israel to make clear its endpoint for the conflict and how Palestinians will be able to govern themselves in the future. If Israel wants to avoid a long-term reoccupation of Gaza and perpetual violence in the West Bank, it will need a comprehensive strategy for unified Palestinian self-governance in both territories, ideally statehood. But lost in this discussion is what will be required of Israel’s own political culture and institutions to ensure lasting peace. Israel must work toward its own “day after,” and that day will never arrive unless the country addresses the constitutional vacuum at its core.

ABSENT AT THE CREATION

Israel’s founders did not originally intend for the country to have no constitution. In November 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, known as the partition plan, required the future Jewish and Arab states to adopt strong democratic constitutions, and Zionist leaders began crafting one. Early drafts show that the founders were intimately aware of the elements necessary to make the country a full democracy, including establishing the equality of all citizens, formulating a bill of rights, and setting down a clear constitutional order defining the powers of the branches of government.

But following the declaration of independence, in May 1948, Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, came to oppose the idea. Among various considerations, he worried about limiting his party’s powers in government and alienating religious parties who rejected secular civic principles. He also may have been concerned about offering equal rights to all Arabs who remained after independence, since he viewed them as a potential threat to Israeli security and an obstacle to building a state for the Jewish population, including through the dispossession of Arab land and property. Whatever the reason, the failure to adopt a constitution meant that Israel lacked binding legal foundations for core components of democratic statehood.

Israeli police clashing with ultra-Orthodox protesters at a military recruitment center in Ramat Gan, Israel, August 2024

Ricardo Moraes / Reuters

For one thing, apart from its border with Egypt, established in the 1978 Camp David accords, Israel has never defined the limits of its sovereign territory. (Although Israel established borders with Jordan in 1994, they do not determine the status of the West Bank.) As a result, it is often unclear where Israeli laws do or do not apply. During the war of independence, the new state conquered territories that extended well beyond those allotted to it in the UN partition plan; Israel’s sovereignty in these areas was eventually recognized by internationally brokered armistice agreements in 1949. But any division of the former British mandate of Palestine was complicated by Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state at all, as well as the Zionist vision of a Jewish state that would cover the entire land. The 1949 armistice lines, also known as the Green Line, were never formalized into Israeli law.

Following Israel’s sweeping victory in the 1967 war—the Israeli army defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and occupied the West Bank along with East Jerusalem, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights—the lack of a finite eastern border provided fuel to those who hoped to incorporate these conquests. In the wake of that war, Israel also showed a proclivity for expansionism, annexing East Jerusalem and eventually the Golan Heights, and allowing the settlement movement to spread throughout all occupied lands. (Israel eventually returned the Sinai to Egypt, and dismantled settlements there, as it did later in Gaza.)

Israel also was slow to define its body politic. At the time of Israeli independence, some 750,000 indigenous Arab Palestinians had been expelled or else fled from areas that became part of the new state. But about 150,000 remained, making up some 15 percent of Israel’s population. In the absence of a constitution, bill of rights, or even a formal citizenship law, this group had ambiguous status, and the Israeli government developed contradictory approaches to it. For example, the new state adopted a then progressive policy of universal suffrage, including for Palestinians in Israel. But it also placed most of their communities under direct military rule, which was enforced through colonial emergency regulations rather than through Israeli law. That approach lasted virtually until the 1967 war, after which Arab Israelis fell under civilian law. But at that point, the state once again established a military regime over nearly a million Palestinians in newly conquered territories, creating, under the pretext of temporary occupation, a huge category of noncitizen subjects. Over time, Israeli control over this population became increasingly entrenched, mitigated only marginally by the limited local autonomy established in the 1993 Oslo accords.

From the outset, Israel’s leaders sought to ensure that the country maintained a clear Jewish majority. Thus, the government declined to enact a citizenship law until it had safeguarded unlimited Jewish immigration to the new state. Israel passed the Law of Return in 1950, granting any Jew in the world the right to immigrate to Israel and facilitating a massive growth of the Jewish population. Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, didn’t proceed with a citizenship law until two years later; even then, citizenship rights for those not covered by the Law of Return—that is, non-Jews—were still limited, and many Palestinians in Israel could become citizens only by waging a legal battle.

Ever since its founding, Israel has lacked core components of democratic statehood.

Yet another missing element in Israel’s democratic foundations was a formal guarantee of equality. To this day, there is no explicit guarantee of equality for all citizens in Israeli law. Although Israel’s declaration of independence calls for such equality, the legal status of that document has long been disputed. Moreover, because of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, the usual democratic separation of religion and state is a nonstarter: the state will not commit to secular sources of law or authority, because with few and highly limited exceptions, Israeli leaders have rejected the possibility of Arab parties joining a government. This has created a dependence on small Jewish religious political parties to reach coalition majorities. These parties have always demanded an expansive role for religion in state institutions; they have also blocked attempts to impose equal duties, such as universal military service, on all citizens.

To some degree, Israel has sought to compensate for a missing constitution with its Basic Laws, a system that was introduced in 1950. But these laws, which have been adopted incrementally over time, are not formally defined, and most of them can be amended or annulled by a plurality of votes in the Knesset, just like any other law. At present, out of 13 Basic Laws, four are “entrenched”—meaning that they require an absolute majority in the Knesset to change them; two more require a two-thirds supermajority to change certain articles.

As a result of this history, Israeli democracy rests on legal and constitutional foundations that are surprisingly weak and readily subject to modification. In the late twentieth century, the risks posed to the state by these vulnerabilities were less apparent. Despite the government’s expansion of a fundamentally undemocratic occupation regime after 1967, democracy for Israeli citizens improved for several decades. But starting in the early years of this century, as the Oslo peace process unraveled and violence flared again, democratic progress stagnated, then declined. Since the 2010s, successive Israeli governments have actively chipped away at the country’s tenuous institutional framework in order to advance an exclusivist, expansionist, and increasingly antidemocratic Zionist state.

THE WAR ON THE JUDICIARY

At the center of the current struggle for control over Israel’s institutions is its judiciary. For most of the decade and a half since Netanyahu’s second election as prime minister (he first served in the late 1990s) in 2009, lawmakers and ministers from his Likud Party and allied parties on the right have been arguing that the courts have too much power and that the executive and the Knesset need more authority. This campaign was inspired in part by the emergence in the 1990s of a more activist Supreme Court, which many conservatives argued would, in promoting a liberal democratic vision of the state, threaten Jewish identity and the will of the majority.

For example, the Knesset passed two Basic Laws in 1992 that guaranteed partial individual rights. The Supreme Court interpreted these rules as conferring on it the right to judicial review of future legislation, although lawmakers themselves were divided on the matter. As a result, citizens demanding greater protections, progress on gender equality, rights for sexual minorities, and revocation of the ultra-Orthodox draft exemption—as well as those seeking to challenge Israel’s harsh occupation policies in the West Bank—increasingly turned to the Supreme Court.

In the years that followed, the court issued numerous rulings that established greater protections from religious coercion, increased gender parity and media freedoms, and upheld other liberal values. It also made a few decisions restricting individual settlements or occupation practices that violated individual Palestinian rights, although it hardly ever intervened against the government’s overall occupation regime. Nonetheless, right-wing factions began to view the court as an obstacle to their Jewish religious agenda and to settlement expansion. They were particularly infuriated when the court declined to block the government’s decision to dismantle Israeli settlements in Gaza in 2005.

Israelis protesting an investigation of abuse of Palestinians at Sde Teiman military base, Israel, July 2024

Amir Cohen / Reuters

And so in the decade after Netanyahu’s return to power, an increasingly right-wing majority in the Knesset began advancing a slew of illiberal laws aimed at eroding civil liberties and human rights and entrenching the occupation. In 2011, the Knesset passed a law against political boycotts; in 2014, it added a Basic Law requiring a referendum for Israel to withdraw from any territory—including areas Israel had annexed in violation of international law, such as East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights. The Knesset also extended a 2002 law imposing bureaucratic hurdles on Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens, effectively threatening them with family separations that most Jews would never encounter. It also passed laws targeting the foreign funding of human rights groups documenting occupation-related violations of Palestinian rights—seeking to tarnish them as foreign agents—and other legislation aimed at encroaching on civil rights.

Knowing that citizens would challenge these laws before the Supreme Court, right-wing leaders and influential allies in the public sphere began to make direct rhetorical assaults on the court itself. They accused it of advancing elite interests; spreading secular, universalist values; and trampling the will of the people by tying the hands of the elected right-wing government. The court was regularly accused of privileging the rights of Palestinians over the interests of Israeli security, even though its decisions upholding Palestinian rights were extremely limited and it allowed the settlements and other occupation policies to go forward. After becoming justice minister in 2015, Ayelet Shaked, a member of the right-wing Jewish Home party, advocated a series of policies and legislative efforts to weaken the judiciary, including giving the Knesset the power to override Supreme Court rulings. The leader of her Jewish Home party was Naftali Bennett, who, in the 2013 Knesset elections, campaigned on annexing a large portion of the West Bank. Having served as prime minister briefly in 2021–22, Bennett is currently seen as one of the leading contenders to succeed Netanyahu.

As Netanyahu continued to win elections—in 2009, 2013, and 2015—Israel’s religious right began to call more openly for annexation of the West Bank. In 2017, the Knesset passed legislation legalizing unofficial West Bank outposts that even Israeli law did not recognize. (All settlements are illegal under international law.) The following year, the Knesset passed the “nation-state law,” a new Basic Law defining Israel as a state in which Jews alone have the right to self-determination and supporting Jewish settlements. The legislation created a formal legal basis for discriminating against non-Jews and demoted the status of the Arab language, which until then had been an official language in Israel. Finally, in the course of 2019 and 2020, Netanyahu made public his plans to gradually annex the West Bank, beginning with specific parts. The prime minister and his political allies did not reveal what they intend to do about the tens or even hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in those lands. If Israel prevents Palestinians in annexed areas from gaining citizenship and forces them to remain merely subjects without rights, it would be openly embracing the status of an apartheid state.

An overarching goal of Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul is to advance annexation.

