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Quotes of the Day:
"ff anyone on the verge of action should judge himself according to the outcome, he would never begin. Even though the result may gladden the whole world, that cannot help the hero; for he knows the result only when the whole thing is over, and that is not how he became a hero, but by virtue of the fact that he began."
– Soren Kierkegaard
"Do the right thing because it is the right thing to do."
– Immanuel Kant
"Be isolated, be ignored, be attacked, be in doubt, be frightened, but do not be silenced."
– Bertrand Russell
1. FM Cho says Pyongyang may respond to Seoul administration's peace overtures
2. Steady Erosion of Confidence: US’s Indo-Pacific Allies Grow Uneasy
3. Senior N.K. diplomat reaffirms Pyongyang will never forgo nuclear arms 'under any circumstances'
4. N. Korea's vice FM holds talks with Cuba's top diplomat in New York
5. N. Korea's vice FM holds talks with Cuba's top diplomat in New York
6. Xi Jinping to Meet South Korea, U.S. Leaders in Gyeongju
7. Kim Jong-un Reaffirms 'Absolutely Unchanged' Nuclear Stance
8. Kim Jong-un's Japanese-Korean Roots Revealed in Family History
9. Why South Korea’s Left is embracing a two-state solution to North Korea
10. Top diplomats of N. Korea, China reach 'complete' consensus on int'l, regional issues: KCNA
11. US stations Reaper drones in ROK to enhance North Korea monitoring
12. Why MASGA Matters for the ROK–U.S. Alliance
13. South Korea Should Build Out a Reconnaissance Satellite Ecosystem
14. What it would take for Trump to play golf with Kim – Part II
15. N. Korea’s deadly propaganda machine
1. FM Cho says Pyongyang may respond to Seoul administration's peace overtures
Yes the regime will respond with political warfare and blackmail diplomacy, unfortunately.
FM Cho says Pyongyang may respond to Seoul administration's peace overtures
en.yna.co.kr
FM Cho says Pyongyang may respond to Seoul administration's peace overtures | Yonhap News Agency
Chae Yun-hwan
North Korea 21:37 September 29, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 29 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Monday that Pyongyang may respond to the new Seoul administration's continued overtures for peace, citing North Korea's dispatch of a diplomatic delegation to the 80th session of the U.N. General Assembly last week.
Cho made the remarks in an interview with broadcaster MBC after returning from the U.N. gathering held in New York last week, where he accompanied President Lee Jae Myung.
When asked about the North Korean delegation's participation, Cho said the move could be understood as Pyongyang's intention to engage in dialogue with the international community.
"So (we) think there could be a response to the messages sent out by the Lee Jae Myung government on easing inter-Korean military tensions, building trust and ultimately establishing peace," Cho said. "Although small, there are also activities (for a response) being detected."
Regarding possible talks between Pyongyang and Washington on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea late next month, Cho said preparations were being made while taking into account various possibilities.
Cho also said efforts are being made to reach a deal in tariff negotiations with Washington "based on principles" before the APEC summit, while noting that Seoul cannot accept terms that go "against national interests or are irrational."
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks during a U.N. meeting in this undated photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
Keywords
#FM Cho #N Korea
HOME North Korea
en.yna.co.kr
2. Steady Erosion of Confidence: US’s Indo-Pacific Allies Grow Uneasy
Excerpts:
Political interference is another cause of concern for US allies, particularly in the face of growing domestic far-right movements and their linkages with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the US. In particular, South Korea and Japan stand out as case studies where the MAGA movement's influence is increasing significantly. This spread of far-right political ideology beyond the anglosphere is directly impacting political discourse in these countries around issues such as immigration, gender rights, and political culture. These movements directly influence political and social equations within these countries, making it difficult for existing dispensations to undertake policy reforms. The arrest of 317 South Korean nationals employed at a Hyundai electric vehicle battery plant in Georgia by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is one example that highlights the clash between Trump’s political and economic agenda. It represents the Trumpian agenda colliding with his attempts to revive manufacturing, delaying Hyundai’s battery production by at least two months.
Besides MAGA politics and its influence, the US stance on Gaza and Ukraine has become another point of divergence with Indo-Pacific allies. Countries like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan now starkly disagree with the US on a two-state solution and Ukrainian security. For instance, US diplomatic dealings with Russia on the Ukraine issue do not enjoy the support of its allies. This has forced many Indo-Pacific allies to reassess their expectations of the current US administration, particularly regarding its commitment to Taiwan. Mike Huckabee, the US Ambassador to Israel, called the Australian recognition of the Palestinian state a ‘terrible’ decision, underlining this difference.
This spread of far-right political ideology beyond the anglosphere is directly impacting political discourse in these countries around issues such as immigration, gender rights, and political culture.
Furthermore, while on one hand we see the US commitment to regional security standing on shaky ground, expectations from allies in the region have significantly increased. Allies have been asked to increase their defence spending and commit to a role in a potential Taiwan contingency, leaving several uneasy (perhaps with the exception of Japan). Similarly, Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy has also clashed with his predecessor’s security commitments. For instance, the AUKUS review by the Pentagon has emboldened sceptics, cautioning Australia to review the deal.
Cumulatively, these political, economic, and security issues strain US ties with allies. Trump’s hostility has alienated allies, further strengthening anti-US voices in these countries. Trump’s whims and fancies regarding trade and security have reversed Washington’s decades-long foreign policy stances. Therefore, if the Trump administration continues its transactional and hostile engagement with allies, it risks further fueling and consolidating anti-US sentiment, reducing its reliability and credibility as a serious actor.
Steady Erosion of Confidence: US’s Indo-Pacific Allies Grow Uneasy
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/steady-erosion-of-confidence-us-s-indo-pacific-allies-grow-uneasy
Author : Abhishek Sharma
Abhishek Sharma
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a ...
Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Sep 29, 2025
Mounting trade disputes, security pressures, and political frictions under the Trump administration are forcing Indo-Pacific allies to question the US’s credibility and explore alternatives, including closer engagement with China.
More than six months have passed since US President Donald Trump’s administration took over from its predecessor. In this short time, a lot of water has flown down the bridge, which has increased US allies' anxiety. Given this context, allies are rethinking their engagement with the US under the current administration, moving towards a more transactionalist approach. Recent actions by the Trump administration regarding tariffs on trade, security alliances, political interference, and the US’s foreign policy decisions have led to growing uneasiness within Indo-Pacific capitals. Given this context, allies' confidence in the US and its reliability is increasingly being debated.
Washington’s Indo-Pacific Ties Under Strain
The Indo-Pacific region has slipped from the radar since Trump assumed office in January 2025. Making matters worse, the trans-Pacific ties have been mired by trade tensions and uncertainties over changing tariffs, which have remained in place. Contemporary domestic political changes have consumed regional allies' time, deferring the earliest conclusion of trade negotiations. All of these issues have vitiated the existing political understanding between the allies.
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s domestic agenda has added to existing problems with allies, impacting diplomatic ties. Issues such as immigration, export controls, and investments have further created serious discord. The administration's disdain for minilateral and multilateral economic and security institutions has further strained relations.
Considering the steps taken by the Trump administration in recent months, US perception among allies has suffered further setbacks, signalling eroding reliability and trust. This has inadvertently elevated the Chinese position in the region as a credible and reliable actor.
Under the Trump administration, Washington’s economic ties with its allies have been strained due to new tariffs against Indo-Pacific partners. In parallel, the withering away of multilateral economic frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), established under the Biden administration, has reduced US economic influence in the region. These steps have inadvertently forced many US allies to turn to Beijing for trade and commerce, reversing the de-risking trend.
A similar challenge is emerging in the security domain, as the US demands allies increase their defence budgets, focus on denial defence (moving beyond grey zone scenarios), showcase strategic flexibility, and clarify their commitments in a Taiwan contingency, as part of the administration’s ‘Peace through Strength’ approach. However, some recent developments have added to the confusion, including the administration's double speak on its dealings with China on national security matters. Recent reports that the Pentagon’s latest National Defense Strategy focused more on homeland threats than countering China have left allies wondering about the US's strategic intentions and its commitment to regional security.
Although the changing perception of Washington’s reliability among US allies in the region was seen as troubling, deeper institutional ties acted as a cushion, safeguarding the overall relations. However, considering the steps taken by the Trump administration in recent months, US perception among allies has suffered further setbacks, signalling eroding reliability and trust. This has inadvertently elevated the Chinese position in the region as a credible and reliable actor.
Trade, Security, and Political Interference
In addition to the baseline, countries have been subjected to varying tariffs. Trump’s demands that allies invest in the US without any safeguards or clarity have put them in a difficult position. Speaking on this issue, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung cautioned that Washington’s demand that Seoul invest US$350 billion without a currency swap would lead to a situation similar to the 1997 financial crisis. Similarly, Japanese officials have contradicted US claims regarding the Trump administration’s complete discretion over the proposed US$500 billion investments. Using tariffs to pressure allies into negotiations has harmed the US's reputation as a proponent of free trade. Therefore, despite reaching a deal, several allies are concerned about trade with the US. Prospects of future tariffs against the semiconductor and pharmaceutical sectors risk damaging the economic relationship further.
Political interference is another cause of concern for US allies, particularly in the face of growing domestic far-right movements and their linkages with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the US.
