​Quotes of the Day:

"The necessary limitations of map problems [today perhaps computer simulations] inhibit the student from considering the effects of hunger, emotion, personality, fatigue, leadership, and many other imponderable yet vital factors."

– Maj George S. Patton, Jr., (1931)

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."

– John Milton

"I know you won't believe me, but the highest form of human excellence is to question oneself and others."

– Socrates

1. N. Korea cracks down on ‘I love you’ as decadent expression

2. Kim Jong Un’s strategic gamble on a post-Western order

3. Another Trump-Kim Meeting May Be in the Works Despite North Korea’s Unwavering Stance Against Denuclearization

4.  With Trump, Xi visits in sight, S. Korea eyes APEC summit to advance N.K. peace bid, tariff talks

5. Right-wing civic groups hold anti-China rally in Seoul

6. N. Korea to grant pardon to convicted people on occasion of key party anniv.

7. S. Korea, U.S. to launch working group to address visa system this week

8. Presidential office says S. Korea, U.S. discuss currency manipulator issue

9. US eyes partnership with Korea for maritime radar in waters claimed by China

10. Trump’s alarming overreach ($350 billion)

11. Editorial: Korean Tensions Stem from Kim Dynasty's Invasion, Terror, Nuclear Arms

12. A North Korean general’s forgotten memoir illuminates the regime’s brutality

13. What Kim Jong-un wants

14. How 'KPop Demon Hunters' Went Global: Myth, K-Tradition, Fandom

1. N. Korea cracks down on ‘I love you’ as decadent expression

​There can be no love in north Korea.  Yes, we can make light of this.

However, when you think about it this is an example of the most egregious of human rights abuses - the regime is trying to eliminate the humanity of human beings in order to completely dominate and completely control each individual Korea who lives in the north.

How can we let this stand? How can there be peaceful coexistence with a regime like this? How can anyone "respect" the regime's political system that does such a thing to the people?

N. Korea cracks down on ‘I love you’ as decadent expression

Young North Koreans routinely consume foreign entertainment—music, films and TV shows from South Korea and China—without much concern about the source

By Eun Seol - September 23, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-cracks-down-on-i-love-you-as-decadent-expression/?tztc=1

North Korea's Rodong Sinmun showed people visiting flower shops on March 7 to buy flowers to celebrate the March 8 International Women's Day. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea has stepped up crackdowns on young people’s love letters, condemning the phrase “I love you” as a sign of “decadent lifestyles.”

Officials from a factory’s Socialist Patriotic Youth League in Hamhung discovered a love letter during a routine inspection on Sept. 13 and turned it into an ideological issue, according to a Daily NK source in South Hamgyong province recently.

“They criticized the phrase ‘I love you,’ which was in the letter, and made a big deal of the matter,” the source said Friday.

The officials found the letter in a young person’s bag while checking personal electronic devices after holding criticism sessions for league members. The letter contained romantic expressions like “I love you” and “The only thing I think of is you.”

The deputy head of the factory’s Socialist Patriotic Youth League committee called the letter evidence of a “decadent lifestyle imbued with capitalist views of love” and immediately organized an ideological struggle session.

During the session, the letter writer was condemned for his “rotten spirit” and forced to publicly criticize himself in front of fellow members.

“Lovers often say ‘I like you,’ but use ‘I love you’ less frequently,” the source explained. “All he did was write down feelings he couldn’t express out loud, but officials turned it into a major issue. Other league members watched the struggle session with disgust, like they were chewing rotten cucumbers.”

Targeting foreign influence

Young North Koreans routinely consume foreign entertainment—music, films and TV shows from South Korea and China—without much concern about the source. Authorities view this as violations of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (2020) and Youth Education Guarantee Act (2021).

Officials have ordered youth organizations to conduct surprise inspections of electronic devices to catch consumption of foreign content. The love letter was discovered during one such inspection, where a simple expression of affection became an ideological problem.

“Young people have various ways to avoid detection, but they can’t escape surprise inspections by their organizations,” the source said. “The league made a big deal of this incident to intimidate young people and suppress even their personal feelings.”

News of the struggle session spread quickly, sparking public criticism mixed with sarcasm.

“People called it absurd, saying things like, ‘If “I love you” is decadent, then the entire world is decadent,'” the source said. “Most couldn’t understand why authorities would crack down on private emotional expressions.”

Read in Korean

2. Kim Jong Un’s strategic gamble on a post-Western order

​I really wish we would consider that the only strategy that we have not tried is unification first, then denuclearization. This excerpt alon should convince of this.

Excerpts:

For 30 years, North Korea pursued autonomy and legitimacy by courting Washington. Now, Pyongyang is taking a different route: embedding itself in an emerging multipolar order that challenges the US-led rules-based system, where it can gain prestige, recognition and the prospect of integration into a rising alternative international community – without compromising regime security or its nuclear status.

In this new reality, diplomacy on terms set by Washington and Seoul is not just unnecessary for Kim Jong Un – it has become counterproductive. The costs of engagement – pressure to denuclearize, risk of appearing subordinate or undermining ties with Moscow and Beijing – outweigh any potential benefits.

In his September 21 speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim turned the tables on both Trump and Lee. There will be no talk of denuclearization, no talk of reunification. The old formula of normalization through denuclearization is finished. Pyongyang no longer seeks Washington’s stamp of approval. That moment has passed.

North Korea has turned the page – and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula must follow, or fade.

​We need to go back to basics and answer these five questions:

1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?

2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

3. Who does Kim fear more: The US and South Korean militaries or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)

4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?

Kim Jong Un’s strategic gamble on a post-Western order - Asia Times

asiatimes.com · Marialaura De Angelis · September 26, 2025

This article, originally published by Pacific Forum, is republished with permission.

If one wonders why North Korea is withholding engagement with Washington and Seoul, the optics of Beijing’s Victory Day military parade may hold the answer. Surrounded by Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and more than two dozen leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Kim Jong Un appeared not as an isolated outlier but as a peer in a shifting world order.

His front-row presence signaled a decisive break from North Korea’s decades-long pursuit of US recognition and the start of a calculated gamble on a post-Western order. Kim now seeks legitimacy and economic development not from Washington, but from an emerging international community outside US leadership.

Since the breakdown of the Trump-Kim talks in Hanoi in 2019, the space for renewed US-DPRK engagement has narrowed considerably. Even with pro-engagement administrations returning in both Washington and Seoul, Kim has signaled a deliberate strategy of distancing, by dismissing a personal outreach letter from Donald Trump and publicly rejecting overtures from South Korea’s new Lee Jae Myung administration.

Analysts often explain this posture in terms of two shifts:

• Kim’s policy recalibration after the failure of Trump-era diplomacy, when he appeared to abandon both the long-standing goal of normalization with the United States and inter-Korean policy; and
• the opportunities opened by Russia’s war in Ukraine, which left Moscow isolated and eager for partners, giving Pyongyang leverage to reduce its dependence on China.

While valid, these explanations do not capture why Kim is not simply raising the stakes with Washington and Seoul but, instead, is shutting the door on engagement altogether.

The fact is, Kim has not simply shifted policy – he has charted a new strategic course for North Korea, one in which Washington is no longer the protagonist.

Constant pursuit of independence and legitimacy

Pyongyang’s foreign policy has always been driven by more than regime survival. Since its founding, North Korea has sought to assert sovereignty and independence – but also to secure international legitimacy and prestige and to escape the image of Korea as a “shrimp among whales” trapped between powerful neighbors.

The Kim dynasty has consistently sought opportunities to advance these goals, demonstrating a pragmatic willingness to shift alignments as the global balance of power evolved.

In the 1950s and ‘60s, Kim Il Sung exploited the growing rivalry between Beijing and Moscow to foster a polycentric international communist system in which Pyongyang could expand its influence. In the 1970s, he leveraged the 1948 Yugoslavia–USSR split by reaching out to Tito in an attempt to position North Korea as a leading voice in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the 1990s, when the Soviet collapse left Pyongyang isolated, Kim Il Sung calculated that recognition from the United States—the post-Cold War superpower—was the only way forward. Since then and for decades after Kim’s death, normalization with Washington became a central pillar of North Korean strategy, carried forward by Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un.