The Supreme Court struck down some of these efforts, including the law to legalize settlement outposts, as well as several government attempts to formalize the military exemption long claimed by large numbers of ultra-Orthodox Jews, a step aimed at buying the Orthodox parties’ loyalty. The court rejected challenges to the 2018 nation-state law; nonetheless, leaders of Israel’s right wing were incensed by the court’s willingness to even entertain such challenges, and they continued their attack on the judiciary.

By late 2019, Netanyahu’s political allies were also seeking to fight his indictment on corruption charges, which led to the opening of a trial against him in a Jerusalem district court the following year. To do so, they needed to further delegitimize the proceedings and the courts overall. They sought, furthermore, to weaken the powers of the attorney general and appoint amenable Supreme Court justices, likely hoping they would strike down relevant legal challenges to Netanyahu’s government—such as his ability to serve under indictment—or rule favorably on future appeals in the corruption case. (As of late September 2024, the trial was ongoing, and defense testimonies, including by Netanyahu, are scheduled to begin in December.) By June 2021, Netanyahu was out of power, having failed to secure a coalition majority in repeated elections. Finally, in late 2022, Netanyahu was able to engineer a return to power by allying with two ultra-Orthodox parties and two ultranationalist, messianic right-wing parties that openly supported the full annexation of the West Bank. Now, Netanyahu saw an opportunity to push through some of the larger plans of the Israeli right and strengthen his grip on the country.

LESS LAW, MORE LAND

Launched in January 2023, the Netanyahu government’s plan to overhaul the judiciary was the culmination of the Israeli right’s long attempts to remove democratic constraints on its power. Among other changes, it aimed to gouge out judicial review, engineer the selection of judges to ensure that courts would be friendly to the ruling coalition’s ideology, and turn professional legal ministerial advisers into political loyalists. The overarching goal was to make sure that the government had as little institutional resistance as possible to its efforts to crack down on Palestinian citizens, civil society, media freedom, and the opposition; stifle left-wing, anti-occupation activism; and advance annexation. Most courts would assess these deeply illiberal policies as violating basic democratic principles.

The plan immediately set off mass protests that quickly evolved into a titanic clash between the government and a large segment of the Israeli population. The ruling coalition insisted that it could not implement the voters’ will because of the decisions of an unelected judiciary. But for the hundreds of thousands of Israelis who took to the streets, Israel’s independent courts were the only things protecting them from the government’s efforts to advance theocratic and Jewish supremacist values, slash individual rights and freedoms, annex occupied territories, and institutionalize corruption. The protests drew a very large cross-section of society, including community and business leaders, doctors and mental health professionals, workers in high-tech industries, scholars, and teachers.

More critically, groups of military reservists, on which the Israel Defense Forces relies to a great extent, threatened that they would refuse to report for duty, sparking deep concerns within the Israeli security establishment. Yoav Gallant, Netanyahu’s own defense minister, called on the government to pause the legislation out of security concerns, and Netanyahu nearly dismissed him. But the government pressed ahead, pushing through one key part of the reform in July 2023, as massive protests continued. By this point, Israelis had begun to recognize how weak their country’s democracy was and were demanding stronger foundations.

Israelis demonstrating against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's judicial plan, Tel Aviv, September 2023

Ilan Rosenberg / Reuters

Yet the vast majority of those taking part declined to protest the government’s plan to expand the occupation and advance annexation of the West Bank; save for small clusters of anti-occupation activists, protesters insisted that this was a separate issue from the judicial takeover. They failed to see that Israel’s ambiguous relationship with democratic values and rules, going back decades, had enabled the occupation and the conflict all along, or that it was setting the stage for a disastrous new war.

In the months after Hamas’s October 7 attack, Netanyahu was given an opportunity. At first, the war stopped the protest movement in its tracks, allowing the government to pursue many of its antidemocratic plans with far less scrutiny. Overnight, groups that had helped organize the democracy protests in 2023 shifted from criticizing the government to distributing basic supplies—including cooked meals, clothing, and toiletries—to those in need. The government, for its part, lagged badly in providing these emergency services but wasted no time pushing through its broader program of consolidating power by eroding civil liberties and installing political loyalists in less-visible professional and technical levels of government. Meanwhile, it ramped up its plans to annex occupied territories, accelerating settlement expansion and virtually ceasing to enforce the law against Israelis living in the occupied territories. Given free rein, settlers in the West Bank became increasingly violent toward Palestinians, culminating in several pogrom-like attacks on Palestinian villages.

For most Israelis, the growing lawlessness in occupied areas is a secondary concern. Yet as the war has ground on, many have become disillusioned by the government’s inability to address their core concerns or even to ensure national security, and a large majority now fear that the conflict in Gaza could spread to the West Bank. At present, the sources of public discontent include the security and intelligence failures that allowed the Hamas attack to happen, the failure to return Israeli hostages from Gaza, and the failure to make clear how the war in Gaza will end—although most Israeli Jews believe the war was eminently justified. Many also blame the government for not securing Israel’s northern border with Lebanon so that tens of thousands of displaced civilians can return, a situation that has become all the more volatile since Israel’s dramatic confrontation with Hezbollah began in September.

Moreover, a clear majority of Israelis now believe the government’s behavior to be driven primarily by Netanyahu’s personal stake in remaining in power. In a June 2024 survey by Israel’s N12 news channel, for example, 56 percent of respondents agreed that Netanyahu’s reluctance to reach a hostage-release deal was driven by political interests. A July poll by the same organization found that 54 percent of Israelis thought Netanyahu’s political considerations were behind the continued fighting in Gaza; and a September N12 poll found that 63 percent believed Netanyahu’s threat to replace his defense minister was driven by political considerations rather than for the good of the state. Through much of the first nine months of 2024, a majority of Israelis said they wanted the government to accept a hostage deal, knowing this would entail a cease-fire—steps that the government continually refused to take.

Israelis were shocked that their government’s checks and balances were so vulnerable, or even absent.

Anger at the government has pushed Israelis back onto the streets for huge demonstrations. Surveys regularly indicate that approximately 70 percent of Israelis want Netanyahu to resign; his current coalition has failed to draw majority support in any survey since early 2023, shortly after its inauguration. Many Israelis are demanding new elections. In a poll in May, the Israeli Democracy Institute found that just 29 percent of Israelis were optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, its lowest such finding ever; in August, the figure inched up but remained at a still dismal 36 percent.

Israel’s democracy crisis cannot be solved by elections alone. The war was ignited from Gaza, a territory that is central to Israel’s strategy of occupation and its division and control of Palestinians. For the sake of continuing and expanding that control, the current government is willing to dismantle Israel’s independent judiciary and further undermine the country’s institutions. By setting out to claim full and exclusive Jewish sovereignty over all the land—including what Netanyahu euphemistically refers to as an ongoing security presence in Gaza—the government is seeking to impose a messianic, theocratic vision of territorial expansion and to formally codify Jewish supremacy. Permanent military occupation has become an inseparable part of the state itself.

ISRAEL REINVENTED

Amid one of the worst regional crises in decades, prospects for democratic renewal in Israel may seem more remote than ever. After all, for more than three-quarters of a century, Israel has been unable to formally commit itself to key democratic principles, even when it wasn’t involved in a dangerous multifront war. But the country’s democratic institutions are under greater threat than at any previous moment in history, and a growing number of Israelis seem to recognize this. Picking up from the extraordinary 2023 protest movement, Israelis have an opportunity to lay down fresh, and genuinely democratic, foundations when the war ends.

To start with, the country needs fixed borders, a government that is committed to full democracy, and a legal system that reflects both Jewish self-determination and true commitment to equality for all citizens. And Israelis must finally adopt a full bill of rights. Such a step is not a fantasy: the writers of a future constitution can draw on numerous drafts of such a concept, painstakingly developed by Israeli lawmakers and civil society figures over many decades but never enacted. Most urgent are crucial rights that are still missing from Israel’s Basic Laws, such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, and due process. These universal rights must be formally legislated for all Israeli citizens.

Protesters demanding an investigation of Israeli failures leading to the October 7 attack, southern Israel, July 2024

Ricardo Moraes / Reuters

An Israeli constitution must also face the sensitive task of addressing the collective identity of Palestinian citizens, who constitute the country’s largest non-Jewish minority. Numerous democratic nation-states, including North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Spain, have constitutions that recognize ethnic or national minorities within their citizenries and acknowledge their equality. Israel can adopt collective minority rights—by way of cultural, linguistic, or even national recognition—without forgoing the Jewish character of the state. Indeed, the Jewish state must be compatible with universal democratic standards so as to ensure civic equality between Jews and non-Jews—and to establish equality between religious and secular Jews, as well.

Of course, building these pillars in the immediate wake of a violent and prolonged conflict will be extremely difficult. But as the examples of other war-riven societies have shown, a constitutional process can itself provide crucial anchors for a more durable peace. Indeed, for Israel, any serious constitutional effort must include Palestinians—both those who are its own citizens and those who are now under Israeli occupation. Effectively conceived, such a constitution-building effort could thus spur a broader peace process based on Palestinians’ self-determination in a state of their own. Ultimately, the two states would then define the border between them—ideally along the Green Line, and preferably in a confederated arrangement that allows for freedom of movement and residency, and in which residents remain citizens only of their nation-state.

For now, any large-scale constitutional process, let alone a two-state solution, may appear far-fetched. But once a cease-fire is finally reached in Gaza or Lebanon, and new Israeli elections are held, the horizon for change might look different, even to Israel’s own leaders. After all, in 2023, hundreds of thousands of Israelis recognized that the ills of the Netanyahu government could not be addressed simply by toppling that government. Instead, they looked deeper, to Israel’s roots. At demonstrations, they broadcast the recording of Ben-Gurion reading the declaration of independence in 1948. Protesters chanted, “We won’t stop until there’s a constitution.” Legal scholars offered public lectures and circulated short, readable explanations of such concepts as judicial review, the evolution and merits of Israel’s judicial-appointment system, and the obscure “reasonability” grounds that the Supreme Court has used to review executive action, particularly the political appointments of figures suspected of corruption. The law passed in July 2023 would have limited the court’s ability to do so, but the court struck down the law in January.

A constitutional process could provide crucial anchors for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Another group of scholars tried to revive long-defunct efforts to build a constituent assembly, in order to establish a citizen-led process for adopting a constitution. At times during the nine months of protests that lasted from January 2023 to the October 7 attack, Israelis were asking themselves bigger questions about the foundations of their country than at any time in recent memory—and they felt an urgency to find answers.

