Quotes of the Day:

"Hold on to what is good, 

Even if it's a handful of earth.

Hold on to what you believe, 

Even if it's a tree that stands by itself. 

Hold on to what you must do, 

Even if it's a long way from here. 

Hold on to your life, 

Even if it's easier to let go. 

Hold on to my hand, 

Even if someday I'll be gone away from you."

- Crowfoot, Blackfoot warrior and orator 1830 - 1890

"The greater part of the population is not very intelligent, dreads responsibility, and desires nothing better than to be told what to do. Provided the rulers do not interfere with its material comforts and its cherished beliefs, it is perfectly happy to let itself be ruled. "

~Aldous Huxley 

"Great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people." 

- Admiral Hyman G. Rickover

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

2. War Books: A Crash Course on Clausewitz

3. A year after China cut mil-to-mil contacts with US, a hint of thaw?

4. New phone sparks worry China has found a way around U.S. tech limits

5. How the War in Ukraine is Likely Driving a New World Order

6. How Xi Returned China to One-Man Rule

7. China to Its People: Spies Are Everywhere, Help Us Catch Them

8. Beijing’s Dangerous Flirtation With Hard Power Intimidation – Analysis

9. SOF Can Help Win the Competition for Influence in South America

10. Why Some People Turn Into Political Extremists

11. Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Spoofing

12. Raimondo says US ‘trying to choke’ China’s military capacity with superconductor limits

13. Palantir: Treading On Thin Ice (NYSE:PLTR)

14. Biden to award Vietnam-era Army helicopter pilot with Medal of Honor

15. The à la carte world: our new geopolitical order

16. West Virginia's foreign language cuts could be a "blueprint" for higher ed attacks

17. Poll: 56% of Americans say debt ceiling fight made them trust government less

18. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September

19. Opinion | By Abandoning Civics, Colleges Helped Create the Culture Wars

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
• Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.
• The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.
• Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 2, 2023

Sep 2, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 2, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] Russian milbloggers who have recently maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces have overcome the Russian “first line of defense” in some areas of the Zaporizhia direction, but that the situation remains difficult due to additional Russian concrete fortifications and dense minefields.[3]

The New York Times reported on September 2 citing Ukrainian military personnel that Russian forces are spreading inflammable agents on mined fields and igniting them with drone-launched grenades while Ukrainian forces clear mines from the areas in an effort to hinder Ukrainian mine clearing efforts that have allowed Ukrainian forces to advance in certain areas.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[5] This observation is not universally true across the frontline, as Ukrainian units regularly report coming under heavy Russian artillery fire corrected by Russian drones. Grosberg also stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful at severely damaging Russian artillery radars since July.[6] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.[7]

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov’s contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov’s replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.

The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues. Director of the Russian think tank the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Valery Garbuzov, published an article on August 29 criticizing Russian ruling elites who, he argues, have created and perpetuated a series of “utopian myths” about Russian hegemony, the “crisis of capitalism,” and Russia’s claimed leadership of a global anti-Western coalition.[13] Prominent voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space levied largely coherent criticisms against Garbuzov’s article on September 2, criticizing Garbuzov’s argument and the Russian political and informational structures that allowed Garbuzov to hold a prominent position in the Russian political sphere.[14] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Telegram channels have filled an analytical gap in the Russian information space following the onset of the war in Ukraine that think tanks should fill and continue to do so 18 months later.[15]

Prominent Russian milbloggers likely have a monetary incentive to regularly report information about the war in Ukraine that is uncritical of Russian authorities. BBC reported on September 1 that prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that they can make between about 48,000 and 188,000 rubles (about $500 to 1,950) per advertisement on their Telegram channels.[16] BBC reported that an advertising agent working with Wagner-affiliated channels claimed that a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated source made around 31,500 rubles (about $330) per advertisement.[17] The advertising agent told BBC that several employees of RIA FAN, a now-shuttered media outlet affiliated with former Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, received only about 10,500 to 21,800 rubles (about $108 to $226) per advertisement due to their lower subscriber count.[18] BBC noted that Russia’s average monthly salary is about 66,000 rubles (about $685). Prominent milbloggers’ monthly salaries are thus likely much higher than the Russian average. Russian milbloggers are likely economically incentivized to maintain and grow audiences through war reporting that is uncritical of Russian authorities, as criticism of the Russian authorities, resistance to attempted censorship, and potential legal problems could lead to a decrease in advertisements, although milbloggers who present themselves as telling unpleasant truths can also gain large followings. Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a prominent milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council, claimed that milbloggers have a “direct channel to privately communicate information” to the Russian MoD.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
• Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.
• The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.
• Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on September 2 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 1 and 2 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several Ukrainian positions north of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), west of Svatove toward the Oskil River, and near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka and Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[22] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on September 1 that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to advance in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[23] Footage published on September 2 purportedly shows elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line, elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People‘s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) operating near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) operating in the Lysychansk direction.[24]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Kreminna near Dibrova (7km southwest) and Hryhorivka (11km south) on September 2.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced near Klishchiivka, although these gains are likely not recent.[26] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes near Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka (all 7-13km southwest of Bakhmut), which Malyar characterized as the center of hostilities in the Bakhmut direction.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian assault groups unsuccessfully attacked near Bakhmut.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line.[29]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and reportedly advanced. Russian sources claimed on September 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are operating near Klishchiivka.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kurdyumivka, and Malyar stated on September 1 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked on the northern flank of Bakhmut.[32]

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) on September 2.[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novomykhailivka and Marinka.[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that fighting is ongoing in western Donetsk Oblast amid evidence of further Ukrainian gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains north of Pavlivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City), although these gains are likely not recent.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are ongoing battles near Shevchenko (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and noted that the settlement is an important Russian logistics hub in the area.[37]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful offensive operations along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified the shelling of Russian positions along the Staromayorske-Pryyutne line.[39] The New York Times reported that Ukrainian personnel fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area stated that Russian forces are deploying reinforcements to this sector of the front due to concerns about further Ukrainian advances.[40] The New York Times also reported that Russian forces have established defensive positions along the T0518 (Velyka Novosilka to Nikolske) highway and are constantly surveilling the section of the highway closer to the frontline with drones.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[43] Russian milbloggers who have previously maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[44] Another milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in forest areas south of Robotyne.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions east of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and that fighting is ongoing between Novoprokopivka and Verbove.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack Russian defensive positions near Verbove and that there is ongoing fighting in fields west of the settlement.[47]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 but did not specify an outcome. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a series of counterattacks southwest and south of Robotyne.[48]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to target Russian rear areas and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and occupied Crimea on September 1 and 2. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted an unspecified Ukrainian projectile targeting Berdyansk.[49] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoriia Halistyna stated that residents reported a large explosion in Berdyansk.[50] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that two explosions occurred near a Russian military base in Kyrylivka (50km south of Melitopol) on September 1.[51] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea that were allegedly targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of September 1 to 2.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as of September 2. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions between Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City) and Pidstepne (13km east of Kherson City).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian groups that tried to replenish a Ukrainian grouping on the left bank near the Antonivsky bridge on September 1.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine. Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported on September 2 that the DNR formed its own branch of Rosgvardia based on the Russian “Vostok” Battalion, a DNR formation that currently operates near Novodonetske and Novomayorske in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[55] RIA Novosti reported that the DNR Rosgvardia’s main strike force is made up of special rapid response (SOBR) forces, currently roughly a motorized rifle platoon, and is training in an unspecified Russian rear area.[56] The formation of a dedicated Rosgvardia branch to assist with security in occupied Ukraine may free up some conventional Russian or DNR units and allow them to deploy to the front line, although not enough to matter at the reported scale. DNR officials may also recruit for Rosgvardia under the premise of operating in deep rear areas and later deploy these units to the frontline anyway.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration published a list of polling stations in over 45 Russian federal subjects for displaced Ukrainians to vote for the occupation regional elections.[57]

Russian authorities continue targeting Ukrainian civilians, including medically fragile civilians, for forcible deportation to Russia. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on September 2 that she invited disabled young adults in occupied Kherson Oblast to live at an assisted living facility in Penza Oblast.[58] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities have detained over 1,000 Ukrainian civilians in southern Ukraine since the start of 2023 and currently hold these Ukrainians in filtration camps without trial or investigation.[59]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported on September 2 that the first Russian tactical nuclear weapons recently arrived in Belarus. Budanov stated that the risk of Russian forces using nuclear weapons from Belarusian territory is “zero.”[60] Budanov reported that Russian forces transferred an unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads for Tochka-U missiles as well as for Su-24m aircraft to Belarusian forces.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relieved Major General Valery Gnilozub from his post as Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Control due to his retirement on September 1.[61]

The Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) continued the “Combat Brotherhood 2023” operational-strategic command staff exercises in Belarus on September 2.[62]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. War Books: A Crash Course on Clausewitz

Readings (and podcasts) for the remainder of Labor Day weekend.

War Books: A Crash Course on Clausewitz - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joe Byerly, Nathan K. Finney · September 1, 2023

Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We ask an expert on a particular subject to recommend five books on that topic and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

For this edition, we’re bringing back a popular contribution from Joe Byerly and Nathan K. Finney, first published in 2019. In it, the two explain that the most influential military theorist among US Army officers is Carl von Clausewitz, but with little time given to formal instruction on the Prussian’s ideas and his most famous work, On War, it is left to individuals to develop an understanding of the ideas and their modern application independently. Byerly and Finney offer a series of books and other resources for military professionals seeking a better, more detailed, and more nuanced understanding of Clausewitz’s work.

If running a rifle range is a critical gate in the development of company-grade officers, understanding On War should share a similar importance for field grades (regardless of career field). Clausewitz’s treatise is important because he introduces several theories and themes that illuminate and inform our modern-day outlooks on war, leadership, and strategy.

The problem, however, is that most field grades do not tackle the theorist until they get to their intermediate leader education (ILE) and are rushed through the material, barely taking the time to absorb it. For example, when the Naval War College and the Command and General Staff College introduced Clausewitz, we had to read him within a week, along with several other articles and chapters of other books. Additionally, the portions of the book foisted on intellectually saturated ILE students are dense, are devoid of any context, and really only cover the highlights that anyone can get by simply Googling “On War.”

If leaders try to read Clausewitz on their own, most are unaware of supplemental material to support their understanding, the best translations to use, or which sections (or “books”) within On War are most relevant today.

The intent of edition of War Books is to provide some minimal guidance to those who wish to read Clausewitz on their own or supplement the basic familiarity they gained in ILE.

Clausewitz is One of Us

When we first heard leaders quote Clausewitz, we pictured him as some wise old sage from history who sat in high tower writing about war. That couldn’t be further from the truth. As Sir Hew Strachan wrote, “[Carl von Clausewitz] would have rather exercised high command than written about it.” He was a young, ambitious combat arms officer who experienced war for the first time at the age of twelve. When Prussia returned to a peacetime posture he became disgruntled. Throughout his twenties he wrestled with the fact that his day-to-day life in garrison looked nothing like what he experienced in combat. War was messy, and “home station” training was mechanistic and too scripted. Meanwhile, Napoleonic France, Prussia’s neighbor, was in the midst of forcefully changing the rules of war. They were doing things so differently that leaders of nations (civilian and military) couldn’t keep up. Eventually France steamrolled Prussia, and Clausewitz was forced to reflect on the defeat. This failure is what drove Clausewitz to write.

Having seen war firsthand, he writes about friction in war, an element that is still present today. He examines leadership and decision-making in war. He teaches us that experience is not enough and that we must bring together self-study, reflection, and our experiences to enhance our decision-making in war.

So, how does a leader penetrate the dense language and focus on the key issues of On War as just described?

First, Context is King

We often recommend those dipping their toes into the dense theory found in On War start by getting a little contextual primer. You can’t go wrong with Sir Michael Howard’s Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction. A leader can finish this (literally) tiny book in a short afternoon, while setting a solid foundation for On War itself.

Second, Translation Matters

Read the translation by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret. It is not only the most clear translation for the practitioner, but also the version all military leaders—inside and outside the United States—reference. Moreover, the Howard and Paret translation includes great introductory essays that offer another way to ease into the big ideas of the book. Finally, at the end of the book theorist Bernard Brodie provides a lucid and useful commentary that readers can reference as they go through the book.

Third, Focus is Key

On War is divided into eight books. It was written over many years and some books are more complete and integrated than others. Also, although Clausewitz attempted to write a timeless treatise, most of the technologies and tactics mentioned in On War are now obviously obsolete. Therefore, readers should focus principally on books one through three and book eight. These are the most complete and applicable to war as we see it today.

Finally, Understand Context

It is easier to understand On War when you understand its context, whether its place in theory or its applicability today. These books are great to have alongside On War to help readers better understand the nineteenth-century Prussian:

Clausewitz and Contemporary War, by Antulio Echevarria

In this book, Echevarria does an amazing job of explaining On War in words that modern readers can understand, as well as tying Clausewitz’s more enduring ideas to today’s character of war.

Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, by Michael I. Handel

This volume of collected works provides an analysis of On War alongside those of by Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and other strategists. This book will help leaders place Clausewitz’s ideas in context with the other leading theorists of war.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, by Colin S. Gray

This book by Colin Gray complements On War, expanding from Clausewitz’s “theory of war” to formulate a “theory of strategy.” This is a dense work that should only be undertaken once a leader has a firm foundation in Clausewitz and other theorists of war, but is critical to understanding how senior military leaders must transition from practitioners of tactical art to a bridge between policy and those tactics.

And of course, there are a host of other resources a leader can use to build a foundation in Clausewitz’s theory, understand the context of his life and work, or expand beyond On War.

Podcasts

There are a few podcasts that we recommend readers listen to for background, insights, and to gain a better understanding of Clausewitz and his writings.

Episode 257: Midrats – Clausewitz Now More Than Ever with Donald Stoker

Before reading On War, I recommend listening to this podcast. In this episode, Donald Stoker discusses Clausewitz the soldier.

Episode 3: The Dead Prussian Podcast – On Carl von Clausewitz with Donald Stoker

Another great summary and history of Clausewitz!

BBC Radio: In Our Time – Clausewitz on War with Sir Michael Howard

This episode provides a history of Clausewitz, as it relates to On War.

Some More History on Clausewitz

If you take a sip of the Clausewitz Kool-Aid and want more, we recommend these books.

Clausewitz and the State, by Peter Paret

Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography, by Sir Hew Strachan

Clausewitz and Contemporary War, by Antulio Echevarria

Clausewitz: His Life and Work, by Donald Stoker

Marie Von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War, by Vanya Bellinger

The Enlightened Soldier, by Charles Edward White

Finally, the ultimate (and free) resource on all things Clausewitz is The Clausewitz Homepage. This website is a one-stop shop for everything relating to Clausewitz and On War.