That vision collapsed in Hanoi. There, Kim Jong Un confronted the reality that even under the most favorable conditions, US and North Korean goals were fundamentally irreconcilable. The breakdown of diplomacy with Trump meant more to Kim than simply losing a deal—it signaled the abandonment of the strategic vision that had guided North Korean foreign policy for decades. He now needed a new path forward.

A Moscow opening, a BRICS dream

In line with traditional North Korean strategy, Kim Jong Un is seeking to achieve his goals by exploiting fractures in the great-power divide and recalibrating alliances in response to shifting global dynamics.

Pyongyang shares Beijing’s view of today’s geopolitical landscape not as “Cold War 2.0” but as the inevitable decline of Western dominance and the rise of multipolarity. Within this context, China and Russia’s growing rift with the US has created an opening for North Korea to assert itself as an independent and influential actor in the emerging alternative international community.

However, Pyongyang adds its own vision of the emerging international community as fundamentally anti-imperialist. As Kim laid out in his 2024 policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea “should set the development of relations with socialist countries as its primary task” and “launch a courageous anti-imperialist joint action and joint struggle on an international scale.”

The war in Ukraine and renewed ties with Moscow mark the first step along this path. Just as Kim Il Sung once saw Tito as a bridge into the Non-Aligned Movement, Kim Jong Un may view Putin as a stepping stone toward broader international recognition.

In fact, their 2024 treaty pledged mutual support in joining international organizations, and Pyongyang’s participation in BRICS sideline events signals a clear ambition to join the bloc.

For Pyongyang, BRICS offers more than symbolism. Membership would anchor North Korea in an alternative order that rejects US-led dominance and brings together rising powers such as China, India and Brazil.

Washington’s role in Pyongyang’s shift

US foreign policy has played a paradoxical role in the development of Kim’s new strategy.

Over the past decade, rather than pursuing a classic divide-and-rule strategy to exploit the many deep-seated frictions among its rivals, Washington has sought to cast China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as a single bloc – CRINK, a new “axis of evil” meant to rally allies against them.

Yet this combine-and-contain approach, designed to reinforce US leverage, has produced the opposite effect: America’s adversaries are finding common cause in resisting US pressure, bridging their divides and expanding cooperation.

The primary beneficiary of this dynamic is North Korea. While the war in Ukraine provided Kim with short-term breathing space, the broader confrontation produced by Washington’s Cold War strategy has opened the way for his long-term ambitions.

By casting Pyongyang as a prominent player in a wider anti-Western bloc, US rhetoric accelerates its integration into an international order in which North Korea can thrive without compromising on its status or regime security.

In this context, engagement in denuclearization talks with the United States looks not only unnecessary but counterproductive to Kim’s goals. Kim has no incentive to return to the negotiating table.

Some had hoped that Donald Trump’s return to the presidency might disrupt this trajectory, given that his personal diplomacy with Kim once appeared to sidestep entrenched Cold War logic. Yet his personal tweets during the parade lashed out not only at Beijing but also at Moscow and Pyongyang – while even alienating India through new trade tariffs and pointed remarks about its ties to China.

Instead of breaking the anti-Western bloc narrative, Trump inadvertently reinforced it.

Beijing’s parade: A triumph leaving no hope for denuclearization

The optics of China’s Victory Day military parade embodied Kim’s success. Twenty-six leaders from what was branded a new “international community” stood alongside Xi and Putin. Kim Jong Un was not at the margins but in the front row, projecting equality and prestige.

This was precisely the kind of international recognition Kim and his predecessor had sought for decades – finally achieved not through compromise with Washington but by rejecting it.

For 30 years, North Korea pursued autonomy and legitimacy by courting Washington. Now, Pyongyang is taking a different route: embedding itself in an emerging multipolar order that challenges the US-led rules-based system, where it can gain prestige, recognition and the prospect of integration into a rising alternative international community – without compromising regime security or its nuclear status.

In this new reality, diplomacy on terms set by Washington and Seoul is not just unnecessary for Kim Jong Un – it has become counterproductive. The costs of engagement – pressure to denuclearize, risk of appearing subordinate or undermining ties with Moscow and Beijing – outweigh any potential benefits.

In his September 21 speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim turned the tables on both Trump and Lee. There will be no talk of denuclearization, no talk of reunification. The old formula of normalization through denuclearization is finished. Pyongyang no longer seeks Washington’s stamp of approval. That moment has passed.

North Korea has turned the page – and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula must follow, or fade.

Marialaura De Angelis (marialaura@pacforum.org) is a James A. Kelly resident fellow at Pacific Forum and an affiliated researcher at the East-West Center. She also serves as a senior advisor to the NGO Track2Asia in Brussels.

asiatimes.com · Marialaura De Angelis · September 26, 2025

3. Another Trump-Kim Meeting May Be in the Works Despite North Korea’s Unwavering Stance Against Denuclearization

I wonder if KJU will play us along and then ultimately snub us to make a point that he no longer needs diplomacy with the US. We (the ROK and US) may be setting ourselves up for an embarrassing failure but trying to make a meeting happen. I see Lucy and the football - we are Charlie Boran having the football pulled from us at the last minute.

Another Trump-Kim Meeting May Be in the Works Despite North Korea’s Unwavering Stance Against Denuclearization

A noted Korea analyst says he thinks there may be a way around the nuclear impasse. ‘Trump may say denuclearization here in D.C. and then call KJU a nuke power when he meets him.’

DONALD KIRK

Sept. 26, 2025 03:10 PM ET

nysun.com

President Trump may meet a leader he has referred to as his bosom friend, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, for the fourth time during the gathering of leaders of the 21 member states of the Asia Pacific Economic Policy group next month in South Korea.

A noted North Korea analyst, Victor Cha, is holding out that possibility after Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency reported that Mr. Kim, during a speech at Pyongyang, said there was “no reason for us not to sit down with the United States.”

The catch, of course, is that Mr. Kim warned Mr. Trump against any illusions about North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons. Although he has “a good memory” of their meetings, Mr. Kim is conditioning another on Washington dropping “its hollow obsession with denuclearization.”

Mr. Cha, who directs Korean issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said he thinks there may be a way around the nuclear impasse. “I don’t necessarily see that as an obstacle,” he told the Sun. “Trump may say denuclearization here in D.C. and then call KJU a nuke power when he meets him.”

The prospect of a meeting between Messrs. Trump and Kim is gaining currency since the president of Communist China, Xi Jinping, confirmed that he would attend the Apec talkfest, to be held on October 31 and November 1 at the southeastern Korean city of Gyeongju, a tourist destination noted for its ancient palaces, temples, and shrines.

“Trump Open to Meeting Kim Jong-un Without Denuclearization,” a headline in South Korea’s biggest-selling newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, said, speculating that Mr. Trump might see a meeting with Mr. Kim “as diplomatic push ahead of midterms” — a reference to the 2026 congressional elections in which Republican control of Congress will be on the line.

Both Washington and its South Korean ally have reaffirmed longstanding demands for North Korea’s “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization,” but there may be ways of getting around that policy without giving up CVID as an abstract goal.

South Korea’s left-leaning president, Lee Jae-myung, favors moving toward North-South reconciliation without abandoning the need for CVID. The question, he told the UN General Assembly, “is whether we persist with fruitless attempts towards the ultimate goal or we set more realistic goals and achieve some of them.”

At this stage, however, North Korea is not recognizing South Korea as anything other than an ”enemy state” and refuses contact of any kind, including at the “truce village” of Panmunjom, where Mr. Trump last saw Mr. Kim in an almost impromptu meeting in June 2019. Mr. Lee is all for Mr. Trump bridging the gap. Mr. Trump, hosting Mr. Lee at the White House last month, said he and Mr Kim might even meet “this year.”

Mr. Trump, in his UN speech, said not a word about North Korea — an omission that stands in stark contrast to the drubbing he gave Mr. Kim in his UN speech of eight years ago, in which he called him “rocket man.” Mr. Kim, by ordering nuclear and missile tests, was “on a suicide mission,” he said at the time, warning there might be “no choice but to totally destroy” his country.

