​Quotes of the Day:

"The necessary limitations of map problems [today perhaps computer simulations] inhibit the student from considering the effects of hunger, emotion, personality, fatigue, leadership, and many other imponderable yet vital factors."

– Maj George S. Patton, Jr., (1931)

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."

– John Milton

"I know you won't believe me, but the highest form of human excellence is to question oneself and others."

– Socrates

1. Rebuilding the Human Edge: Restoring Special Forces’ Core Competencies

2. Albert Peter Dewey: the first American fatality in Vietnam

3. Russia Hits Ukraine With Massive Overnight Attack

4. Is There Any Role for the United Nations in Trump 2.0?

5. New documentary scrutinizes the lies that fueled the war in Afghanistan

6. The U.S. Military's Great Drone Crisis Has No Easy Fix

7. Tomahawks, NATO's "War on Russia" and Russian Gas Shortages - 28 September update

8. Xi Is Chasing a Huge Concession From Trump: Opposing Taiwan Independence

9. Zelensky says Trump understands battlefield, has ‘faith in Ukraine’

10. Trump’s Gaza peace plan leaves door ajar for Palestinian state

11. China at UN warns against return to 'Cold War mentality'

12. “War Without Harm”: China’s Hybrid Warfare Playbook Against Taiwan

13. Commentary: Japan faces a fundamental dilemma on counterstrike missiles

14. China steps into climate leadership role with new goals as the US falls behind: Analysts

15. The Rise of America’s Young Socialists—From the 2008 Financial Crisis to Mamdani

16. Trump to attend gathering of top generals, upending last-minute plans

1. Rebuilding the Human Edge: Restoring Special Forces’ Core Competencies

From our Special Forces brother, Mark Haselton.

Note the link to the OSS, implied and specified. 

The Old and Bold

Rebuilding the Human Edge

Restoring Special Forces’ Core Competencies

https://vaberet.substack.com/p/rebuilding-the-human-edge?utm

The Old and Bold

Sep 27, 2025

This paper builds on my previous Substack, Army Special Forces in Strategic Competition. That paper made the case that Special Forces risks irrelevance if reduced to elite assault troops in an Army dominated by large-scale combat operations. It called for a return to the Regiment’s irregular warfare heritage—its comparative advantage in an era defined as much by proxies, persuasion, and political warfare as by conventional firepower.

This paper, Rebuilding the Core, takes that argument further. It moves from diagnosis to prescription, focusing on how Special Forces can restore the human edge that has always been its hallmark. It lays out a belief that the Regiment needs to treat language, culture, and networks as combat skills on par with shooting, demolitions, and medicine. Just as we invest years to make an 18D competent and credible, we must do the same for fluency and cultural depth. Without this shift, the Regiment risks becoming redundant. With it, SF reclaims its rightful place as America’s premier irregular warfare force.

Introduction

After two decades of counterterrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, many commanders have come to view Special Forces as little more than elite assault troops. They know the legend of SF’s origins but assume the Regiment has “moved on” from irregular warfare. That misconception narrows their campaign planning and hides SF’s real value in today’s era of strategic competition.

In truth, Army SF was never about raids alone. Its lineage runs back to the OSS, when small teams working through indigenous partners altered campaigns far larger than their numbers. Detachment 101 in Burma mobilized thousands of Kachin tribesmen to harass Japanese forces and rescue downed aircrews. Jedburgh teams dropped into France ahead of D-Day, training and equipping resistance cells that disrupted German reinforcements. Their success came not from firepower, but from trust, influence, and the ability to multiply effects through others.

That “by, with, and through” approach has been in SF’s DNA from the start, codified by the Lodge Act of 1950, which infused the Regiment with émigrés whose language, culture, and authenticity gave SF its human edge. Yet over the past twenty years, that edge has dulled. Counterterrorism became the bread and butter. Nightly raids honed tactical skill but eroded language mastery, cultural immersion, and regional continuity—the very foundations of credibility in irregular warfare.

This isn’t the first time SF has struggled with identity. In the 1990s, it fought for relevance in an Army consumed by AirLand Battle. After 9/11, it was pulled deeper into counterterrorism while the Army relearned counterinsurgency. Those choices made sense in the moment, but they carried a cost.

Now, in an age of strategic competition, the stakes are higher. SF risks being typecast as a strike force—just another version of the Rangers or the 82nd Airborne. What the nation needs is something different: a return to SF’s roots as America’s OSS, the heirs of the Jedburghs, the successors to Lansdale, and the modern “Lawrences of Arabia.” Rebuilding that human edge isn’t nostalgia. It’s survival.

Introduction

The call to return Special Forces to its irregular roots has never faded. For more than two decades—whether in think tanks, battalion command posts, Afghan villages, or the Pentagon—a steady current of voices has pressed the case for the mission set that makes the Regiment unique. Their arguments have been consistent: unconventional warfare is not an anachronism, but the very capability that gives Special Forces enduring relevance. The obstacle has never been weak ideas—it has been institutional inertia, the seductive clarity of counterterrorism raids, and the Army’s fixation on large-scale combat operations.

The counterinsurgency debate was one of the early flashpoints. John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and his work on FM 3-24 reminded the Army that legitimacy, adaptation, and partner-centric operations were core to winning irregular wars. Yet as doctrine leaned toward COIN, practice pulled SF toward high-value target raids. The theories matched our DNA, but the exigencies of the moment—the relentless urgency of the CT fight—pulled SF in another direction. Over time, that shift reinforced the perception of Special Forces as assault troops with flair rather than as the nation’s premier irregular warfare specialists.

Inside the Regiment, other leaders tried to bend the narrative back. Charlie Cleveland, first at SOCCENT and later at USASOC, pushed the idea of a Global SOF Network—a lattice of persistent SOF presence designed to contest adversaries in the gray zone. I supported this effort when I led the SOF Support Team at JIEDDO, embedding operations and intelligence elements into SOF JIATFs worldwide. Where it was resourced, the concept worked; but when budgets and bias favored CT or LSCO, it withered.

Other voices came from within our own ranks. Colonel Mark Boyatt, who commanded my battalion in 1st SFG(A), argued that the essence of SF is “by, with, and through”—a philosophy of exporting credibility and influence through partners, not replicating missions Rangers can already perform. Dave Maxwell carried the same torch with relentless consistency, insisting that UW is not just a tactical option but a strategic capability, America’s comparative advantage in competition. Without it, he warned, SF risked irrelevance.

From the field, Jim Gant put theory into practice with One Tribe at a Time, advocating Tribal Engagement Teams that lived in Afghan villages, built trust through presence, and adapted to local rhythms. Messy and controversial, his approach nonetheless proved that cultural immersion generated influence in ways raids never could. I was serving as GEN Petraeus’s C-IED advisor in Kabul when Gant’s ideas began circulating widely; they sparked debate precisely because they cut against the prevailing current of raids and rotations.

Running through all of these efforts is the enduring lesson of Edward Lansdale. In the Philippines, he embedded himself with Magsaysay’s circle, grasped the political heartbeat of an insurgency, and showed how persuasion and legitimacy could achieve what firepower could not. In many ways, Nagl, Cleveland, Boyatt, Maxwell, and Gant were carrying forward Lansdale’s torch, adapted to their own time and fight.

None of these ideas were entirely new. The Dixie Mission to Mao’s headquarters in 1944, postwar advisory groups in Greece and Turkey, and other micro-detachments of the early Cold War had already demonstrated that persistent presence and trust-building were an American way of irregular competition. Even Afghanistan, in the fall of 2001, gave us a reminder: SF orchestrated the “first cavalry charge of the 21st century,” toppling the Taliban at speed and scale through UW. Yet rather than reinforce those lessons, the system shifted to counterterrorism and direct action—failing to recognize that if success in Afghanistan was possible, it required a generational commitment to irregular warfare.

Attempts to shift our focus back to UW didn’t fail because the ideas were wrong—they failed because the institution made deliberate choices. UW requires patience, persistence across years (sometimes generations), and a high tolerance for ambiguity. Its outcomes are difficult to measure and even harder to brief. Direct action, by contrast, delivers quick, visible results and immediate credit. High-value target raids may be complex, but they are far less ambiguous than UW, and therefore more attractive to a system that craves clarity. In the end, an overstretched and under-resourced force defaulted to kinetic prestige: Iraq and Afghanistan consumed bandwidth, budgets flowed toward CT and LSCO modernization, doctrine gave UW lip service without permanence, and inside the Regiment, operators gravitated to the missions that were recognized and rewarded—cementing the “assault troops with flair” stereotype.

Yet the voices that carried the case for UW were not looking backward; they were pointing ahead. Nagl’s population-centric doctrine, Cleveland’s Global SOF Network, Boyatt’s partner-first philosophy, Maxwell’s strategic UW advocacy, Gant’s tribal engagement, and Lansdale’s lessons in persuasion were all acknowledged but never fully institutionalized. They remain a roadmap. Across levels and generations, leaders have pressed the enduring case for UW. And today, in an era defined by strategic competition, the environment they foresaw has arrived.

The Fight We Were Built For

While the U.S. shift toward strategic competition is evident in investments aimed at deterring China, Russia, and Iran, those competitors are not choosing between conventional and irregular tools—they are pursuing both. Even as they field advanced systems—long-range precision strike, integrated air defenses, electronic warfare, unmanned platforms, and anti-access/area-denial architectures—they are simultaneously expanding their irregular warfare portfolios: proxies, cyber and information operations, economic coercion, and lawfare. Their goal is not a fair fight in large-scale combat but a steady campaign to erode American will, fracture coalitions, and shape the battlespace short of open war.

This blended contest is exactly where Special Forces should lead. The lineage of ideas carried by Boyatt, Maxwell, Cleveland, and others was not academic; it was a warning. They anticipated a fight defined less by tank battles and more by persuasion, proxies, and political warfare—the fight we now face every day. Investing for success in this environment is not a zero-sum choice between conventional or irregular capabilities; it requires putting resources where the U.S. gains the greatest return in both realms. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has called repeatedly for “increased lethality” across the force. Some might view Special Forces’ renewal of language, cultural fluency, and UW tradecraft as the opposite of lethality—“soft skills” in a hard-power world. The truth is the opposite. These are the very skills that create conditions where lethality matters most: they open doors, build alliances, generate intelligence, and set the stage so that when the United States does apply force, it is decisive. Renewing SF’s irregular warfare core doesn’t dilute lethality; it multiplies it.

The thinkers and practitioners who urged SF back to its roots were not looking backward; they were pointing ahead. Strategic competition now validates their warning: the nation needs Special Forces to reclaim its role as America’s irregular warfare force of choice. SF in IW is essential in multiple ways—sometimes the application of UW skills can preclude the need for a kinetic fight, while in other environments it sets the stage for conventional operations across domains. That return to relevance begins with rebuilding language and cultural fluency—not as academic exercises, but as operational imperatives that underpin everything from influence to partnership to survivability.

Competing in this environment demands more than intent; it requires recovering the attributes that once defined SF’s edge. Language is the entry ticket to credibility. Cultural fluency transforms access into lasting influence. Networks must be built and sustained so they can withstand pressure where adversaries exploit theirs. And UW tradecraft—sabotage, subversion, influence, deception—produces effects in the human domain that no missile, drone, or armored brigade can achieve.

Fluency as a Combat Skill

Reclaiming Special Forces’ human edge begins with a simple truth: language and cultural fluency are not academic electives—they are combat skills. They are the foundation of credibility, influence, and survivability in irregular warfare. Without them, SF is just another strike force. With them, SF becomes the partner of choice, the disruptor adversaries fear, and the force multiplier no conventional unit can match.

Training must move beyond classroom drills to residency-style immersion. Just as doctors learn by practicing under supervision, SF soldiers must live in diaspora communities or train abroad to achieve true fluency. RAND studies reinforce what history has already proved: continuity and duration of exposure are what drive language retention and operational effectiveness.

Recruiting must also revive what once made the Regiment distinct. Early SF thrived on émigrés who brought authentic language skills, cultural knowledge, and networks. A modern Lodge Act approach—spotting, assessing, and integrating immigrants with critical skills—would restore that authenticity. RAND’s own findings show that graduates with immersion experience not only achieve higher proficiency but sustain it longer, proving that authenticity and cultural depth pay off.

Immersion itself must be real, not episodic. OSS teams lived with the Kachins, and Jim Gant’s Tribal Engagement Teams did the same in Afghan villages. That model still works. SF soldiers need sustained exposure where they are forced to think, negotiate, and operate daily in the target language. One way to achieve this is through persistent micro-detachments—two- or three-man elements embedded year-round in select partner nations or U.S. diaspora hubs. Another option is leveraging the U.S. embassy platform. Small SF cells embedded in embassies—perhaps an 18F, 18D, and warrant officer—could rotate in for six to twelve months as staff augmentees. Functioning inside the Country Team, they would sharpen language and cultural skills under operational pressure while contributing real value to the mission.

Alongside immersion and recruiting, the Regiment should create a pool of vetted language and cultural specialists—operators and carefully screened partners with deep regional expertise, networks, and fluency—who can be attached to ODAs for missions requiring the highest degree of mastery and operational precision. Just as CWMD missions embed scientists to provide the technical depth commanders need, Special Forces should be able to embed cultural and language specialists to provide the human depth irregular warfare demands.

None of this is without precedent. Lansdale built his effectiveness in the Philippines by embedding with Magsaysay’s circle, living among his partners, and mastering the cultural and political nuance of his environment. The Dixie Mission in China, JUSMAPG in Greece and Turkey, and countless early Cold War advisory teams were micro-detachments in all but name. Embassy cells, persistent detachments, and a pool of deployable specialists are simply modern adaptations of that proven model, updated for the gray-zone fight of the 21st century.

But immersion and expertise will fail if our personnel system continues treating detachments as interchangeable. Cohesion is everything. Teams must remain intact long enough to capitalize on the investment in skills, trust, and networks. That requires keyed assignments, multi-year stability, and retention incentives tied to language proficiency and partner feedback. Digital sustainment can help—but it must supplement, not replace, real immersion. Daily online drills keep skills sharp between rotations, but credibility in irregular warfare only comes from presence, persistence, and cultural depth.

Acknowledging the Hard Truths

These recommendations will require a cultural shift inside Special Forces Groups and sustained commitment from senior leaders. This isn’t about adding another block of instruction at SWCS or sending a few more mobile training teams from DLI. It is about re-engineering how the Regiment thinks about language, culture, and networks as combat skills. In the gray zone, language is not optional—it is life support for credibility.

The first hard truth is that language proficiency and cultural fluency matter more than fighting skills. Our ODAs must still be masters of warfare, but their unique purpose is to recruit, organize, train, and employ others. A detachment is designed to build and lead a battalion-sized partner force. That requires trust, not just firepower. We already accept this logic for our 18Ds: nobody questions the years of training, clinical rotations, and constant recertification required to keep a medic sharp, because lives depend on it. The same mindset must apply to language and culture. Lives—and campaigns—depend on whether an ODA can build trust, read a room, and operate inside another society’s frame of reference.

The second hard truth is that training time comes at a premium—and for UW skills, it must be invested first, not as an afterthought. For too long, cultural and language training have been the things we bolt on if there’s time left after ranges, demolitions, and tactical drills. That formula guarantees failure. If UW is our comparative advantage, then immersion, residency training, and sustainment must come first in the training calendar, not last.

We must also confront a seductive illusion: that technology will solve the problem for us. A Star Trek–style “universal translator” may someday spit out words, but it will never capture intent, tone, or worldview. It won’t read the undercurrent in a tribal shura, the nuance in a Russian officer’s phrasing, or the subtle cues that betray whether a partner is hedging or preparing to defect. In UW, credibility is not built through literal translation but through trust, immersion, and the ability to understand and anticipate.

Here is another hard truth: for the past 20 years, the Regiment has often graded itself by tactical warfighting skills—sometimes joking that our ODAs “speak three languages: nine-millimeter, 5.56, and 7.62.” That pride in direct action is understandable, but it reflects a tendency to measure ourselves against Rangers, JSOC, and conventional formations. The problem is those lanes are already well covered. Competing there only makes us a lesser version of someone else, and that is not what makes us special.

