Quotes of the Day:

"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." 

- Nelson Mandela

"If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." 

- John Stuart Mill

“Information affects the very fabric of society. It could be the primary weapon in the future of war, and it could determine the future of humanity.”

- Roger Spitz

1. GEC Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment

2. China Uses ‘Deceptive’ Methods to Sow Disinformation, U.S. Says

3. Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (2nd Edition)

4. The Dysfunctional Superpower – Can a Divided America Deter China and Russia? By Robert M. Gates

5. Iran’s Influence Operation Pays Off

6. Moshchun and the Ukrainian Way of War by Mick Ryan

7. Analysis | Can the U.N. really regulate the power — and danger — of AI?

8. Chinese Hackers Suspected of Stealing Tens of Thousands of State Department Emails

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2023

10. How a Tiny Crew Struck a Blow Against China With a Wooden Boat and a Knife

11. American Tactics vs. Chinese Strategy

12. Tanks and troops out in the open in Ukraine can't go 10 minutes without being spotted and fired upon, Ukrainian official says

13. China Presents Its Foreign Policy Blueprint – Analysis

14. The Scrambled Spectrum of U.S. Foreign-Policy Thinking

15. Attention-Seekers and Autocrats Are a Combustible Mix

16. 'Hunt Forward' cyber teams have deployed to 24 countries, including Ukraine

17. Dark ‘N’ Stormy

18. Fields of Battle and Fields of Friendly Strife: The Link between Competitive Sports and Performance in War

19. DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

20. Ending Ukraine Aid Would Be 'Devastating' to Its War Effort, Nominee for Top Pentagon Post Warns

21. NATO's secretary-general meets with Zelenskyy to discuss 'ending Russia’s aggression'

22. Lawmakers, Army headed for a fight over cuts to special operations forces

23. How AI can put mistakes into overdrive

24. Chinese Leaders Are Scared of Their Country’s History

25. Ukraine’s naval victories show a winning strategy is underway

26. How the Pentagon can better deploy the data it collects as a weapon

1. GEC Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment

The 25MB, 58 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/HOW-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-SEEKS-TO-RESHAPE-THE-GLOBAL-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT_Final.pdf

Excerpts:

The PRC’s global information manipulation is not simply a matter of public diplomacy – but a challenge to the integrity of the global information space. Unchecked, Beijing’s efforts could result in a future in which technology exported by the PRC, coopted local governments, and fear of Beijing’s direct retaliation produce a sharp contraction of global freedom of expression. Beijing would play a significant – and often hidden – role in determining the print and digital content that audiences in developing countries consume. Multilateral fora and select bilateral relationships would amplify Beijing’s preferred narratives on issues such as Taiwan and the international economy. Access to global data combined with the latest developments in artificial intelligence technology would enable the PRC to surgically target foreign audiences and thereby perhaps influence economic and security decisions in its favor. Lastly, Beijing’s global censorship efforts would result in a highly curated international information environment characterized by gaps and inherent pro-PRC biases.

In this future, the information available to publics, media, civil society, academia, and governments as they engage with the PRC could be distorted by propaganda and disinformation and circumscribed by censorship. This would pose a direct challenge to all nations that seek to predicate their relations with the PRC on fact-based assessments of their sovereign interests. This future is not pre-ordained. Although backed by unprecedented resources, the PRC’s propaganda and censorship have, to date, yielded mixed results. When targeting democratic countries, Beijing has encountered major setbacks, often due to pushback from local media and civil society. Global understanding of PRC information manipulation is a starting point for a future in which the PRC’s ideas, values, and stories must compete on an even playing field.

GEC Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Every country should have the ability to tell its story to the world. However, a nation’s narrative should be based on facts and rise and fall on its own merits. The PRC employs a variety of deceptive and coercive methods as it attempts to influence the international information environment. Beijing’s information manipulation spans the use of propaganda, disinformation, and censorship. Unchecked, the PRC’s efforts will reshape the global information landscape, creating biases and gaps that could even lead nations to make decisions that subordinate their economic and security interests to Beijing’s.

PRC Information Manipulation

The PRC spends billions of dollars annually on foreign information manipulation efforts.2 Beijing uses false or biased information to promote positive views of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the same time, the PRC suppresses critical information that contradicts its desired narratives on issues such as Taiwan, its human rights practices, the South China Sea, its domestic economy, and international economic engagement. More broadly, the PRC seeks to cultivate and uphold a global incentive structure that encourages foreign governments, elites, journalists, and civil society to accept its preferred narratives and avoid criticizing its conduct.

The PRC’s approach to information manipulation includes leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media. Collectively, these five elements could enable Beijing to reshape the global information environment along multiple axes:

Overt and covert influence over content and platforms. Beijing seeks to maximize the reach of biased or false pro-PRC content. It has acquired stakes in foreign media through public and non-public means and sponsored online influencers. Beijing has also secured sometimes restrictive content sharing agreements with local outlets that can result in trusted mastheads providing legitimacy to unlabeled or obscured PRC content. In addition, Beijing has also worked to coopt prominent voices in the international information environment such as foreign political elites and journalists. Beyond focusing on content producers, the PRC has targeted platforms for global information dissemination, for example, investing in digital television services in Africa and satellite networks.

Constraints on global freedom of expression. On issues it deems sensitive, the PRC has employed online and real-world intimidation to silence dissent and encourage self-censorship. The PRC has also taken measures against corporations in situations where they are perceived to have challenged its desired narratives on issues like Xinjiang. Within democratic countries, Beijing has taken advantage of open societies to take legal action to suppress critical voices. On WeChat, an application used by many Chinese-speaking communities outside the PRC, Beijing has exercised technical censorship and harassed individual content producers. Notably, data

harvested by PRC corporations operating overseas have enabled Beijing to fine-tune global censorship by targeting specific individuals and organizations.

An emerging community of digital authoritarians. The PRC promotes digital authoritarianism, which involves the use of digital infrastructure to repress freedom of expression, censor independent news, promote disinformation, and deny other human rights.3 Through disseminating technologies for surveillance and censorship, often through capabilities bundled under the umbrella of “smart” or “safe cities,” the PRC has exported aspects of its domestic information environment globally. Beijing has also propagated information control tactics, with a particular focus on Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In parallel, the PRC has promoted authoritarian digital norms that other countries have adopted at a rapid pace. As other countries emulate the PRC, their information ecosystems have become more receptive to Beijing’s propaganda, disinformation, and censorship requests.

Future Impact

The PRC’s global information manipulation is not simply a matter of public diplomacy – but a challenge to the integrity of the global information space. Unchecked, Beijing’s efforts could result in a future in which technology exported by the PRC, coopted local governments, and fear of Beijing’s direct retaliation produce a sharp contraction of global freedom of expression. Beijing would play a significant – and often hidden – role in determining the print and digital content that audiences in developing countries consume. Multilateral fora and select bilateral relationships would amplify Beijing’s preferred narratives on issues such as Taiwan and the international economy. Access to global data combined with the latest developments in artificial intelligence technology would enable the PRC to surgically target foreign audiences and thereby perhaps influence economic and security decisions in its favor. Lastly, Beijing’s global censorship efforts would result in a highly curated international information environment characterized by gaps and inherent pro-PRC biases.

In this future, the information available to publics, media, civil society, academia, and governments as they engage with the PRC could be distorted by propaganda and disinformation and circumscribed by censorship. This would pose a direct challenge to all nations that seek to predicate their relations with the PRC on fact-based assessments of their sovereign interests. This future is not pre-ordained. Although backed by unprecedented resources, the PRC’s propaganda and censorship have, to date, yielded mixed results. When targeting democratic countries, Beijing has encountered major setbacks, often due to pushback from local media and civil society. Global understanding of PRC information manipulation is a starting point for a future in which the PRC’s ideas, values, and stories must compete on an even playing field.

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state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

2. China Uses ‘Deceptive’ Methods to Sow Disinformation, U.S. Says

NY Times analysis of the new GEC report on China.

China Uses ‘Deceptive’ Methods to Sow Disinformation, U.S. Says

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · September 28, 2023

The accusations reflect worry in Washington that China’s information operations pose a growing security challenge to the United States.

The State Department reports that China is using various methods, including buying stakes in media organizations and using social media, to spread propaganda.Credit...Joshua Roberts/Reuters

By

Sept. 28, 2023

The State Department accused China on Thursday of using “deceptive and coercive methods” to shape the global information environment, by acquiring stakes in foreign newspapers and television networks, using major social media platforms to promote its views and exerting pressure on international organizations and media outlets to silence critics of Beijing.

The accusations, detailed in a report by the department’s Global Engagement Center, reflect worry in Washington that China’s information operations pose a growing security challenge to the United States and to democratic principles around the world by promoting “digital authoritarianism.”

China not only pushes its own propaganda, the report said, but exports digital surveillance tools to police information and people online. Although many of the tactics detailed are not new, the report warned that they could “lead nations to make decisions that subordinate their economic and security interests to Beijing.”

“Every country has the right and every right to tell its story to the world, but a nation’s narrative should be facts, and it should rise or fall on its own merits,” James P. Rubin, the coordinator of the Global Engagement Center, said at a briefing. Referring to the People’s Republic of China, he went on: “By contrast, the P.R.C. advances coercive techniques and increasingly outright lies.”

The report echoes a raft of recent studies detailing the growing — and shifting — scope of China’s information campaigns. It came a day after officials disclosed in a Senate briefing that Chinese hackers who gained access to the email accounts of Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and other officials this year stole 60,000 emails from the State Department alone.

According to the State Department’s report released on Thursday, China’s efforts have evolved from a primary focus on promoting or defending the country’s political views on issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong to one that aims to sow disinformation to discredit the United States at home and abroad.

That has included accusations about the origins of the Covid pandemic, the new security partnership between the United States and Australia, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Meta, the owner of Facebook and Instagram, disclosed last month that it had dismantled a Chinese campaign using more than 8,000 accounts, pages or groups on the two platforms, the largest inauthentic network it had found so far. Microsoft and other researchers also linked China to the spread of false claims about the causes of the deadly wildfires in Hawaii.

That campaign included images generated by artificial intelligence, a tool that the researchers, like the State Department, warn could greatly enhance China’s efforts.

The Chinese television company StarTimes provides digital television services in Africa, reaching most of the continent’s viewers.Credit...Imaginechina, via Associated Press

China’s control over information internally is virtually absolute, but increasingly it is expanding its influence abroad, with its state channels broadcasting in 12 languages.

The report said that China has spent billions of dollars to build an expansive state news operation under the Central Propaganda Department and the United Front Work Department, which the report said oversees investments in foreign media aimed at Chinese diaspora communities.

The report cited investments in media organizations in the Czech Republic, Australia and Thailand, where Tencent sidestepped a law against foreign ownership to acquire Sanook, the country’s most popular news site.

China has also become a leading provider in digital television services in Africa through StarTimes, a Chinese company that now reaches most of the continent’s viewers.

While the department’s report was based largely on public information, it included references to knowledge seemingly based on classified information.

That included “U.S. government information” about an agreement with a newspaper “in an East African country” to publish paid articles from China without disclosing the connection and the fact that until at least late 2020, ByteDance, the Chinese owner of TikTok, maintained “a regularly updated internal list” of people who were blocked or restricted on the platform.

The report also detailed what it described as a fictitious author, Yi Fan, whose writings in English have appeared in publications around the world since 2015 under bylines describing him as an independent analyst.

China has also become adept at using social media platforms that the authorities banned inside the country’s Great Firewall. China now operates 333 diplomatic or official media accounts on Twitter, now known as X, with nearly 65 million followers, according to the report.

Those official accounts, it added, were bolstered by networks of bots and inauthentic accounts. From June 2020 to January 2021, a single network of those accounts impersonating British citizens accounted for 44 percent of the retweets and 20 percent of the replies to posts by Liu Xiaoming, the Chinese ambassador at the time and one of the outspoken “wolf warriors” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Between mid-2020 and early 2021, a single network of bot accounts on Twitter was found to be behind a large portion of replies to posts by Liu Xiaoming, a former ambassador to Britain from China.

“Although more than half of Liu’s retweets during this period came from accounts that were ultimately suspended for violating Twitter’s terms of service at the time,” the report said, “new accounts continued to pop up to prolong this inauthentic amplification.” Twitter has since dropped the labels that identified foreign government accounts.

China uses similar accounts to stifle criticism. The report noted that more than 1,000 fake accounts sought to drown out a report last year by Safeguard Defenders, a human rights organization, that detailed the undisclosed presence of Chinese police officers in 53 countries. The campaign used accounts with the same name as the organization in what appeared to be an effort to trigger Twitter’s policy to de-emphasize inauthentic campaigns.

The State Department’s Global Engagement Center was established in 2011 with a focus on countering terrorism and violent extremism. In 2017 Congress extended its mandate to focus on propaganda and disinformation.

The impact of China’s effort can be difficult to measure, and the report suggests that the Chinese campaigns often encounter resistance in other countries. The country’s Communist Party appears committed, however, to reshaping the international environment suited to its political goals.

“We have every reason to believe that will continue,” said Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, a researcher at the RAND Corporation and a co-author of a recent report on China’s reliance on artificial intelligence to bolster its information operations. “They’re more likely to double down than they are to stop.”

Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.” More about Steven Lee Myers

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: China Accused of Spreading Disinformation

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · September 28, 2023

3. Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (2nd Edition)

The 107 page report can be downloaded here:  https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/Crafting-Strategy-for-Irregular-Warfare_2ndEd.pdf?ver=mFY-dJC9aRGKfjz0E0KK5Q%3d%3d

Excerpt:

The framework is based on the pedagogical approach of the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) within the National Defense University (NDU), the only U.S. irregular warfare college. It is designed to cut through the analytical ambiguities of irregular warfare and map such strategies to design an effective counter. Though an analytical framework is no panacea for the malaise facing Western strategy, it is an indispensable starting point for all that must follow.

Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (2nd Edition)

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Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare

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The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy made headlines by officially downgrading terrorism as a national security priority in favor of “inter-state strategic competition.” Many interpreted the statement as signifying a return to “conventional combat,” yet a closer reading suggests that even state-based competition is likely to be “irregular.” Much like insurgent adversaries, revisionist states blend separate lines of effort to offset military weakness, weaponize narratives to ease strategic progress, and exploit social and political contradictions to undermine and divide target societies. This approach is appealing because it allows for gains that, although incremental, are less likely to face backlash and are therefore more sustainable. Indeed, it was precisely when Russia abandoned this playbook, through its conventional invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that it succeeded in mobilizing significant local and global resistance, greatly complicating its military and political effort. Thus, for several reasons, irregular warfare is likely to be the strategy of choice for states seeking to contest international order.

The United States, and the West, struggle to understand and respond to irregular warfare, whether by states or nonstate actors. Attempts to master the art have generated much new jargon, ranging from “hybrid war” to “the gray zone,” and most recently “integrated deterrence.” The terminology belies a struggle to overcome entrenched presumptions about war—a confusion that generates cognitive friction with implications for strategy. To inform a better approach, this monograph presents an analytical framework to assess and respond to irregular threats. The framework is based on the pedagogical approach of the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) within the National Defense University (NDU), the only U.S. irregular warfare college. It is designed to cut through the analytical ambiguities of irregular warfare and map such strategies to design an effective counter. Though an analytical framework is no panacea for the malaise facing Western strategy, it is an indispensable starting point for all that must follow.

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4. The Dysfunctional Superpower – Can a Divided America Deter China and Russia? By Robert M. Gates

Excerpts:

Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

...

China and Russia think the future belongs to them. For all the tough rhetoric coming from the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch about pushing back against these adversaries, there is surprisingly little action. Too often, new initiatives are announced, only for funding and actual implementation to move slowly or fail to materialize altogether. Talk is cheap, and no one in Washington seems ready to make the urgent changes needed. That is especially puzzling, since at a time of bitter partisanship and polarization in Washington, Xi and Putin have managed to forge impressive, if fragile, bipartisan support among policymakers for a strong U.S. response to their aggression. The Executive Branch and Congress have a rare opportunity to work together to back up their rhetoric about countering China and Russia with far-reaching actions that make the United States a significantly more formidable adversary and might help deter war.

Xi and Putin, cocooned by yes men, have already made serious errors that have cost their countries dearly. In the long run, they have damaged their countries. For the foreseeable future, however, they remain a danger that the United States must deal with. Even in the best of worlds—one in which the U.S. government had a supportive public, energized leaders, and a coherent strategy—these adversaries would pose a formidable challenge. But the domestic scene today is far from orderly: the American public has turned inward; Congress has descended into bickering, incivility, and brinkmanship; and successive presidents have either disavowed or done a poor job explaining America’s global role. To contend with such powerful, risk-prone adversaries, the United States needs to up its game in every dimension. Only then can it hope to deter Xi and Putin from making more bad bets. The peril is real.

The Dysfunctional Superpower

Can a Divided America Deter China and Russia?

By Robert M. Gates

 September 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Robert M. Gates · September 29, 2023

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never before has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

The problem, however, is that at the very moment that events demand a strong and coherent response from the United States, the country cannot provide one. Its fractured political leadership—Republican and Democratic, in the White House and in Congress—has failed to convince enough Americans that developments in China and Russia matter. Political leaders have failed to explain how the threats posed by these countries are interconnected. They have failed to articulate a long-term strategy to ensure that the United States, and democratic values more broadly, will prevail.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have much in common, but two shared convictions stand out. First, each is convinced that his personal destiny is to restore the glory days of his country’s imperial past. For Xi, this means reclaiming imperial China’s once dominant role in Asia while harboring even greater ambitions for global influence. For Putin, it means pursuing an awkward mixture of reviving the Russian Empire and recapturing the deference that was accorded the Soviet Union. Second, both leaders are convinced that the developed democracies—above all, the United States—are past their prime and have entered an irreversible decline. This decline, they believe, is evident in these democracies’ growing isolationism, political polarization, and domestic disarray.

Taken together, Xi’s and Putin’s convictions portend a dangerous period ahead for the United States. The problem is not merely China’s and Russia’s military strength and aggressiveness. It is also that both leaders have already made major miscalculations at home and abroad and seem likely to make even bigger ones in the future. Their decisions could well lead to catastrophic consequences for themselves—and for the United States. Washington must therefore change Xi’s and Putin’s calculus and reduce the chances of disaster, an effort that will require strategic vision and bold action. The United States prevailed in the Cold War thanks to a consistent strategy pursued by both political parties through nine successive presidencies. It needs a similar bipartisan approach today. Therein lies the rub.

The United States finds itself in a uniquely treacherous position: facing aggressive adversaries with a propensity to miscalculate yet incapable of mustering the unity and strength necessary to dissuade them. Successfully deterring leaders such as Xi and Putin depends on the certainty of commitments and constancy of response. Yet instead, dysfunction has made American power erratic and unreliable, practically inviting risk-prone autocrats to place dangerous bets—with potentially catastrophic effects.

XI’S AMBITIONS

Xi’s call for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is shorthand for China becoming the dominant world power by 2049, the centenary of the Communists’ victory in the Chinese Civil War. That objective includes bringing Taiwan back under the control of Beijing. In his words, “The complete unification of the motherland must be realized, and it will be realized.” To that end, Xi has directed the Chinese military to be ready by 2027 to successfully invade Taiwan, and he has pledged to modernize the Chinese military by 2035 and turn it into a “world-class” force. Xi seems to believe that only by taking Taiwan can he secure for himself status comparable to Mao Zedong’s in the pantheon of Chinese Communist Party legends.

Xi’s aspirations and sense of personal destiny entail significant risk of war. Just as Putin has disastrously miscalculated in Ukraine, there is a considerable danger Xi will do so in Taiwan. He has already dramatically miscalculated at least three times. First, by departing from the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of “hide your strength, bide your time,” Xi has provoked exactly the response Deng feared: the United States has mobilized its economic power to slow China’s growth, begun strengthening and modernizing its military, and bolstered its alliances and military partnerships in Asia. A second major miscalculation was Xi’s leftward swing in economic policies, an ideological shift that began in 2015 and was reinforced at the 2022 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. His policies, from inserting the party into the management of companies to increasingly relying on state-owned enterprises, have profoundly harmed China’s economy. Third, Xi’s “zero COVID” policy, as the economist Adam Posen has written in these pages, “made visible and tangible the CCP’s arbitrary power over everyone’s commercial activities, including those of the smallest players.” The resulting uncertainty, accentuated by his sudden reversal of that policy, has reduced Chinese consumer spending and thus further damaged the entire economy.

If preserving the power of the party is Xi’s first priority, taking Taiwan is his second. If China relies on measures short of war to pressure Taiwan to preemptively surrender, that effort will likely fail. And so Xi would be left with the option of risking war by imposing a full-scale naval blockade or even launching an all-out invasion to conquer the island. He may think he would be fulfilling his destiny by trying, but win or lose, the economic and military costs of provoking a war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for China, not to mention for everyone else involved. Xi would be making a monumental mistake.

Despite Xi’s miscalculations and his country’s many internal difficulties, China will continue to pose a formidable challenge to the United States. Its military is stronger than ever. China now boasts more warships than the United States (although they are of poorer quality). It has modernized and restructured both its conventional forces and its nuclear forces—and is nearly doubling its deployed strategic nuclear forces—and upgraded its command-and-control system. It is in the process of strengthening its capabilities in space and cyberspace, as well.

Xi’s sense of personal destiny entails significant risk of war.

Beyond its military moves, China has pursued a comprehensive strategy aimed at increasing its power and influence globally. China is now the top trading partner of more than 120 countries, including nearly all of those in South America. More than 140 countries have signed up as participants in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s sprawling infrastructure development program, and China now owns, manages, or has invested in more than 100 ports in some 60 countries.

Complementing these widening economic relationships is a pervasive propaganda and media network. No country on earth is beyond the reach of at least one Chinese radio station, television channel, or online news site. Through these and other outlets, Beijing attacks American actions and motives, erodes faith in the international institutions the United States created after World War II, and trumpets the supposed superiority of its development and governance model—all while advancing the theme of Western decline.

There are at least two concepts invoked by those who think the United States and China are destined for conflict. One is “the Thucydides trap.” According to this theory, war is inevitable when a rising power confronts an established power, as when Athens confronted Sparta in antiquity or when Germany confronted the United Kingdom before World War I. Another is “peak China,” the idea that the country’s economic and military power is or will soon be at its strongest, while ambitious initiatives to strengthen the U.S. military will take years to bear fruit. Thus, China might well invade Taiwan before the military disparity in Asia changes China’s disadvantage.

But neither theory is convincing. There was nothing inevitable about World War I; it happened because of the stupidity and arrogance of Europe’s leaders. And the Chinese military itself is far from ready for a major conflict. Thus, a direct Chinese attack on or invasion of Taiwan, if it happens at all, is some years in the future. Unless, of course, Xi grievously miscalculates—again.

PUTIN’S GAMBLE

“Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, the political scientist and former U.S. national security adviser, once observed. Putin certainly shares that view. In pursuit of Russia’s lost empire, he invaded Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022—with the latter adventure turning out to be a catastrophic miscalculation with devastating long-term consequences for his country. Rather than dividing and weakening NATO, Russia’s actions have given the alliance new purpose (and, in Finland and, soon, Sweden, powerful new members). Strategically, Russia is far worse off now than it was before the invasion.

Economically, oil sales to China, India, and other states have offset much of the financial impact of sanctions, and consumer goods and technology from China, Turkey, and other countries in Central Asia and the Middle East have partly replaced those once imported from the West. Still, Russia has been subjected to extraordinary sanctions by virtually all developed democracies. Countless Western firms have pulled their investments and abandoned the country, including the oil and gas companies whose technology is essential to sustain Russia’s primary source of income. Thousands of young tech experts and entrepreneurs have fled. In invading Ukraine, Putin has mortgaged his country’s future.