Lt. Col. Joe Byerly is a US Army armor officer who currently commands 4th Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment. A former nonresident fellow with the Modern War Institute, he founded the leader development website From the Green Notebook.

Lt. Col. Nathan K. Finney is a US Army strategist currently serving as a special assistant to the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command in the commander’s action group. He earned a PhD in history at Duke University in 2022. You can find him on Twitter @NKFinney.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Joe Byerly, Nathan K. Finney · September 1, 2023

3. A year after China cut mil-to-mil contacts with US, a hint of thaw?

Perhaps about as much as holding a candle to a glacier.

A year after China cut mil-to-mil contacts with US, a hint of thaw?

INDOPACOM commander met with Chinese military delegation, Pentagon confirms.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Adm. John Aquilino spoke with Chinese defense officials at a conference this month, a potential breakthrough in military-to-military communications more than a year after China suspended most such interactions.

When Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder was asked on Thursday to respond to a Chinese defense ministry spokesman’s comments about communication between the two militaries, the Pentagon press secretary cited Aquilino’s meeting as an example of U.S. willingness to keep avenues of communication open.

Ryder said Aquilino spoke to the Chinese officials at the 2023 Chiefs of Defense Conference, co-hosted by INDOPACOM in Fiji from Aug. 14 to 16. He did not say what was discussed in Fiji, nor whether INDOPACOM and PRC officials have talked since.

INDOPACOM did not respond to a query about the meeting before publication.

Chinese officials suspended regular contacts with the U.S. military last August after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, which China claims as part of its own country. “But the problem existed even before Pelosi’s visit,” the Associated Press wrote earlier this year. “The U.S. says China has declined or failed to respond to over a dozen requests from the Department of Defense for top-level dialogues since 2021.”

On Thursday, a Chinese defense ministry spokesman said that “military-to-military communication between China and the United States has not stopped” and mentioned Aquilino’s conference meeting with Gen. Xu Qiling, the deputy chief of staff in the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, the South China Morning Post reported.

But the spokesman also said there are still “obstacles” to high-level military communication, including the sanctions on China’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, and continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Ryder was asked to respond at a Pentagon press conference. “[F]rom a United States standpoint, there is nothing preventing the [People’s Republic of China] minister of defense from communicating with Secretary [Lloyd] Austin,” Ryder said. “But again the broader point here being is that we're going to continue to do everything we can do on our part to maintain open lines of communication to reduce the potential for miscalculation. And ensure that, you know, we recognize that we have a relationship characterized by competition, but we do not want a relationship that results in conflict.”

Ryder said that recent conversations between U.S. defense leaders and PRC officials include a recent bilateral meeting with Ely Ratner, the assistant defense secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs.

Communication has also occurred at “lower levels, but certainly we welcome that higher-level communication between the commander of INDOPACOM and PRC officials. Again, to keep the channels of communication open,” he said.

China’s participation in the conference had been in doubt as late as July, when Aquilino told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum that he was not in contact with his Chinese counterparts, who had not responded to an invitation to the event.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

4. New phone sparks worry China has found a way around U.S. tech limits

Excerpts:

high-water mark in China’s technological capabilities, with an advanced chip inside that was both designed and manufactured in China despite onerous U.S. export controls intended to prevent China from making this technical jump. Those sanctions were first imposed by the Trump administration and continued under President Biden.

The timing of the phone announcement on Monday, while Raimondo was in Beijing, appeared to be a show of defiance. Chinese state media declared it showed the U.S. that trade war was a “failure.”

New phone sparks worry China has found a way around U.S. tech limits

Huawei, which has been under U.S. sanctions for years, released the phone pointedly during Gina Raimondo’s visit to Beijing

By Eva Dou

September 2, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Eva Dou · September 2, 2023

As Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo was visiting China earlier this week, a sea-green Chinese smartphone was quietly launched online.

It was no normal gadget. And its launch has sparked hushed concern in Washington that U.S. sanctions have failed to prevent China from making a key technological advance. Such a development would seem to fulfill warnings from U.S. chipmakers that sanctions wouldn’t stop China, but would spur it to redouble efforts to build alternatives to U.S. technology.

Huawei Technologies Co.’s new smartphone, the Mate 60 Pro, represents a new high-water mark in China’s technological capabilities, with an advanced chip inside that was both designed and manufactured in China despite onerous U.S. export controls intended to prevent China from making this technical jump. Those sanctions were first imposed by the Trump administration and continued under President Biden.

The timing of the phone announcement on Monday, while Raimondo was in Beijing, appeared to be a show of defiance. Chinese state media declared it showed the U.S. that trade war was a “failure.”

Paul Triolo, the technology policy lead at the Washington-based business consulting firm Albright Stonebridge Group, called the new phone “a major blow to all of Huawei’s former technology suppliers, mostly U.S. companies.”

“The major geopolitical significance,” he said, “has been to show that it is possible to completely design [without] U.S. technology and still produce a product that may not be quite as good as cutting edge Western models, but is still quite capable.”

Biden administration officials declined to comment.

How powerful the new chip design is remains an open question. Unusually, Huawei revealed little about key aspects of the phone in its announcement, such as whether it was 5G-enabled or what process was used to produce it. In a statement, Huawei simply touted the phone as making breakthroughs in “satellite communications.”

China’s official broadcaster, CGTN, in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter, called the phone Huawei’s “first higher-end processor” since U.S. sanctions were imposed and said the chip it contains was made by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., a company partially owned by the Chinese government.

One person told The Washington Post that the Mate 60 Pro has a 5G chip. Speed tests posted by early buyers of the phone online suggest its performance is similar to top-of-the-line 5G phones. In July, Reuters reported Huawei’s imminent return to the 5G phone market, citing three technology research firms speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Nikkei Asia has reported, citing sources, that SMIC would be using what’s known as the “7-nanometer process” to make the chips for Huawei, the most advanced level in China. This would be on par with the process used for the chips inside Apple’s iPhones launched in 2018. Apple’s latest iPhone chips were made by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, using what is known as the four-nanometer process. A nanometer is a measure of chip size, with the fewer nanometers in the process, the better. A piece of paper is about 100,000 nanometers thick.

U.S. sanctions were intended to slow China’s progress in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and big data by cutting off its ability to buy or build advanced semiconductors, which are the brains of these systems. The unveiling of a domestically produced seven-nanometer chip suggests that has not happened.

Industry experts cautioned that it’s still too early to tell how competitive China’s chipmaking operations will become. But what is clear is that China is still in the game.

“This shows that Chinese companies like Huawei still have plenty of capability to innovate,” said Chris Miller, a professor at Tufts University and author of the book “Chip War.” “I think it will also probably intensify debate in Washington on whether restrictions are to be tightened.”

Few stakeholders have yet to voice opinions publicly, as industry groups seek to confirm more details and evaluate their stances. But there is no doubt the new Huawei phone has sparked discussions of what comes next. “There is a lot of activity,” said Craig Allen, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, a nonprofit group that promotes trade between the United States and China.

Opinions differ as to how the U.S. government should react.

“This development will almost certainly prompt much stronger calls for further tightening of export control licensing for U.S. suppliers of Huawei, who continue to be able to ship commodity semiconductors that are not used for 5G applications,” Triolo said.

On the other hand, he added, “U.S. semiconductor companies would prefer to be able to continue to ship commodity semiconductors to Huawei and other Chinese end users, to maintain market share and stave off the designing [without] U.S. technology from Chinese supply chains more broadly.”

Washington faced a similar quandary of how to hobble the Soviet Union’s technological development during the Cold War. Willy Shih, an economist at Harvard Business School, said Huawei’s breakthrough was evocative of what happened with Global Positioning System technology, now commonly known as GPS. The U.S. Defense Department developed the technology and restricted its export, wary of it in the hands of rivals. But the export restrictions pushed Moscow and other governments to develop their own versions, Shih said.

“So it went from a situation where the U.S. really dominated that technology and everyone would come to the U.S. to buy it, to now there are all these different alternatives,” he said. “And you have to wonder if the same thing is happening now with Huawei.”

China’s race to build an advanced homegrown chip began in May 2019, when, amid the Trump administration’s trade war with China, the Commerce Department put Huawei on its “Entity List,” prohibiting U.S. companies from doing business with it. Some wondered if it was a “death penalty” for Huawei, with the company choked from obtaining key components.

Huawei had long been in the crosshairs of Washington as the sharpest tip of China’s tech industry. Since 2012, Huawei has been the world’s largest supplier of the equipment needed to operate the global internet, a position it has maintained despite U.S. sanctions. Huawei files more patent applications than any other company in China, and a constellation of Chinese start-ups rely on Huawei’s AI algorithms to build their own applications for face and voice recognition, pattern identification and other purposes.

Huawei’s business lines include geopolitically sensitive products including mobile base stations that provide nations with cell coverage, video-surveillance gear for police and submarine cable systems, which all require chips as their brains.

In the wake of the sanctions, Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s charismatic founder who got his start in China’s army engineering corps, rallied Huawei’s staff for an all-out fight for the survival of their company. They stockpiled chips from overseas suppliers, predicting that Washington might close loopholes in the sanctions. This indeed came to pass. Washington plugged the loopholes one by one, including sanctioning SMIC, the only factory in China potentially capable of manufacturing advanced chips for Huawei — and pushing for suppliers of specialized chipmaking gear to halt sales to China more broadly.

Since then, Huawei has hunkered down into survival mode, drawing on its stockpiled chips as it raced to secure a domestic chipmaking solution.

SMIC has striven to make cutting-edge chips since its founding in 2000, but the dream had long seemed pie-in-the-sky. Each generation of chips reflects a new frontier in just how microscopically small humans can draw precise designs into a sheet of silicon. By the time SMIC caught up to one generation, industry leaders had raced further ahead based on new breakthroughs by the world’s brightest physicists and technicians.

“It’s hard to catch up because chips are the most complex manufactured good humans have ever produced,” Miller said. “There’s nothing more complicated that humans make … this is really hard stuff.”

Miller says a considerable gap remains between SMIC’s capabilities and those of TSMC, the industry leader that produces the newest chips for companies like Apple. It also remains unclear if SMIC can produce advanced chips at a scale and cost that will make its products globally competitive.

Shih said that regardless of if SMIC can reach the cutting edge, the foundry will certainly be able to produce older-generation chips at scale, possibly pushing down prices of chips worldwide. “We will see price pressure and commoditization pressure,” he said.

U.S. companies like Intel and Qualcomm have already lost significant sales in China, the world’s second-largest economy, due to the U.S. sanctions, crimping their research and development budgets. U.S. executives fear this could weigh on their long-term strength, in an industry where only a few of the strongest, fastest companies tend to survive.

“It starts a downward spiral in ability, to not be competitive with the rest of the world,” said an industry executive, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

Since the U.S. chip sanctions began, Beijing has flexed what muscles it can to prevent more of the global chip industry from falling under Washington’s sway. For instance, Intel recently announced it will have to pay $353 million in termination fees to Israel’s Tower Semiconductor after failing to acquire Chinese regulatory approval for the acquisition.

Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Eva Dou · September 2, 2023

5. How the War in Ukraine is Likely Driving a New World Order

Excerpts:

In sum, whether or not the Ukraine war turns out to be the global inflection point many leaders foresee, it has already had a powerful impact on key aspects of what is commonly understood to comprise global order – especially thinking about nuclear weapons and the composition and direction of alliances and other international groupings. The question of whether these trends continue to evolve and mature has an unsatisfactory answer: it depends.

Above all, it depends on how and in what circumstances the Ukraine war ends. A war that grinds on or coincides with major conflict elsewhere or with a major political change in the United States, would probably open up a period of inconclusive maneuvering among all of the forces I’ve discussed here. If, on the other hand, Ukraine succeeds in expelling Russia, there is a good chance we will see regime change in Moscow, a loss of momentum among autocracies, and a recalibration of strategies in many of the arenas I’ve discussed.

So, tectonic plates are moving in global politics. The only question is how they will settle.

How the War in Ukraine is Likely Driving a New World Order

SEPTEMBER 3RD, 2023 BY JOHN MCLAUGHLIN | 0 COMMENTS

thecipherbrief.com · · September 3, 2023

Is the Ukraine a Global Inflection Point? And if so, with what Consequences?

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Since early on in the Ukraine war, practically every Western leader has said that this war marks an “inflection point” in world affairs — a turning point, a tectonic shift, or moment of transition from one era to another. I think we all sense that … but what does this mean and is it really true? And if it is, what does it tell us about the future?

There are not many things in modern history that rise to such status.

In the 20th century, World War I would surely qualify as an inflection point, given that it was marked by the collapse of two empires – the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman – and the emergence of many new countries, including the Soviet Union.

World War II also has to make the cut, because it ushered in new institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, along with decolonization, the European unification drive, and seventy years of global tensions during the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, were other dramatic moments that certainly brought sweeping changes but arguably not of the magnitude of the two world wars.

And the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States homeland had transformational impact on U.S. national security policy and alliance relations, elements of which endure after more than twenty years – but still of lesser scope than the World Wars.

So, what is it about Ukraine that has so many people talking “inflection point”?

First, there is the sheer surprise and shock of it. In most minds – Western minds at least – this sort of thing was not supposed to happen again, that is, a full-scale invasion of one major country by another in the heart of Europe.

Remember that almost no one, including the Ukrainians, believed it when U.S. intelligence predicted it would happen. So, Putin’s attack redefined the concept of threat among those who were wary of Russia but assumed Putin’s style was more careful, stealthy, and incremental.

Second, there are all the widely-discussed changes that came in the wake of the war – Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Germany and Japan adopting more robust national security policies after 75 years of caution and restraint.

There is also the increased volatility of oil prices, food shortages, and the division globally between those who condemn Russia and those such as China, India and many other countries that remain focused on their own problems, blame both sides, or, like China, walk a fine line – simultaneously deploring the violence but offering at least rhetorical support to Russia. That’s enough to say that the war is having at least as much impact on global dynamics as the 9/11 attacks and possibly more.

There is another big factor shaping the feeling that everything could change fundamentally. This is the nagging fear that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is finally serious about forcefully integrating Taiwan into China in the near term, with all the attendant dilemmas this would pose for the U.S. and Asian allies who have pledged to oppose this.