What does make us unique—and what the nation actually needs in this era of strategic competition—are the enduring strengths that have always defined SF: cultural immersion, credible partnerships, unconventional warfare, and influence below the threshold of war. As T.E. Lawrence reminded his readers in 1917, “Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” That truth remains unchanged.

Residency-style training, ILR proficiency gates, sustained immersion, a modern Lodge Act, deployable language specialists, embassy-cell detachments, persistent micro-teams, and personnel reforms to preserve cohesion—these are the steps required to restore credibility in irregular warfare. None are easy. All demand resources, discipline, and leadership buy-in. But if we are serious about keeping Special Forces relevant in the 21st century, we must treat language and culture the way we treat medicine for our 18Ds: as a no-fail requirement. Anything less is malpractice.

Conclusion: Rebuilding the Human Edge

Special Forces was never meant to be the Army’s elite assault force. Its identity—its comparative advantage—has always been in irregular warfare, cultural immersion, and the ability to shape environments below the threshold of war. The lessons of the OSS, the Jedburghs, the Dixie Mission, and Edward Lansdale all point to the same truth: America wins not when it outguns its enemies, but when it outthinks, out-influences, and outmaneuvers them in the human domain.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s call for “increased lethality” should not be seen as contradicting this focus on language, culture, and unconventional tradecraft. Quite the opposite: these are the tools that make lethality meaningful. They create access, generate intelligence, build networks, and shape battlespaces where U.S. firepower can be applied with maximum effect. As Colonel Mark Boyatt reminded us, “the ODA must be the deadliest element in that area … because that is how you get respect from the locals.” But “deadliest” in this context is not about the raw firepower of twelve men—it is about their ability to generate effects exponentially larger than themselves by enabling, leading, and multiplying the power of partner forces. Renewing the Regiment’s human edge doesn’t water down lethality—it ensures it strikes at scale and in ways no adversary can match.

The steps outlined here—residency blocks, Lodge Act 2.0, deployable language specialists, embassy-cell immersion, personnel reform, and treating language as seriously as trauma medicine—are not luxuries. They are survival. If the Regiment clings to kinetic prestige, it will become indistinguishable from other strike units. If it rebuilds its human edge, it will once again become indispensable.

This paper has focused on rebuilding the core—restoring the credibility and fluency that made SF unique. The next paper in this series will take the argument forward: how to integrate technology without losing identity. Because while drones, AI, and cyber tools are transforming warfare, they will only enhance SF if they are married to the same human skills that made Detachment 101, the Jedburghs, and Lansdale so effective. The challenge ahead is clear: to harness the future without forgetting who we are.

Recommend The Old and Bold to your readers

2. Albert Peter Dewey: the first American fatality in Vietnam

​And speaking of the OSS.

Albert Peter Dewey: the first American fatality in Vietnam

https://www.octodaydispatch.com/column_posts/world_war_ii/albert-peter-dewey-the-first-american-fatality-in-vietnam/article_44b7b16d-cf38-4e40-ad33-4f648c4fa892.html

• Peter Ayers Wimbrow III Sep 25, 2025 

Albert Peter Dewey wrote a book, “As They Were,” about life in Paris before the war, which was published posthumously.

(Sept. 26. 2025) This week, 80 years ago, a decorated hero, Albert Peter Dewey, who went by Peter, became the first American fatality of the Vietnam War.

Dewey was the son of two-term Republican Congressman Charles S. Dewey, who represented the 9th Congressional District of Illinois, from 1941 to 1945. The district includes parts of north Chicago and its suburb, Evanston (where Northwestern University is located). That district is now represented by Democrat, Ann Schakowsky.

Dewey was also the first cousin, once removed, of the Republican Governor of New York, Thomas E. Dewey. The New York governor would, in the 1948 presidential election, be upset by the incumbent Democratic President Harry S Truman.

The younger Dewey graduated from Yale University. Upon his graduation from Yale, he began a career as a journalist with the Chicago Daily News in its Paris bureau. During the Battle of France, he enlisted as a lieutenant in the Polish Military Ambulance Corps, which was a part of the French Army. Following the defeat and occupation of France, he made his way back to the United States through Spain and Portugal.

He joined the United States Army and served in the Air Force in North Africa, achieving the rank of captain. He later joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was the forerunner of the CIA.

While in the States, Dewey married Nancy Weller, Aug. 1, 1942. They were blessed with one child, a daughter, Nancy.

On Aug. 10, 1944, Dewey was parachuted into southern France as the leader of a 10-man team behind enemy lines, as part of “Operation Dragoon.” For this activity, he was awarded the following: Legion of Merit by the United States; the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre, with Palms, by France. He was also the recipient of the Order of Polonia Restituta from Poland, and the Order of Glory from Tunisia.

Still with the OSS, he arrived in Saigon on Sept. 4, 1945, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, to head a seven-man team, “...to represent American interests ...” in “Project Embankment.”

While in that position, he arranged the repatriation of 4,549 Allied POWs, including 240 Americans from two Japanese POW camps.

The situation was very confused in Vietnam at that time, as the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh, of course, wanted independence for their country. However, the French wanted to restore French sovereignty over their former colony.

The British had been designated as the occupation forces, but were woefully undermanned, so they enlisted the former French POWs, as well as the Japanese, to keep a lid on the Viet Minh.

The French and the Japanese were treating the Vietnamese very harshly for resisting the reestablishment of French authority. Col. Dewey complained to the British officer in command, Gen. Douglass David Gracey, about the poor treatment of the Vietnamese, who had also been fighting against the Japanese during the war, while the French had cooperated with them.

However, Gen. Gracey, being a colonialist, sympathized with his fellow colonialists, who were trying to restore their colonial empire. The upshot was that Gen. Gracey complained to Washington, and Dewey was ordered to return home.

He was scheduled to leave Vietnam on Sept. 26, but the airplane that was supposed to fly him out did not arrive on time. He, therefore, returned from the airport to the city for lunch with war correspondents Bill Downs and Jim McGlincy at the OSS villa in Saigon.

As he neared the villa, his vehicle was ambushed by Viet Minh troops, and he was shot in the head. The Viet Minh claimed that their troops mistook him for a Frenchman, because he had spoken to them in French. His body was never recovered.

Gen. Gracey had prohibited the display, by anyone, other than general officers, of any flags on vehicles. Dewey wanted to fly an American flag on his vehicle to protect him from the Viet Minh. It is thought that if the American flag had been displayed on his Jeep that he would not have been killed. Ho Chi Minh sent a letter of condolence about Dewey’s death to President Truman. Dewey was not quite 29, and had been married a little more than three years. He was awarded the Silver Star.

Col. Dewey had analyzed the situation and presciently said, “Indo-China is burning, the French and the British are finished here, and we ought to clear out of Southeast Asia.” Unfortunately, as we all know, we not only did not get out, we got further in!

Because the Department of Defense ruled that the Vietnam War did not officially start until Nov. 1, 1955. Dewey’s name cannot be found on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. It is listed on the American Battle Monuments Commission’s Tablets of the Missing, at Manila American Cemetery and Memorial. There he is listed as “Major Albert P. Dewey.”

Dewey wrote a book, “As They Were,” about life in Paris before the war, which was published posthumously.

In addition to his relation to the Illinois congressman, his father, and the New York governor, his cousin, Dewey was also a cousin to Spanish-American War hero, admiral of the Navy, George Dewey. His nephew, David Dewey Alger, was killed in the attacks on New York’s World Trade Center, on Sept. 11, 2001.

Next week: Trial, and Execution, of Ferenc Szálasi

Mr. Wimbrow writes from Ocean City, Maryland, where he practices law representing those persons accused of criminal and traffic offenses, and those persons who have suffered a personal injury through no fault of their own. He can be contacted at: wimbrowlaw@gmail.com.

3. Russia Hits Ukraine With Massive Overnight Attack

Russia Hits Ukraine With Massive Overnight Attack

Missile and drone strikes across the country come at the end of a tense month during which 19 Russian drones flew into Polish airspace

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-hits-ukraine-with-massive-overnight-attack-64d1b599

By Ian Lovett

Follow

Updated Sept. 28, 2025 5:52 am ET

Much of the damage from Russia’s overnight strikes was concentrated in Kyiv. Photo: vladyslav sodel/Reuters

Quick Summary

• Russia launched over 500 drones and dozens of missiles at Ukraine, killing four and injuring 40.View more

Russia launched more than 600 drones and dozens of missiles at Ukraine on Saturday night and Sunday morning, one of the largest aerial attacks of the war, while the United Nations General Assembly remains in session.

At least four people have been killed and 40 others injured, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

“This vile attack came virtually at the close of the U.N. General Assembly week,” Zelensky wrote Sunday morning on social media. “Moscow wants to keep fighting and killing, and it deserves the toughest pressure from the world.” 

The overnight bombardment targeted cities across Ukraine. In response, Poland closed the airspace over several cities near the Ukrainian border, according to Flightradar24, which tracks air traffic. 

Much of the damage on Sunday morning was concentrated in Kyiv, where four people were killed, according to Zelensky. Local officials said at least 10 others were injured. 

The southern city of Zaporizhzhia was also hit hard, with 27 people wounded, including three children, according to the regional governor. 

“The enemy’s tactics do not change…hitting people who are sleeping peacefully in their homes,” Regina Kharchenko, acting head of the Zaporizhzhia City Council, wrote on social media. “Insidious tactics, an inhuman thirst for human pain.”

Rescuers work at the site of apartment buildings in Kyiv damaged during the attack. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press

The attack comes at the end of a tense month, during which 19 Russian drones crossed into Poland and a Russian jet entered Estonian airspace. Military analysts said the incursion was part of a Russian effort to test the defenses of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Meanwhile, President Trump’s efforts to broker a cease-fire appear to have stalled, with no tangible progress since he met, separately, with the leaders of Ukraine and Russia in August.

On Saturday, Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin could attack another European country. 

“Putin won’t wait until the end of the war in Ukraine. He will open another direction,” Zelensky said. “He is testing Europe. He has checked that Europe doesn’t have the capacity to protect itself from Russian drones.”

Several drones which posed a direct threat were shot down during the incursion, according to Polish officials. Dutch F-35 and Polish F-16 jet fighters were involved in the operation to down the drones.

Also on Saturday, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, insisted that his country had no plans to attack NATO or European Union countries. 

“Russia has never had and does not have such intentions,” Lavrov said at the U.N. General Assembly in New York, where the war in Ukraine has been one of the main topics of debate. “But any aggression against my country will be met with a decisive response.”

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

4. Is There Any Role for the United Nations in Trump 2.0?

​Excerpts:

Michael Waltz, President Trump’s newly confirmed ambassador to the United Nations, expanded on the president’s criticisms when he said in response to a press question on what changes are needed at the UN, “They need to stop all of this woke nonsense.” Waltz explained that the United Nations has seven agencies focused on climate change and formed a “George Floyd Commission” to investigate the massive riots in the U.S. during the summer of 2020. Ambassador Waltz said the UN must “get back to basics” by working to stop and prevent wars. He also called on the UN to start helping President Trump craft peace deals.

But Waltz indicated that despite the UN’s many flaws, it still has value for the U.S.

According to Waltz, there needs to be one place in the world where all nations can get together and talk. He noted that President Trump had 150 world leaders in attendance at his UN General Assembly speech, listening to his vision on immigration, energy independence, and world peace.

Ambassador Waltz said that the UN headquarters in New York City is beneficial for U.S. peace efforts because it has made the city a place where U.S. diplomats can engage with several countries that do not have embassies in Washington but maintain diplomatic missions to the UN, such as Venezuela and North Korea.

Overall, Waltz stressed that the UN should be a forum where the Trump administration “can get things done” to promote peace.

I believe Ambassador Waltz previewed what the second Trump administration’s strategy on the UN will be. It is not going to withdraw from the world organization, except for a handful of exceptionally biased and corrupt UN agencies. Trump officials will fight corruption and politicization in the UN with tough rhetoric and by withholding U.S. funding. I expect Waltz to lead an aggressive U.S. effort in all UN organizations to end woke ideology and promote ethical and responsible management.

Is There Any Role for the United Nations in Trump 2.0?

Trump blasted the UN as corrupt, anti-American, and obsessed with “woke nonsense,” vowing to cut funding while pushing it to focus on peace and real security.

https://amgreatness.com/2025/09/26/is-there-any-role-for-the-united-nations-in-trump-2-0/

By Fred Fleitz

September 26, 2025

During his address to the United Nations General Assembly this week, President Trump denounced the UN for its uselessness in ending wars, stating that the world organization is not living up to its potential and pointedly asked, “What is the purpose of the United Nations?”

This is a question many Americans have asked recently as they watched President Trump and his foreign policy team try to end wars around the world while the UN did nothing but hold do-nothing meetings, issue “empty words” about global conflicts, and pass anti-Israel resolutions.

This, of course, is not a new problem. The UN has been corrupt and strongly anti-U.S. and anti-Israel for most of its existence. Like President Trump, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick once condemned the UN for the “bizarre reversal” of its founding intent to resolve conflicts. During the Cold War, the UN was dominated by an anti-Western/anti-Israel Third World-Soviet bloc alliance. Today, it is dominated by China and woke anti-U.S./anti-Israel ideologies.

Trump said his exasperation with the UN has also been driven by its obsession with climate change and “the failed experiment of open borders.” The president stated that these issues are destroying many nations.

Trump called climate change the “greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world” and “the green energy scam.” He also slammed UN aid to migrants, claiming the world organization is “funding an assault on Western countries,” and noted that the UN in 2024 “budgeted $372 million in cash assistance to support an estimated 624,000 migrants journeying into the United States.” The president concluded, “It’s time to end the failed experiment of open borders.”

Although Trump’s views on these topics are commonly held in the U.S., they are sacrilege at the UN and were received with gasps and grumbling in the General Assembly Hall—a clear sign of how out of touch the United Nations is with the American people.

Trump had harsh words for many nations that are making it harder to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. He criticized moves by several states to recognize a Palestinian state as rewarding Hamas. The president also criticized nations that are buying energy from Russia, noting that “China and India are the primary funders of the ongoing [Ukraine] war by continuing to purchase Russian oil. But inexcusably, even NATO countries have not cut off much Russian energy and Russian energy products.”

Trump’s frustration with the UN has led his administration to reduce U.S. funding and withdraw from several UN agencies. The administration is withholding part of America’s 2025 UN dues. This includes a congressional rescissions package passed in July that pulled back approximately $1 billion in previously approved UN funding and an August 2025 proposal to withhold over $1.4 billion for UN dues and peacekeeping operations.

The administration’s 2026 budget proposes more cuts in U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping and pauses other UN contributions.

The Trump administration has also withdrawn from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the China-controlled World Health Organization (WHO). The Trump administration has also cut off funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), an organization accused of backing Hamas.

Ambassador Waltz Suggests a Way Ahead for Trump 2.0 and the United Nations

Michael Waltz, President Trump’s newly confirmed ambassador to the United Nations, expanded on the president’s criticisms when he said in response to a press question on what changes are needed at the UN, “They need to stop all of this woke nonsense.” Waltz explained that the United Nations has seven agencies focused on climate change and formed a “George Floyd Commission” to investigate the massive riots in the U.S. during the summer of 2020. Ambassador Waltz said the UN must “get back to basics” by working to stop and prevent wars. He also called on the UN to start helping President Trump craft peace deals.

But Waltz indicated that despite the UN’s many flaws, it still has value for the U.S.

According to Waltz, there needs to be one place in the world where all nations can get together and talk. He noted that President Trump had 150 world leaders in attendance at his UN General Assembly speech, listening to his vision on immigration, energy independence, and world peace.

Ambassador Waltz said that the UN headquarters in New York City is beneficial for U.S. peace efforts because it has made the city a place where U.S. diplomats can engage with several countries that do not have embassies in Washington but maintain diplomatic missions to the UN, such as Venezuela and North Korea.

Overall, Waltz stressed that the UN should be a forum where the Trump administration “can get things done” to promote peace.

I believe Ambassador Waltz previewed what the second Trump administration’s strategy on the UN will be. It is not going to withdraw from the world organization, except for a handful of exceptionally biased and corrupt UN agencies. Trump officials will fight corruption and politicization in the UN with tough rhetoric and by withholding U.S. funding. I expect Waltz to lead an aggressive U.S. effort in all UN organizations to end woke ideology and promote ethical and responsible management.