Political interference is another cause of concern for US allies, particularly in the face of growing domestic far-right movements and their linkages with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the US. In particular, South Korea and Japan stand out as case studies where the MAGA movement's influence is increasing significantly. This spread of far-right political ideology beyond the anglosphere is directly impacting political discourse in these countries around issues such as immigration, gender rights, and political culture. These movements directly influence political and social equations within these countries, making it difficult for existing dispensations to undertake policy reforms. The arrest of 317 South Korean nationals employed at a Hyundai electric vehicle battery plant in Georgia by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is one example that highlights the clash between Trump’s political and economic agenda. It represents the Trumpian agenda colliding with his attempts to revive manufacturing, delaying Hyundai’s battery production by at least two months.
Besides MAGA politics and its influence, the US stance on Gaza and Ukraine has become another point of divergence with Indo-Pacific allies. Countries like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan now starkly disagree with the US on a two-state solution and Ukrainian security. For instance, US diplomatic dealings with Russia on the Ukraine issue do not enjoy the support of its allies. This has forced many Indo-Pacific allies to reassess their expectations of the current US administration, particularly regarding its commitment to Taiwan. Mike Huckabee, the US Ambassador to Israel, called the Australian recognition of the Palestinian state a ‘terrible’ decision, underlining this difference.
This spread of far-right political ideology beyond the anglosphere is directly impacting political discourse in these countries around issues such as immigration, gender rights, and political culture.
Furthermore, while on one hand we see the US commitment to regional security standing on shaky ground, expectations from allies in the region have significantly increased. Allies have been asked to increase their defence spending and commit to a role in a potential Taiwan contingency, leaving several uneasy (perhaps with the exception of Japan). Similarly, Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy has also clashed with his predecessor’s security commitments. For instance, the AUKUS review by the Pentagon has emboldened sceptics, cautioning Australia to review the deal.
Cumulatively, these political, economic, and security issues strain US ties with allies. Trump’s hostility has alienated allies, further strengthening anti-US voices in these countries. Trump’s whims and fancies regarding trade and security have reversed Washington’s decades-long foreign policy stances. Therefore, if the Trump administration continues its transactional and hostile engagement with allies, it risks further fueling and consolidating anti-US sentiment, reducing its reliability and credibility as a serious actor.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).
ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
3. Senior N.K. diplomat reaffirms Pyongyang will never forgo nuclear arms 'under any circumstances'
Senior N.K. diplomat reaffirms Pyongyang will never forgo nuclear arms 'under any circumstances' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr
Senior N.K. diplomat reaffirms Pyongyang will never forgo nuclear arms 'under any circumstances'
Song Sang-ho
North Korea 02:48 September 30, 2025
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By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 (Yonhap) -- A senior North Korean diplomat reiterated Monday that Pyongyang will never renounce its nuclear program "under any circumstances," stressing that it has stipulated its nuclear arsenal as a "sacred" and "absolute" asset that can "never be tampered with."
Speaking at a general debate of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong also expressed the North's openness to engaging with countries that "respect" and take a "friendly" approach toward his country.
It marked the first speech at the Assembly podium by a high-level North Korean official since 2018 when then Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho attended the gathering.
"We will never give up (our) nuclear (program), which is our state law, national policy and sovereign power as well as the right to existence, under any circumstances," he said. "We will never walk away from this position."
North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong addresses the United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York on Sept. 29, 2025, in this photo released by AFP. (Yonhap)
His remarks came as U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has reaffirmed its commitment to the "complete" denuclearization of North Korea, although its leader Kim Jong-un has expressed openness to conditional dialogue with the United States.
He reminded the attendees that Pyongyang has codified its nuclear status in law.
"In order to permanently maintain this state of balance and ensure everlasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, we have stipulated nuclear in our constitution as a sacred and absolute thing that can never be touched upon and tempered with," he said.
"Imposition of denuclearization on the DPRK is tantamount to demanding it to surrender sovereignty and right to existence and violate the Constitution. We will never give up sovereignty, abandon the right to existence and violate the Constitution."
DPRK is short for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In justifying its nuclear program, the diplomat denounced military exercises between South Korea and the U.S., as well as trilateral drills involving Japan.
"Can we find such a place as the Korean Peninsula where the world's biggest nuclear weapon state and its allied forces conduct bilateral and multilateral war exercises year around and even stage real-war drills simulating the use of nukes targeting a sovereign state by mobilizing massive multinational combat forces and latest strategic assets?" he said.
But he left open the door for engagement with countries.
"Irrespective of differences in ideals and systems, the DPRK will promote multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation with the countries that respect and take a friendly approach towards it," he said.
The vice minister's speech came as both Seoul and Washington expressed their hope to reengage with Pyongyang to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Speculation has persisted that Trump might seek to resume dialogue with the North Korean leader when he visits South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit set to take place in the southeastern city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31-Nov. 1.
Kim has said that he is open to engaging with the U.S. if Washington drops its demand for the North's denuclearization.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. S. Korea unable to pay US$350 bln in cash to U.S. for tariff deal: security adviser
It is hard to see how anyone thought this was a good idea or even feasible.
I guess this means the highest tariffs for South Korea.
Will we see another IMF crisis in Korea and how will the alliance fare in the long run?
S. Korea unable to pay US$350 bln in cash to U.S. for tariff deal: security adviser
en.yna.co.kr
S. Korea unable to pay US$350 bln in cash to U.S. for tariff deal: security adviser | Yonhap News Agency
Kim Eun-jung
Diplomacy 16:40 September 29, 2025
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Sept. 29 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Monday that South Korea is unable to fulfill its US$350 billion investment pledge to the United States in cash under a framework deal that lowered tariffs, after U.S. President Donald Trump said the investment package would be made "upfront."
Wi made the remarks as Seoul and Washington have been hammering out the details of the investment package to finalize a framework deal in July that lowered the U.S. tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent.
"From our perspective, it is not possible to pay $350 billion in cash," Wi told reporters.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac explains about Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's visit to South Korea during a press briefing held at the presidential office in Seoul on Sept. 29, 2025. (Yonhap)
Asked about Trump's remark on the upfront payment, Wi said it was not clear whether the U.S. president fully reflected on Seoul's stance, adding he presumed Trump reiterated the U.S. government's "basic stance."
Seoul officials have said the $350 billion investment pledge required safeguards, such as a currency swap, and was intended to finance projects rather than a cash payment.
He also said he was not aware of the intention behind U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's remark that discussions with Korean officials included the possibility of raising the investment amount beyond the initial pledge.
With intense negotiation currently under way, Wi struck a cautious tone toward the ruling Democratic Party's recent criticism of Washington's demands.
"As negotiations with the U.S. are taking place in a highly intense atmosphere, I believe we should use all available cards, but we must not overplay them," Wi said.
Wi called for a measured approach on the visa issue, as Seoul and Washington are set to launch a working group this week to improve the U.S. visa system for Korean workers following the immigration authority's detention of more than 300 Korean workers earlier this month.
He stressed that while improving the U.S. visa system would help Korean companies' investment process, it is not directly linked to Seoul's investment pledge.
"There are strong public sentiments and various demands, but we must not handle the issue emotionally," he said. "If the government's position is to create a new visa category, it is important not to overplay the matter by setting targets beyond that."
While there was cautious hope that Trump could meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un if he visits South Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit slated for Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, Wi remained cautious, saying, "To be realistic, we have not detected any change in North Korea's attitude."
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
Keywords
#US #trade talks
en.yna.co.kr
5. N. Korea's vice FM holds talks with Cuba's top diplomat in New York
We should ot forget the adjunct or junior member of the CRInK - Cuba.
N. Korea's vice FM holds talks with Cuba's top diplomat in New York
en.yna.co.kr
N. Korea's vice FM holds talks with Cuba's top diplomat in New York | Yonhap News Agency
Park Boram
North Korea 10:18 September 29, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 29 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean vice foreign minister has held talks with Cuba's top diplomat to discuss bilateral ties on the sidelines of the ongoing U.N. General Assembly in New York, news reports and an online feed showed Monday.
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Eduardo Rodriguez Parrilla's X account and foreign news reports on Sunday (local time) showed he met with North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong in New York.
They discussed the friendship and solidarity between North Korea and Cuba, highlighting the historical ties between their parties and governments, according to Rodriguez.
He also shared photos of himself shaking hands with Kim and sitting next to him over a coffee table.
This image of Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Eduardo Rodriguez Parrilla (R) shaking hands with North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong in New York is captured from the Cuban official's X account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Kim arrived last week in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly, marking North Korea's first high-level attendance at the U.N. gathering in seven years.
The Kim-Rodriguez talks effectively mark the first reported high-level meeting between the countries since South Korea established official diplomatic relations with Cuba in February last year, a move seen as a blow to the North, which has maintained close ties with the communist country.
Kim also held separate talks with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Eduardo Gil Pinto and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Denis Moncada in New York, according to news reports. Both countries are among Central and South American nations that maintain friendly ties with Pyongyang.
The North Korean vice foreign minister is reportedly scheduled to deliver a speech Monday (local time), the final day of the general debate, marking the first address at the General Assembly by a North Korean official dispatched directly from Pyongyang in seven years.
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
Keywords
#N Korea #Cuba
HOME North Korea
en.yna.co.kr
6. Xi Jinping to Meet South Korea, U.S. Leaders in Gyeongju
Xi Jinping to Meet South Korea, U.S. Leaders in Gyeongju
First visit to South Korea in 11 years; summit formats with President Lee Jae-myung, President Donald Trump under discussion
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/30/A2G6CDDELFCJPG5L7HIEMOIJIU/
By Joo Hee-yeon,
Kim Min-seo
Published 2025.09.30. 00:50
Updated 2025.09.30. 02:54
Choe Son-hui, left, North Korea's Foreign Minister, calls on Li Chang, China's Premier and 'number two', on the 29th. /Xinhua-Yonhap
It was reported on the 29th that Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit South Korea for a two-night, three-day schedule to attend the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Leaders’ Meeting, which will be held in Gyeongju from the 31st of next month to November 1st. President Xi is expected to stay in Gyeongju during this period and hold a series of South Korea-China and U.S.-China summits with President Lee Jae-myung and U.S. President Donald Trump. If President Xi visits South Korea as scheduled, it will mark his first visit in 11 years since 2014, during the Park Geun-hye administration.