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This mix of ongoing horror in Ukraine, uncertain dread about Taiwan, and evolving policies elsewhere raises in turn, a whole series of alarming ‘what if’s’ feeding the feeling that we are on the verge of a great transition. What if some concatenation of events, accidents, and miscalculations pulls NATO and the U.S. more directly into conflict with Russia? What if Xi moves on Taiwan while the U.S. is still preoccupied with Russia’s aggression? What if that pulls in Asian allies at just the moment that the Ukraine war becomes more demanding on European partners? Perhaps most importantly, what if there is a partisan-driven change of administration in the U.S. in the midst of all this? If that all happened, it would indeed start to feel like a major discontinuity in international affairs, in which another global conflict would not be unimaginable.

None of that is predictable of course, and most analysts would hesitate to say it is probable. But most would probably also say the chances are not zero. It is this ‘hard-to-articulate’ sense of looming catastrophe that contributes to the conviction that we are now standing at one of those watershed moments in modern history.

In wondering whether the Ukraine war will really upend things, here is a key question to ask: what are the possible counterreactions to the reactions we’ve seen so far?

Thinking back to times at CIA when we were surprised by something (often then charged with “intelligence failure”) the origins of surprise sometimes came in barely-noticed incremental changes. These are the small, hard-to-see shifts whose significance is obscured until they achieve the critical mass necessary to plainly reveal a major change. In other words, a surprise.

With that in mind, here are two areas that merit special attention.

One has to do with the way the Ukraine war has altered calculations about nuclear weapons. Nuclear weaponry has been a constant in international affairs for decades but in recent years, we’ve not witnessed the big nuclear ‘scares’ that were an ever-present possibility during the Cold War. However, Putin’s nuclear threats during the war have forced everyone to think anew about the dangers that nuclear weapons pose. War with nukes is still the ultimate nightmare. And it can become more likely, the more nuclear weapons spread.

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In that regard, it cannot be lost on many countries that if Ukraine had kept the nuclear weapons stationed on its soil when the USSR collapsed (Kyiv gave up 5,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in 1994, under an agreement among Russia, Ukraine and the U.S.), Putin might have thought twice before launching his war. To date, there are no signs that Ukraine is moving to build nuclear weapons. And although some experts call rumors of this ‘dangerous nonsense’, an end to the war is still not in sight. If it does not end in a way that gives Ukraine total confidence in its future security, it’s hard to believe Ukraine would not consider regaining a nuclear arsenal.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s plight must also be causing policy debates in other countries with worries about their future security.

Iran’s neighbors, principally Saudi Arabia, have to confront the reality that Tehran is now at nuclear “break out”; early this year, a senior Pentagon official said Iran was 12 days away from having enough enriched material for a bomb. And in 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman plainly said Riyadh would “follow suit” if Tehran succeeded in acquiring the bomb.

In Asia, Japan and South Korea must be impressed that China is likely by 2030, to more than triple its nuclear weapons force (to about 1,000) at a moment of great political uncertainty in the U.S. and therefore about Washington’s fidelity to “extended deterrence” — that is, provision of its protective ‘nuclear umbrella’. (It is almost impossible to exaggerate the anxiety expressed by foreign counterparts regarding the political turmoil they now see in the U.S. and the weakening effect that worry could have on long-standing U.S. commitments.)

The second development with potential to inject new currents of surprise into international affairs, is the hardening of opposing alliances.

On the US side, the tightening of NATO is by now obvious but just coming into view is a comparable tightening of U.S. ties with key Asian partners. This was most recently visible in a new tripartite security pact between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, in which the three countries pledged to set up a crisis “hotline” and to cooperate more closely on missile defense and in joint military exercises. This is remarkable when set against the long history of suspicion and tension between South Korea and Japan tracing back to WW II. China has already blasted the pact and my guess is we will see an increase in Sino-Russian military exercises in the region.

Mirroring this among the autocracies of the world is the growing cooperation the Ukraine war is stimulating among Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. These four countries are drawing together across the board, driven by opposition to US global preeminence and the sanctioning power of the U.S. dollar.

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Tangible cooperation is most apparent in the weapons trade that Russia has initiated with North Korea and Iran. North Korea is supplying Moscow with rockets and artillery shells it needs in Ukraine under an arms deal that the U.S. says was arranged during the Russian defense minister’s recent visit – in violation of unanimously adopted UN Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, Iran has become a key source for missiles and drones. For its part, China is investing in Iranian and North Korean infrastructure in return for oil and manufactured weapons.

China is investing in Iranian and North Korean infrastructure in return for oil and manufactured weapons. It’s only logical to ask what Tehran and Pyongyang might seek in return for such assistance. One obvious quid pro quo is Russia’s help with the nuclear and missile programs of both countries. CIA Director William Burns has already noted signs of Russian assistance to Iran’s missile program. Russian assistance could enable the Iranian program to finally gain success with longer range missiles, including an intercontinental capability that has long eluded Iranian engineers.

In short, some aspects of the Ukraine war have brought into closer alignment, the tangible interests of these four autocratic countries. These are likely to tighten the longer the war persists.

A third global alignment that is changing involves the grouping of nations called BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It took shape between 2001 and 2006, to increase economic cooperation and political clout among the five countries. Now, about 40 other countries are seeking to join, although only Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia were accepted at the group’s meeting earlier this month. This is a big win for Russia and China both of whom have been pushing to make the group larger as a counterweight to what they see as a U.S.-dominated global order.

This expansion is another offshoot of the Ukraine war insofar as the surge of interest in BRICS represents opposition to the East-West split that the war has crystalized – and opposition to the dominance of the U.S. dollar and the power that gives the U.S. to sanction other countries. For now, BRICS expansion is mainly of symbolic importance, but key countries that desire a global order less driven by the U.S. – especially Russia, China, and India – have every incentive to try translating it into concrete power. One tactic would be voting together more often in forums such as the UN and the International Monetary Fund. At minimum, BRICS expansion shows that broadly-shared grievances with the current global order, offers Russia another way to limit its diplomatic isolation, and gives China an arena in which to push for changes to the status quo.

In sum, whether or not the Ukraine war turns out to be the global inflection point many leaders foresee, it has already had a powerful impact on key aspects of what is commonly understood to comprise global order – especially thinking about nuclear weapons and the composition and direction of alliances and other international groupings. The question of whether these trends continue to evolve and mature has an unsatisfactory answer: it depends.

Above all, it depends on how and in what circumstances the Ukraine war ends. A war that grinds on or coincides with major conflict elsewhere or with a major political change in the United States, would probably open up a period of inconclusive maneuvering among all of the forces I’ve discussed here. If, on the other hand, Ukraine succeeds in expelling Russia, there is a good chance we will see regime change in Moscow, a loss of momentum among autocracies, and a recalibration of strategies in many of the arenas I’ve discussed.

So, tectonic plates are moving in global politics. The only question is how they will settle.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in national security? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

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thecipherbrief.com · by Suzanne Kelly · September 3, 2023

6. How Xi Returned China to One-Man Rule

Excerpts:

I. One-Man Party Xi overturned term limits, erased factions and installed loyalists to establish sweeping control of the Communist Party.

...

II. Sidelining the GovernmentStep by step, Xi has deepened the control that he and the party have over the government, which oversees the economy and day-to-day administration. 

...

III. Reining In Private CompaniesThe party has pressured executives, cracked down on corporate power and exercised greater control over company decisions.

....

IV. You Are Being WatchedThe world’s biggest and most pervasive surveillance system ensures that nobody can easily challenge the power Xi has amassed.

...

The surveillance is one more way that Xi has cemented his daunting power — over the party, the government and everyday people.

Xi’s promise to Chinese citizens living under these controls is that they will, in return, enjoy safety, stability and national pride. His message can be a powerful one, especially when Chinese people are shown an outside world – emphasized through state-controlled media – of war, instability and democratic decline.

But not everyone goes along. The widespread protests over China’s harsh Covid controls late in 2022 showed that draconian policies can ignite a backlash. As China’s economic recovery struggled in 2023, the government has also tried to win back the confidence of private businesses shaken by Xi’s previous actions.

Ultimately, Xi’s dominance may come back to haunt China. It could encourage a herd mentality among officials, deterring them from sharing bad news or admitting mistakes. And when Xi steps down or passes on, can a successor hold together the pyramid of power that he has built?

How Xi Returned China to One-Man Rule

By Weiyi Cai, Aaron Byrd, Chris Buckley and Pablo RoblesSept. 2, 2023

The New York Times · by Pablo Robles · September 2, 2023

Like his predecessors, Xi wields power through his control of the Communist Party, the military and the government.

But Xi has expanded his power beyond previous limits. He has concentrated decision-making around himself. He has intensified the power of the party over society. His name, his image and his words fill the media.

To many, this wasn’t supposed to be the path that China would take. After decades of reforms, the country showed signs of moving toward collective leadership, preventing the re-emergence of autocratic rule. Here’s how Xi dismantled those barriers.

I. One-Man PartyXi overturned term limits, erased factions and installed loyalists to establish sweeping control of the Communist Party.

After Mao and Deng, China was moving toward a pattern of decade-long reigns for leaders. Xi broke the norm when he took a third five-year term in 2022, and he may stay in power much longer.

In his view, an all-powerful party leader is needed to secure China’s rise in a dangerous world.

Xi has also remade the party elite. Under previous leaders, senior officials rose from different backgrounds and factions, diluting the power of the top leader.

When Xi first took power in 2012, few in the Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful group in China, had close ties with him.

By the end of 2022, virtually every member was a longtime protégé or had proven his loyalty.

Many of them first worked with Xi decades ago when he was still a little-known provincial official. A personal tie to Xi is not the only ticket to the top, but it helps.

Xi has also forced potential rivals out of the party’s 24-member Politburo – the second tier of power – and installed officials with the skills to help realize his vision of China as a technologically advanced superpower.

II. Sidelining the GovernmentStep by step, Xi has deepened the control that he and the party have over the government, which oversees the economy and day-to-day administration.

The Communist Party has long been the ultimate decision maker in China. But after Mao died, Deng Xiaoping and his successors built some checks against excessive power, hoping to avoid a repeat of Mao’s turbulent rule.

The party and government systems worked in tandem. Party leaders often set broad policy, and government ministries and agencies refined and implemented their goals, sending feedback to the leaders.

Xi has overturned that pattern. He declared that “east, west, north, south and center, the party leads everything.”

Xi expanded the power of policy groups within the Communist Party, taking away the initiative from government agencies.

Some government agencies have been absorbed into the party, making it even clearer that Xi calls the shots. The party’s propaganda department took over the state media office, tightening the party’s grip on information.

The party also took over the government’s oversight of religious and ethnic affairs.

Xi also founded a national security commission within the party that has magnified his power to root out perceived political threats.

Many other government agencies were subsumed under party authority.

The leader of at least nine of these commissions? Xi himself.

III. Reining In Private CompaniesThe party has pressured executives, cracked down on corporate power and exercised greater control over company decisions.

Private companies have long been the drivers of China’s economic takeoff, creating jobs and paying a large share of taxes. Leaders courted private investors.

But Xi has changed the deal for business. His message: Businesses can still do well in China, but they must follow the party’s agenda.

The party concluded that Alibaba was getting too arrogant. It was fined billions of dollars for violating antimonopoly laws, and its founder, Jack Ma, stepped down.

Private companies have been required to install and expand internal groups to do the party’s work …

… giving political leaders more control over decisions.

IV. You Are Being WatchedThe world’s biggest and most pervasive surveillance system ensures that nobody can easily challenge the power Xi has amassed.

If the party suspects that an official has been disloyal, investigators can visit their house, question them and take them away.

A visit from these investigators, who don’t follow normal police procedure, can be chilling. They can secretly detain officials and turn them over to prosecutors, usually on corruption charges.

The party-controlled courts almost always find them guilty.

Xi has stepped up surveillance of citizens, too, especially during the pandemic. People can be watched on the streets, online and even abroad.

The surveillance is one more way that Xi has cemented his daunting power — over the party, the government and everyday people.

Xi’s promise to Chinese citizens living under these controls is that they will, in return, enjoy safety, stability and national pride. His message can be a powerful one, especially when Chinese people are shown an outside world – emphasized through state-controlled media – of war, instability and democratic decline.

But not everyone goes along. The widespread protests over China’s harsh Covid controls late in 2022 showed that draconian policies can ignite a backlash. As China’s economic recovery struggled in 2023, the government has also tried to win back the confidence of private businesses shaken by Xi’s previous actions.

Ultimately, Xi’s dominance may come back to haunt China. It could encourage a herd mentality among officials, deterring them from sharing bad news or admitting mistakes. And when Xi steps down or passes on, can a successor hold together the pyramid of power that he has built?

The New York Times · by Pablo Robles · September 2, 2023

7. China to Its People: Spies Are Everywhere, Help Us Catch Them

It is interesting that Ms. Wang can report this from Beijing. I wonder how long before she will be branded a "spy?"

Are foreign intelligence agencies helping to drive this paranoia? Are they using deception to create the belief that there are a lot more "spies" than there really are? Is it useful to feed Chinese (CCP) paranoia? Or does it put every foreigner at great risk. That said will this paranoia drive our foreigners and foreign business? Is it really worth doing business in a country that does not operate under the rule of law but instead the rule BY law?

China to Its People: Spies Are Everywhere, Help Us Catch Them

By Vivian Wang

Reporting from Beijing

The New York Times · by Vivian Wang · September 2, 2023

As Beijing tries to enlist the “whole of society” to guard against foreign enemies, the line between vigilance and paranoia fades.

Surveillance cameras in Shanghai in March.Credit...Aly Song/Reuters

Sept. 2, 2023, 5:00 p.m. ET

Beijing sees forces bent on weakening it everywhere: embedded in multinational companies, infiltrating social media, circling naïve students. And it wants its people to see them, too.

Chinese universities require faculty to take courses on protecting state secrets, even in departments like veterinary medicine. A kindergarten in the eastern city of Tianjin organized a meeting to teach staffers how to “understand and use” China’s anti-espionage law.

China’s Ministry of State Security, a usually covert department that oversees the secret police and intelligence services, has even opened its first social media account, as part of what official news media described as an effort at increasing public engagement. Its first post: a call for a “whole of society mobilization” against espionage.

“The participation of the masses,” the post said, should be “normalized.”

China’s ruling Communist Party is enlisting ordinary people to guard against perceived threats to the country, in a campaign that blurs the line between vigilance and paranoia. The country’s economy is facing its worst slowdown in years, but China’s authoritarian leader, Xi Jinping, appears more fixated on national security and preventing threats to the party’s control.

“We must be prepared for worst-case and extreme scenarios,” Mr. Xi told China’s National Security Commission in May. He called on officials to “enhance real-time monitoring” and “get prepared for actual combat.”