Waltz indicated that, despite its many flaws, the Trump administration sees the United Nations as a useful forum for discussion and to promote U.S. peace efforts and national security policies. I believe this is the right approach. I look forward to President Trump using the UN General Assembly next year to press world leaders to support his peace efforts and to call them out again on the radical climate change agenda, out-of-control migration, and other woke policies.

***

Fred Fleitz previously served as National Security Council chief of staff, a CIA analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff member. He is the Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Security.

5. New documentary scrutinizes the lies that fueled the war in Afghanistan

It is painful to see so many of our mistakes exposed.

I do not mean to diminish the tragedy and costs in blood and treasure but I cannot help but think about the "Bus to Abilene" as a contributing phenomenon. Only John Sopko refused to get on the bus.

In an Abilene Paradox a group of people collectively decide on a course of action that is counter to the preferences of many (or all) of the individuals in the group. It involves a common breakdown of group communication in which each member mistakenly believes that their own preferences are counter to the group’s and, therefore, does not raise objections. A common phrase relating to the Abilene Paradox is a desire not to “rock the boat.” This differs from groupthink in that the Abilene Paradox is characterized by an inability to manage agreement.

https://ennyman.medium.com/the-bus-to-abilene-6114b17f90be

New documentary scrutinizes the lies that fueled the war in Afghanistan

‘Bodyguard of Lies,’ based on reporting from The Washington Post, asks top military officials about mistruths used to sell the decades-long conflict to the American public.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/movies/2025/09/26/bodyguard-of-lies-afghanistan-documentary/

September 26, 2025 at 3:49 p.m. EDTSeptember 26, 2025

8 min

Summary

82

A scene from “Bodyguard of Lies,” which chronicles years of U.S. failure in the Afghanistan conflict. (CBS/Paramount+)

By Sophia Nguyen

“Bodyguard of Lies,” a documentary examining the deceit that drove the longest war in American history, takes its title from a Winston Churchill line: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

It’s difficult to say whether truth was considered precious, during the decades that the United States was mired in military conflict in Afghanistan. As the film demonstrates, it was certainly in short supply.

The film adapts a 2019 investigation in The Washington Post, “The Afghanistan Papers,” which uncovered hundreds of firsthand accounts from generals, diplomats and other government officials about what went wrong in the conflict. In their reporting, The Post’s Craig Whitlock, Leslie Shapiro and Armand Emamdjomeh found that those unvarnished remarks often directly contradicted statements made by those same leaders to the American public — adding up to decades of deliberate deception. (Whitlock was also executive producer on the film and appears in it.)

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In the movie, director Dan Krauss draws on the revelations from that cache of documents, interviewing a number of people involved in the conflict, including John F. Sopko, special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction; Gen. David McKiernan, the four-star general fired during the Obama administration; and Maj. Gen. Edward M. Reeder, who commanded the U.S. Army Special Forces for much of the war.

Krauss and I spoke over Zoom a few days after the documentary’s Sept. 23 streaming premiere. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

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Going into this project, what was your sense of public memory of the war?

I mostly ran into a lack of interest, to be honest. I think even before the war was over, the American public had really tuned out. Now — what is it, four years after the war has ended? — Afghanistan feels really distant in the minds of the American public. It feels like a lifetime ago, to many.

Can you tell me about how you identified and recruited some of the on-camera interview subjects? Especially when it came to senior military officials, I was curious about why you chose the people you did — and whether there were people you wanted to get but couldn’t.

I said early on to the team, it’s not about the war, it’s about words. There’s been so much terrific landmark reporting about the war itself, and I didn’t want to repeat the work that had come before us. I wanted to keep a very tight focus on the lies — on the differences between what the American public was being told and what those same officials knew to be true behind closed doors.

So who do you recruit to tell that story? There are some obvious players, the big-hat, brand-name players that we could’ve tried to get. It didn’t seem to me that we would learn anything new by putting them in front of the camera again. So I was really focused on handing the microphone to people who hadn’t already spoken at length on this subject — and also people who could speak most directly, and most honestly, to their own role in propagating this rosy picture of the progress being made in Afghanistan.

For my money, General David McKiernan, the four-star general who was fired, is really the hero of the film. He’s deeply introspective and honest about his own experience. He said he’s seen it twice now and each time he’s been very bothered — I think he said troubled — by the film. He was one of the only people who spoke up and said the solution to Afghanistan was going to be a political solution, not a military solution. But there were times, as you saw in the film, whereas he said — you don’t lie, but you maybe don’t say as much as you could, about how difficult the road ahead is going to be. He has a certain amount of regret, I think, for doing that. He acknowledges a certain degree of complicity.

Retired Gen. David McKiernan in “Bodyguard of Lies.” (Jigsaw Productions/Paramount+)

The documentary grew out of the revelations of the Afghanistan Papers, which were published in late 2019. Do you think their publication significantly changed the way the war was conducted?

I have no idea. I mean, I have to — I would like to think that kind of reporting would have an impact. I can’t think of Craig’s reporting without thinking about the Pentagon Papers and Daniel Ellsberg and the Vietnam War. The lies that were told during that war are very like the ones we were being told during this one.

The heart of the film is, as you say, words and deception from the government. Do you think the American public believed the deception?

Certainly, in my neck of the woods and maybe yours, too, I don’t think anyone ever believed that the war was going as well as they were telling us. I don’t know that the sales pitch was really thoroughly effective, at least for people who had a critical eye.

But it’s one thing to sense that, and it’s another thing to read it or to hear it. And that’s what the Afghanistan Papers did, at least for me. … Craig asks in the film, how do you prove that someone’s not telling the truth? Well, in the case of his reporting, you get the receipts.

Right, and then how do you prove that the person isn’t just self-deluded, but is actively telling you something they know to be untrue?

There was a certain degree of self-delusion that went into the lies, and there was also this very American brand of can-do optimism — that if you say something out loud, you will it into being. We are going to win. We are going to create a democracy in Afghanistan. You have to say it out loud in order for it to happen — and if you say it out loud then it puts an enormous amount of pressure and responsibility on the people beneath you.

A scene from “Bodyguard of Lies.” (Danfung Dennis/Paramount+)

By that token, do you think the Biden administration deserves more credit for, in some sense, dispensing with these illusions? The U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan within his first year in office, at some political cost.

I don’t know. I think what’s not discussed, and what I felt was important to include in the film. is the fact that the Trump administration negotiated an agreement with the Taliban, essentially in secret, without input from the U.S. Congress or the Afghan government. Biden inherited that agreement. So there’s certainly a legitimate debate to be had about whether the withdrawal was accomplished as effectively as it would’ve been under another government — who’s to say? Certainly there are strong feelings on all sides of that. But what’s not acknowledged as much is the agreement that led to that withdrawal.

I ask because while watching this documentary, I imagined some theoretical young person who might be getting their first real education about the war. They learn about the lies that got us into, and prolonged, this conflict — then all of a sudden it’s over, and that’s also a calamity. But at some point there must have been a pivot. Some leaders, somewhere — during either the Trump or Biden administrations — took a different course of action and dropped the illusion that we should stay in Afghanistan.

The war ended so disastrously that giving credit to anybody seems really daunting. It’s less about giving credit than reminding people how the end of the war came about: that it was not Biden deciding on his own, unilaterally, to end the war, and it was not Trump actually going through the difficult task of logistically pulling our military out of the country, which is a very, very difficult and dangerous thing to do.

At one point, John F. Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan, almost lays down a gauntlet for the viewer: We should learn our lesson, so we don’t screw up if some president someday promises us a splendid little war. Do you think there are also lessons specifically for the American press corps, especially as they navigate a much more hostile environment? To cite just one example, the Pentagon recently demanded that journalists pledge not to obtain any unauthorized information.

I remember when we bombed the nuclear facilities in Iran and reporters were asking questions about the effectiveness of those strikes — very fair questions, given that American service members were put at risk, and taxpayer dollars and political capital were expended. But there was this sense in the briefing room at the Pentagon that it was unpatriotic to ask questions about the effectiveness of that military strike.

That was one example; the pledge is another. When I see the briefing room at the Pentagon now, I don’t think we’ve learned any lessons, and that things have gotten, in fact, much worse.

The American public has a right to know what’s being done in their name. The idea that it’s unpatriotic to demand answers from our political and military leadership — that’s really scary.

6. The U.S. Military's Great Drone Crisis Has No Easy Fix

​What is the answer?

Excerpts:

Rogoway, writing for The War Zone, argues this might be too late, and that the Pentagon should be looking to build “tens of thousands” of drones per year, rather than just hundreds or thousands. Or else, the U.S. will risk falling behind Russia and China.

The key, he argues, is to “clone” existing drones.

The drones needed, he writes, are “not complex. They are not expensive. They are anything but exquisite. They are also not innovative in any way. In fact, they take a play right out of our adversary’s playbook.”

“Two types of relatively simple and adaptable long-range, expendable drones, built at scale by multiple companies, big and small. No, it’s not that much of an ask, is it?” Rogoway writes. “So let’s do it. Waiting for tomorrow is now too late.”

The U.S. Military's Great Drone Crisis Has No Easy Fix

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Stephen Silver · September 27, 2025

Key Points and Summary – Russia turned Iran’s Shahed into a cornerstone of its Ukraine campaign—now producing swarms domestically to saturate air defenses and grind infrastructure.

-Output has exploded, with launches reportedly hitting 800 in a night. Iran–Russia frictions aside, Moscow’s industrial push is clear.

U.S. Army Pvt. 1st Class Ian Wojick, assigned to 552nd Military Police Company, 25th Infantry, aims a DroneBuster, an anti-drone weapon, toward the sky during the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Exportable (JPMRC-X) exercise at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines, June 1, 2025.

This iteration of the JPMRC-X marks the second Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation conducted in the Philippines. As part of the Army’s premier regional CTC, JPMRC-X enables the U.S. Army, joint force, allies, and partners to develop skills in realistic environments and conditions. Through exportable capabilities, JPMRC-X strengthens war-fighting readiness, enhances multilateral relationships, and contributes to regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Keith Thornburgh)

-The U.S., meanwhile, risks trailing in low-cost, expendable attack drones.

-A Trump executive order and a Pentagon memo vow to “unleash” American drone dominance, but critics argue the pace and scale fall short.

-The near-term answer isn’t exquisite tech—it’s cloning simple, long-range, one-way drones by the tens of thousands, arming units fast, and training to fight with swarms—not just admire them.

Where’s the American Shahed Drone?

The Shahed drone has become a key weapon in Russia’s war with Ukraine.

According to an IISS report back in April, Russia has “doubled down” on the use of the drones, by “launching ever-increasing numbers, expanding production capabilities and refining tactics.”

That report, which cited Ukrainian Air Force figures, found that the number of drones launched by Russia had been increasing month-to-month, from late 2024 to early 2025. In fact, Russia has sent 34,000 drones and decoys into Ukraine so far this year, nine times the number in the equivalent amount of time in the previous year.

Swarming the Skies

The New York Times reported this month on the full story of how the Shahed drone became so important to the Russian war effort.

Russia reached a deal in 2022 with Iran to use the drones and, eventually, to manufacture them within Russia. When Russia launched 43 drones at Ukraine in a single night that year, it “made headlines around the world.” But this month, Russia launched more than 800 of the drones in a single night.

How did Russia do it? According to the Times, the one-way attack drones have been prioritized by Vladimir Putin, and they’re now being produced at two different facilities inside Russia.

Along with missiles and decoys, the Times said, Russia is using the drones to “saturate air defenses and mount mass onslaughts on Ukraine’s weapons production facilities, energy infrastructure and cities.” It even led to a possible international incident when some of its drones crossed over into the NATO state of Poland, leading to an Article 4 declaration from that country. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, this month, threatened all-out war with NATO should it start shooting down drones over Ukraine.

“The war has reached another inflection point in how drones are being used, both at the front line and in the strike campaigns being conducted by Russia and Ukraine,” Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Times.

Ukraine had a drone advantage earlier in the year and maintains a lethal drone capability. But Russia, if it hasn’t erased that advantage, appears on the verge of doing so. That advantage has “diminished in recent months in light of Russia deploying its own elite drone formations and better organization in how they deploy drones,” Kofman added.

And while Russia maintains that its drones are targeted at military targets, it certainly hasn’t turned out that way.

Russia vs. Iran?

Meanwhile, CNN reported back in August that Russia and Iran were in tension over the drone effort. Russia had reached an agreement with Iran to manufacture the Shahed drones inside Russia, at Alabuga, 600 miles east of Moscow, with that facility continually growing. The original deal was for $1.75 billion, CNN reported.

But CNN quoted an intelligence source as stating that Russia’s drone arrangements “have effectively marginalized Iran, revealing a rift between Moscow and Tehran,” with Iran “growing increasingly impatient with the little return it’s received from the deal with Russia.” Tehran is also upset about what it perceives as a lack of support from Moscow during its brief war with Israel this summer.

Per CNN, it could even lead to Russia selling the drones back to Iran, whose stocks are depleted following its war with Israel.

Why Can’t the U.S. Do That?

But there’s another angle to Russia’s drone revolution: That the U.S. risks falling way behind Russia and other countries when it comes to attack drone capability.

The War Zone argued in a piece this month that the U.S. “needs to be building tens of thousands of Shahed-136 Clones right now.”

The author, Tyler Rogoway, says that he’s been arguing for years that the U.S. needs to take drones seriously, and the Pentagon is now “desperately trying to play catch-up.”

“This massive failure in vision could be heavily paid for in blood if a major conflict were to erupt between the U.S. and a capable adversary,” Rogoway writes.

In July, the Pentagon released a memo titled “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance.” Addressed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to U.S. military commanders and senior Pentagon leadership, the memo describes drones as “the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation, accounting for most of this year’s casualties in Ukraine,” while also blaming the previous administration for “red tape.”

The memo is building on an executive order from President Donald Trump, issued on June 6 of this year, also titled “Unleashing American Drone Dominance.”

“The United States must accelerate the safe commercialization of drone technologies and fully integrate UAS into the National Airspace System,” Trump said in the order.

The executive order also called to “accelerate testing and to enable routine drone operations, scale up domestic production, and expand the export of trusted, American-manufactured drone technologies to global markets.”

Hegseth’s memo calls for the Pentagon to “bolster” the U.S. drone sector by approving American drone products, to “power a technological leapfrog” by making those products available to combat units, and “ train as we expect to fight.”

The memo also calls on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to team up with the Undersecretaries of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), to explore whether the same categorization that applies to Group 1 and Group 2 drones can be applied to Group 3 as well.

The “Secretary of War”’s memo concludes with the declaration that “the Department’s bureaucratic gloves are coming off.”

Is it Too Late?

Rogoway, writing for The War Zone, argues this might be too late, and that the Pentagon should be looking to build “tens of thousands” of drones per year, rather than just hundreds or thousands. Or else, the U.S. will risk falling behind Russia and China.

The key, he argues, is to “clone” existing drones.

The drones needed, he writes, are “not complex. They are not expensive. They are anything but exquisite. They are also not innovative in any way. In fact, they take a play right out of our adversary’s playbook.”

“Two types of relatively simple and adaptable long-range, expendable drones, built at scale by multiple companies, big and small. No, it’s not that much of an ask, is it?” Rogoway writes. “So let’s do it. Waiting for tomorrow is now too late.”

About the Author: Stephen Silver

Stephen Silver is an award-winning journalist, essayist, and film critic, and contributor to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Broad Street Review, and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. For over a decade, Stephen has authored thousands of articles that focus on politics, national security, technology, and the economy. Follow him on X (formerly Twitter) at @StephenSilver, and subscribe to his Substack newsletter.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Stephen Silver · September 27, 2025

7. Tomahawks, NATO's "War on Russia" and Russian Gas Shortages - 28 September update

​Following updates on Ukraine and the Pacific here are the "Big five:"

1. Why the West Failed to See Russia’s Invasion Coming

2. Foggy with a Chance of Surprise

3. Military Decision-Making with Unexplainable AI

4. The Pathology of Learning Lessons from War

5. Pursuing the AGI Delusion

Futura Doctrina

3

The Big Five

Tomahawks, NATO's "War on Russia" and Russian Gas Shortages - 28 September update

My regular update on global conflict. This week: Russia's war against NATO, Tomahawks for Ukraine(?), developments in the Pacific and my Big Five recommended war and national security reads.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/tomahawks-natos-war-on-russia-and?utm

Mick Ryan

Sep 27, 2025

Image: @DefenceU and 22nd Mech Brigade

The world sees that Russia has entered a stage where the war will bring more and more problems for the Russian system itself, the Russian economy, and Russian society. The critical point is not to ease the pressure on Russia for this war. President Zelenskyy, 26 September 2025.

