I have returned from two weeks in Seoul and should resume regular timing over the weekend. 

Quotes of the Day:

1. “Once dismissed, MacArthur questioned whether he really was subordinate to Truman. He spoke of a

‘new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.’

The proposition that military leaders can decide to be disloyal when they disagree with a particular president is normally considered to be far more dangerous than a president asserting authority over the military, for this is a logic that could lead to coups. At all levels of the chain of command, including the president, individuals have only temporary authority, but it is still sufficient to exercise command. Yet while in his case MacArthur’s observation was disingenuous, behind it there was a perplexing question: what was an officer supposed to do when the chain of command demanded behaviour which was illegal, contradicted core values, or was otherwise unconscionable? It is a question to which we will return throughout this book.”

— Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine by Lawrence Freedman

2. "My affections were first for my own country, then, generally, for all mankind" 

- Thomas Jefferson

3. First learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak.

​- ​Epictetus

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 29 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (29.09.22) CDS comments on key events 

3. Pentagon working to form new command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine

4. Putin Frames Illegal Annexation as Part of Existential Battle With West

5. US Navy sailor charged with setting fire to the USS Bonhomme Richard found not guilty

6.  America's Four-Star Problem

7. Putin’s Roulette

8. DOJ: Major in the United States Army and a Maryland Doctor Facing Federal Indictment for Allegedly Providing Confidential Health Information to a Purported Russian Representative to Assist Russia Related to the Conflict In Ukraine

9. Johns Hopkins doctor and spouse, an Army doctor, indicted for trying to leak medical information to Russia

10. Taiwan, And The World, Needs To Worry About the Western Disinterest In Protecting It

11. Norway's defense minister on how NATO expansion will, and won't, impact defense plans

12. Palantir to empower US DoD units with key AI/ML capabilities

13. The Tech Site That Took On China’s Surveillance State

14. Guarding the Pacific: How Washington can Counter China in the Solomons and Beyond

15. Ukraine Submits Application to join NATO, With Big Hurdles Ahead

16. How disinformation shut down US special operators

17. AUKUS Is Not the New Asian NATO, nor Even a Start at One

18. Afghan Resistance Leaders See ‘No Option’ but War

19. Russian hackers' lack of success against Ukraine shows that strong cyber defences work, says cybersecurity chief

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 29 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 29

Sep 29, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 29, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin continues to violate its stated “partial mobilization” procedures and contradict its own messaging even while recognizing the systematic failures within the Russian bureaucracy just eight days after the declaration of mobilization. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged and deflected the blame for repeated “mistakes” during the first week of mobilization in his opening remarks at the Russian Security Council meeting on September 29.[1] Putin recounted instances of mobilizing men without prior military experience, assigning servicemen to the wrong specializations, and unfairly mobilizing men with health conditions or large families. ISW has previously reported that Kremlin-state media began exploring similar complaints just days after Putin’s declaration of “partial mobilization.”[2] Putin called on the Russian General Staff, Ministry of Defense (MoD), and federal subjects to fix the reported problems with mobilization, while noting that prosecutors and working groups within enlistment centers will monitor all complaints. Speaker of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin also announced that Russian men with a military registration cannot leave their permanent residence without the approval of enlistment centers.[3] Volodin and the Kremlin’s Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later retracted these statements, noting that the Russian MoD informed him that Russian officials may only restrict the movement of military-registered men in case of full mobilization.[4] Republic of Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov also condemned a police car with a loudspeaker that ordered all men to appear at the enlistment center while driving around Derbente, Republic of Dagestan, stating that local authorities did not authorize such announcements.[5]