A flag-raising ceremony at an elementary school in Neijiang, China, on National Security Education Day in April.

The sense of urgency may be heightened by the fact that Beijing is confronting some of its biggest challenges since Mr. Xi’s ascension more than a decade ago. Beyond the economic gloom, China’s relations with the West are increasingly tense. And unexplained personnel changes at the highest tiers of power — including the sudden removal in July of China’s foreign minister and two high-ranking generals — suggest that Mr. Xi may have feared threats to his control.

In July, China revised its anti-espionage law to broaden an already sweeping scope of activities that it regards as spying. It is offering rewards of tens of thousands of dollars to people who report spies.

While the call for mass vigilance has inspired widespread caution, it is unclear to what extent that is translating to action on the ground. In the last month, the authorities have announced the capture of at least four spies, including two men recruited by the C.I.A., but some of the cases appeared to be old ones belatedly announced, such as a married couple arrested in 2019.

The authorities also said earlier this year that they had sentenced an American citizen to life in prison for espionage, and they arrested a high-ranking Chinese newspaper editor while he was dining with a Japanese diplomat. (The editor’s family has called the charges trumped up.)

“The push reflects the profound legitimacy challenges and crisis that the regime is facing,” said Chen Jian, a professor of modern Chinese history at New York University. Professor Chen said the call to mass action bore echoes of the sweeping campaigns that Mao Zedong unleashed in part to consolidate his own power. The most notable was the Cultural Revolution, a decade-long period of chaos and bloodshed when Chinese leaders urged people to report on their teachers, neighbors or even families as “counterrevolutionaries.”

“We must be prepared for worst-case and extreme scenarios,” Xi Jinping said in May. He called on officials to “enhance real-time monitoring” and “get prepared for actual combat.”Credit...Pool photo by Leah Millis

Chinese society would not be as easily stirred into a mob frenzy now, given how the country has modernized, Professor Chen noted. And China does have grounds for wariness: The C.I.A. director, William Burns, said recently that America was rebuilding its spy network in China.

Nor is China alone in adopting increasingly dire warnings about foreign influence. Some have warned that Washington is fanning a new Red Scare, such as through the Justice Department’s now-scrapped China Initiative targeting academics. The United States and other Western countries are also working to restrict access to TikTok, the Chinese-owned short video app, citing security concerns.

But China’s approach stands out for its scale and ubiquity.

On high-speed trains, a video on loop warns passengers to be careful when taking photos for social media, in case they capture sensitive information. In government offices where residents file routine paperwork, posters remind them to “build a people’s defensive line.”

One local government in Yunnan Province published a video of men and women in the traditional dress of the Yi, an ethnic group there, dancing and singing cheerily about China’s national security law.

“Those who don’t report will be prosecuted. Covering crimes will lead to jail,” the performers sang as they fanned out in a circle, the women fluttering their bright yellow, blue and red skirts.

Other forms of anti-espionage education are more formal. The National Administration of State Secrets Protection runs an app with an online course on secret-keeping, which many universities and companies have ordered their staff to complete. The first lesson opens with a quotation from Mao Zedong on the importance of confidentiality; a later one warns that iPhones and Android devices are foreign products and may be vulnerable to manipulation.

An Apple store in Shanghai last year.

Even groups that seem to have little to do with national security have been recruited. A sports education department at a university in Shandong Province ordered faculty to take the online course; so did a college of veterinary medicine in the city of Guangzhou.

One hotel, in the seaside city of Yantai, usually advertises beach getaways and dinner deals in its social media posts. But last October, it published an infographic about the groups the security ministry had deemed most at risk of co-optation by foreign enemies. They included people who had studied abroad and “young internet users.”

Young Chinese are an area of particular concern, especially after widespread protests last year against China’s harsh Covid restrictions. Some participants were college students who had been locked down on their campuses for months. And now many young people face a spate of other problems, including record unemployment.

But the authorities have attributed discontent to outside instigators. After last year’s protests, a Chinese official said attendees had been “bought by external forces.”

A protest against Covid restrictions in Beijing in November.

Chinese academics are still pushing that idea. At a conference on international relations organized by Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University in July, one scholar suggested that the protesters had fallen prey to “cognitive and ideological manipulation” by countries including the United States. Such efforts by “hidden forces” were growing harder to detect, said the professor, Han Na, from People’s Public Security University, the country’s top police academy.

“Some call them spies, some call them special operations. They’re the people among us who are from some special departments.”

She added: “That’s why we have our current problem.”

Part of the authorities’ solution is teaching young people to be more on guard. Mr. Xi has called for expanding national security education, and universities have created squads of students tasked with reporting people who, among other things, use overseas websites.

But the constant exhortations also remind students that they, too, are being watched. University students in Beijing have been questioned by the police or administrators for exchanging messages with New York Times journalists — in at least two cases, before any article had been published.

Perhaps the central effect — or goal — of the campaign has been to make even the slightest connection to foreigners grounds for suspicion. That has extended to cultural fields where exchange has historically been richest.

Facial recognition camera-controlled gates at Peking University in Beijing in 2020.Credit...Thomas Peter/Reuters

Some academics have stopped meeting with foreigners. Venues across China have canceled performances by foreign musicians.

The cancellations surged in May, amid a crackdown on cultural events deemed out of step with the party’s agenda. But months later, scrutiny remains intense, said Brian Offenther, an American D.J. in Shanghai. In one week in August, venues in three different cities told him they could not host him. One said that the police had threatened to shut down the venue if a foreigner performed, according to a chat screenshot Mr. Offenther shared. Another said simply, in English: “It is not the right time for foreign D.J.”

Beijing has not issued any clear directives about contact with foreigners; it maintains that China remains open, lauding the importance of foreign investment. But the signals are contradictory. This spring, the authorities raided or questioned the offices of several American consulting and advisory firms, accusing one of trying to obtain state secrets through Chinese experts it hired.

Even sharing a name with a foreign organization can invite scrutiny, as a volunteer group in Guangzhou found out when they were forced to cancel a speaker conference scheduled for August under the name TEDxGuangzhou.

TED, the U.S.-based company known for speaker showcases, allows groups to use the TEDx branding for free, and the Guangzhou group had no other affiliation with it, the organizers said in a statement. TEDx conferences have taken place in Guangzhou since 2009. Still, the police said this year that the volunteers could not proceed unless they registered as a foreign nongovernmental organization.

Some Chinese have reacted skeptically to the call for constant vigilance.

When an airport in Hunan Province recently banned Teslas from its parking lots, arguing the American company’s cars could be used for spying, some social media commenters asked whether Boeing jets should be banned too. Even Hu Xijin, the retired editor of Global Times, a nationalist party tabloid, wrote online that it was worrisome that academics he knew were avoiding foreigners.

But officials have brushed off concerns. In an editorial about the call for mass mobilization, Global Times said it was critics who were the paranoid ones.

“If you haven’t done anything wrong,” it said, “why are you so scared?”

Siyi Zhao contributed research from Seoul.

Vivian Wang is a China correspondent based in Beijing, where she writes about how the country's global rise and ambitions are shaping the daily lives of its people. More about Vivian Wang

The New York Times · by Vivian Wang · September 2, 2023

8. Beijing’s Dangerous Flirtation With Hard Power Intimidation – Analysis

Excerpts:

This rising assertive path chosen by Beijing is based on a four-pronged factor. First, the fast closing window and timeframe for Xi to execute his ultimate Chinese Dream plan for Taiwan unification, with increased containment pressure and critical tech embargo by the West. This is worsened with Beijing’s internal economic decline and crisis now threatening to derail future efforts to have capable economic support in maintaining the potential of a protracted conflict with the West over Taiwan. The fast closing time frame is also exacerbated by the prospect of a sensational Trump return to power in 2024, which will further squeeze Beijing’s options and capacities in challenging the US especially in the realm of economic and military superiority.

Second, the increasing counterforce capacities by the US in thwarting Beijing’s moves have challenged Beijing’s near term capacities, with defence and security friendshoring efforts with Manila, Seoul, Tokyo, Hanoi, Delhi,Canberra and other regional players including Pacific Island states have further hampered Beijing’s power and influence expansion depth and momentum.

Thirdly, the declining effectiveness of deterrence and influence of ASEAN and its conflict prevention mechanisms in showing real and credible opposition to Beijing’s inroads, will give a clearer path for Beijing to reassert its push and further cementing its divide and conquer approach.

Fourth, in shoring up the legitimacy and capacity of President Xi in his internal consolidation of influence and power amidst new internal challenges and economic crisis. This is critical in laying the foundation of greater nationalistic sentiments and sense of Chinese pride and purpose, in superseding the current systemic challenges of the demographic crisis, economic slowdown, property and debt crisis, and the record unemployment among the youth.

Various confidence building measures and conflict prevention mechanisms have also failed to address the core causes of regional tensions, which have further escalated security dilemmas and arms races. Beijing has accused the West including the various deterrent mechanisms including Aukus and Quad as destabilising and the primary cause of regional tensions and arms build-up.

Line of Actual Control between China and India Credit: Map by the CIA, Wikipedia Commons

Beijing’s Dangerous Flirtation With Hard Power Intimidation – Analysis

https://www.eurasiareview.com/03092023-beijings-dangerous-flirtation-with-hard-power-intimidation-analysis/

 September 3, 2023  0 Comments

By Collins Chong Yew Keat

The 2023 China Standard Map has reaffirmed Beijing’s claim and dominance over Arunachal Pradesh, the Aksai Chin region, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, all of which remain disputed and controversial.

The new map has reaffirmed Beijing’s claim and dominance over Arunachal Pradesh, the Aksai Chin region, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, all of which remain disputed and controversial.

It includes maritime areas within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Sabah and Sarawak, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The timing of this release has invited new scrutiny, in light of rising tensions in the region and upcoming geopolitical events that will compel Beijing to defend its interests and maximise its gains. A three-pronged factor is involved.

First, the recently approved USD500 million arms sales to Taiwan by the Biden administration has created further discontentment to Beijing, which has responded with the usual array of air and naval power intimidation and encirclement of the island in a new normal setting. Taiwanese Vice President and Presidential hopeful William Lai’s recent stopovers in New York and San Francisco, and his conventional hardline approach in Taiwan’s status and its ties with mainland China have added to the anger of Beijing.

Secondly, the release of the treated radioactive water from the stricken Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has been seized upon by China to discredit Japan for convenient geopolitical gains, ignoring the obvious scientific evidence presented. This move to discredit Tokyo is an opportunistic and convenient pretext amidst growing tensions in the South China Sea and the growing counterbalancing forces and solidarity shown by the West and other players for Manila.

While Beijing has gained ground in Southeast Asia in elevating its soft power narrative and hard power postures to enhance trust, it continues to receive dwindling perception and acceptance in its Eastern neighbours.

Beijing’s worst fear of a consolidated security pact has come true, and the prospects of an expanded Camp David alliance or an enlarged Quad in the form of a mini or Asian Nato further accelerate Beijing’s hardened playbook and antagonizing behaviours.

Thirdly, the upcoming G20 Summit to be hosted by India remains another platform seen by Beijing as squeezing its rise and interests, in which China will need to build on its momentum of capturing the Global South and portraying itself as the undisputed leader of developing countries and in creating a new bulwark of anti-Western order and sphere of influence. India is increasingly being courted in a more holistic manner by the US led West, and China will want to send another two-pronged message to Delhi and Washington as well as regional neighbours in South and Central Asia that Beijing still holds the dominant economic and security upper hand, although its economic credentials have taken a serious hit.

The coming openings for China’s consolidation of influence and power expansion capabilities including the G-77 event and the recently concluded BRICS Summit are seen as crucial progressive tools for Beijing’s continuous anti-West narrative, in enhancing its flurry of strategic moves including the de-dollarisation movement and an expansive soft power and messaging capacity in upping the positive image of China and playing the victim card in painting the US led West as the main antagonist and instigator of tensions in chokepoints across the region.

The recent revelation by Meta on Tuesday that it had disrupted a disinformation campaign linked to Chinese law enforcement described as the largest known cross-platform covert influence operation in the world, remains a case in point. The influence network generated positive posts about China, while also attempting to spread negative commentary about the U.S. and disinformation in multiple languages about the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic, as reported by Meta.

This rising assertive path chosen by Beijing is based on a four-pronged factor. First, the fast closing window and timeframe for Xi to execute his ultimate Chinese Dream plan for Taiwan unification, with increased containment pressure and critical tech embargo by the West. This is worsened with Beijing’s internal economic decline and crisis now threatening to derail future efforts to have capable economic support in maintaining the potential of a protracted conflict with the West over Taiwan. The fast closing time frame is also exacerbated by the prospect of a sensational Trump return to power in 2024, which will further squeeze Beijing’s options and capacities in challenging the US especially in the realm of economic and military superiority.

Second, the increasing counterforce capacities by the US in thwarting Beijing’s moves have challenged Beijing’s near term capacities, with defence and security friendshoring efforts with Manila, Seoul, Tokyo, Hanoi, Delhi,Canberra and other regional players including Pacific Island states have further hampered Beijing’s power and influence expansion depth and momentum.

Thirdly, the declining effectiveness of deterrence and influence of ASEAN and its conflict prevention mechanisms in showing real and credible opposition to Beijing’s inroads, will give a clearer path for Beijing to reassert its push and further cementing its divide and conquer approach.

Fourth, in shoring up the legitimacy and capacity of President Xi in his internal consolidation of influence and power amidst new internal challenges and economic crisis. This is critical in laying the foundation of greater nationalistic sentiments and sense of Chinese pride and purpose, in superseding the current systemic challenges of the demographic crisis, economic slowdown, property and debt crisis, and the record unemployment among the youth.

Various confidence building measures and conflict prevention mechanisms have also failed to address the core causes of regional tensions, which have further escalated security dilemmas and arms races. Beijing has accused the West including the various deterrent mechanisms including Aukus and Quad as destabilising and the primary cause of regional tensions and arms build-up.

However, Beijing’s increasing hard power projection and intimidation are what caused regional jitters and fears in the first place, sparking the natural reactions of deterrent capacities and the unyielding drive to secure the importance of a rules based order and maintaining peace and stability.

Collins Chong Yew Keat

Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya, the top university in Malaysia for more than 9 years. His areas of interests include strategic and security studies, American foreign policy and power analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.