Since then North Korea, possibly under pressure from China, has conducted no nuclear tests but has gone on producing nuclear warheads at four different sites and is believed by now to have stockpiled about 100 of them along with intercontinental ballistic missiles needed to send them to distant targets.

Mr. Trump’s omission of North Korea at the UN may show a desire to soften his stance while looking to ease tensions with China, which, along with Russia, not only guarantees the North’s defense but provides most of its oil and half the hungry nation’s food.

Mr. Trump has often said that he and Mr. Kim “fell in love” during their first summit, in Singapore in June 2018. They have remained on warm terms despite the failure of their second summit in February 2019 in Hanoi, where Mr. Kim flatly refused to give up his nuclear program.

If Mr. Trump does see Mr. Kim again at Panmunjom, it will be an impromptu mission resembling his side trip to the North-South line more than six years ago, when he was in South Korea to see Korea’s then-president, Moon Jae-in. Like Mr. Lee, the leftist Mr. Moon applauded the meeting even though Mr. Kim would have nothing to do with him after having seen him three times previously, including during one summit on the North-South line.

nysun.com

4.  With Trump, Xi visits in sight, S. Korea eyes APEC summit to advance N.K. peace bid, tariff talks

​Setting the conditions for a major snub. Or perhaps the only way to make this happen may be to recognize north Korea as a nuclear power and set conditions to make Kim look more important on the world stage than he really is.

Either way, Kim looks good and we look bad. KJU continues to win the peninsula poker game with his pair of two's. 

(News Focus) With Trump, Xi visits in sight, S. Korea eyes APEC summit to advance N.K. peace bid, tariff talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 28, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Sept. 28 (Yonhap) -- With U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the offing, the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit may set the stage for South Korea to advance its North Korea peace initiative and stalled tariff talks with Washington.

The multilateral gathering, set to be held in the southern South Korean city of Gyeongju on Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, comes as the Lee Jae Myung government seeks to restore inter-Korean ties and revive the stalled nuclear dialogue between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The summit also comes as Seoul seeks to maintain stable ties with China and leverage Beijing's role in facilitating talks with Pyongyang, carefully navigating its strategy amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.

Lee is widely expected to hold bilateral summits with both leaders on the margins of the forum. If realized, it would mark the second summit with Trump in about two months and the first talks with Xi.

In this file photo, President Lee Jae Myung shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump during their summit talks at the Oval Office in the White House, Washington, D.C., on Aug. 26, 2025. (Yonhap)

In his U.N. address Tuesday, Lee unveiled the "END" initiative -- a peace road map for the Korean Peninsula that calls for resuming exchanges (E), normalizing ties with North Korea (N) and denuclearizing the reclusive state (D).

The initiative follows Lee's "three-stage" approach to North Korea's denuclearization, starting with the suspension of its nuclear programs, followed by their reduction and dismantlement.

Despite debate over the feasibility of the plans, given North Korea's fierce resistance to relinquishing its nuclear arsenal and repeated rejection of Seoul's overtures, the initiative underscores Lee's determination to bring Pyongyang back to dialogue and break the nuclear deadlock, even at the risk of repeating his predecessors' failures.

In recent interviews with foreign media, Lee indicated he is open to granting North Korea sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze on its nuclear programs, warning that continued pressure would only prompt the North to produce more bombs.

"For the North Korean nuclear issue, we often think of this as a choice between all or nothing ... But I believe that there is a middle ground," Lee told Time magazine.

He told BBC it would be "an interim emergency measure" and a "realistic alternative" to "fruitless attempts toward the ultimate goal of denuclearization."

This file photo, released by the Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 5, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping for summit talks in Beijing the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

As Trump has touted his personal rapport with Kim and expressed willingness to meet him again "this year," attention is drawn to whether another meeting between the two leaders will materialize at the APEC summit.

Trump's third and last meeting with Kim took the world by surprise as they met at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in June 2019, a spectacle that came after Trump had offered to meet Kim via a social media message.

In an apparent response to Trump's outreach, Kim said at last week's parliamentary meeting that there is no reason for him to avoid meeting Trump, noting he has "a good memory" of the president, but only so long as Washington drops its denuclearization demand.

South Korea's top national security adviser Wi Sung-lac has downplayed the likelihood of a Trump-Kim meeting during the APEC summit.

South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol (2nd from R) holds talks with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick (2nd from L) during their meeting to discuss bilateral trade issues in Washington, D.C., on July 29, 2025, in this file photo provided by the finance ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Seoul is also likely to seize on the APEC event to hash out with the Trump administration details of their tariff deal that has dragged on since the two countries verbally reached an agreement in late July.

The two sides agreed to a framework under which the Trump administration will lower "reciprocal" tariffs on Korea and sectoral levies on Korean autos to 15 percent from 25 percent, in return for Korea's commitment to investing US$350 billion in the United States, along with other pledges.

However, they have yet to put the agreement in writing, with the two sides still far apart on how to finance the investment package and divide the profits. Seoul has pushed for loans and loan guarantees, while Washington reportedly wants its ally to make direct equity investments and claim most of the profits once Korea recoups its initial investment.

South Korea has proposed a currency swap line as a safety net. Lee has said in an interview with Reuters that the Korean economy could face a crisis comparable to the 1997 financial meltdown if his government accepts current U.S. demands without safeguards.

Lee said that he hopes the allies will "maintain the minimum amount of rationality" and reaching an agreement that guarantees "commercial reasonableness" will be key to finalizing the negotiations.

Speaking to reporters at the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Wi expressed hope that the tariff talks will be resolved during the APEC summit and said Seoul is working to reach a conclusion even earlier.

Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo (R) inspects a venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju, about 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on Sept. 4, 2025, in this file photo provided by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Xi's widely expected visit is also in focus.

If realized, it would mark his first visit to South Korea in 11 years. Xi last paid a state visit to Seoul in July 2014 at the invitation of then President Park Geun-hye. It has been speculated that Seoul is arranging a state visit for Xi.

Lee and Xi would discuss North Korea and other outstanding bilateral issues, such as China's steel structures in the overlapping area of the Yellow Sea that has sparked a row between the two countries.

On North Korea, Lee is expected to call for China, Pyongyang's traditional ally and biggest economic sponsor, to do its part to bring the North back to dialogue.

They could discuss North Korean issues in light of the expanding military ties between North Korea and Russia since Pyongyang's troop dispatch to aid Moscow's war against Ukraine under a bilateral defense treaty forged last June.

China invited Kim to its major military parade in Beijing earlier this month, where the North Korean leader stood alongside Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin atop Tiananmen Square in what many saw as a show of solidarity against the South Korea-U.S.-Japan partnership.

Lee could also address ways to resolve China's unofficial ban on Korean entertainment and cultural content, such as K-pop concerts and TV dramas, imposed in 2016 in apparent retaliation for South Korea's deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system.

This EPA photo shows the Hwabaek International Convention Center, a venue of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Sept. 24, 2025. (Yonhap)

The APEC summit itself will provide Seoul an opportunity to reinforce its global standing as a key international stakeholder, with the Lee government highlighting its brand of "pragmatic" diplomacy to tackle trade and other common challenges amid rising protectionism.

This year's gathering, held under the banner "Building a Sustainable Tomorrow," will focus on three pillars -- connect, innovate and prosper -- reflecting the forum's commitment to fostering a resilient and inclusive future.

The summit will address trade and investment, innovation, digitalization, and sustainable growth, APEC Senior Officials' Meeting Chair Yoon Seong-mee said earlier. It also aims to advance digital transformation in the region, addressing the digital divide and the growing role of artificial intelligence, as well as demographic challenges such as low birth rates and an aging population.

It remains to be seen whether the member states will reach consensus on key issues and produce a leaders' declaration, given their differing positions on trade and other economic agendas.

The summit is expected to draw some 20,000 participants worldwide, including about 3,500 government delegates from the 21 APEC member economies.

Ministerial meetings of top foreign and trade officials will be held the same week ahead of the main summit session, followed by a gathering of global business leaders.

In this file photo, South Korean Science and ICT Minister Bae Kyung-hoon (C) addresses a meeting of digital and artificial intelligence ministers from 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum member economies at the Songdo Convensia convention center in Incheon, west of Seoul, on Aug. 4, 2025. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 28, 2025

5. Right-wing civic groups hold anti-China rally in Seoul

​This should not be a right or left wing issue. China is conducting malign activities in South Korea and Koreans should be united against these threats.