It has been a big week in international affairs and the war in Ukraine.

President Trump hinted that he might be changing his mind about supporting Ukraine in a social media post, endorsed shooting down Russian aircraft in NATO air space, and Ukraine requested Tomahawk missiles. In Europe, Russia conducted another probe of NATO’s air defences. Russia and Ukraine continued their respective long-range strike operations.

In the Pacific, China continued its operations around Taiwan, including daily aerial incursions into Taiwan ADIZ, deployed two massive uncrewed submarines, and released a video of aircraft trials with its latest aircraft carrier. Taiwan held a major arms expo and released a report about the vulnerability of its eastern regions.

Welcome to this week’s update on war and strategic competition, and of course, The Big Five!

Ukraine

Image: UATV.UA

Tomahawks for Ukraine? This week saw reports emerge that the weapon that President Zelenskyy had asked President Trump for recently (and this is associated with the rumoured Ukrainian future offensives) was American Tomahawk long-range strike missiles. This is not the first time that Ukraine has asked for these weapons. And that they are doing so how is indicative of a couple of things.

First, it is a Ukrainian test to see whether Donald Trump’s social media post earlier this week about Ukraine winning back its territory was just more rhetoric or was indicative of a willingness by the Trump administration to put even more pressure on the Russians through the supply of even more sophisticated and capable long-range strike weapons.

Second, it will be indicative of whether the Trump administration has the same ‘escalation terror’ (or escalation terror, as explored in this piece) that characterised the Biden administration’s approach to providing military assistance to Ukraine. The hard reality is that providing Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine would not be an escalation in the war. Russia has been using long-range cruise missiles with large explosive warheads since the beginning of the war. Russian long-range cruise missiles used against Ukraine since 2022 (with hundreds of each fired) include:

• The 3M14 Kalibr, a Russian land attack cruise missile with an estimated range of around 1,500 to 2,500 km and 450kg warhead.
• The Kh-555 conventional air-launched cruise missile with a range of around 2000 km and a 410kg warhead.
• The Kh-101, an advanced stealthy long-range subsonic cruise missile launched from a strategic bomber with a range of up to 5,000 km.

Tomahawks for Ukraine just levels the playing field with regards to long-range strike. And as we know, on a level playing field (and even on an uneven playing field), the Ukrainians out-think and out-fight the Russians every time. Putin knows this and is terrified of an even more capable Ukrainian strike force with long-range, large-warhead stealthy Tomahawks from America.

Third, it also indicates that the Ukrainians still have some issues with getting large warheads as far into Russia as they would like. While the various Ukrainian missiles and drones have been able to reach deep inside Russia, they lack the payload to cause significant damage on arrival. The Tomahawk, with a range that can extend at far as 2500 kilometres in certain conditions, packs an explosive warhead of nearly half a metric ton. That, as we would say in the army (and excuse the language), is a ‘shitload of bang”. This would put major Russian airfields, munitions depots and other significant military targets deeper inside Russia at risk.

The Tomahawk has a much longer range than the Storm Shadow, and is a much faster missile than the drones and drone-missile hybrids used by Ukraine. This puts it in a class of its own in its unique ability to get further inside Russia and cause more damage.

But importantly, providing Tomahawks to Ukraine would be a significant political statement by America about the war, and their desire to have Putin recognise that there is no pathway for him to win the war.

Will Trump provide the Tomahawks?

Who knows. If I was a betting person, I would probably say no because someone in the administration is sure to raise the two favourite arguments against their use: escalation and lack of U.S. stocks.

I have already addressed the escalation chimera above.

When it comes to stocks, several U.S. allies already have Tomahawks and are procuring more (the U.K., Australia and Japan among them). Perhaps some could come from these stocks (Australia has been a notable laggard in new military and other material support to Ukraine in 2025) and more might be sourced from the production for these nations?

The U.S. Army has also proven its Typhon mid-range capability system, which is a ground launcher for the Tomahawk, and has operationally deployed it in the Pacific to Japan and the Philippines.

Regardless, it will be interesting to see what the Trump administration does.

Image: CNN

NATO ‘at war’ with Russia. This week, the Russian foreign minister stated that NATO was at war with Russia. Speaking at the United Nations, Lavrov stated that:

A clear example is the crisis in Ukraine, provoked by the collective West, through which NATO and the European Union … have already declared a real war on my country and are directly participating in it.

It is an interesting viewpoint from a country that has been undertaking a years-long sabotage and subversion campaign against European nations and has recently undertaken several aerial incursions with crewed and uncrewed vehicles into NATO countries. The interesting thing is that NATO has not engaged in any similar behaviour.

Of course, we all know that the way to tell if Lavrov is lying is that his lips are moving. So, there is no reason to take him seriously. However, his words do have strategic intentions behind them. These are:

• Condition his domestic audience to constant confrontation with the West. Even if Russia is forced to withdraw from Ukraine without achieving any of its goals, Russia has reason to remain on a war footing - and keep hundreds of thousands of any war veterans out of Moscow.
• Message the ‘global south’ that they should not trust America or Europe, and that they (especially BIRICS members) have good reason for aligning with Russia and China.
• Breed distrust among NATO members.

A New Ukrainian Offensive. Apparently, one of the issues that President Zelenskyy discussed with President Trump during their recent meeting was a request for a specific capability to enable a future Ukrainian offensive. Of course, as soon as word hit Washington DC about the possible Ukrainian offensive, it leaked!

I have no idea whether Ukraine is planning a future offensive or not but would not speculate here if they were. All I will say is that good staff officers are always planning future operations, some offensive and some defensive. These plans, most of which sit on shelves, get dusted off when there are opportunities to use them. Given Russia’s faltering ground offensive and continuing massive losses in manpower, there will definitely be opportunities for Ukraine to strike back, destroy more Russian forces and liberate Ukrainian territory.

But when that might be, I think it is worth allowing the Ukrainians to keep us guessing!

Russia’s Airborne Operations Training for China. It is hardly a surprise that Russia and China have been swapping ideas on modern war. Over the last couple of years, China has been the biggest enabler of Russia’s war, which includes buying their oil, amplifying Russian misinformation, providing dual use goods to Russia (particularly components that can be used in missiles and drones) and providing advice on more rapid and efficient industrial processes for manufacturing drones in Russia.

Separately, I have published a couple of articles that explore the interaction and collaborative learning between Russia and China, which also includes North Korea and Iran. Most recently, I explored the new Adaptation War, which features an authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc, in this paper published by the Special Competitive Studies Project.

This week, the Washington Post reported that Russia is assisting China with the ongoing development of its air mobile ground forces. As the Post reported:

The 800-page cache — obtained by hactivist group Black Moon and reviewed by The Washington Post — shows Russia agreeing in October 2024 to sell 37 BMD-4M light amphibious vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled anti-tank guns, 11 BTR-MDM airborne armored personnel carriers to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

Separate documents outlined training programs for Chinese paratroopers in the combat use of the weaponry — and the advanced command and control systems used to direct operations — by Russian specialists in Russia and later in China.

While this is an interesting development, there is little in this deal to get overly excited about. The Chinese already have multiple airborne brigades, which under a 2017 reorganization, were allocated directly to the joint theatre commands as early entry forces for operations against Taiwan and whatever regional nation China decides to pick a fight with in future. (The Jamestown Foundation in 2023 published a useful article on Chinese airborne capabilities, which can be read here.) The training being provided by the Russians is likely to be used by the Chinese to assess the current state of development of PLA airborne brigades, and ascertain and capability gaps.

It is likely that the Chinese will use the Russian equipment for a similar purpose. The PLA has an array of indigenous, newer vehicles that will probably be assessed against the Russian equipment. If the Russian equipment has any capabilities that are either missing from PLA vehicles, or is superior in design, the Chinese are certain to copy it.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Russian airborne and air assault forces have probably performed better in Ukraine than most of their other ground force colleagues. That will allow them to transfer modern ground combat experience to the Chinese.

But, when was the last time the Russians executed a successful airborne or air assault operation? They did one an air assault operation on the first day of the full scale invasion in February 2022 in to the Hostomel Airport north of Kyiv. Designed to secure the airfield for the air landing of more troops, the operation ultimately failed to achieve this objective. You can read more about it in the report at this link.

Therefore, the Russians might pass this experience on to their Chinese colleagues but there were no obviously new lessons from the operation that could not have been learned from previous wars.

Russian Air Strikes. As I write this, Ukraine is being attacked again by Russian long-range strike missiles. Russia has continued its aerial assault against Ukraine in the past few weeks, settling into a steady tempo of attacks that occur every night. While periodically they surge and attack with hundreds of drones, recent trends show a nightly attack force of 100-200 drones, most of which are shot down.

Russian air attacks against Ukrainian cities in the past week. Source: Ukrainian Air Force

To enhance their strike capacity, a Russian medium-range ballistic missile system Oreshnik (Kedr) has been deployed to Belarus. The Russians, so far, have only fired one of these missiles at Ukraine since 2022. But missiles in Belarus gives Russia another direction that Ukraine has to have their sensors focused on, and adds another complication to the overall missile defence system in Ukraine.

At this stage of the war, it is hard to see what strategic impact these attacks are actually having. Unlike Ukraine’s much more effective strategic strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, transportation hubs and defence industrial targets, Russia’s attacks appear to be hardening the resistance of Ukraine and increasing the support for Ukraine from Europe and America.

The attacks don’t appear to be getting Russia any closer to its war aims of subjugating Ukraine, and forcing it into negotiations that are favourable to Russia. Indeed, they are just pointless raids to terrorise Ukrainians now.

Ukraine’s New Unmanned Air Defence Force. Ukraine has begun establishing an organisation called the Unmanned Air Defense Force, which will be a component of the Ukrainian Air Force. The formation of the new institution was announced by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Syrskyi in an interview with the news outlet Militarnyi.

The new component of the Ukrainian Air Force is designed to complement tactical aviation and anti-aircraft missile forces, particularly in reinforcing and strengthening air defence capabilities protecting strategic facilities and heavily populated areas.

It will be interesting to see the command and control relationship that the new Unmanned Air Defense Force has with the established Unmanned Systems Force.

Ukraine’s War on Russian Oil Income. Unlike Russia’s strategically aimless long-range aerial attack campaign, Ukraine had continued its focus on a narrow range of target categories: oil infrastructure, defence industry and transportation nodes. There is increasing evidence that the Ukrainians are experiencing some success, with fuel rationing now widespread inside Russia. Even the American president acknowledged the impact of Ukraine’s strategic strikes in his recent ‘change of direction’ social media post about Ukraine (read more about that here).

Recent significant Russian targets struck by the Ukrainians include the following:

• The Afipsky oil refinery” in Krasnodar Krai, about 380 km from the front line.
• The Shchastia gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk.
• The Sievierodonetsk gas distribution station.
• UAV production facilities in the city of Valuyki, Belgorod.
• The Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant.
• Two linear production-dispatching stations (LPDS) on russian main oil pipelines at Bryansk and Samara.
• Novokuybyshevsk and Saratov oil refineries.

Fuel shortages, which initially occurred in Russia’s far east, are beginning to impact country wide. One indication of the success of this Ukrainian campaign is that Russia has banned fuel exports until the end of the year. This is a key measure of success for the Ukrainians because it denies the Russians important sources of foreign income.

Source: @USF_Army

The Eastern Front. The situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine remains dynamic. In Kharkiv, the Russians are continuing their slow-rolling advance on a couple of fronts around Kupyansk and elsewhere. While they are slowly advancing, they are nowhere close to taking back the territory that they lost when Ukraine executed its surprise offensive in Kharkiv in September 2022. There is little prospect of them doing so.

Further south, the Russians continue their main effort of attempting to envelop and seize Pokrovsk. Again, they are making very slow progress. The Ukrainian counter attacks to the north of Pokrovsk have inflicted significant casualties on the Russians, and it appears that there are several pockets of surrounded Russian troops.

The current situation on Russia’s main effort on the ground. Source: Deepstatemap.live

When viewing both the aerial and ground operations of the Russians in Ukraine, it remains clear to any military professional that Russia’s prospects are only getting worse. The quality of their ground forces are declining, the rate of advance is nowhere near that which would permit any kind of breakthrough, and Ukrainian drone operations are getting more lethal.

The Russians have almost no prospect of winning this war, and very limited prospect of achieving even some of their pre-war objectives for the war. The Ukrainian strategy at present - destroy Russian oil export income, degrade munitions and drone production, employ a thick drone wall to impose disproportionate casualties on Russia and use diplomacy to shift Trump away from Putin - is bearing fruit.

Despite this, we should not expect any significant breakthrough with regards to peace talks anytime soon. Putin still appears to believe he has the upper hand in this war and is willing to continue throwing away lives and resources in pursuit of this goal. Until that changes, he will not negotiate for peace.

The Pacific

Image: Taiwan Security Monitor

Taiwan’s Vulnerable Eastern Flank. A recent tabletop simulation of a war between Taiwan and China has demonstrated that eastern Taiwan is more vulnerable to attacks by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) than has traditionally been assumed. A series of books about the simulation has just been released by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation, which co-sponsored the war game.

The simulation found that Taiwan required additional countermeasures to protect eastern Taiwan from Chinese strikes, and that the eastern regions of Taiwan can no longer serve as a secure base of operations for the Taiwanese military. Former chief of the Taiwanese armed forces, Admiral Lee Hsi-Ming stated that:

Taiwanese armed forces’ long-held assumption that strategic assets could be sheltered in Taiwan’s eastern region is no longer correct…The PLA now possesses submarines and bombers with the capability of firing cruise missiles from the air and seas east of Taiwan, endangering the fighter jets in the underground hangars of Hualien County’s Chiashan Air Force Base.

Fujian Carrier Operations Video. This week, the PLA-Navy released a video showing the launch and recovery of a variety of aircraft from its newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian. Naval analyst Alex Luck provided an assessment of the video for Naval News, in which he wrote:

Fujian is expected to wrap up her ongoing ninth sea trial in the near future. Significantly, the carrier may commission with PLAN after this event, possibly at Sanya on Hainan. However, this step very much remains to be confirmed for the time being. Even once the ship enters service with the Chinese Navy, the carrier will not be operational in any meaningful sense for several years. Fujian will instead continue with qualifications and testing, including further flight operations.

The Kaui-Chi uncrewed naval attack vessel. Image: Naval News

Taiwan’s New Uncrewed Attack Vessel. A new uncrewed naval attack vessel was revealed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition this week.

According to Taiwanese reports, the Kaui-Chi uncrewed naval attack vessel has recently passed combat evaluations by successfully hitting a target ship during a sea-and-air missile-firing drill. The vessel is able to launch UAVs at targets, similar to Ukrainian uncrewed naval vessels.

Image: @CovertShores and Naval News

H.I. Sutton has recently examined the various uncrewed naval vessel programs underway in Taiwan. You can read his update at this link.

China Tests Two Massive Uncrewed Subs in South China Sea. The PLA is testing two new uncrewed submarines around Hainan in the South China Sea. As the Naval News article on this topic notes, there is still much that we don’t know about these vessels:

The new vessels themselves remain enigmatic. From satellite images we can determine that they are around 40-42 meters (131 -138 ft) long, do not appear to have traditional submarine sails, and have X-form rudders at the stern. Strong circumstantial evidence links one of the two vessels has been developed by 705 Research Institute, part of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.

Clearly the Chinese believe that complementing their crewed submarines with these uncrewed systems is the way ahead for naval operations in the Pacific.

Allied High Training Tempo. The tempo of multinational exercises remains high in the Pacific. Over the past week, major exercises conducted included Freedom Edge 2025 (U.S. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces), Orient Shield 2025 (U.S., Japanese and Australian ground forces) and Resolute Dragon 2025 (Japanese military and U.S. Marines).