The consequences of not doing so could be dire. If Israel chooses to remain on its current path of conquest and annexation and commits itself to opposing Palestinian statehood—as Netanyahu repeatedly has done—it will consummate the destruction of Israel as a democratic state. It will face the de facto incorporation of millions of noncitizen Palestinians under Israeli rule; and in such a scenario, it would never be able to recognize this huge population, because it would pose a threat to Israel’s Jewish identity. (At present, an approximately equal number of Jews and Palestinians—seven million each—live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.)

Such an outcome will affect every Israeli citizen and subject. To avoid international isolation, Israel will increasingly rely on authoritarian and nondemocratic states, and on nondemocratic forces within the United States. Israel will find it difficult to retain the support of longtime democratic allies. Already, numerous key Western partners have constrained weapons exports to Israel over the past year, including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy—Israel’s third-largest arms supplier. The United States itself has delayed shipments. If Israel no longer manifests the “shared values” that have notionally bound it to the liberal democratic order, pressure on Western governments to limit their aid to Israel will deepen.

After a decade in which populism has surged all over the world, it has become clear how easy it is for political leaders to undermine democratic norms in service of their own pursuits of power, especially during large-scale wars. Democracy must always be defensive, but first it must be built. Israel must end the war and start building.

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN is a pollster, a Policy Fellow at Century International, and a columnist at Haaretz. She is the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled.

Foreign Affairs · by The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled · September 27, 2024

14. Zelensky makes urgent in-person plea to Biden and Harris who highlights her contrasting approach to Trump

Zelensky makes urgent in-person plea to Biden and Harris who highlights her contrasting approach to Trump | CNN Politics

amp.cnn.com · by Kevin Liptak, MJ Lee · September 26, 2024

CNN —

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the White House on Thursday may have been his final chance to convince a receptive American president of his country’s war aims.

And just weeks before a US presidential election that could have a profound impact on his country’s future, Vice President Kamala Harris used the moment to draw a stark contrast between her and former President Donald Trump’s approach to the conflict.

The wide divide was the backdrop to Thursday’s meetings at the White House. During an appearance alongside Zelensky, Harris suggested her Republican opponent would force Ukraine into ceding territory to its Russian invaders, falling in line with demands from President Vladimir Putin.

“In candor, I share with you, Mr. President, there are some in my country who would instead force Ukraine to give up large parts of its sovereign territory, who would demand that Ukraine accept neutrality and would require Ukraine to forego security relationships with other nations,” she said outside her ceremonial office next to the White House. “These proposals are the same of those of Putin, and let us be clear, they are not proposals for peace. Instead, they are proposals for surrender, which is dangerous and unacceptable.”

While Harris did not specify who she was talking about, the implication was clear. And though Zelensky has sought to cultivate relationships with Republicans, including Trump, during his visits to the United States, it was not lost on him or anyone watching that November’s election is providing fresh urgency to his search for a way to position Ukraine for victory.

“History reminds us, and history is so clear in reminding us, the United States cannot and should not isolate ourselves from the rest of the world,” Harris said. “Isolation is not insulation.”

Zelensky was in Washington on Thursday to try and convince the Biden administration his country can still win its war with Russia, so long as the United States and other nations significantly and quickly ramp up their military assistance.

Trump says he and Zelensky will meet

Trump told reporters Thursday that he would be meeting with the Ukrainian president in New York on Friday.

“President Zelensky has asked to meet with me, and I will be meeting with him tomorrow morning at around 9:45 in Trump Tower,” Trump said during remarks at Trump Tower.

Earlier Thursday, Trump cryptically posted on Truth Social what appeared to be a private communication between the Ukrainian deputy ambassador and an aide to the former president asking to pass along a message from Zelensky requesting a meeting. Trump did not indicate in the post whether he would do so.

Zelensky had been expected to depart the United States but was prepared to stay an extra day to facilitate a meeting, a source familiar with his plans said.

The anticipated meeting comes after the Ukrainian president recently told The New Yorker that he believes Trump “doesn’t really know how to stop the war even if he might think he knows how.”

“With this war, oftentimes, the deeper you look at it the less you understand,” Zelensky told the magazine prior to his Washington trip.

On Thursday, Trump told reporters that he looks forward to the planned meeting with Zelensky but disagreed with his assessment, saying, “I believe I will be able to make a deal between President Putin and President Zelensky quite quickly.”

But the former president declined to delve into the specifics of his plan and left things open-ended when asked whether he believes Ukraine should cede territory to Russia as a means of ending the war.

Ahead of Zelensky’s arrival in Washington, President Joe Biden ordered a surge of assistance to Ukraine, directing the Pentagon to allocate all remaining funding already approved by Congress before he leaves office in the hopes of positioning Kyiv for victory no matter the winner of November’s US presidential election.

Speaking to reporters next to Zelensky just before the pair met privately in the Oval Office, Biden said “This will strengthen Ukraine’s position in future negotiations.”

On post-war recovery efforts, Biden said the US and allies “have to support Ukraine on its path to membership to both the EU and to NATO, and to continue to make reforms to counter corruption,” while ensuring the country is able to repel any future Russian attacks.

And he pledged continued US support for recovery and reconstruction efforts in the country, in some cases “using Russian assets as well.”

Biden is usually apt to take his time making decisions about providing Ukraine new capabilities. But with November’s election potentially portending a major change in American approach to the war if Trump were to win, Ukrainian officials — and many American ones — believe there is little time to waste.

Trump has claimed he will be able to “settle” the war upon taking office and has suggested he’ll end US support for Kyiv’s war effort.

“Those cities are gone, they’re gone, and we continue to give billions of dollars to a man who refused to make a deal, Zelensky. There was no deal that he could have made that wouldn’t have been better than the situation you have right now. You have a country that has been obliterated, not possible to be rebuilt,” Trump said during a campaign speech in Mint Hill, North Carolina, on Wednesday.

Comments like those lent new weight to Thursday’s Oval Office talks, according to American and European officials, who have described an imperative to surge assistance to Ukraine while Biden is still in office.

Biden orders surge of assistance

Anxiety over the future of American support has colored many of Zelensky’s visits to Washington. When he visited the White House last year, it was meant in part to apply pressure on Republican congressional leaders to approve billions of dollars in new assistance.

The aid was eventually passed, but support for Ukraine among Trump allies is not high. While Zelensky visited Capitol Hill Thursday, he did not meet Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson.

During his more than hourlong meeting with senators before his visit to the White House, Zelensky made his case for increased US support for his war-weary country while laying out the plan he would later present to Biden. He was emphatic he needs permission to strike deeper into Russia, which many senators on Capitol Hill have supported and something that continues to be a major priority for Ukraine.

Some lawmakers in the meeting said they also lent Zelensky suggestions on how he could be more persuasive with Biden.

Biden said ahead of his meeting with Zelensky that he was directing the Department of Defense “to allocate all of its remaining security assistance funding that has been appropriated for Ukraine by the end of my term in office.” He also said he was approving new long-range weapons, Patriot missiles and the US military will expand training for Ukrainian F-16 pilots, taking on an additional 18 pilots next year.

The US president said he plans to convene Western leaders next month in Germany to coordinate their efforts toward helping Ukraine achieve victory.

Whether that is enough to help defeat Russia remains to be seen. And, at least publicly, Biden has stopped short of granting Ukraine permission to fire Western provided long-range weapons deeper into Russian territory, a line Biden once was loathe to cross but which he’s recently appeared more open to as he has come under growing pressure to relent.

Even if Biden decides to allow the long-range fires, it’s unclear whether the change in policy would be announced publicly.

Biden said he’d decided to provide Ukraine with a Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) long-range munition to “enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities,” though his statement did not specify whether he planned to lift restrictions on firing the long range weapons deep inside Russian territory.

Previewing Zelensky’s visit to the White House a day beforehand, Biden declared on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly his administration was “determined to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs to prevail in fight for survival.”

Zelensky looks to develop Harris relationship

Zelensky’s separate meeting with Harris on Thursday – which took place after the Ukrainian leader wraps up with Biden – signaled his desire to further develop what would be his most important leader-to-leader relationship should she win.

In the weeks since taking the political baton from Biden, Harris and her aides have gone to great lengths to insist that on major matters of foreign policy, there is no daylight between the vice president and the outgoing president.

The ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia is no exception, they say, insisting that Ukraine would continue to have the US’s unwavering support against Russian aggression under a Harris presidency.

The vice president’s face time with Zelensky on Thursday marked their sixth meeting since the war broke out in February of 2022. Just several days prior to the start of Russian attacks in February 2022, the vice president also saw Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference, where the two discussed Russia’s military build-up around Ukraine and the possibility of the start of a war.

In her remarks at the Democratic National Convention last month, Harris was deliberate in taking credit for the US’s response.

“Five days before Russia attacked Ukraine, I met with President Zelensky to warn him about Russia’s plan to invade. I helped mobilize a global response – over 50 countries – to defend against Putin’s aggression,” she said. “And as president, I will stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies.”

Advisers to the vice president say Trump’s public statements about the war in Ukraine could not make more clear the starkly different foreign policy worldviews of the vice president and the former president. (Trump appears unlikely to sit down with the Ukrainian leader, despite saying last week they would “probably” meet.)

Harris has insisted that if she were to become president – unlike under Trump’s watch – Ukraine would be able to count on unwavering US support.

Trump’s campaign has been blasting Zelensky over an interview with the New Yorker published Sunday in which Zelensky called vice presidential nominee JD Vance “too radical.”

“His message seems to be that Ukraine must make a sacrifice. This brings us back to the question of the cost and who shoulders it. The idea that the world should end this war at Ukraine’s expense is unacceptable,” Zelensky said in the interview. “For us, these are dangerous signals, coming as they do from a potential Vice-President.”

Trump alluded to the comments in North Carolina on Wednesday.

“The President of Ukraine is in our country. He’s making nasty little aspersions toward your favorite president, me,” he said.

There is quiet recognition even inside the Biden administration that any reassurances Zelensky may receive from Biden and Harris this week on the US’s commitment to supporting Ukraine could all be for naught under a different American president.