But I think we have different views on what democracy is all about. This reeks of kowtowing to China. Why are the same statements not made about his supporters who conduct anti-American protests?

Excerpts:

Earlier this month, President Lee criticized the anti-China rallies as being "rife with profanity and hateful remarks that went beyond freedom of expression."

Lee said such rallies do not align with South Korea's global status as "a model nation for democracy that values diversity and inclusiveness."

Right-wing civic groups hold anti-China rally in Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 28 (Yonhap) -- Protesters from ultra-right civic groups held an anti-China rally Sunday, chanting slogans calling for the release of now-jailed former President Yoon Suk Yeol over his martial law bid.

At 2:30 p.m., demonstrators from several conservative groups gathered at the square in front of Seoul Station in central Seoul and marched toward Namdaemun, which means "south gate."

Holding the national flags of South Korea and the United States, around 150 participants chanted slogans such as "(former) President Yoon Suk Yeol," "nullify the rigged election" and "arrest (President) Lee Jae Myung."

Some protesters held a message that calls for destroying China's Communist Party and were seen wearing T-shirts that carry phrases commemorating the assassination of U.S. conservative activist Charlie Kirk.

During the march, there were no reports of physical clashes with police.

Earlier this month, President Lee criticized the anti-China rallies as being "rife with profanity and hateful remarks that went beyond freedom of expression."

Lee said such rallies do not align with South Korea's global status as "a model nation for democracy that values diversity and inclusiveness."

This photo, taken Sept. 28, 2025, shows protesters from ultra-right civic groups holding an anti-China rally as they gathered at the square in front of Seoul Station in central Seoul and marched toward Namdaemun, which means "south gate." (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

6. N. Korea to grant pardon to convicted people on occasion of key party anniv.

​The power to pardon is the most important in any country. But it is used mostly for political purposes. 

N. Korea to grant pardon to convicted people on occasion of key party anniv. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will grant a pardon to convicted people next month on the occasion of the 80th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), state media reported Sunday, a move seen as aimed at solidifying internal unity.

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly has decided to grant a pardon to those who were convicted of "crimes against the country and people" to mark the WPK's founding anniversary set for Oct. 10, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The amnesty will be effective Wednesday, it said, noting the Cabinet and related organs will map out "practical measures" to help the pardoned settle and return to their normal lives.

North Korea last carried out pardons around two key anniversaries in 2022 -- the 110th birthday of late state founder Kim Il-sung's birthday in April and the 80th birthday of late former leader Kim Jong-il in February.

The North has granted pardons on the occasion of key national holidays and political events, including the birthdays of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Pardons also have been issued to mark the regime's Sept. 9 establishment and anniversaries of the WPK's founding when they end in a zero or five.

Experts said the purpose of the pardons is to elicit the people's loyalty toward the incumbent leader Kim Jong-un and appease the public amid the prolonged economic slowdown.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) presides over a key consultative meeting on the production of nuclear materials and weapons on Sept. 26, 2025, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

7. S. Korea, U.S. to launch working group to address visa system this week

​Let's get this fixed right. There has to be a win-win on this issue.

S. Korea, U.S. to launch working group to address visa system this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States will launch a working group this week to improve the visa system for Korean workers after the detention and release of more than 300 South Koreans in a recent U.S. immigration raid, diplomatic sources said Sunday.

The two nations will hold the inaugural meeting of the working group in Washington on Tuesday (local time), the sources said, weeks after the Georgia raid on South Korean workers.

In early September, more than 300 South Korean workers at a factory construction site in Georgia were detained for a week over unclear violations of visa rules. They were released after diplomatic negotiations.

Seoul's foreign ministry and the U.S. State Department will lead the working group, the sources said. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Commerce Department are also believed to be taking part in the group.

The two nations are widely expected to discuss how to improve the U.S. visa system for South Korean workers at a time when Korean firms have been carrying out large manufacturing projects in the U.S.

Many of those who were detained in the Georgia raid had arrived in the U.S. on a B1 visa, issued for business purposes, such as attending meetings or signing contracts, or under the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) visa waiver program for short-term stays.

South Korea and the U.S. are likely to discuss whether to flexibly apply the B1 visa. If the scope of business purposes under a B1 visa is clarified, the U.S. could swiftly address South Korean business people's difficulties without the need to change the current visa system.

The possibility of setting up a separate visa desk at the South Korean Embassy in the U.S. could be handled for Koreans making U.S. investments, according to the sources.

More than 300 South Korean workers arrive at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul, in this file photo taken Sept. 12, 2025, after a weeklong detention by U.S. immigration authorities in Georgia. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

8. Presidential office says S. Korea, U.S. discuss currency manipulator issue

Presidential office says S. Korea, U.S. discuss currency manipulator issue | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 28 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office said Sunday that South Korea and the United States have discussed the possibility of Seoul being designated a currency manipulator after Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol's recent remarks on the allies' completed foreign exchange (FX) talks.

Upon arrival from his trip to the U.S., Koo told reporters Saturday that South Korea and the U.S. have completed their FX negotiations and plan to announce the outcome soon.

His remarks spawned speculation that there may be some progress in Seoul's request for opening a currency swap line with the U.S., a proposal aimed at cushioning the potential impact on the FX market by South Korea's massive investment package in the U.S.

However, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said the FX negotiations referred to by Koo were not the same talks that centered on the tariff issue.

"The U.S. has determined whether or not to put some other countries on its list of currency manipulators. Regarding this, it's believed that it has not judged South Korea to be a currency manipulator," Kang said.

In June, the U.S. kept South Korea on its list of countries that should have their FX policies monitored, citing its trade and current account surplus with the U.S. Although South Korea is not designated as a currency manipulator, it has been kept on the monitoring list since November 2024.

In regard to the ongoing tariff talks with the U.S., Kang said the government is proceeding with the negotiations while prioritizing the promotion of national interests.

Trade negotiations between South Korea and the U.S. have shown little headway in resolving the details of Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge linked to lowering U.S. tariffs on Korean products from 25 percent to 15 percent.

Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung holds a press briefing at the presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, on Sept. 28, 2025, over the recent fire at the state data center in the central city of Daejeon. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 28, 2025

9. US eyes partnership with Korea for maritime radar in waters claimed by China

US eyes partnership with Korea for maritime radar in waters claimed by China - The Korea Times

Approach suggested as Ieodo Research Society discusses China’s gray zone tactics

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

JEJU ISLAND — A U.S. Special Operations Command official identified a Korean research group as a potential partner for a grant to install a powerful maritime radar in the waters southwest of Jeju Island around Ieodo, a submerged reef where Korea has maintained a science station to monitor the seas.

The suggestion came after China was found setting up structures in the West Sea, where Ieodo is located and where the two countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) overlap.

The Ieodo Research Society, a civilian think tank with close ties to Korea’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, received inquiries about the possibility of a $150,000 grant to install the radar, according to people familiar with the discussions.

“I have a $150,000 U.S. government grant to provide partners with enhanced maritime domain awareness radar. We would be able to set up and run a server and push all of the data to whomever you chose. I would like to discuss further,” the official said in an email to the think tank, obtained by The Korea Times.

The official added that improved monitoring of the undelimited maritime areas could ease tensions by allowing data to be shared.

An official from the research group told The Korea Times that Korea “already has what it needs,” citing existing technology monitoring the sea around Ieodo.

The offer comes as tensions sharpen over Ieodo, a submerged reef known in China as Suyan Rock, where Korea has operated Ieodo Ocean Research Station since 2003, monitoring oceanographic and atmospheric conditions and transmitting observations in real time. The site lies in waters controlled by Seoul but within the overlapping EEZs of both Korea and China.

For Washington, expanding surveillance would help track China’s increasingly assertive naval and coast guard patrols, and push allies to share intelligence in the region more closely. For Seoul, the station is more than a research base — it is a declaration that the country already has the means to monitor the Ieodo waters on its own.