◇ Format of Xi’s visit remains undecided
A government official stated on the same day, “The schedule for President Xi’s two-night, three-day stay in Gyeongju has been finalized,” adding, “The South Korea-China and U.S.-China summits are also planned to take place in Gyeongju.” President Xi is also expected to attend the APEC Leaders’ Meeting and the leaders’ dinner. Since China will assume the chairmanship of APEC next year, President Xi is anticipated to receive the chairmanship at the end of the meeting and introduce the next host country.
However, the format of President Xi’s visit to South Korea has not yet been finalized. A senior official from the ruling party said, “There were discussions about an official bilateral visit to South Korea, including separate schedules in Seoul, but nothing has been confirmed yet.” In this regard, the Chinese Embassy in South Korea had explored the option of the Chinese delegation fully reserving The Shilla Seoul to stay there during the APEC period on the 11th, but it was reported that the reservation was canceled on the 27th.
Whether President Xi’s visit to South Korea is for the purpose of “attending the APEC Leaders’ Meeting” or constitutes an “official visit” carries different diplomatic implications. If he only attends the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, it would mean participating in APEC at a multilateral diplomatic level, with the location just happening to be South Korea. Even if he holds a summit with the South Korean president as the host country, it would be a routine meeting between the host and a participant at a multilateral conference.
However, an official bilateral visit to South Korea would strongly imply that South Korea-China relations are being considered separately from the APEC Leaders’ Meeting. For this reason, the South Korean government had reportedly hoped for a format where President Xi would visit South Korea separately. At one point, some within the government and ruling party strongly advocated for designating this visit as a “state visit.” However, it is understood that a state visit is no longer being pursued.
◇ Kim Jong-un dispatches Choe Son-hui to China
Meanwhile, on the 27th, the same day the Chinese side canceled the reservation at the Shilla Hotel, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui visited China at the invitation of Foreign Minister Wang Yi. This occurred around 20 days after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on the 4th. It was Choe Son-hui’s first solo visit to China and first North Korea-China diplomatic talks since she assumed the position of foreign minister in June 2022. This indicates that the two countries have “major issues” requiring close discussion.
Choe Son-hui held talks with Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the 28th and paid a visit to Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the country’s “number two,” on the 29th. On the 29th, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the previous day’s North Korea-China foreign ministers’ meeting involved “in-depth exchanges of opinions on international and regional issues, and a complete agreement was reached.” The phrase “complete agreement” was not used in the announcement following the early part of this month’s North Korea-China summit. This has led to analysis suggesting that there may have been a sharing of situations regarding President Xi’s visit to South Korea and the South Korea-China, U.S.-South Korea, and U.S.-China summits.
Park Byung-kwang, a senior researcher at the National Security Strategy Institute, said, “North Korea announced that Choe Son-hui traveled to Beijing on a ‘chartered plane,’ indicating she moved under full support and instructions from Kim Jong-un.” He added, “It cannot be ruled out that the issue of President Xi’s visit to North Korea was discussed.” However, the timing of such a visit remains uncertain.
Kim Jong-un, having attended the Chinese victory day military parade, hopes that President Xi will attend the 80th-anniversary military parade of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the 10th of next month. However, some analyses suggest it is unlikely that President Xi will visit Pyongyang just a month after the North Korea-China summit in Beijing. There are also opinions that it would be difficult for President Xi to visit both North Korea and South Korea in the first and second half of October.
There are also observations that Kim Jong-un may have requested through Choe Son-hui, “Please do not go to South Korea on the occasion of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting,” or asked to lower the level of diplomacy with South Korea. When President Xi made a state visit to South Korea in 2014, he stayed in Seoul for only one night and two days, shorter than the usual state visit period of two nights and three days, leading to speculation in diplomatic circles that the decision was made “with North Korea in mind.”
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
7. Kim Jong-un Reaffirms 'Absolutely Unchanged' Nuclear Stance
Kim means what he says. We need a new strategy.
Kim says I will show you what President Lee's "END" policy means - it is the END of any hope for denuclearization (as long as I am in power).
Kim Jong-un Reaffirms 'Absolutely Unchanged' Nuclear Stance
Statement follows President Lee Jae-myung's UN 'E.N.D. Initiative' proposal for denuclearization talks
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/30/A2G6CDDELFCJPG5L7HIEMOIJIU/
By Kim Min-seo
Published 2025.09.29. 00:48
Updated 2025.09.29. 11:17
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met with nuclear scientists and technicians from the Nuclear Weapons Research Institute on the 26th and stated, “The logic of ensuring stability through nuclear force as the core is our absolute, unchanging position.” Kim Jong-un emphasized, “Continuously evolving the nation’s nuclear response posture is an essential top priority given the Republic’s security environment,” and pledged to scientists and technicians, “We will prioritize and support all possibilities and conditions for sustained advancement in nuclear technology.”
This reaffirmation of a “no denuclearization” stance by Kim Jong-un came just two days after President Lee Jae-myung unveiled the ‘E.N.D. Initiative’—advocating for engagement, normalization of relations, and denuclearization—during his keynote address at the 80th UN General Assembly on the 23rd (local time; Korean time, the 24th).
Kim Jong-un holds meeting with Hong Seong-mu overseeing nuclear development North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met with Hong Seong-mu (fourth from left), First Deputy Director of the Party's Munitions Industry Department, and scientists and technicians from the Nuclear Weapons Research Institute on the 26th to discuss nuclear material and nuclear weapon production, Korean Central Television reported on the 27th. /Korean Central Television
**◇Showcasing Nuclear Material Production and Advancement of Nuclear Capabilities?**
On the 27th, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim Jong-un held an “important consultative meeting” the previous day with scientists and technicians in nuclear-related fields to discuss the production of nuclear materials and weapons. At the meeting, attended by Hong Sung-mu, First Deputy Director of the Workers’ Party’s Military Industry Department and North Korea’s chief nuclear developer, Kim Jong-un urged, “All experts in nuclear technology must deeply recognize the essence of our Party’s policy to strengthen nuclear capabilities and welcome the Party’s 9th Congress with outstanding research achievements and remarkable production results.”
President Lee reaffirmed the “three-step denuclearization solution”—halting the advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by reduction and eventual dismantlement—during his UN speech. On the same day, the U.S. reaffirmed its goal of “complete denuclearization of North Korea” through a G7 foreign ministers’ joint statement. However, two days later, Kim Jong-un ordered increased production of nuclear materials and advancement of nuclear capabilities ahead of the 9th Party Congress scheduled for next year.
During the meeting, Kim Jong-un reportedly reviewed a report on the “progress of the 2025 capacity expansion plan for the nuclear material production sector” and inspected the “recent projects and key production activities of the Nuclear Weapons Research Institute.” North Korean media stated that Kim Jong-un expressed great satisfaction, saying, “The key links in advancing the country’s nuclear capabilities have been perfectly resolved as a result of thoroughly implementing the two major tasks of the new strategic plan presented by our Party in the nuclear material production sector and the Nuclear Weapons Research Institute.” This is presumed to be related to the “important tasks” Kim Jong-un mentioned during his on-site guidance at the Nuclear Weapons Research Institute and weapons-grade nuclear material production facilities in September last year.
At a Korea Economic Briefing (IR) in New York on the 25th, President Lee stated, “North Korea continues to produce nuclear materials capable of manufacturing 15 to 20 nuclear warheads per year and is also enhancing its nuclear bomb production capabilities. Given the high likelihood of exporting nuclear weapons or materials exceeding what is needed for regime maintenance, there are significant security benefits in halting such production.” The fact that Kim Jong-un received a report on nuclear material production plans the following day suggests an intention to showcase nuclear capabilities beyond what is necessary for regime maintenance and thereby strengthen negotiating leverage with the U.S.
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (left) shakes hands with Wang Yi, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs director, in Beijing on the 28th. Korean Central News Agency reported that Choe Son-hui's delegation 'departed Pyongyang by chartered plane on the 27th,' and Choe Son-hui is scheduled to stay in China until the 30th. /CGTN broadcast social media
**◇North-Korea-China Diplomatic Talks in Beijing**
Amid these developments, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Choe Son-hui, North Korean Foreign Minister, held in-depth discussions on common interests with Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, in Beijing on the 28th. Wang Yi stated, “We hope to strengthen cooperation and coordination with North Korea on international and regional issues, oppose all forms of hegemony, and jointly safeguard bilateral interests and international fairness and justice.” Choe Son-hui reportedly said, “We will closely collaborate with China on multilateral cooperation to jointly counter unilateralism and power politics, and promote the establishment of a more just and equitable world order,” according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
As Chinese President Xi Jinping mentioned “high-level exchanges” during the North-Korea-China summit on the 4th, attention is focused on whether Xi’s potential visit to North Korea during the 80th anniversary military parade of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the 10th of next month was discussed. If the visit materializes, Xi would meet with Kim Jong-un before attending the APEC summit in South Korea later next month.
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
8. Kim Jong-un's Japanese-Korean Roots Revealed in Family History
Excerpts:
Ryu Hyun-woo, a former deputy ambassador to Kuwait, said, “In North Korea, individuals of ethnic Korean origin from Japan are denied opportunities for key positions.” He added, “If Ko’s background becomes known, it would have the impact of a nuclear bomb on North Korean society.”