9. SOF Can Help Win the Competition for Influence in South America

Excerpts:

Furthermore, SOF play a pivotal role in supporting other US government agencies’ endeavors to impose costs on PRC actions that threaten regional security and sovereignty. This support involves collaborating on various measures, including sanctions, diplomatic pressure, legal actions, and cyber operations. An example of this support is assisting law enforcement agencies to disrupt the PRC’s illicit activities, including money laundering, smuggling, and trafficking. By partnering with the interagency to counter these activities, SOF contribute to creating a bulwark against the PRC’s influence in South America, aligning with broader U.S. strategic objectives.

The PRC’s growing presence and influence in South America presents many challenges, including threats of eroding democratic values, undermining sovereignty, and advancing geopolitical goals against the interests of the United States. The PRC’s economic engagements, coupled with its aggressive information campaigns and military cooperation, aim to reshape the regional landscape in its favor. With unique capabilities, competencies, and agility, SOF can foster trust, build generational partnerships, and bolster the capacity of regional partners towards achieving regional objectives in line with US national strategy, while countering the PRC’s malign influence in South America.

SOF Can Help Win the Competition for Influence in South America - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Cole Herring · September 1, 2023

The United States faces growing challenges from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in South America, and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) are often at the center of this competition. The National Security Strategy states, “Recognizing the direct link between the region’s prosperity and security and that of our own, it is vital for the United States to revitalize our partnerships to build and preserve economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security within the hemisphere,” and “no region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere.” SOF are uniquely suited to build partnerships towards these ends and as a counter to the malign influence of the PRC in America’s backyard.

The countries of South America face an array of security, environmental, legal, and governmental challenges. These include countering transnational criminal organizations engaged in various malign activities and linked to violent extremist groups, which pose threats to both the region and the United States. Humanitarian crises, meanwhile, necessitate assistance and relief efforts from the United States and its partners. Environmental degradation affects the region’s natural resources, ecosystems, and, consequently, the wellbeing and security of its populations. Land erosion, a direct consequence of deforestation, affects more than 60% of South America’s soil and threatens the continent’s food security. Finally, the government-perpetuated human rights violations and other abuses threaten the dignity and rights of the people in the region and can have far-reaching consequences to democracy and governance.

SOF must be aware of the complex and dynamic situation in South America, especially the threats and challenges facing the region, along with the PRC’s aggressive campaign for influence and its reliance on the region for critical resources. This includes SOF working with South American partners to counter PRC malign activities that have the potential to erode US influence; challenge democratic values and norms; undermine human rights and the rule of law; exacerbate social and economic problems; fuel corruption and criminality; increase regional tensions and conflicts; and threaten U.S. allies and partners in the region—all which have implications for the security and stability of the region.

The United States has a long history of engagement in South America, grounded in shared interests, democracy, human rights, rule of law, security, prosperity, and social inclusion. This includes cooperation on various regional and global issues, such as counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, climate change, health, migration, and humanitarian assistance. However, there is also a deep distrust in some areas towards the United States due to its legacy of interventionist policies and actions. Past interference in domestic affairs and perceived disregard for sovereignty have contributed to skepticism and caution regarding the United States. The PRC exploits these perceptions using the same method it uses in Africa: amplifying propaganda beneath a veneer of grassroots legitimacy to create a narrative that highlights the ineffectiveness of democracy, criticizes the United States as hypocritical, and promotes the PRC.

Beyond proximity and shared history, South America is strategically important for the United States. The region accounts for $740 billion in annual trade, more than double that of the United States’ single largest trading partner, Canada; contains 31% of the world’s freshwater; has the world’s largest oil reserves; and is home to the environmentally crucial Amazon rainforest. In 2022, Colombia was the fifth-largest source of U.S. crude oil at 4% of total imports, with Saudi Arabia being 7% for perspective. South America holds 66% of the world’s lithium reserves, mostly in brine deposits in Chile and Argentina. From powering satellites to drones to electric vehicles, the demand for lithium will increase based on the trend of emerging technology and capabilities.

The PRC’s dominance over global critical mineral supply chains presents one of the United States’ largest strategic vulnerabilities. For example, two of the world’s largest lithium miners, Ganfeng and Tianqi, are Chinese, and the PRC is the largest investor in Peru’s mining sector, controlling seven of Peru’s largest mines, all of Peru’s iron production, and 25% of its copper output. The PRC is also involved in energy development in South America; PowerChina has more than 50 ongoing projects across Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. The accumulation of assets affords the PRC power to affect local prices in key sectors, and provides political leverage to strongarm elected officials to support PRC positions on issues such as recognition of the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea or the implementation of “safe city” projects. Safe city initiatives provide governments with surveillance capacity to fight crime in urban areas, but the data infrastructures give the PRC real-time, unfiltered access to massive amounts of data and intelligence.

In addition to the demand for critical mineral resources, the PRC is facing a food security challenge due to its limited arable land, water scarcity, environmental degradation, and population growth. As a result, the PRC has become increasingly dependent on food imports to meet its domestic demand. According to the World Bank, the PRC’s food imports rose from $14.1 billion in 2000 to $133.1 billion in 2019, making it the world’s largest food importer. One of the PRC’s main sources of food is South America, which has abundant natural resources and agricultural production. In 2020, the PRC imported $34.1 billion worth of food from South America, accounting for 25.6% of its total food imports. Brazil was the largest supplier, followed by Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.

With the importance of South America for both countries in mind, the PRC competes with the United States for influence, which threatens US interests in the region. In March 2023, the commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Laura Richardson, testified before Congress, stating, “What concerns me as a combatant commander is the myriad of ways in which the PRC is spreading its malign influence, wielding its economic might, and conducting gray zone activities to expand its military and political access and influence in [South America].” The PRC has increased its economic, military, and diplomatic ties with South American countries, especially those hostile to the United States, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. This includes increased military cooperation and arms sales, providing these countries with weapons, equipment, training and intelligence. At the same time, the PRC exploits the vulnerabilities of South American countries by offering them enticing but predatory deals that erode sovereignty, democracy, and human rights. As the largest trading partner and creditor of many South American countries, the PRC has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative, such as ports, railways, roads, dams, and power plants. The deep-water ports are dual use and could provide naval basing options for the PRC in the future.

The PRC also seeks to expand its soft-power and cultural influence through media, education, and cultural exchanges. Richardson warned, “The PRC engages in an aggressive information operations campaign that attempts to depict the PRC as a more trustworthy partner than the US, … and spreads disinformation about the US in the region.” The PRC is also increasing its relationship with Russia, which likewise seeks to undermine US leadership and credibility by supporting anti-American regimes and spreading disinformation, campaigns the PRC is happy to amplify. As part of these efforts, the PRC has launched diplomatic initiatives such as the Forum on China-Latin America Cooperation, which aims to enhance cooperation and coordination on various issues such as trade, investment, health, education, and climate change. This includes efforts to shape public opinion and perception on issues such as COVID-19 and Taiwan, using state-owned media outlets, social media platforms, and think-tanks while both harassing and recruiting local journalists. The PRC also promotes cultural exchanges to spread their language and values, such as through its Confucius Institutes, scholarships, and tourism.

While some view the PRC’s growing presence and influence in South America as a threat, others argue that not all PRC activity is malign and that there are potential benefits for the region. For instance, PRC investment in South America has contributed to the improvement of infrastructure, energy, and connectivity, which are essential for the region’s economic and social development. According to the International Monetary Fund, the PRC’s overseas investment has tilted toward sectors where the PRC has a comparative advantage in the global markets, such as telecommunications, transportation, and renewable energy. Moreover, PRC trade with South America has provided the region with a stable source of income and market diversification, especially for its exports of commodities and agricultural products. While it is true that some PRC activity in the region has been beneficial to specific countries, which are essential for the region’s economic and social development, there are concerns that the PRC is using these relationships to pursue its geopolitical goals, including the further isolation of Taiwan, and to bolster authoritarian regimes such as those in Cuba and Venezuela.

As the PRC attempts to create a vision of South America in line with its interest, SOF are uniquely suited to push back against the PRC and engage partners on a continuous basis to be the region’s preferred partner. The Secretary of Defense said, “You can’t surge trust; trust is something you have to work on every day.” The best way to outcompete our adversaries is to help partners deliver at the speed of relevance by improving partner nation capability, capacity, and resilience through security cooperation, intelligence sharing, exercises, and training programs while upholding democratic values to ensure malign influence and autocratic alternatives do not further take root.

“Our Joint Exercise Program continues to provide an outsized return on investment not only in building readiness but also in strengthening partnerships that allow us to counter malign influence,” Richardson said during her congressional testimony. A notable illustration of this dynamic is the case of Paraguay, one of only 13 countries in the world, mostly in South America and Pacific Island Countries, that still recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country. In response, the PRC limits trade and diplomacy with Paraguay, just as it does with any country that recognizes Taiwan. Over the past few years, and with the promise of enhanced trade, loans, and investment, the PRC has successfully persuaded several of these countries, such as the Solomon Islands, Panama, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, to alter their affiliations. The United States has sought to reassure Paraguay in the face of this pressure through persistent SOF engagement. During a recent Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET), the president of Paraguay personally came to the closing ceremony to present certificates to the Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha. The JCET ultimately led to the president of Paraguay visiting 7th Special Forces Group and U.S. Special Operations Command in 2023. As of this publication, Paraguay continues to recognize Taiwan and its bilateral trade with the United States has increased since 2021, following a period of steady decline.

Another critical aspect of SOF’s value in the region is the information operations it conducts to expose the PRC’s malign activities and intentions. This includes “naming and shaming” the PRC’s predatory economic practices, human rights abuses, interference in domestic affairs, and attempts to undermine US leadership and alliances. As part of these operations, SOF support public diplomacy initiatives that counter PRC disinformation campaigns on issues like COVID-19 and Taiwan, while emphasizing the contributions made by the United States to the region’s health, security, and development.

Furthermore, SOF play a pivotal role in supporting other US government agencies’ endeavors to impose costs on PRC actions that threaten regional security and sovereignty. This support involves collaborating on various measures, including sanctions, diplomatic pressure, legal actions, and cyber operations. An example of this support is assisting law enforcement agencies to disrupt the PRC’s illicit activities, including money laundering, smuggling, and trafficking. By partnering with the interagency to counter these activities, SOF contribute to creating a bulwark against the PRC’s influence in South America, aligning with broader U.S. strategic objectives.

The PRC’s growing presence and influence in South America presents many challenges, including threats of eroding democratic values, undermining sovereignty, and advancing geopolitical goals against the interests of the United States. The PRC’s economic engagements, coupled with its aggressive information campaigns and military cooperation, aim to reshape the regional landscape in its favor. With unique capabilities, competencies, and agility, SOF can foster trust, build generational partnerships, and bolster the capacity of regional partners towards achieving regional objectives in line with US national strategy, while countering the PRC’s malign influence in South America.

Maj. Cole Herring serves as a Special Forces officer in the US Army. He has served in 7th Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command – South.

Main image: A member of the Special Operations Team from Colombia fires his weapon during a rifle marksmanship competition July 24 as part of Fuerzas Comando 2014 in Fort Tolemaida, Colombia. (U.S. Army)

irregularwarfare.org · by Cole Herring · September 1, 2023

10. Why Some People Turn Into Political Extremists

Two important questions. If you answer these incorrectly then you are part of the problem (said with only some sarcasm).

With this as context, here are the two questions every engaged citizen should ask themselves:

1. Have the concepts of “my truth” and “your truth” caused irreversible damage to our ability to be objective in our political leanings?
2. Is it possible to have polarized views on political issues and, as a society, still get along?

​Conclusion:

Understanding the emotional and societal factors behind misinformation spread is key. The issue isn’t just about debunking false information—it also involves addressing extremists’ need for social belonging and identity affirmation. In a world divided by “my truth” and “your truth,” striving for critical media literacy and open dialogue can build bridges and potentially free us from the prison of our beliefs.

Why Some People Turn Into Political Extremists

In the post-truth age, we will believe anything as long as it echoes us.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/social-instincts/202308/why-some-people-turn-into-political-extremists

Posted August 25, 2023 |  Reviewed by Devon Frye

Annie Sprat / Unsplash

Wherever you fall on the political spectrum, chances are you have strong opinions on things that matter to you. You may also have a sense of loyalty and devotion to your political group, whether it’s a party, a movement, or a leader.

Politics is, and always has been, divisive. But with social media, things appear to be going from bad to worse.

In fact, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed that over 50 percent of all American adults get their news from social media, which is notorious for creating echo chambers and propagating harmful misinformation. To add to the problem, research has shown that people who think they can’t be fooled by misinformation are the most likely to believe it.

This is the recipe for a post-truth-based society, where truth, fact, and objective reality are all relative to who you ask.

Let’s look at the rise of right-wing populism across the world today. Consider, for instance, how Germany is experiencing a neo-Nazi resurgence, Spain’s popular far-right political party Vox is at loggerheads with the LGBTQ community, and France’s far-right National Rally party, led by Marine Le Pen (who is vehemently anti-immigration in her beliefs), is gaining more support from voters. America, too, finds itself entrenched in an uncertain, hyper-polarized society where many people who supported Donald Trump throughout his presidency continue to do so.

With this as context, here are the two questions every engaged citizen should ask themselves:

1. Have the concepts of “my truth” and “your truth” caused irreversible damage to our ability to be objective in our political leanings?
2. Is it possible to have polarized views on political issues and, as a society, still get along?

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. But there is one crucial piece of information that can help us understand why political extremists sometimes cling to wild beliefs despite evidence to the contrary. It has to do, at least in part, with the need to belong.

Virtue Signaling May Explain The Spread of Misinformation Among Political Extremists

A recent study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General explored, through a series of three experiments, how conservatives in Spain and the United States respond to misinformation that aligns with their political values.

In the first experiment, conservatives from Spain who were either far-right or center-right were shown various social media posts criticizing the liberal government. These posts were designed to either appeal to their conservative sacred values or their non-sacred values. Sacred values are moral imperatives that people are unwilling to compromise while non-sacred values can be weighed against other values and may be subject to negotiation or trade-offs.

The experiment showed that despite fact-checks and accuracy nudges (like you would see on popular social media platforms like Twitter or Instagram), far-right individuals were far more likely compared to center-right individuals to reshare blatant misinformation. This was especially true if the post resonated with their sacred values and if their personal identity was closely related to their political ideology.

For the second experiment, the researchers replicated the social media experiment in the United States, where they found similar results among Trump-supporting Republicans. In fact, Republicans who voted for Trump (and self-identified as Trump supporters) were found to be undeterred by Twitter fact-checks and were willing to share the misinformation anyway. This tells us that social media fact-checks or flagging of “fake news” may not sufficiently prevent the spread of misinformation, especially when it has an extremist agenda attached to it.