The Republic of Korea Navy's 7,600-ton Aegis destroyer Yulgok Yi I patrols the waters around Ieodo, an underwater reef and home to a Korean ocean research station south of Jeju Island, in this file photo from Dec. 3, 2013, in the wake of China's declaration of a new air defense identification zone that includes it. Yonhap

The American official, who wished to remain unnamed, told The Korea Times during the Ieodo International Seminar — an annual event organized by the think tank, held in Jeju from Thursday to Saturday — that the message was neither an official proposal nor a formal U.S. Army stance, but rather a “personal opinion of what we can do.”

In the official’s hypothetical scenario, the data collected from the facility would be “made unclassified” and shared openly, with the aim of preventing a potential outbreak of conflict.

Tensions between Korea and China in the West Sea have increased in recent years over disputed territories, maritime installations and naval operations.

In April, Korea expressed “deep concern” over Chinese structures in the Provisional Measures Zone, where the countries’ EEZs overlap and where the two nations agreed to guarantee fishing activities for both countries. Beijing said its facilities support marine farming and fishing and are unrelated to sovereignty claims.

Ieodo, also called Socotra Rock, has emerged as a focal point in the dispute. The submerged reef lies 149 kilometers from Mara Island, Korea’s southernmost point, making it closer to Korea than to China. Seoul claims jurisdiction based on the median line principle, while Beijing objects to Korea’s activities in the area.

Founded in 2007 with government accreditation, the Ieodo Research Society promotes awareness of the underwater reef through research, education and publications on its strategic and scientific significance.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

10. Trump’s alarming overreach ($350 billion)

​Conclusion:

The Korea-U.S. alliance is strongest when rooted in fairness, not fear. Washington must reconsider the trajectory of its demands, and Seoul must respond with clarity, resolve and strategic foresight.

Trump’s alarming overreach - The Korea Times

Prudent diplomacy urged to address nonsensical demands

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent demand that South Korea provide a $350 billion “up-front” investment in exchange for tariff relief is a stark and troubling departure from the principles of mutual respect and reciprocity that should underpin the Korea-U.S. alliance. Not only is the figure equivalent to nearly 84 percent of Korea’s foreign exchange reserves, but the demand that it be delivered in cash — with Washington alone determining how and where the funds are invested — is an alarming overreach.

The Korean government has consistently explained that the proposed investment would be structured primarily through loans, guarantees and other financial instruments. Nevertheless, Washington appears to have reversed its position mid-negotiation, now insisting on a Japan-style cash injection. The result has been immediate and severe: The Korean won plummeted past 1,400 to the dollar — an important psychological barrier — while equity markets suffered a sharp decline. The uncertainty surrounding the talks is already reverberating through the economy, prompting fears of capital flight and even raising the specter of a second financial crisis.

More than an economic dispute, this impasse highlights a growing asymmetry in the Korea-U.S. relationship under the Trump administration. Trade negotiations have become increasingly entangled with broader issues of national security, including defense cost sharing and the status of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. If the current talks break down, Korea could face a punishing 25 percent blanket tariff, higher than those applied to Japan or the European Union. Trump has also threatened a 100 percent tariff on pharmaceuticals produced by foreign companies without manufacturing operations in the U.S., a move clearly aimed at intensifying pressure on Korea and other U.S. trading partners.

This kind of transactional diplomacy, built on coercion rather than cooperation, risks doing lasting damage to one of America’s most important alliances in Asia. Korea is not a passive recipient of U.S. security guarantees, but an active and reliable partner. Over the decades, Seoul has contributed to regional stability, expanded bilateral trade and stood shoulder to shoulder with Washington on major global issues. To treat such a partner as little more than a bargaining chip in a domestic political game is both shortsighted and self-defeating.

Furthermore, this high-handed approach is already fueling anti-American sentiment among the Korean public. The perception that the U.S. is demanding economic submission while offering little in return is not only damaging politically, but could erode popular support for the alliance itself. Washington must recognize that public opinion in Korea matters, and that the long-term cost of alienating a key ally will far outweigh any short-term gain.

To his credit, President Lee Jae Myung directly addressed these concerns during his recent meeting with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, emphasizing that Korea’s economic and monetary conditions differ significantly from those of Japan. He also warned that forcing a full cash investment without the backing of a currency swap agreement could destabilize Korea’s economy. His call for a commercially sound and mutually beneficial arrangement reflects a reasonable and constructive approach to what should be a collaborative process.

As the negotiations move forward, Seoul must remain firm in defending its national interests while maintaining open channels for diplomacy. Symbolic gestures that allow Trump to claim political victory may be inevitable, but they must be carefully calibrated to avoid irreversible concessions. Options such as phased investment rollouts, Korean participation in investment decisions and limited bilateral currency swap arrangements should all be explored as means of providing necessary safeguards.

The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit offers an opportunity to reset the tone. Korea should leverage this multilateral stage not only to defend its economic sovereignty but also to reaffirm the value of balanced and principled diplomacy. Strategic alignment with the U.S. must never come at the cost of national dignity.

The Korea-U.S. alliance is strongest when rooted in fairness, not fear. Washington must reconsider the trajectory of its demands, and Seoul must respond with clarity, resolve and strategic foresight.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

11. Editorial: Korean Tensions Stem from Kim Dynasty's Invasion, Terror, Nuclear Arms

​You cannot white wash north Korea's history of aggression.

Editorial: Korean Tensions Stem from Kim Dynasty's Invasion, Terror, Nuclear Arms

President Lee Jae-myung's remarks overlook North Korea's aggression history: invasions, terror, nuclear arms

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/09/27/3ZKDMSVVCFDDNF4J4OUP3UOMY4/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.09.27. 00:00

Updated 2025.09.27. 02:08

President Lee Jae-myung speaks at the Korea Investment Summit held at the New York Stock Exchange in the US on the 25th, local time. /Newsis

President Lee Jae-myung stated during an event held while on a visit to the U.S., “Concerns about military tensions on the Korean Peninsula arise solely for political reasons,” adding, “North Korea is being provoked for other reasons, and provocations have been made against North Korea.”

The “political reasons” mentioned by President Lee appear to relate to the operation involving the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Pyongyang during the tenure of former President Yoon Suk-yeol, which a special counsel team has recently scrutinized. Although no verdict has been reached regarding the truth of this operation, it was North Korea that first deployed UAVs. Shortly after former President Yoon’s inauguration, North Korea sent swarms of UAVs that entered areas near the presidential office.

The origin of the “military tensions on the Korean Peninsula” cited by President Lee traces back to the June 25th invasion. The nation’s land was devastated, and countless lives were lost. North Korea committed the 1968 Kim Shin-jo raid on Cheong Wa Dae, the 1983 Rangoon bombing, the 1987 Korean Air bombing, and the 2010 Cheonan sinking. Hundreds of South Korean citizens died, and many were abducted. In comparison, South Korea’s UAV response operation or leaflet dispersal toward North Korea are minor issues. No North Korean residents have been killed or injured. President Lee’s remarks raise questions about his understanding of the root causes of the Korean Peninsula’s problems. The tragedy of the peninsula fundamentally stems from the Kim regime’s invasion of the South, cross-border terrorism, enslavement of its people, and nuclear armament.

It is also perplexing that President Lee stated, “North Korea appears to have sufficiently secured nuclear weapons.” This suggests an urgency to lift sanctions and freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. However, the Democratic Party has historically downplayed North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. In the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear development, the party consistently claimed, “North Korea has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and lacks the capability.” Now, they assert, “North Korea has sufficiently secured nuclear weapons.” Few have apologized for this dramatic shift in stance.

12. A North Korean general’s forgotten memoir illuminates the regime’s brutality

​We cannot overlook what has happened and what is happening inside north Korea.

We should keep this in mind: The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

A North Korean general’s forgotten memoir illuminates the regime’s brutality

Firsthand account of Kim Il Sung’s purges shows how the DPRK turned to concentration camps as a tool of political terror

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/a-north-korean-generals-forgotten-memoir-illuminates-the-regimes-brutality/

Andrei Lankov September 26, 2025

North Korean military officials at a parade in Pyongyang | Image: NK News, edited

North Korea’s nationwide political prisons are notorious as much for secrecy as brutality, with only limited information about the crimes against humanity committed within their walls trickling out via defectors.