Image: @IndoPacom

*********

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new article which explores the costs of pursuing Artificial General Intelligence as well as a report from the China Maritime Studies Institute about Chinese deception in amphibious operations. There is a terrific report on biased strategic and political thinking in the lead up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as well as a good piece on learning lessons from war.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Why the West Failed to See Russia’s Invasion Coming

In this new report, the authors explore why Western political systems failed to accept the threat posed by Russia and to adequately anticipate and prepare for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Among the reasons the authors propose for Western failures in the lead up to the war are policymakers being unable to imagine large-scale war in Europe because they hadn’t experienced it in recent history; An inability to acknowledge the threat because it would have required rejecting core beliefs in diplomacy and economic interdependence; and, because politicians assumed Russia would act rationally by Western standards. The full report can be read here.

2. Foggy with a Chance of Surprise

The U.S. Naval War Collleg’s China Maritime Studies Institute has published a new report that explores the use of deception by the People’s Liberation Army in any amphibious operations against Taiwan. The report is quite comprehensive and notes that “Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war.” The full report is available at this link.

3. Military Decision-Making with Unexplainable AI

In this article, the authors explore why proposes that explainable AI models need not be a prerequisite for their use in military decision support processes. Instead, it is proposed that trust can be built in AI not by explaining decisions, but by verifying consistent outputs from multiple, independently developed AIs. As the authors note, “the most impactful AI strategies will frequently defy human logic. The key to cultivating justified trust in these opaque oracles is rigorous calibration and confidence built on experience, not explainability.” The article can be read at this link.

4. The Pathology of Learning Lessons from War

In this excellent Modern War Institute piece, the author explores the military mindset with regards to learning versus observing lessons. He uses the case study of how lessons were either misread or ignored in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. As he writes in the article, “to avoid the pitfalls of the past and repeating another instance of lessons observed over lessons learned, force design must account for technological, cultural, and tactical biases. Furthermore, even an unbiased and non-parochial force design might fall short if it does not consider two distinct observations: first, that escalation is a tactical—not just strategic—paradigm, and second, that militaries must have the humility to anticipate ambiguity and wars of attrition.” The article is available here.

5. Pursuing the AGI Delusion

In this excellent piece published by Foreign Affairs, the authors propose that America is chasing Artificial General Intelligence at the cost of many shorter term applications for AI. As they note in their article, “Washington must ensure that the pursuit of AGI does not come at the expense of near-term adoption. Racing toward a myth is not sound policy. Instead, the country’s primary goal must be rapidly scaling practical AI applications—improvements that meet government needs and deliver real efficiencies today and tomorrow.” You can read the full article at this link.

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A conversation about technology, ideas, people and their convergence in contemporary war and competition. Also covering issues related to the war in Ukraine, Chinese aggression against Taiwan and Indo-Pacific defence.

8. Xi Is Chasing a Huge Concession From Trump: Opposing Taiwan Independence

​By definition, doesn't the "One China Policy"oppose Taiwan independence? Apparently not to Xi. So will the demand be to stop providing support to Taiwan that could (and already does) support independence? Is the requirement going to be to demonstrate substantive action to demonstrate that the US does not support independence (e.g., but withdrawing military support)? If we throw Taiwan under the bus to appease Xi does that mean we no longer have to worry about (and plan for) war in Taiwan because we are not going to support its independence? Will that mean we are giving "permission" for an invasion? Or will Xi just continue his political warfare campaign to subvert Taiwan so it can be coerced into unification? Either way, no war for the US. I hope someone is not thinking like this.

Excerpts:

Xi is no longer satisfied with the U.S. position adopted by the administration of President Joe Biden that Washington “does not support” Taiwanese independence, the people said. That statement reassured Beijing but didn’t deviate from the U.S.’s strategically ambiguous “One China” policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s claim over Taiwan without endorsing it.

For Xi, the difference between not supporting Taiwan’s independence and explicitly opposing it is more than semantics. It would signal a shift in U.S. policy from a neutral position to one that actively aligns with Beijing against Taiwanese sovereignty—a change that could further cement Xi’s hold on power at home.

Xi Is Chasing a Huge Concession From Trump: Opposing Taiwan Independence

The Chinese leader views the president’s eagerness for a trade deal as an opportunity to press for his top goal

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-xi-talks-china-taiwan-8ed82d1b

By Lingling Wei

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Sept. 27, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Chinese leader Xi Jinping is planning to press his American counterpart to formally state that the U.S. ‘opposes’ Taiwan’s independence. Photo: Lintao Zhang/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Quick Summary

• Xi Jinping believes he can persuade President Trump to oppose Taiwanese independence as they try to strike a trade deal.View more

Having set the stage for a year of high-level engagement with the Trump administration, Xi Jinping is now chasing his ultimate prize, according to people familiar with the matter: a change in U.S. policy that Beijing hopes could isolate Taiwan.

As President Trump has shown interest in striking an economic accord with China in the coming year, the people said, the Chinese leader is planning to press his American counterpart to formally state that the U.S. “opposes” Taiwan’s independence.

Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi has made bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control a key tenet of his “China Dream” of national revival. Now, well into an unprecedented third term, he has repeatedly emphasized that “reunification” is inevitable and can’t be stopped by outside forces—a reference to Washington’s political and military support to Taipei.

Xi is no longer satisfied with the U.S. position adopted by the administration of President Joe Biden that Washington “does not support” Taiwanese independence, the people said. That statement reassured Beijing but didn’t deviate from the U.S.’s strategically ambiguous “One China” policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s claim over Taiwan without endorsing it.

For Xi, the difference between not supporting Taiwan’s independence and explicitly opposing it is more than semantics. It would signal a shift in U.S. policy from a neutral position to one that actively aligns with Beijing against Taiwanese sovereignty—a change that could further cement Xi’s hold on power at home.

A television broadcast of a military parade in China is seen at a TV store in Taiwan this month. Photo: Ritchie b. Tongo/EPA/Shutterstock

The Trump administration hasn’t inherited the Biden-era language of not supporting Taiwanese independence. Instead, “We have long stated that we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” a State Department spokesperson said. “China presents the single greatest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”

Xi believes that he can entice a switch on Taiwan from Trump, who Beijing thinks is eager to secure an economic bargain, the people said. In talks with their American counterparts, Chinese policy advisers outside the government have already stressed the need for the U.S. to officially announce its opposition to Taiwan’s independence.

“Driving a wedge between Washington and Taipei is the holy grail of the Taiwan problem for Beijing,” said Evan Medeiros, a former senior national-security official of the Obama administration and now a professor at Georgetown University. “It would undermine Taiwan’s confidence and increase Beijing’s leverage over Taipei.”

“Xi likely sees the coming period of interactions with Trump as the best opportunity to try to pull Washington and Taipei apart,” Medeiros added.

In a statement, Liu Pengyu, spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in the U.S., said, “China firmly opposes any form of official exchanges or military ties” between the U.S. and Taiwan.

A recent deal brokered by Trump and Xi for the sale of the social-media app TikTok to U.S. investors has paved the way for a series of high-level talks. The two leaders plan to meet at the coming Asia-Pacific summit in South Korea, with potential follow-up visits to Beijing by Trump in early 2026 and to the U.S. by Xi that December. This engagement remains tentative, people close to the White House said, as Trump’s trip to China hinges on Beijing’s cooperation on trade and efforts to curb the flow of substances that make fentanyl.

At the same time, the U.S.’s relationship with Taiwan appears to have grown more uncertain. 

Trump, unlike Biden, has largely avoided explicitly stating whether the U.S. would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan, saying commenting publicly would weaken his negotiating position. In an August interview with Fox News, Trump said Xi had promised him that China wouldn’t invade Taiwan while he is the president. Trump didn’t specify when that promise was made but noted that Xi added, “But I am very patient, and China is very patient.”

The Trump administration recently delayed some military aid and denied Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a U.S. transit stop—a move that led to Lai’s canceling his trip to Latin America. Those actions have raised questions in both Washington and Taipei about whether it is giving priority to a trade deal with China over support for Taiwan.

The people close to the White House said the administration is focused on deterring China from taking military actions against Taiwan and encouraging Taipei to increase its spending on capabilities such as drones and munitions to bolster its self-defense. The recent decision to deny the transit stop, they said, was intended to avoid dragging the U.S. into domestic Taiwanese politics by boosting Lai’s party during a local legislative recall election.

Rejecting Beijing’s Taiwan independence narrative is a key to deterrence, the people said, as doing so would deny China a potential pretext for conflict that mirrors Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A senior administration official said, “The U.S.’s one-China policy, which provides for executive-branch interactions with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, remains the same as the first Trump administration.” Under Trump’s first presidency, the U.S. increased engagement with Taiwan and boosted arms sales.

In a January call with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Secretary of State Marco Rubio privately reiterated the reassurance of nonsupport for Taiwanese independence, according to people familiar with the matter. Beijing then publicized the remark in an official account of the call without U.S. permission, the people said, which irked Rubio.

The U.S. readout of the January call instead focused on the concerns Rubio expressed to Wang over Beijing’s “coercive actions” against Taiwan. An updated State Department fact sheet on the U.S.-Taiwan relations in February even removed the Biden-era phrase stating that the U.S. doesn’t support Taiwan independence.

Ivan Kanapathy, a senior national-security official who helps formulate the administration’s policy toward China, is an advocate for improving the U.S.’s ability to deter China from trying to take Taiwan by force as Beijing continues to build up its military might.

In an article published last year by the Brookings Institution, a centrist think tank, Kanapathy argued that U.S. officials should avoid publicly stating nonsupport for Taiwanese independence, because that phrase creates doubt in Taiwan and confuses allies. He proposed a more neutral message: simply opposing any unilateral change to the status quo.

Still, Xi is expected to use every chance he gets with Trump to press the American leader to adopt a firm stance against Taiwanese independence.

“No U.S. policy change on Taiwan will happen overnight,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center. “China will push for its position persistently and repeatedly so as to inch forward, and in the process undermine Taiwan’s confidence in U.S. commitment.”

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

9. Zelensky says Trump understands battlefield, has ‘faith in Ukraine’

​Excerpts:

Analysts say economic measures are among the most effective ways to help end the war, because they would slow Russia’s ability to make and purchase weapons and pay attractive salaries to soldiers.

Ukraine has struggled to persuade neighbors to stop purchasing Russian oil. Hungary has refused; Zelensky said talks with Slovakia continue.

Zelensky said Europe must reject Russian oil after recent Russian drone and plane incursions into NATO airspace. Europe is not prepared to counter more such operations, he said, and Ukraine expects Russia eventually to open a new front in the war.

“Just look at those drones,” he said. “That’s weird if they go on importing energy resources from Russia.”

Zelensky says Trump understands battlefield, has ‘faith in Ukraine’

Zelensky, seeking weapons and support, told reporters Saturday that he shared his “visions” for the battlefield with Trump in New York.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/27/zelensky-trump-us-weapons/

September 27, 2025 at 5:11 p.m. EDTYesterday at 5:11 p.m. EDT

4 min

Summary

39

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks to journalists Saturday in his office in Kyiv. (Ed Ram/Getty Images)

By Siobhán O'Grady

KYIV — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he provided an illustrated list of weapons requests to President Donald Trump when they met in New York on Tuesday, just before Trump, in a stark reversal, said he thought Kyiv could win back all of its occupied territory.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

Zelensky told reporters Saturday that he shared his “visions” for the battlefield with Trump, but declined to expand on what, specifically, he asked of the president. It’s expected that Kyiv sought U.S. help with long-range strikes into Russia, assistance the Biden administration restricted for fear of escalation.

Zelensky said Ukraine and the United States reached an understanding in New York of “what can be achieved on the battlefield.”

Relations between Zelensky and Trump have undergone a remarkable turnabout since their disastrous Oval Office meeting in February stirred fears that the incoming administration would abandon Ukraine.

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Trump’s abrupt change in tone has stunned Kyiv and its partners in Europe. He had said recently that Ukraine would have to cede territory to Russia to end to the war.

Zelensky attributed the rhetorical shift to Trump’s new distrust in Putin, his deepened understanding of the battlefield and his “faith in Ukraine.”

European officials cautioned against reading new commitments into Trump’s remarks. They noted he appeared to expect Europe to provide more assistance to Kyiv without direct U.S. involvement. The battlefield is complicated: Russian troops are deeply dug into much of the 20 percent of Ukraine they occupy, and the number of drones flying over the front line have made it almost impossible for either side to make large-scale advances.

Zelensky said he did not think Trump was abandoning Ukraine or that “we are left alone.”

Zelensky speaks during a meeting Tuesday with President Donald Trump at U.N. headquarters in New York. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Israel recently sent Ukraine a U.S. Patriot air defense system, he said, after years of pleas for those systems. They are the only systems capable of shooting down Russian ballistic missiles, which terrorize civilians throughout the country. Israel had long refused to transfer any air defense systems to Kyiv.

Ukraine expects two more Patriot systems from other countries to be fully operational later this fall. He declined to comment further; Patriots are a major target for Russia.

He warned Russia of retaliatory strikes if Moscow continues to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter.

“If we are threatened by blackouts in the capital of Ukraine, then the Kremlin should know there will also be blackouts in the capital of Russia,” he said.

Russian strikes on the northern Ukrainian city of Chernihiv in recent days have cut power to much of the region. Fears are increasing that Russia will significantly ramp up its attacks as winter sets in, provoking more misery among civilians and potentially triggering a wave of refugees to the European Union.

Ukraine regularly strikes targets inside Russia with its own drones, which it uses to circumvent Western weaponry restrictions and shortages. Recent Ukrainian attacks have significantly damaged Russian oil infrastructure.

Kyiv is urging Russia’s European energy customers to find alternatives immediately and for Western partners, including the United States, to impose new sanctions on Moscow’s energy system, a major revenue source for the Kremlin’s war machine.

Some foreign troops will soon travel to Ukraine for training on countering Russian drones, Zelensky said. He declined to name the countries that will participate.

Analysts say economic measures are among the most effective ways to help end the war, because they would slow Russia’s ability to make and purchase weapons and pay attractive salaries to soldiers.

Ukraine has struggled to persuade neighbors to stop purchasing Russian oil. Hungary has refused; Zelensky said talks with Slovakia continue.

Zelensky said Europe must reject Russian oil after recent Russian drone and plane incursions into NATO airspace. Europe is not prepared to counter more such operations, he said, and Ukraine expects Russia eventually to open a new front in the war.

“Just look at those drones,” he said. “That’s weird if they go on importing energy resources from Russia.”

10. Trump’s Gaza peace plan leaves door ajar for Palestinian state

​Excerpts:

Some elements of the U.S. proposal are very specific. “Once all the hostages have been released,” it reads, “Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after October 7. … For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.”

The proposal says that “upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip … including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, [and] entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.” But the plan makes no mention of who would perform this work or pay for it.

Much of the world has charged Israel with restricting aid, while Israel has charged the U.N. and other organizations with incompetence and Hamas sympathies and Hamas with stealing aid to finance terrorism.

Trump’s Gaza peace plan leaves door ajar for Palestinian state

The 21-point proposal includes Hamas disarmament, an international security force and a “Trump development plan” to rebuild the shattered enclave. But Israel might balk at some proposals.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/27/trump-21-point-gaza-peace-plan/

September 27, 2025 at 8:25 p.m. EDTYesterday at 8:25 p.m. EDT

A Palestinian man takes cover following an Israeli airstrike during a military operation in Gaza City on Saturday. (Mohammed Saber/EPA/Shutterstock)

By Karen DeYoung, Souad Mekhennet and Adam Taylor

The Trump administration’s proposal for ending the Gaza war would begin with the immediate cessation of all military operations, “battle lines” frozen in place and the release within 48 hours of all 20 living hostages and the remains of more than two dozen believed dead.

According to the 21-point plan, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post and verified by officials from two governments that have been briefed on it by the administration, all of Hamas’s offensive weaponry would be destroyed. Those militants who “commit to peaceful co-existence” would be offered amnesty. Safe passage to other countries would be facilitated for Hamas members who choose to leave.

Neither Israel nor Hamas has agreed to the just over three-page page plan, which U.S. officials shared with regional and allied governments at high-level meetings at the United Nations over the past week. President Donald Trump is expected to press Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept it when they meet Monday at the White House.

A senior Israeli official told journalists in a briefing Friday that his country’s leadership still needed to review the plan ahead of the Monday meeting.