A broadcasts of Chinese military drills, Beijing, August 2023

Tingshu Wang / Reuters

As for Russia’s military, even though the war has significantly degraded its conventional forces, Moscow retains the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Thanks to arms control agreements, that arsenal includes only a few more deployed strategic nuclear weapons than what the United States has. But Russia has ten times as many tactical nuclear weapons—about 1,900.

This large nuclear arsenal notwithstanding, the prospects for Putin seem grim. With his hopes for a quick conquest of Ukraine dashed, he appears to be counting on a rough military stalemate to exhaust the Ukrainians, betting that by next spring or summer, the public in Europe and the United States will tire of sustaining them. As a temporary alternative to a conquered Ukraine, he may be willing to consider a crippled Ukraine—a rump state that lies in ruins, its exports slashed and its foreign aid dramatically reduced. Putin wanted Ukraine as part of a reconstituted Russian Empire; he also feared a democratic, modern, and prosperous Ukraine as an alternative model for Russians next door. He will not get the former, but he may believe he can prevent the latter.

As long as Putin is in power, Russia will remain an adversary of the United States and NATO. Through arms sales, security assistance, and discounted oil and gas, he is cultivating new relationships in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. He will continue to use all means at his disposal to sow division in the United States and Europe and undermine U.S. influence in the global South. Emboldened by his partnership with Xi and confident that his modernized nuclear arsenal will deter military action against Russia, he will aggressively continue to challenge the United States. Putin has already made one historic miscalculation; no one can be sure he will not make another.

AMERICA IMPAIRED

For now, the United States would seem to be in a strong position vis-à-vis both China and Russia. Above all, the U.S. economy is doing well. Business investment in new manufacturing facilities, some of it subsidized by new government infrastructure and technology programs, is booming. New investments by both government and business in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, and bioengineering promise to widen the technological and economic gap between the United States and every other country for years to come.

Diplomatically, the war in Ukraine has handed the United States new opportunities. The early warning that Washington gave its friends and allies about Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine restored their faith in U.S. intelligence capabilities. Renewed fears of Russia have allowed the United States to strengthen and expand NATO, and the military aid it has given Ukraine has provided clear evidence that it can be trusted to fulfill its commitments. Meanwhile, China’s economic and diplomatic bullying in Asia and Europe has backfired, enabling the United States to strengthen its relationships in both regions.

The U.S. military has been healthily funded in recent years, and modernization programs are underway in all three legs of the nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines. The Pentagon is buying new combat aircraft (F-35s, modernized F-15s, and a new, sixth-generation fighter), along with a new fleet of tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling. The army is procuring some two dozen new platforms and weapons, and the navy is building additional ships and submarines. The military continues to develop new kinds of weapons, such as hypersonic munitions, and strengthen its offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities. All told, the United States spends more on defense than the next ten countries combined, including Russia and China.

Sadly, however, America’s political dysfunction and policy failures are undermining its success. The U.S. economy is threatened by runaway federal government spending. Politicians from both parties have failed to address the spiraling cost of entitlements such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Perennial opposition to raising the debt ceiling has undermined confidence in the economy, causing investors to worry about what would happen if Washington actually defaulted. (In August 2023, the ratings agency Fitch downgraded the United States’ credit rating, raising borrowing costs for the government.) The appropriations process in Congress has been broken for years. Legislators have repeatedly failed to enact individual appropriations bills, passed gigantic “omnibus” laws that no one has read, and forced government shutdowns.

As long as Putin is in power, Russia will remain a U.S. adversary.

Diplomatically, former President Donald Trump’s disdain for U.S. allies, his fondness for authoritarian leaders, his willingness to sow doubt about the United States’ commitment to its NATO allies, and his generally erratic behavior undermined U.S. credibility and respect across the globe. But just seven months into the administration of President Joe Biden, the United States’ abrupt, disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan further damaged the rest of the world’s confidence in Washington.

For years, U.S. diplomacy has neglected much of the global South, the central front for nonmilitary competition with China and Russia. The United States’ ambassadorships are disproportionately left vacant in this part of the world. Beginning in 2022, after years of neglect, the United States scrambled to revive its relationships with Pacific island nations—but only after China had taken advantage of Washington’s absence to sign security and economic agreements with these countries. The competition with China and even Russia for markets and influence is global. The United States cannot afford to be absent anywhere.

The military also pays a price for American political dysfunction—particularly in Congress. Every year since 2010, Congress has failed to approve appropriations bills for the military before the start of the next fiscal year. Instead, legislators have passed a “continuing resolution,” which allows the Pentagon to spend no more money than it did the previous year and prohibits it from starting anything new or increasing spending on existing programs. These continuing resolutions govern defense spending until a new appropriations bill can be passed, and they have lasted from a few weeks to an entire fiscal year. The result is that each year, imaginative new programs and initiatives go nowhere for an unpredictable period.

The Budget Control Act of 2011 put in place automatic spending cuts, known as “sequestration,” and reduced the federal budget by $1.2 trillion over ten years. The military, which then accounted for only about 15 percent of federal expenditures, was forced to absorb half that cut—$600 billion. With personnel costs exempted, the bulk of the reductions had to come from maintenance, operations, training, and investment accounts. The consequences were severe and long-lasting. And yet as of September 2023, Congress is headed toward making the same mistake again. A further example of Congress letting politics do real harm to the military is allowing one senator to block confirmation of hundreds of senior officers for months on end, not only seriously degrading readiness and leadership but also—by highlighting American governmental dysfunction in such a critical area—making the United States a laughingstock among its adversaries. The bottom line is that the United States needs more military power to meet the threats it faces, but both Congress and the Executive Branch are rife with obstacles to achieving that objective.

MEETING THE MOMENT

The epic contest between the United States and its allies on one side and China, Russia, and their fellow travelers on the other is well underway. To ensure that Washington is in the strongest possible position to deter its adversaries from making additional strategic miscalculations, U.S. leaders must first address the breakdown in the decades-long bipartisan agreement with respect to the United States’ role in the world. It is not surprising that after 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans wanted to turn inward, especially given the United States’ many problems at home. But it is the job of political leaders to counter that sentiment and explain how the country’s fate is inextricably bound up in what happens elsewhere. President Franklin Roosevelt once observed that “the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate.” But recent presidents, along with most members of Congress, have utterly failed in this essential responsibility.

Americans need to understand why U.S. global leadership, despite its costs, is vital to preserving peace and prosperity. They need to know why a successful Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion is crucial for deterring China from invading Taiwan. They need to know why Chinese domination of the Western Pacific endangers U.S. interests. They need to know why Chinese and Russian influence in the global South matters to American pocketbooks. They need to know why the United States’ dependability as an ally is so consequential for preserving peace. They need to know why a Chinese-Russian alliance threatens the United States. These are the kinds of connections that American political leaders need to be drawing every day.

It is not just one Oval Office address or speech on the floor of Congress that is needed. Rather, a drumbeat of repetition is required for the message to sink in. Beyond regularly communicating to the American people directly, and not through spokespersons, the president needs to spend time over drinks and dinners and in small meetings with members of Congress and the media making the case for the United States’ leadership role. Then, given the fragmented nature of modern-day communications, members of Congress need to carry the message to their constituents across the country.

Putin addressing Russian military units, Moscow, June 2023

Sergei Guneev / Reuters

What is that message? It is that American global leadership has provided 75 years of great-power peace—the longest stretch in centuries. Nothing in a nation’s life is costlier than war, nor does anything else represent a greater threat to its security and prosperity. And nothing makes war likelier than putting one’s head in the sand and pretending that the United States is not affected by events elsewhere, as the country learned before World War I, World War II, and 9/11. The military power the United States possesses, the alliances it has forged, and the international institutions it has designed are all essential to deterring aggression against it and its partners. As a century of evidence should make clear, failing to deal with aggressors only encourages more aggression. It is naive to believe that Russian success in Ukraine will not lead to further Russian aggression in Europe and possibly even a war between NATO and Russia. And it is equally naive to believe that Russian success in Ukraine will not significantly increase the likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan and thus potentially a war between the United States and China.

A world without reliable U.S. leadership would be a world of authoritarian predators, with all other countries potential prey. If America is to safeguard its people, its security, and its liberty, it must continue to embrace its global leadership role. As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said of the United States in 1943, “The price of greatness is responsibility.”

Rebuilding support at home for that responsibility is essential to rebuilding trust among allies and awareness among adversaries that the United States will fulfill its commitments. Because of domestic divisions, mixed messages, and political leaders’ ambivalence about the United States’ role in the world, there is significant doubt abroad about American reliability. Both friends and adversaries wonder whether Biden’s engagement and alliance-building is a return to normal or whether Trump’s “America first” disdain for allies will be the dominant thread in American policy in the future. Even the closest of allies are hedging their bets about the United States. In a world where Russia and China are on the prowl, that is particularly dangerous.

Restoring public support for U.S. global leadership is the highest priority, but the United States must take other steps to actually exercise that role. First, it needs to go beyond “pivoting” to Asia. Strengthening relationships with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and other countries in the region is necessary but not sufficient. China and Russia are working together against U.S. interests on every continent. Washington needs a strategy for dealing with the entire world—particularly in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, where the Russians and the Chinese are fast outpacing the United States in developing security and economic relationships. This strategy ought not to divide the world into democracies and authoritarians. The United States must always advocate for democracy and human rights everywhere, but that commitment must not blind Washington to the reality that U.S. national interests sometimes require it to work with repressive, unrepresentative governments.

China and Russia think the future belongs to them.

Second, the United States’ strategy must incorporate all the instruments of its national power. Both Republicans and Democrats have grown hostile to trade agreements, and protectionist sentiment runs strong in Congress. This has left the field open for the Chinese in the global South, which offers huge markets and investment opportunities. Despite the Belt and Road Initiative’s flaws, such as the enormous debt it piles on recipient countries, Beijing has successfully used it to insinuate China’s influence, companies, and economic tentacles into scores of countries. Enshrined in the Chinese constitution in 2017, it is not going away. The United States and its allies need to figure out how to compete with the initiative in ways that play to their strengths—above all, their private sector. U.S. development assistance programs add up to a small fraction of the Chinese effort. They are also fragmented and disconnected from larger U.S. geopolitical objectives. And even where U.S. aid programs are successful, the United States maintains a priestly silence about its accomplishments. It has said little, for example, about Plan Colombia, an aid program designed to combat the Colombian drug trade, or the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which saved millions of lives in Africa.

Public diplomacy is essential to promoting U.S. interests, but Washington has let this important instrument of power wither since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, China is spending billions of dollars around the world to advance its narrative. Russia also has an aggressive effort to spread its propaganda and disinformation, as well as incite discord in and among democracies. The United States needs a strategy for influencing foreign leaders and publics—especially in the global South. To succeed, this strategy would require the U.S. government not merely to spend more money but also to integrate and synchronize its many disparate communications activities.

Security assistance to foreign governments is another area in need of radical change. Although the U.S. military does a good job training foreign forces, it makes piecemeal decisions about where and how to do so without sufficiently considering regional strategies or how better to partner with allies. Russia has increasingly provided security assistance to governments in Africa, especially those with an authoritarian bent, but the United States has no effective strategy to counter this effort. Washington must also figure out a way to accelerate the delivery of military equipment to recipient states. There is now a roughly $19 billion backlog of weapons sales to Taiwan, with delays ranging from four to ten years. Although the holdup is the result of many factors, an important cause is the limited production capacity of the U.S. defense industry.

U.S. marines in the Baltic Sea, September 2023

Janis Laizans / Reuters

Third, the United States must rethink its nuclear strategy in the face of a Chinese-Russian alliance. Cooperation between Russia, which is modernizing its strategic nuclear force, and China, which is vastly expanding its once small force, tests the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent—as do North Korea’s expanding nuclear capabilities and Iran’s weapons potential. To reinforce its deterrent, the United States almost certainly needs to adapt its strategy and probably needs to expand the size of its nuclear forces, as well. The Chinese and Russian navies are increasingly exercising together, and it would be surprising if they were not also more closely coordinating their deployed strategic nuclear forces.

There is broad agreement in Washington that the U.S. Navy needs many more warships and submarines. Again, the contrast between politicians’ rhetoric and action is stark. For a number of years, the shipbuilding budget was basically flat, but in recent years, even as the budget has increased substantially, continuing resolutions and execution problems have prevented the navy’s expansion. The main obstacles to a bigger navy are budgetary: the lack of sustained higher funding to the navy itself and, more broadly, underinvestment in shipyards and in industries that support shipbuilding and ship maintenance. Even so, it is difficult to discern any sense of urgency among politicians for remedying these problems anytime soon. That is unacceptable.

Finally, Congress must change the way it appropriates money for the Defense Department, and the Defense Department must change the way it spends that money. Congress needs to act more quickly and efficiently when it comes to approving the defense budget. That means, above all, passing military appropriations bills before the start of the fiscal year, a change that would give the Defense Department badly needed predictability. The Pentagon, for its part, must fix its sclerotic, parochial, and bureaucratic acquisition processes, which are especially anachronistic in an era when agility, flexibility, and speed matter more than ever. Leaders in the Defense Department have said the right things about these defects and announced many initiatives to correct them. Effective and urgent execution is the challenge.

LESS TALK, MORE ACTION

China and Russia think the future belongs to them. For all the tough rhetoric coming from the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch about pushing back against these adversaries, there is surprisingly little action. Too often, new initiatives are announced, only for funding and actual implementation to move slowly or fail to materialize altogether. Talk is cheap, and no one in Washington seems ready to make the urgent changes needed. That is especially puzzling, since at a time of bitter partisanship and polarization in Washington, Xi and Putin have managed to forge impressive, if fragile, bipartisan support among policymakers for a strong U.S. response to their aggression. The Executive Branch and Congress have a rare opportunity to work together to back up their rhetoric about countering China and Russia with far-reaching actions that make the United States a significantly more formidable adversary and might help deter war.

Xi and Putin, cocooned by yes men, have already made serious errors that have cost their countries dearly. In the long run, they have damaged their countries. For the foreseeable future, however, they remain a danger that the United States must deal with. Even in the best of worlds—one in which the U.S. government had a supportive public, energized leaders, and a coherent strategy—these adversaries would pose a formidable challenge. But the domestic scene today is far from orderly: the American public has turned inward; Congress has descended into bickering, incivility, and brinkmanship; and successive presidents have either disavowed or done a poor job explaining America’s global role. To contend with such powerful, risk-prone adversaries, the United States needs to up its game in every dimension. Only then can it hope to deter Xi and Putin from making more bad bets. The peril is real.

• ROBERT M. GATES was U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2011.

Foreign Affairs · by Robert M. Gates · September 29, 2023

5. Iran’s Influence Operation Pays Off

I did not know this:

One of Tehran’s targets, Ariane M. Tabatabai, joined the Biden administration’s Iran team with Malley and is now the chief of staff for the assistant secretary of defense for special operations. 

Iran’s Influence Operation Pays Off

The emails look bad

By Graeme Wood

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · September 28, 2023

When news comes out that someone has suffered an email breach, my first instinct is to pity them and practice extreme charity. I don’t remember any emails I wrote a decade ago, but I’m sure there’s something in there appalling enough to sour my relationships with every friend, ex, or co-worker I ever had. Give me your email password, and I will ruin your career.

This week, the careers in jeopardy belong to a handful of Americans and Europeans who were, by the looks of their emails, groomed by the Iranian government to promote conciliatory policies toward Tehran. According to reports by Semafor and Iran International, Iranian foreign-policy bigwigs such as Mohammad Javad Zarif identified think-tank staffers of Iranian origin, sponsored meetings with them, and used the group to coordinate and spread messages helpful to Iran. The emails, which date from 2014, suggest that those in their group—the “Iran Experts Initiative”—reacted to Iranian outreach in a range of ways, including cautious engagement and active coordination. The Iranian government then paid expenses related to this group’s internal meetings; cultivated its members with “access to high-ranking officials and extended invitations to visit Tehran,” according to Iran International; and later gloated over how effectively it had used its experts to propagate the Islamic Republic’s positions.

Graeme Wood: Talk to coldhearted criminals

The government had reason to gloat. It picked excellent prospects, some of whom sucked up to Tehran over email and echoed its negotiating positions publicly. A few of them ended up in and near positions of prominence in the U.S. government through connections to Robert Malley, a veteran Middle East hand in Democratic administrations. Malley, who led Obama teams focusing on the Islamic State, Syria, and Iraq, is known to favor negotiation with unfriendly governments in the region and to scorn the “maximum pressure” approach that replaced nuclear negotiation when Donald Trump entered office. Earlier this year, Malley lost his security clearance for reasons still not explained, and he is on leave from government service. (He did not reply to a request for comment.)

One of Tehran’s targets, Ariane M. Tabatabai, joined the Biden administration’s Iran team with Malley and is now the chief of staff for the assistant secretary of defense for special operations. Another, Ali Vaez, formerly worked as an aide to Malley on Iran issues. That is the disturbing upshot to the reports: Witting participants in an Iranian influence operation have been close colleagues with those setting the Biden administration’s Iran policy, or have even served in government and set it themselves.

On Tuesday, President Joe Biden’s State Department spokesperson, Matthew Miller, dismissed the reports as “an account of things that happened almost a decade ago, most of which involved people that do not currently work for the government.” I assume he meant the U.S. government. Anyway, the accusations are serious and can’t be batted away by the suggestion that 2014 was a long time ago.

One sign of the gravity of these accusations is the unconvincing attempts to minimize them. The commentator Esfandyar Batmanghelidj said opponents of Tehran had smeared the analysts merely because they “maintained dialogue and exchanged views with Iranian officials.” He went on to note Semafor’s links to Qatar and Iran International’s to Iran’s archenemy, Saudi Arabia. The journalist Laura Rozen tweeted that the stories were “McCarthyistic” and targeted blameless analysts “because they try to talk to everybody and because of their Iranian heritage.”

Defending the emails as maintaining “dialogue” so ludicrously misrepresents the accusation that I am forced to conclude that these defenders find the actual accusation indefensible. No one is alarmed that Americans of Iranian descent are talking with Iranian-government officials. What’s alarming is the servile tone of the Iranian American side of that dialogue, and the apparent lack of concern that the Iranian government views them as tools for its political ends. Rozen and Batmanghelidj don’t dispute the emails’ authenticity. Comparing the Iranian influence operation to supposed Qatari and Saudi ones is, in turn, tacit admission that the emails are probably real.

Cultivating a source is fine. But any self-respecting analyst, journalist, or politician wants to be the one cultivating, not the one being cultivated. This mutual back-scratching can erode one’s integrity and independence. That is why the Iranians do it: to turn influential and otherwise smart people into their pets, and eventually condition them to salivate at the issuance of a visa, or an email from Javad Zarif. Responding to these overtures is fine. You can butter up an official (“Your Excellency”), maybe grovel a little for a visa. But the writing itself, and the analysis behind it, must be independent to the point that even the most cynical observer could not accuse you of altering your views to please a subject.

By this standard, some of the reported exchanges between the Iran Experts and their convenor are mortifying. After the report, Vaez, a deputy to Malley, admitted on X (formerly Twitter) that he’d sent a full draft of an op-ed to the Iranian government. “I look forward to your comments and feedback,” his email to the Iranians read. If I sent a source a draft of a story, I would be fired. (I asked The National Interest, where the article appeared, if its policy also forbids sharing drafts. The editor, Jacob Heilbrunn, did not reply.) Sending questions is laudable. Checking facts is standard practice. But a magazine article is not a Wiki whose contributors are also its subjects. Sharing a full draft of an article, whether for approval or just improvement, makes the recipient an unacknowledged co-author.

Vaez later pledged to the Iranian foreign minister to “help you in any way,” by proposing “a public campaign” to promote Iran’s views on its nuclear program. He offered these services “as an Iranian, based on my national and patriotic duty.” Vaez, like his former boss Malley, has written widely about Iran and U.S.-Iran relations, for magazines including this one. (Attempts to reach Vaez through his employer to verify the authenticity of the emails and their context were not answered by the time of publication.)

According to the same reports, Adnan Tabatabai, CEO and founder of the German think tank CARPO, “offered to prepare articles for Iran’s foreign ministry.” “We as a group [could] work on an essay,” he suggested. “It could, for example, be published under a former official’s name.” Tabatabai, the report says, worked as a contractor for Malley’s International Crisis Group. (He did not respond to a request for comment.)

Ariane Tabatabai (who is not related to Adnan) wrote to her contact at the Iranian foreign ministry and asked his advice on whether to work with officials in Saudi Arabia and attend a meeting in Israel. “I would like to ask your opinion too and see if you think I should accept the invitation and go,” she asked Mostafa Zahrani of the foreign ministry. She made clear that she personally “had no inclination to go” to a workshop at Ben-Gurion University, but she thought it might be better if she went, rather than “some Israeli,” such as Emily Landau of Tel Aviv University. Zahrani told Tabatabai to look into Saudi Arabia and avoid Israel. She thanked him for the guidance, and she went to Tehran herself in 2014. In another email to the Iranians, she noted that she had recently published an article arguing that Tehran should be given more leeway to spin up centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

These emails look bad. So would mine, if they came out in a selective leak, and so would yours. But I’m not sure that they would look this bad, or that my excuses would be so weak.

Vaez tweeted that he “shared the draft as a courtesy after [Iranian] officials claimed I had been too harsh on their position in my writing.” Even if sharing a draft were permissible, would he extend the courtesy to Trump officials? “[ICG’s Iran] work has always been informed by the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders,” he claims. I am confident that if you plumbed his inbox, you would find no fan mail addressed to “Your Excellency” Mike Pompeo, offering his devoted and patriotic service. Nor would he soften the blow of criticism of Trump officials (whose Iran policy was built on sanctions and drone strikes) by giving them a “courtesy” peek at his next work.

Roya Hakakian: Ebrahim Raisi has blood on his hands

For once, the Iranians themselves are blameless. As conspiracies go, the one alleged here is mild. They found Westerners of Iranian extraction who did not despise their religious government, as so many Iranian expatriates do. They made a list. They flattered its members and waited to see who welcomed the flattery and reciprocated with offers of service. These techniques paid off splendidly when the Biden administration started appointing the very people Tehran had been grooming. (Vaez was poised to join Malley at State, but the appointment was never made.)

The emails do not demonstrate or suggest that Ariane Tabatabai, now in the Defense Department, or others not in government, became agents of Tehran. The Pentagon says that Tabatabai was “thoroughly and properly vetted” for her current job but refuses to say whether her emails were accurately and fairly quoted. Even if they do not show that she is a security risk, they do show that she and others responded to Tehran’s blandishments and sought its approval. The administration should find staff who know Iran and its leaders, ideally well enough to recognize Zarif by the smell of his cologne or the sound of his footfall. To get that close takes some ingratiation. The method of ingratiation matters, though, and in this case, it stinks.

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · September 28, 2023

6. Moshchun and the Ukrainian Way of War by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

The new era people’s war being implemented by Ukraine is an effective strategy for a smaller country that has been attacked by a larger nation. While military forces might fight battles, it is actually nations that fight wars. Building a cohesive society, and then providing it with the right purpose, is critical in building and sustaining a nation’s war fighting capability.

The people’s war approach, of the kind demonstrated at Moshchun and many other towns and villages since, appears to be an important component of Ukraine’s modern way of war.

Moshchun and the Ukrainian Way of War

Ukraine Visit Diary #2

MICK RYAN

SEP 29, 2023

mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan

The memorial at Moshchun (Image: from author)

This is the Battle of Moshchun, a small village that became a place of great courage, a great feat of our great people. Your great relatives and friends. A small village near Kyiv that became its great shield.

President Zelenskyy, March 2023

My visit to Ukraine continues.

I have been fortunate to have been able to speak with a range of different people, including Ministry of Defence officials, about how the war is being fought. It is providing me with greater insight into how nations face war under modern conditions, and how Ukraine is using all of its national power to resist the Russian invasion. As such, this is helping me further refine my hypothesis about a Ukrainian Way of War.

This week , I had the opportunity to conduct a visit to several areas to the north of Kyiv.