But a now-forgotten memoir by a former DPRK general offers a revealing look into the origins of this cruel system of terror, providing a rare account of life inside the black box of the country’s concentration camps.

The account of life in North Korea during the 1950s and 1960s — “The Taedong River Dyed Red” (붉게 물든 대동강) — was first published in Seoul in 1991 and credited to the author “Ryo Jong.” The preface made clear this was a pseudonym adopted for security reasons.

And with good reason. The author was a former North Korean general who fought in the Korean War but was arrested in 1959 on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government, later escaping and finding political asylum in China after serving his prison sentence.

It did not take long for the author to be identified as Major General Kang Su Bong, who was born in 1925 and died sometime between 1994 and 2005. 

Though Kang’s memoir attracted some interest among scholars, it remains poorly known to the broader public. That is unfortunate: The book is the only known prison narrative from 1960s North Korea, offering a rare firsthand account of one of the most opaque and repressive periods in DPRK history.

In the late 1950s, North Korea experienced a massive purge of its military and political elite, a local version of Stalin’s Great Purge of 1937-38. As in the Soviet case, many (if not a majority) of North Korea’s first-generation leaders perished in this political bloodletting.

Yet despite the scale of the repression, Kang remains the only known victim of the purge to have left behind a detailed written account.

An excerpt from Kang’s memoirs as serialized in the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper | Image: Dong-A Ilbo, edited by NK News

1

2

PURGING CHINESE INFLUENCE

During the Korean War, a significant number of North Korean generals and senior officers were former officers in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They were ethnic Koreans who had been sent to Korea at Mao Zedong’s direction and Kim Il Sung’s request. 

Though their combat experience had once been invaluable, by the late 1950s Kim Il Sung began distancing North Korea from both Chinese and Soviet influence. These ex-PLA officers, despite their wartime contributions, came to be viewed as a political liability or even an outright threat. In 1958-59, a purge of their ranks began.

As might be expected, they were accused of plotting a coup — a highly improbable accusation given the situation at the time. 

In late 1956, amid uprisings in Hungary and Poland, fellow Communist Bloc countries, the North Korean leadership drafted a contingency plan to be enacted in the event of similar unrest at home. The plan called for the swift seizure of government buildings, transportation hubs and other strategic points — in other words, the very steps one might take during a coup.

Kim Il Sung and his people would later point to the existence of this plan as “evidence” of a generals’ conspiracy. According to official claims, the military plotters were working in concert with a group of high-ranking party officials who, in Aug. 1956, publicly criticized Kim’s policies and called for North Korea to adopt the reformist line then emerging in the Soviet Union. 

In reality, the accusations in the North Korean military were highly selective: The purge focused almost exclusively on generals with Chinese (PLA) backgrounds.

North Korean founding leader Kim Il Sung | Image: KCTV

LIFE IN PRISON

Kang’s memoirs shed valuable light on the scale and mechanics of the late-1950s purge. Among the 243 prisoners held alongside Kang were roughly half a dozen Cabinet ministers, several department heads from the Central Committee, a few dozen senior civil officials (city mayors, deputy ministers, etc.) and numerous high-ranking military commanders.

Kang never fails to refer to the exact names and positions of other inmates, and from his descriptions, one is left with the impression that there were very few commoners in the facility: The vast majority of the inmates belonged to the top 0.1% of North Korea’s bureaucracy.

Unlike in later periods, the 1960s political prisoners were subjected to staged trials lasting an hour or so. Therefore, they were at least told about the length of their sentences, and those who survived did, in fact, get released once their terms were complete.

Until 1966, political prisoners were held in the same facilities as ordinary criminals, although any interaction between the two groups was strictly prohibited. Common criminals enjoyed rights that political inmates were denied: They could exchange letters with relatives, receive occasional family visits and accept care packages.

The conditions were harsh. Of the 243 inmates sent to the prison in 1960, 49 people had died by 1969.

One particularly revealing episode in Kang’s memoirs involves a fellow inmate who was executed following a public show trial. 

Soviet military authorities originally arrested the man in 1948 for anti-Soviet propaganda, and he spent six years in Soviet prisons. After Stalin’s death, North Korean citizens who had been imprisoned in the USSR between 1945 and 1954 were given a choice: remain in the Soviet Union or return home. He chose to return, only to be arrested again upon arrival in the DPRK.

While in prison, he recounted to fellow inmates that Soviet prisons, though hardly lenient, provided each prisoner with an individual sleeping space. In North Korean prisons, three inmates shared a single mattress and blanket. He also noted that Soviet inmates ate meat or fish several times a week — luxuries that were served only a few times per year in North Korea.

These casual comparisons were deemed “subversive propaganda” and, in the regime’s view, justification for execution.

One especially distinctive feature of prison life at the time was the mandatory system of mutual denunciation — a practice no longer believed to exist in North Korean prisons today. Each day, every inmate was issued a form and required to report on any improper behavior by fellow prisoners. Those who were particularly active in denouncing others were promised preferential treatment.

Some of the rules were bizarre. In one case, a prisoner was thrown into solitary confinement simply for calling another inmate “comrade.” The use of that word was strictly banned within the prison’s walls.

Image: Alexey Demidov via Pexels

AFTER RELEASE

After completing his prison sentence, Kang was sent into internal exile in a remote mountain village in South Pyongan Province. 

By then, he had learned that he would not be reunited with his family. The reasons remain unclear. Initially, officials told him that his wife and son would join him in due time. But later, without explanation, they informed him that he should no longer expect their arrival.

From the outset, Kang contemplated escape to China. A significant portion of his memoir is devoted to the planning, preparation and execution of this daring journey. The task was daunting: He had to traverse more than 200 kilometres to the Chinese border, and then find a way to cross it. Yet he succeeded.

His memoir ends at the moment he reaches a Chinese border outpost. There, he told the initially suspicious guards that he was a former officer of the PLA who had been sent to North Korea, imprisoned and escaped. 

Upon hearing his story, the guards’ demeanor changed; their suspicion gave way to a cautious acceptance. Kang understood that he had made it.

Little is known about Kang’s life after the escape. While both China and the Soviet Union occasionally granted asylum to North Korean defectors, they also insisted that such individuals remain silent and keep a low profile. This may explain his silence about the final decades of his turbulent and eventful life.

Revisiting Kang’s memoirs prompts reflection on the fate of North Korea’s political prisoners in the decades since he was detained.

To begin with, today’s prisons are no longer filled with members of the elite. While generals, Cabinet ministers or ambassadors can still find themselves behind bars, the vast majority of political prisoners now come from far humbler backgrounds. 

Unlike in Kang’s time, today’s inmates are rarely informed of the length of their sentences — if a sentence even exists. Most have no idea how long they will remain incarcerated. 

Yet what remains constant is the deep, lingering fear. Arrest or worse is something that can happen to anyone in North Korea, and every citizen has known it for decades.

Edited by Bryan Betts

13. What Kim Jong-un wants

​While KJU attempts to reframe the conversation, we need to reframe our strategy to Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights. KJU is especially vulnerable right now (and getting more vulnerable every day) and we can help drive the conditions for change inside north Korea. Kim fam will change or he can be changed by the Korean people in the north.

Conclusion:

Kim Jong Un’s September address should be read not just as a static policy statement but as the start of a new round of diplomatic maneuvering. His goal is to reframe the conversation: from complete denuclearization to arms control. For the United States, this presents a dilemma. Ignoring the speech risks ceding the initiative to address the North Korean issues, but engaging without careful planning risks legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear status prematurely. For South Korea, the task is even more delicate: to maintain deterrence and alliance coordination while keeping the door open for eventual talks that reduce tension. Ultimately, Kim seeks recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power — but even absent such recognition, he aims to extract concessions. Whether the next chapter of Korean Peninsula diplomacy leads to stability or renewed tension will depend on how skillfully Seoul and Washington manage their response.

[Wang Son-taek] What Kim Jong-un wants

koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · September 25, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s address to the Supreme People’s Assembly on Sunday was an unusually significant foreign-policy speech, with nearly half devoted to external relations. Unlike many routine domestic policy reports, this speech clearly laid out Pyongyang’s position on the United States, South Korea and the future of the Korean Peninsula. For analysts and policymakers, it offers a rare opportunity to gauge Kim’s strategic thinking.