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Hamas has not yet been given a copy of it, regional officials said.

It remained unclear whether elements it outlines for governance, security, and rehabilitation and development in Gaza have already been put in motion or how quickly they could be implemented if a ceasefire is actually imminent.

Trump, who vowed during his campaign to quickly end the Gaza war and has since repeatedly claimed that a negotiated peace was near, told reporters Friday: “I think we have maybe a deal on Gaza. We’re very close. … I think it’s a deal that will get the hostages back. It’s going to be a deal that will end the war.”

The proposal provides little or no detail as to how or in what sequence — beyond the initial ceasefire, hostage release and increase in humanitarian aid — its 21 points would be addressed. While it specifies that no Gazans would be compelled to leave, and that anyone who leaves would be entitled to return, the plan does not address where they will go while a “Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize” the enclave is being undertaken.

“Nothing is finalized … these are broad strokes,” said an official from the region, one of several who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive diplomacy. “There are still things that need to be ironed out.”

The White House did not immediately respond to questions about the proposal. Portions of the plan were reported earlier Saturday by the Times of Israel.

Some elements of the U.S. proposal are very specific. “Once all the hostages have been released,” it reads, “Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after October 7. … For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.”

The proposal says that “upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip … including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, [and] entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.” But the plan makes no mention of who would perform this work or pay for it.

Much of the world has charged Israel with restricting aid, while Israel has charged the U.N. and other organizations with incompetence and Hamas sympathies and Hamas with stealing aid to finance terrorism.

“Entry and distribution of aid … will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies … in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party,” the proposal reads. It was unclear whether that included the U.S.- and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which has delivered aid in southern Gaza.

The plan also outlines a “temporary transitional governance” of “qualified Palestinians and international experts” to run “day to day” public services in Gaza. That governing body would be “supported and supervised” by a “new international body” established by the United States in consultation with others, while the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority undertakes internal reforms until it is deemed capable of taking over Gaza at some future point.

The United States also “will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force to immediately deploy and oversee the security in Gaza” while a Palestinian force is being trained. Israel Defense Forces will “progressively hand over the Gaza territory they occupy,” the document says. Eventually, the Israelis will completely withdraw, except for an undefined “perimeter presence.”

Some Arab governments have agreed provisionally to participate in the international force, the official in the region said, “but we need more conversations about it.”

Trump has reportedly grown exasperated with Netanyahu and expressed public irritation at an Israeli airstrike in Qatar early this month that targeted Hamas negotiators in Doha, where they were considering a previous proposal by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff. That plan was discussed in a White House meeting Trump convened in late August — attended by Jared Kushner, who spearheaded Middle East policy during Trump’s first term, and former British prime minister Tony Blair.

The current plan incorporates much of the earlier one but includes new elements such as an Israeli promise it will not occupy or annex Gaza and will launch “no further attacks on Qatar.”

The plan “acknowledges the important role Qatar has played as a mediator in this conflict,” and notes that it was the United States and Israel who first asked Qatar to host Hamas negotiators.

Despite complaints about the Qatar strike, the senior Israeli official said that other Arab leaders were privately happy for Israel to kill Hamas leaders. “As long as it’s not on [their] territory,” the official said.

In a bombastic speech at the U.N. on Friday, Netanyahu made no reference to an imminent deal, instead charging that the world “no longer remembers” the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, that killed around 1,200 Israelis and took some 250 hostages.

Over the past two years, Israel’s retaliatory attacks have nearly leveled Gaza, killing more than 60,000 Palestinians, according to Gazan health authorities. Hundreds of thousands of Gazans have been corralled in makeshift tent cities in about a quarter of the enclave’s territory and the U.N. has declared a famine in some areas.

This month, Israel launched a new offensive in Gaza City, where Netanyahu said “the final remnants of Hamas are holed up.” Their goal, he said, is to “repeat the atrocities of October 7 again and again. … That is why Israel must finish the job and that is why we want to do so as fast as possible.”

The senior Israeli official said that some elements of the plan would be difficult, such as the process for disarmament in Gaza, but that Israel agreed with the principle that a provisional government should be set up and run by Gazans “and others.”

The official said that the Gaza City offensive was key to making Hamas accept a deal, and “the pressure is already working.”

Perhaps most controversial, the last two points appeared designed to appeal to the more than 150 countries that have recognized Palestinian statehood, and to Arab governments who have insisted they will not buy into the peace deal without some reference to an eventual state.

Once all the development and political reforms the proposal envisions are carried out, the document carefully says, “conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian Statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.” The United States, it says, “will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.”

In his Friday speech, Netanyahu said that Israel would not allow Western governments to “shove a terror state down our throats.” He has previously said Israel would not permit either a Palestinian state or Palestinian Authority governance in Gaza.

11. China at UN warns against return to 'Cold War mentality'

China at UN warns against return to 'Cold War mentality'

27 Sep 2025 01:00AM

(Updated: 27 Sep 2025 06:59AM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/china-un-warns-against-return-cold-war-mentality-5372366

China's Premier of the State Council Li Qiang addresses the 80th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at U.N. headquarters in New York City, US, September 26, 2025. (Photo: Reuters/Kylie Cooper

UNITED NATIONS: Chinese Premier Li Qiang on Friday (Sep 26) warned against a return to a "Cold War mentality" and defended multilateralism and free trade, in a veiled criticism of the United States during an address to the United Nations General Assembly.

Li did not directly mention US President Donald Trump but cast China as a defender of the global order, long anchored by Washington.

"The world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation," Li said. "Unilateralism and Cold War mentality are resurfacing. The international rules and order built over the past 80 years are under serious challenge and the once effective international system is constantly disrupted."

LI DEFENDS MULTILATERALISM

Li added that humanity had "once again come to a crossroads".

He criticised the use of tariffs, a tool Trump has frequently used against Beijing and other countries, even though Washington and Beijing reached a fragile truce.

"A major cause of the current global economic doldrums is the rise in unilateral and protectionist measures such as tariff hikes and the erection of walls and barriers," Li said. "China has consistently opened its door wider to the world."

Li said China "hopes to work with the rest of the world to uphold the ideals of the UN".

Related:

Roadblocks remain despite thaw in China-India diplomatic ties

Assistant Professor Duan Xiaolin on China's global presence, foreign policy

China steps into climate leadership role with new goals as the US falls behind: Analysts

SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

The United States and its Pacific allies have long demanded that China allow freedom of navigation in the strategic South China Sea, where Beijing has overlapping territorial claims.

The Trump administration, while still critical of China, has shifted away from defending international conventions and instead has emphasised raw US power.

Source: AFP/fs

12. “War Without Harm”: China’s Hybrid Warfare Playbook Against Taiwan

​Strategic unconventional warfare with Chinese characteristics (yes, unrestricted warfare and China's three warfares).

Note emphasis on "cognitive warfare."

Excerpts:

China’s approach to this “war without harm” involves a systematic five-phase strategy: sabotaging critical infrastructure, waging cognitive warfare through disinformation, conducting cyber-physical convergence attacks, employing military encirclement, and leveraging political subversion. Recent incidents, including the Matsu cable sabotage and disinformation campaigns during Taiwan’s 2024 elections, provide a glimpse of what future efforts to destabilize Taiwanese defense and erode public trust might look like. The attacks represent more than just scattered provocations among the typical ebb and flow of cross-Strait relations—they constitute a new model for hybrid warfare, one designed to neutralize Taiwan’s ability to resist while preserving its value as an economic and strategic asset.

...

• To counteract cognitive warfare and the spread of AI-driven disinformation, Taiwan must institutionalize media literacy and public education programs across all levels of society. These efforts should be supported by advanced AI systems designed to detect and neutralize false narratives rapidly. Enhancing cooperation with democratic allies and international organizations will be vital in bolstering Taiwan’s capacity to combat election interference and other psychological operations effectively. While existing initiatives show promise, notably Taiwan’s efforts to boost disinformation resilience surrounding elections, scaling them to meet the growing complexity of these threats is imperative.

Conclusion:

Ultimately, addressing these interconnected threats requires a whole-of-society approach. Taiwan’s legal frameworks must be updated to counter political subversion, including revisions to Foreign Influence Registration Laws modeled after international best practices, such as those in Australia. Technological innovation, particularly in autonomous defense systems and AI-driven monitoring, should be accelerated to outpace adversarial advances. Strengthening diplomatic ties and diversifying international partnerships are equally essential to mitigate geopolitical isolation and build a robust network of allies. But above all, if the Taiwanese government is to rise to the challenge of China’s evolving hybrid warfare capacity, it will have to raise its own level of proactive preparedness to that being displayed by Beijing.

“War Without Harm”: China’s Hybrid Warfare Playbook Against Taiwan​

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/war-without-harm-chinas-hybrid-warfare-playbook-against-taiwan/

Situation Reports - September 16, 2025

By Yen-ting LinShare

The escalating tensions across Taiwan are not isolated provocations—they are calculated maneuvers in China’s evolving blueprint for hybrid warfare. Unlike traditional military campaigns, this strategy seeks to conquer Taiwan without destroying its infrastructure or economy, aiming instead to coerce submission under a pretense of “peaceful” unification.

China’s approach to this “war without harm” involves a systematic five-phase strategy: sabotaging critical infrastructure, waging cognitive warfare through disinformation, conducting cyber-physical convergence attacks, employing military encirclement, and leveraging political subversion. Recent incidents, including the Matsu cable sabotage and disinformation campaigns during Taiwan’s 2024 elections, provide a glimpse of what future efforts to destabilize Taiwanese defense and erode public trust might look like. The attacks represent more than just scattered provocations among the typical ebb and flow of cross-Strait relations—they constitute a new model for hybrid warfare, one designed to neutralize Taiwan’s ability to resist while preserving its value as an economic and strategic asset.

Here’s how a Taiwan conflict might play out under this new hybrid warfare paradigm:

Phase One: Cutting Taiwan Off from the World via Infrastructure Sabotage

The first phase involves operations that leverage non-military and proxy actors, such as state-aligned civilian vessels, to target infrastructure in such a way that creates a classic ‘gray zone’ dilemma for Taiwanese policymakers. To respond risks escalating tensions and alienating international support, as any retaliation can be framed as aggression against non-combatants. Conversely, failing to respond allows China to continue disrupting Taiwan’s critical systems unchecked. This strategic ambiguity is central to China’s hybrid warfare strategy, enabling significant disruption while evading direct attribution.

Documented incidents attest to how this strategy is neither isolated nor unprecedented. In February 2023, Chinese vessels severed cables near the Matsu Islands, leaving residents and businesses without internet access for over 50 days . A similar operation in January 2025 targeted the Trans Pacific Express Cable System, with Chinese-linked entities concealing their involvement through sophisticated vessel-tracking obfuscation. The operations align with a broader global pattern of infrastructure sabotage, as seen in the 2024 Baltic Sea attacks, where China-linked vessels disrupted European undersea networks to gain strategic leverage without triggering conventional retaliation.

In a hypothetical wartime scenario, infrastructure sabotage would serve as the opening salvo of a broader campaign, crippling communications, financial systems, and operational coordination before conventional hostilities begin. The $10 trillion digital economy and Taiwan’s pivotal role in global semiconductor production amplify the consequences of such attacks, creating cascading effects on global supply chains, financial stability, and military readiness. These disruptions would obstruct international crisis response, delay allied support, and deepen Taiwan’s isolation in the critical opening stages of a conflict. By plunging Taiwan into a state of isolation and chaos, these actions pave the way for the next wave of hybrid warfare: cognitive manipulation.

Phase Two: Manufacturing Chaos and Consent via Cognitive Warfare

With Taiwan’s external connections disrupted, the CCP moves to shape perceptions within Taiwanese society, leveraging state-controlled media and coordinated bot networks to flood the information space with disinformation, sowing division and confusion.

Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election already showcased advanced CCP capabilities in the information sphere. AI-generated disinformation campaigns, including deepfakes and synthetic narratives, sought to influence voter behavior and undermine democratic processes. Historical influencing ops like distributing paper propaganda have now evolved into sophisticated digital operations, though the goal remains the same: manipulating perceptions and fracturing societal trust.

The psychological toll of this phase compounds the isolation caused by the infrastructure sabotage, leaving the Taiwanese public vulnerable to Beijing’s strategic domination of the narrative. By spreading divisive narratives and exploiting cultural and linguistic similarities, Beijing deepens societal fractures and creates an environment of uncertainty and fear. Here we see China’s next-generation psychological warfare strategy in action, where destabilizing adversaries takes precedence over direct confrontation.

Phase Three: Disrupting Communications via Electronic Warfare

China then escalates its hybrid warfare strategy to electronic warfare (EW), a distinct phase targeting Taiwan’s technological backbone. Where the first phase engenders physical isolation by severing underseas cables, EW seeks to disrupt Taiwan’s operational capability by impairing GPS and communication networks in and around the islands, impacting both military and civilian functionality.

China’s EW arsenal includes radar jamming, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and GPS interference—tools demonstrated during PLA Navy drills in 2024, which obstructed critical maritime logistics routes near Taiwan. By disabling GPS systems, EW renders Taiwan’s reliance on advanced military technologies, such as drones, guided munitions, and precision navigation, ineffective. Civilian supply chains also suffer as logistical operations falter under disrupted communications.

Compounding these challenges is Taiwan’s lack of an independent satellite system, leaving it reliant on foreign partners for critical data. In contrast, China’s dominance in space-based infrastructure provides it with uninterrupted access to satellite capabilities, creating an asymmetric advantage that Taiwan cannot counter. This airspace and satellite disparity deepens Taiwan’s strategic vulnerability, as Beijing can isolate the island technologically while ensuring its own systems remain operational.

This stage differs from earlier phases in its direct incapacitation of Taiwan’s operational systems. While cable sabotage engenders physical disconnection and cognitive warfare sows informational chaos, EW disables the technological tools needed to navigate and respond. The collapse of GPS and communication infrastructure traps Taiwan in a state of systemic paralysis, affecting both strategic defense and everyday civilian functions.

By integrating these sequential disruptions, China effectively preconditions the battlefield before a single conventional shot is fired.

Phase Four: Military Encirclement

In the next phase the PLA attempts to seize the advantage amid Taiwan’s isolation and technological incapacitation, surrounding the island with overwhelming military power, hoping to amplify fear and weaken resistance. Military aircraft violate Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in record numbers, while warships position themselves along critical maritime routes, simulating a blockade. These actions create a no-exit scenario, signaling to both Taiwan and the international community that any attempt at intervention could escalate into direct conflict.

The simultaneous deployment of naval assets and long-range bombers erases the distinction between military signaling and active siege tactics. When conducted under the conditions of informational and technological disconnection, such maneuvers become exponentially more intimidating.

The 2024 “Joint Sword” exercises appeared to be a rehearsal for this phase, with missile overflights and encirclement drills demonstrating Beijing’s readiness to enforce physical isolation

Phase Five: United Front Destabilization and Political Subversion

Exploiting years of groundwork by the United Front Work Department, Beijing activates its network of infiltrators within Taiwan’s military, governance, and media sectors to push for surrender. Espionage cases like the 2022 scandal involving Taiwanese Colonel Hsiang Te-en, who accepted bribes for signing a surrender letter, demonstrate how internal actors are being primed to align with Beijing’s objectives in a moment of crisis. Espionage incidents have surged between 2022-24, some involving military personnel and officials compromising national security; for example, a former Presidential Office aide leaking sensitive documents to China earlier this year.

Simultaneously, United Front-linked institutions such as Jinan and Huaqiao Universities cultivate pro-Beijing sympathies among Taiwanese students through scholarships and career incentives, ensuring a steady supply of ideological allies. These efforts are reinforced by Chinese propaganda infiltrating Taiwanese news outlets and disinformation campaigns flooding social media during critical moments, such as the 2024 presidential election, to sow division and undermine resistance.