He continued, “Kim Jong-un became heir in his 20s despite having no achievements, solely because of the Baekdu bloodline. If it becomes known that his mother was of ethnic Korean origin from Japan, it would not only shake his legitimacy but also destabilize the hereditary system at its roots.”
Ko’s parents, Ko Kyung-taek and Lee Maeng-in, were both born in Jeju, South Korea, and moved to Japan during the Japanese colonial period. Ko was born there.
Kim Jong-un's Japanese-Korean Roots Revealed in Family History
Newly disclosed photo of grandmother sparks debate on Baekdu bloodline legitimacy
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/29/YRNNNLA5VFHHZBWNKNK5UZC2VY/
By Kim Ja-ah
Published 2025.09.29. 09:57
Updated 2025.09.29. 22:40
From left: North Korea's Kim Jong-un's maternal grandmother Lee Maeng-in, mother Ko Yong-hui, Kim Jong-un/Channel A
The family history of Ko Yong-hui, the mother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who had long been shrouded in secrecy, has been revealed. Ko, a former resident of Japan with ethnic Korean roots, has been regarded as a potential weakness for Kim Jong-un, as her background could undermine the "Baekdu bloodline" narrative that the North Korean regime has emphasized to justify its hereditary succession.
On the 28th of last month, Channel A’s program *‘Now I Go to Meet You’* featured Komi Yoji, a former editorial writer for the Tokyo Shimbun who spent 10 years investigating Ko Yong-hui, to disclose secrets about her family.
Ko, the fourth wife of the late leader Kim Jong-il, was born in Osaka, Japan, in 1952 and spent her childhood there. She moved to North Korea in 1962 and became a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe, where she caught Kim Jong-il’s attention. She later gave birth to three children with him: Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-un, and Kim Yo-jong.
However, Ko remained a thoroughly hidden figure in North Korea. “No one dares to speak openly about Kim Jong-un’s mother,” Komi stated.
Kim Jong-il and Ko Yong-hui./Channel A
Ryu Hyun-woo, a former deputy ambassador to Kuwait, said, “In North Korea, individuals of ethnic Korean origin from Japan are denied opportunities for key positions.” He added, “If Ko’s background becomes known, it would have the impact of a nuclear bomb on North Korean society.”
He continued, “Kim Jong-un became heir in his 20s despite having no achievements, solely because of the Baekdu bloodline. If it becomes known that his mother was of ethnic Korean origin from Japan, it would not only shake his legitimacy but also destabilize the hereditary system at its roots.”
Ko’s parents, Ko Kyung-taek and Lee Maeng-in, were both born in Jeju, South Korea, and moved to Japan during the Japanese colonial period. Ko was born there.
During the colonial era, approximately 2 million ethnic Koreans lived in Japan. While most returned to Korea after liberation, around 600,000 remained due to circumstances, facing discrimination and financial hardship. North Korea promoted a repatriation program, offering free education and healthcare, and about 90,000 ethnic Koreans from Japan moved to North Korea, deceived by its propaganda. Ko’s family was among them.
The broadcast also revealed a photo of Lee Maeng-in, Kim Jong-un’s paternal grandmother, for the first time. Panelists were astonished by her resemblance to Kim.
Jeong Yuna, a defector from North Korea’s Jagang Province, said, “In North Korea, instead of saying ‘like father, like son,’ people say, ‘The grandmother ate and vomited.’ It means they look exactly alike.”
Komi noted, “Lee Maeng-in had a very bold personality. She likely followed her husband to North Korea, a place she had never been, with the hope of starting anew.”
Park Hyang-su, a former activist with the Pro-North Korea Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, said, “First-generation Korean-Japanese grandmothers lived tough lives and were tenacious. This grandmother seems similar. Kim Jong-un’s appearance and temperament both resemble his grandmother’s.”
From right: North Korea's Kim Jong-un, daughter Ju-ae, wife Ri Sol-ju./Rodong Sinmun-Yonhap
Kim Jong-un has recently engaged in bold political activities featuring women, including his wife Lee Sol-ju and daughter Kim Ju-ae. Komi analyzed that this reflects his resentment toward his father, Kim Jong-il, known for his womanizing, and his guilt over his mother’s hidden life.
Ryu Hyun-woo stated, “For a revolution to change North Korea’s system, residents must realize that the Kim family’s divine status is a myth.” He emphasized, “Through Ko Yong-hui’s life, North Koreans must be made aware of the true face of the Baekdu bloodline.”
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
9. Why South Korea’s Left is embracing a two-state solution to North Korea
Another victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
Ironically is it this view that could lead back to a one Korea - though that one Korea will be dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State of north Korea as this view supports KJU's strategy.
Columns
Why South Korea’s Left is embracing a two-state solution to North Korea
Chung Dong-young’s claim that Koreas are separate countries concedes a reality long papered over by political fictions
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/why-south-koreas-left-is-embracing-a-two-state-solution-to-north-korea/
Andrei Lankov September 29, 2025
Unification minister Chung Dong-young against a backdrop of the North and South Korean flags | Image: Chung Dong-young's Facebook, edited by NK News
To many around the world, the ROK unification minister’s statement that North and South Korea are separate states will have hardly registered as a controversial claim. After all, rival governments have ruled on the two halves of the peninsula for 80 years.
But Chung Dong-young’s remarks to journalists in Seoul last week actually marked a significant departure from decades of ROK policy, and they send a clear signal about how the current administration — or at least a key faction within it — intends to approach Pyongyang in the long term.
During the press conference, Chung stated, “The South and the North are in fact two states, and from the standpoint of international law they are also two states.” He added that “at least 50-60% of South Korean citizens” view North Korea as a separate state, according to polls.
However, he immediately qualified this: “This does not mean that division is eternal. What we are talking about is more flexible relations between the two Koreas, based on practical and realistic considerations.”
Chung’s remarks demonstrate just how deeply Kim Jong Un’s rejection of unification has scrambled the inter-Korean policies of South Korea’s political Left and Right, curiously positioning conservatives as the champions of unification.
And while there are dissenting positions with the Lee Jae-myung administration, this shift could nonetheless open the way to a more pragmatic approach to managing relations with the North.
The unification arch in Pyongyang, before its destruction | Image: NK News (Aug. 2018)
POLITICAL FACT AND FICTION
From the establishment of separate governments in 1948 until very recently, both Seoul and Pyongyang insisted that Korea remained a single nation, only temporarily divided. Both governments routinely underscored their alleged commitment to reunification and declared again and again that they did not regard the other side as a separate state, but merely as a temporarily estranged part of their own nation.
Of course, these claims were little more than convenient political fictions. The existence of two states on the Korean Peninsula has been a fact for nearly 80 years, whether either side liked it or not. Even the lofty declarations of a shared desire for reunification were best understood less as practical policy than as political rhetoric, designed above all to appeal to Korean nationalism.
It was only in late 2023 that one of the two quarreling sides finally acknowledged the long-standing geopolitical reality. At that time, Kim Jong Un declared that North Korea would no longer pursue unification and saw no reason to regard the South as anything other than a hostile neighboring state.
Since then, North Korea has undertaken a sweeping campaign to purge traces of its decades-long adherence to the principle of unification. This rectification drive has been broad, dramatic and occasionally expensive. In one particularly striking case, DPRK authorities completely demolished the massive unification arch that had long been one of the nation’s major political symbols.
At any rate, the new policy means that Kim Jong Un and his government have finally acknowledged reality. This decision was almost certainly driven not by any newfound commitment to truth but by far more pragmatic, even cynical, considerations — above all, the need to perpetuate their own power.
Still, whatever the motives, Pyongyang has at last recognized a hard and obvious fact, and decisively abandoned the hollow unification rhetoric that both sides had dutifully maintained for decades.
Lim Jong-seok speaks at a press briefing in Seoul about the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang on Sept. 17, 2018 | Image: Joint Inter-Korean Summit Press Corps
THE SOUTH RESPONDS
In the South, this shift did not go unnoticed. Last fall, several left-leaning South Korean politicians and commentators openly declared that reunification, if assessed realistically, was neither desirable nor feasible in the foreseeable future and therefore should be abandoned as a practical political goal.
They were, of course, telling the truth. But given their backgrounds, the irony was impossible to miss.
The most vocal of these new “unification skeptics” was Lim Jong-seok, a former firebrand student activist and later President Moon Jae-in’s chief of staff, who built his entire career on constant professions of devotion to the reunification ideal.
His change of heart, along with others, suggests that South Korea’s left-wing nationalists are quite prepared to discard the outdated slogan of reunification that they once defended with remarkable fervor.
Interestingly, conservatives — who have traditionally been much cooler toward unification slogans — suddenly moved in the opposite direction and began to defend it with uncharacteristic zeal.
Most likely, this turn has been driven by pragmatic considerations: Now that their progressive opponents are abandoning unification rhetoric, conservatives see an opportunity to score political points by appealing to Korean nationalism — an enormously powerful force that until now had been exploited almost exclusively by the Left.
Against this backdrop, Chung’s remarks appear to be a bid to formalize a new position. In effect, through his words, the Lee administration is acknowledging the reality of two Korean states and signaling its readiness to shape policy toward North Korea on that basis.
To be sure, Chung still uttered the obligatory lines about striving for reunification in some unspecified distant future. But this sounded more like perfunctory lip service paid to avoid alienating nationalist sentiment and save face, since the Left’s U-turn executed has been so dramatic and obvious.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac | Image: Wi Sung-lac’s Facebook page
POLICY DIFFERENCES
All of this is not to say that the Lee administration’s policy is entirely clear, as comments by other officials have muddled the picture.