We visited Hostomel, which is a large airfield and the site of a major battle at the beginning of the Russian large scale invasion in February 2022. For an excellent account of the battle, this recent article from War on the Rocks is highly recommended. And as many will know, Hostomel is also the site of the now-wrecked heavy lift cargo aircraft, the Mriya.

But we also visited the small village of Moshchun, which is a short distance to the east of Hostomel. In the early stages of the February 2022 Russian invasion, this tiny village was the focal point for a large part of Russia’s northern army. The Russians needed the well-located village as an intermediate step on their way to the Ukrainian capital. After failing to break through Ukrainian defences around Irwin, the Russians turned their attention to an advance through Moshchun.

Nearly 30,000 Russian soldiers were involved in attempting to seize the village. This included the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, the 98th Guards Airborne Division and the 155th Separate Marine Brigade. Opposing them was a single Ukrainian mechanised brigade, the 72nd Brigade. The dug in around the town and prepared to defend against the Russian assault. The Russians conducted two weeks of vicious ground, air, rocket and artillery attacks against the Ukrainians.

There are some accounts of the battle including this piece in Small Wars Journal. The battle was also mentioned as part of a larger story about the defence of Kyiv by the Washington Post. I am yet to uncover a more detailed study of the battle. If there is one out there, please let me know.

But, the Battle of Moshchun is not just a story of military courage and tenacity.

It is also a story of how civilians and soldiers fought - and died - together defending the town. Throughout the battle, many people of the village didn’t run away. They stayed and cooked and fed the soldiers. They used their cars and trucks to haul ammunition, including the critical Javelin missiles, to forward defensive positions. Some even used Molotov cocktails against unsuspecting Russian soldiers.

Between 5 and 21 March 2022, the Russians conducted almost continuous attacks. The 72nd Brigade, with attached elements from the Territorial Defence Forces and Ukrainian special forces, held fast. Then, after two weeks and two days, the Russians withdrew. They had suffered around 600 killed and at least as many wounded. The local people, having played a key part in helping the army defend their village, immediately began rebuilding. As part of their rebuilding their village, the inhabitants of Moshchun decided to build a memorial to those Ukrainian soldiers who had given their last full measure of devotion to defend the village.

I had the opportunity to visit this memorial and discuss it with the village head. It is a lovely, poignant site. It sits atop the trench system that the 72nd Brigade constructed to defend Moshchun. The memorial is beautifully designed and maintained by the local people, and has been visited by many foreign dignitaries as well as by President Zelenskyy.

President Zelenskyy visit Moshchun and its memorial, March 2023 (Image: President of Ukraine website)

While the Battle of Moshchun is significant in the role it played in saving Kyiv, it is also representative of a larger trend in Ukraine’s contemporary way of war: a 21st century, people’s war. In many respects, Ukraine has adopted a 21st century, digitised people’s war.

The concept of people’s war was first conceived by Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong. He used this approach to fight a war by maintaining popular support while drawing an enemy deep into the country side and attacking them through a mix of conventional and unconventional tactics. This had a military objective, which was to bleed the enemy of manpower and supplies. Importantly, it also had the political objective of wearing down the will of the enemy politicians and citizens.

The Chinese employed this form of war against the Japanese in the Second World War and during the Chinese Civil War.

Writing in “On Protracted War” Mao noted that:

The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.

There is a massive irony in the democratic polity of Ukraine appropriating and re-applying an approach originally developed by a Chinese dictator for use against authoritarian Russia. There are three elements of Ukraine’s contemporary adoption of peoples war.

The first aspect is Ukraine nurturing popular support for its war effort through a focus on societal unity. This has been a theme in many of my discussions on this current visit to Ukraine. Civil society, and the unity of that society, is seen as a central, vital element of sustaining the Ukrainian war effort. As one of my interlocutors noted, it is about a mindset of “this is not mine, it is ours.”

From the beginning of this war, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has used themes of unity, sovereignty and reinforcement of Ukrainian culture in his communication with the Ukrainian people and the world beyond. This has provided a crucial sense of purpose for soldiers and citizens. And while the Ukrainian Armed Forces have expanded significantly since the start of the war, the Ukrainian government has employed its Territorial Defence Force as an effective way for local people to contribute to the defence of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian military has taken pains to use battlefield tactics that limit casualties in order to preserve both the force and its social license with the Ukrainian people.

This popular support element of the Ukrainian people’s war has resulted in a myriad of other ways for Ukrainian citizens to directly contribute to the defence of their country. Crowd-funding has been a big effort. It has raised enormous sums to purchase everything from socks to drone, from medical kits to satellites. Smart device applications, developed by private industry and used by various parts of government permit Ukrainians to report on enemy movements, be aware of incoming missiles, or report enemy drones and missiles flying overhead. These kinds of initiatives mean that a significantly larger proportion of society is now involved in directly supporting the war effort than many previous conflicts.

A second element of this new-era Ukrainian people’s war has been the constant efforts to wear down of the Russian military. In earlier articles, I have described this Ukrainian approach as a strategy of corrosion. It is a focus on slowly but surely attacking the Russians physically and psychologically to destroy their combat potential. The key elements of this are the large scale ground campaigns in 2022 and 2023 which have attacked the Russians in the north, the east and south of the country. But it also incorporates maritime strikes against the Russian Black Sea fleet using drones, missiles and uncrewed attack vessels, as well as the improvements in air defence which sees the majority of Russian drones and missiles destroyed before they reach their intended targets.

In addition to these conventional attacks have been the implementation of widespread partisan activities in areas occupied by Russia. The foundation for this was provided as part of a national resistance law that was approved by President Zelenskyy in 2021 Ukrainian citizens in occupied territory provide intelligence of Russian troop concentrations, headquarters and supply dumps. These are then attacked with missiles, special forces or by the resistance members themselves. This resistance network ensures the Russians have look to their front for attacking Ukrainians while also looking over their shoulders for partisans.

The final component of Ukraine’s information age people’s war has been its accelerating effort to corrode Russian political will and its support for the war. Early in the war, Ukraine had limited ability to conduct long range strikes against Russia, but it did have an active IT sector. It leveraged this, social media and President Zelenskyy’s speeches to implement a global strategic influence program to degrade support for Russia. This has included friendly hactivists and the global #NAFO movement to combat the widespread Russian efforts at misinformation.

Over the past six months, these political attacks on Russia have expanded and have embraced long range attacks on Moscow as well as Russian military airbases. I explored this topic in my recent articles on Ukraine’s strategic strike program. Also included in this approach has been incursions by ‘separatist’ groups into the Belgorod region earlier in 2023. The spectacular attacks conducted as part of this strategic strike campaign are designed to highlight to the Russian people the ongoing (and growing) cost of Putin’s war against Ukraine. They also aim to decrease the stature of Putin and the Russian military in the eyes of Russians - as well as in the eyes of Russia’s foreign supporters.

The new era people’s war being implemented by Ukraine is an effective strategy for a smaller country that has been attacked by a larger nation. While military forces might fight battles, it is actually nations that fight wars. Building a cohesive society, and then providing it with the right purpose, is critical in building and sustaining a nation’s war fighting capability.

The people’s war approach, of the kind demonstrated at Moshchun and many other towns and villages since, appears to be an important component of Ukraine’s modern way of war.

(You can read more about Moshchun and it’s rebuilding at the Kyiv School of Economics Rebuild UA project page).

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mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan

7. Analysis | Can the U.N. really regulate the power — and danger — of AI?

Analysis | Can the U.N. really regulate the power — and danger — of AI?

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · September 29, 2023

As world leaders gathered in New York for the annual high-level meetings at the United Nations last week, they discussed very real problems of war and disaster. But they also began taking a serious look at an issue that, for now, remains largely theoretical: The danger posed to humanity by artificial intelligence.

“Generative artificial intelligence holds much promise — but it may also lead us across a Rubicon and into more danger than we can control,” U.N. Secretary General António Guterres told the assembled world leaders as he opened the summit. He noted that only two world leaders had mentioned AI when he first appeared as U.N. chief in 2017. “Now AI is on everyone’s lips — a subject of both awe and fear,” he said.

The sudden visibility of AI over the past year has turned heads. It’s already in use in war zones including Ukraine, and there are serious fears the technology will upend the livelihoods of everyone from car manufacturers to Hollywood writers. As Today’s WorldView has noted, many see this as an “Oppenheimer” moment — a reference to Robert Oppenheimer, the American physicist who led the creation of the atomic bomb.

After making the bomb, Oppenheimer became a proponent of nuclear nonproliferation and worked with the nascent United Nations. Now, more than half a century later, industry and government officials alike are again looking to the world’s top multilateral institution, the United Nations, for leadership.

Guterres has taken up the challenge. At the United Nations last week, the secretary general continued his push for a High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence, with the aim of eventually establishing a U.N. agency devoted to AI — a request made most prominently by OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, an American AI researcher sometimes compared, often by himself, to Oppenheimer. Altman has suggested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could serve as a model for the global coordination of AI governance.

But for those watching the global nuclear debate over recent years, the comparison with AI may not be reassuring. More than 65 years after the creation of the IAEA, the war in Ukraine and the sudden increase in nuclear tensions it created has drawn into question whether a fractured and divided United Nations is serving its purpose. Why would AI be any better?

The U.N.’s plans for AI are still in an early stage, but they are expected to move fast. Applications to join the High-Level Advisory Body are already running into the thousands. The aim is to form the board by October, so it can prepare its final report with recommendations by September 2024, when Guterres is hosting the “Summit of the Future” at next year’s high-level U.N. meeting.

Already, there are signs of division. The idea of an IAEA model for the AI regulation has support due to the nuclear watchdog’s history of working and fostering cooperation on issues. However, some within the U.N. system don’t believe that the IAEA, with its focus on physical nuclear material, provides the right model for safeguarding a digital, intangible technology like AI.

Other potential models have been suggested, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which focuses more on expert advice. Some believe that there is not necessarily a need for a new agency at all. Aki Enkenberg, team lead for innovation and digital cooperation at Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, told Time Magazine recently it looked like a “hasty move” to insist on a new agency when existing bodies might work.

The challenge posed by AI is complicated by the still-uncertain nature of its impact and “possible pathways” through which AI could threaten humanity. “It took decades to build an effective system of control for atomic energy even with a common view of the risk,” Ian Stewart, executive director of the James Martin Center in Washington and a former official with the U.K. Ministry of Defense, wrote for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in June. The dominance of the private sector in AI aggravates governance challenges, he added.

It is also being shaped not by academic researchers, but tech company upstarts — people who likely have very different values than the U.N. diplomats sitting in Turtle Bay, and much greater power. Is Altman, for example, really keen to cede control of AI to the United Nations? His sternest critics say no, he’s just cynical.

“You say, ‘Regulate me,’ and you say, ‘This is a really complex and specialized topic, so we need a complex and specialized agency to do it,’ knowing damn well that that agency will never get created,” tech writer and podcaster Jathan Sadowski was quoted as saying in a sharp New York Magazine profile of Altman. “Or if something does get created, hey, that’s fine, too, because you built the DNA of it.”

The dichotomy between political leaders and tech leaders was highlighted by a surprising world leader voice during an event hosted by Elon Musk in San Francisco before the U.N. summit.

“You have these trillion-dollar [AI] companies that are produced overnight, and they concentrate enormous wealth and power with a smaller and smaller number of people,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a conservative icon and strong supporter of free markets. “That will create a bigger and bigger distance between the haves and the have-nots, and that’s another thing that causes tremendous instability in our world. And I don’t know if you have an idea of how you overcome that?”

While dealing with these new “superintelligence” issues, the U.N. will still have to deal with the all-too-familiar problem of geopolitical divides. An earlier AI-related push, known as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, was founded without the support of major countries like the United States. This time, Russia has indicated it will not support the creation of a new U.N. agency to tackle AI, undermining any potential consensus that Guterres hopes to build.

At several side events in New York last week, there was also concern that AI was becoming another area of divide between wealthy nations and the Global South. Speaking at the New York Public Library, Nigerian Communications Minister Olatunbosun Tijani noted that “even the conversation on governance [on AI] has been led from the West.”

The recent lessons from nuclear governance are hardly encouraging. Since the war in Ukraine began, there has been a breakdown in order, with deep divisions among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — all of whom are nuclear-armed. The IAEA has found itself, quite literally, in the middle of fighting in Ukraine, while key deals like the multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the bilateral New START are facing huge divisions among member states.

Nonnuclear countries pushing for disarmament agreements, such as the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, have not only found little support for such efforts by the governments of nuclear-armed countries but also seen little evidence that the aim of delegitimizing nuclear weapons use is succeeding. “We seem incapable of coming together to respond” to existential threats, Guterres said in his speech last week.

AI could prove to be a giant leap for the U.N. system, helping countries fight major issues like poverty and hunger. However, the disruption AI causes might one day make nuclear weapons look like firecrackers. The United Nations will have to battle not only self-interested world powers but also world-making tech barons. It’s a fight it can’t afford to lose.

The Washington Post · by Adam Taylor · September 29, 2023

8. Chinese Hackers Suspected of Stealing Tens of Thousands of State Department Emails

Excerpts:

Fletcher and three colleagues who briefed the Senate said that the State Department has made significant improvements to its cybersecurity posture, according to the Schmitt staffer. Over the past two years, officials said, the department has increased the number of computer systems that require multi-factor authentication—an extra login step after the usual password—from 10% to 90%. They have also tried to move away from relying on one vendor for vital services to reduce the impact of a potential compromise of that vendor’s systems.

“We need to harden our defenses against these types of cyberattacks and intrusions in the future,” Schmitt said in a statement, “and we need to take a hard look at the federal government’s reliance on a single vendor as a potential weak point.”

Chinese Hackers Suspected of Stealing Tens of Thousands of State Department Emails

They stole roughly 60,000 emails from 10 State Department employees, whose 'focus was mostly on Indo-Pacific diplomacy efforts,' during their breach of the department’s Microsoft email system earlier this year, according to a congressional staffer

Published 09/29/23 03:57 PM ET|Updated 12 hr ago

Eric Geller

themessenger.com · September 28, 2023

Suspected Chinese government hackers stole roughly 60,000 emails from 10 State Department employees during their sophisticated breach of the department’s Microsoft email system earlier this year, according to a congressional staffer.

The hackers also accessed a complete directory of State Department employees and information about officials’ travel plans and confidential discussions, according to the staffer for Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.), who attended a State Department briefing for senators and aides on Wednesday.

Nine of the 10 hacked employees were working on East Asia and Pacific policy, while the tenth person was focused on Europe, according to the Schmitt staffer, who requested anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. The employees’ “focus was mostly on Indo-Pacific diplomacy efforts,” the staffer said.

The new details underscore the potentially serious diplomatic impact of the cyberattack, which Microsoft says was the work of the Chinese government. The Biden administration has not yet publicly blamed China.

Beijing has aggressively used cyberattacks to steal information about its geopolitical rivals’ foreign-policy goals. The latest attack is believed to have helped China prepare for upcoming meetings with top Biden administration officials.

The hackers used advanced techniques to pry open the email accounts of a select group of Microsoft customers. By exploiting a rare confluence of events and hacking into a Microsoft engineer’s computer, the attackers were able to steal one of Microsoft’s heavily protected account-signing keys; the hackers then used those keys to log into their victims’ accounts without triggering the usual alarms. The campaign only came to light when the State Department noticed suspicious activity and alerted Microsoft.

The intruders were ultimately able to access 25 Microsoft customers’ email systems, according to the Schmitt staffer. In addition to State, they breached two other federal agencies, including the Commerce Department, where they accessed Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s inbox.

At the State Department, the data available to the hackers included as many as 10 Social Security numbers, Kelly Fletcher, the State Department’s chief information officer, told lawmakers during Wednesday’s briefing. It’s unclear if the hackers actually obtained that information.

Fletcher and three colleagues who briefed the Senate said that the State Department has made significant improvements to its cybersecurity posture, according to the Schmitt staffer. Over the past two years, officials said, the department has increased the number of computer systems that require multi-factor authentication—an extra login step after the usual password—from 10% to 90%. They have also tried to move away from relying on one vendor for vital services to reduce the impact of a potential compromise of that vendor’s systems.

“We need to harden our defenses against these types of cyberattacks and intrusions in the future,” Schmitt said in a statement, “and we need to take a hard look at the federal government’s reliance on a single vendor as a potential weak point.”

themessenger.com · September 28, 2023

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28.
• Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days.
• Russian aviation is increasingly active in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.
• Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son.
• The Russian information space continued to criticize Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed gains.
• Russian sources stated that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces received a new batch of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter and fourth-generation Su-35S air defense fighter aircraft on September 28.
• Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on September 28 that Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military facility in occupied Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (21km southwest of Mariupol).

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

Sep 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 28, 2023, 7:20pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and in the Bakhmut direction.[1] The “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that unspecified sources continue to spread false information about a Ukrainian breakthrough in the Robotyne-Verbove area, possibly referring to a fringe Russian milblogger’s claims on September 22 and 23 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[2] ISW has been unable to confirm this report and will not continue to record it in the absence of visual confirmation or similar claims from other Russian sources.

Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days. Russian and Ukrainian officials are increasingly reporting fewer Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, indicating that Ukrainian offensive operations have drawn Russian forces away from the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and significantly degraded the Russian offensive effort on this line.[3] ISW has previously assessed that Russian offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line aimed to pin Ukrainian forces on this line and away from more critical areas of the front.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated on September 28 that Russian forces conducted defensive operations and reinforced units in the past week while Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and pushed Russian forces from unspecified positions.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff’s September 28 morning situation report (SITREP) reported no Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions while the September 28 evening SITREP only reported one Russian attack south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[6] Russian aviation has become increasingly active on this line as ground attacks have apparently diminished, and Russian sources consistently claim that Russian air strikes hit Ukrainian-controlled bridges across the Oskil River — presumably to stymie the threat of any Ukrainian offensive operations east of the river.[7]

Russian aviation is increasingly active in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations. Russian forces have been increasingly conducting airstrikes against targets in the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and against rear Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction in the past week.[8] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 28 that Russian Su-35 attack aircraft and Ka-52 helicopters are increasingly active in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that Russian forces conducted 21 airstrikes in these directions, primarily near the Siversk (19km south of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[9] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Oleksandr Tolokonnikov stated on September 28 that Russian forces have increased the number of airstrikes on Kherson City and right bank Kherson Oblast by a factor of three or four in the past three days and that Russian forces dropped more than 50 aerial glide bombs against targets in these areas.[10]

Russian aviation continues to conduct strikes against rear Ukrainian areas in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, although mentions of Russian aviation repelling Ukrainian assaults in frontline areas have become less routine in Russian reporting than earlier in the counteroffensive. Russian sources noted that Russian aviation, particularly Ka-52 helicopters, played a significant role in disrupting Ukrainian assaults at the start of the counteroffensive.[11] Ukrainian forces appear to have increased their ability to down Russian Ka-52 helicopters in mid-August 2023, and the Russian command may have decreased aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast out of fears of aviation and pilot losses.[12] The decreased Russian aviation use in western Zaporizhia Oblast has not seriously undermined the Russian defense, however, as Russian forces appear to have increased their use of strike drones against advancing Ukrainian forces, and Russian artillery units continue to play a significant role in repelling Ukrainian assaults. It remains unclear what Russian forces intend to achieve with increased aviation activity in Kherson Oblast and whether more airstrikes against Ukrainian targets in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions will be able to offset degraded Russian combat power in the area.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 31 of 39 Russian-launched Shahed drones over Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28 and three out of five Shahed drones on September 27.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched the drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea.[14] Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Captain Andriy Rudyk stated that Russian companies have modified the Russian-produced Shahed-136 drones to contain more domestically produced parts but have not improved the drone’s tactical or technical characteristics.[15] Rudyk stated that the modifications indicate that Russia continues to pursue the domestic mass production of Shahed drones.[16]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front. Some notably critical Russian milbloggers claimed that they only publish five to 15 percent of the amount of information they receive.[17] One milblogger claimed that problems with communications, drones, tires, electronic warfare (EW), personnel payments, and various other issues persist among Russian forces on the frontline but that Russian personnel attempt to mitigate these problems through connections and personal initiatives, likely, according to the milblogger, because Russian commanders routinely silence complaints and ignore efforts to fix problems.[18] The milblogger amplified a statement from a claimed Russian platoon commander who complained about the inefficient flow of information from the Russian frontline to decision makers and who stated that he has had to take unusual measures to mitigate negative battlefield consequences from this poor information flow.[19] Another milblogger noted that certain information should not be shared and that the ability to remain silent at the right moment is an important quality.[20] A Russian milblogger deleted a part of a post on September 25 claiming that Ukrainian forces advanced near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and controlled the northeastern part of the settlement.[21] The milblogger edited the post and instead claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), just north of Novoprokopivka.[22] Geolocated footage published later in the day showed that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.5km northeast of Novoprokopivka.[23] The milblogger’s deletion suggests that Russian sources are intentionally limiting their reporting on tactical actions, especially those with outcomes unfavorable to Russia. Censorship or self-censorship among Russian milbloggers will affect ISW’s and the wider Western coverage ability of Russian operations, and ISW will continue to track changes in the Russian information space that could affect open-source reporting on the war in Ukraine.