In this final stage, infiltrators emerge publicly, leveraging the chaos caused by severed communications and disrupted logistics to urge surrender and the acceptance of Beijing’s terms. Without firing a single shot, China’s hybrid warfare strategy culminates in internal collapse, achieving domination through meticulously orchestrated subversion.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

Each phase presents distinct threats requiring its own tailored solutions, all while contributing to an overarching strategy of resilience and deterrence:

• To increase resilience to critical infrastructure sabotage, Taiwan must prioritize securing its undersea communication cables above all. While technologies such as real-time distributed temperature sensing systems have been implemented in limited contexts, these capabilities should be expanded to provide comprehensive island-wide monitoring. Rapid-response units equipped with advanced repair technologies are also essential to minimize downtime in the event of sabotage. Taiwan should further strengthen its international collaborations to gain actionable intelligence on submarine activities and coordinate maritime security patrols with regional allies, addressing gaps in surveillance and response, which remain critical weak points.
• To counteract cognitive warfare and the spread of AI-driven disinformation, Taiwan must institutionalize media literacy and public education programs across all levels of society. These efforts should be supported by advanced AI systems designed to detect and neutralize false narratives rapidly. Enhancing cooperation with democratic allies and international organizations will be vital in bolstering Taiwan’s capacity to combat election interference and other psychological operations effectively. While existing initiatives show promise, notably Taiwan’s efforts to boost disinformation resilience surrounding elections, scaling them to meet the growing complexity of these threats is imperative.
• Shoring up critical communications systems calls for new investments in cyber-physical convergence defenses, including those already allocated for shielding drones and command networks, all of which must be integrated into a cohesive defense architecture. Developing indigenous satellite capabilities to ensure resilience against space-based disruptions is an urgent priority, as this will reduce reliance on foreign partners. Taiwan’s participation in international training programs, such as its investment in the “Viper Shield” electronic warfare system for F-16s, underscores its commitment to advancing electronic defense capabilities, though challenges remain in achieving full-spectrum readiness.
• A potential military encirclement can be blunted through proactive efforts to counter isolation and assert sovereignty. By expanding naval and aerial patrols, Taiwan can reinforce its presence in territorial waters and airspace. Strengthening alliances through joint regional exercises simulating encirclement scenarios will also enhance readiness and deterrence. Public preparedness programs should also be bolstered to maintain civilian morale and resilience in the face of prolonged isolation. Taiwan’s government has already taken key steps to protect electoral integrity from foreign manipulation, a foundation that must be expanded to encompass broader civil and military preparedness.

Ultimately, addressing these interconnected threats requires a whole-of-society approach. Taiwan’s legal frameworks must be updated to counter political subversion, including revisions to Foreign Influence Registration Laws modeled after international best practices, such as those in Australia. Technological innovation, particularly in autonomous defense systems and AI-driven monitoring, should be accelerated to outpace adversarial advances. Strengthening diplomatic ties and diversifying international partnerships are equally essential to mitigate geopolitical isolation and build a robust network of allies. But above all, if the Taiwanese government is to rise to the challenge of China’s evolving hybrid warfare capacity, it will have to raise its own level of proactive preparedness to that being displayed by Beijing.

13. Commentary: Japan faces a fundamental dilemma on counterstrike missiles

Commentary: Japan faces a fundamental dilemma on counterstrike missiles

There is increasing political and public support in Japan for counterstrike capabilities as a deterrent. But there’s a misleading perception that oversimplifies the issue, says political scientist Yasuo Takao.​

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/japan-defence-rearming-missiles-deterrence-article-9-5368871

A Japanese Type 12 surface-to-ship missile is launched by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force during a joint exercise in Australia, on Jul 22, 2025. (Photo: PTE Alex Brown/Australian Department of Defense via AP)

Listen8 min

Yasuo Takao

26 Sep 2025 06:00AM

(Updated: 26 Sep 2025 12:52PM)

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Read a summary of this article on FAST.

FAST

PERTH: Eighty years after World War II ended and forced its pacifist identity, Japan now finds itself in the middle of a volatile security environment. Against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and intensifying US–China rivalry, there’s a sense of unease that the unthinkable has become plausible. 

This has tilted public opinion toward greater defence spending and support for counterstrike capabilities – in a country committed to its post-war constitution, shielded by US security guarantees and the only one for which nuclear warfare is no abstraction. 

On Aug 29, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced concrete plans to deploy domestically-produced long-range missiles as part of the country's counterstrike capability, starting in March 2026. Tokyo also plans to acquire several hundred US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. Together, these developments mark the practical realisation of Japan’s long-debated enemy base strike capability.

Defence is a central issue in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership race on Oct 4, which will also decide who succeeds Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister. Frontrunner Sanae Takaichi supports broad constitutional revision and argues Japan should acquire counterstrike capabilities as “a highly effective measure.”

But at the heart of this debate lies a fundamental dilemma: Do counterstrike capabilities truly enhance Japan’s security through deterrence, or do they risk dangerous escalation, constitutional ambiguity and regional mistrust?

SHIFTING DOCTRINE 

Since 1947, Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution has renounced war as a sovereign right and prohibited the maintenance of “war potential”. Over decades, successive governments reinterpreted this clause to allow for a military, known as the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) under the principle of senshu boei – exclusively defensive defence.

Codified in the 2022 Defense White Paper, senshu boei rests on three restrictions: that force can be exercised only after Japan has already come under armed attack; that the use of force must be limited to the minimum necessary for self-defence and that capabilities must remain confined to this minimum threshold.

But the calculus is shifting.

Since 2016, North Korea has deployed solid-fuel missiles that are harder to detect pre-launch, and since 2019 has tested ballistic and hypersonic systems with erratic trajectories that complicate interception. Japan thinks its current missile-defence network can no longer fully cope. In the past year, Chinese and Russian aircraft have also intruded into Japanese airspace. 

Public opinion has clearly flipped. Where a 2006 Yomiuri poll showed 39 per cent of respondents in favour of counterstrike capabilities and 55 per cent in opposition, a Yomiuri–Waseda survey in mid-2022 found 62 per cent supported and 35 per cent opposed these weapons. 

In December 2022, the Kishida government approved a landmark defence overhaul, authorising the development of counterstrike capabilities – framed as an extension, not a rejection, of senshu bōei.

Tokyo’s logic was clear: Once an adversary launches a missile, interception is uncertain. To protect its citizens, Japan must be able to strike enemy launch sites, but only if an attack is deemed imminent.

Related:

Commentary: Japan enters a new phase in politics with rise of 'Japanese First'

Commentary: Japan deserves far better leadership than this

CAPABILITY AND CREDIBILITY

While the government frames counterstrike as a form of deterrence, a persistent gap exists between stated ideals and operational realities. A common but misleading perception is that simply possessing counterstrike capabilities makes Japan secure. 

Proponents argue counterstrike raises the costs of aggression, strengthening deterrence. But deterrence rests on two pillars: the physical capability to inflict unacceptable costs on an adversary and the political will and legal clarity to credibly use those means.

Japan may soon have the capability, but its credibility is undercut by constitutional limits, political caution and regional sensitivities. Without credibility, even advanced weapons may fail to deter – a paradox where the pursuit of deterrence could weaken deterrence itself.

The Tomahawk purchase highlights the contradictions. These long-range missiles, while powerful, cannot reliably destroy adversary weapons in the narrow window before launch.

Consider North Korea: Its missiles are fired vertically, revealing no target until after takeoff. By the time Japan detects the launch, confirms their destination and responds, Tomahawks may find their target too late.

This leaves Japan trapped between two unattractive options: Strike too late and it is meaningless. Strike too early and it risks undermining Article 9 and eroding Japan’s reputation for restraint.

Another challenge is intelligence. Japan’s ability to detect and attribute imminent attacks remains uncertain, given the opacity of Chinese and North Korean missile forces, as well as the proliferation of hypersonic missiles and cyber interference.

The risk that faulty judgment could spark escalation is growing.

This misperception that mere possession guarantees safety makes the public vulnerable to manipulation. Adversaries can exploit it by spreading narratives that amplify division or pressure policymakers into rash decisions. Thus, counterstrike is also an information security challenge.

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force on Jun 25, 2025 shows a single "Type-88" missile being tested off the coast at the JGSDF Shizunai Anti-aircraft firing range in Shinhidaka, Hidaka district on the northern island of Hokkaido. (File photo:…see more

THE PACIFIST BRAND

For decades, Japan’s pacifist identity reassured its citizens and gave Tokyo moral legitimacy in East Asia. Counterstrike blurs this line. 

It signals to neighbours that Japan is edging toward offence, no matter how much it is couched in defence. Given historical sensitivities, even symbolic shifts carry risks of mistrust and strategic backlash, particularly from China and South Korea.

For Japan, strengthening security means not just acquiring new strike systems, but also preserving the credibility of its pacifist commitments. Deterrence works by threatening costs; reassurance works by reducing incentives for conflict. They are necessary counterparts.

Related:

Commentary: PM Ishiba’s grand vision for Japan defence finds little support, even at home

Commentary: No one wants an Asian NATO, except Japan’s new PM Ishiba

Japan’s shift cannot be understood outside the US-China rivalry. Washington has long pressed Tokyo to assume greater security responsibilities. Counterstrike fits into this pattern of alliance “burden-sharing.”

Yet this creates entrapment risks. If Japan demonstrates willingness to strike enemy bases, adversaries may perceive it as a forward partner in US military strategy. This perception could make Japan a target in any Taiwan crisis or US-China confrontation, even if Tokyo itself seeks restraint.

THE REAL TEST OF LEADERSHIP

Japan faces a fundamental choice: pursue counterstrike capabilities that offer limited deterrence but high risks, or craft a strategy that makes conflict less likely by combining defensive strength with credible restraint.

A more constructive path for Japan’s security would involve a clearer doctrine emphasising defensive aims, crisis management channels to prevent inadvertent escalation, alliance mechanisms for de-escalation and information resilience to counter disinformation and build public understanding.

The real test of leadership will be whether Tokyo can balance the imperatives of protecting its citizens without undermining the principles that have anchored its security for decades. Failure to strike this balance risks dragging Japan into the very conflicts it seeks to deter.

Dr Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow of Political Science at Curtin University.

14. China steps into climate leadership role with new goals as the US falls behind: Analysts

​The US sees a scam in climate change. China sees an opportunity, 

China steps into climate leadership role with new goals as the US falls behind: Analysts

Experts say China’s recent commitment marks a major step forward in global climate action, standing in stark contrast to the US’s retreat from international climate goals.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/sustainability/climate-action-china-usa-carbon-emissions-5371191

In recent days, US President Donald Trump has called climate change a "con job" and doubled down on fossil fuels, while Chinese President Xi Jinping announced new climate goals and called on nations to take action.

Listen6 min

Darrelle Ng

26 Sep 2025 04:55PM

(Updated: 26 Sep 2025 11:14PM)

Read a summary of this article on FAST.

FAST

China has made a landmark climate pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 7 to 10 per cent below peak levels by 2035.

Beijing’s reduction target marks the first time the world's biggest emitter has committed to an actual decrease in emissions, rather than merely slowing their growth. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping made the announcement at a climate leaders’ summit on Wednesday (Sep 24), where the United States was notably absent. 

Analysts say China’s commitment is a pivotal moment in global climate action, with the potential to substantially improve the health of the planet.

“China is such a big emitter that it's the only country that, if it changes its emissions significantly, it changes the (carbon footprint) of the whole of planet Earth,” said Benjamin Horton, dean of the City University of Hong Kong’s School of Energy and Environment.

Beijing's vow is backed by promises to expand wind and solar power capacity sixfold from 2020 levels, drastically increase forest coverage and accelerate electric vehicle production. 

Yao Zhe, a global policy advisor at environmental organisation Greenpeace East Asia, said Xi’s reduction target is a modest baseline.

With strong momentum in its clean energy developments, China could surpass its current pledge, she added.

Tibetan sheep graze at a solar farm in Hainan prefecture in western China's Qinghai province, Jul 1, 2025. (Photo: AP/Ng Han Guan)

“China is the world's largest carbon emitter … but it is also the biggest clean technology provider. So, what China has to offer matters a lot,” Yao told CNA’s East Asia Tonight programme.

“I'm hopeful that the actual progress will, in fact, outpace the target on paper.”

AMERICA MISSING ON CLIMATE ACTION

Experts said China’s commitment speaks volumes at a time when the US is moving away from global climate goals.

The US is the world's biggest historical greenhouse gas emitter and second biggest current emitter behind China.

Washington once promised major emission cuts under previous President Joe Biden – up to 66 per cent by 2035.

But those pledges are now off the table after President Donald Trump in January pulled the US out of the Paris Agreement.

“The Paris Agreement was put in place because scientists know the dangers for civilisation if we start to cross planetary boundaries … (when) global mean temperature (rises) 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial (levels),” said Horton. 

The global average atmospheric carbon dioxide was 422.8 parts per million in 2024 – a record high, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an American scientific and regulatory agency. 

“The safety net for planet Earth is at around 280 parts per million. So, we’re far in excess of that. Every single year we increase our carbon dioxide … we increase our temperatures,” said Horton.

Last year was the warmest year on record.

Scientists have linked rising temperatures to more extreme weather events such as drought, wildfires, heatwaves and storms. 

Horton, who is based in Hong Kong, pointed to Super Typhoon Ragasa, which in recent days wreaked havoc in the territory and nearby countries and regions. 

“We need to see action and ultimately, we need to see results. We need to see our carbon dioxide volumes starting to stabilise, and as we move into the future, to decrease,” he said. 

A drone view shows buildings partially submerged in floodwaters and mud, following Super Typhoon Ragasa, in Hualien, Taiwan, Sep 25, 2025. (Photo: Reuters/Ann Wang)

CHINA IN CONTRAST TO US’ STANCE

On Tuesday, Trump called climate change the “greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world” during his United Nations General Assembly speech. He added that climate predictions are made by “stupid people” and that countries will “fail” if they continue with the “green scam”.

In contrast, Xi urged stronger climate action from developed countries and delivered a veiled critique of the US president's anti-climate rhetoric.

Horton said China's pledges appear genuine, stemming from concern for environmental health and long-term economic prosperity, rather than over rivalry with the US. 

“This is not about geopolitics. (The pledge) shows that the Chinese government is listening to science and is developing regulations and policies,” he said. 

“It's about an understanding of scientific information and (climate) threats posed to the population (and) the economy. If we don't control our carbon dioxide emissions, extreme (weather) events are going to impact lives and livelihoods.” 

Still, many observers said Xi’s pledge fell short of expectations. 

Yao said the biggest challenge to China’s clean energy transition lies in the limited capacity of its power grid to handle increased renewable energy input. 

“China has no problem producing and manufacturing such equipment, but the problem is whether the grid can absorb all this (additional) renewable energy being produced,” she said. 

She added that Chinese policymakers are also trying to find a balance between decarbonisation and maintaining flexibility for future economic stimulus.

CLIMATE HEALTH LINKED TO ECONOMY

The UN has hailed Beijing’s commitments but said the world must aim higher as the clock ticks down on rising temperatures.

Alongside China, the UN said about 100 nations have signalled new climate targets ahead of the COP30 climate summit in Brazil in November. 

However, there were also setbacks. The European Union is struggling to find unity on climate action, missing the September deadline to present its climate plan. 

Environmental advocates warned that climate health is closely connected to that of the economy, and that environmental degradation can lead to serious financial consequences. 

Horton said it is a link China appears to be acting on, while the US remains divided.

He added that the climate agenda should be on the table at all trade talks, especially major ones like the Group of 7 (G7) and Group of 20 (G20) meetings, as “we cannot have a healthy economy without a healthy planet”.

“In China, science and business are starting to work hand-in-hand. Contrast that to the US,” he said.

“On one side of the geopolitical boundary, we have science and policy starting to align, and on the other side, we see the divergence.” 

Related:

Commentary: Ten years after Paris Agreement, climate action faces a reckoning

China’s clean energy revolution a contradiction in terms? A few truths about its green story

Source: CNA/dn(ca)

15. The Rise of America’s Young Socialists—From the 2008 Financial Crisis to Mamdani

​Where you stand depends on where you sit.

The Rise of America’s Young Socialists—From the 2008 Financial Crisis to Mamdani

For many on the forefront of the far left, the misery of the economic meltdown left a lasting impression

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/socialists-zohran-mamdani-2008-financial-crisis-f98e54fa?st=9u4UnF&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Joshua Chaffin

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 | Photography by Natalie Keyssar for WSJ

Sept. 27, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Well before Lehman Brothers collapsed and capitalism quaked, Gabe Tobias had an arresting view of what would become the global financial crisis.

It was in Santa Ana, Calif., where Tobias was working as a community organizer after finishing college in 2006. He was meant to be advising low-income families on healthcare.