At the signing of a new US-Ukraine defense pact on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Italy in June, Zelensky was asked what contingency plan he might have for precisely such a scenario.

“If the people are with us, any leader will be with us in this struggle for freedom,” Zelensky responded.

This headline and story have been updated with additional developments.

CNN’s Michael Williams, Lauren Fox, Morgan Rimmer, Ted Barrett, Donald Judd, Sarah Davis and Kit Maher contributed to this report.

amp.cnn.com · by Kevin Liptak, MJ Lee · September 26, 2024

15. The Big Five - 27 September edition by Mick Ryan

The five topics:

1. The Asia Power Index

2. What the U.S. Election Means for Ukraine

3. The Profusion of Recon-Strike

4. China’s Nuclear Arsenal Expands

5. Hezbollah: Everyone’s Problem

The Big Five

The Big Five - 27 September edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on the character of modern war and planning for future

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-big-five-27-september-edition?utm conflict.

Mick Ryan

Sep 28, 2024

Source: @DefenceU on Twitter / X

We continue to live in interesting times. Here is my (long) update on Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, as well as my top five recommended readings for this week.

The Russo-Ukraine War

Five key topics dominate reports on the war in Ukraine and Russia this week.

First, the Ukrainians have conducted strikes on at least three major Russian munitions storage depots. I wrote about these strikes in a piece earlier this week. Stocks of S300 and S400 missiles were among the stocks destroyed, as well as munitions provided by North Korea. While the effects of these attacks are not certain, it is possible they will restrict the supply of some natures of ammunition to Russian forces in Ukraine. An estimate from Estonian military intelligence noted that the destruction at the Russian munition depots would have an impact on Russian operations over the coming months.

A second topic of focus this week has been the ongoing Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. The Russian counter attack appears to have gained some ground in the western parts of the Ukrainian salient, however the tempo of this counter attack has slowed significantly. The Ukrainian incursion to the west of where the Russian counter attacked has potentially compromised the flank security of the Russians, and reportedly has cutoff hundreds of Russian troops.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Besides that however, the Ukrainians appear to be focussed on consolidating what ground they currently hold and digging in to begin a defensive campaign to attrit attacking Russian forces. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian Kursk operation does not (yet) appear to have drawn sufficient Russian troops from Ukraine to have a major impact on the Russian advances in the Donbas.

Which brings me to the third important topic: Russia’s advances in the Donbas. The Russians are largely maintaining their offensive tempo in eastern Ukraine. They have advanced on several axes of advance, which must be placing enormous pressure on the Ukrainian general staff to deploy reserves and stem the losses in troops and Ukrainian territory. This military pressure is sure to translate into political pressure on the Zelenskyy government, particularly as the Kursk campaign does not appear to have slowed Russia’s main effort in the Donbas.

The fourth key topic is Putin’s announcement about changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. In essence, Russia might now target non-nuclear nations who are supported by a nuclear armed country.

The final interesting topic this week has been the Zelensky visit to the United States and his discussions about the new Ukrainian Victory Plan. While we are yet to see this plan, it is being sold as a way to support Ukraine and force the Russians to negotiate a ceasefire or war termination agreement that is favorable to Ukraine. Another unknown is how much more support Ukraine will be requesting, and whether their Victory Plan aligns with the new U.S. strategy for Ukraine that was recently sent to Congress.

Zelenskyy met with members of the U.S. Senate, met with President Biden and held a press conference with Vice President Harris. Unfortunately, the bipartisan consensus about Ukraine in the war’s early months appears to have broken down.

Before getting on the plane to return home, Zelenskyy also met with former president Trump on Friday morning (Washington DC time). After the meeting Zelenskyy tweeted the following:

I had a very productive meeting with @realDonaldTrump. I presented him our Victory Plan, and we thoroughly reviewed the situation in Ukraine and the consequences of the war for our people. Many details were discussed. I am grateful for this meeting. A just peace is needed.

Source: President Zelenskyy official Twitter / X site

It is hard to imagine Trump, Vance and other republicans walking back some of their tough rhetoric on the war and Ukraine. As he noted during their meeting:

I think the fact that we’re even together today is a good sign, and hopefully we’ll have a good victory because if the other side wins, I don’t think we’re going to have victories with anything, to be honest with you.

The report on the meeting from Politico described how “Trump said he “learned a lot” and claimed that if he wins, Ukraine and Russia will reach “a very fair and I think, actually, a rather rapid deal,” but said it was “too early” to share his plans to end the war.” OK. This is hardly an endorsement of Ukraine’s plan to end the war on terms favorable to them.

In final Ukraine news, U.S. administration also announced during the Zelenskyy visit a significant package of support which included:

The U.S. Department of Defense is to allocate all of its remaining security assistance funding that has been appropriated for Ukraine by the end of the Biden term in office. $5.5 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority has been authorised.
The Department of Defense announced $2.4 billion in security assistance through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
Provision of the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) long-range weapon.
An additional Patriot air defense battery and additional Patriot missiles
Expanded training for Ukrainian F-16 pilots, including an additional 18 pilots in 2025.

The German Bundestag this week announced 400 million euro increase in military funding for Ukraine to enable the purchase of air defense systems, tanks, drones, ammunition, and spare parts. The French President stated during a meeting with President Zelensky that France will train and fully equip a Ukrainian brigade.

The Middle East

The Grim Beeper attacks continue to reverberate throughout southern Lebanon. There is no doubt that this has had a profound psychological impact on Hezbollah. Their members no longer know which means of communications to trust, and this is corrosive in any organisation. It will have degraded the responsiveness and flexibility of the organisation, and will have sent a message that the Israelis can find and target individual Hezbollah members where and when they want to.

The Israelis this week not only conducted an air strike that appears to have decapitated the Hezbollah Radwan force leadership, but also attacked what they described at Hezbollah’s ‘main headquarters’ in Beirut. The IDF has also targeted and destroyed many of Hezbollah’s missile stocks. Around 1600 strikes were conducted by the IDF, which is a very significant level of effort for their Air Force. There were a large number of casualties on the ground, and the balance of civilians and Hezbollah in the casualty numbers remains unknown. Hezbollah is estimated to possess somewhere between 100 and 200 thousand missiles of varying range and precision, so just how much of an impact these strikes will have on Hezbollah’s capacity remains to be seen.

Hezbollah also launched a ballistic missile at Tel Aviv. The alleged target was the headquarters of Mossad. The missile was intercepted by the IDF, but was an indication of Hezbollah capacity, and the potential for further escalation in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

The big question is whether these attacks are designed to deter Hezbollah from any escalation or are shaping operations for a larger scale Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon. This is something that the IDF has been thinking about and preparing for over the past decade, so we might expect a different concept of operations compared to their previous large-scale operation in southern Lebanon in 2006. While there are many uncertainties about such an operation, Effects Based Operations will probably not be a feature this time!

Source: Reuters

The government of Israel has made clear that it wants the citizens of northern Israel who have been evacuated since October 2023 should be able to return to their homes. Conducting a large ground and air operation in southern Lebanon may be part of ensuring this happens.

The Pacific

In the Pacific this week, the big news was the Chinese launch of an ICBM from southern China and which travelled east out across the Pacific between the northern Phillipines and southern Taiwan. It was the first such launch in four decades. I am sure that China was sending a message to two of its neighbors besides undertaking a technical check of their missile. This test is probably part of the ongoing testing and development of new and improved missiles, and part of the broader expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent and strike capability.

For a good exploration of the ongoing development of nuclear warheads, missiles, readiness and doctrine, this article from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (also one of my Big Five below) provides an excellent update.

Source: Ian Ellis Jones

Also this week, the PLA for the first time had all three of its in-service aircraft carriers at sea. Two carriers – the Shandong and the Liaoning – were undertaking training near Hainan and to the east of The Philippines. The third carrier, the new Fujian, was undertaking sea trials. While interesting, it is a rare event to have all aircraft carriers at sea at anyone time for any navy.

Maintenance requirements for the carriers and their escort ships tend to drive a rotation of ships at sea in navies. I don’t think the concurrent deployment indicates that this will be a routine event, but it is done demonstrate that the Chinese probably have a plan, which they seek to test, to surge all their carriers for certain contingencies.

Source: Ian Ellis Jones

Publications and travel

Since my last Big Five (sorry about not publishing one last week), I have published an article on the recent Ukrainian attacks on Russian munitions depots. This piece also examined the components of Ukraine’s strategic strike capability and the lessons that the Ukrainian strategic strike campaign offers for other military organisations. I have also published an article on the pager attacks in Lebanon with the Lowy Institute, as well as an episode of the Bourke and Ryan podcast (it’s a good one - check it out here).

Last week I published an article on what the Chinese leadership might be learning about U.S. and NATO strategic decision-making based on their decision-making since Russia’s large scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Finally, this week I published an article on Israel’s options in Lebanon and the key lessons from its last major ground operation there in 2006.

I have also been traveling a bit.

After returning from Germany, I spent a couple of days in Sydney, which included a book launch event at the Lowy Institute for my new book, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire (which you can watch at this link). And as I write this, I am on a plane between the east and west coasts of the United States. I just completed a couple of days in Washington DC doing some catch up meetings and workshops, as well as a book talk with the team at the Special Competitive Studies Project. On Thursday I spoke at the Skydio Ascend 2024 event (which was awesome) before returning home.

Speaking at the Skydio Ascend 24 event. Source: Skydio

And so, to this week’s readings…

This week, a mix of articles. There is the new Lowy Institute Asia Power Index, which is always worth reading. There are also good reads on the profusion of recon-strike capabilities around the world, the development of China’s nuclear capability and the potential impacts on Ukraine of the U.S. presidential election. As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Asia Power Index

The Lowy Institute’s annual Asia Power Index measures resources and influence and produces an index on the relative power of states in Asia. It ranks 27 countries and territories from Pakistan, north as Russia, into the Pacific. Key findings include that China’s overall power is plateauing well beneath that of the U.S., although its military power has increased relative to the U.S. You can read the full report here.