The most striking part of Kim’s address was his implicit offer to reopen dialogue with Washington, but strictly on his own terms. Kim made clear that any talks could not be based on an agenda of denuclearization. Kim likely understands that Trump still longs for a major diplomatic spectacle, one that could earn him a Nobel Peace Prize. By dangling the prospect of another summit while ruling out denuclearization, Kim is attempting to shift the baseline — to normalize North Korea’s nuclear status as a starting point for negotiations. From Pyongyang’s perspective, this speech represents one more step toward making its nuclear arsenal an irreversible asset.

Another notable feature of the speech was Kim’s uncompromising stance toward South Korea. He devoted considerable time to explaining why dialogue with Seoul was off the table. He accused President of South Korea Lee Jae Myung of inheriting the same "absorption unification" schemes of previous presidents and continuing hostile military exercises with Washington. However, Kim’s language was unusually detailed and logical rather than merely vitriolic. This shows that he is paying close attention to Lee’s policies. While his statement that “there will be no sitting down with South Korea” sounds categorical, the very act of issuing such a carefully reasoned critique may signal that Pyongyang still sees value in managing, not abandoning, inter-Korean relations.

A deeper reading of the speech suggests that Kim’s goal was not simply to pronounce his policy positions on diplomatic issues but to shape the strategic environment. Much of the message seems designed as psychological warfare aimed at Washington and Seoul. Kim sent a well-calibrated signal to Trump, banking on that the American and South Korean media would focus on the possibility of another summit rather than on his firm rejection of denuclearization. This asymmetry benefits Pyongyang: It shifts public discussion toward diplomacy while eroding pressure for regime-ending concessions.

At the same time, Kim left a small opening for negotiations. One key passage noted that "as long as external threats exist, we must continue to strengthen our military power." In North Korean discourse, such conditional phrasing implies that if those threats were removed, military policy could change. This is the closest Kim came to acknowledging that arms control or a phased freeze could be on the table — provided the security environment changes. In short, Kim is not rejecting diplomacy but attempting to redefine its terms. His strategy appears to be to narrow the denuclearization agenda to its smallest possible scope before entering any future summit.

Equally revealing is Kim’s updated assessment of the international order. Since 2022, he has frequently framed global politics in terms of a new Cold War: US-China rivalry, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the emergence of competing blocs. At one point, Pyongyang even encouraged a formal anti-US solidarity with Beijing and Moscow. Yet this latest speech downplays bloc confrontation. Kim now seems less interested in building an anti-American coalition and more focused on leveraging Washington’s unpredictability — particularly Trump’s transactional style — to improve North Korea’s bargaining position.

His participation in Beijing’s Victory Day military parade and meetings with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin highlighted his ability to engage with China and Russia, but his September speech indicates that he did not exclude a direct deal with the United States that advances North Korea’s economic goals. This shift signals a partial retreat from a “new Cold War” diplomacy and a return to diplomacy that centers on bilateral negotiation with Washington.

Roughly half of Kim’s speech listed domestic accomplishments in industry, agriculture, housing and public health. While the details were standard propaganda, the tone suggested growing confidence in the regime’s ability to govern despite economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. By presenting economic progress as irreversible and sustainable, Kim reinforced the message that North Korea is not negotiating out of desperation. Instead, Pyongyang seeks to bargain from a position of strength, trading its growing nuclear leverage for tangible benefits without surrendering its core deterrent.

Kim’s performance was a master class in message control. He projected willingness to meet Trump while simultaneously slamming the door on denuclearization. He rejected dialogue with Seoul in absolute terms but still demonstrated careful attention to South Korean politics, hinting that circumstances could change if Seoul abandoned what he sees as hostile intentions. For policymakers in Seoul, this dual message is both a warning and an opportunity. The warning is that North Korea will not disarm, at least not under current conditions. The opportunity lies in the fact that Kim appears eager to shape the next phase of diplomacy, meaning that proactive engagement could still influence his calculus.

Kim Jong Un’s September address should be read not just as a static policy statement but as the start of a new round of diplomatic maneuvering. His goal is to reframe the conversation: from complete denuclearization to arms control. For the United States, this presents a dilemma. Ignoring the speech risks ceding the initiative to address the North Korean issues, but engaging without careful planning risks legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear status prematurely. For South Korea, the task is even more delicate: to maintain deterrence and alliance coordination while keeping the door open for eventual talks that reduce tension. Ultimately, Kim seeks recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power — but even absent such recognition, he aims to extract concessions. Whether the next chapter of Korean Peninsula diplomacy leads to stability or renewed tension will depend on how skillfully Seoul and Washington manage their response.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.

khnews@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Korea Herald · September 25, 2025

​14. How 'KPop Demon Hunters' Went Global: Myth, K-Tradition, Fandom

​Soft power. There are some PSYOP lessons in this.

But I still have not been able to bring myself to watch this.

EnglishNational

How 'KPop Demon Hunters' Went Global: Myth, K-Tradition, Fandom

Netflix animation surpasses 330 million views, theme song tops Billboard and UK charts

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/09/27/GDYJ2GO5ZZHIZE3X27QKEBMZKQ/

By Jeong Si-haeng

Published 2025.09.27. 00:30

Updated 2025.09.27. 10:33

The virtual girl group HUNTR/X from the wildly popular K-Pop Demon Hunters are exorcists who have defeated evil spirits for hundreds of years. /Netflix

Who would have thought it would be this explosive? First, it shook the world, and now Korea is being turned upside down belatedly. This is the story of Netflix’s K-pop fantasy English animation ‘KPop Demon Hunters’.

‘KPop Demon Hunters’ surpassed 330 million cumulative views just three months after its June 20 release in 190 countries and 34 languages. On Netflix, the world’s largest video streaming platform, the milestone of 300 million views is a peak that even ‘Squid Game’ (2021, 265.2 million views) and ‘Wednesday’ (2022, 252.1 million views) never reached.

When Netflix entered Korea in January 2016, there were concerns that “the ‘American drama dinosaur’ would devastate Korea’s entertainment ecosystem.” Yet, less than a decade later, a Korean production featuring a large cast of Korean creators, actors, and singers has become the platform’s biggest global hit.

‘KPop Demon Hunters’ has also conquered the global music scene. Its theme song “Golden” has topped the Billboard Hot 100 for six consecutive weeks and the UK Singles Chart for seven. Simultaneous dominance of both charts is a feat no K-pop group, including BTS or BLACKPINK, has achieved. Notably, a theme song from an all-ages animated series reaching No. 1 on Billboard is a first since ‘Aladdin’’s “A Whole New World” in 1993—32 years ago. The fact that four songs from ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ simultaneously entered Billboard’s Top 10 is also unprecedented in film history.

Netflix's animation KPop Demon Hunters, featuring three K-pop warrior women, continues to set various new records. /Graphics by Song Youn-hye

People worldwide are singing along to “Golden” or dancing to “Soda Pop,” while Korean traditional culture and food from the series have become “hot items.” Foreign tourists are flocking to Seoul, the film’s setting, and Korean companies and local governments are rejoicing over the ripple effects.

Netflix has already begun discussions on producing a sequel and a live-action film. Major international media outlets are listing ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ as a strong contender for prestigious awards like the Grammys and Oscars.

The unexpected ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ phenomenon has even made skeptics—adults who dismissed it as “a clichéd K-pop girl group fantasy” or “a childish cartoon,” and critics who asked, “Why get excited about something Korea made but doesn’t profit from?”—sit up and take notice. Exploring the ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ universe might offer older generations a chance to understand the struggles and dreams of younger generations and re-evaluate Korea’s undervalued soft power.

The ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ syndrome, guided by the protagonists’ Korean dialogue: “Let’s go, go, go, go!”

1. Light and Darkness, the Hero’s Sacrifice… The Power of Universal Narratives

The plot of ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ revolves around HUNTR/X (Huntrix), a globally popular Korean girl group. On stage, they are dazzling idols, but their true identity is that of exorcist hunters who have battled evil spirits for centuries. Gwima (鬼魔), the demon lord who devours human souls, forms the five-member boy group Saja Boys to neutralize HUNTR/X.