To understand the brain activity of political extremists viewing misinformation, the researchers conducted a third experiment on 36 participants from Spain who supported the far-right political party, Vox. Here, the researchers repeated the same procedure as in the first and second experiments, but this time they conducted an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to observe the changes in participants’ brains as they were asked to decide if they would reshare the social media post.

The experiment revealed that certain parts of the brain, like the bilateral inferior frontal cortex and the precuneus, were more active in these individuals when they contemplated sharing the post. These areas of the brain are involved in making you feel like you belong to a social group, understanding other people’s emotional states, and responding to social cues in ways that are considered socially appropriate.

Plainly speaking, when these far-right individuals choose to share misinformation, they are likely doing so because they view it as a way to signal to other like-minded extremists that they belong to the same social and political group. This need to virtue signal is the strongest when the misinformation presented to them is related to values that are considered sacred to their community, which, in the case of the far-right, may involve issues such as immigration, religion, or nationalism.

Conclusion

Understanding the emotional and societal factors behind misinformation spread is key. The issue isn’t just about debunking false information—it also involves addressing extremists’ need for social belonging and identity affirmation. In a world divided by “my truth” and “your truth,” striving for critical media literacy and open dialogue can build bridges and potentially free us from the prison of our beliefs.

About the Author

Mark Travers, Ph.D., is an American psychologist with degrees from Cornell University and the University of Colorado Boulder.

Online: Awake Therapy

11. Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Spoofing

We need to to understand this so that we can practice good cyber civil defense and employ good cyber hygiene to protect ourselves and our networks.

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Spoofing

Spoofing is the act of deceptively and deliberately falsifying a vessel’s AIS identifying information or location.

https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-spoofing

Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 2, 2023

A China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter transmits fraudulent AIS signals to nearby vessels, appearing as a fishing boat on their monitoring equipment (Credit: Gaille Powell).

Gaute Friis

Analyst

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Spoofing is a deception tactic meant to disrupt monitoring of maritime activities. It is frequently employed by Chinese gray zone actors in the South China Sea. In contrast to the “going dark” tactic of simply disabling a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) broadcast, the spoofing tactic involves manipulating transmitting signals in order to falsify a vessel's identity and/or location.

Spoofing has come to be used as an umbrella term that encompasses a range of AIS-tampering techniques. We divide these techniques into three primary buckets:

1. Identity spoofing, or continuously broadcasting false vessel information.
2. Identity switching, or temporarily changing vessel information when conducting certain activities. 
3. Location spoofing, or embedding false GPS location data within a vessel’s AIS transmissions. 

Valid AIS identities for spoofing purposes can be acquired by various methods, such as simply assuming the identity of another operating vessel ("identity theft") or the identity of a scrapped ("zombie") vessel. A gray zone actor may also switch to a fraudulently obtained IMO-registered shell identity ("identity laundering"). This white paper by maritime intelligence provider Windward goes into more detail about these practices. 

1. Identity spoofing  

Ship operators are responsible for manually entering their AIS broadcast messages into their own transponders. This makes it easy to manipulate basic information such as a vessel's name, type, length, tonnage, or Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI)—a 9-digit reference number administered by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that should be unique to each ship. 

One unsophisticated method is for vessels to enter the country code followed by all zeros (XXX000000). In fact, so many ships do this that it can lead to multiple vessels operating simultaneously with the same fake ID. 

For example, on April 18 2023, a China Coast Guard cutter intercepted a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal while broadcasting an AIS signal identifying itself only as "G", a 2x2m pleasure craft with MMSI 412000000--a bogus number used concurrently by dozens of other ships around the globe.

2. Identity switching 

It is so easy to manually change AIS broadcast data that occasionally ships are caught red-handed switching identities during sensitive operations. One example of this occurred on March 21 2023, when China Coast Guard cutter 5201 abruptly changed its callsign from "CCG5201" to "DONGYU1527-8 50%" while shadowing the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Malapascua on a routine patrol mission in the Spratly Islands.

"Yu" (鱼) is Mandarin for "fish" and is often used in Chinese fishing boat names, which strongly suggests what the offending ship hoped its watchers would believe in this clumsy spoofing effort.

3. Location spoofing 

It is also possible for a more sophisticated gray zone actor to insert fake GPS location data into an AIS boadcast, which makes the spoofing vessel appear to to be in a different location. We are unaware of any known incidents of Chinese security vessels spoofing their locations in the South China Sea, but location spoofing is a well known tactic in other maritime contexts. 

Suffice it to say, AIS spoofing in all its forms endangers shipping and other lawful maritime activity, hinders transparency and effective monitoring, and contravenes both norms and rules for safety at sea and ITU regulations. 

See the rest of the gray zone playbook here.

ANALYSIS

PLAYBOOK

CHN

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Gaute Friis

Gaute is a Defense Innovation Scholar at Stanford's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation.

12. Raimondo says US ‘trying to choke’ China’s military capacity with superconductor limits

Raimondo says US ‘trying to choke’ China’s military capacity with superconductor limits

BY LAUREN SFORZA - 09/03/23 9:19 AM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4185029-raimondo-says-us-trying-to-choke-chinas-military-capacity-with-superconductor-limits/

Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said in an interview that aired Sunday that the United States will not be selling its advanced superconductor chips to China for their “military capacity.”

NBC’s Chuck Todd asked Raimondo on “Meet the Press” if the U.S. would be exporting superconductor chips to China “in a way that China doesn’t feel we’re trying to choke their military technology.”

Raimondo instead said that capping their military capacity is exactly what the U.S. wants to do.

“We are trying to choke their military capacity,” Raimondo said. “So if they feel that, that means our strategy’s working. Certainly on my watch, we are not going to sell the most sophisticated American chip to China that they want for their military capacity.”

Raimondo visited Beijing last week to after months of rising tensions between the two countries. She also told Todd that the U.S. “will have a large, deep, best-in-the-world semiconductor ecosystem” by the end of the decade.

“We need to get back into the business of actually manufacturing leading edge chips here and packaging leading edge chips here,” she said. “And yes, we will, by the end of this decade, have regained prominence and have that deep ecosystem, including research and development, here in the U.S.”

She also noted that before her trip that she was hacked by Chinese actors, describing the relationship between the two countries as “complicated.”

“They did hack me, which was unappreciated, to say the least,” she said. “I brought it up, clearly. Put it right on the table. By the way, I brought up many of our grievances on behalf of our national security concerns, concerns of U.S. labor, concerns of U.S. business. Didn’t pull any punches.”

13. Palantir: Treading On Thin Ice (NYSE:PLTR)

For those who are investors. 

But since Palantir is so important to the intelligence and national security communities I wonder about the effects.

Graphics at the link: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4632562-palantir-treading-on-thin-ice?utm

Palantir: Treading On Thin Ice (NYSE:PLTR)

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4632562-palantir-treading-on-thin-ice?utm

seekingalpha.com · by Richard Durant · September 1, 2023

BlackJack3D

While Palantir Technologies Inc. (NYSE:PLTR) stock had a strong start to the year, the share price has been fairly stagnant in recent months. Palantir's valuation is far higher than warranted by the company's current performance due to an expectation that generative artificial intelligence, or AI, will cause growth to accelerate. This may be difficult to achieve in a soft demand environment, though, and with an unclear path to AIP adoption and monetization. Improving margins will help to support the stock somewhat, but Palantir's share price is likely to come under pressure if growth doesn't improve in coming quarters.

Market

Palantir has been a large beneficiary of the recent surge in interest in AI. While LLMs - large language models - have created a large amount of hype, the main impact of this so far has been on the demand for hardware. This will potentially result in software demand in time, although the lag could be considerable. Snowflake (SNOW) has suggested that it may be 2024 before the impact is really seen. There is a large amount of uncertainty, though, as end market demand and monetization potential are unclear. Palantir's stock price has already anticipated significant benefits accruing to the company, creating downside risk if the expected growth does not eventuate.

Figure 1: ChatGPT Search Interest and NVIDIA and Palantir Stock Price Growth (source: Created by author using data from Google Trends and Yahoo Finance)

Palantir believes that there is strong demand for AI, particularly in the U.S., across both LLMs and other models which can impact business outcomes. This is difficult to see in current data, though, as Palantir doesn't appear to be investing ahead of a growth surge and the company's customer acquisition hasn't accelerated.

Snowflake has suggested that the macro environment continues to be unsettled, although there has been an improvement in sentiment. Generative AI is at the forefront of Snowflake’s conversations with customers, but customers are realizing their AI strategy must be built on a solid data strategy. This could be interpreted as bullish for Palantir, particularly amongst customers that do not have the expertise to implement their own solutions.

Alteryx (AYX) believes that demand has been fairly consistent, with data analytics continuing to be a priority for CIOs. The macro environment has had an impact on the company though, with longer sales cycles and greater deal scrutiny. Management suggested on the second quarter earnings call that the macro environment was tougher than expected, with a significant change in customer buying behavior observed in the last two weeks of the quarter.

AIP

Palantir wants to be the most important software company in the world, and a big part of that is combining its existing capabilities with the potential of generative AI. Palantir's AIP aims to enable organizations to use LLMs in a secure manner, extracting value from data and orchestrating tools, actions and other AI models.

AIP offers customers a range of functionality:

• AIP Builder enables customers to build data pipelines using natural language
• AIP Logic enables customers to build LLM-backed functions and includes no-code functionality
• AIP Automate enables customers to create and monitor AI agents
• AIP Assist is a productivity tool that provides guidance to users of AIP, Gotham and Foundry.

Many software companies are rushing to embed LLMs in their products, though often with unclear value propositions. Palantir is potentially differentiated in this regard by its ontological approach, providing a semantic layer that could enable LLMs to deliver more reliable results. Palantir's background in defense and intelligence also means that Palantir brings significant capabilities in governance and control, which could help to alleviate customer security concerns when utilizing LLMs.

AIP was only released a few months ago, and hence it is probably too early to expect it to be impacting performance. It is reportedly opening expansion conversations with Palantir’s largest customers, though. AIP has over 5,000 monthly users, and the number of users has been growing 50% month-over-month. Early interest has reportedly exceeded that witnessed during the introduction of Palantir’s other products.

Financial Analysis

Revenue growth was only 13% YoY in the second quarter. Excluding the impact of revenue from strategic commercial contracts, revenue growth was 16% YoY. Revenue from strategic commercial contracts was 19 million USD in the second quarter, down over 40% sequentially. Third quarter revenue from this segment is only expected to be $14-16 million USD, and fourth quarter revenue is expected to be even lower.

Palantir expects third quarter revenue to be between $553 and $557 million USD, a 16% YoY growth rate at the midpoint. Full year revenue is expected to be greater than $2.212 billion USD, implying greater than 16% growth. While guidance is for a modest acceleration in growth, and there may be some conservatism in the guidance, it appears that growth is stabilizing in the mid-to-high teens rather than moving sharply higher.

Figure 2: Palantir Revenue Growth (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

Palantir's customer base continues to be fairly concentrated, but the company is making progress expanding its customer base. Palantir's customer count increased 38% YoY to 421 customers. This is dragging the average revenue per customer lower, but in general, Palantir's customer base still skews towards extremely large customers.

Table 1: Deals Closed in Q2 2023 (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

Figure 3: Palantir Customers (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

Commercial revenue grew 10% YoY in the second quarter, although performance was negatively impacted by a decline in revenue from strategic commercial contracts. Excluding the impact from strategic commercial contracts, commercial revenue grew 19% YoY. The U.S. has been an area of strength for the commercial business, with commercial revenue in the U.S. growing 37% YoY excluding the impact of strategic commercial contracts. The international commercial business was relatively soft, only growing 4% YoY. Palantir continues to invest in its international commercial business though, specifically highlighting the potential of Japan, Korea, Canada and the Middle East.

Government revenue grew 15% YoY in the second quarter, with international government customers driving growth. International government revenue increased 31% YoY. This strength was attributed to UK Government work.

Figure 4: Palantir Revenue by Customer Segment (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

The most impressive part of Palantir's business in recent quarters has been the ability of the company to consistently improve its operating profit margins. While much of this is a natural outcome of growth moderating and Palantir's customer base maturing, the company has also made progress in controlling costs.

Figure 5: Palantir Profit Margins (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

Palantir is focused on controlling general and administrative expenses, driving cloud efficiencies and managing headcount increases. There is likely still significantly more room to reduce the burden of general and administrative expenses, but further reductions in sales and marketing and R&D expenses may be difficult to come by. Particularly if Palantir begins to invest more aggressively to capitalize on the generative AI opportunity.

Figure 6: Palantir Operating Expenses (source: Created by author using data from Palantir)

Given Palantir's ambition to be the most important software company in the world, and the anticipated growth acceleration due to generative AI, it is somewhat surprising that Palantir is not increasing its headcount faster. Hiring data seems to point towards ongoing sluggish growth rather than Palantir approaching an inflection point.

Figure 7: Palantir Job Openings (source: Revealera.com)

Conclusion

Palantir is in something of an unusual position at the moment. The stock has risen significantly on the back of AI hype, despite Palantir's actual performance being fairly sluggish. Palantir is also talking about a desire to be the most important software company in the world and helping accelerate GDP growth. So far there has been nothing to support these enormous ambitions (increased expansion rates, increased customer count growth, etc.), and Palantir does not appear to be increasing investment in anticipation of a growth surge.

While there could just be a lag between developing solutions which leverage the capabilities of LLMs and moving these through the typical sales cycle, Palantir Technologies Inc. will need to begin demonstrating progress in the near future, or the stock price is likely to correct significantly.

Figure 8: Palantir Relative Valuation (source: Created by author using data from Seeking Alpha)

seekingalpha.com · by Richard Durant · September 1, 2023

​14. Biden to award Vietnam-era Army helicopter pilot with Medal of Honor

Biden to award Vietnam-era Army helicopter pilot with Medal of Honor

BY BRAD DRESS - 09/01/23 10:58 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4182862-biden-to-award-vietnam-era-army-helicopter-pilot-with-medal-of-honor/

President Biden will award the Medal of Honor at the White House Sept. 5 to a former Army helicopter pilot who rescued four of his fellow comrades in a daring mission during the Vietnam war.

Biden will extend the nation’s highest military service award to retired Capt. Larry L. Taylor, of Chattanooga, Tenn., a veteran who has already earned dozens of medals for his service, including the Distinguished Flying Cross and Air Medal.

The White House said in a Friday press release that Taylor’s brave years of service had earned him recognition for one of the nation’s highest honors.

“Taylor’s conspicuous gallantry, his profound concern for his fellow soldiers, and his intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army,” according to the release.