2. What the U.S. Election Means for Ukraine

In this article, Alexander Vindman explores the potential outcomes of the U.S. Presidential election and what the election of Trump or Harris might mean for the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. A thoughtful and insightful article, the wargaming of different outcomes of the election is certain to have been a focus of the Ukrainians as they developed their new Victory Plan. You can read the article here.

3. The Profusion of Recon-Strike

This is an excellent article that explore the development and profusion of recon-strike complexes in different nations. It explores why some countries invest heavily in conventional capabilities despite an already-large lead over their adversaries, and why other states instead opt to invest in alternatives rather than balancing symmetrically. You can read the full article here.

4. China’s Nuclear Arsenal Expands

The continuing development of China’s nuclear weapon arsenal, the construction of new missile silo fields and the ongoing deployment of newer classes of missiles has been covered in the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual updates on China for the last couple years. However, in this article from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a comprehensive update on weapons, delivery systems, readiness, command and control and doctrine is provided. It is a thoroughly interesting piece and can be read here.

5. Hezbollah: Everyone’s Problem

This is a good opinion piece published in the New York Times. The article explores the lessons from Israel’s 2006 operation in southern Lebanon, and what they mean for any operations that might be conducted there again in the coming weeks. You can read the article here.

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16. Special operations forces face hurdles to DOD program for civilian transition, report says

Special operations forces face hurdles to DOD program for civilian transition, report says

Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · September 27, 2024

Green Berets from 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) join Serbian counterparts in a jump over Pranjani, Serbia, on Sept. 21, 2024. The Defense Department is not doing enough to ease special operations forces service members' transition to civilian life, according to a Government Accountability Office report. (Kyle Odum/U.S. Army)

The Pentagon is failing special operations forces personnel by not tracking problems they encounter accessing and completing a program for service members transitioning to civilian life, according to a watchdog agency’s report. As a result of that monitoring failure, U.S. Special Operations Command and the Defense Department services may be unaware of Transition Assistance Program shortcomings for special operations forces, the Government Accountability Office report issued Wednesday said.

Transitioning to civilian life can be even more difficult for SOF service members because of the physical and mental strain of rigorous training, multiple combat deployments and other factors, according to the report.

Over the past 20 years, special operations staffing levels across the services rose to about 74,000 personnel in 2022, as the U.S. worked to counter terrorism. But the Pentagon now is refocusing to address threats from peer adversaries, such as China and Russia, the report stated.

As a result, many special operations forces service members remain on active duty or separate from the military. From 2021 to 2023, the time period analyzed by the GAO, some 7,000 of them returned to civilian life, the GAO said.

A Naval Special Warfare operator provides security as part of a nighttime direct-action raid training in California in May 2024. The Pentagon is not doing enough to ease the transition of Special Operations Forces service members who choose to leave the military, according to a Government Accountability Office report. ( Alex Smedegard/U.S. Navy)

The program, known as TAP, is required for all service members leaving the military. The Defense Department estimates that more than 500,000 members will participate in the program over the next few years, according to the GAO.

The study evaluated data related to special operations forces’ participation in TAP, which includes information and training designed to guide departing service members toward employment, higher education and other opportunities.

While SOF personnel generally completed the mandated training at a higher rate than other service members leaving the military, just 39% began the program a year or more before their separation date as required, the report said.

“It is imperative that service members planning to leave military service start accessing transition programs on time to fully leverage existing resources and transition activities,” the report authors wrote.

And without a thorough Pentagon analysis of TAP, service members transitioning out of special operations could be prevented from fully realizing the program’s benefits, according to the report.

In its review, the agency found that a high operational tempo, delays in medical assessments and other problems kept special operations personnel from starting TAP on time and participating in related activities.

That hold-up was more acute for lower-ranked enlisted special operations forces personnel when compared with those of higher enlisted ranks or officers, who may have more control over their schedules, the report found.

Active-duty SOF service members and veterans told the agency that “there also is tension within a command that is trying to balance operational and mission needs with the ability to support transition program requirements.”

The GAO recommended that U.S. Special Operations Command and the services analyze TAP participation and other data annually and develop plans to address problems if needed. The Pentagon concurred with the recommendations.

Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · September 27, 2024

17. A Crisis of Competence

Excepts:

The United States needs to rebuild its reputation as competent great power and its national credibility in a way that demonstrates to the American citizenry and to the world that we are still capable of thinking in pragmatic terms, and that the ideological normative flourishes of the GWOT and globalization eras that sapped the nation’s strength are a thing of the past. Today Washington urgently needs to revisit the fundamentals of what constitutes a viable national strategy, one that can clearly articulate the irreducible national interests and objectives to be achieved, identifies the requisite resources to achieve them, and most importantly provides a trajectory going forward that will ensure the sustained support of Congress and the American people. Most of all, our foreign policy establishment must demonstrate that it still has the competence to implement such a strategy, including real expertise when it comes to understanding different theaters, cultures, and polities.

If it cannot, we need to bring fresh blood into the policymaking and implementation process to ensure we never again fall prey to our ideological wishful thinking about how the world should be. We must face head-on the realities of power and economics as they have always been and will remain going forward: a strong industrial base as the foundation of our defense industry and our military, and an economic policy that preserves and expands the opportunity and prosperity of the American nation. Then can we speak about rebuilding American credibility worldwide, restoring deterrence, and ensuring that the United States is not pulled unprepared into a wider war against our determined adversaries. Effective deterrence rests on capabilities and, most of all, on the genuine competence and will to deploy those capabilities in a way that communicates unequivocally that the nation will not go looking for the proverbial monsters to slay, but that it nonetheless remains resilient and determined to defeat decisively anyone intent on threating its security. The clock is ticking, and to get there we need to relearn the fundamentals of great power politics that we seem to have forgotten since the end of the Cold War.

A Crisis of Competence

By Andrew A. Michta

September 27, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/27/a_crisis_of_competence_1061277.html

September 27, 2024Last month we marked the third anniversary of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan—a poorly planned and executed retreat that capped a two decade-long policy that cost some two and a half thousand American lives, over twenty thousand American servicemen and women wounded, and an estimated $1 to $2 trillion—or between $150 million to $300 million a day for the duration of the conflict.[i] Yet Afghanistan is but one example of the profligate expenditure of American blood and treasure post-Cold War—the wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria all failed to achieve their stated strategic objectives and cost the nation dearly. The total price tag for the Global War on Terror post 9/11 is estimated to stand at up to $8 trillion.[ii] The accuracy of such estimates is subject to debate, but in hindsight none of the overall goals that had been originally declared to justify the effort were achieved, nor did much of the bespoke “nation-building” or “democracy-building” we were promised come to pass. And so, during the current election season, when debates about different strategies going forward oscillate between the “China first” and “pivot to Asia” on the one hand, and business as usual of American primacy—AKA hegemony—compete for the public’s ear, it is time we took stock of what happened during those three decades, and ensure we chart a different course going forward, one that no longer allows for the unsustainable profligacy in expending American blood and treasure.

The first step to recovery is to recognize that one has a problem, and in the case of the United States foreign policy elite we seem no longer able to craft a workable strategy, operationalize and execute it to reach the proclaimed objectives. We need to ask ourselves a simple question: Why has the United States been routinely unable to win wars over the past three decades (the Desert Storm battle to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait a notable exception)—not in the sense of breaking the adversary’s military and destroying its government, but when it comes to achieving the strategic objectives we set out to accomplish? Is it that we no longer have the resources to implement what we set out to do? Or perhaps it is that what increasingly passes for strategy is more reminiscent of a policy conversation in a self-contained echo chamber, rather than being grounded in the realities of the Darwinian ecosystem we call international relations? I submit that it is the latter, and here is why.

The three post-Cold War decades were defined by a fundamental misreading of what the implosion of the Soviet empire meant, what caused it, and how long this strategic pause would endure. The Washington consensus was wrong that there was anything final or decisive about the decomposition of the Warsaw Pact, that Russia would somehow recognize that its path to empire had run its course, and that it would “accept its seat at the table” that we generously – so we thought – offered. In reality, the end of the Cold War was more an end in the battle fought for the domination of the Eurasian landmass after 1945, but it was no more a period of peace than the breather between the First and the Second World Wars was anything but an armistice. American foreign policy elites celebrated the win as an existential victory, imbued with ideological meaning and “end-of-history” triumphalism when they should have understood that if anything, geopolitics were to be brought front-and-center, and that Russia’s weakness was likely to beget revanchism of the sort that seized Germany during the Weimar Republic. In contrast to the strategists of the “Greatest Generation” who understood that caesuras in history happen only with tectonic shifts engendered by total defeats and victories, the post-Cold War leaders seemed to believe that our former adversaries would want to be “like us,” paying little attention to the extent of humiliation and anomie that defeat always brings forth. It was this lack of strategic foresight that imbued American post-Cold War triumphalism with the crippling certitude that we could shape the world to our liking. Future historians will marvel that the United States frittered away so much power in just one generation, pursuing the chimera of “primacy” and the “unipolar moment,” instead of husbanding and preserving for as long as possible the unique power position it found itself occupying in 1991.

In fairness, dramatic events also shaped our elite perceptions. The terror attacks on 9/11 were a true game-changer, as they wrecked America’s sense that it was entitled to live in a secure homeland—separated from the world by two oceans and neighboring on Canada and Mexico, two friendly countries that pose no threat. The trauma of 9/11, and especially the failure of the George W. Bush administration at that point of dread to ask something of the nation beyond money and security measures at our airports, laid the foundation for the most breathtaking hubris in American history: the belief that properly crafted institutions would in short order remake non-Western cultures, and that we would not be safe until we had transformed entire regions of the globe in our image. This folly was not so much a quest for empire as its critics posited; it was a borderline elite fixation enabled by the nation’s trauma wrought by a group of criminals who on that fateful day murdered several thousand American citizens. And so instead of capturing or killing Bin Laden and his co-conspirators to show to all that Americans may be gullible and sloppy at times, but that if you try to hurt them you will die, Washington launched on a breathtaking “transformative project” that cost trillions, exhausted the nation’s will, and in strategic terms achieved precious little. The Kantian dream of “democratic peace,” whereby if all nations were democracies, the problem of war would be eliminated, in Washington’s rendition – Democrat and Republican – became a self-induced defeat. We have yet to fully appreciate how much damage GWOT and the attendant theories have done to American credibility, its good name, and the erstwhile belief that this country was being led by competent people who understood the harsh realities of state power and its limits in global politics.