In KPop Demon Hunters, Mira (right) fights with a sword inspired by the Gaya geokdo, Rumi (center) with a Joseon-era Sa-in sword, and Joy (left) with a small divine knife, a ritual object. All members' accessories and weapons undergo thorough historical verification. /Netflix

The twist is that Rumi, the leader of HUNTR/X, is a half-demon born to a human hunter and a demon. When she becomes aware of her weakness, she loses her voice, ruins a performance, and the team fractures. The Honmun (魂門), the device sealing the demons, is breached. However, they ultimately reclaim their inner strength to save their fans and the world.

The basic framework follows a familiar superhero narrative structure, from ‘Superman’ to ‘Batman’, ‘Harry Potter’, and ‘Kung Fu Panda’. Stories of light vs. darkness, sacrifice, redemption, and self-discovery are recurring themes in major religions, folklore, and classics.

The conflict and overcoming of obstacles that prevent heroes from using their powers add dramatic depth. ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ faithfully follows this formula with three strong, relatable female warriors.

2. Comforting the Younger Generation Struggling with Dual Identities

On the 14th, dance teams composed of domestic and international K-pop fans perform choreography from KPop Demon Hunters at the 2025 Seoul Hunters Festival held at Seoul Plaza. /Newsis

The ‘Wall Street Journal’ noted that ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ “captures the zeitgeist of popular culture.” It addresses the anxieties of Gen MZ (20s–30s) and Gen Alpha (teens) who have lost confidence and direction amid crises like climate change and low growth.

Central to this is the issue of “dual identity”—the dissonance between the persona shown on social media and the true self, leading to existential questions: “Who am I?”

‘KPop Demon Hunters’ tackles this dilemma with a 21st-century sensibility. Inspired by the historical role of female shamans who used performances to exorcise evil, it creates a “girl group hunter” protagonist and explores their struggles with dual identities. The backstory that past popular female groups like the Joseon-era “Jeogori Sisters” and S.E.S. were secretly part of a hunter lineage birthed a unique hero narrative unseen in Eastern or Western media.

Rumi, both heir and disruptor of tradition, agonizes under the older generation’s pressure to hide her weaknesses. But she resolves to embrace her true self, declaring, “Even broken pieces shine/No more hiding,” and rebuilds the Honmun through friendship, trust, and solidarity.

The Grief Reaper-inspired idol group 'Saja Boys' from KPop Demon Hunters. Some interpret the initial good vs. evil dynamic between the girl group and boy group as symbolic of Korean gender conflict. /Netflix

Some interpret the clash between the girl group and boy group as a metaphor for Korea’s intense gender conflicts. However, the shared vulnerability of Rumi and Jinwoo, the boy group’s leader—both half-human, half-demon, tormented by shame, guilt, and self-loathing—offers a profound message of mutual understanding and salvation.

3. K-Tradition, K-Landscapes, K-Emotions… The Mystery of Korean Culture

The global acclaim for ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ as “original” stems from its unprecedented spotlight on Korea. It’s not just about cameos of ramen, kimbap, Korean language, or Seoul. Korean tradition, modernity, and collective unconsciousness drive the 99-minute narrative. It’s a work “of, by, and for K.”

A traditional culture industry worker said, “I used to cringe at how Korea was portrayed in foreign films, but *KPop Demon Hunters*’ first scene, with its meticulously accurate Joseon-era architecture and costumes, left me stunned.”

In KPop Demon Hunters, the Ilwolbongdo painting worn by Joseon kings appears in the background as HUNTR/X performs 'Golden' on a dazzling stage. /Netflix

Experts marvel at the integration of Korean motifs: tigers and magpies from Minhwa paintings, goblins, water spirits, and grim reapers; weapons like the Saingeom sword, Woldo, Gokdo, Jeju Shinkal, and Banguljong; and backgrounds like Ilwolobongdo and dancheong.

Cultural critic Kim Heon-sik noted, “Each HUNTR/X member wears a different Ogwangsaek norigae (five-color knot), and the light effects from their swords incorporate traditional patterns in a fantastical way.”

Modern Korean landscapes and daily life are depicted with meticulous detail: Namsan Tower, Naksan Park, Jamsil Sports Complex, Myeongdong Street, Cheongdam Bridge, subway pink seats for pregnant women, car-free streets, green bath towels in public baths, chopped green onions on tteokbokki, napkins under spoons when eating gukbap (rice soup), women’s sun caps and sleepwear, and even the strict seniority culture in K-pop where debut order dictates 90-degree bows.

In KPop Demon Hunters, Jin-woo (left) and Rumi walk along the Naksan Park fortress wall path, sharing a date-like moment. The modern Korean lifestyle and Korean sentiment are meticulously captured. /Netflix

The protagonists’ Korean-style self-criticism—“I must be perfect in front of others,” “I’m not proud of who I am,” or “I betrayed my family to survive”—strikes a deep chord. Gwima exploits this shame to manipulate humans and demons.

4. A Feast of Addictive K-Pop

The other star of ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ is its music. The eight songs are not just background tracks but drive the story. Their simultaneous Billboard entries led to sing-along versions and global screenings.

Praise pours in: “The music’s universality transcends cultural specificity” (‘Time’), and “K-pop becomes a supernatural weapon defeating darkness, amplifying the film’s emotional impact” (BBC).

HUNTR/X and Saja Boys’ songs blend K-pop’s signature elements—catchy beats, melodies, rap, and choruses—for instant familiarity. “Golden,” reflecting Rumi’s turmoil and aspirations, uses soaring high notes to evoke catharsis.

Recently, KPop Demon Hunters albums are displayed at Kyobo Bookstore's Gwanghwamun branch. 'Golden' has remained at number one on Billboard's main singles chart 'Hot 100' for six weeks. 'Your Idol' and 'Soda Pop' by Saja Boys reach fourth and fifth places respectively. /News1

K-pop, a hybrid of Western pop and Korean culture, has become a distinct genre. ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ authentically depicts its unique culture: trainee systems, grueling schedules, role divisions (vocalists, sexy, cute, rebellious), synchronized dance, strict privacy management, and the “positive influence” image loved by fans’ parents. These details enhance immersion.

5. Delicate Capture of Fan Experiences

The biggest hurdle for older generations understanding the ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ universe might be Gen Z’s fandom culture. Without grasping or respecting this, the emotional core is lost.

In the film, K-pop fans wear group T-shirts, wave glow sticks, flood live chats with support, and empathize with stars’ joys and sorrows. This “high-intensity fanning” mirrors real-life groups like BTS’s ARMY.

HUNTR/X sacrifices rest and privacy “for the fans,” tears up at their love, and battles demons threatening them. The girl group is not just a consumable product but a family and protector. Fan passion becomes the energy sustaining the Honmun.

Novak Djokovic (Serbia) secures advancement to the semifinals of the US Open men's singles in New York earlier this month and performs the 'Soda Pop' choreography from KPop Demon Hunters. He said, 'I learned it from my daughter.' /US Open YouTube

The ‘New York Times’ praised, “A overlooked virtue of *KPop Demon Hunters* is its deep understanding and respect for fandom, blurring reality and fiction.” It also warns that self-loss in fandom can be toxic, exploited by Gwima.

6. Strategic Algorithm Bombardment

‘KPop Demon Hunters’’ success also stems from Netflix’s capital-intensive production, global simultaneous release, and social media algorithm strategies. The platform’s reach allowed real-time global fandom formation.

The OST was designed for global and short-form markets. Sony, the producer, released the “Golden” dance video first to go viral, followed by the film’s explosive streaming.

As users say, “My YouTube and Instagram are flooded with ‘KPop Demon Hunters’,” the film, songs, and user-generated content dominated algorithms, making it the “hottest content.”

Overseas fans parody a scene of Rumi from KPop Demon Hunters taking a whole bite of gimbap and post it online. /TikTok

7. Virtual to Reality… Immersive Content Proliferation

Though an animation, ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ is designed for real-world immersion. Virtual idols’ songs inspire celebrity covers, museums offer Honmun-themed MU:DS, and Seoul’s filming locations host affordable food tours—blending virtual and real experiences.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com