The Kremlin’s contradictory statements and procedures demonstrate the fundamental nature of the systemic weakness of the Russian military establishment that have characterized the entire invasion. Russian officials continue to execute a supposed reservist call-up as a confused undertaking somewhere between a conscription drive and the declaration of general mobilization, likely issuing conflicting orders to already flawed bureaucratic institutions. CIA Director Williams Burns noted that even if the Kremlin manages to mobilize 300,000 men it will not be able to ensure logistic support or provide sufficient training and equipment to the newly-mobilized men.[6] Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces have already committed mobilized men to Kharkiv Oblast who have since told the Ukrainian forces that they did not receive any training prior to their deployment around September 15.[7]

The bureaucratic failures in the Russian partial mobilization may indicate that Putin has again bypassed the Russian higher military command or the Russian MoD. The deployment of mobilized men to centers of hostilities on the Kharkiv or Kherson frontlines may suggest that Putin is directly working with axis commanders on the ground who are likely clamoring for reinforcements, rather than following standard military practices (that are also required by Russian law) such as providing training to the mobilized prior to their deployment to the frontlines. ISW has previously reported that Putin bypassed the Russian chain of command on numerous occasions when making decisions regarding the progress of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine, likely because he had lost confidence in the Russian MoD.[8] The contradictory and inconsistent narratives used by Kremlin officials and the Russian MoD about mobilization procedures could indicate that Putin, as the supreme commander, issued divergent or contradictory orders.

Belarus remains highly unlikely to become directly involved in the war in Ukraine on the part of Russia, despite statements made by Ukrainian sources on September 29 that Belarus is preparing to accommodate newly mobilized Russian servicemen. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Belarus is preparing to accommodate up to 20,000 mobilized Russian men in existing civilian premises, warehouses, and abandoned agricultural facilities in Belarus.[9] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksiy Hromov, similarly stated that actions are being taken to expand the Luninets Airfield (50km from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border) and to repair storage and military infrastructure.[10] Independent monitoring organization Belarusian Hajan Project also reported that Russia delivered Su-30 aircraft to the Baranavichy airfield in Belarus.[11] These data points may indicate that Russia hopes to use Belarusian military facilities and infrastructure to hold and potentially train newly mobilized Russian forces, but it remains exceedingly unlikely that these are leading indicators of imminent Belarusian involvement in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf. Hromov also stated that there are no signs of Russian troops forming a strike group to target northern Ukraine, which suggests that Russian forces are unlikely to use Belarus as a launching pad for ground attacks into Ukraine despite reports of troop and equipment accumulations in Belarus.[12] These reports more likely suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin is continuing to leverage his relationship with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in order to use Belarusian land for the development of Russian military capabilities. ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko cannot afford the domestic ramifications of Belarusian involvement in Ukraine.[13] ISW also assesses that Russia does not have the ability to form a ground strike force from scratch or from existing units in Belarus quickly.

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin continues to violate its stated “partial mobilization” procedures and contradict its own messaging even while recognizing the systematic failures within the Russian bureaucracy just eight days after the declaration of mobilization.
• Belarus may be preparing to accommodate newly-mobilized Russian servicemen but remains unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.
• Ukrainian troops have likely nearly completed the encirclement of the Russian grouping in Lyman and cut critical ground lines of communication (GLOCS) that support Russian troops in the Drobysheve-Lyman area.
• Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast but stated that Russian forces are deploying newly-mobilized troops to reinforce the Kherson Oblast frontline.
• Ukrainian troops continued to target Russian logistics, transportation, and military assets in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces have likely increased the use of Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones in southern Ukraine.
• An independent Russian polling organization, the Levada Center, found that almost half of polled Russians are anxious about mobilization, but that support for Russian military actions declined only slightly to 44%.
• Ukrainian officials reiterated their concerns that the Kremlin will mobilize Ukrainian citizens in occupied oblasts following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation announcement.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

ISW's September 29 maps do not depict the reported encirclement of Lyman because the first Russian reports of the Ukrainian encirclement of Lyman broke after the 3:00 pm EST daily map cutoff. The ISW maps of September 30 will include all verified and updated information about the reported encirclement of Lyman.

Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops have likely completed the envelopment of the Russian grouping in the Lyman area as of the end of the day on September 29. A prominent Russian military correspondent reported that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defenses around Stavky, 10km north of Lyman, and cut the Torske-Drobysheve road that is the last supply and egress route for Russian elements holding the line west of Lyman.[14] The correspondent called the situation “extremely difficult” for elements of the BARS-13 detachment and the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 20th Combined Arms Army, which are reportedly defending around Drobysheve and into Lyman.[15]

Another Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian troops are attacking Lyman from three directions and have cut Russian access to the critical Svatove-Lyman road, which is the major ground line of communication (GLOC) sustaining the Russian grouping within Lyman itself.[16] Several milbloggers stated that the fall of Lyman to Ukrainian troops is imminent without the immediate reinforcement of Russian forces.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier in the day on September 29 that seven tank units formed by newly mobilized and low-skilled personnel deployed to the Lyman area without proper fire training for tank weapons and got into a road accident.[18] It is highly unlikely that any deployment of additional, newly mobilized, forces to Lyman will afford the existing Russian grouping significant defensive capabilities and prevent Ukrainian troops from collapsing the Lyman pocket.

Russian sources also continued to discuss Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Oskil River in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on September 29. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops attempted to break through Russian defenses near the Kharkiv-Luhansk border in an unspecified location.[19] Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Main Operational Department, Oleksiy Hromov, stated on September 29 that the Russian 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army suffered considerable losses over the past few weeks while operating in Kupyansk, which lies near the Oskil River by the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[20] As ISW previously reported, the 4th Tank Division lost nearly an entire regiment worth of advanced T-80 tanks during earlier stages of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast, which suggests that whatever remnants of the 4th Tank Division that are currently operating around near Kupyansk are severely understrength.[21]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on September 29 but emphasized that Russian forces are deploying new troops to the area, likely to reinforce Russian defensive lines against the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia deployed 2,000 mobilized men from Crimea to Kherson Oblast on September 27, many of whom are newly-mobilized members of the historically marginalized Crimean Tatar community and are likely undertrained and unmotivated to fight on the side of Russian troops.[22] Ukrainian military officials reiterated that Ukrainian troops are continuing an interdiction campaign against Russian military, logistics, and transportation assets, as well as concentration areas, in Kherson Oblast.[23]

Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian strikes impacted three main areas in Kherson Oblast on September 29: around Kherson City, east of Kherson City in the Nova Kakhovka-Beryslav area, and south of the Dnipro River. Several sources reported that Ukrainian troops struck Oleshky (8km southeast of Kherson City), Antonivka (5km east of Kherson City), and Mala Kardashynka (10km southwest of Kherson City).[24] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command and Russian milbloggers additionally stated that Ukrainian troops struck Russian positions and concentration areas in Nova Kakhkovka and Beryslav, 60km and 65km east of Kherson City, respectively.[25] Footage posted to local Kherson Oblast Telegram channels additionally shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian strike on a gas pipeline in Brylivka, 45km southeast of Kherson City.[26]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources identified any specific areas where Ukrainian troops conducted ground maneuvers on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops once again attempted to advance towards Bezimenne (western Kherson Oblast near the Inhulets River).[27] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian troops “suppressed” Russian strongholds in Khreschenivka (northeastern Kherson Oblast) with “active actions.”[28] This language is vague and could either mean that Ukrainian troops conducted ground attacks in this area or inflicted fire damage on Russian positions. The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian troops struck Ternovi Pody (25km northwest of Kherson City), indicating that Ukrainian troops control this settlement.[29]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske and south of Bakhmut near Zaitseve (about 8km southeast of Bakhmut), Mykolaivka Druha (about 13km south of Bakhmut), Odradivka (about 9km south of Bakhmut), Zalizne (about 26km southwest of Bakhmut), and Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian military correspondent claimed that Ukrainian troops are retreating further into Bakhmut itself, although ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks southwest of Avdiivka and Donetsk City in Pervomaiske, Pobieda, Novomykhalivka, and Pavlivka. Ukrainian sources reported on September 29 that Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes throughout the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast.[32]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces have increased their use of Iranian-made drones to attack Ukrainian positions and cities in southern Ukraine. Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Main Operational Department, Oleksiy Hromov, stated that Russian forces used two Iranian-made drones in attacks in southern Ukraine last week, whereas thus far Russian forces have used 29 drones between September 25 and September 29.[33] Ukrainian Strategic Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to detect the Shahed-136 drones because they can operate at low altitudes.[34] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces operate the drones from Crimea and primarily use them in operations targeting critical and military infrastructure throughout Southern Ukraine.[35] Ukrainian sources also claimed to have shot down 22 Shahed-136 drones since September 10.[36]

Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on September 29.[37] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City and Nikopol and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[38] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces continued heavy shelling and rocket strikes in the vicinity of Bereznehuvate.[39] Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian air defense systems shot down four Russian Kh-59 cruise missiles over Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts on September 29.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed three Russian S-300 systems in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast.[41]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continued to face challenges in attempting to suppress anti-mobilization protests throughout Russia. A Russian Human Rights group reported that Russians protested in 11 different Russian cities and settlements on September 29.[42] Russian sources reported that Russian police dispersed an anti-mobilization protest in Kyzyl, Tuva Oblast, detaining 20 women.[43] Russians continued to attack local administrations and military recruitment centers, with Novosibirsk Oblast officials claiming to have detained a man who had attempted to set a military recruitment center on fire in Novosibirsk.[44] Russian sources also reported that unknown protesters set village administrations on fire in Moscow and Rostov Oblast on September 28 and September 29, respectively.[45] Unknown perpetrators also reportedly attempted arson at a military recruitment center in Vladivostok two nights in a row on September 27 and September 28.[46]

Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center found that almost half of polled Russians are anxious about mobilization, but the support for Russian military actions has not significantly declined since the declaration of partial mobilization. Levada found that 47% of Russians expressed concern over mobilization, 13% were outraged, and 11% noted experiencing depression as a result of the mobilization; 23% reported feeling prideful for Russia.[47] More than half of polled Russians said they are afraid that war in Ukraine may lead to general mobilization, whereas a majority of respondents did not express such concern in February 2022. Levada noted that the percent of Russians reporting concern about the situation in Ukraine increased from 74% in August to 88% this week, but absolute support for Russian forces’ actions in Ukraine only decreased by two percent to 44% in the same time frame.[48]

Russian enlistment officers are continuing to undertake sly measures to prevent Russian men from avoiding mobilization. Russian outlets reported that teachers may administer draft notices to men, while enlistment officers in Vladivostok attempted to use fire alarms to coerce men into leaving their apartments.[49] Russian officials are also distributing summonses and establishing checkpoints at the Russian-Kazakh border in Astrakhan Oblast to prevent Russian men from fleeing abroad.[50]

The Kremlin continues to redeploy troops and equipment from the westernmost part of Russia to reinforce war efforts in Ukraine. An unnamed senior Nordic defense official told Foreign Policy that Russia has approximately 6,000 remaining troops of its pre-war 30,000 at the borders with Baltic countries and Finland.[51] The official stressed that Russian forces largely maintained their air power and the Northern Fleet in the area but deployed high-end military hardware such as anti-aircraft systems and missiles to Ukraine. The Kremlin’s consistent deployment of troops and military equipment from westernmost bases is not consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s narratives claiming that the war is a response to NATO threatening Russian territory.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian officials reiterated their concerns that the Kremlin will mobilize Ukrainian citizens in occupied oblasts following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation announcement. A representative of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Vadym Skibitsky, said that the Kremlin would announce mobilization in occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia Oblasts after annexing these territories.[52] Skibitsky added that Russian forces have already mobilized “almost all” of the male population in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Advisor to the Mariupol Mayor Petro Andryushenko stated that annexation will allow Russians to also mobilize temporarily displaced persons for Donetsk City, Makiivka, and Horlivka, that will be considered Russian citizens under Russian law.[53] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai also noted that Russian border officials are not letting approximately 1,000 Ukrainian refugees from occupied territories in Pskov Oblast flee to Latvia.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian occupation officials in Crimea are prioritizing mobilizing Crimean Tatars and are assigning them to units operating in areas of intense hostilities.[55]