Just two days before Chung’s remarks, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters in New York that the South Korean government “does not support or acknowledge the two-state theory.”
“The government’s position is that ‘inter-Korean relations are a provisional special relationship until unification,’ as stated in the 1991 Basic Agreement,” he said.
The Basic Agreement, signed by the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, codified the long-standing traditional stance that relations between North and South are “special,” not merely those of two sovereign states, and that unification remains the ultimate objective.
Thus, within the space of two days, two senior officials made statements that were essentially contradictory. This strongly suggests that differing views exist within Lee Jae-myung’s inner circle.
Still, there are good reasons to pay closer attention to Chung’s words. He is a long-time progressive activist with considerable influence inside the party, a political veteran with deep roots. Wi Sung-lac, by contrast, is known primarily as a career diplomat and international relations expert — a respected figure, but not a lifelong party insider.
In short, while the Lee administration has not completely solidified its position, a shift toward acknowledging reality is under way, and that should be welcomed.
It is time to abandon the fantasies — or at least push them deep into the background — and focus instead on the real task: creating the conditions for peaceful, even if not always friendly, coexistence between the two Korean states.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. Top diplomats of N. Korea, China reach 'complete' consensus on int'l, regional issues: KCNA
(LEAD) Top diplomats of N. Korea, China reach 'complete' consensus on int'l, regional issues: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr
(LEAD) Top diplomats of N. Korea, China reach 'complete' consensus on int'l, regional issues: KCNA
Park Boram
North Korea 07:37 September 29, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details, photo, byline; RECASTS headline)
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Sept. 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, have reached a "complete" consensus in their discussions on international and regional issues during their recent talks, the North's state media reported Monday.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported the agreement after Choe and Wang held their first one-on-one meeting in China on Sunday. Since Saturday, Choe and her delegation have been visiting China on a four-day trip.
"During the talks, (the two sides) exchanged views on international and regional issues in depth and reached complete consensus," the KCNA said.
This Associated Press photo shows North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui shaking hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during their talks in Beijing on Sept. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
The KCNA did not provide details about their discussions on such issues, but the foreign ministers may have discussed common ground ahead of potential South Korea-China or U.S.-China summits expected on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, set for Oct. 31-Nov. 1 in South Korea.
Choe's visit to China is her second in less than a month, following her trip with state leader Kim Jong-un to attend China's high-profile military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3.
At that time, Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first talks in more than six years, signaling that bilateral ties, strained by Pyongyang's military alignment with Russia, are back on track.
Choe said the military parade "clearly demonstrated China's historic achievements, international status and comprehensive national power," during the talks with Wang.
Her country will "proactively work toward the deepening and development" of bilateral friendship in line with the Kim-Xi talks, Choe said, also reiterating Kim's pledge, expressed during the talks, that North Korea-China ties will never waver regardless of changes in international situations.
Wang described the Kim-Xi summit as providing "direction and a blueprint for elevating bilateral ties to a higher level."
Building on the common ground shared by the state leaders, China and North Korea need to strengthen "strategic communications," exchanges and cooperation to jointly safeguard regional peace and stability, the Chinese foreign minister also noted, reaffirming China's "unwavering" stance to advance ties with Pyongyang.
Wang also said Choe's visit to China would provide an opportunity to advance bilateral ties and promote shared interests between the countries.
The latest Choe-Wang talks mark Choe's first in-person meeting with a Chinese foreign minister since she became foreign minister in June 2022, as well as her first independent visit to China in that role.
The meeting came amid speculation about whether Xi will reciprocally attend North Korea's military parade marking the 80th founding anniversary on Oct. 10 of the Workers' Party of Korea.
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (C) departs Pyongyang for Beijing on Sept. 27, 2025, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
11. US stations Reaper drones in ROK to enhance North Korea monitoring
US stations Reaper drones in ROK to enhance North Korea monitoring
Activation of new squadron marks first time the combat and recon drone has been based in South Korea
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/us-stations-reaper-drones-in-rok-to-enhance-north-korea-monitoring/
Joon Ha Park September 29, 2025
The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle during a training mission over the Nevada Test and Training Range on July 15, 2019 | Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class William Rio Rosado
The U.S. has permanently stationed MQ-9 Reaper combat and reconnaissance drones in South Korea for the first time, establishing a new air squadron that will improve the allies’ ability to monitor North Korean military activities.
The U.S. 7th Air Force announced in a press release Monday that the 431st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), equipped with MQ-9s, has been officially activated at Kunsan Air Base, located 180 kilometers south of Seoul.
Lt. Col. Douglas J. Slater formally assumed command of the 431st ERS at Kunsan on Sept. 28, according to the 7th Air Force’s press release.
“The activation of the 431st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron reaffirms the United States’ strong commitment to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula,” the 7th Air Force said in its press release. “MQ-9 operations will enhance U.S.-ROK intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation across the Indo-Pacific and improve our ability to respond to emerging threats.”
This marks the first permanent deployment of the capability on the peninsula. Previously, the MQ-9 rotated into South Korea temporarily for joint U.S.-ROK training against North Korean threats.
For example, in Nov. 2024, a Reaper visited South Korea for the ongoing Freedom Flag joint exercise involving over 110 manned and unmanned aircraft, the allies’ first live-fire drone exercise. The drill took place just a day after North Korea tested its largest-ever solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), told NK News that the MQ-9’s surveillance capabilities allow for real-time targeting and strengthened monitoring capabilities around the Korean Peninsula.
“While existing reconnaissance systems are in place on the South Korean side, the U.S. military would have judged that additional coverage was necessary, which is why the MQ-9 is now permanently stationed here,” Shin said.
The expert suggested North Korea will be “cautious” about the deployment but will not view it as an immediate threat, even though it will reinforce the ability to monitor DPRK activities.
He also observed that the deployment “reflects a clear focus on monitoring China,” highlighting the strategic flexibility the U.S. military gains by stationing assets that can respond quickly to emerging threats across the Indo-Pacific theater.
In the past, Pyongyang has sharply criticized U.S. reconnaissance flights around the peninsula, accusing American spy planes of violating its airspace and threatening to shoot them down.
North Korea has also stepped up its own efforts to modernize its Cold War-era air force fleet and improve its reconnaissance capabilities, including through unmanned aerial vehicles modeled off the U.S.-made Global Hawk and Reaper drones
North Korean state media recently released photos of the country’s Saetbyol-9 and Saetbyol-4 reconnaissance drones undergoing testing, with leader Kim Jong Un calling UAV development the country’s “top priority.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. Why MASGA Matters for the ROK–U.S. Alliance
Excerpts:
The Indo-Pacific security environment is entering a decisive decade. China’s naval rise, North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities, and Russia’s disruptive behavior in the maritime domain all point to a future where sea power will be even more critical. The U.S.–ROK alliance must adapt not only in operational terms but also in industrial foundations. MASGA offers a practical pathway: by linking South Korea’s proven shipbuilding strengths to America’s strategic requirements, it strengthens deterrence, reinforces alliance credibility, and ensures that the maritime balance does not tilt irreversibly. For both Washington and Seoul, this is not about shipbuilding alone; it is about securing the alliance’s future in an era of intensifying great-power competition.
Why MASGA Matters for the ROK–U.S. Alliance
By Jihoon Yu
September 29, 2025
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/09/29/why_masga_matters_for_the_rokus_alliance_1137666.html
The U.S.–ROK alliance has long rested on the credibility of American extended deterrence and South Korea’s own growing military capabilities. However, the alliance now faces a strategic challenge: the erosion of the U.S. naval industrial base. The U.S. Navy, once unrivaled, struggles to meet force structure goals due to shipbuilding delays, cost overruns, and limited capacity across its yards. This industrial shortfall risks undermining not only U.S. global maritime power but also the effectiveness of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s naval expansion continues at a breakneck pace. It is in this context that the MASGA— “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again”—initiative, which envisions leveraging South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding sector to revitalize U.S. naval capacity, becomes a vital agenda for both Washington and Seoul.
The United States cannot ignore the gap between strategic demand and industrial supply. The U.S. Navy’s own force structure assessments call for over 350 ships, yet it has hovered around 290, with aging vessels facing delayed replacement. China, by contrast, has surpassed the United States in total battle force ships, with estimates suggesting a fleet of over 400 by the early 2030s. Even if U.S. technological superiority remains an advantage, quantity exerts its own quality in naval strategy, especially in potential flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The bottleneck is not strategic imagination but industrial production. American yards lack the capacity to scale up rapidly. This makes external partnerships not a luxury but a necessity.
South Korea offers precisely what the U.S. needs: world-class shipbuilding capacity, efficiency, and reliability. South Korean firms such as Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai are global leaders in both commercial and naval shipbuilding, with advanced technologies in propulsion, stealth design, and integrated logistics support. Seoul has demonstrated that it can produce complex platforms like KDX destroyers, Aegis-equipped vessels, and KSS-III submarines at competitive cost and within compressed timelines. By integrating Korean shipyards into the U.S. supply chain under the MASGA concept, the U.S. could alleviate pressure on its overstretched industrial base and accelerate the delivery of critical hulls.
Critics may argue that outsourcing naval production undermines the sovereignty of U.S. defense industries. Yet such concerns overlook the fact that alliance resilience is increasingly measured by industrial interoperability as much as by operational interoperability. Just as the F-35 program involves multiple partners in production, maintenance, and component supply, MASGA could institutionalize an allied shipbuilding framework that distributes burdens while reinforcing common interests. For Washington, this would not dilute but rather multiply industrial capacity, while keeping strategic design and command firmly in American hands. For Seoul, it would represent a leap forward in defense-industrial integration with its principal ally, cementing South Korea not just as a buyer of U.S. systems but as a co-producer of global security.