The United States needs to rebuild its reputation as competent great power and its national credibility in a way that demonstrates to the American citizenry and to the world that we are still capable of thinking in pragmatic terms, and that the ideological normative flourishes of the GWOT and globalization eras that sapped the nation’s strength are a thing of the past. Today Washington urgently needs to revisit the fundamentals of what constitutes a viable national strategy, one that can clearly articulate the irreducible national interests and objectives to be achieved, identifies the requisite resources to achieve them, and most importantly provides a trajectory going forward that will ensure the sustained support of Congress and the American people. Most of all, our foreign policy establishment must demonstrate that it still has the competence to implement such a strategy, including real expertise when it comes to understanding different theaters, cultures, and polities.

If it cannot, we need to bring fresh blood into the policymaking and implementation process to ensure we never again fall prey to our ideological wishful thinking about how the world should be. We must face head-on the realities of power and economics as they have always been and will remain going forward: a strong industrial base as the foundation of our defense industry and our military, and an economic policy that preserves and expands the opportunity and prosperity of the American nation. Then can we speak about rebuilding American credibility worldwide, restoring deterrence, and ensuring that the United States is not pulled unprepared into a wider war against our determined adversaries. Effective deterrence rests on capabilities and, most of all, on the genuine competence and will to deploy those capabilities in a way that communicates unequivocally that the nation will not go looking for the proverbial monsters to slay, but that it nonetheless remains resilient and determined to defeat decisively anyone intent on threating its security. The clock is ticking, and to get there we need to relearn the fundamentals of great power politics that we seem to have forgotten since the end of the Cold War.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow and Director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.

18. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 27, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 27, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-september-27-2024

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The PRC Ministry of State Security claimed that a hacker group called Anonymous 64 is a “cyber army” affiliated with the Taiwanese military's Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command. Taiwan rejected the accusation.
The PRC canceled tariff exemptions for 34 Taiwanese agricultural products on September 25. The PRC likely intends to undermine popular Taiwanese support for the DPP through fear of economic repercussions as a result of its cross-strait policy.
The PRC condemned the latest US arms sale to Taiwan as support for Taiwan’s independence and froze the assets of nine companies in response to the sale.
The PRC test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980.
PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Yanan attended the Chiefs of Defense conference in Hawaii and met with US Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Samuel Paparo. The PRC is increasing its emphasis on military diplomacy likely to stabilize bilateral relations in anticipation of the US administration change in 2025 and amid escalation in the South China Sea.
A PLA aircraft carrier sailed through Japan’s contiguous zone for the first time. The transit may be part of a pattern of the PRC testing Japan’s military response.
The Philippine Coast Guard has resumed its patrol of Sabina Shoal, fulfilling its promises to return to the disputed territory and ensure that the Shoal does not fall under PRC control. The CCG may deny the access of Philippine resupply missions to Sabina Shoal to compel the PCG to withdraw from the shoal.

19. Strategic Options to De-escalate the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah presents a complex challenge with deep-rooted political, ideological, and territorial dimensions. No single strategy is likely to resolve the conflict on its own, but a combination of diplomatic engagement, regional cooperation, and international mediation offers the most viable path to de-escalation. Diplomatic engagement provides a starting point for reducing immediate violence, while regional cooperation offers the potential for a more comprehensive solution that addresses broader security concerns. International mediation, supported by peacekeeping initiatives, can lend legitimacy and resources to the peace process.

Ultimately, success will depend on the willingness of all parties—Israel, Hezbollah, and key regional and international actors—to prioritize peace over conflict. By pursuing these strategies in concert, there is hope for reducing the risk of further escalation and creating the conditions for a more stable and peaceful Middle East.

Strategic Options to De-escalate the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict

By Jeremiah Monk

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/strategic-options-to-de-escalate-the-israel-hezbollah-conflict

INTRODUCTION

The enduring conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has become one of the most entrenched and volatile flashpoints in the Middle East. Rooted in deep-seated political, religious, and territorial issues, this ongoing struggle continues to cause significant human suffering and threatens the stability of the broader region. As tensions escalate, particularly with cross-border rocket attacks, retaliatory strikes, and occasional skirmishes, there is a growing urgency to explore potential strategies to de-escalate hostilities and seek a pathway toward sustainable peace.

Beyond a macabre strategic option of hoping bombardment will lead one side or the other to victory, this article proposes three key strategies that offer pathways to reduce the risk of further escalation: 1) diplomatic engagement and confidence-building measures, 2) regional cooperation and security frameworks, and 3) international mediation and peacekeeping initiatives. Each of these approaches comes with distinct opportunities, challenges, and requirements for success. This article explores these strategies in depth, assesses their viability, and proposes a holistic approach for their implementation.

1. Diplomatic Engagement and Confidence-Building Measures

Diplomatic engagement is a traditional, but essential, tool in conflict resolution, even when the parties involved hold deep animosities. In the context of Israel and Hezbollah, direct communication channels—particularly through neutral intermediaries—can help reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings and limit the scope of escalation. Confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as temporary ceasefires and the establishment of no-conflict zones, can create the groundwork for broader negotiations.

Viability of Diplomatic Engagement: Diplomatic engagement between Israel and Hezbollah has historically been minimal due to the ideological and strategic positions of both sides. Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, views Israel as an illegitimate state, while Israel considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization that poses a significant security threat. These positions have often rendered direct negotiations impossible. However, in times of crisis, even hostile actors have found ways to communicate indirectly, using trusted intermediaries to open channels for dialogue.

Pros:

Reduced Miscommunication: Direct or back-channel communication can prevent the escalation of hostilities resulting from misunderstandings.
Temporary Ceasefires: These can provide breathing space, reducing the immediate risk of escalation and preventing civilian casualties.
Incremental Trust: While a comprehensive agreement may be elusive, small, successful diplomatic engagements can build trust over time.

Cons:

Mistrust: The deeply ingrained mistrust between Israel and Hezbollah is a significant obstacle. Each side may question the other's sincerity and could use diplomatic talks as a stalling tactic.
Short-Term Focus: Temporary ceasefires, while helpful in preventing immediate violence, often lack the structural support needed for long-term peace.

Requirements for Success: To succeed, diplomatic engagement must be accompanied by a strong commitment from both sides to at least explore non-military solutions to the conflict. The use of neutral intermediaries, such as Switzerland or France, which have maintained open diplomatic relations with both sides, is critical for initiating and maintaining these channels.

Additionally, implementing confidence-building measures such as humanitarian pauses, withdrawal from certain conflict zones, and the creation of neutral areas for future negotiations can contribute to stabilizing the situation. Monitoring mechanisms by third parties (e.g., international observers) can help ensure that both sides adhere to these agreements.

Probability of Success: The success of diplomatic engagement depends heavily on the willingness of both Israel and Hezbollah to prioritize de-escalation over immediate military gains. Given the entrenched nature of the conflict, we assess the probability of success in the short term is moderate. However, even temporary reductions in violence can create the conditions necessary for a more sustained peace process in the future.

2. Regional Cooperation and Security Frameworks

The Middle East is a region where local conflicts often have regional implications, and the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is no exception. Hezbollah is a significant player within Lebanon's domestic politics and security apparatus, while Israel's security concerns are deeply entwined with the actions of neighboring states and non-state actors. As such, a regional security framework that involves key regional players—such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—offers another avenue for de-escalation.

Viability of Regional Cooperation: A regional approach can be particularly effective because it shifts the focus from the bilateral conflict between Israel and Hezbollah to broader regional security concerns. Key regional powers like Egypt and Jordan already have peace treaties with Israel and maintain cordial relations with Hezbollah’s political supporters in Lebanon, making them well-positioned to act as mediators. Saudi Arabia, despite its adversarial stance toward Hezbollah due to its ties with Iran, also has an interest in maintaining regional stability and curbing Iran’s influence in Lebanon.

Pros:

Leverage of Regional Actors: Regional powers like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have the ability to exert influence over both Israel and Hezbollah through diplomatic, political, and economic means.
Regional Stability: A broader security framework can address not only the Israel-Hezbollah conflict but also other conflicts in the region, contributing to long-term stability.
Economic Incentives: Stability in the region could open up economic opportunities, particularly in terms of trade, investment, and reconstruction, which could incentivize cooperation.

Cons:

Complex Regional Dynamics: The political interests of regional actors often diverge, with some powers supporting Hezbollah and others viewing it as a destabilizing force. Aligning these interests for a coordinated effort can be difficult.
Influence of External Powers: Iran’s support for Hezbollah and its broader influence in Lebanon complicates any regional framework that aims to limit Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

Requirements for Success: For regional cooperation to succeed, several conditions must be met:

Alignment of Regional Interests: Regional actors must align their interests, which may require external incentives, such as economic cooperation frameworks or security guarantees from external powers like the United States.
Strong Diplomatic Leadership: Countries like Egypt and Jordan, which have diplomatic relationships with both Israel and some elements within Lebanon, must take leadership roles in crafting and promoting a regional security framework.
Inclusion of Key Players: Regional powers must ensure that Hezbollah's backers, particularly Iran and Syria, are either included in the dialogue or adequately neutralized diplomatically to prevent their interference.

Probability of Success: We assess the probability of success for a regional cooperation strategy is moderate to high, depending on the ability of regional actors to align their interests. If successful, a regional framework could provide a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to conflict resolution, addressing the broader geopolitical issues that fuel the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

3. International Mediation and Peacekeeping Initiatives

The international community, particularly the United Nations, has long played a role in managing conflicts in the Middle East. The deployment of peacekeeping forces along the Israel-Lebanon border (UNIFIL) and previous UN-mediated ceasefires between Israel and Hezbollah have set important precedents for international involvement. A renewed international mediation effort, supported by robust peacekeeping initiatives, could help stabilize the situation and create space for longer-term peace talks.

Viability of International Mediation: International mediation can offer legitimacy and neutrality to the peace process, providing both parties with the cover needed to engage in dialogue without appearing to make concessions. Furthermore, peacekeeping forces can help monitor and enforce ceasefires, ensuring that both parties adhere to agreed terms.