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space.[24] The bill amends a current Russian law that punishes inciting extremism with a fine of up to 300,000 rubles (about $3,100) and up to four years in prison.[25] The amendment would also increase the imprisonment term to five years for calling for, promoting, or justifying extremism online.[26] Russian authorities arrested former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on July 21 on extremism charges and likely intends to use the proposed expansion of the law on extremism to encourage self-censorship among more figures disseminating criticisms of the Kremlin in the Russian information space.[27]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son. Putin praised the claimed successes of Chechen forces in Ukraine and Kadyrov’s leadership of Chechnya during the meeting.[28] Putin and Kadyrov appeared comfortable during the meeting in stark contrast with the pair’s last meeting on March 23 where Kadyrov appeared visibly nervous.[29] Kadyrov’s and Putin’s September 28 meeting comes amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and recent public backlash over footage of Kadyrov’s son beating a detainee.[30] Putin’s meeting with Kadyrov is likely a reciprocation of Kadyrov’s expressions of loyalty to Putin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 and signals Putin’s willingness to continue supporting Kadyrov despite recent events.[31]

The Russian information space continued to criticize the Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia. Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin called the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh “pathetic” on September 27 for attempting to undertake “imperial functions” without the “ability and willingness” to support peacekeeping operations.[32] Girkin also claimed that Russian peacekeeping forces would have suffered defeat if they had intervened in the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] A Russian milblogger criticized the Armenian government for not intervening in Nagorno-Karabakh.[34] Another Russian source claimed that Russia has lost a “frozen conflict” that it can leverage and that the disappearance of a breakaway republic in Russia’s supposed sphere of influence is directly connected to decreasing Russian international influence.[35]

Senior NATO and Western defense officials met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on September 28 to discuss Ukraine’s military needs.[36] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu discussed defensive cooperation and strengthening Ukrainian air defenses with Zelensky.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28.
• Russian forces have reduced the tempo of their localized offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent days.
• Russian aviation is increasingly active in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts and apparently less active in areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 27 to 28.
• Several Russian milbloggers claimed that they self-censor the majority of their reporting amidst an apparent wider self-censorship in Russian reporting about the tactical realities on certain sectors of the front.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading that criminalizes promoting and justifying extremism, likely to encourage self-censorship in the Russian information space.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled his support for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov during a meeting on September 28 amid continued speculations about Kadyrov’s health and public backlash against the recent behavior of Kadyrov’s son.
• The Russian information space continued to criticize Armenian leadership and lament Russia’s perceived decreased influence in Armenia.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed gains.
• Russian sources stated that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces received a new batch of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter and fourth-generation Su-35S air defense fighter aircraft on September 28.
• Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on September 28 that Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military facility in occupied Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (21km southwest of Mariupol).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (13km south of Kremina).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 27 that Russian forces continue to pressure Ukrainian forces near Synkivka (6km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and west of Svatove.[38] Other Russian sources claimed on September 27 and 28 that limited fighting is ongoing in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[39]

Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 28 that unspecified elements of the newly-formed Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) are operating on the Kupyansk-Lyman front line.[40] ISW previously reported, citing Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov, that Russian forces deployed the 25th CAA “roughly north of Bakhmut” rather than the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[41] Yevlash’s September 28 statement is more consistent with prior reports that Russian forces deployed elements of the 25th CAA to the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, however.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 28 and reportedly recently advanced. Ukrainian Deputy Director of the Department of Application Planning of the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful assault operations in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in the past week.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 25th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, Western Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack in a forest area near Synkivka on September 28.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make confirmed gains on September 28. Ukranian Commander of the 5th Separate Assault Brigade stated that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced beyond Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Klishchiivka.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near the railway line east of Andriivka and that some previously Russian-held positions near Andriivka are now contested.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 27 and 28 that fighting continues near the railway line along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7-12km southwest of Bakhmut).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 28 but did make confirmed gains. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 27 that Russian forces cleared Ukrainian forces from Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed evidence of this recurring Russian claim.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 28 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[52] Ukrainian Director of the Planning Department of the Main Directorate of the National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated that the Russian military is reinforcing advanced units to prevent further Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut direction.[53]

Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely significantly disrupting Russian drone operations near Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 28 that Ukrainian EW systems disrupted 258 Russian drone missions over the past day.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 19 that Ukrainian EW systems are stronger than Russian EW systems in the Bakhmut area.[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Avdiivka and near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka).[57] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 27 that Russian forces captured a position near Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City).[58]

The Russian MoD claimed on September 28 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line near Pervomaiske and southwest of Vesele (6km north of Avdiivka).[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful ground attacks along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 28. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Zavitne Bazhannya (12km south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have curtailed attempts to break through Russian defenses in the area and are conducting assaults for tactical purposes.[62]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 28 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Urozhaine and recaptured unspecified positions north of Pryyutne.[64]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults along the Robotyne-Verbove line (10km south of Orikhiv to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) and conducted small, mechanized assaults near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[66] Select Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian assaults near Novoprokopivka and Verbove were unsuccessful.[67] The “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that unspecified sources continue to spread false information about a Ukrainian breakthrough in the Robotyne-Verbove area.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted mechanized assaults near Kopani (11km southwest of Orikhiv) and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to break through to the settlement along tree lines in the area.[69]

Russian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 28 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts to restore lost positions near Chervone (9km east of Hulyaipole) and near Robotyne.[70] A Russian milblogger amplified footage purporting to show elements of the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) counterattacking near Verbove and claimed that these elements seized positions at nearby strongholds, although ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of any recent Russian advances in the area.[71]

Russian milbloggers continue to express concern about Ukrainian activity on islands in the Dnipro River delta and the possibility of a Ukrainian crossing to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on September 28 that small Ukrainian groups landed in marsh areas northeast of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City).[72] Several Russian milbloggers expressed concern that Ukrainian forces are accumulating forces to conduct a landing from islands in the Dnipro River delta to the left bank of Kherson Oblast.[73]

Several Russian milbloggers claimed on September 28 that Russian forces intercepted a Ukrainian missile targeting an unspecified target in occupied Crimea.[74] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 28 that Russian authorities temporarily closed the Kerch Strait Bridge due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike.[75]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian sources stated that the Russian Aerospace (VKS) Forces received a new batch of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter and fourth-generation Su-35S air defense fighter aircraft on September 28.[76] Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov stated that this delivery is part of the state defense order and that Russian forces will receive another batch of Su-57 aircraft by the end of 2023.[77] This was reportedly the third batch of Su-35S aircraft that the Russian VKS received in 2023.[78]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 28 that Ukraine’s authorities and partners have evidence that Iran has not yet sold Iranian missiles to Russia.[79] The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (CTP) and ISW assessed on September 27 that senior Iranian and Russian military officials reviewed Iranian advanced conventional weapons in Moscow and Tehran in August and September 2023 and may conclude a drone and missile sale agreement following the expiration of UN missile restrictions on October 18.[80]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on September 28 that Ukrainian partisans set fire to a Russian military facility in occupied Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (21km southwest of Mariupol).[81]

Occupation authorities continue efforts to repopulate occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens. Andryushchenko stated on September 27 that occupation authorities plan to evict Ukrainian residents from a large apartment complex in occupied Mariupol within the next week and sell the apartments to Russian citizens.[82] Andryushchenko stated that occupation authorities raised mortgages for these apartments to rates unaffordable for local Ukrainian residents.[83]

Russian federal subjects continue to expand their patronage networks in occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on September 28 that Pskov Oblast authorities have nearly completed constructing a kindergarten in occupied Pavlivka, Henicheskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast.[84] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also stated that Pskov Oblast authorities sent Russian-language literature, construction equipment, and reagents for water purification to occupied Kherson Oblast.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian maneuver brigades conducted mining, parachute, drone, and ambush exercises on September 28. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the 38th Airborne Assault Brigade conducted parachute exercise at the Brest training ground in Brest Oblast; that the 103rd Separate Guards Airborne Brigade conducted underwater mining and demining exercises at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk Oblast; and that the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted drone, counter-drone, and ambush exercises at the Borisovsky training ground in Minsk Oblast.[86]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

10. How a Tiny Crew Struck a Blow Against China With a Wooden Boat and a Knife

How a Tiny Crew Struck a Blow Against China With a Wooden Boat and a Knife

When the Chinese coast guard put up a barrier in the South China Sea, the Philippines devised a plan to retaliate

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/how-a-tiny-crew-struck-a-blow-against-china-with-a-wooden-boat-and-a-knife-fc397ee1?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Niharika MandhanaFollow

Sept. 28, 2023 12:00 pm ET

The tiny crew had a risky mission: Sail to a contested coral atoll in the South China Sea, cut a barrier blocking Filipino fishermen and get out before Chinese ships catch on.

Last week, Chinese forces floated a nearly 1,000-foot-long string of buoys near Scarborough Shoal, a reef located about 120 nautical miles from the Philippines that has been at the center of maritime tensions between the countries for years. Manila had objected, saying the “floating barrier” obstructed the country’s fishermen.

Then, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made a decision: The barrier needed to go.

Security officials devised a simple but bold plan. They would try to slip past the four Chinese coast-guard ships in the area without attracting attention and cut it, said Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesman for the Philippine coast guard.

So, days after the barrier went up, a small coast-guard crew climbed into a wooden fishing boat and set off. They didn’t wear their uniforms in an effort to pass themselves off as fishermen.

Philippines Removes Chinese Floating Barrier in South China Sea

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The Philippines has removed a floating barrier that it says was installed by China in the South China Sea. Photo: Philippine Coast Guard/Reuters

They managed to approach the barrier on the southeast side of the reef unnoticed. A diver plunged in and swam just below the surface of the water to the line anchored at one end of the buoys. A video released by the Philippine coast guard on Monday shows him severing the rope after briefly sawing it with a knife. The crew heaved aboard the anchor securing the barrier—and left.

The buoys had been set adrift, no longer blocking the entrance to the atoll, Tarriela said.

Chinese-occupied islands/reefs

With runway

Other islands/reefs

TAIWAN

CHINA

Scarborough Shoal

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINES

VIET.

Spratly

Islands

BRUNEI

200 miles

MALAYSIA

INDO.

200 km

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

It was a small, audacious act that, in some ways, had no real practical effect for Filipino fishermen. They couldn’t enter the atoll, which is guarded at all times by Chinese ships.

But it was an act of defiance against a powerful rival, showing a new effort by the Philippines to push back against China’s claims in the South China Sea.

The goal was “to show the Filipino people, to show the world, that we’re now going to stand up against the bully,” said Tarriela. “This is the main message of what we did.”

The country’s previous leader, former President Rodrigo Duterte, played down China’s actions in the South China Sea, and some in his administration pointed to the wide gulf in power and resources between Beijing and Manila as reason to improve relations. Under Marcos, who took office 15 months ago, a different strategy has emerged: publicly naming and shaming China for its tactics—and, sometimes, going further.

On Wednesday, the Chinese coast guard denied the Philippines had cut the barrier, saying the Chinese side had removed it. It was put up, the coast guard said, after a Philippine fisheries-department vessel barged into the lagoon at the center of Scarborough Shoal, which the Philippines denies.

China claims much of the South China Sea, including areas a long way from its coast that fall within the exclusive economic zones of others in the region, putting it at odds with those nations. To enforce its claims, Beijing has, over the past decade, built artificial islands in the waterway and turned them into military bases with missiles, runways and radars. 

Its coast guard and fishing militia fleets—the largest such forces in the world—patrol widely, shadowing vessels of opposing nations and swarming hotly contested sites. Countries like the Philippines are severely outmatched.   

While his predecessor favored cooperation with China, Marcos has tightened his country’s security alliance with the U.S. In February, the two sides unveiled a major expansion of a defense-cooperation agreement, effectively extending U.S. access to nine Philippine military bases, from a previous five. 

A Philippine fishing boat sailing past a Chinese ship near the Scarborough Shoal. PHOTO: TED ALJIBE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A Chinese coast-guard ship sending a warning message to a Philippine vessel. PHOTO: TED ALJIBE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The move toward tighter relations with Washington has irked China. An editorial in the state-run China Daily newspaper this week said the latest South China Sea incident was “clear proof that with the encouragement and support it has received from Washington, Manila feels emboldened to once again make waves in the South China Sea.”  

Scarborough Shoal is often cited as a potential flashpoint in the South China Sea. China seized it from the Philippines in 2012 after a long standoff. Another clash there between Philippine and Chinese forces could escalate, with the potential to involve the U.S. Some security analysts say Beijing could try to build on and militarize Scarborough Shoal like it did other South China Sea features, which would give it even greater reach and control. 

The triangular reef encircles a resource-rich lagoon. Before 2012, Filipino fishermen routinely entered the lagoon, which can only be accessed through a small opening, to fish and to take shelter from bad weather. Since China seized it, Filipino fishermen haven’t been able to get in, though they have, by and large, been able to fish in the vicinity of the shoal. 

The Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea as seen in a handout photo provided by Planet Labs. PHOTO: PLANET LABS/REUTERS

Chinese coast-guard ships are ever-present, with at least one guarding the opening to the lagoon. Others patrol the surrounding area, shadowing Philippine coast-guard and fisheries-department boats and keeping them away, usually at a distance of 8 or 10 nautical miles from the reef, said Tarriela. 

For months, Philippine authorities have been trying to get closer. “We just try to keep on pushing and pushing—every time that we successfully reach a particular mark,” he said.  

They had a breakthrough last week. On Sept. 20, a fisheries-department vessel, with coast guard crew on board, managed to get as close as about 950 feet to the shoal. No official Philippine crew had been that close since 2012—marking a milestone, Tarriela said.

They were able to pull it off, he said, because of the presence of journalists on the boat. With a camera pointed at them, the Chinese coast guard took a less aggressive approach, he said. 

“They’re usually the kind of opponent that knocks you down,” he said. This time, he said, “they’re attempting to block you at a certain distance, but because of that hesitation to come closer, you’re able to maneuver and outrun them.” 

Allowing journalists on patrol is part of a new Philippine strategy this year: calling out Chinese actions—often and publicly. The Philippines has issued detailed statements about what it sees as dangerous Chinese maneuvers, such as one in February when Chinese forces flashed a green laser at a Philippine vessel. Last month, the Philippine armed forces released a video of the Chinese coast guard blasting a water cannon. 

It was when the Philippine fisheries department vessel with journalists aboard was near Scarborough Shoal that its crew noticed Chinese personnel on inflatable boats putting up the floating barrier. The buoy barrier stood at the opening to the lagoon, anchored on two sides. Filipino fishermen told officials that such barricades tended to go up when the Chinese side saw large numbers of Filipino fishing boats in the area. That day, there were about 50.

A photo made available by the Philippine coast guard shows Chinese coast-guard ships patrolling next to Chinese fishing boats in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal in 2022. PHOTO: PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

While the Philippine actions show it is thinking of new ways to exercise its rights in the South China Sea, some also warn about the risks. 

“We still need to think about what will happen should China choose to exercise its escalation dominance,” said Julio S. Amador III, chief executive of advisory firm Amador Research Services, who specializes in strategic issues involving the Philippines. “What is the end goal, and how is the Philippines going to respond to further escalation from the Chinese side.”

Still, Tarriela said, the recent mission carried out by the Philippine coast guard is nothing compared with China’s tactics.

“China used military-grade laser. China did a lot of dangerous maneuvers. China used water cannon. They did a lot of provocative, aggressive, escalatory actions,” said Tarriela. “Are they upset because we cut their anchor line?”

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the September 29, 2023, print edition as 'How a Tiny Boat Buoyed Resistance to Chinese Barriers'.

11. American Tactics vs. Chinese Strategy

Excerpts:

America’s tactical approach to the Chinese tech sector has been directed at the country’s military-civil fusion; the intent is to prevent the application of dual-use technologies to the production of weapons. Both Raimondo and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have warned that the US may use this same lens to assess the new Mate 60 Pro. That means the US could also be taking dead aim at China’s ultimate consumer-information appliance, with potential adverse implications for the consumer-led strain of Chinese growth that most Western economists, myself included, have long favored.

But China is not without clout in the phone war. Under the dubious guise of security concerns, it has started to restrict iPhone purchases by government officials, and there are hints that it might broaden the ban to include workers at state-owned enterprises. This is hardly inconsequential for America’s most valuable company, given that the Chinese market accounts for nearly 20% of Apple’s total global revenue. The biggest risk of all: Apple’s reliance on China as its main production and assembly base, despite early attempts to move operations to India and Vietnam.

In the end, it’s hard to argue with either Porter or Sun. Tactics are not enough to compensate for a lack of strategic thinking. Just ask Huawei and the world’s largest smartphone market. And try telling that to Washington.

American Tactics vs. Chinese Strategy

Sep 27, 2023

 STEPHEN S. ROACH

For decades, US policymakers have preferred piecemeal tactical actions, while the Chinese government has consistently taken a more strategic approach. This mismatch is the reason why Huawei, to the shock of sanctions-focused American officials, was able to make a processor breakthrough in its flagship smartphone.

NEW HAVEN – The debate over the difference between tactics and strategy is as rich as it is enduring. In his seminal 1996 article in the Harvard Business Review, Harvard’s Michael Porter tackled this issue head on. While his focus was business, his arguments can be applied much more broadly – including to today’s Sino-American rivalry.

1. Culture
2. 
   

Porter differentiated between “operational effectiveness” and strategy, arguing that nimble companies had become well practiced in the former, but had dropped the ball on the latter. He also drew a sharp contrast between tactical tools – such as benchmarking, re-engineering, and total quality management – and competitive strategies aimed at “choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.”

Roughly 2,500 years earlier, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu offered an equally profound perspective. In The Art of War, Sun wrote, “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory,” stressing the complementarity of these two aspects of military decision-making. But Sun also counseled, “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat” – an admonition not to fixate on short-termism.

Notwithstanding Porter’s role in shaping the modern debate about strategy, today’s American body politic has little patience for long-term thinking. This was not always the case. George Kennan, first as a diplomat and later as an academic, devised the containment strategy that the United States used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Andrew Marshall, as the head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, pushed the envelope on US military strategy. And Henry Kissinger, of course, was the ultimate practitioner of what has been dubbed “Grand Strategy.”

But these were exceptions, not the rule. Ever since former US President George H.W. Bush famously mocked “the vision thing” ahead of the 1988 presidential campaign, strategy has been held in low regard in Washington. The real-time feedback of ever fickle focus-group polling has become the North Star of US policy decisions.

That is especially the case in the Sino-American conflict, which over the last five years has morphed from a trade war to a tech war to the early stages of a new cold war. The US Trade Representative’s Section 301 report, published in March 2018, framed America’s tactical approach to its Chinese adversary, hinting at the tough actions that were soon to come.

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This stands in stark contrast to China’s more strategic approach, exemplified by its five-year plans and longer-term industrial-policy initiatives, such as the controversial Made in China 2025 program, the Internet Plus Action Plan, and the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Like them or not, these goal-oriented initiatives come complete with metrics aimed at defining a trajectory from point A to point B.

The US, however, has focused more on penalizing China for defying the rules and norms of the global system – holding China accountable, for example, for violating the terms of its WTO accession in late 2001. This has taken the form of tariffs and sanctions – unilaterally imposed by the US – which were quickly followed by tit-for-tat retaliation from China.

From the start of the trade war in mid-2018, it has been American tactics vs. Chinese strategy. This mismatch has important consequences, not least for the so-called “phone war,” the new front in the Sino-American tech conflict. The opening salvo came this past August, when Huawei, China’s leading technology company, took the US by surprise with the release of its new Mate 60 Pro smartphone. The launch was undoubtedly timed to coincide with US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s visit to Beijing.

A TechInsights teardown commissioned by Bloomberg News revealed that the new Chinese smartphone is powered by a seven-nanometer Kirin 9000s chip fabricated by SMIC, China’s leading semiconductor manufacturer. While it still lags behind Apple’s new iPhone 15, which runs on a three-nanometer chip, Huawei’s breakthrough shocked sanctions-focused American officials by offering an indigenous product with 5G-like capabilities.

This is what happens in a conflict where one side is focused on tactics and the other on strategy. It should come as no surprise that Huawei has responded strategically to America’s aggressive tactical campaign to restrict its core businesses and supply-chain dependencies. When the US Commerce Department first put Huawei on the entity list for export controls in 2019 – striking a severe blow to the company’s once dominant smartphone – it forced the hand of China’s most R&D-intensive enterprise. Porter couldn’t have asked for more.

America’s tactical approach to the Chinese tech sector has been directed at the country’s military-civil fusion; the intent is to prevent the application of dual-use technologies to the production of weapons. Both Raimondo and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have warned that the US may use this same lens to assess the new Mate 60 Pro. That means the US could also be taking dead aim at China’s ultimate consumer-information appliance, with potential adverse implications for the consumer-led strain of Chinese growth that most Western economists, myself included, have long favored.

But China is not without clout in the phone war. Under the dubious guise of security concerns, it has started to restrict iPhone purchases by government officials, and there are hints that it might broaden the ban to include workers at state-owned enterprises. This is hardly inconsequential for America’s most valuable company, given that the Chinese market accounts for nearly 20% of Apple’s total global revenue. The biggest risk of all: Apple’s reliance on China as its main production and assembly base, despite early attempts to move operations to India and Vietnam.

In the end, it’s hard to argue with either Porter or Sun. Tactics are not enough to compensate for a lack of strategic thinking. Just ask Huawei and the world’s largest smartphone market. And try telling that to Washington.

STEPHEN S. ROACH

Writing for PS since 2011

159 Commentaries

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Stephen S. Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is the author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China (Yale University Press, 2014) and Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022).

12. Tanks and troops out in the open in Ukraine can't go 10 minutes without being spotted and fired upon, Ukrainian official says

Tanks and troops out in the open in Ukraine can't go 10 minutes without being spotted and fired upon, Ukrainian official says

businessinsider.in · by Thibault SpirletSep 28, 2023, 21:19 IST

• Tanks and troops out in the open can now be spotted in five minutes, a Ukrainian official said.
• Vadym Skibitsky told The Wall Street Journal that they can be hit in a further three minutes.

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The sheer number of drones operating in Ukraine, as well as battle-management systems that provide real-time imaging and locations, mean that troops and tanks out in the open have just minutes before they are targeted, a top Ukrainian military official told The Wall Street Journal.

"Today, a column of tanks or a column of advancing troops can be discovered in three to five minutes and hit in another three minutes," Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitsky, the deputy commander of Ukraine's HUR military intelligence service, said.

"The survivability on the move is no more than 10 minutes," he added.

Skibitsky also told the newspaper that "surprises have become very difficult to achieve."

Russia and Ukraine are both deploying thousands of drones on the battlefield, and are using cheap drones to target each other's forces.

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This in turn is bringing into question some fundamentals of American military doctrine.

"The days of massed armored assaults, taking many kilometers of ground at a time, like we did in 2003 in Iraq — that stuff is gone because the drones have become so effective now," retired US Army sergeant Bradley Crawford, an Iraq war veteran, told the newspaper.

Ukraine has been increasingly relying on cheap, first-person-view drones, or FPVs, to take out Russian military hardware.

These drones tend to cost around $400 to $500, which is a lot less than a regular 155mm artillery shell, which can cost up to $3,000, or a T-72 tank, which costs about $1,2 million.

Last week, unmanned Ukrainian aerial vehicles struck a record 205 pieces of Russian military hardware in Ukraine, Ukraine's Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, said.

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These included 64 cannons, 27 tanks, and 55 trucks, he said.

While the exact number of drones deployed remains unclear, the Royal United Services Institute estimated earlier this year that Ukraine was losing about 10,000 drones per month, a sign of their widespread use.

Meanwhile, Russia is working to make a deadlier, more advanced version of Iran's Shahed-136 attack drone, according to documents leaked to The Washington Post.

businessinsider.in · by Thibault SpirletSep 28, 2023, 21:19 IST

13. China Presents Its Foreign Policy Blueprint – Analysis

Excerpts;

Declaring China’s belief in peaceful negotiations to settle disputes, the document says that Beijing has settled land boundary issues with 12 of its 14 neighbours and delimited the maritime boundary in the Beibu Bay with Vietnam.

China’s has offered a blueprint for a political solution to the Ukraine Crisis and mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran successfully.

On the controversial maritime security issue, the document says that China has proposed a “maritime community of shared future” concept and is “committed to the peaceful resolution of territorial sovereignty and maritime issues and interests through dialogue and consultation.” 

Further, China has signed and fully and effectively implemented the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries, and continues to advance consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. 

China has proposed to jointly build a partnership on Blue economy and strengthen maritime connectivity. The document says that China adheres to the path of pursuing joint development while setting aside disputes, and is actively exploring joint resource development with its maritime neighbours.

China Presents Its Foreign Policy Blueprint – Analysis

 September 28, 2023  0 Comments

By P. K. Balachandran

Says China is benign and accommodative while its adversaries are not

China’s State Council Information Office has released the country’s blueprint for a better world entitled “Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions”.

Presented on September 26, the document projects a benign, accommodative and progressive image of China, contrasting it with its adversary countries which are dubbed hegemonic and narrow-minded. 

However, no adversary has been named in the document.

The document says that it is wrong to assume that strong countries will naturally seek hegemony. It disputes the notion that China will be aggressive because it is growing.

“There is no iron law that dictates that a rising power will inevitably seek hegemony. This assumption represents typical hegemonic thinking and is grounded in memories of catastrophic wars between hegemonic powers in the past.”

“China has never accepted that once a country becomes strong enough, it will invariably seek hegemony.”

The root of hegemony is an “obsession with superior strength, and the zero-sum mentality” the document points out.  

It says that China is not in the hegemonic league because it “understands the lesson of history – that hegemony preludes decline.”

“China develops itself not by invasion or expansion but by creating opportunities for itself while creating more development opportunities for the entire world, and not in order to supersede or subjugate others.”

Further, “the strong preying on the weak is not a way for humans to coexist. If the law of the jungle is imposed on human society, and the idea that might is right prevails, the principle of sovereign equality will be fundamentally undermined, and world peace and stability will be severely endangered.”

Making a strong pitch for globalization, the document says that “globalization is not an option, but is the reality and the way of life in a highly interdependent and interconnected world.” 

Describing the “winner-takes-all” mind set as the “law of the jungle,” the document says that the way forward is “inclusive development for the benefit of all.”

“Certain countries still cling to the zero-sum game and blindly pursue  monopolistic advantages but this will do nothing for their development over the long run.” 

“No country should hope for others to fail. Instead, it should work together with other countries for the success of all. This is an integrated world. Those who turn their back on it will have no place in it,” the document says.