There are also broader alliance benefits. First, MASGA would enhance deterrence credibility by ensuring that the U.S. Navy has the hull numbers and maintenance depth required to operate forward in the Indo-Pacific. A fleet that is seen as unable to meet commitments invites miscalculation; one that can regenerate strength through allied shipbuilding signals staying power. Second, it would bind the U.S. and South Korea in a deeper web of strategic interdependence. The alliance has already expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula into global issues such as Ukraine, cyber defense, and space security. Industrial cooperation on shipbuilding would extend this trend, anchoring the alliance in a tangible infrastructure of shared production.
Third, MASGA fits squarely into Washington’s own rhetoric on burden-sharing. Rather than viewing allied contributions narrowly in terms of troop deployments or host-nation support, MASGA redefines burden-sharing in industrial and technological terms. South Korea, through its competitive shipbuilding sector, would be providing a capability that the U.S. urgently needs, while benefiting from access to advanced U.S. naval technologies and design standards. This is not charity but a mutually reinforcing partnership.
Of course, challenges remain. Legal frameworks such as the Jones Act, concerns about technology transfer, and potential opposition from U.S. labor unions could complicate implementation. Seoul, for its part, would need to ensure that its participation in MASGA does not trigger pushback from Beijing, which already views ROK–U.S. military cooperation with suspicion. But these hurdles are not insurmountable. They call for political leadership, careful framing, and institutional design—treating MASGA not as an outsourcing scheme but as an allied capacity-building initiative central to alliance security.
The Indo-Pacific security environment is entering a decisive decade. China’s naval rise, North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities, and Russia’s disruptive behavior in the maritime domain all point to a future where sea power will be even more critical. The U.S.–ROK alliance must adapt not only in operational terms but also in industrial foundations. MASGA offers a practical pathway: by linking South Korea’s proven shipbuilding strengths to America’s strategic requirements, it strengthens deterrence, reinforces alliance credibility, and ensures that the maritime balance does not tilt irreversibly. For both Washington and Seoul, this is not about shipbuilding alone; it is about securing the alliance’s future in an era of intensifying great-power competition.
Jihoon Yu is a research fellow and the director of external cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Jihoon was the member of Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project. He is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, and maritime strategy. He earned his MA in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University.
13. South Korea Should Build Out a Reconnaissance Satellite Ecosystem
Excerpts:
As the Indo-Pacific security environment grows more complex, South Korea cannot afford to remain dependent on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance priorities of external partners. The current reliance on foreign systems and fragmented policy structures leaves critical vulnerabilities in both deterrence and crisis response. These gaps have significant implications: Without resilient and autonomous reconnaissance satellite capabilities, South Korea risks strategic blind spots that could undermine national sovereignty and weaken deterrence.
Addressing these challenges requires more than technological upgrades. It calls for building a sustainable national ecosystem that integrates operational models, contracting mechanisms, and legal frameworks, supported by civil–military partnerships and innovative sustainment practices. Such an approach would not only reduce lifecycle costs and improve readiness but also anchor South Korea’s sovereignty in space.
While no single model fits all, the lessons from the United States, France, Japan, and Israel demonstrate viable pathways. For Seoul, the way forward is to adapt these approaches into a tailored strategy — expanding partnerships, embedding resilience in system design, and linking sustainment with long-term strategic objectives. In doing so, South Korea can ensure its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are not only functional but resilient, responsive, and firmly aligned with its strategic posture.
South Korea Should Build Out a Reconnaissance Satellite Ecosystem
Chang-young Lee
September 29, 2025
warontherocks.com · September 29, 2025
What happens if, in the opening hours of a crisis on the Korean peninsula, U.S. reconnaissance satellites turned their gaze elsewhere? For South Korea, this is not an abstract question, but a pressing national security vulnerability. Despite being a global technology powerhouse, Seoul remains heavily dependent on U.S. — and, to a lesser extent, Japanese — intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for early warning and strategic awareness. This dependency is especially perilous given that South Korea faces a nuclear-armed neighbor that has repeatedly threatened the use of such weapons.
A recent acceleration in North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, coupled with intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, has raised concerns in South Korea that the intelligence assets of allies — especially satellites — might be re-prioritized if a crisis erupts. Satellites are unique among collection platforms: They can deliver persistent, wide area coverage, forming the backbone of an independent strategic intelligence-gathering capability.
To address the vulnerability, South Korea should invest in reconnaissance satellite technology. This technology should be complemented by a comprehensive satellite sustainment ecosystem, underpinned by robust policies, contracting mechanisms, and civil-military cooperation. This supporting architecture is as critical as satellite hardware for ensuring long-term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resilience.
BECOME A MEMBER
Conventionally Capable, Strategically Dependent
While South Korea has strong conventional forces, including missile defense systems; high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles; and complex command, control, communications, and computers, its independent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity remains limited. This means Seoul can monitor North Korean activity intermittently and often through U.S. feeds, yet it cannot conduct continuous, sovereign surveillance of missile sites or nuclear facilities. In a fast-moving crisis, this gap could leave decision-makers in Seoul vulnerable to delays and external dependencies.
At present, South Korea operates a small fleet of E-737 airborne early-warning aircraft and a handful of reconnaissance planes, while relying heavily on U.S. satellite imagery and signals intelligence. Its first military reconnaissance satellite was only launched in 2023, and full constellation coverage is still years away. Even with high-altitude unmanned systems like the RQ-4 Global Hawk, persistent monitoring and rapid targeting depend on data streams provided by the United States — and, increasingly, Japan. This dependence underscores South Korea’s vulnerability: Unlike partners such as France or Japan, which maintain autonomous surveillance baselines, Seoul has yet to secure an independent reconnaissance satellite architecture.
Meanwhile, South Korea has made remarkable progress in developing and producing commercial satellites over the past three decades. Seoul started to build out its capacity in the space field with its first small satellite, KITSAT-1, launched in 1992. Since then, South Korea’s technical prowess has advanced significantly. For example, KOMPSAT-3A, a multipurpose low earth orbit satellite launched in 2015, has a 144-fold better resolution than KOMPSAT-1, a predecessor. Today, South Korea has a satellite lineup consisting of low earth orbit satellites with optical, infrared, and radar payloads, as well as geosynchronous earth orbit satellites with communication, ocean, and meteorological payloads.
However, in the area of national security — particularly military reconnaissance satellites — the country lags behind regional peers like Japan as well as global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance leaders such as the United States and Israel. This lag is due to many factors: historical underinvestment in space, policy fragmentation between defense and science ministries, and a longstanding reliance on the United States for security and intelligence.
Until 2024, space-related policy and research and development in South Korea were scattered across multiple ministries, leading to fragmented budgets and policy implementation. This structure, split between the Ministries of Science and Information and Communication Technology, the Ministry of National Defense, and private space research institutes, inevitably weakened the driving force for reconnaissance satellite investment. In 2024, South Korea established its first space agency, the Korea AeroSpace Administration, to integrate and manage all these functions.
Encouragingly, the satellite-related defense industry is beginning to evolve. South Korean companies that participated in early reconnaissance satellite programs now contribute to advanced follow-on systems, including microsatellite constellations in low earth orbit. This expansion marks a major milestone, positioning South Korea to use commercial innovation for defense purposes. Still, the infrastructure to sustain these systems throughout their lifespan — from mission design and launch to secure data transmission, sensor calibration, orbital correction, and eventual decommissioning — remains underdeveloped.
Building the Ecosystem
Reconnaissance satellites are not stand-alone assets. Instead, they depend on an integrated sustainment ecosystem. Secure communications, orbital stability, anomaly recovery, and long-term sensor performance should be managed cohesively. For South Korea, this requires moving from project-based acquisitions to a systemic approach that involves both military and civilian stakeholders. The commercial sector can provide agility and innovation, while the military ensures security and mission alignment. Achieving this balance between the public and private sectors demands progress on four pillars: technology, operations, contracts, and legal systems. Procurement strategies should evolve beyond short-term contracts to stable, long-term arrangements that encourage industrial investment and innovation.
International Approaches
To address the challenge facing South Korea, it is useful to examine how major countries sustain their reconnaissance satellites. Each model reflects distinct national approaches — based in part on prevailing security concerns, technical and economic capacities, and strategic cultures — yet all prioritize mission success and availability.
The U.S. military integrates intelligence operations into a full-spectrum command and control architecture which supports global situational awareness and response. At the heart of this capability is a robust satellite-based surveillance infrastructure. The United States employs long-term contracting that blends performance-based logistics with contractor logistics support. This ensures budget predictability, continuity of technology, and reduced lifecycle costs while maintaining operational stability.
Japan takes a state-led approach and embeds resilience into system design, emphasizing end-to-end encryption, AI-based monitoring, and hardened electronic warfare defense.
Israel uses small, high-performance satellites and integrates contractor logistics support with export packages, enabling a package model that strengthens both intelligence autonomy and defense exports.
While these approaches differ in contract structures, civil-military cooperation, and export strategies, they collectively highlight that sustainment — not acquisition alone — is the linchpin of a resilient reconnaissance satellite capability. For South Korea, these cases illustrate potential pathways: expanding civil–military partnerships, adopting integrated product support-based maintenance, embedding AI-enabled security, and exploring export-linked sustainment models. These are not prescriptive solutions but viable options tailored to South Korea’s emerging space ambitions.