Ukrainian partisans continued to target collaborators in occupied territories. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian partisans attempted to kill collaborator Olena Shapurova in an improvised explosive device attack in Melitopol on September 29.[56] Shapurova’s husband reportedly sustained injuries as a result of the attack.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69459; https://smotrim dot ru/article/2966351?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=main2-news&utm_campaign=main2-news6

[7] https://suspilne dot media/286863-rf-mobilizuvali-vze-ponad-100-tisac-z-ogolosenih-300-genstab/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSAZj9CJEkg

[9] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-bilorusi-hotuiutsia-pryiniaty-20-tysiach-mobilizovanykh-z-rf.html ; https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid026MQ25QyQW2ZnsJ5d5stht...

[10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/09/29/biloruski-vijskovi-aerodromy-ta-zaliznyczyu-gotuyut-dlya-pryjomu-vijsk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSAZj9CJEkg

[12] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/09/29/biloruski-vijskovi-aerodromy-ta-zaliznyczyu-gotuyut-dlya-pryjomu-vijsk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSAZj9CJEkg

[37]

[42] https://ovd dot news/news/2022/09/25/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciyami-protiv-mobilizacii-25-sentyabrya

[44] https://newtimes dot ru/articles/detail/223674

[47] https://www dot levada dot ru/2022/09/29/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-sentyabr-2022-goda/

[48] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/09/29/levada-tsentr-u-poloviny-rossiyan-ukaz-o-mobilizatsii-vyzval-trevogu-i-strah-u-chetverti-gordost-za-rossiyu ; https://www dot levada.ru/2022/09/29/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-sentyabr-2022-goda/

[49] https://ria dot ru/amp/20220929/mobilizatsiya-1820276505.html; https://t.me/bazabazon/13552 ; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1575469940068519936?s=20&t=SfM3J-Hrl...

[50] https://t.me/stranaua/66708; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/15904999

[52] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-tymchasovo-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-luhanskoi-ta-donetskoi-oblastei-mobilizovane-maizhe-vse-choloviche-naselennia.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/27/conscription-fears-young-u...

[56]

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (29.09.22) CDS comments on key events 

CDS Daily brief (29.09.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

As of the morning of September 29, 2022, more than 1,175 Ukrainian children are victims of full-scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who have died and been wounded in the course of the Russian aggression is 396, and more than 779 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

Ukraine conducted another exchange of prisoners with Russia and returned from Russian captivity four marines (two officers and two soldiers) and two civilians, informed Andriy Yermak. Four marines, among them one woman, took part in the battles for Mariupol.

Civilians - Viktoriya Andrusha was taken by Russian soldiers because her phone contained data on enemy equipment in her phone, which she transmitted to the Armed Forces. Yana Maiboroda was captured because her phone contained photos of Russian equipment in the Chornobyl zone.

The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories urges Ukrainians not to rush back to the de-occupied territories of Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson Oblast until all life support systems are restored, and the risk to the lives of civilians remains, reported Ukrinform. At the same time, life gradually returns to the de-occupied towns and villages, including [restoring] social benefits payments, IDP aid, and pensions. The gradual examination and renewal of gas and electricity supply networks continue. In particular, gas supply was restored to 739 consumers in Balakliya and Barvinkove of the Izyum District of Kharkiv Oblast in just one day. However, restoring networks in the de-occupied Kherson region is more complex. The enemy does not stop trying to destroy the civilian infrastructure, constantly shelling populated areas and destroying already repaired ones.