Taylor enlisted in the Army in 1966 and trained as a helicopter pilot before he was deployed to Vietnam from August 1967 to August 1968.

In June 1968, Taylor led a light-fire helicopter unit to support American troops surrounded by enemy soldiers during a reconnaissance mission near the Vietnam village of Ap Go Cong.

After the four trapped American soldiers had signaled their locations with flares, Taylor and his wingman attacked enemy positions for about 45 minutes, according to the White House.

But a plan to evacuate the patrol team men was called off because it was unlikely the soldiers could be safely airlifted out.

Facing uncertainty, Taylor directed his wingman to keep up the pressure with return fire. He then designated a new extraction point, where he landed to pick up the soldiers, risking his life under heavy fire, and safely got the troops home.

Taylor flew more than 2,000 combat missions during his career, engaged with enemy fire more than 300 times and was forced down on five separate occasions, according to his alma mater, the University of Tennessee.

Taylor left active duty service honorably in 1970 and was honorably discharged from the reserves in 1973.

He later operated a roofing and sheet metal company in Chattanooga and now lives in nearby Signal Mountain.

Taylor is the fifth veteran to receive the Medal of Honor from the Chattanooga area, according to the Chattanooga Times Free Press.

Taylor told the local newspaper that Biden called him in July to inform him of the news and the upcoming ceremony. Taylor said he was “proud” to join his fellow Chattanooga honorees on the Medal of Honor wall.

“To be mentioned in the same company as those people kind of makes you stop and think,” he said.

15. The à la carte world: our new geopolitical order

Excerpts:

In Washington and west European capitals, officials are all focused on the rise of the middle powers and the need to reassess their world view. German officials even posit that Germany too can be seen as a middle power. “Our clear idea is that the world is not a G2 world,” said one. “It should be a multipolar world. The task of Germany could be more in the middle.”

Biden administration officials talk of the need not to react when old allies adopt positions close to China or Russia, but rather to make their case privately and stress the long-term advantages of America’s values over China’s. All the while Washington is busy working away at new constellations of regional alliances, including the trilateral Aukus defence pact and the Quad grouping of Indo-Pacific powers.

At times the rhetoric emanating from Johannesburg will sound like a reheating of the old anti-imperialist language of Bandung. But western officials accept it would be wrong to dismiss it all out of hand as their 20th-century predecessors might have been tempted to do.

The age of the western set menu is over. And the new menu, while heavily influenced by two lead chefs, is still being written.

The à la carte world: our new geopolitical order

Financial Times · by Alec Russell · August 21, 2023

For a telling insight into the seismic changes reshaping the global order, it is worth a glance at the official schedule of Kenya’s diplomats. There was a time when they were called upon to host delegations from global powers relatively rarely. No longer. Now there is barely a slot free in their calendar.

In the early summer Nairobi hosted in quick succession US officials to discuss a free trade deal, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, to address parliament, and EU officials to sign a trade agreement.

Kenya’s military commanders have an impressively full dance card too: in May, for example, an Indian frigate anchored off Mombasa for a joint naval exercise, even as British Royal Marines trained Kenya’s first commando unit.

All the while China, which two decades ago identified Kenya as a vital partner in Africa, in its then fledgling courtship of the continent, is investing in infrastructure leading from the Indian Ocean coast to the interior. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, popped by in July. Oh yes, and Iran’s president Ebrahim Raisi had a red-carpet reception in Kenya in July at the start of an African tour.

Welcome to the à la carte world. As the post-cold war age of America as a sole superpower fades, the old era when countries had to choose from a prix fixe menu of alliances is shifting into a more fluid order. The stand-off between Washington and Beijing, and the west’s effective abandonment of its three-decade dream that the gospel of free markets would lead to a more liberal version of the Chinese Communist party, are presenting an opportunity for much of the world: not just to be wooed but also to play one off against the other — and many are doing this with alacrity and increasing skill.

The rise of the middle powers

This is the first in a series on how the stand-off between America and China has ushered in a new era of opportunity for countries across the world

Part 1: The à la carte world: our new geopolitical era

Part 2: China’s blueprint for an alternative world order

Part 3: UAE and Saudi Arabia — the Gulf powerhouses

Part 4: The fight to dethrone the dollar as the world’s currency

“For Kenya and others it’s not a question of picking sides. It’s a question of picking everyone,” says Michael Power, a Cape-Town based investment analyst, most recently for global asset manager Ninety One, who has devoted his career to following emerging markets.

“We should no longer talk of the non-aligned movement,” he adds, referring to the group of African, Asian and Latin American countries, formed in the cold war, and avowedly neutral in the contest between the west and the Soviet Union. “But of the multi-aligned movement.”

It is 15 years since the first round of this phenomenon when the G20 found its voice and role in shoring up the global economy during the financial crisis — as captured by the commentator Fareed Zakaria in his 2008 essay, The Rise of The Rest. Now, however, with the US and China at loggerheads, the G20 is more divided and less effective and a new more opportunistic era is under way.

One senior western policymaker, privy to thinking in the west and China, sees it as a “once-in-a-generation shift”. Western diplomats talk of the era of “fence-sitters” and “swing states”. For Ivan Krastev, the political scientist, it is the age of the middle powers. The word “middle”, he stresses, refers to their position — in between the US and China — rather than their weighting.

His vision encompasses a range of distinctly un-middling countries including traditional US allies such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and even Germany, as well as titans of the global south, such as Indonesia and India, patently a rising great power.

Brics country leaders meet in 2009, including Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Hu Jintao of China and Manmohan Singh of India © Dmitry Kostyukov/AFP/Getty Images

“This geostrategic entrepreneurialism reflects the evolution of the global order into an archipelago over the past decade,” says Nader Mousavizadeh, an adviser to Kofi Annan, when he was UN secretary-general, and who is the chief executive of Macro Advisory Partners, a strategic advisory firm. “The shift has to be seen as structural, secular and not cyclical.”

“The fact that the relationship between Washington and Beijing has become adversarial rather than competitive has opened up space for other actors to develop more effective bilateral relationships with each of the big powers but also to develop deeper strategic relationships with each other.”

Beyond the Brics

This new less regimented landscape most obviously benefits the global south, the loose term broadly synonymous with the developing economies of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Their heightened ambitions will be on display in South Africa in mid-August at the summit of the Brics nations, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

The Brics was formalised in the aftermath of the financial crisis drawing on a classic jazzy bankers’ acronym — it was coined by Goldman Sachs economists — when their interests were more aligned than now. The founding four later invited South Africa, a relative economic minnow, to join; its inclusion brought Africa into the group.

Now after some years treading water, the Brics is gathering momentum. Symbolically at least the summit has the potential for being seen as the 21st-century equivalent of the Bandung conference of 1955, which launched the non-aligned movement.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

Top of the agenda is the application of 22 countries to join, and which if any to accept. The eclectic roll call of suitors includes global south ideological stalwarts such as Venezuela and Vietnam, but also Middle East actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran, and powerhouses from other regions, including Indonesia, Nigeria and Mexico.

Add all of them, and the block would represent 45 per cent of the global economy. Even a more limited expansion would create a behemoth accounting for almost half the world’s population and 35 per cent of its economy, says Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s ambassador to the Brics who is co-ordinating the summit. He anticipates “a more ambitious agenda and more forceful position, including a strong push for reform of the global political, economic and financial architecture”.

The anticipated arguments behind the scenes over who should join underline that it may be easier to articulate the Brics’ ambitions than realise them. They and potential new members have very different and in some cases rivalrous interests. China, for example, has no desire to see India or Brazil join them on the top table at the UN Security Council — nor is it in favour of a multipolar world, whatever it may say in public.

But however the Brics develops, the summit does underline the broader phenomenon. To understand the new room for manoeuvre, Krastev argues that talk of the rise of a new cold war between America and China is misleading.

“Don’t focus on US-China competition, as they are not going to be able to discipline fragmentation as Russia and America did in the cold war,” he says. “The middle powers may not be big enough or strong enough to shape the international order, but their ambition is to increase their relevance.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

“Their overactivity is going to make them unpredictable,” he adds. “Their activism is contagious. When I think of them, I am reminded of a line from a nonsense novel I read as a child: ‘Lord Ronald flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse, and rode madly off in all directions.’”

In its stance over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey is a case study of a country choosing sometimes to align itself with the west and sometimes to stand against it. Its unpredictability was to the fore this summer at the Nato summit when it did a U-turn in allowing Sweden to join the alliance.

Western officials see Saudi Arabia and the UAE very much in this category of states behaving more assertively on the global stage and more independently of their traditional ally, America. Policymakers in Brussels have noted their intensified engagement in the politics of the Horn of Africa, for example, and also of course Saudi Arabia’s hosting of Ukrainian peace talks, and concluded that the EU needs to rethink its foreign policy priorities and focus. “We need to be engaging more with such countries,” says a senior EU official. “A large part of our foreign policy structures are 20 years out of date.”

The spirit of activism will certainly be to the fore in Johannesburg. Much of the pre-summit argument focused on whether Vladimir Putin would attend. This posed a dilemma for South Africa over its international obligations to arrest him given that the Russian leader has been indicted by the International Criminal Court.

Putin’s decision to stay at home was a boon for Cyril Ramaphosa, the president of South Africa, whose refusal to criticise Moscow has exasperated some in the Biden administration. It also suited many other countries attending which faced awkward encounters with Putin. While loath to join with the west in denouncing Moscow, many African states are upset by Russia’s ending of the deal on safe transport for Ukrainian grain supplies.

Instead it will be the other autocracy among the Brics founders, China, which will overshadow the summit, via the looming argument over expansion.

China’s desire to be the de facto head of the developing world is undisputed. Sir Danny Alexander, a former British government minister who is in Beijing as vice-president for policy and strategy at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, says China clearly sees itself as the natural leader of the global south.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

“At a meeting of the China International Development Co-operation Agency there was a lot of discussion about the different kinds of collaboration going on. They talked about south south, north south and triangular co-operation. What is clear is there is a multiplicity of discussions on development and investment issues and these conversations no longer all flow through a western lens.”

For Beijing, a beefed-up Brics would be a counterweight to the G20, although some of the leading players at the Brics summit — India in particular — have no interest in allowing the Brics to segue into a China “club”. Indian diplomats have made clear that India is not in favour, for example, of developing a Brics currency.

As the two Asian giants warily eye each other, New Delhi has this year made unprecedented strategic overtures to the west, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi making state visits to Washington and Paris. Indian officials talk though of being “aligned with our own interests” and in its stance towards Russia, including buying its oil, New Delhi has resolutely avoided taking the west’s line.

President Joe Biden and Narendra Modi during the Indian prime minister’s visit to Washington in June. New Delhi has this year made unprecedented strategic overtures to the west © Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

Brazil too is wary of the implications of expanding the Brics, diplomats involved in the preparations for the summit have said, for all the anti-western rhetoric of its leftwing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on a recent visit to Beijing.

Such diplomatic dexterity and juggling are on display daily by middle powers around the world, not least by Singapore, which feels the squeeze between China and America acutely.

De-dollar diplomacy

And yet for all the discordance behind the scenes in Johannesburg, most of the participants share a frustration that the global economic order is tilted in the west’s favour, and believe that now finally is the time to change it.

Mia Mottley, the prime minister of Barbados, spoke for many developing countries at a summit hosted by President Emmanuel Macron in June when she called for a transformation of the World Bank and IMF. “When these institutions were founded [in 1944] our countries did not exist,” she said.

Zoltan Pozsar, head of the macroeconomic advisory firm, Ex Uno Plures, believes that system is at a tipping point. “The global east and south are renegotiating the world order,” he says, highlighting the drive in the global south for de-dollarisation and a rethink of the IMF and World Bank. “The west dreamt of the Brics as a lapdog, that they would accumulate dollars and recycle them into Treasuries, but instead of that they are renegotiating how things are done.”

French president Emmanuel Macron greets Mia Mottley, prime minister of Barbados, in Paris. Mottley has called for a shake up of the World Bank and IMF © Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Images

The US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen has confidently pushed back against this, reflecting the view of many market participants that the ambition to dethrone the dollar as the global reserve currency is a very long-term bet. “There is a very good reason why the dollar is used widely in trade, and that’s because we have deep, liquid, open capital markets, rule of law and long and deep financial instruments,” she said at the Paris summit.

But politically at least the context is more propitious than ever to push for change. In the heyday of the cold war, the non-aligned movement had to rely on moral and emotional rather than economic or political clout. Now the Brics and aspirant members run an ever-larger share of the global economy and control many of the critical minerals the west so badly needs.

Moreover, some of the most influential “middle powers” who are wary of China share Beijing’s concerns over America’s weaponisation of financial sanctions. The signal moment for them in the past 18 months, argues the former Kofi Annan aide Mousavizadeh, was not Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 nor Nato’s rediscovery of its purpose, but the freezing of Russian central bank reserves, which dramatically underlined once again the power of the US dollar.

“For middle powers, it was the equivalent of someone going in and seizing embassy property. It was a reminder that you can have this sense of opportunity in the archipelago but that the alternatives to a US dollar world do not exist.

“Many thought we have to do whatever it takes to avoid being in the position of having reserves of this magnitude frozen in the future. That was Modi’s main response and many other middle power governments including in the Middle East were obsessed about this too.”

In Washington and west European capitals, officials are all focused on the rise of the middle powers and the need to reassess their world view. German officials even posit that Germany too can be seen as a middle power. “Our clear idea is that the world is not a G2 world,” said one. “It should be a multipolar world. The task of Germany could be more in the middle.”

Biden administration officials talk of the need not to react when old allies adopt positions close to China or Russia, but rather to make their case privately and stress the long-term advantages of America’s values over China’s. All the while Washington is busy working away at new constellations of regional alliances, including the trilateral Aukus defence pact and the Quad grouping of Indo-Pacific powers.

At times the rhetoric emanating from Johannesburg will sound like a reheating of the old anti-imperialist language of Bandung. But western officials accept it would be wrong to dismiss it all out of hand as their 20th-century predecessors might have been tempted to do.

The age of the western set menu is over. And the new menu, while heavily influenced by two lead chefs, is still being written.

Data visualisation by Alan Smith and Keith Fray

Letter in response to this article:

Financial Times · by Alec Russell · August 21, 2023

16. West Virginia's foreign language cuts could be a "blueprint" for higher ed attacks

Higher education is in trouble in so many ways.