Pros:

Legitimacy: Involvement from the United Nations or other international organizations can lend legitimacy to the peace process and provide diplomatic and financial support.
Peacekeeping Presence: International peacekeeping forces can serve as a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah, reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation.
Global Pressure: The international community can exert pressure on both sides to de-escalate through diplomatic channels, sanctions, or incentives.

Cons:

Perception of Bias: Hezbollah, in particular, may view international mediation as biased in favor of Israel, especially if Western countries are heavily involved in the process.
Vulnerability of Peacekeepers: UN peacekeepers have historically been targeted in volatile regions, which could complicate their ability to enforce ceasefires and could escalate hostilities if peacekeepers come under attack.

Requirements for Success: To be effective, international mediation and peacekeeping initiatives require:

UN Resolutions and Mandates: A clear and enforceable mandate from the UN Security Council that outlines the role of peacekeepers and the conditions for ceasefire enforcement.
Commitment from Major Powers: Key international stakeholders, including the United States, Russia, and China, must agree on the terms of the peacekeeping operation and support the mediation process.
Sufficient Resources: Peacekeeping operations need adequate funding, personnel, and equipment to monitor the situation on the ground and respond to violations effectively.

Probability of Success: We assess the probability of success for international mediation is moderate, depending on the willingness of both parties to accept international involvement and the capacity of peacekeeping forces to maintain order in a highly volatile environment. While international mediation can provide valuable support, it may be perceived as external interference and could face challenges in implementation.

Conclusion

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah presents a complex challenge with deep-rooted political, ideological, and territorial dimensions. No single strategy is likely to resolve the conflict on its own, but a combination of diplomatic engagement, regional cooperation, and international mediation offers the most viable path to de-escalation. Diplomatic engagement provides a starting point for reducing immediate violence, while regional cooperation offers the potential for a more comprehensive solution that addresses broader security concerns. International mediation, supported by peacekeeping initiatives, can lend legitimacy and resources to the peace process.

Ultimately, success will depend on the willingness of all parties—Israel, Hezbollah, and key regional and international actors—to prioritize peace over conflict. By pursuing these strategies in concert, there is hope for reducing the risk of further escalation and creating the conditions for a more stable and peaceful Middle East.

20. How Defense Experts Got Ukraine Wrong By Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien

Excerpts:

What is troubling is that analytic failures can happen again in any setting where small groups of experts in a particular country exercise outsize influence. Let’s hope analysts of the People’s Liberation Army will take a different approach if tensions with China continue to escalate.

“You should never trust experts,” the late-19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury famously wrote. “If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.”

The correctives for recent intelligence failures do not include, obviously, chucking expertise altogether. But our report shows why, especially in moments of crisis, governments and the public need to hear from a wide variety of experts, demand relentless commonsense questioning, and, above all, create incentives for open, sharply expressed disagreement on fundamental issues. Expertise is not a form of occult knowledge, and those of us who consume expert opinion should always do so with a strong dose of skepticism. The analytic failure in Ukraine makes a strong case for something so often lacking in military analysis and the academic world more generally: intellectual humility.

How Defense Experts Got Ukraine Wrong

On questions of war and peace, governments must hear from many types of experts.

By Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen, Phillips Payson O’Brien · September 27, 2024

One might think that an intelligence failure can be benign: The good guys do far better than expected, the bad guys far worse. In fact, erring on the side of pessimism can be as big a problem as being too bullish. The period just before and after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, is a good example of this. At the West’s most influential research organizations, prominent analysts—many of them political scientists who follow Russian military affairs—confidently predicted that Russia would defeat its smaller neighbor within weeks. American military leaders believed this consensus, to the point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair reportedly told members of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a Russian attack. Although those analysts’ gloomy assessments turned out to be wrong, they’ve nevertheless made the United States and its allies overly cautious in assisting Ukraine in its self-defense.

Both of us are military historians who have a keen interest in contemporary strategic issues—and who, at the outset of the war, harbored grave doubts about the prevailing analysis of Russian and Ukrainian capabilities. One of us, Eliot, has served in senior positions in the U.S. government; the other, Phillips, has advised the British Ministry of Defense on Ukraine and other matters. In a report published this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we sought to understand how prominent military analysts had been so badly wrong. Why did they assume that Russia could successfully conduct an exceedingly complex lightning offensive and win a major war in considerably less time than the Wehrmacht needed to overrun France, a smaller country, in 1940? Why did they persistently take the most negative possible view of Ukraine’s abilities and prospects?

Anne Applebaum: Is Congress really going to abandon Ukraine now?

As we reread scores of articles and reports, listened to podcasts, and reviewed op-eds and interviews, we noticed how little uncertainty had been expressed. Russia, prominent analysts had insisted, had completely modernized its military. Its soldiers were no longer chiefly conscripts but professionals. Its military doctrine—particularly its organization of units into so-called battalion tactical groups, which are small infantry battalions reinforced with tanks and artillery—was a stroke of organizational genius. Its soldiers and airmen had been battle-tested in Syria and earlier operations in Ukraine. The two of us pored over the maps, reprinted widely, that showed half a dozen or more red arrows effortlessly piercing Ukraine up to its western border.

To the extent that analysts discussed Ukraine in any detail, its citizens were depicted as the demoralized and atomized victims of a corrupt government. The country’s substantial Russophone population was portrayed as largely indifferent to rule from Moscow or Kyiv. Ukraine’s equipment was no match for advanced Russian systems. They had experienced only static warfare in the Donbas and would have no chance against a Russian blitzkrieg. Volodymyr Zelensky was portrayed as an ineffective president. He was a comedy performer, not a wartime leader; his government, intelligence services, and armed forces had been penetrated by Russian spies and saboteurs. Ukrainians might not even put up much of a guerrilla resistance. On top of it all came consistent policy advocacy: assertions that Ukraine was not worth arming or that well-intentioned efforts to do so would merely increase suffering.

Two and a half years later, the Russians have taken as many as 600,000 casualties; Ukrainian cities have been shattered but still stand, while Ukrainian drones have hit Moscow. Ukrainians have driven the Black Sea Fleet from its anchorages around Crimea, sunk a third of its ships, and freed up sea lanes for the vital export of Ukrainian agricultural products. Ukrainian forces have in the past few weeks seized an area larger than Los Angeles inside the borders of Russia itself.

The same expert analytic community that erred early in the war continues to dominate much of the public and governmental discourse. Many of them persist in downplaying Ukrainian chances and counseling against giving the Ukrainians weapons that they have repeatedly shown themselves able to use with great effect. Some of them still warn of Russian escalation, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons, even as one Russian red line after another has faded to pink and vanished.

One reason for such larger errors rests on what our friend and colleague Hew Strachan, a British military historian, describes in his foreword to our report as Military Balance analysis. A thick volume produced every year by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance is an invaluable resource. It documents important statistics such as the size of each nation’s armed forces, the amount and type of equipment it has available, and the number of men and women it has actively deployed. But those metrics are often far less important in war than immeasurable factors such as organization, discipline, fighting spirit, and quality of command at all levels.

The standard analysis of Russia and Ukraine paid almost no attention to the documented corruption of the Russian military, the rote nature of its exercises, and the failure of attempts to professionalize it. Far from having an abundance of well-trained personnel akin to American and British soldiers, Russian forces consisted for the most part of conscripts who had been bribed or coerced into signing up for a second year of duty in the same old abusive system. Many commentators wrongly compared Vladimir Putin’s forces to their Western counterparts, yielding predictions that Russia would employ “shock and awe” against the Ukrainians—as if its air force had experience and organization similar to that of the United States. But the Russian military was not a somewhat smaller and less effective version of America’s. It was a brutal, deeply flawed, and altogether inferior armed force.

Many observers also paid scant attention to all that had changed in Ukraine since 2014. This point is crucial: Many Western analysts had been trained as Russia specialists. Implicitly, perhaps subconsciously, they viewed Ukraine the way Russian imperialists did: as adjunct to Russia. In many cases ignorant of Ukrainian history, and even dismissive of its claims to national identity and political cohesion, authors of nearly a quarter of the reports we read did not even attempt to describe Ukraine as anything more than a target set for Russia. Many had never visited Ukraine, or spoken with Westerners—including members of allied training missions who had served there—who might have had different and better-informed views.

Read: Ukraine was biding its time

Possibly most disturbing, the two of us discovered just how small and insular the world of Russian-military analysis was. Think-tank political scientists with narrow specialties had enormous influence in a community whose incentives, unlike those in more vibrant academic disciplines, were for consensus rather than vigorous debate. Many authors made oracular pronouncements and seemed to resent serious questioning by outsiders, even including retired senior military.

We do not doubt prominent analysts’ smarts or honest intentions. But we were reminded of how some public-health experts acted in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic: confidently rendering judgments, dismissing doubts about them, excluding other experts—such as child psychologists, on the question of closing or opening schools—with relevant expertise different from their own.

Many in the public-health community have since engaged in some introspection. Russia experts have shown little such self-awareness, let alone self-criticism. The same experts continue to appear in the same forums, visit the White House, and brief an intelligence community that largely shares its views.

What is troubling is that analytic failures can happen again in any setting where small groups of experts in a particular country exercise outsize influence. Let’s hope analysts of the People’s Liberation Army will take a different approach if tensions with China continue to escalate.

“You should never trust experts,” the late-19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury famously wrote. “If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.”

The correctives for recent intelligence failures do not include, obviously, chucking expertise altogether. But our report shows why, especially in moments of crisis, governments and the public need to hear from a wide variety of experts, demand relentless commonsense questioning, and, above all, create incentives for open, sharply expressed disagreement on fundamental issues. Expertise is not a form of occult knowledge, and those of us who consume expert opinion should always do so with a strong dose of skepticism. The analytic failure in Ukraine makes a strong case for something so often lacking in military analysis and the academic world more generally: intellectual humility.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen, Phillips Payson O’Brien · September 27, 2024

21. Has the Third Lebanon War Begun?

Excerpts:

For Israel’s part, the objective is clear: Hezbollah must demilitarize in areas of Lebanon south of the Litani River. The proposed buffer zone is in keeping with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War by mandating Hezbollah’s withdrawal but was never enforced by the Lebanese government or the international community, despite the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the area.