Decrying protectionism, including “de-coupling and de-risking” from China, the document says that such raising of walls will halt globalization. 

The artificial walls thus created, coupled with the pandemic, resulted in the Human Development Index declining for the first time in 30 years. 

“The world’s poor population has increased by more than 100 million, and nearly 800 million people live in hunger,” the document says.

Describing the security deficit as “glaring”, the document lays the blame on the Cold War mindset of some powers who have revived ideological warfare.

“Some countries’ hegemonic, abusive, and aggressive actions against others, in the form of swindling, plundering, oppression, and the zero-sum game, are causing great harm,” the document says and points out that non-traditional security challenges, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, and transnational crime, have increased. 

The panacea for these ills is in a drastic change in approach. 

“Standing at a crossroads, humanity is faced with two opposing options. One is to revert to the Cold War mentality that deepens division and antagonism and stokes confrontation between blocs. The other is to act for the common well-being of humanity, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, advocate openness and win-win results, and promote equality and respect,” the documents points out.

Stressing the need to accept the diversity of systems, the document says that the goal should not be to replace one system or civilization with another. Instead, it should be about countries with different social systems, ideologies, histories, cultures and levels of development coming together to promote shared interests, shared rights, and shared responsibilities in global affairs.

Non-recognition of diversity goes hand in hand with isolationism and exclusivism which run counter to the multipolar trend, the document argues. 

It calls for democracy in international relations “to make sure that the future of the world is determined by all, that international rules are written by all, that global affairs are governed by all, and that the fruits of development are shared by all.”

It points out that acceptance of diversity leads to mutual learning which gives an impetus to human progress. 

It calls for an end to the practice of adopting double standards or selectively applying international law.

Calling or a joint approach to problems, the document says: “Viewed from a country-first perspective, the world is small and crowded, and locked in fierce competition; but viewed from the perspective of a shared future, the world is vast and full of opportunities for cooperation. No country can overcome global development challenges on its own. Cooperation among all countries is the only viable option.” 

Development is sustainable only when it is inclusive, it adds. 

On China’s approach to international conflicts, the document says that “when neighbours are in trouble, instead of reinforcing one’s own fences, one should extend a helping hand. As challenges often take on global dimensions, it is all the more important for countries to cooperate in addressing them, turning pressure into motivation and crises into opportunities.”

Citing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an example of meaningful cooperation, the document cites a World Bank report which says that if the projects are implemented, trade between BRI countries trade will increase by 4.1%. 

And by 2030, the BRI will generate US$1.6 trillion in annual global revenues. 

Among the successful BRI projects cited in the report are: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; the China-Laos Railway; the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway (reaching a speed of 350 km an hour); the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway; and the China-Europe Railway Express.

In addition to the BRI, China has set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund to fund hundreds of projects

As regards China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) the document says that more than 100 countries and international organizations have expressed support for it, and over 70 countries participated in the Group of Friends of the GDI at the UN.

Through the Global Security Initiative (GSI) presented in 2023, “China seeks to work with the international community in upholding the spirit of the UN Charter.”

The GSI calls for “changes in the international landscape through solidarity, addressing traditional and non-traditional security risks and challenges with a win-win mind set, and creating a new path to security that features dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and win-win approach over the zero sum game.”

Declaring China’s belief in peaceful negotiations to settle disputes, the document says that Beijing has settled land boundary issues with 12 of its 14 neighbours and delimited the maritime boundary in the Beibu Bay with Vietnam.

China’s has offered a blueprint for a political solution to the Ukraine Crisis and mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran successfully.

On the controversial maritime security issue, the document says that China has proposed a “maritime community of shared future” concept and is “committed to the peaceful resolution of territorial sovereignty and maritime issues and interests through dialogue and consultation.” 

Further, China has signed and fully and effectively implemented the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries, and continues to advance consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. 

China has proposed to jointly build a partnership on Blue economy and strengthen maritime connectivity. The document says that China adheres to the path of pursuing joint development while setting aside disputes, and is actively exploring joint resource development with its maritime neighbours.

(The article was published in Counterpoint) 

P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

14. The Scrambled Spectrum of U.S. Foreign-Policy Thinking

Necessary graphics are at the link: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/27/republican-debate-trump-biden-foreign-policy-ideology/?utm

The Spectrum (view the graphics) 

Assertive: 1. Unilateral 2. Democratic 3. Realist 4. Multilateral

Less assertive: 1. Retractors 2. Restrainers

Excerpts:

The schools of thought that make up this spectrum, reflecting fundamentally different views about the U.S. role in the world, are highly influential but not very well understood.

In seeking to differentiate between foreign-policy positions, the media often resorts to cliches, such as “hawks versus doves,” or buzzwords, such as “isolationist” and “neoconservative.” However, these terms tend to be oversimplified or exaggerated and convey little useful information. International relations theories are not all that helpful either. “Realism” is routinely conflated with an academic concept that predicts how nations can be expected to behave, rather than how they should. And other theories, such as “idealism” and “constructivism,” offer limited utility in understanding real-world decision-making.

Yet there are critical differences in how policymakers view the world and are seeking to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy. There is a clear dichotomy, for instance, between those who believe that U.S. influence is mostly positive and that the United States should play an active role in global affairs and those who believe that U.S. hubris more often leads to bad outcomes and want to scale back the country’s overseas commitments.

The Scrambled Spectrum of U.S. Foreign-Policy Thinking

Presidents, officials, and candidates tend to fall into six camps that don’t follow party lines.

SEPTEMBER 27, 2023, 5:33 PM

By Ash Jain, a former director for democratic order with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Ash Jain · September 27, 2023

Foreign policy is likely to feature prominently at the Republican presidential primary debates. At the debate in August, a question on whether the candidates would support continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine produced a firestorm. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who had previously suggested that Russia’s war in Ukraine was not a “vital” national interest, appeared skeptical, calling on Europe to do more instead. Entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy was more direct in opposing such aid, calling it “disastrous” for the United States to be “protecting against an invasion across somebody else’s border.” Former Vice President Mike Pence and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, on the other hand, expressed strong support for assisting Ukraine, effectively standing behind President Joe Biden’s efforts to counter Russian aggression while imploring the United States to do even more.

On the other side of the aisle, some Democrats have been wary of Biden’s policy on Ukraine, as evidenced by a letter (that was later retracted) sent to the president by progressive Democrats, calling for a diplomatic end to the conflict and potential sanctions relief for Russia.

In today’s polarized political atmosphere, such cross-cutting views may appear confounding. On most domestic policy issues, whether political leaders have an R or a D next to their name is often a pretty good guide to their take on any particular issue. But when it comes to foreign policy, the normal rules of politics do not apply. Instead, of much greater relevance is where a political leader falls on the foreign-policy ideology spectrum.

A visualization shows the six schools of foreign-policy thought, four interntionalists and two non-internationalists.

A visualization shows the six schools of foreign-policy thought, four interntionalists and two non-internationalists.

The schools of thought that make up this spectrum, reflecting fundamentally different views about the U.S. role in the world, are highly influential but not very well understood.

In seeking to differentiate between foreign-policy positions, the media often resorts to cliches, such as “hawks versus doves,” or buzzwords, such as “isolationist” and “neoconservative.” However, these terms tend to be oversimplified or exaggerated and convey little useful information. International relations theories are not all that helpful either. “Realism” is routinely conflated with an academic concept that predicts how nations can be expected to behave, rather than how they should. And other theories, such as “idealism” and “constructivism,” offer limited utility in understanding real-world decision-making.

Yet there are critical differences in how policymakers view the world and are seeking to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy. There is a clear dichotomy, for instance, between those who believe that U.S. influence is mostly positive and that the United States should play an active role in global affairs and those who believe that U.S. hubris more often leads to bad outcomes and want to scale back the country’s overseas commitments.

There is a significant divide between those who believe that the United States should prioritize efforts to advance democratic values and norms and those who believe in defending more narrow strategic interests. And there are disparate views on whether the United States should stand firm against adversaries, such as Russia and China, or should seek to find common ground.

I have delineated six distinct foreign-policy camps that represent the dominant strains of thinking on the U.S. role in the world. These camps can be placed along a spectrum of international engagement. Four of them fall on the more assertive side of this spectrum, constituting “internationalists,” who believe that the United States should exercise its influence and be actively engaged in global affairs. And two of the camps are “non-internationalists,” who believe that the United States should scale back its global commitments and adopt a less forward-leaning foreign policy.

THE FOUR INTERNATIONALISTS

THE NON-INTERNATIONALISTS

INTERNATIONALISTS

A spectrum visualization plots the universalist internationalist foreign-policy position as the most assertive of six camps.

1. Unilateral Internationalists

Mugshots of unilateral universalists Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Bolton.

Defining worldview: Unilateral internationalists believe U.S. primacy and freedom of action are paramount and prioritize unilateral U.S. action, unconstrained by alliances or international agreements, to advance strategic interests. While President George W. Bush came close, especially during his first term, no U.S. president has directly embraced this school.

Key attributes:

• View China and Russia as the greatest challenges to U.S. primacy in the international system and seek to exert maximum pressure to counter U.S. adversaries and project American power
• Prioritize U.S. national interests, even if at the expense of allies, and favor strategic interests over democratic values or a “rules-based order”—but support U.S. alliances while skeptical of allies’ willingness to act
• Are distrustful of the United Nations and international agreements and favor U.S. withdrawal from international institutions where necessary to avoid restraints on U.S. power and sovereignty
• Support using military force to advance U.S. interests

Prominent voices: Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton

Recent U.S. presidents: None

Republican candidates: None

A spectrum visualization plots the democratic internationalist foreign-policy position as the second most assertive of six camps.

2. Democratic Internationalists

A grid of mugshots of democratic internationalists Madeleine Albright, John McCain, Mitt Romney, Chris Coons, G. John Ikenberry, Hal Brands, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Joe Biden, Chris Christie, Nikki Haley, and Mike Pence.

Defining worldview: Democratic internationalists believe that defending democracy is essential to maintaining U.S. and global security and prioritize working with like-minded allies to advance shared values and a rules-based democratic order. This school has been predominant among elected U.S. leaders—across both political parties—since President Harry Truman declared it was the policy of the United States to help “free and independent nations to maintain their freedom.”

Key attributes:

• View strategic competition between democracy and autocracy as the major fault line in the international system and support proactive measures to defend against revisionist autocracies, namely China and Russia
• Are strong proponents of democratic alliances and solidarity and are eager to maintain the United States’ role as the “leader of the free world”
• Support robust efforts to advance democratic values and human rights and to hold autocratic regimes to account for war crimes and violent oppression
• Are willing to consider use of force if necessary to defend democracy and the rules-based order

Prominent voices: Madeleine Albright, John McCain, Mitt Romney, Chris Coons, G. John Ikenberry, Hal Brands

Recent U.S. presidents: Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Joe Biden

Republican candidates: Chris Christie, Nikki Haley, Mike Pence

A spectrum visualization plots the realist internationalist foreign-policy position as the third most assertive of six camps.

3. Realist Internationalists

A grid of mugshots of realist universalists Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Richard Haass, Stephen Krasner, Charles Kupchan, Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush, and Ron DeSantis

Defining worldview: Realist internationalists believe that U.S. power should be utilized to defend more narrow strategic interests and prioritize pragmatic engagement with all nations to help preserve global and regional stability. Former National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger were quintessential practitioners of this school, which was also embraced by the presidents they served.

Key attributes:

• View great-power rivalry as inevitable in the global system and support U.S. alliances and active efforts to deter rival powers and maintain global order
• Are willing to engage adversaries and work with all nations, regardless of regime type, to advance strategic objectives
• Are prepared to make mutual accommodations with rivals, or seek to divide them, to achieve a stable balance of power
• Are inclined to “accept the world as it is” and are wary of U.S. intervention and democracy promotion efforts
• Support a strong U.S. defense posture and are willing to use force when required to defend vital national interests

Prominent voices: Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Richard Haass, Stephen Krasner, Charles Kupchan

Recent U.S. presidents: Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush

Republican candidates: Ron DeSantis

A spectrum visualization plots the multilateral internationalist foreign-policy position as the fourth most assertive of six camps (and the least assertive of four internationalist camps).

4. Multilateral Internationalists

A mugshot grid of multilateral universalists John Kerry, Bruce Jones and Barack Obama.

Defining worldview: Multilateral internationalists believe that peaceful coexistence with other nations should be a key objective and prioritize working through the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to solve global challenges and uphold international norms. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy was steeped in this school, now represented by former Secretary of State John Kerry, who is currently serving as the United States’ chief climate negotiator.

Key attributes:

• Are wary of great-power rivalry and strategic competition and are eager to “extend a hand” and find areas of common ground with adversaries
• Support active U.S. engagement to advance global norms, good governance, and human rights
• Seek to cooperate with all nations to address transnational challenges, with a particular priority on climate change
• Prefer to engage through inclusive institutions but support working with U.S. alliances to foster a rules-based order
• Are disinclined to use military force and will consider it only when authorized by the U.N. Security Council

Prominent voices: John Kerry, Bruce Jones

Recent U.S. presidents: Barack Obama

Republican candidates: None

Non-Internationalists

A spectrum visualization plots the retractor non- internationalist foreign-policy position as the second least assertive of six camps.

1. Retractors

A grid of mugshots of retractor non-internationalists Michael Anton, Donald Trump, and Vivek Ramaswamy.

Defining worldview: Retractors believe that the world is taking advantage of the United States and support a more transactional foreign policy that seeks to retract the United States from global commitments and maximize pecuniary benefits. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy epitomizes this school. But its adherents date back to Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan in the late 1990s and the America First movement of the 1930s that sought to keep the United States out of World War II.

Key attributes:

• Are deeply cynical about values and norms and seek and are prone to conspiracy theories and suspect the role of the “deep state” in manipulating U.S. policy
• Are critical of alliances and disdainful of U.S. allies, particularly in Europe, and believe efforts to cooperate through international institutions are naive and self-defeating
• Seek to “make deals” with autocratic regimes and are dismissive of democratic values and international norms
• Emphasize economic protectionism and closed borders to prevent others from “ripping America off”
• Believe the United States is militarily overcommitted but support occasional limited military actions to “act tough” and demonstrate U.S. prowess

Prominent voices: Michael Anton

Recent U.S. presidents: Donald Trump

Republican candidates: Donald Trump, Vivek Ramaswamy

A spectrum visualization plots the restrainer non- internationalist foreign-policy position as the least assertive of six camps.

2. Restrainers

A grid of mugshots of restrainer non-internationalists Rand Paul, Bernie Sanders, Andrew Bacevich, Stephen M. Walt, and Stephen Wertheim.

Defining worldview: Restrainers believe that the United States is overstretched and overcommitted and support a more restrained foreign policy that significantly reduces the country’s global footprint. While still largely on the margins, this school has gained some prominence in recent years, as reflected by the emergence of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and its adherents.

Key attributes:

• Are distrustful of U.S. power and influence in the international system and believe that the United States has no standing to promote democratic values or a rules-based order, given its own flawed democracy, hypocrisy, and imperialism
• Believe the United States has picked unnecessary fights with adversaries and that its overseas military posture, alliances, and sanctions policies are often overly provocative
• Are wary of “inflating” threats posed by China and Russia and favor diplomatic efforts to cooperate with adversaries and reach a mutual accommodation and view a nationalistic foreign policy as arrogant and distasteful
• Seek to reduce the U.S. military presence overseas and to scale back commitments to NATO and other alliances and vigorously oppose the use of force

Prominent voices: Rand Paul, Bernie Sanders, Andrew Bacevich, Stephen M. Walt, Stephen Wertheim

Recent U.S. presidents: None

Republican candidates: None

Several key points follow from this analysis. First, admittedly, the edges of these camps are fuzzy, and policymakers may often find themselves straddling one or more of these camps, especially on specific issues. Nevertheless, these six schools are sufficiently discrete and represent the primary worldviews that are influencing the contemporary debate on how the United States should conduct its foreign policy.

Second, many of these schools tend to cross partisan lines. Democratic internationalism, for example, has been enthusiastically embraced by political leaders on both sides of the aisle and has strong bipartisan constituencies, as reflected in pro-democracy institutions such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute. Realism has also had a long tradition in U.S. foreign policy, resonating with national security practitioners across both parties. Similarly, the restraint school draws support among both progressives on the left and libertarians looking for Washington to scale back its global commitments. On the other hand, unilateral internationalism has found a home mainly among conservatives, while multilateral internationalism draws support mostly from liberals. In recent years, retraction has become the policy of choice among pro-Trump Republicans.

Third, determining where recent U.S. presidents fall on this spectrum is not axiomatic. While they may be inclined toward a particular camp as they enter office, most presidents are not purists, and as they govern, many find themselves running up against practical and political realities that make it difficult to maintain a consistent and predictable foreign-policy governing philosophy.

Barack Obama, for example, seemed drawn toward realist internationalism, pursuing a “reset” in relations with Russia and later declining to commit U.S. force to hold Syrian President Bashar al-Assad accountable for his use of chemical weapons. But given the priority Obama placed on engaging adversaries such as Cuba and Iran and working through the United Nations, the main thrust of his foreign policy appeared more consistent with multilateral internationalism.

George W. Bush also straddled various camps. In launching the global war on terrorism, Bush seemed determined to assert U.S. primacy and appeared to be leaning toward unilateral internationalism. But with his emphasis on democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan, his signature Freedom Agenda, and his call for “ending tyranny in our world” in his second inaugural address, Bush’s overall worldview appeared to be more grounded in democratic internationalism.

Where Biden falls is still up for debate. Currently, the Biden national security team is split between realists, who pressed for Biden to withdraw from Afghanistan and reengage with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Sultan, and democratic internationalists, who championed the president’s initiative to organize a Summit for Democracy. However, given Biden’s steadfast commitment to work with NATO to defend a democratic Ukraine and his conviction that the world is facing a “global struggle between democracy and autocracy,” the broad arc of the Biden administration’s foreign policy so far seems to be more consistent with democratic internationalism—though a more definitive judgment will have to wait until his presidency concludes.

So where does this leave the current slate of Republican candidates? Pence and Haley, as well as former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, all of whom have called for standing up against Russian aggression and have denounced China’s human rights violations, are squarely in the democratic internationalist camp. Donald Trump, of course, has his own lane. DeSantis and Ramaswamy, on the other hand, appear caught between realism and Trumpian retraction, as they battle for support among the Republican rank and file who are skeptical of U.S. global engagement. DeSantis favors a pivot away from Ukraine and toward China—a very realist way to think about trade-offs. Ramaswamy, who has called for a strategy to split Russia and China, also sounds like a realist at times, but his stance on extricating the United States from any involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, potentially ceding Taiwan to China, and putting the “interests of America first” seems to suggest he is veering toward retraction.

While voters may not consider foreign policy to be central to their vote for the next president, how U.S. leaders choose to engage in the world is critical to the security and prosperity of the American people. By gaining a clearer understanding of the most influential foreign-policy schools of thought, voters—and indeed the candidates themselves—will be in a better position to make informed choices.

Foreign Policy · by Ash Jain · September 27, 2023

15.  Attention-Seekers and Autocrats Are a Combustible Mix

Excerpts:

To be sure, China remains a crucial trading partner, and those involved in business or other essential work there should clearly be able to enter the country and expect consular support in emergencies. Those wishing to visit the country for less essential reasons, though, should have to sign a waiver declaring they’re aware of the dangers and won’t expect consular support. Today, geopolitics is so sensitive that there’s no place in it for pranksters, not even accidental ones.

Attention-Seekers and Autocrats Are a Combustible Mix

Geopolitical provocateurs can cause serious diplomatic headaches.

Braw-Elisabeth-foreign-policy-columnist3Elisabeth Braw

By Elisabeth Braw, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Elisabeth Braw · September 28, 2023

In an extremely online age, insulting foreign governments is a superhighway to fame and notoriety. Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have already proved handy tools for such provocateurs. Those autocrats’ skin, though, seems positively rhino-like compared with what may be coming our way from China. Planned new legislation will make it illegal to offend “the Chinese national spirit” or hurt “the feelings of the Chinese people.” The proposed legislation is a recipe for diplomatic disputes with the West—especially in a social media culture where provocation has become a course for fame.

2023 has already been the year of the foreign policy-focused provocateur, who has gone straight for the ego of overseas leaders. At the beginning of the year, Sweden—where nothing less than accession to NATO is at stake—turned out to be a perfect staging ground for Danish agitator Rasmus Paludan, who realized he could get massive attention by burning a Quran just as Erdogan was weighing how to view the Swedish NATO application.

The same set of circumstances also made Sweden a perfect staging ground for pro-Kurdish activists, whose protests—including hanging an effigy of Erdogan in front of Stockholm City Hall—got vastly more attention than pro-Kurdish protests can ordinarily hope to get. Iraqi refugee Salwan Momika, an unknown until earlier this year, has become an international household name and generated TikTok income by burning Qurans in Stockholm—thus harming Sweden’s NATO application and its relations with Muslim countries.

Swedish opposition politicians, meanwhile, have used Orban in demagoguery, comparing Sweden’s peaceful prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, to the Hungarian strongman. This has so angered the Hungarian government that it threatens to derail Sweden’s NATO accession even more. And in Japan, an American named Ramsey Khalid Ismael, aka Johnny Somali, has made trespassing and being arrested a performance for social media.

Enter Chinese President Xi Jinping. In late August, China’s rubber-stamp parliament discussed draft amendments to the Public Security Administration Law, which would ban behavior, clothing, and speech that offend the Chinese people or government. Offenders risk a fine of 5,000 yuan (about $685) or up to 15 days in prison—but the proposed amendments don’t specify offensive actions, words, or clothing. That’s much like China’s recently amended espionage law, which covers all “documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests” but doesn’t define national security and interests.

The move wasn’t directed at foreigners; instead, it seems to have been a reaction to a series of nationalist temper tantrums online about people wearing traditional Japanese clothes and other perceived offenses. Its sloppiness prompted immediate pushback on the Chinese internet, with even nationalists and conservatives condemning the law. That doesn’t mean it won’t eventually pass—under Xi, China has added more layers of legal constraint every year. “The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] can always decide on its own what you can do and not do—they don’t need a law for it,” noted Oscar Almén, a China analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. “With this planned legislation, there’s the expectation that authorities should be proactive.” And Alicia Hennig, a China specialist and interim professor at the Technical University of Dresden, told me that “if the proposed changes to China’s public security law are enacted into law, they will also affect the foreign communities still in China, including expatriates, students, and even foreign visitors.” She added: “A fine of 5,000 RMB or up to 15 days’ imprisonment for a statement or action is not trivial. But what actually constitutes this crime is far from well defined. It is essentially another catch-all phrase that allows the government to punish people arbitrarily.”

While working as an academic in China several years ago, Hennig conducted interviews with expats and found that “people were already very cautious, turning off their phones altogether even when topics were not highly critical. What happens when cameras, ubiquitous in major Chinese cities, listen in even when phones are switched off? What happens when students have a more critical conversation in one of Shanghai’s bars? Or when a foreign tourist snaps at a waitress? These changes will only increase the feeling of being constantly watched—of being part of the CCP’s panopticum.”

Enter Western provocateurs and adventurers. If you have the mindset of a Rasmus Paludan, you’re willing to cause harm simply to gain fame or notoriety. And you can gain even more fame by taking your stunts to a dangerous realm, all in the safe knowledge that your home country will move mountains to rescue you if you get into trouble. China’s planned legislative amendment, in fact, creates a new and tantalizing opportunity for thrill-seekers to expose themselves to a bit of geopolitically infused harm without having to be very creative.