Aug 30, 2023 - Politics & Policy

West Virginia's foreign language cuts could be a "blueprint" for higher ed attacks

• Jennifer A. Kingson
• , author of Axios What's Next

https://www.axios.com/2023/08/30/west-virginia-university-foreign-language-classes

Illustration: Aïda Amer/Axios

The news that West Virginia University (WVU) may ax its entire world languages program sent humanities scholars and others into a tailspin — so much so that the university backpedaled a bit late Tuesday.

• The concern is less for what the plan says about the ongoing decline of language education than for how it might imperil socioeconomic opportunity for students in the poor, rural state — and for what it may portend for humanities education more broadly.

Why it matters: Yes, you can learn bits and pieces of a foreign language on a smartphone app. But scholars call WVU's decision a dangerous inflection point — one with political overtones that may augur more cuts throughout higher education.

• "It's a story about state higher education thinking that public school students don't deserve or need a liberal arts education," Paula M. Krebs, executive director of the Modern Language Association, tells Axios.
• "They start here in a state with weak institutions and weak governance and no oversight on university administration, and it's easy to push this kind of thing through," adds Jonah Katz, associate professor of linguistics at WVU.
• "But once these people have laid their blueprint for how to basically dismantle a large research university ... maybe the next target will be something not quite so soft."

Driving the news: West Virginia University announced Aug. 11 it would eliminate 9% of the majors offered at its main Morgantown campus (32 of the total 338), dissolve the Department of World Languages, Literatures and Linguistics, and fire 7% of its faculty members (169 people) — all for financial reasons.

• The school's Board of Governors is scheduled to vote on the proposal on Sept. 15.

• Students, families and scholars nationwide are pointing fingers at WVU President E. Gordon Gee, saying the school's financial woes are a result of mismanagement and a fig leaf for pivoting to vocational/trade education.

What's happening: Late yesterday, the school relented somewhat, saying it would continue offering instruction in Spanish and Chinese and retain five professors, while continuing to pursue the elimination of the undergraduate language requirement.

• The softening follows an appeals hearing last Friday — and a large outcry in the news media over the situation.

What they're saying: "Our department has been under sustained attack since I got here in 2014," Katz tells Axios, estimating that the number of faculty has dwindled from 30-plus to 18 in that time.

• "I'm working under the assumption that I'm going to be without a job in May."

Katz's research on speech and pronunciation — funded with a National Science Foundation grant — was recently the focus of a glowing university write-up, and the department routinely wins grants from the U.S. State Department and Duolingo, he said.

• "We've been able to expose humanities students to scientific ideas that they might not have been exposed to otherwise, as well as exposing high-achieving STEM students to ideas about language and human sciences that they might not have otherwise been exposed to," Katz said.

Katz's opinion — echoed by many WVU faculty and students — is that administrators "have been extremely dishonest with their data," manipulating the numbers to make interest in language education look lower than it actually is.

• Krebs, from the Modern Language Association, expressed the same view: "What the cuts are about is [eliminating] small classes," she said.
• "There's plenty of demand for creative writing courses all around the country, but they don't want to pay people to teach a 20-student class when they can put 300 people in a computer science class."

By the numbers: While WVU is staring down a $45 million budget deficit, the world languages department brings in $800,000 a year in profit, according to a report by the provost's office.

• Public colleges have been spending money hand over fist, building fancy edifices without the enrollment figures to back them up, a Wall Street Journal investigation shows — and WVU is no exception.
• The dynamic has led to tuition hikes and pleas for state bailouts.
• In West Virginia, this has led to objections from the American Federation of Teachers about the proposed cuts — and corresponding accusations from a conservative lawmaker that the group is "a 'socialist ideologue institution.'"

The other side: WVU says the $45 million deficit is "not a crisis, given this is a small percentage (less than 3.5%) of the university's $1.3 billion budget."

• "We've been working [for] several months on an accelerated timeline for the Academic Transformation, which began back in 2020," a WVU spokesperson told Axios by email.
• "Importantly, this process had already started and continues, regardless of the budget challenge. That challenge has simply accelerated and intensified it."

Between the lines: It's no secret that language study enrollment has been declining for decades — a result of translation software that makes communication easy and the growing worship of U.S. students at the vocational altar of STEM.

• "Language programs are often the first to go" amid budget cuts, said Nancy Tittler, who has taught Russian at Binghamton University in New York since 1980 — and recalled with a chill when, in 2010, SUNY Albany eviscerated its language offerings. "It's seen as a commodity we don't need."
• On top of being a worthy intellectual pursuit, learning languages "makes you more of a citizen" and more hireable, said Tittler, who signed a petition against WVU's cuts.
• But "we have to constantly make this argument," Tittler tells Axios. "What does language give you if it doesn't give you a salary at Goldman Sachs or something?"

Yes, but: The number of foreign language majors doesn't tell the whole story since lots of students want to learn a new language as part of a well-rounded education — and plenty of schools continue to build their language departments.

• In schools that have invested in language arts, "enrollments rise," Krebs said, "and programs in schools where they're making cuts, the enrollments fall. This is absolutely natural."
• The Modern Language Association, which tracks the number of college students who take foreign languages, says overall enrollment in language courses dropped 15.4% between 2016 and 2020.
• Some individual languages saw increases, however — most notably Korean (+25.4%) and American Sign Language (+4.6%).

The bottom line: Disputes over resources at U.S. universities are likely to escalate as money grows tighter and election-year politics escalate.

• On a personal level, "people's lives are being destroyed," said Katz.
• At the modern languages department, "we've been a very successful unit — we've worked together for a long time, and we're also personal friends. We know each other's children, and we've been to each other's houses. It's just devastating."

17. Poll: 56% of Americans say debt ceiling fight made them trust government less

Sep 2, 2023 - Politics & Policy

Poll: 56% of Americans say debt ceiling fight made them trust government less

https://www.axios.com/2023/09/02/poll-trust-federal-government?utm

• Stef W. Kight

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Data: Partnership for Public Service; Chart: Axios Visuals

Americans of both parties think the federal government is doing a worse job for other people than it is for them personally, according to new polling from the Partnership for Public Service.

Zoom in: The prolonged, partisan fighting over raising the debt ceiling in May worsened people's perspective of how the government operates. 56% of respondents overall said the negotiations somewhat or strongly decreased their trust in the government's effectiveness.

• That overall majority included 42% of Democrats and a whopping 68% of Republicans surveyed.

Zoom in: Republicans were far more likely to report having a negative view of — and experience with — the federal government than Democrats on the survey.

• Republicans were split when asked if their personal experience with the government was mostly positive — 45% agreed while 43% disagreed.
• In contrast, only 22% of Democrats disagreed when asked the same question.
• Similarly, more than half of Republicans said they did not think most people in the U.S. have positive experiences with the federal government. Just 39% of Democrats said the same.

By the numbers: Just 38% of the 1,000 respondents surveyed online using a quota sampling method said overall they thought most Americans had positive experiences with the federal government.

• Nearly half (47%) disagreed.
• This lack of faith in the government was less pronounced when respondents were asked about their own personal experiences, however.
• A majority overall — 53% — said their personal experiences were mostly positive.

What they're saying: ""We are experiencing a crisis in the public's trust of our government, which hampers the effectiveness of federal agencies to respond to important problems and threatens the vitality of our democracy," Max Stier, president and CEO of Partnership for Public Service, told Axios in a statement.

18. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September

​Read the entire country by country and regional and functional analysis at this link: https://www.fdd.org/policy-tracker/2023/09/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-september-3/

September 1, 2023 | FDD Tracker: August 3-September 1, 2023

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September

John Hardie

Russia Program Deputy Director

Trend Overview

By John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

Aiming to curtail Beijing’s ability to exploit American technology, the Biden administration moved to restrict U.S. investment in China. At the same time, President Joe Biden dispatched Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo to China as part of his — so far unsuccessful — effort to establish a “floor” under ever-worsening relations between Washington and Beijing. Biden did, however, score a big win with a U.S.-Japan-South Korea summit at Camp David, where leaders from the three countries pledged to step up trilateral cooperation.

Meanwhile, Biden has asked Congress for another $24 billion in Ukraine-related funding. As debate heats up in Congress and among GOP presidential candidates, the White House is falling short in explaining to the American people why support for Ukraine serves U.S. interests. A spate of press leaks by administration officials expressing pessimism about Kyiv’s military prospects has only exacerbated skepticism regarding Ukraine aid.

In the Middle East, the administration continues to pursue a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia but has put the potential deal in jeopardy by demanding Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the White House struck a hostage-swap deal with Iran that will grant Tehran access to $6 billion.

Check back next month to see how the Biden administration deals with these and other challenges

​

19. Opinion | By Abandoning Civics, Colleges Helped Create the Culture Wars

Opinion | By Abandoning Civics, Colleges Helped Create the Culture Wars

By Debra Satz and Dan Edelstein

Professor Satz is the dean of Stanford’s School of Humanities and Sciences, where Professor Edelstein is the faculty director of the civic, liberal and global education program.

The New York Times · by Dan Edelstein · September 3, 2023

Guest Essay

By Abandoning Civics, Colleges Helped Create the Culture Wars

Sept. 3, 2023, 6:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Johanna Walderdorff

By Debra Satz and

Professor Satz is the dean of Stanford’s School of Humanities and Sciences, where Professor Edelstein is the faculty director of the civic, liberal and global education program.

Free speech is once again a flashpoint on college campuses. This year has seen at least 20 instances in which students or faculty members attempted to rescind invitations or to silence speakers. In March, law school students at our own institution made national news when they shouted down a conservative federal judge, Kyle Duncan. And by signing legislation that undermines academic freedom in Florida, Gov. Ron DeSantis is carrying out what is effectively a broad assault against higher education.

We believe that this intolerance of ideas is not just a consequence of an increasingly polarized society. We think it also results from the failure of higher education to provide students with the kind of shared intellectual framework that we call “civic education.” It is our responsibility as educators to equip students to live in a democratic society whose members will inevitably disagree on many things. To strengthen free speech on campuses, we need to return civic education to the heart of our curriculum.

Throughout the 20th century, many colleges and universities had a required first-year course that honed these skills. Typically, this course was known as Western Civ (short for “civilization”). Such courses became standard during the interwar period, as immigration transformed the student body and liberal democracy itself was under threat around the world.

Western Civ also served another, often unintentional, purpose: It provided a mutually intelligible set of references that situated students’ disagreements on common ground.

Generations of students grappled with Socrates’ argument that the rule of law cannot survive if people simply ignore laws they don’t support. By debating plausible answers, students learned to see disagreement as a necessary ingredient of both learning and of life. They also confronted hard questions about civil disobedience and social change. And the common references that students picked up in their first year provided a foundation for future conversations and courses.

The limitations of Western Civ are evident from its title. It exposed students to Western ideas only, implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) suggesting that these ideas were superior to those from other cultures.

Eventually, these limitations proved intractable. In 1987, activists at Stanford denounced the “European-Western and male bias” of the university’s first-year requirement, then called Western Culture. The course was replaced with a program that had no Western focus.

From 1964 to 2010, almost all selective schools (Columbia being an exception) abandoned first-year requirements featuring a common humanities curriculum. Instead, they opted for a “buffet” model, in which students could choose from various curricular tracks. Between 1995 and 2012, Stanford students could pick from around a dozen first-year humanities classes, from a course on gender roles in Chinese families to Technological Visions of Utopia. While many of these courses were excellent, they had no common core of readings nor any transparent rationale for why they were required.

Many colleges said the change was a pragmatic one, given the disagreements about which texts should be mandatory. We believe there was another reason universities turned toward an à la carte curriculum: They had come under the spell, like much of society at that time, of a free-market ideology. In this vision, individual choice and individual advancement take center stage. Requirements are recast as paternalistic; freedom is understood as doing as one pleases.

Freedom of choice is an important value. But without common foundations, it can lead to people shouting one another down. An educational model that leaves no room for a core curriculum shaped by the demands of 21st-century democracies leaves students woefully ill equipped for dealing with disagreements. In a world where individual choice is supreme, how do we learn to accept that there are alternative perspectives to our own that may also be valid? If my goals are the only ones that matter, those who do not share them can too easily be viewed as obstacles that need to be swept away. In the educational context, the invisible hand can turn into an iron fist.

The widespread adoption of a free-market approach to the college curriculum has had other noxious effects, as well: It has fueled a rampant vocationalism among students, leading them to desert humanities classes in favor of pre-professional tracks aimed at lucrative careers. When universities do not signal the intrinsic value of certain topics or texts by requiring them, many students simply follow market cues.

Civic education, by contrast, is a public good. Left to the market, it will always be undersupplied. It is rarely a priority for employers or for job seekers to promote the skills of active listening, mutual reasoning, respecting differences and open-mindedness. We need to reinvest in it.

In the absence of civic education, it is not surprising that universities are at the epicenter of debates over free speech and its proper exercise. Free speech is hard work. The basic assumptions and attitudes necessary for cultivating free speech do not come to us naturally. Listening to people with whom you disagree can be unpleasant. But universities have a moral and civic duty to teach students how to consider and weigh contrary viewpoints, and how to accept differences of opinion as a healthy feature of a diverse society. Disagreement is in the nature of democracies.

Universities and colleges must do a better job of explaining to our students the rationale for free speech, as well as cultivating in them the skills and mind-set necessary for its practice. The free-market curriculum model is simply not equipped for this task. We cannot leave this imperative up to student choice.

At Stanford, since 2021, we once again have a single, common undergraduate requirement. By structuring its curriculum around important topics rather than canonical texts, and by focusing on the cultivation of democratic skills such as listening, reasonableness and humility, we have sought to steer clear of the cultural issues that doomed Western Civ. The new requirement was approved by our faculty senate in May 2020 without a single dissenting vote.

Called Civic, Liberal and Global Education, it includes a course on citizenship in the 21st century. Delivered in a small discussion-seminar format, this course provides students with the skills, training and perspectives for engaging in meaningful ways with others, especially when they disagree. All students read the same texts, some canonical and others contemporary. Just as important, all students work on developing the same skills. Preliminary assessments and feedback suggest that our new program is meeting its goals.

To be clear, our civic education does not aim at achieving consensus among students, nor at producing moderation. Our students, like all of us, will continue to disagree on many things. Nor are our students the only ones in need of such civic skills — numerous members of Congress and governors could no doubt use this curriculum, as well. (We’d be happy to share it.)

But it is our belief that by restoring a common curricular foundation centered on the democratic skills our students need to live in a diverse society, they will turn to more constructive ways to engage with those with whom they disagree than censorship or cancellation.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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Debra Satz is the dean of Stanford’s School of Humanities and Sciences. Dan Edelstein is the faculty director of the school’s Civic, Liberal and Global Education program.

The New York Times · by Dan Edelstein · September 3, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com