While Israel somewhat tolerated a Hezbollah presence along its northern border for years, Hamas’ ground attack changed the calculation: Many evacuees will be unwilling to return if terrorists remain in close range of their communities.

“If Israel and Hezbollah see it as in their interest to have a temporary ceasefire to recover from the exchange of attacks in the last couple of months, then there will be a ceasefire. I’m skeptical about that,” Steinberg said. “Israel has a very strong incentive to push into southern Lebanon and make it possible for at least 60,000 Israeli civilians who were forced to flee on October 8, when Hezbollah began its attacks on the north, to return home.”

Has the Third Lebanon War Begun?

The U.S. calls for calm while Hezbollah and Israel consider their next steps.

thedispatch.com · by Charlotte Lawson · September 27, 2024

TEL AVIV, Israel—After nearly a year of cross-border fighting in the north, Israel has ushered in what its defense minister calls a “new phase” in the war against Hezbollah with a series of aggressive operations. The goal: to push the Iranian-backed terrorist organization, through diplomacy or force, to abandon its strategy of slowly weakening Israel through a war of attrition.

This week began with the military’s largest wave of airstrikes against Hezbollah infrastructure to date, with Israeli warplanes hitting an estimated 1,600 military targets across Lebanon on Monday. The campaign destroyed tens of thousands of Hezbollah’s estimated 150,000 to 200,000 projectiles in a single day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that night.

The aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stockpiles and launchers have persisted in the days since, as have Israel’s efforts to systematically dismantle the group’s top leadership through precision strikes on Beirut. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said Tuesday that it had successfully targeted Ibrahim Qubaisi, head of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket force, in a Beirut airstrike. On Thursday, another precision strike on the Lebanese capital killed Hezbollah’s top drone chief.

The high-level hits followed an aerial attack last week that killed some 20 commanders of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force and the detonation of explosives in thousands of pagers—an alleged Israeli operation that a Hezbollah official said took 1,500 fighters off the board.

“The degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities in the last couple of weeks has no precedent historically. Even their ability to shoot rockets seems to have been quite limited,” Gerald Steinberg, a professor at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, told The Dispatch. “And of the top 20 people who have been the main officials in Hezbollah responsible for building a force and for implementing attack plans, about half of them are gone. That’s a very major loss for Hezbollah. They can fill those positions, but it’ll take time.”

With Hezbollah reeling from the repeated attacks, analysts are now questioning whether Israel is laying the ground to broaden the war further—perhaps by pushing into southern Lebanon to create a buffer zone that allows its displaced northern residents to return home—or whether it’s attempting to corner the group into an agreement that ends hostilities.

“Israel is, after 11 months, finally responding to 8,000 rockets and missiles and drones. The question is: Can Israel achieve de-escalation through deterrence?,” said Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Now we’re putting to the test whether a forceful response can help bring about an end to this—in other words, show Hezbollah that there is a price—or whether Hezbollah is willing to go all the way.”

So far, the militant group’s response has been inconclusive. While Hezbollah has demonstrated its willingness to escalate, the terrorist group also refrained from unleashing its full firepower on Israeli cities, as many officials expected it to early on. It remains unclear whether it’s holding back because of a lack of capability—both in personnel and materiel—or due to concern about bringing the sides to an all-out war. The group shot a lone ballistic missile at Tel Aviv early Wednesday morning, but Israel’s air defenses intercepted it.

“Hezbollah suffered heavy losses, no doubt about it. But it’s still capable of continuing the war.”

Eyal Zisser

“Hezbollah suffered heavy losses, no doubt about it. But it’s still capable of continuing the war,” Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University and an expert on Lebanon, told The Dispatch. “I doubt very much that Hezbollah will be ready to cease fire as long as the war in Gaza continues.” Such a move, he added, would be tantamount to a “white flag” after the group began firing on Israel in solidarity with Hamas following its October 7 massacre of 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, in the south.

Calling off its attacks while the war in Gaza continues would undermine Iran’s “unity of arenas” strategy, in which its various proxies in the region come to one another’s aid. Yet Iran has refrained from becoming directly involved, despite a reported request by Hezbollah for Tehran to intervene by attacking Israel on its behalf. “[The Israelis] are dragging us to a point where we do not wish to go,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Monday, accusing Jerusalem of setting “traps” to draw his country into a broader war.

Meanwhile, the U.S. remains determined to broker truce agreements between Israel and Hezbollah. In a joint statement with French President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday, President Joe Biden called on a settlement that allows civilians on both sides of the border to return home safely. “The exchange of fire since October 7th, and in particular over the past two weeks, threatens a much broader conflict, and harm to civilians,” the leaders wrote.

The statement doesn’t mention Hezbollah by name, nor does it articulate a plan for the group’s withdrawal from the Israeli border. In theory, the proposed 21-day pause in fighting would allow the two parties to reach a more lasting arrangement. In practice, Israeli officials worry it would allow Hezbollah to recover and regroup with little progress toward a deal that addresses the ongoing displacement of Israel’s northern communities.

For Israel’s part, the objective is clear: Hezbollah must demilitarize in areas of Lebanon south of the Litani River. The proposed buffer zone is in keeping with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War by mandating Hezbollah’s withdrawal but was never enforced by the Lebanese government or the international community, despite the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the area.

While Israel somewhat tolerated a Hezbollah presence along its northern border for years, Hamas’ ground attack changed the calculation: Many evacuees will be unwilling to return if terrorists remain in close range of their communities.

“If Israel and Hezbollah see it as in their interest to have a temporary ceasefire to recover from the exchange of attacks in the last couple of months, then there will be a ceasefire. I’m skeptical about that,” Steinberg said. “Israel has a very strong incentive to push into southern Lebanon and make it possible for at least 60,000 Israeli civilians who were forced to flee on October 8, when Hezbollah began its attacks on the north, to return home.”

thedispatch.com · by Charlotte Lawson · September 27, 2024

22. Stanley McChrystal: Why Kamala Harris Has Won Me Over

I offer this not as a partisan endorsement but for the civil-military relations question about senior retired military officers making political endorsements (which of course they have every right to do so).

Opinion

Guest Essay

Stanley McChrystal: Why Kamala Harris Has Won Me Over

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/26/opinion/kamala-harris-president.html?

Sept. 26, 2024

Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

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By Stanley McChrystal

General McChrystal is a retired Army general and the founder of the McChrystal Group, a consulting firm.

Some deeply consequential decisions are starkly simple. That is how I view our upcoming presidential election. And that is why I have already cast my ballot for character — and voted for Vice President Kamala Harris.

As a citizen, veteran and voter, I was not comfortable with many of the policy recommendations that Democrats offered at their convention in Chicago or those Republicans articulated in Milwaukee. My views tend more toward the center of the political spectrum. And although I have opinions on high-profile issues, like abortion, gun safety and immigration, that’s not why I made my decision.

Political narratives and policies matter, but they didn’t govern my choice. I find it easy to be attracted to, or repelled by, proposals on taxes, education and countless other issues. But I believe that events and geopolitical and economic forces will, like strong tides, move policymakers where they ultimately must go. In practice, few administrations travel the course they campaigned on. Circumstances change. Our president, therefore, must be more than a policymaker or a malleable reflection of the public’s passions. She or he must lead — and that takes character.

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Character is the ultimate measure of leadership for those who seek the highest office in our land. The American revolutionary Thomas Paine is said to have written, “Reputation is what men and women think of us; character is what God and angels know of us.” Regardless of what a person says, character is ultimately laid bare in his or her actions. So I pay attention to what a leader does.

History has shown us that the office of the presidency unfailingly reveals the occupant’s character. Moments of disappointment and crisis — like Jimmy Carter’s acceptance of responsibility for the failed 1980 Iran hostage rescue mission, John F. Kennedy’s navigation of the terrifying 13-day confrontation over Soviet missiles in Cuba and Abraham Lincoln’s courageous issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation — said little about policy but much about character.

And we’ve seen both sides of the coin: Failures of character, such as those of Richard Nixon and his vice president Spiro Agnew, dishonor and potentially threaten our republic. Character will dictate whether we stand by our NATO allies and against Vladimir Putin’s continued aggression. Character will dictate whether we have a commander in chief who honors and respects the men and women who serve in uniform.

Fortunately, neither candidate in this pivotal election is unknown to us. We’ve had years to watch both closely.

Each of us must seriously contemplate our choice and apply the values we hope to find in our president, our nation and ourselves. Uncritically accepting the thinking of others or being swayed by the roar of social media crowds is a mistake. To turn a blind eye toward or make excuses for weak character from someone we propose to confer awesome power and responsibility on is to abrogate our role as citizens. We will get — and deserve — what we elect.

I’ve thought deeply about my choice and considered what I’ve seen and heard and what I owe my three granddaughters. I’ve concluded that it isn’t political slogans or cultural tribalism; it is the best president my vote might help select. So I have cast my vote for character, and that vote is for Vice President Kamala Harris.

Ms. Harris has the strength, the temperament and, importantly, the values to serve as commander in chief. When she sits down with world leaders like President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, representing the United States on the global stage, I have no doubt that she is working in our national interest, not her own.

I would urge others to vote as I have. But whatever decision you make, let it be thoughtfully considered, carefully reached and yours alone. We’ll all have to live with it.

Stanley McChrystal is a retired Army general and the founder of the McChrystal Group, a consulting firm.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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1. The Asia Power Index

2. What the U.S. Election Means for Ukraine

3. The Profusion of Recon-Strike

4. China’s Nuclear Arsenal Expands

5. Hezbollah: Everyone’s Problem

The Big Five - 27 September edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on the character of modern war and planning for future

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-big-five-27-september-edition?utm conflict.

1. The Asia Power Index

2. What the U.S. Election Means for Ukraine

3. The Profusion of Recon-Strike

4. China’s Nuclear Arsenal Expands

5. Hezbollah: Everyone’s Problem

Special operations forces face hurdles to DOD program for civilian transition, report says

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 27, 2024

How Defense Experts Got Ukraine Wrong

Has the Third Lebanon War Begun?

“Hezbollah suffered heavy losses, no doubt about it. But it’s still capable of continuing the war.”

Stanley McChrystal: Why Kamala Harris Has Won Me Over