All you need to do is walk the streets of, say, Beijing wearing clothing the police deem offensive. Why would anyone expose themselves to such risk? you may ask. Just remember Miles Routledge, the 22-year-old Briton who traveled to Afghanistan “on vacation” during the evacuation two years ago and secured a prized spot on an evacuation flight, broadcasting it all on social media. He then returned this year and was captured by the Taliban, leaving U.K. diplomats with another case to try to resolve. Or consider the unfortunate case of Otto Warmbier, who in December 2015 traveled to North Korea, where he was arrested after allegedly stealing a propaganda poster. The U.S. government made extraordinary efforts to get him back—and succeeded, only to discover upon receiving the student that he was close to death. And this week, two months after sprinting into the country, U.S. Army Pvt. Travis King was released by North Korea—the result of massive diplomatic efforts involving not just the United States but Sweden and China as well.

Today, such prospects matter in China, too, because in the past few years China and its fellow great power Russia have joined countries, such as Iran and North Korea, that are not embarrassed to use Western citizens for geopolitical purposes. Iran has seized not just a host of dual nationals on espionage charges but also some foreigners, including Swedish European Union official Johan Floderus, who went to Iran as a tourist last spring and is approaching 530 days in captivity. The two Michaels, Canadian citizens detained by China when Canada arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. arrest warrant; the basketball player Brittney Griner; and the reporter Evan Gershkovich are hardly the only Westerners seized by Russia or China on flimsy charges. Western citizens, for their part, are so accustomed to globe-spanning travel that many eagerly keep turning up in increasingly hostile or dangerous countries. And today, doing so means they risk creating foreign-policy dilemmas for their home countries.

Of course, Chinese law has always provided any excuse to arrest people, from hazy charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” to jumped-up claims of espionage. But the new atmosphere creates even greater potential for a feedback loop between potential provocateurs, angry home audiences, and authorities looking to build their own nationalist credentials. Combine that with the post-COVID resumption of air travel to China and the opportunity to gain fame and social media revenues through ill-considered stunts and you could see why provocateurs may soon be booking flights to Beijing or Shanghai.

In addition to thrill-seekers, there are, of course, also ordinary Westerners who may have no intention of hurting “the feelings of the Chinese people” and will definitely not wear any Winnie the Pooh merch. Even they, though, could discover they’ve committed an offense only when they’re charged with it. The proposed legislation is certain to create never-ending foreign-policy headaches for Western countries, which adds to the dilemmas created by China’s amended espionage legislation.

Given such developments, it’s good news that Western tourism to China has slumped in recent years: In the first quarter of 2023, 52,000 people visited China on overseas trips organized by travel agencies, down from 3.7 million during the first quarter of 2019. But under the proposed legislation, every one of them—and every Westerner who otherwise visits China or lives there—is at risk of arrest. With China often making extraterritorial use of its laws, the offense amendment could even be used against visitors who have committed allegedly offensive acts while abroad. And, Almén noted, for the same reason it would put Chinese citizens living abroad in even greater peril, as China applies its laws to them regardless of their whereabouts. And their home governments are already overstretched trying to find an equilibrium with Russia and China and a modus operandi with Saudi Arabia and other rising powers, creating better relations with India, helping their companies to friendshore, and assisting Ukraine, not to mention tackling climate change.

COVID-19 already struck a blow to the freedom to travel, and the growing dangers of speaking freely—or provocatively—in many parts of the world may do more damage. The U.S. government already advises citizens to “reconsider” travel to China, but large European countries issue no such specific instructions, and no Western countries ban citizens from traveling to the country. North Korea is in the U.S. State Department’s Do Not Travel category. Such strong warnings may become inevitable for China. “We can’t always rely on our embassies to support us,” Hennig said. “I have learned from personal experience that the consulate of my home country was unable to help me when I had problems with my employer, a Chinese university. Another thing I have learned is that when you’re in China, it is better to keep your mouth shut. Today, however, it seems increasingly necessary to understand our own personal risks before traveling to China, whether as an expat, a student, or a tourist.” Ordinary Westerners’ reluctance to spend time in China under such circumstances may not be bad news for Beijing, Almén told me. “This is just the latest law making it more difficult for foreigners to go to China and interact with people. Considering such a law demonstrates how insecure the regime feels. And limiting Westerners’ interaction with Chinese citizens may also be what the Chinese government wants,” he said.

To be sure, China remains a crucial trading partner, and those involved in business or other essential work there should clearly be able to enter the country and expect consular support in emergencies. Those wishing to visit the country for less essential reasons, though, should have to sign a waiver declaring they’re aware of the dangers and won’t expect consular support. Today, geopolitics is so sensitive that there’s no place in it for pranksters, not even accidental ones.

Foreign Policy · by Elisabeth Braw · September 28, 2023

16. 'Hunt Forward' cyber teams have deployed to 24 countries, including Ukraine

Excerpts:

Nakasone also announced that the NSA is consolidating its various AI-related activities into a new entity called the NSA Artificial Intelligence Security Center which will work with the private sector, national labs, academia and across the intelligence community.

The new Center will be staffed by close to 100 people – some of them civilian military personnel that will be “focused on the security of our infrastructure,” Nakasone told Task and Purpose, with a goal of having military personnel do repeat tours and “perform cyber operations all the time.”

When asked what “keeps him up at night” about future threats, Nakasone said it was the challenge of recruiting a cyber workforce.

Citing the military-wide challenges recruiting new troops, Nakasone said that cyber forces are open to people who “have the passion” and can be trained on the job or those with previous experience.

The pandemic was “an opportunity to look at ourselves differently” and ensure that the workforce the DOD recruits, trains and retains “has the resiliency and has the appreciation in terms of how we do our business,” Nakasone told attendees. “That’s why I said: what we do, it hasn’t changed, but how we do has changed tremendously.”

'Hunt Forward' cyber teams have deployed to 24 countries, including Ukraine

The cyber defense teams monito crucial networks in allied countries. US cyber chief Gen. Paul Nakasone also said the NSA is centralizing AI-related missions.

BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED SEP 28, 2023 6:13 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · September 28, 2023

More than two months before Russia’s invasion, the U.S. sent teams of Marines and Navy sailors from U.S. Cyber Command to Ukraine to hunt for malicious cyber activity.

Known as “Hunt Forward” teams, the U.S. operators sat alongside Ukrainian cyber personnel and hunted for suspicious cyber activity on Ukrainian networks, aiming to identify and address potential threats and mitigate harm from any possible attacks.

Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, who leads both Cyber Command and the National Security Adsaid, discussed the pre-invasion work of those teams Thursday at a National Press Club event in Washington D.C. Nakasome also said that the NSA will soon centralize its AI-related security work into a single entity, the Artificial Intelligence Security Center.

The Hunt Forward teams’ pre-invasion role in Ukraine was reported in 2022, but Nakasone said Thursday they continue to deploy around the world at the request of partner nations to assist them against malicious cyber actors. Teams have been deployed to Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and elsewhere since 2018.

Nakasone called Hunt Forward operations a “resounding success” at warding off malign cyber activities with more than 50 deployments in 24 countries on 77 networks. With their partner nation’s approval, U.S. teams have brought malware samples back for domestic analysis and shared them broadly with other federal agencies and private sector partners, according to Nakasone.

U.S. Cyber Command has “exposed” more than 90 malicious software samples “which cost these malicious cyber actors time, money and effort,” he said.

The Defense Department conducts offensive operations as part of its “Defend Forward” strategy. That plan envisions U.S. cyber assets as “persistently engaged” to inform allies and partners about cyber threats, help reduce them and take notes on adversaries’ tactics, plans, capabilities and tools.

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The NSA and the cyber community have been in the news more this month than they usually prefer. As Congress debates re-authorizing section 702 – a key provision of a 2008 law that allows the government to conduct targeted surveillance of foreign people outside the U.S. using electronic communications to acquire intelligence – a U.S. oversight board report released Thursday said that the law is “highly valuable to protect nationals security, and that it creates serious privacy and civil liberties risks.”

U.S. Army Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, director of the National Security Agency and chief of the Central Security Serviceat the opening ceremonies of the Indianapolis 500 at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway in Indianapolis, May 28, 2023. Air National Guard photo by Airman 1st Class Amber Anderson

Naksone said that cyber missions have to balance enforcing security with maintaining civil liberties and privacy.

Though the DOD rarely releases information on offensive strategy or missions, Nakasone insisted that U.S. military offensive cyber operations are guided by “our laws and from our civilian leaders in terms of our actions,” follow “our values as a nation,” and “conducted in a manner that is reflective of our nation.

U.S. intelligence agencies have been criticized for skirting domestic privacy laws in order to conduct surveillance for security missions in the past.

Nakasone also announced that the NSA is consolidating its various AI-related activities into a new entity called the NSA Artificial Intelligence Security Center which will work with the private sector, national labs, academia and across the intelligence community.

The new Center will be staffed by close to 100 people – some of them civilian military personnel that will be “focused on the security of our infrastructure,” Nakasone told Task and Purpose, with a goal of having military personnel do repeat tours and “perform cyber operations all the time.”

When asked what “keeps him up at night” about future threats, Nakasone said it was the challenge of recruiting a cyber workforce.

Citing the military-wide challenges recruiting new troops, Nakasone said that cyber forces are open to people who “have the passion” and can be trained on the job or those with previous experience.

The pandemic was “an opportunity to look at ourselves differently” and ensure that the workforce the DOD recruits, trains and retains “has the resiliency and has the appreciation in terms of how we do our business,” Nakasone told attendees. “That’s why I said: what we do, it hasn’t changed, but how we do has changed tremendously.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · September 28, 2023

17. Dark ‘N’ Stormy

Excerpts:

And it is not simply the wonderful students I teach at my home institution. I am fortunate to be involved in the Ax:son Johnson Institute for Statecraft and Diplomacy, which, among other great initiatives, supports an applied history course at the Stockholm School of Economics for which I guest lecture every year. The students are bright and sophisticated, enthusiastically engaging the classics, and wrestling with complex historical questions before they go on to work at McKinsey and Goldman Sachs, or even as CEOs. They are also ambitious. The students joke about their parents and grandparents reminding them of the importance of janteloven, or the old Swedish idea that it is unbecoming to celebrate success or strive for great accomplishment, a concept they find amusing and quaint.

This highlights that Sweden, like Ireland, over the same period, has changed dramatically, if more quietly. It is no longer the brooding, socialist, neutral, libertine nation one encountered through Ingmar Bergman or ABBA. It is a serious, thoughtful, and forward-moving country that, like Ireland, is performing impressively. Without abandoning its long-term commitment to equality and generous development aid, or its admirable leadership on global challenges like climate action, Sweden’s entry into NATO reveals how seriously it takes the hard security and military issues that mark our current era. It might shock Americans to realize that not only is Sweden a high-tech nexus and finance innovator, but it also scores higher than the United States on measures of civil and criminal justice, order and security, fundamental rights, lack of corruption, and openness. Which is a reminder, as the prospect of a second Trump presidency looms, that there are impressive cohorts of next-generation leaders emerging, not just in Dublin and Stockholm, but in every part of the globe, from Buenos Aires to Seoul to Jakarta to Gaborone. In my experience, these smart young people are realistic, not cynical, worried but not without the capacity for joy and laughter, and committed to fixing the terrible global problems we have left for them. It is also a great sign for the planet. The United States may not be as essential to fixing a broken world as Americans (including myself) often imagine.

Celebrating their hard work, one of the students introduced me to a drink which I had never had before but is now my favorite: the Dark ‘N’ Stormy. On the one hand, being rum-based, it has an island feel, which generates feelings of fun and frivolity. On the other, it was invented in the shipwreck capital of the world, Bermuda. Legend has it that a British sailor, after World War I, took one look at the drink and said it was “the color of a cloud only a fool or a dead man would sail under,” like a “cloud nobody could hope to sail underneath and come out alive.” In other words, it is the perfect drink for our times. There are deep, grave, and, yes, dark and stormy challenges ahead, which we must take seriously. But there is no reason we can’t smile, be generous and joyful, and try to have fun while doing it.

Dark ‘N’ Stormy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Francis J. Gavin · September 29, 2023

In his introduction to Volume 6, Issue 4, the chair of our editorial board, Frank Gavin, writes about why so many people feel such doom and gloom when we are living in an a time of unprecedented prosperity, why his faith has been shaken, and how he’s finding solace and hope in the classroom.

This past summer, I visited the home of my ancestors — Ireland — for the first time. I was left with two surprising impressions. My first reaction was similar to the way I felt after visiting Israel: How could such a tiny place with a relatively small population generate so much trouble and attention? My drama-prone family, which holds grudges like no other, now made much more sense to me. Second, it struck me that we may not give Francis Fukuyama enough credit. The island is no longer anything like the poor, rebellious, rosary-praying, sexually conservative, Guinness-drinking food desert populated by poets and musicians I had heard about from relatives when I was growing up. Dublin is a high-tech mecca, with expensive housing, Michelin star restaurants, Pride flags, and empty churches. Even Belfast, the location of the Troubles that pitted Catholics against Protestants and the United Kingdom, was different than I expected. We took a “black taxi” tour of Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, guided by a former Irish Republican Army member, who did his best to capture the tension and tragedy that gripped the city decades ago. But he could not hide his disgust that the leading tourist attraction in the city was a fancy glass and steel museum devoted to the Titanic, built to exploit the worldwide popularity of the James Cameron movie. The locals were more interested in discussing the sites where “Game of Thrones” was filmed than any current or past political drama.

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History may not have completely ended in Ireland, but it appears to have been stylized and serialized to stream on Netflix.

Shouldn’t these “end of history” trends please us? Writ large, the new wealth, the ubiquity of cutting-edge technology, and the dramatic decrease in violence and strife in places like Ireland reflect quite positive changes. It is a reminder that the world is wealthier and safer than it was 25 years ago, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed, and that the international system in 1998 was far wealthier and safer than it had been 25 years before that, which was safer and wealthier than 25 years before that, and so on and so forth. Despite what seems to be great material progress, however, it is hard to find people who actually believe things feel better than in the past.

Over the years, many close friends and colleagues have pushed back against what they see as my unconvincing “Panglossian” view of historical progress. How can I be optimistic when all around us, there are signs of danger? Democracy in collapse, authoritarian states aggressively bullying neighbors, inequality spiking, the planet vexed by violent weather and overheating from our own over-production. For them — and I suspect, for most people — the world is not sunny and calm; it is instead dark and stormy.

I try to respond with numbers. By almost any meaningful measure, the world has never had it so good. The amount of wealth the world generates — and how it is created — is historically unprecedented. Global GDP per capita in 1960 was merely $459. In 2021, it was $12,235. This wealth allows for dramatic improvements in security, stability, and quality of life, and not only in the developed world. Other indices of human development have dramatically increased.

The historian in me reminds people to think about what the world was like, not that long ago. Human life before our recent age was often marked by misery, violence, and uncertainty. The average life expectancy in Europe in 1770 was 34 years. Even by 1900, after decades of industrialization, it was only 42.7, while for the world as a whole, it was only 32 years, rising to just 46.5 by 1950. Today, a European can expect to live to nearly 80, a remarkable change, while for the rest of the world it has reached 71. In 1750, global literacy was estimated to be 12 percent, whereas today it approaches 90 percent. Per capita caloric consumption is a third higher today on average than in the mid-18th century, and the variety, quality, and reliability of food have increased enormously. To give just one of many examples of the kind of disasters that were regularly visited upon the world, in the last 25 years of the 19th century, between 30 and 60 million people in Brazil, China, and India died of famine. In the last century, India’s famine during World War II took 3 million lives, and anywhere from 17 to 45 million died during the Great Leap Forward in China between 1959 and 1961. World War I and the ensuing revolutions and influenza killed tens of millions, before the even bloodier World War II killed off 3 percent of the world’s population. One of the wealthiest cities in the world, London, still had an infant mortality rate of 16 percent as the 20th century began. The murder rate in Puritan and Quaker early America was at least four times higher than it is today, and one out of every 10 Americans suffered from syphilis in the 1930s, with devastating consequences. There are countless other measures and stories that detail how much more precarious life was in the periods before ours.

These statistics, stark as they are, cannot capture the deep sense of instability and unpredictability of life for most people, most of the time, until quite recently. Crop failures, famine and disease, fires and floods, financial panics, riots, mass killings and pogroms, slumps, and depressions, and a general lack of information about the larger world haunted humanity. While these disasters have not completely disappeared, they are certainly far less frequent than in the past. Intolerance was once the norm, not the exception, and how, where, and with whom one lived was determined by what community you were born in. Government was, for many people throughout the world, unresponsive, exploitative, and even malign. Personal and communal violence were far more persistent, criminal justice rare, and war and the threat of war and its consequences constant. As the great historian William McNeil once pointed out, before our recent era, “A human life unaffected by famine, pestilence, and war was rare indeed.”

In other words, while by no means without deep problems, by any material measure, life today is much, much better than in the past. This supposed improvement raises an important question: If things are so much better now, why does everyone appear miserable? I often blame what I call historical anamnesis, or the inability of people to properly recognize and accept when circumstances are improving. As individuals and societies, we are hard wired to complain, to see the worst, not to update our expectations, only wanting more. That said, I am not sure I think this fully solves the puzzle. And despite my best efforts, the term “anamnesis,” like “fetch,” does not look like it’s going to happen.

Truth be told, my own faith has been shaken. The last few years have not been kind to glass-half-full types like me. China’s ruthless suppression of Hong Kong and Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, in addition to murderous conflicts and coups in countries ranging from Niger to Yemen, remind us that history has not quite ended. The storming of the Capitol in January 2021, combined with America’s inept handling of the COVID-19 crisis across two presidential administrations, has put a significant dent in my sense of my country’s exceptionalism. The feeling of dark foreboding is even seen in our popular music, which is supposed to lift our spirits. A recent study analyzed top hits on Billboard 100 since the 1950s and revealed that in recent years, “anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and conscientiousness have increased significantly, while joy, confidence, and openness expressed in pop song lyrics have declined.” Where once people enjoyed the mental escape provided by frothy, lighthearted fare such as “Melrose Place” or “The O.C.,” today’s most talked about television shows focus on dystopian hellscapes seen in “The Silo” or “The Last of Us.”

This latest issue of the Texas National Security Review — “The Shape of Strategy” — reminds us that conflict and tragedy are still with us. Jaehan Park highlights the continued importance of geopolitics in international relations. Lin Le chronicles how Xi Jinping went from a hoped-for reformer to the authoritarian strongman he is today. Mark Berlin and Stephen Rangazas explain how insurgent groups make strategic decisions about employing and, more interestingly, withholding violence during civil wars. John J. Chin, Kiron Skinner, and Clay Yoo analyze the changes and continuities of national security challenges over time. Collectively, the issue reveals that smart, rigorous research and scholarship on the questions of international relations and strategy remain as important as ever.

Does this mean I have completely abandoned my embarrassingly Whiggish belief in progress? There is, in fact, one source where I find not only solace, but even hope: my students. I have little patience for people who claim that the so-called Generation Z and millennial generations are uninterested in the world around them, overly woke, their brains and reasoning addled by addictions to social media, and their papers written by ChatGPT. In my experience, today’s students are far smarter and more curious, more interesting, more tolerant and broad-minded, more open to new ideas, than those of my generation.

This came through clearly in a recent discussion during my American Foreign Policy class at the School of Advanced International Studies. With great worry and trepidation, I broke the students up into groups to discuss, argue, build a consensus around, and present their ideas on both how we should teach the contested life, presidency, and impact of Woodrow Wilson, as well as the ideas that inform the concept of Wilsonianism. As we all know, the questions around Wilson as a person and leader are serious, sensitive, and controversial. My students — who come from every part of the globe with a wide range of backgrounds — delivered, to my great surprise, excitement, and relief, presentations marked by impressive nuance, balance, insight, and even humor. I didn’t think there was much more I could learn about Wilson after three decades of teaching, but, as I often do, I came away from the discussion much smarter than before.

And it is not simply the wonderful students I teach at my home institution. I am fortunate to be involved in the Ax:son Johnson Institute for Statecraft and Diplomacy, which, among other great initiatives, supports an applied history course at the Stockholm School of Economics for which I guest lecture every year. The students are bright and sophisticated, enthusiastically engaging the classics, and wrestling with complex historical questions before they go on to work at McKinsey and Goldman Sachs, or even as CEOs. They are also ambitious. The students joke about their parents and grandparents reminding them of the importance of janteloven, or the old Swedish idea that it is unbecoming to celebrate success or strive for great accomplishment, a concept they find amusing and quaint.

This highlights that Sweden, like Ireland, over the same period, has changed dramatically, if more quietly. It is no longer the brooding, socialist, neutral, libertine nation one encountered through Ingmar Bergman or ABBA. It is a serious, thoughtful, and forward-moving country that, like Ireland, is performing impressively. Without abandoning its long-term commitment to equality and generous development aid, or its admirable leadership on global challenges like climate action, Sweden’s entry into NATO reveals how seriously it takes the hard security and military issues that mark our current era. It might shock Americans to realize that not only is Sweden a high-tech nexus and finance innovator, but it also scores higher than the United States on measures of civil and criminal justice, order and security, fundamental rights, lack of corruption, and openness. Which is a reminder, as the prospect of a second Trump presidency looms, that there are impressive cohorts of next-generation leaders emerging, not just in Dublin and Stockholm, but in every part of the globe, from Buenos Aires to Seoul to Jakarta to Gaborone. In my experience, these smart young people are realistic, not cynical, worried but not without the capacity for joy and laughter, and committed to fixing the terrible global problems we have left for them. It is also a great sign for the planet. The United States may not be as essential to fixing a broken world as Americans (including myself) often imagine.

Celebrating their hard work, one of the students introduced me to a drink which I had never had before but is now my favorite: the Dark ‘N’ Stormy. On the one hand, being rum-based, it has an island feel, which generates feelings of fun and frivolity. On the other, it was invented in the shipwreck capital of the world, Bermuda. Legend has it that a British sailor, after World War I, took one look at the drink and said it was “the color of a cloud only a fool or a dead man would sail under,” like a “cloud nobody could hope to sail underneath and come out alive.” In other words, it is the perfect drink for our times. There are deep, grave, and, yes, dark and stormy challenges ahead, which we must take seriously. But there is no reason we can’t smile, be generous and joyful, and try to have fun while doing it.

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Francis J. Gavin is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and the director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the School of Advanced International Studies in Johns Hopkins University. He serves as chair of the editorial board of the Texas National Security Review.

Image: Eric Henderson (used with photographer’s permission).

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Francis J. Gavin · September 29, 2023

18. Fields of Battle and Fields of Friendly Strife: The Link between Competitive Sports and Performance in War

Fields of Battle and Fields of Friendly Strife: The Link between Competitive Sports and Performance in War - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer, Liam Collins · September 28, 2023

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During World War II, General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the US Army, sought an officer to form and lead an elite unit on a high-risk mission. He issued his instructions to find the right individual. “I want an officer for a secret and dangerous mission,” he reportedly said. “I want a West Point football player!”

The quote by Marshall, who himself played left tackle on the Virginia Military Institute football team, is celebrated to this day by the West Point football team. Apocryphal or not, it speaks to the notion that the benefits of competitive athletics extend well beyond the field of play. Or, in the words of General Douglas MacArthur, a former superintendent of the United States Military Academy, “Upon fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that upon other fields, on other days, will bear the fruits of victory.” Of course, there is a massive chasm separating even the most competitive sporting events and the realities of combat. And yet, success in both endeavors share common elements. Leadership, courage, and cohesion—these are MacArthur’s seeds in the sporting arena and his fruits of victory in war and are vital to victory in both.

An Athlete in Ukraine

When Ukraine needed to defend its capital city against a full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, the head of the Ukrainian military, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, did not ask for a football player, but he did get an athlete.

The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, had been a professional boxer. Nicknamed “Dr. Ironfist,” he had won forty-five professional fights—forty-one by knockout—and only lost two. He is one of only four three-time world heavyweight champions, alongside Lennox Lewis, Muhamad Ali, and Evander Holyfield.

Klitschko entered politics in 2004, playing a significant role in the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. He made two failed mayoral runs in 2008 and 2012, was active in the 2014 Maidan Revolution, and shortly thereafter—like a boxer who rises from the canvas after being knocked down twice—ran for mayor a third time, this time successfully.