Implications and Recommendations
To build a resilient and self-sufficient reconnaissance satellite ecosystem, South Korea should move beyond simple acquisition and focus on establishing a comprehensive sustainment strategy. This requires a systemic approach that integrates policy, technology, and contracting, drawing lessons from international approaches while tailoring them to South Korea’s specific needs.
First, South Korea should prioritize an operational system centered on mission success and availability rather than merely extending a satellite’s lifespan. Like the United States, Israel, and Japan, South Korea can ensure this through long-term technical support, structured training programs, a robust system for spare parts management, routine software upgrades, and real-time satellite health monitoring.
Second, to improve efficiency and reduce lifecycle costs, South Korea should expand integrated product support and performance-based logistics. The U.S. model shows how long-term performance-based logistics contracts with industry can provide stability and curb expenses, a strategy South Korea could adapt for its own reconnaissance satellite program.
Third, public-private partnerships combined with long-term maintenance contracts, as seen in France, are critical. Given South Korea’s growing private-sector expertise, expanding these partnerships would not only spread costs — thus decreasing the economic burden on any single entity — but also accelerate technological innovation, fostering a collaborative environment.
Fourth, South Korea should follow the lead of Israel and Japan by integrating end-to-end encryption, AI-based anomaly detection, and hardened relay networks from the design stage to reduce vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Strengthening cyber and electronic warfare resilience is indispensable.
Fifth, South Korea should seek satellite logistics independence. Without indigenous sustainment, South Korea risks becoming even more dependent on external parties for its intelligence needs. Israel, France, and Japan demonstrate how combining satellite exports with sustainment packages can enhance both autonomy and competitiveness. For South Korea, building an integrated capability across design, operation, and logistics could lay the foundation for future export models.
Sixth, to institutionalize these efforts, South Korea should establish a legal framework for sustainable logistics support. This includes incorporating military reconnaissance satellite logistics into South Korea’s defense support program, which would provide a legal foundation for civil-military cooperation. Contracts for this cooperation should be both short-term and long-term, using single-vendor contracts for sensitive areas like secure communications and competitive bidding for standardized areas such as training and spare parts.
Finally, a civil-military consortium is essential for applying advanced technology and ensuring continuous updates. This collaborative hub would keep sensor technologies like electro-optical imaging, infrared sensing, and synthetic aperture radar current, granting the military access to commercial innovation. Ultimately, fostering a sustainable satellite ecosystem requires integrating operational models, contracting mechanisms, and legal frameworks, with a civil-military consortium serving as a central point of coordination. Seoul’s overarching goal should be to achieve resilient, responsive, and persistent intelligence capabilities that align with the country’s strategic posture.
Conclusion
As the Indo-Pacific security environment grows more complex, South Korea cannot afford to remain dependent on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance priorities of external partners. The current reliance on foreign systems and fragmented policy structures leaves critical vulnerabilities in both deterrence and crisis response. These gaps have significant implications: Without resilient and autonomous reconnaissance satellite capabilities, South Korea risks strategic blind spots that could undermine national sovereignty and weaken deterrence.
Addressing these challenges requires more than technological upgrades. It calls for building a sustainable national ecosystem that integrates operational models, contracting mechanisms, and legal frameworks, supported by civil–military partnerships and innovative sustainment practices. Such an approach would not only reduce lifecycle costs and improve readiness but also anchor South Korea’s sovereignty in space.
While no single model fits all, the lessons from the United States, France, Japan, and Israel demonstrate viable pathways. For Seoul, the way forward is to adapt these approaches into a tailored strategy — expanding partnerships, embedding resilience in system design, and linking sustainment with long-term strategic objectives. In doing so, South Korea can ensure its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are not only functional but resilient, responsive, and firmly aligned with its strategic posture.
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Chang-young Lee is a researcher at Security Management Institute in Seoul, specializing in the defense industry and sustainment logistics. A retired Republic of Korea Air Force lieutenant colonel, he served as an F-4 weapon selector officer and in the avionics, maintenance, and logistics fields.
Image: Midjourney
warontherocks.com · September 29, 2025
14. What it would take for Trump to play golf with Kim – Part II
I would like to see them play golf but KJU would be very afraid because not only would POTUS decisively beat him on the golf course, it would also expose KJU's weakness and lack of any athletic ability.
On a serious note I will say no one is going to win a Nobel Peace Prize for talking to north Korea or even for denuclearization. POTUS must understand that a Nobel will only be given to those who solve the Korea question, the unnatural division of the peninsula.
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Excerpt:
For Trump, this is more than another deal – it is the chance to write his name into history as the man who turned confrontation into peace. By securing a breakthrough with Pyongyang, Trump could win the Nobel Peace Prize he has long desired. For Kim, the reward would be no less profound – lifting millions of North Koreans out of poverty, laying the foundations for lasting prosperity, and securing his place in history as the leader who secured a bright future for North Korea. This is the only viable plan that can lead to a win-win situation for all stakeholders involved. It is high time for Trump and Kim to put an end to the issue and let golf clubs do the talking instead of missiles.
What it would take for Trump to play golf with Kim – Part II
Devising a package deal Kim cannot refuse
By Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. - September 23, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/what-it-would-take-for-trump-to-play-golf-with-kim-part-ii/
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shake hands at the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit. / Image: Kevin Lim/THE STRAITS TIMES
In the first part of this two-part series, I argued that for the DPRK, nuclear weapons are at best a means of deterrence, but cannot constitute a viable substitute for legitimacy. It should be noted that the challenge that North Korea faces does not emanate from external threats, but from its own internal inconsistencies: the blatant contradiction between the ruling ideology and prevailing reality that has led to the erosion of the Kim regime’s legitimacy and threatens its survival. When it comes to the DPRK’s denuclearization, world leaders must fully grasp this premise.
This brings us to the second and more pertinent question: what would it take for Donald Trump to convince Kim Jong-un to abandon his nuclear arsenal, opening the door to both denuclearization and that much-discussed game of golf? The challenge for Trump is not simply to bargain over weapons, but to make Kim an offer he cannot refuse – an audacious offer that persuades Kim that the DPRK has a better chance of survival without nuclear weapons than with them.
To make such an offer, the United States must secure the endorsement of the other key stakeholder nations – China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It is imperative that Trump understands that the United States alone does not have all the means – neither “carrots” nor “sticks” – to offer a viable package deal to Kim. Only a package endorsed by all sides can reverse Kim’s prevailing stance and make a round of golf between Trump and Kim more than just a fantasy.
“Carrots” and “sticks”: a cost-benefit analysis
For both Beijing and Moscow, any deal must guarantee the survival of the Kim regime, and ensure that the DPRK continues to act as a strategic buffer between themselves and South Korea – a US ally. Trump has both “carrots” and “sticks” that he can deploy to secure their support. The most significant “carrot” is the removal of US ground troops from South Korea – contingent upon the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. This step not only addresses North Korea’s security concerns but also aligns with the long-term interests of China and Russia, easing their concerns over the US military presence on the peninsula. However, Trump also possesses “sticks” he can apply against North Korea, should it reject the deal. If the DPRK refuses denuclearization, or if China and Russia withhold their support, Washington could redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, as it has done in the past, or even encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Either scenario would render North Korea’s nuclear deterrent obsolete while creating profound security risks for both China and Russia, potentially destabilizing the entire region. In effect, Trump can offer North Korea and its traditional partners a stark choice – a roadmap toward economic development, peace, and regional prosperity, or a drift toward nuclear proliferation, and confrontation in Northeast Asia.
Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump at the second U.S.-DPRK summit in Hanoi in February 2019. (KCNA)
US allies in the region also have a critical role to play. South Korea stands to benefit the most from the DPRK’s denuclearization, therefore it must provide the necessary development funds to support the economic reforms required to achieve economic development within the DPRK. This should be coupled with security guarantees, a peace treaty with South Korea, normalization of relations with the United States, and the removal of American troops from South Korea upon culmination of the deal. Japan can provide diplomatic normalization and economic aid to North Korea, but it also carries unresolved historical grievances that need to be addressed and for which Tokyo would be compelled to compensate.
Ultimately, for the denuclearization of the DPRK to take place, the stakeholder states must come up with a shared policy that is mutually beneficial, rather than a zero-sum game.
Necessary conditions
Any viable denuclearization proposal must acknowledge that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is not a mere bargaining chip but a core pillar of regime survival, both as a deterrent to real or imagined threats, and as a fulfillment of Kim Il-sung’s mandate. This raises the threshold for any acceptable deal. To bring Kim Jong-un to the table, stakeholder nations must first satisfy a set of necessary conditions – not sufficient for the long-term survival of the DPRK, but essential for Kim to consider negotiations. These include:
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Security guarantees from the United States, South Korea, and Japan to respect North Korea’s sovereignty and security, the normalization of relations through the establishment of embassies, explicit reassurances that its traditional partnerships with China and Russia will remain intact, and signing a peace treaty with South Korea, officially ending the Korean War.
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Lifting all forms of military and economic threats and pressures, including UN-led sanctions, joint US-South Korean military exercises, deployment of advanced weapon systems, and the broader policy of diplomatic isolation.
- Allocating sufficient development funds of at least $30 billion annually – over a period of 10 years – for a total of $300 billion: South Korea, as it stands to benefit the most from denuclearization, would supply the bulk of this funding, supplemented by reparations from Japan.
Meeting these conditions would not automatically ensure the survival of the DPRK. Without nuclear weapons, the survival of the DPRK is contingent upon robust economic development. To achieve this, there are sufficient conditions that need to be met.