Soon, though, his work changed.

Acorn, the nonprofit that employed him, began to see rashes of families, particularly Hispanic immigrants, complaining that they were being forced out of their homes. The culprit was adjustable-rate mortgages they had signed up for but scarcely understood.

“It was devastating,” Tobias recalled. “They had everything locked up in their homes. They had nothing else.” 

In the ensuing months, he would become familiar with unscrupulous mortgage brokers’ tricks of the trade—using multiple sets of paperwork to mislead customers, enlisting community leaders to sell dubious products to those who spoke little English, and more. At an early age, he came to a sobering conclusion: “There’s an industry that’s set up to suck money out of working people.” 

In June, Tobias’ friend, Zohran Mamdani, 33, shocked the world when he handily won the Democratic primary for New York City mayor running as a proud socialist. Mamdani’s victory has variously been attributed to his charisma, his adroit use of social media, his ability to bring South Asian residents into city politics and the warts of his leading opponents.

But it is also something else: the flowering of a movement that began to gestate nearly 20 years ago, when the misery of the financial crisis proved formative for a generation then just coming of age.

Sen. Bernie Sanders and Mamdani at a New York town hall on Sept. 6. Photo: eduardo munoz/Reuters

The crowd at the Sept. 6 town hall in New York. Photo: eduardo munoz/Reuters

For many, like Tobias, now 39, that crisis—and what they view as a feckless response to it—left a lasting impression about the ills of capitalism and the inability of America’s dominant political parties to address the country’s problems. 

Over time, some have found a home in the nativist MAGA movement created by President Trump. But others traveled left in a search for answers. Along the way, they have revived what had been a moribund faction of the Democratic Party and created a cadre of now-seasoned operatives who propelled Mamdani.

“A lot of the germs for what’s become the resurgent left have come from [2008],” said Tobias, who is now a top strategist for the Democratic Socialists of America, the political home of Mamdani and other progressive stars like N.Y. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. “I know a lot of people who work on the left who have personal experience [of the financial crisis].”

Veterans of Occupy Wall Street, the protest movement that sprang up in response to the 2008 crisis, now hold senior roles in groups like the Working Families Party, which gave Mamdani a vital early endorsement, and the Justice Democrats. 

“People keep saying, ‘New Yorkers are more conservative than you think. A socialist will never win,’” said Jasmine Gripper, who began her teaching career in the shadow of 2008 and is now co-director of the Working Family Party’s New York branch. “I’m like, ‘A socialist is winning, y’all.’”

While the mainstream Democratic Party’s popularity has sunk to a 30-year low, according to one poll, and its leadership appears uncertain of how to oppose Trump, the far left seems vigorous—particularly among the young. A recent survey by the Cato Institute and YouGov found that 62% of Americans ages 18 to 29 hold a “favorable view” of socialism—something that would have been unimaginable to Cold War generations.

Some are venturing even further left.

On a recent evening, 15 comrades from the Northwest Philadelphia cell of the Revolutionary Communists of America gathered for their weekly meeting in a classroom at Thomas Jefferson University.

The mostly 20- and 30-somethings had eschewed the Mao caps and Che Guevara T-shirts of previous generations. Soon, though, terms like “ruling class,” “parasitic,” “bourgeoisie” and “dialectic” were bandied about the room as they settled into an earnest discussion of the assigned reading, an article entitled “Morality and the Class Struggle.” References to the 2008 crisis were also plentiful. Several members invoked it when explaining what prompted them to ditch “the milquetoast” left, as one called it.

The Northwest Philadelphia cell of the Revolutionary Communists of America met at Temple University to distribute materials and discuss organizing plans.

Zach Bickel, 34, blamed the crisis for taking his father’s job and causing his community in central Pennsylvania to be “whittled away.” 

“The system never really recovered from 2008,” said Nico Melton, 25, who claimed to have become disillusioned while studying at the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania, the capitalist bastion that is Trump’s alma mater. Melton was one of just a few members when the cell was formed about a year ago.

At times, the meeting felt like a support group—in this case, for people suffering from the modern economy. Communism, they acknowledged, hadn’t worked anywhere in the world it had been attempted—at least not yet.

Still, one of the cell’s veterans urged newer comrades to proudly brandish the hammer and sickle during their fall recruiting drive. “Wherever we go, we must show up and show out,” the comrade said. “We are Revolutionary Communists!” 

None of this surprised Jeremy Varon, a history professor at the New School in New York who has studied the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s and considers himself a progressive. “They didn’t grow up with that sense of stigma to all things socialist or communist,” he said of his students. 

Moreover, he noted, Ocasio-Cortez, Mamdani and Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders had made their brand of socialism appealing by casting it as a moral imperative. “It’s the simple proposition that such a productive and prosperous country shouldn’t have poverty and so many people shouldn’t have to work so hard for so little while a handful of people own so much,” Varon explained. “If you articulate it in those terms, it is not only palatable but, I think, you know, exciting to people.”

Genevieve Rand, 28, a tenants’ rights organizer, put it this way: “Being a socialist—the traditional conception of that is you’re a nerd who reads a lot of books from 200 years ago.”

No longer.

An office for tenants' rights organizers where Rand did some work before canvassing for Mamdani.

‘A lot of upheaval’

On a recent evening, Rand was going door to door in and around Brooklyn’s Prospect Park, canvassing for Mamdani in jean shorts, black tights and a red-and-white “Freeze the Rent” T-shirt. She maintained her good cheer while navigating barking dogs, faulty apartment intercoms, suspicious neighbors and other frustrations. When she did make contact, residents seemed receptive.

“Socialism,” one woman replied, when asked why she supported Mamdani.

“Plenty of people say that,” Rand confided. 

Her own experience of the 2008 crisis was both intensely personal and mysterious. Growing up in a middle-class household in southern New Hampshire, Rand’s parents had always been guarded about their finances.

At some point, though, she noticed that they began canceling music lessons, after-school sports—anything that cost money. Then one day around 2011 they informed her they would be moving in with her grandparents to save money. Some six months later, the family moved to a smaller house in rural New Hampshire. The nearest grocery store was a 30-minute drive.

Rand’s parents leaned on religion to cope with their misfortune. They became ardent members of an evangelical church with apocalyptic leanings. “It was a lot of upheaval. It was very confusing,” she said of those days.

Eventually, she escaped to a small New Hampshire college, juggling classes and shifts at a fast- food restaurant. She didn’t consider herself particularly political until she encountered Sanders, then in the midst of his outsider campaign for the Democratic Party’s 2016 nomination.

“He was saying things that made sense about why things were so hard and who was benefiting from it,” Rand recalled. “I was seeing this on the internet, and I was like, ‘Hell, yeah!’”

Rand canvassing for Mamdani in Brooklyn, with pins for the NYS Tenant Bloc and the Democratic Socialists of America on her backpack.

Rand’s first taste of organizing came in 2019, after she moved to Ithaca, N.Y., with a few hundred dollars. She convinced about a dozen of her restaurant co-workers to start a union to boost their wages. The restaurant soon closed but the sense of solidarity she felt with her fellow union members remained. Rand was then transitioning her gender and felt especially vulnerable—yet they still stood by her and helped her find new work.

“That was a really formative experience for me,” she recalled.

Rand was thrust into the tenant movement by the Covid pandemic, and the sudden fear that she might be evicted from her apartment as she awaited government relief checks. What began as a narrow issue in Ithaca, a college town, has since become a movement and “a cultural thing,” as Rand put it. 

Last year, the volunteer Ithaca Tenants Union she helped to establish celebrated a milestone when the city inaugurated its first-ever council in which renters sympathetic to its cause were the majority. 

It was achieved with the organizing muscle of the Democratic Socialists of America, whose late founder, Michael Harrington, described its aim as “the left-wing of the possible.” At first, Rand explained, her membership in the group was less ideological than practical. New York politics, she argued, are dominated by real-estate barons. The only way to level the field was by mobilizing the grassroots. The DSA had proved itself adept at doing so and focused on the issues that most concerned her. 

“Why should I care about saving democracy if it can’t provide me a home to live in or food I can afford?” she asked, calling housing “the economic issue of our time.”

Rand going door to door in Brooklyn.

‘Incredible disappointment’

For Tobias, his entry into DSA politics was also gradual. He worked as an organizer for Barack Obama’s campaign in 2008 and had high hopes that the new president would both end the Iraq war and hold Wall Street accountable for the financial crisis. 

To his dismay, the latter never really happened. “There was just incredible disappointment about those first two years,” Tobias recalled, shrugging off the passage of Obamacare. 

The Occupy movement was then brewing and his own political views were in flux. He saw the Democratic establishment as beholden to donors, and so, the wealthy. He became disgusted with the idealized version of the party portrayed in the popular television show “The West Wing.​”

“This isn’t just about us trying to pass a bill,” he explained. “This is about a fundamental problem with the system.”

Tobias then regarded left-wing politics more as a hobby than a possible career, and went overseas to work for Oxfam and other aid organizations in Latin America and North Africa. In between jobs, he was back in New York in 2014 and went to work on a bare-bones campaign that Zephyr Teachout, a law professor and transparency activist, was running against Andrew Cuomo for New York governor.

Zephyr Teachout in Brooklyn in 2014. Photo: Peter morgan/associated press

The wonkish Teachout had little money or name recognition and, arguably, even less star power. The campaign’s antiquated phone bank required staffers to dial each number individually. Cuomo, meanwhile, had locked up support of the labor unions and the Working Families Party. 

Still, Teachout garnered a third of the primary vote. While her performance was largely overlooked at the time, Tobias called it “eye-opening.” It convinced him there was an appetite for something different. “Most people didn’t even get reached by the campaign—and yet they voted for us,” he said.

Also toiling on that campaign was a woman named Tascha Van Auken, who was a talent recruiter for the Blue Man Group theater troupe. Van Auken would go on to lead Mamdani’s wildly successful field operation in this year’s mayoral primary, in which tens of thousands of volunteers like Rand calloused their knuckles knocking on doors for the candidate.

Sanders’ failed 2016 run was a watershed. It brought together disillusioned young people across the country. Mamdani has cited it as an essential chapter in his own political coming-of-age. Tobias, meanwhile, noticed that friends who once called themselves progressives had taken cues from the Vermont senator and were now identifying as socialists.

The other force driving them together was Trump. Tobias watched his election night victory on a small and grainy television screen in the Moroccan desert, where he was then working. He still recalls a stricken John Podesta addressing Hillary Clinton’s supporters.

Back in Brooklyn the following year, a friend from the Teachout campaign insisted that Tobias help with another campaign: This one for a 28-year-old bartender and waitress named Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who was challenging one of the Democratic Party’s most senior members of Congress.

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at her election night party in 2018. Photo: andrew kelly/Reuters

“She has such a radiant personality. Like, this is a fun person to spend time with,” Tobias observed. Ocasio-Cortez’s steeliness also left an impression.

One day, he was sitting with her at a progressive event when two men behind them were making disparaging remarks about the speaker, he recalled.

“Alex says to me: ‘If he says one more thing I’m going to turn around and give them the business,’” Tobias recalled. And soon she did, dead-eyeing the men and ordering them to “show some f—ing respect.”

‘Just step one’

It was around then that Tobias met Mamdani. Like so many others, he found him unusually personable and charismatic. Tobias was also struck, he said, by Mamdani’s ability to blend the gruel of policy with the syrup of narrative.

“That’s always part of his thought process,” he said, adding: “He gets how to marry left-wing goals to boring bureaucracy.”

Tobias sat out his campaign and instead took a position earlier this year leading the DSA Fund, a nonprofit that was established to help elected socialist officials govern. “Zohran winning is like, this is just step one,” he said.

Rand, by contrast, was in the thick of the campaign. 

She met Mamdani in Albany a few years ago when she was trying to rally support for “good cause” legislation that would limit rent increases and make it harder for landlords to evict tenants. There were then only a handful of DSA members in the state assembly, including Mamdani, who won an upset to represent his Queens district in 2020.

While most Democrats were cool, Rand recalled how the DSA caucus embraced her and fellow activists as comrades, even lending them their offices. “They saw their seat as belonging to a group of working-class people,” she explained.

Rand leaving fliers for Mamdani.

When Mamdani launched his long-shot mayoral bid earlier this year, Rand rode the bus to the city on weekends to volunteer. Meanwhile, the tenant movement became a bedrock of support for the young candidate. A petition it drew up calling for a rent freeze garnered 20,000 signatures in New York City and created buzz around one of Mamdani’s signature campaign promises.

As November’s election approaches, Rand sees a through-line—from the turmoil she endured as a child of the global financial crisis to a calling as an activist and Mamdani campaigner.

“My political identity as a Democratic Socialist comes from these direct experiences of how capitalism and corporate-controlled policies made my life worse,” she reflected. “Socialism made it better.”

Write to Joshua Chaffin at joshua.chaffin@wsj.com

16. Trump to attend gathering of top generals, upending last-minute plans

Trump to attend gathering of top generals, upending last-minute plans

Hundreds of top military officers and staff have been summoned to Virginia on short notice for a speech by Pete Hegseth. Trump decided this weekend to attend the meeting, adding new security concerns.​

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/28/trump-hegseth-speech-generals-quantico-security/?utm

September 28, 2025 at 10:32 a.m. EDT4 minutes ago

President Donald Trump walks the field prior to addressing graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point in Michie Stadium on May 24, 2025 in West Point, NY. (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)

By Tara Copp, Dan Lamothe, Noah Robertson and Alex Horton

President Donald Trump has decided he’s going to the last-minute global gathering of the nation’s top generals in Quantico, Virginia, that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered last week.

Trump’s appearance not only upstages Hegseth’s plans, but adds new security concerns to the massive and nearly unprecedented military event.

“We have confirmation from the White House that POTUS is now attending the speech on Tuesday,” according to a planning document sent Saturday and viewed by The Washington Post.

Notice went out to offices around the Pentagon that the decision will “significantly change the security posture” of the speech, set for Tuesday morning.

The addition of the president at Quantico will now put the Secret Service in charge of securing the event. Hundreds of the military’s top commanding generals and admirals, ranked one-star and above, along with their senior enlisted leaders were ordered to attend by Hegseth last week. The orders provided no reason for the event and initially raised concern among attendees and military officials that he was gathering the group to inform them of mass firings or demotions.

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Last week The Post first reported that Hegseth was ordering all of the generals in command positions to Quantico to hear him speak for less than an hour about military standards and his vision for a “warrior ethos,” but the now expanded visit from the president could change that schedule — and add a more politicized tenor to the gathering.

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It is estimated that the cost of flying, lodging and transporting all of the military leaders — some of whom will be traveling from the Middle East, Europe and the Indo-Pacific — will be in the millions of dollars. The event has also raised security concerns about having all the top leadership in one place, particularly given that Tuesday is the end of the fiscal year, and if the government shuts down it could leave key personnel stranded from their units.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the president’s travel for Tuesday’s speech.

Hegseth has committed to reducing the general officer corps by 20 percent and has fired without cause roughly two dozen senior officers — a disproportionate number of them female general or flag officers — since he was sworn in.

Hegseth is seriously considering reducing the rank of the top commanding generals at several top posts from four to three stars, and proposing a significant consolidation of the combatant commands, which are major regional headquarters focused on areas such as Africa, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, several officials familiar with that planning and speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal deliberations told The Post.

All of those moves come as the administration’s new National Defense Strategy is expected to significantly shift attention and resources away from preparing for a conflict with China to sharply focus on homeland defense and military use at home.

On Saturday, Trump in a Truth Social post ordered the Pentagon to scramble troops to “War ravaged” Portland, Oregon, authorizing them to use “Full Force” to protect Immigration and Customs Enforcement sites that have drawn sporadic protestors. The order was not clear as to whether he intended to send troops under federal control or activate troops under state control, but any deployment could be challenged in court. Oregon Gov. Tina Kotek, a Democrat, said she doesn’t believe Trump has the authority to deploy federal troops on state soil and is working with the attorney general on a potential response.

Trump’s deployment order also comes just days after he signed an executive order directing the nation’s law enforcement and military capabilities to be used against “domestic terrorism and organized political violence,” an edict that gives the administration sweeping powers to investigate and prosecute a broad array of political opponents.

This is a developing story and will be updated.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com