While interviewing Mayor Klitschko about the 2022 Battle of Kyiv, it was apparent that the thirty-eight-day battle had left an impact on him. Leading a major city like Kyiv, with a preinvasion population of over three million, is full of challenges. But none compare to leading one under siege by the second most powerful military in the world. As he spoke, it was also clear that a lifetime of competitive sports had helped to prepare him to lead his city in war.

Leadership

While leadership has certain context-dependent and difficult-to-define qualities, it is vital for any organization to identify its critical components. US Army leadership doctrine provides a model detailing specific leadership requirements. These requirements are broken up into two overarching categories: competencies, which are skills that are trained and developed, and attributes, which are personal characteristics, often molded through experience over time.

The Army leadership requirements model (ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession).

Leadership, then, requires individuals to constantly develop the skills and knowledge for their assigned positions—these are their competencies. But at any moment, leaders may find themselves in a situation in which their knowledge and skills are insufficient. This is when they must be able to rely on what they have gained from a lifetime of personal experiences—their attributes. That is especially important when called upon to lead in uncertainty—exactly the position in which Klitschko found himself when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Even as signs of coming a Russian invasion mounted, the Ukrainian government expected the heaviest fighting in the east, so there had been no real planning for the defense of Kyiv. When a fast-moving Russian force reached the outskirts of the city within the battle’s first twenty-four hours, defending the capital required leadership.

In addition to tracking, caring for, and providing services to Kyiv’s residents, Klitschko also served as a member of the Kyiv Defense Council. Recognizing quickly that the single mechanized brigade (and supporting assets) available to defend Kyiv was not enough, the council was hastily established to help organize the collective city’s defense. Klitschko and the other members of the council—senior military officers and civilian leaders— met daily to discuss both critical military topics—such as enemy locations and the need for checkpoints—and priorities for the city and its residents.

Few mayors in Klitschko’s position would have the skills necessary to lead a city and keep it running during a massive invasion. But he did have experience he could rely on, specifically the attributes he had gained from his career as a professional athlete.

When asked where he invested his time during the battle, Klitschko said that his number one priority was to keep the spirit of the people high. “I’m a fighter, you know,” Klitschko said. “I know it is not size that is so important, but the spirit.” The mayor knew that city’s residents needed to see him and that his presence needed to exhibit strength, confidence, and the will to fight by any means possible. Gone were the suits and ties he often wore as mayor, replaced with casual attire and often body armor, signaling his readiness to join the rest of the city in fighting if needed.

Courage

All people experience fear in war—the fear of being hurt, the fear of dying, the fear of failing, or the fear of the unknown. Courage is not the absence of fear but the ability to continue forward and accomplish the mission or task despite being afraid. Developing courage is a complex endeavor that requires a mix of knowledge, training, experience, and more.

One way to develop courage is to routinely face fearful situations, and one way to do that is in sports competition. Since 1907, passing boxing class has been a graduation requirement for West Point cadets. One of the reasons that the academy requires cadets to take boxing is to “put them in a fearful situation” to which they must react—to develop the courage to move forward and fight back even if they are experiencing high levels of fear.

As a boxer, Klitschko also understands that with danger, fear is always present. He knew the people of Kyiv were scared and he recognized that despite his own fear, his role as a leader was to help them combat their fear by being present, communicating confidence, and leading by example.

As many as one million of Kyiv’s residents fled the city and tens of thousands moved underground to avoid the bombing. At the height of the battle, Klitschko recalled visiting the Kyiv central train station, where an area had been set up for children to play while their parents awaited their train. A young boy was crying and screaming loudly. When the mayor asked others around him where the boy’s parents were, he was told that both had been killed the day prior and that no one had the heart to tell the child. Fear was pervasive in the city—from fear of being killed like the boy’s parents to fear of taking responsibility for the safety of others—and Klitschko knew that he had to do something. He worked with the staff to get the child care and comfort, because, as he said, “You have to have the courage [to do hard things].”

Cohesion

Cohesion, Army doctrine says, is “the bond of relationships and motivational factors that help a team stay together.” Good leaders recognize that prevailing in difficult situations requires cohesive teams working toward a common goal.

This is true in sports. Researchers have linked cohesion to team performance. But it is equally noticeable to watching fans—when a team goes on a winning streak and is described as playing loose and having fun together, for instance, or when an underperforming team is disjointed, its members out of sync with one another.

It is also true in war, which is why Klitschko so often speaks about the benefits of teamwork. When he moved around Kyiv in the opening days of the battle, Klitschko found citizens of all types—men, women, young, old—ready to join with others to fight the Russian invaders. He remembers an elderly man, over seventy, telling him, “I want to fight. I need a weapon.” The city handed tens of thousands of weapons to its residents and others to help defend the capital. Once armed with the means to fight back, Klitschko encouraged a sense of unity among the defenders, inspiring them to fight not for themselves, but for each other, their city, and their nation. “Every house, every street, every checkpoint, we will fight to the death if necessary,” he said.

While Marshall is said to have wanted a West Point football player, he would have been equally well served by a West Point hockey player, or basketball player, or wrestler. Every cadet at West Point must participate in competitive sports, whether varsity intercollegiate athletics, intercollegiate clubs, or company athletics. Beyond building physical fitness, this requirement does much more—enabling cadets to overcome adversity and face their fears, developing in them the attributes necessary to succeed off the field of play, instill a spirit of teamwork. Marshall and MacArthur understood this connection between sports and battlefield performance during World War II. Klitschko embodies it today.

The men and women who serve the United States in uniform will be confronted with challenges that test them, as individuals and as leaders. A wide range of factors—from military training to equipment to organizational structure and more—will combine to influence whether they will be prepared to meet those challenges. But among the contributors to their success will be the seeds sown on MacArthur’s fields of friendly strife.

Note: John Spencer interviewed Mayor Vitali Klitschko for this article in April 2023.

Colonel (CA) John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years on active duty as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He was a member of the 2/75th Ranger Regiment when the development of the current US Army Combatives program was initiated and competed in the Best Ranger Competition. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War, which focuses on the necessity of cohesion in war, and is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

Colonel (retired) Liam Collins is executive director of the Madison Policy forum and a fellow at New America Foundation. He was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016 to 2018. He was an intercollegiate cross country and track athlete as a cadet and won the Army’s Best Ranger Competition in 2007. He earned two “V” devices for valor in combat and attributes his experience as an athlete as one of his most important developmental experiences that made him a successful leader in combat. He is coauthor of the book Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: John Pellino, US Military Academy

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer, Liam Collins · September 28, 2023

19.  DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

The unclassified strategy can be found here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/28/2003310413/-1/-1/1/2023_STRATEGY_FOR_COUNTERING_WEAPONS_OF_MASS_DESTRUCTION.PDF

The fact sheet can be accessed here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/28/2003310409/-1/-1/1/FACT_SHEET_2023_STRATEGY_FOR_COUNTERING_WEAPONS_OF_MASS_DESTRUCTION.PDF

DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Today, the Department of Defense released the unclassified version of its 2023 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).

The 2023 DOD CWMD Strategy seeks to account for current and emerging WMD challenges and threats, and provide tailored methods to address them. The Department will account for WMD threats holistically to prevent, mitigate, withstand, operate through, and recover from WMD attacks in close consultation with Allies and partners.

"This Strategy lays the foundation for the Department to confront the complex and demanding challenges presented by WMD," wrote Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in the Secretary's Foreword.

In line with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the CWMD Strategy recognizes the People's Republic of China as the pacing challenge, Russia as the acute threat, and the DPRK, Iran, and violent extremist organizations as persistent threats.

Recognizing that different actors and threat modalities pose distinct challenges, the CWMD Strategy outlines a strategic approach that requires tailored investments and actions to address each challenge. The CWMD Strategy explains how the Department will align authorities, operations, activities, and investments based on the DoD's unique current and emerging CWMD needs.

"This Strategy reinforces other guidance provided in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Missile Defense Review, and the Biodefense Posture Review by clarifying the role of the CWMD mission within the Department's overall approach to integrated deterrence and conflict," said Secretary Lloyd Austin, "I am confident that the Department possesses the ingenuity and determination necessary to outpace current and future threats."

The 2023 CWMD Strategy is the third iteration for the Department, and replaces the 2014 Strategy for CWMD.

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20. Ending Ukraine Aid Would Be 'Devastating' to Its War Effort, Nominee for Top Pentagon Post Warns

Excerpt:

But the fight over what is essentially a rounding error in the Pentagon's budget is an ominous sign for the billions in emergency funding for Ukraine's more immediate needs in the war.

Ending Ukraine Aid Would Be 'Devastating' to Its War Effort, Nominee for Top Pentagon Post Warns

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · September 28, 2023

Ending U.S. aid to Ukraine would be "devastating" to Ukraine's war of survival against Russia, the nominee for what's widely considered the third-most powerful position in the Pentagon warned Thursday.

"It'd be devastating, first and foremost, to Ukraine, which is putting good use to the assistance we are providing them, but also to this very, very impressive alliance that has been formed over the last 20 months," Derek Chollet told the Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing to be under secretary of defense for policy.

Chollet's testimony on Capitol Hill comes as there appears to be no clear path in Congress to approving more aid for Ukraine. While a majority of lawmakers in both parties continue to support the funding, a growing number of Republicans are turning against the aid.

In what could be the most consequential shift, GOP House leadership is bowing to far-right pressure to pump the brakes on the security assistance.

Chollet told the Senate committee that more than 50 countries, including donors outside of Europe, are contributing in some way to the effort in Ukraine.

"These are countries all around the world that are providing some form of military assistance," said Chollet, who currently serves as counselor at the State Department. "We are leading by example. We are doing the most thanks to Congress' strong support here, and so I think it is absolutely vital that we maintain our robust assistance to Ukraine."

The wavering in Congress comes just a week after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with lawmakers in person on Capitol Hill to press his case for continued support.

The war is at a critical juncture, with U.S. officials warning there is little time left for Ukraine's counteroffensive to make progress before the winter freeze sets in and allows each side time to regroup. Ukrainian forces have so far struggled to break through Russia's heavily mined lines, though U.S. officials have commended the progress they have made.

Amid concerns that the House's fiscal 2024 Pentagon spending bill does not have the votes to pass because of conservatives' opposition to Ukraine aid, House GOP leadership is moving to strip $300 million in funding for Ukraine from the bill.

Those funds are meant for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a program started in 2014 after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, a region that was part of Ukraine. Unlike most of the U.S. military support for the war that has come directly from U.S. weapons stockpiles to provide Ukraine with immediate help, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds contracts with U.S. weapons makers to provide the country with longer-term support.

On Wednesday night, lawmakers rejected an amendment to cut the $300 million from the Pentagon bill in a 330-104 vote. A separate amendment to bar any security assistance to Ukraine failed in a 339-93 vote.

But facing the prospect of the Pentagon bill failing on the House floor for the third time in two weeks, Republican leadership announced it would take the $300 million out of the bill despite the amendment failing.

In both cases, support for the amendments came entirely from Republicans. And even though the amendments failed, the votes demonstrated growing opposition in the GOP to Ukraine aid. A similar vote in July to cut off aid to Ukraine garnered just 70 Republican votes.

In lieu of including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding in the Pentagon bill, the House is scheduled to vote Thursday night on a standalone bill with the $300 million that will likely pass.

But the fight over what is essentially a rounding error in the Pentagon's budget is an ominous sign for the billions in emergency funding for Ukraine's more immediate needs in the war.

The Senate is pressing forward with plans to pass a bill that includes $4.5 billion in military aid and $1.7 billion in economic assistance for Ukraine. That's well short of the $24 billion the White House asked for, but even that amount is expected to be dead on arrival in the House.

"If [senators] want to put focus on Ukraine and not focus on the southern border, I think their priorities are backwards," House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., told reporters Tuesday.

On Wednesday, McCarthy added that he doesn't "see the support in the House" for the Senate bill.

-- Rebecca Kheel can be reached at rebecca.kheel@military.com. Follow her on X @reporterkheel.

21. NATO's secretary-general meets with Zelenskyy to discuss 'ending Russia’s aggression'

NATO's secretary-general meets with Zelenskyy to discuss 'ending Russia’s aggression'

AP · September 28, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — NATO’s secretary-general met with Ukraine’s president to discuss the status of the war and needs of troops on Thursday, the day after Russia accused Ukraine’s Western allies of helping plan and conduct last week’s missile strike on the Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters in the annexed Crimean Peninsula.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg agreed to make efforts to get NATO members to help provide additional air defense systems to protect Ukraine’s power plants and energy infrastructure that were badly damaged by Russian attacks last winter.

Zelensky also reminded the secretary-general of the persistent drone, missile and artillery attacks that often strike residential areas and were blamed Thursday for at least three civilian deaths in the past day.

“In the face of such intense attacks against Ukrainians, against our cities, our ports, which are crucial for global food security, we need a corresponding intensity of pressure on Russia and a strengthening of our air defense,” Zelenskyy said.

Stoltenberg said that NATO has contracts for 2.4 billion euros ($2.5 billion) in ammunition for Ukraine, including 155 mm Howitzer shells, anti-tank guided missiles and tank ammunition.

“The stronger Ukraine becomes, the closer we come to ending Russia’s aggression,” Stoltenberg said. “Russia could lay down arms and end its war today. Ukraine doesn’t have that option. Ukraine’s surrender would not mean peace. It would mean brutal Russian occupation. Peace at any price would be no peace at all.”

Ukraine has pushed to join NATO and Stoltenberg reiterated Thursday that Ukraine’s future is in the trans-Atlantic military alliance and that it would stand with Kyiv as long as it takes.

The Kremlin views Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO as an existential threat, and Russia has said that preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance is one of the reasons for its invasion.

On Wednesday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the attack on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Crimea had been coordinated with the help of U.S. and U.K. security agencies, and that NATO satellites and reconnaissance planes also played a role.

Ukraine said without providing supporting evidence that the attack had killed 34 officers and wounded 105 others. It also claimed to have killed the fleet’s commander, Adm. Viktor Sokolov, who was shown on Russian state television on Wednesday speaking with reporters in the Black Sea city of Sevastopol.

Unconfirmed news reports said Storm Shadow missiles provided to Ukraine by the U.K. and France were used in the attack on the Russian navy installation. The U.K. Ministry of Defense, which in the past has declined to discuss intelligence-related matters, didn’t comment on Zakharova’s remarks.

The meeting with Stoltenberg came on the same day that France’s defense minister met with Zelenskyy to discuss how to keep supplying weapons to the war effort. On Wednesday, the U.K. defense secretary reaffirmed the British government’s support and pledged to provide more ammunition as Ukraine’s counteroffensive plods forward toward the season when damp and cold weather could slow progress.

French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu brought a delegation that included about 20 representatives from French defense contractors who manufacture drones, robots, artillery, ammunition and employ artificial intelligence and cybertechnology.

Having donated air defense systems, artillery, armored vehicles and other weaponry and support to Ukraine, France is anxious not to deplete its own defenses.

But the French government is exploring other ways to help Ukraine sustain its war effort. Lecornu said that it would transfer fewer weapons to Ukraine, but make direct acquisitions, sometimes with French subsidies, for the Ukrainian army.

“It’s also a way for us to hold on for the long term and also lastingly install France’s interests in Kyiv,” Lecornu said in comments carried by French broadcaster BFMTV.

U.K. Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, who hosted a Ukrainian family in his home for a year, told Zelenskyy that he was personally aggrieved by what his country had endured.

“Our support for you, for Ukraine remains absolutely undented,” Shapps said in a video posted by Zelenskyy. “We stand shoulder to shoulder with you. We feel your pain of what’s happened and we want to see a resolution, which is the resolution that you want and require.”

Zelenskyy said Thursday that Ukraine is working on a plan that will outline practical steps for it to align with the principles and standards of NATO.

“And it is very important that the allies have agreed that Ukraine does not need an action plan for NATO membership,” Zelenskyy said.

During NATO’s annual summit this summer in Lithuania, members pledged more support for Ukraine but stopped short of extending an invitation for the country to join the alliance. NATO leaders said they would allow Ukraine to join the alliance “when allies agree and conditions are met.” They also decided to remove obstacles on Ukraine’s membership path so that it can join more quickly once the war with Russia is over.

Stoltenberg was asked about the remains of drones similar to those used by Russia that have been found on several instances recently in Romania near the border with Ukraine.

He said there was no indication they were the result of an intentional attack by Russia against a NATO member, but that strikes by Moscow “close to the Romanian borders are reckless and are destabilizing.”

Stoltenberg said that NATO was adding troops, air policing and surveillance to monitor its eastern borders, including Romania.

“There should be no doubt that NATO is there to defend all allies,” he said.

Meanwhile, officials in Moldova, which lies between Romania and Ukraine, said that authorities were trying to determine where a “crashed rocket” found in Harbovat Lake had originated. The remains were detonated Thursday in Anenii Noi district near Ukraine’s border, Moldova’s interior ministry said.

___

John Leicester in Paris, Stephen McGrath in Sighisoara, Romania, Yuras Karmanau in Tallinn, Estonia, and Brian Melley in London, contributed to this report.

___

Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · September 28, 2023

22. Lawmakers, Army headed for a fight over cuts to special operations forces

We have a joint SOF force and USSOCOM only by the grace of Congress.

Excerpts:

The Senate staffer told Defense One: “We’ve heard cuts are likely to affect various headquarters positions and enablers, and that the intent was never to cut ODAs. The biggest problem, though, is that the department hasn’t actually briefed Congress yet on their plans … If some of the headquarters positions we’re hearing about are cut, those tasks and responsibilities are either not going to be done or pushed down to the operational units. That will reduce the operational capacity of those very specialized units. It doesn’t pass the smell test.”

What happens from here? The House and Senate are currently working through two separate versions of the NDAA. While the House version prohibits the cuts, the Senate version requires the Army to report its reasons and the potential impact. 

But the Army shouldn’t confuse that reporting requirement with a rubber stamp, the staffer said. In fact, the Senate is more likely to try and block the cuts rather than agree to them, at least until it understands them better. 

“We have a reporting requirement and a sense of the Senate that those cuts should not occur…Given the ongoing recruiting crisis and that Army end strength is shrinking, SOF may very well have to take a cut, but the department needs to show Congress its math and how it arrived at its decision. It appears the Army has opted to make cuts to SOF to maintain conventional capabilities that not everyone is convinced will have the same impact in either competition or potential conflict.”

Lawmakers, Army headed for a fight over cuts to special operations forces

defenseone.com

Lawmakers, Army headed for a fight over cuts to special operations forces - Defense One

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

September 28, 2023 09:25 PM ET

Lawmakers are worried that a U.S. Army plan to cut up to 3,000 people from its special operations forces will embolden China. 

One defense official told Defense One that the Army is not looking to reduce the number of operators, but rather to eliminate redundant positions in headquarters, logistics, and support. But lawmakers say the Army hasn’t given them enough information about their plans and they won’t allow the service to make any cuts without their approval. 

The public first learned about the Army’s proposed SOF cuts last May during a Senate Armed Services subcommittee hearing. Four months later, a Senate staffer told Defense One that U.S. Special Operations Command head Gen. Bryan Fenton did not agree with the plan, and his objections were under consideration by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

“So the reason it’s at Austin’s level is because there was a non-concurrence from SOCOM to the Army’s plan,” the staffer said. 

Last week, Sen. Ted Budd, R-N.C., met with members of the SOF community and others on Capitol Hill and fretted that cutting SOF would embolden China. 

“I’m very concerned about the pacing threat of China simultaneously with the reduction of SOF. When you look at the things that would deter China, SOF are on the tip of the spear. And so I think that the more we invest in our special operations, problems that ultimately could harm our nation over the next decade or two could be prevented,” he said. “It’s unclear that this administration understands the value of SOF. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be proposing cuts.”

Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, an Army National Guard veteran who, like Budd, sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, “Special operations forces are our nation’s premiere force during peacetime and war. In the face of recruiting challenges for our military and growing threats around the world, cuts to SOF are not the answer.”

But the cuts may have limited impact on the Army, sources said, because they are intended to spare the highly specialized tactical operator teams that people associate with special operations forces. A senior defense official told Defense One that SOCOM will decide what to cut, but: “The Army does not recommend cutting ‘shooters.’ Army leadership believes in the SOF truth: special operations forces cannot be mass-produced.”

Only a small fraction of individuals in Special Operations Command count as “shooters,” which leaves a lot of other people that do things like logistics or accounting. Over the years, particularly during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the bureaucracy within Special Operations Command has grown to unsustainable levels, the official said. 

“At some point, we have to recognize the excess size we grew to during the post 9/11 era,” the official said, pointing to the multiple Army SOF headquarters units as an example of bureaucratic bloat. 

“The Ranger Regiment has more military intelligence than an entire Army division…There’s U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command…These are not warfighting headquarters. When deployed, the operational units would be commanded and controlled by the combatant commands and theatre special operations command.”

The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office had recommended cuts to support, logistics, and communications, the official said, and the office noted that many SOF support units spend more time at their home stations than other people in similar roles. Other services should also chip in more to support SOF teams, they said, since right now Army units support Navy SEAL teams. 

Finally, while the Army is not considering cutting Operational Detachment Alphas, or A-Teams, those teams are only manned at 60% due to recruiting shortfalls, he said.

Still, cuts to SOF support and logistics mean that SOF would have to go to the services to fill roles in things like cyber, logistics, or support. Those people won’t have as much time to train or build relationships with their SOF teammates. 

During a July hearing, Ernst mentioned a SOCOM effort to assess the impact of the cuts: “It says that SOF can only execute its assigned mission with SOF enablers, and cutting enablers increases risk to mission.”

Said Budd, “I just think we need to let more folks know, not just on the Senate side, but on the House side as well, about those potential cuts. Will the Army make some window dressing cuts to say that they did something, maybe? Even play politics? Perhaps. But I think it’d be devastating, especially when you look at the critical capabilities, like the access they provide for cyber, intelligence, and targeting.”

The Senate staffer told Defense One: “We’ve heard cuts are likely to affect various headquarters positions and enablers, and that the intent was never to cut ODAs. The biggest problem, though, is that the department hasn’t actually briefed Congress yet on their plans … If some of the headquarters positions we’re hearing about are cut, those tasks and responsibilities are either not going to be done or pushed down to the operational units. That will reduce the operational capacity of those very specialized units. It doesn’t pass the smell test.”

What happens from here? The House and Senate are currently working through two separate versions of the NDAA. While the House version prohibits the cuts, the Senate version requires the Army to report its reasons and the potential impact. 

But the Army shouldn’t confuse that reporting requirement with a rubber stamp, the staffer said. In fact, the Senate is more likely to try and block the cuts rather than agree to them, at least until it understands them better. 

“We have a reporting requirement and a sense of the Senate that those cuts should not occur…Given the ongoing recruiting crisis and that Army end strength is shrinking, SOF may very well have to take a cut, but the department needs to show Congress its math and how it arrived at its decision. It appears the Army has opted to make cuts to SOF to maintain conventional capabilities that not everyone is convinced will have the same impact in either competition or potential conflict.”

NEXT STORY: HASC chair: Space Command’s temporary office is insecure. Officials: untrue

defenseone.com

23. How AI can put mistakes into overdrive

Excerpt:

Why it matters: AI at work remains a double-edged sword — able to add great value but also able to destroy it when workers use it without coaching.

2 hours ago - Technology

How AI can put mistakes into overdrive

https://www.axios.com/2023/09/29/ai-mistakes-consulting-bcg-study

• Ryan Heath
• , author of Axios AI+

Illustration: Aïda Amer/Axios

Researchers have demonstrated that knowledge workers significantly degrade the quality of their work by asking OpenAI's GPT-4 technology to perform tasks it didn't train for, and then failing to spot "hallucinations" in its answers.

• A new study of more than 750 strategy consultants showed that AI helped them produce better content, more quickly in many tasks — but the consultants were "less likely to produce correct solutions" by attempting tasks of similar difficulty which fell outside the AI model's capabilities.