Sufficient conditions
The commitments offered by key stakeholders provide only the necessary conditions for denuclearization. They may open the door to negotiations, but they cannot by themselves guarantee the long-term survival of the DPRK. For that, North Korea must meet a distinct set of sufficient conditions:
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Kim must formulate a strategic plan, an economic blueprint that will transform the existing extractive system into an inclusive one. This plan must lay the foundations for economic modernization within 10 years: by achieving robust, economic development, Kim will be able to preserve the integrity of the DPRK, and ensure a peaceful succession process. He must display unwavering commitment to reform and opening in order to achieve an economic miracle, perhaps surpassing even South Korea, Singapore, or China during their peaks.
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For the DPRK’s economy to integrate successfully within the world’s economy, structural market-oriented economic reforms are needed: business entities currently operating without legal sanction in the shadow economy must be legalized, protection of property rights must be guaranteed, and the means of production must cease to be exclusively in the hands of the state. Market reforms are required to replace the dysfunctional economic system with an efficient market-socialist framework, carefully adapted to North Korea’s political and social environment.
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To attract the necessary foreign investment required to achieve economic development, North Korea needs to abandon its current belligerent foreign policy and replace it with an amicable one. Proper legislation to facilitate foreign investments based upon market principles must be introduced. This implies that political reform has to precede economic reform: only Kim holds the power to achieve this.
- Achieving sustained economic growth – an average GDP growth rate of at least 10% annually – will require securing sufficient development funds for an amount of $300 billion from South Korea and other stakeholders. This should be provided as a trade-up for denuclearization. Furthermore, in order to maintain stability, Kim should introduce special economic zones to attract foreign investments and contain the spread of market activities that could undermine his regime.
Unless Kim renounces the Juche ideology no external assistance will save the regime. Juche’s belligerent character makes peaceful coexistence with South Korea impossible. Class struggle remains a core pillar of Juche, and so long as the DPRK holds onto Juche, it will need a perpetual enemy. Even without nuclear weapons, such an ideology guarantees hostility, undermining the very peace a denuclearization deal is meant to secure.
Lessons from past socialist experiences
A 2015 Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Svetlana Alexievich, quoted a joke in her book, Secondhand Time: “From the very beginning, communism was based on an error. Remember the song, ‘Our train is flying forward, / The next stop is the commune…’…‘Trains don’t fly.” Indeed, historical experience shows that a socialist economic system cannot achieve economic development. North Korea and South Korea are compelling proof of that. The economic gap between North Korea and South Korea is considerable: South Korea’s GDP is 60 times higher than the DPRK’s and, according to our estimations, should the current trend persist, South Korea’s GDP will be more than 78 times higher than the Northern one by 2035. As it was the case for other socialist countries in the past, the crux of the issue is not merely economic, but political – embedded in the ruling ideology on which all socialist systems are founded.
N/S Korea GDP Growth Rate: 2015 to 2024
Table with 12 columns and 2 rows. (column headers with buttons are sortable)2015201620172018201920202021202220232024AVERAGEDPRK−1.10%3.90%−3.50%−4.10%0.40%−4.50%−0.10%−0.20%3.10%3.70%−0.24%South Korea2.90%3.20%3.40%3.20%2.30%−0.70%4.60%2.70%1.60%2.00%2.52%
Source: Bank of Korea (BOK) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)Get the dataCreated with Datawrapper
2035: S. Korea's GDP will be 78 times larger than N. Korea's
Table with 3 columns and 4 rows. (column headers with buttons are sortable)DPRKSouth Korea2024 (current)$31.5 bln.$1.87 trn.Interest (compounded)-0.24%2.52%Period10 years10 years2035 (forecast)30,752,000,000 USD ($30.8 bln)2,398,433,000,000 USD ($2.4 trn.)
Source: Sources: Bank of Korea (BOK) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)Get the dataCreated with Datawrapper
By the late 1970s, China’s leaders, emerging from the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, recognized that Maoist policies had left the country impoverished and isolated. The challenges faced were daunting – and not just economic, but also ideological. Until that point, the nation’s leaders had been guided by a political mindset based on class struggle. Under Deng Xiaoping, the leadership initiated a bold departure from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, in December 1978, the Plenum moved away from class struggle ideology: “From this day forward, we renounce class struggle as a central focus, and instead take up economic development as our central focus.” Central planning gave way to indicative planning, the rationing system was dismantled, and private enterprises – including property rights – were introduced, paving the way for a thriving private sector and foreign investment. While Deng was a pragmatic Just-Do-It leader, under his guidance the party had a major ideological shift. These changes set China on a path of sustained growth and global integration, later mirrored in Vietnam’s Đổi Mới reforms.
In the Soviet Union, it was not until the mid-1980s that Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged the system’s stagnation and sought to revitalize socialism through glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika (“restructuring”). The reform program included measures such as cost accounting for enterprises, decentralization of economic management, adjustments to price formation, and restructuring foreign trade. However, these reforms remained framed within the ideological boundaries of socialism, and thus lacked the transformative impact of Deng’s approach. In the spring of 1991, I had the chance to meet with Gorbachev. The meeting was organized by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the leader of the soon-to-be-independent Republic of Kazakhstan. I worked with Nazarbayev as his Economic Advisor and as the Vice-Chairman of the Expert Committee, which Nazarbayev himself chaired. Kazakhstan was implementing radical market-oriented economic reform at the time which led to robust economic development, in sharp contrast with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’s leadership. When I met with Gorbachev, we spent hours together as I tried to argue and persuade him that, in order to save the Soviet Union, a reform of the system was sine qua non. I explained that, without altering the ownership structure and renouncing the ideology of class struggle, no reform would succeed. But Gorbachev was not ready to give up on the ideology he had served all his life and stated that he wished to be remembered as a proud dedicated communist. Eventually, he faced a coup in August 1991 that subsequently triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
For Trump, this is more than another deal – it is the chance to write his name into history as the man who turned confrontation into peace. By securing a breakthrough with Pyongyang, Trump could win the Nobel Peace Prize he has long desired. For Kim, the reward would be no less profound – lifting millions of North Koreans out of poverty, laying the foundations for lasting prosperity, and securing his place in history as the leader who secured a bright future for North Korea. This is the only viable plan that can lead to a win-win situation for all stakeholders involved. It is high time for Trump and Kim to put an end to the issue and let golf clubs do the talking instead of missiles.
15. N. Korea’s deadly propaganda machine
N. Korea’s deadly propaganda machine
Russia has attempted to use North Korean reinforcements and drones to gain an upper hand in the war in Ukraine, but this hasn't produced the desired breakthrough
By Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University - September 29, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-deadly-propaganda-machine/
Rodong Sinmun reported on Aug. 22, 2025, that "a state decoration ceremony for commanders and combatants of the Korean People's Army overseas operation units was held at the Party Central Committee headquarters building," adding that "commanders and combatants who achieved outstanding military exploits in overseas military operations, as well as bereaved families of martyrs, participated in the ceremony." The photo shows Kim Jong Un greeting bereaved families. (Rodong Sinmun·News1)
North Korea’s ruling party has recently bestowed the title “Hero of the Republic” upon soldiers who died fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and has published videos of supreme leader Kim Jong Un shedding tears of mourning. While these actions have drawn criticism from the international community, the Workers’ Party of Korea is sending lecturers across the country to promote the slogan that “our army is the best.”
A source in South Pyongan province said that lecturers discussing the Russia-Ukraine War in Pyongsong and other areas have repeatedly emphasized that “our army is the best under the Party’s wise leadership.”
But this slogan amounts to deceitful propaganda. Just as North Korea has distorted the truth about the Korean War—which it blames on South Korea and the United States—it is also whitewashing the human cost of the war in Ukraine, spreading a misleading narrative aimed at fostering national unity.
The reality is that the international community has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an “unjust war.”
When Ukraine moved to join NATO, Russia launched an invasion to counter what it called a “threat” to its sovereignty and state survival. But for many critics, this was a calculated act of aggression designed to shift the global balance of power.
The Pyongyang regime hasn’t shared this context with the public. Instead, it has deployed thousands of young soldiers to the battlefield.
North Korea’s military reality check
Moreover, the North Korean military cannot objectively be described as “the best.” Global Firepower, an annual ranking that considers over 60 factors, places North Korea in 34th place, while South Korea ranks 5th. This ranking focuses on troop numbers and equipment quantities, without weighing weapon system functionality, years of service, or training levels. If those factors were included, North Korea’s military would undoubtedly rank even lower.
In modern warfare, the decisive factor is strategic strike capability. To end a war before it begins, a military must be able to launch precision strikes that cripple the enemy’s ability to fight.
Although Russia enjoys a comfortable numerical advantage over Ukraine in soldiers and equipment, it has struggled with limited air power and resources depleted over the course of this protracted war, now in its third year. Russia has attempted to use North Korean reinforcements and drones to fill the gap, but this hasn’t produced the desired breakthrough.
Experts believe North Korean units have suffered heavy losses on the battlefield as they’ve struggled to adapt to modern weaponry. Drones and missiles capable of precision strikes pose a deadly threat to North Korean soldiers, many of whom have been killed in action.
North Korea devotes over 20% of its GDP to the military, but aside from its nuclear weapons, it has little that compares to the world’s major military powers. True military strength is a comprehensive measure that includes not only troop numbers and equipment but also technical expertise, training quality, and economic foundation.
All in all, North Korea’s slogan of “our army is the best” is far from reality. Rather than whipping up patriotism to protect the regime, North Korea’s leaders should swiftly bring their troops home and reunite them with their families.
Read in Korean
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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