Why it matters: AI at work remains a double-edged sword — able to add great value but also able to destroy it when workers use it without coaching.

• Highly skilled workers struggled to navigate what AI can and can't do well, and a reliance on clichéd GPT-4 outputs reduced the group's diversity of thought by 41%.
• The researchers termed the uneven nature of AI capabilities a "jagged technological frontier."

Details: Researchers from Harvard, MIT, Wharton and other institutions teamed up with Boston Consulting Group's think tank to study 758 BCG consultants given complex tasks "selected by industry experts to replicate real-world workflows."

• Half the participants were asked to conceptualize and develop new product ideas — such as new beverages and types of footwear — and the others were asked to identify the root cause of one company's challenges using performance data and executive interviews.
• Participants conducted an assessment task to establish a baseline for the quality of their work, and the later experiment task involved 18 sub-tasks graded by two humans.
• All participants began their work without AI, before being randomly split into three categories mid-way: no AI access, GPT-4 AI access, or GPT-4 AI access with a prompt engineering overview.

What happened: Of the consultants asked to develop new ideas — a challenge within GPT-4's known capabilities — those who received both AI access and guidance "consistently" performed better than those given AI access only. Both groups outperformed the control group.

• Those with AI access also worked faster and completed more of the 18 tasks, on average.
• Consultants who scored below average in the assessment task got the biggest boost from using AI later in the creativity experiment: Their output improved by 43%, compared to 17% for above average consultants.
• The other half of the group were tackling one company's deep problems, a topic that GPT-4 knew little about. Those using AI in their responses were "more likely to make mistakes" and 19% less likely to produce correct solutions compared to those without AI, per the report.

The intrigue: Employers face a dilemma with these results.

• AI can quickly and cheaply increase worker performance, but taking shortcuts with AI training might cause more mistakes, which could potentially blow up in an employer's face.
• Even the AI experts behind this report are stumped by "novel and unexpected" AI capabilities and capability gaps in the workplace.

Zoom out: AI holds the promise of significantly improving productivity growth — which is appealing to both CEOs and politicians because of its correlation with strong economic growth.

• But industrial revolutions from the steam engine to personal computing took decades to translate into widespread productivity growth.

Yes, but: Long-term projections of generative AI's economic impact are largely guesswork at this early stage of the technology's development.

What they're saying: "Even participants who were warned about the possibility of wrong answers from the tool did not challenge its output" when GPT-4 made things up, BCG analysts noted in a review of the study.

• But when participants used AI for brainstorming ideas, "around 90% of participants improved their performance" and "people did best when they did not attempt to edit GPT-4's output."
• "This study highlights the importance of validating and interrogating AI" and the importance of applying "experts' judgment" when working with AI, per the report.

The other side: The work measured by the study isn't rocket science, or even software coding, and the assessment of quality is inevitably subjective.

• Some critics argue that boosting business-consultant productivity with AI is a pointless game of maximizing output for "a profession of bulls--t generators."

24. Chinese Leaders Are Scared of Their Country’s History

Chinese Leaders Are Scared of Their Country’s History

A new book explores the Chinese filmmakers, writers, and artists who are trying to uncover a past that the authorities would rather forget.

By Han Zhang

The Atlantic · by Han Zhang · September 28, 2023

Late one night in 1958, a man named Liu Bingshu whispered to his wife, the mother of their four young children, “There is no escape. I could be taken away … If I can come back, we will see each other again.” Liu would soon be the victim of a massive policy change by the Communist leader of China, Mao Zedong. Just a year earlier, Mao had famously demanded that “a hundred flowers bloom,” actively inviting criticism and suggestions from the public. But those who spoke up were soon labeled “rightist” enemies; the party estimated that they amounted to 5 percent of the population. Some half a million intellectuals, including Liu, were ordered to undergo “reeducation.” Thousands were dispatched to three labor camps in the northwestern Chinese province of Gansu. The deadliest of them was Jiabiangou, where less than half of the inmates are reported to have survived. Liu’s family never saw him again.

This intimate and devastating nighttime discussion between Liu and his wife has been preserved because Liu’s oldest son, 12-year-old Liu Tianyou, woke up and overheard it, and decades later, in his modest apartment in Gansu, the documentary filmmaker Ai Xiaoming recorded his memory. Ai spent two years interviewing dozens of Jiabiangou survivors as well as the families of victims. She traveled to the former camp site and filmed the shallow graves with skulls still poking out of the sand. In 2017, 60 years after Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Ai released her seven-hour film: Jiabiangou Elegy.

People such as Ai Xiaoming—Chinese filmmakers, writers, and artists, those who are looking to uncover and expose the darkest episodes in China’s history, often at great risk to themselves—are the subject of the long-time China correspondent Ian Johnson’s new book, Sparks. Johnson considers these individuals to be engaged in the ancient Chinese tradition of producing yeshi, or “wild history”—accounts of the past that strayed from official dynastic court history, or zhengshi. In the China of today, Johnson contends, this practice continues with a sparse but committed underground insisting on yeshi in the face of a digitally reinforced version of zhengshi.

The Communist government considers the official narratives of the past sacrosanct, and control over them as essential to the maintenance of power. Attempts to challenge any aspect of the accepted history of Communist rule have become particularly dangerous in the past decade, under the rule of Xi Jinping. Johnson himself was among a group of foreign correspondents who were suddenly expelled from the country in 2020, amid the COVID-19 outbreak and growing animosity between the Trump and Xi administrations. Especially at a time of renewed repression, Johnson argues, the fight against collective amnesia is an important front line. The work of these documentarians is to better understand the past, but it has also become “a battleground for the present,” Johnson writes.

In this sense, Johnson’s work is not unlike that of his subjects: They ask their audiences to shift their vantage point and to reconsider an overlooked group or a sanitized past to truly comprehend the country they live in. Johnson captures a range of grassroots historians carrying out this work, including the Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser, who conducted oral-history interviews in order to piece together the destruction of her native land during the Cultural Revolution, and the anthropologist Guo Yuhua, who documented the suffering of peasants in the enduring regional famines in rural Shaanxi province in northwestern China.

Every ideology creates its own origin myths. Mao and his fellow idealists canonized their memory of brotherly love in Yan’an, the Communists’ homebase in the 1930s and ’40s, which in reality was dominated by fierce power struggles punctuated by executions. Americans don’t have to search far to find examples of such airbrushing, like the belief in the unwavering fair-mindedness of the American Founding Fathers, many of whom were slave owners. Recent years have seen a global “memory boom,” Johnson writes, an attempt to correct the record. And in China, this push has its own urgency: The government sees self-reflection and criticism as a form of lethal weakness, justifying its oppressive policies and persecutions. For the country to break free from the cycles of injustice and violence, zhengshi and yeshi have to first make peace.

After the Anti-Rightist Campaign of the mid-1950s, which swept up Liu Bingshu and so many others, Mao launched a series of utopian experiments. The Great Leap Forward, a crash industrialization program, soon led to the Great Famine, from 1959 to 1961, in which an estimated 45 million people starved to death. The Cultural Revolution soon followed; Mao, uncertain of his grasp on power, declared that enemies of the regime were preparing for a counterrevolution. In July 1966, he urged students and other young people to attack authority figures around them. The next month, in Beijing alone, more than 1,700 people were killed. The upheaval ended only shortly after Mao’s death, in 1976.

When Deng Xiaoping rose to power as Mao’s successor, he was confronted with the seminal task of reframing the deadly chaos from which the country had just emerged. In 1980, he convened a committee to work on a draft resolution about this turbulent recent history. But Johnson writes that Deng was reportedly livid when the committee submitted its first draft, because he found the criticism of Mao far too blunt. Deng himself had suffered under Mao: He had been purged twice. His oldest son was tortured and had jumped off a building, becoming paralyzed. However, Deng felt that to reject the legacy of the Great Helmsman so thoroughly would undermine the Communist Party’s own legitimacy.

Read: The China model is dead

Ultimately, a more conciliatory version was distributed to a few thousand senior officials that September, triggering complaints that the draft had failed to address the period’s mass fatalities. Deng managed to prevent a full-blown denunciation of his predecessor, and nine months later, the resolution was officially ratified. It acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution was a costly error and blamed it on the “anti-revolutionary” Gang of Four, a faction of party officials who had become notorious during that era. It reaffirmed Mao’s status as “a great leader and mentor,” vaguely concluding that “his contributions were primary, his mistakes secondary.”

President Xi Jinping, who has led the country since 2013, has sanctioned this paving over of difficult history. And he has explicitly pointed to the Soviet Union and what he calls its “historical nihilism” as a cautionary tale. Xi saw the Soviet leadership’s decision after Stalin’s death to allow a degree of criticism of his reign and its bloody repressions as the beginning of the end of Soviet power. The permission to reassess history in this way, Xi believes, opened the floodgates to demands for increased liberalization. To get ahead of this “historical nihilism,” on the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth, in 2013, Xi instructed party members to see Mao in his historical context. “We can’t use today’s circumstances,” he said, “to measure our predecessors.”

Over the years, party commentators have echoed Xi’s thoughts. In 2018, the Central Committee journal Qiushi published an article on “historical nihilism” and blamed Nikita Khrushchev specifically for his infamous 1956 secret speech in which he acknowledged some of Stalin’s crimes. Khrushchev “failed to analyze the historical background,” the article argued. “And disproportionately focused on Stalin’s shortcomings and mistakes.” The author also warned against the subversive “information explosion” that the Soviets underwent. In the 1960s, memoirs from victims of Stalin’s Gulags, petition letters, underground journals, and books by dissidents circulated in a period known in the Soviet Union as “The Thaw.” “We must unequivocally oppose and resist historical nihilism,” Xi said at a Central Committee meeting in 2021. The same year, party theorists called on the public to “dare to struggle against” this “historical nihilism,” which one of them said was aimed at “removing the spinal cord” of the Chinese race.

One of the survivors Ai Xiaoming followed in her documentary was Zhang Suiqing, who took it upon himself to erect a tombstone of sorts for his less fortunate Jiabiangou peers. In 2013, he obtained approval from local authorities. When the modest memorial was finally built, the officials changed their minds and had it dismantled. What happened to Zhang’s project is reminiscent of a passage in Georgi Gospodinov’s 2020 novel, Time Shelter, about post-communist Bulgaria. When a character set about trying to build a museum dedicated to the role of the country’s state security, he met endless obstacles: “We don’t want to divide the people,” he was told. “It wasn’t the right moment,” others said. Finally, he gave up, noting, “You can’t make a museum to preserve something that has never left.”

With charming modesty, China experts from the United States and Europe sometimes call themselves “students of China.” Ian Johnson has been “a student of China” in the best sense of this phrase. In his first book about the country, Wild Grass, published in 2004, he traced the possibility of liberalization at the turn of the century, by pursuing—literally, by train and taxi, or down a hallway—underdog figures who became accidental activists as they tackled problems such as police brutality and the overtaxation of farmers.

Those who have read Wild Grass may feel a wistfulness for it while reading Sparks: For many, the hopefulness of the early 2000s has evaporated. The country feels much further away from the sense of potential he was describing then. Johnson’s writing, too, has changed over time, shifting from the conventions of narrative long-form to a more documentarian style. His cast of characters has grown and no matter how brief the appearance is, he diligently notes each person’s name as if he, too, is fending off erasure. The landscape has widened, and he insists that readers see China the way he sees it: how the sprawling geography, history, and people who animate it are intricately intertwined. In Dao County, one of the worst sites of the Cultural Revolution, an elderly man, Tan Hecheng, showed Johnson around. Tan spent four decades researching and documenting the thousands of local killings. At a scenic spot by a local river, he showed Johnson saber marks on the parapet of a bridge—a sickening trace of the executions. Johnson sees not only the physical wounds of the past but also the psychic toll on the historian: “His mind is overloaded with horrific images. As he gets older, they overwhelm him, becoming more real than ever.”

Read: How China sees the world

Authoritarians have an instinct to try to control a nation’s historical memory. This impulse emerges out of fear. They are convinced that their power will be weakened if they allow a more accurate and nuanced vision of the past, worrying that discussions of guilt, accountability, and reparation will be required if they get too far. But such a binary calculation in dealing with a nation’s history is “the opposite of thought,” as the novelist Zadie Smith recently put it in an interview. When Ai Xiaoming’s film was released, she and her subjects were harassed by the authorities. “Aren’t today’s events enough for you to believe the veracity of the Jiabiangou stories?” she asked on WeChat in 2017.

“Without the Anti-Rightist Campaign there would have been no Great Leap Forward; without the Great Leap Forward, people would not have starved to death. If people didn’t starve to death, there would not have been the Cultural Revolution. Without the Cultural Revolution, there would not have been Tiananmen,” Huang Zerong, who went to prison for publishing an underground journal, told Johnson. In the imprisonment of Huang and the harassment of Ai, the vicious cycle repeats. China’s underground historians use writing like a time shelter: Through manuscripts saved in drawers, informal lectures on tucked-away staircases, and magazines circulated by PDF file to evade the government’s eye, they want to memorialize those who came before them and to deliver a message to the future.

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The Atlantic · by Han Zhang · September 28, 2023

25. Ukraine’s naval victories show a winning strategy is underway

Ukraine’s naval victories show a winning strategy is underway 

BY STEPHEN BLANK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 09/28/23 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4225615-ukraines-naval-victories-show-a-winning-strategy-is-underway/?utm_source=pocket_saves

A hallmark of the so-called realist opposition to aiding Ukraine further is that Ukraine cannot win the war. At best this war of attrition will not end with anyone‘s conclusive victory.

However, here again, as I’ve previously argued, the facts contradict these unfounded assertions. At present, Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet are scoring tactical victories one after another; degrading the force, undermining Russia’s Black Sea blockade and making Russia’s occupation of Crimea increasingly untenable. It is no coincidence that these outcomes correspond to Ukraine’s tactical, operational and strategic maritime objectives. 

Ignorance of this critical theater of military operations is reflected in the lack of commentary about it. There’s a distinctively Western tendency to downgrade the role of navies in contemporary warfare. Supposedly navies play a secondary or even tertiary role relative to land and air forces in bringing about decisive victory. Nevertheless, maritime threats and the use of navies to accomplish strategic missions are actually increasing. Ignorance cannot absolve observers of a failure to address the facts.

Ukrainian missiles, drones and raiding groups have repeatedly struck Russian naval targets, damaging ships, repair and drydock facilities, air defense systems and airfields. Most recently, Ukraine struck the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, killing its commander and many senior officers. Ukrainian forces have also raided the Crimean coast, recapturing energy rigs seized previously by Russia. These are not sideshow operations, as critics have charged. 

Indeed, they highlight the ongoing failure of Moscow’s naval strategy and air defenses. But more importantly, considering the offensive gains made without sufficient air power, they underscore a reality significantly at odds with the supposedly realist account of the war. They reveal Ukraine’s strategic intelligence in coordinating military operations to fit its available capabilities and economic and political objectives. Its ultimate goal is to eject Russia from Crimea and unravel its capabilities to blockade it, strangle its economy, launch missile, air or amphibious attacks against it or provide logistical support for the Russian army. 

These operations merit continued large-scale European support. As one writer wrote for The Economist, the West’s support for breaking the illegal blockade on Ukraine’s grain exports is vital to sustaining Ukraine’s economy, which also underpins its military effort. Therefore, in order to rebuff Moscow’s claims of exclusive dominion over the Black Sea and the blockade, NATO must go beyond current efforts to help find alternatives to secure Kyiv’s exports.

While exports through Balkan states like Greece, Romania, possibly Bulgaria and even Croatia are necessary to avert disaster in Ukraine; it is essential that the principles of freedom of navigation and the Montreux Treaty be upheld so that Moscow cannot act again in the expectation of impunity and immunity from retaliation. Thus, I and others, including former Supreme Allied Command Europe Admiral James Stavridis have argued on behalf of armed NATO escorts with purely defensive rules of engagement to escort Ukrainian and other international commercial shipping through the Black Sea.  

Moreover, Rene Kofod-Olsen, CEO of V. group, the world’s largest shipping management firm, has reportedly advocated NATO intervention along these lines due to the global need for secure food imports. These escorts would comprise NATO air, air defense, electronic, intelligence and communications assets in the littoral states to preserve the Montreux Treaty rules pertaining to commercial vessels. For example, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force reconnaissance aircraft are now guarding grain ships traversing the Black Sea to deter Russian attacks. 

Still, much more needs to be done. We need to understand that the naval war is profoundly linked to the conduct of the land war. The connection between the urgency of breaking the blockade and providing for Ukraine’s economic sustainment has long been evident to external observers. And that understanding must become clear to policymakers in both Washington. If the blockade can be broken and Ukraine can be provided with the weapons it needs for land warfare and maritime operations, it will gain the strength to make Russia’s occupation of Crimea unsustainable. 

Already, Ukraine’s maritime successes have attenuated Russia’s capabilities in the Black Sea, curtailed its naval operations and demolished its previous maritime strategy. It is clear that much more will need to be done for months, if not years. This already is a long war and despite realist arguments, neither side will negotiate. Ukrainian determination to survive and prevail here confronts Putin’s awareness that negotiations entail a lasting threat to his power.  

So we must build our long-term support and strategy on the reality that it is in our and our allies’ vital interest that Ukraine wins the war and on the proven facts that it can formulate and execute a winning strategy. If Western support is diminished or given without sufficient strategic purpose, then, as President Zelensky told Congress, we lose the war. And that is an intolerable outcome.

Stephen Blank, Ph.D. is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. 

26. How the Pentagon can better deploy the data it collects as a weapon

Excerpts:

A significant culture change must take place if the DoD is to realize data as a weapon system.

Too many agencies are determined to accumulate lots of data and then store and secure it in a place where it can’t be fully utilized. Such data holds tremendous value for countless different uses. It is far more beneficial to decisions makers, operators, and maintainers alike to have that data stored in an approved system of authority for decision intelligence and critical actions.

Make it understandable for humans and machines

For this to happen, we must ensure the data is multilingual, platform agnostic and machine readable, so any maintenance or security information and event management can ingest it. It must be understandable to all consumers, with a data catalogue that tells users everything they need to know, such as the format and what each data-element represents and that maps back to an actively maintained interface control document. As a result, users will not only get to the data, but they’ll also be provided context and understanding.

There is no doubt that data can be transformed into a weapon system, and a powerful one at that. But we aren’t there yet, in large part because the Pentagon isn’t getting the most out of all available assets. Once the valuable data contained within recordings and transmissions is recognized and made accessible, translatable and understandable, U.S. forces can ensure the information is working for us, and not our enemies.

How the Pentagon can better deploy the data it collects as a weapon

c4isrnet.com · by Egon Rinderer · September 28, 2023

In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense has sought to transform into a data-centric enterprise. As part of the initiative, the Pentagon is firmly focused on what it calls “VAULTIS” goals, which state that data must be visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable and secure.

“(It) is the responsibility of all DoD leaders to treat data as a weapon system and manage, secure and use data for operational effect,” according to the DoD Data Strategy, which introduced VAULTIS goals in 2020.

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Electronic warfare in Ukraine informing US playbook

“Both sides are doing the cat-and-mouse game very, very well,” said Col. Josh Koslov, the commander of the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing.

An Army-posted article elaborated upon these themes, stating that information dominance is the new arms race, and the data weapon system must enable readiness and dominance in the information and cyberspace domains. “It’s HOW the data is used that will decide who will win in the long-run,” according to the article.

Yet, in a recent interview, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation, said the Pentagon doesn’t treat data like it treats ammunition. Despite being a “massive emitter of data,” the DoD needs “a better system for capturing the data, analyzing it and then leveraging commercial AI to analyze the data and utilize the data,” said Gallagher, who is a Marine veteran with an intelligence background. “It would give us such a massive advantage, not only in terms of the pure military competition … but also in terms of our ability to find massive savings.”

The military would make profound advances in achieving those objectives if it would more effectively leverage a relatively untapped resource: the onboard data generated by weapon systems, aircraft, maritime vessels, ground vehicles and other fleet assets known as operational technology, or OT.

These assets produce tremendous volumes of valuable data that — when comprehensively captured, collected, monitored, translated, enriched, stored, and processed — can enable the observability required for actionable information and real-time decisions for predictive maintenance, fuel needs, cybersecurity threats, and mission objectives and requirements.

When data is emitted, it’s out there for anyone to acquire, including enemies. This means the U.S. can use it to its advantage, or risk having it used against it — there is no neutral state through inaction.

Here’s an illustration of the potential dangers of the latter situation: By abusing an aircraft’s legitimate data input channels, an adversary can corrupt sensor data in order to spoof the GPS system. Now deceived by bad data, the pilot approaches an airfield, surrounded by trees, for landing.

They believe they are 200 feet higher than they are, only realizing otherwise when making visual assessment on approach—a very risky turn of events. Poor visibility could easily have caused the aircraft to make contact with the treetops on approach, all because the data was manipulated in a way that maintained the pilot’s trust in the systems they’ve come to rely on.

So how can the military avoid such scenarios while maximizing the power of data to support a mission? By adopting the following best practices/recommendations:

Capture all the data

Incomplete data is one of the top detractors from effective decision making. A limited data set, stale data, and data without context all result in one-dimensional, fragmented insights, but complete data always tells the truth and is critical for a comprehensive understanding of what’s going on within an individual asset or an entire fleet.

Complete data is the foundational element of observability and enabling real-time decision intelligence at the edge. Further, the centralization of this data once captured and collected allows for deeper analysis and enrichment, and the ability to make comparisons against historical data sets for further insights, ultimately evolving the decision-making process from reactive to proactive.

You may, for example, examine communications/activity from more than 100 aircraft within the last three years. By digging in, you see that the same GPS spoofing attempt occurred on seven separate aircraft. Then you dig even deeper to discover that all seven incidents took place in a common geospatial reference. You have also captured the method being used to cause the erroneous GPS readings and can use this data to create deterministic detection methods in order to provide early warning to operators.

This is of critical importance as, unlike GPS jamming, in the case of subtle GPS spoofing, there must be a means of operator warning that their instrumentation cannot be trusted (other means of PNT reference exist which the pilot can fall back on). At this point, data is delivering highly actionable/useful intelligence because you are picking up on the adversary’s attack patterns.

Complete data shows the entire picture—both the frames of “good” data (i.e., data produced by the pilot’s input to the aircraft’s controls), as well as the frames of “bad” data (i.e., data that’s inserted with malicious intent by an adversary). In our plane illustration, there is intelligence to extract from the 200-foot gap between the instrument’s reading and reality.

From there, one can cross-check this spoofing technique with associated attack methods of various adversarial nation-states to build profiles that better inform crews in the immediate future. This allows not only for heat mapping of danger zones, but also for attribution of sources within those zones.

Make it accessible

A significant culture change must take place if the DoD is to realize data as a weapon system.

Too many agencies are determined to accumulate lots of data and then store and secure it in a place where it can’t be fully utilized. Such data holds tremendous value for countless different uses. It is far more beneficial to decisions makers, operators, and maintainers alike to have that data stored in an approved system of authority for decision intelligence and critical actions.

Make it understandable for humans and machines

For this to happen, we must ensure the data is multilingual, platform agnostic and machine readable, so any maintenance or security information and event management can ingest it. It must be understandable to all consumers, with a data catalogue that tells users everything they need to know, such as the format and what each data-element represents and that maps back to an actively maintained interface control document. As a result, users will not only get to the data, but they’ll also be provided context and understanding.

There is no doubt that data can be transformed into a weapon system, and a powerful one at that. But we aren’t there yet, in large part because the Pentagon isn’t getting the most out of all available assets. Once the valuable data contained within recordings and transmissions is recognized and made accessible, translatable and understandable, U.S. forces can ensure the information is working for us, and not our enemies.

Egon Rinderer is chief technology officer at Shift5, a supplier of onboard operational technology (OT) data observability solutions for the defense, aviation and rail transportation industries.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com