According to the morning round-up of the regional military administrations, nine Oblasts of Ukraine were under Russian shelling during the past day.

Last day, the occupiers shelled the Zaporizhzhya, Vasylivskyi, and Pologivskyi districts of Zaporizhzhya Oblast. 29 objects of civil infrastructure were damaged.

At night, the Russians shelled Dnipro. According to the head of the Dnepropetrovsk Military Administration, Valentyn Reznichenko, three civilians are known to have died, including one child. Five more people were injured, including a 12-year-old girl. As a result of the impact, several private houses were completely destroyed. Rescuers continue dismantling the rubble, looking for people. On the night of September 28-29, the Russians launched 4 missile attacks on the Dnipro. The shelling was carried out by Soviet unprecise Kh-22 anti-ship missiles.

Around 8 am, Russian forces hit the Kryvyi Rih district with prohibited cluster shells by "Hurricanes." They targeted the industrial infrastructure in the Zelenodolsk community. There are 19 wounded civilians as a result of shelling.

In Donetsk Oblast on September 28, enemy shelling killed: 2 civilians in Toretsk, 1 - in Bakhmut, 1 - in Pivnichne, 1 - in Blagodatne, 1 - in Mykolaivka. 4 more people were injured.

On the morning of September 29, the Russian occupiers shelled Kramatorsk, resulting in 11 wounded civilians. According to the head of the Donetsk Oblast Military Administration, Pavlo Kyrylenko, the shelling began at 9 am. The building of the former boarding school, high-rise buildings, the road, the hospital, and the Ukrtelecom were damaged. The official once again urged local residents to evacuate.

The enemy shelled Mykolaiv at night, damaging civilian objects, including a museum and an educational institution. Later, on the afternoon of September 29, Russian cluster projectiles hit the area of the public transport stop in a crowded area of the city during "rush hour," the head of the Mykolaiv Regional Council, Hanna Zamazeyeva, reported. "This is nothing but a purposeful terrorist act to destroy the civilian population!" As of 19:20, three civilians killed and twelve wounded were reported, according to Mykolaiv mayor Oleksandr Sienkovych. There is also damage to residential buildings and electricity networks.

In Kharkiv Oblast during the past day, the Russians shelled Kupyanskyi (7 wounded), Kharkivskyi, and Bohodukhivskyi districts of the Oblast. Private houses and commercial buildings were damaged. A 26-year-old man was injured by a landmine explosion in the Izyum district.

Occupied territories

Deputy Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, Denis Chistikov, said that the recruitment of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied Crimea [into the Russian Armed Forces] has been going on for more than eight years [since its occupation by Russia in 2014]. During this time, 15 conscription campaigns took place. More than 35,000 residents of the temporarily occupied Crimea were recruited into the armed forces of the Russian Federation, most of whom were citizens of Ukraine.

At the same time, newly illegally mobilized residents of the occupied Crimea are sent to participate in hostilities without prior training, said

the chairman of the board of the CrimeaSOS human rights organization Oleksiy Tilnenko, reports Ukrinform. According to him, the men are being transported from Sevastopol, where they spent two days after receiving the summons. During this time, they were not trained. As reported, the permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, stated that in the temporarily occupied Crimea, the distribution of summons after Putin announced "partial" mobilization often took place in the form of raids. At least 1,500 summonses were distributed to representatives of the Crimean Tatar people.

According to the [Ukrainian] police of the Kherson Oblast, the Russian military and representatives of the Russian FSB kidnapped eight people in the Kherson Oblast. Men and women were taken from homes and from the streets in Kherson, Vesele and Henichesk villages and Bilozerska territorial community.

Operational situation

It is the 218th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas").

The enemy continues to focus on attempts to fully occupy Donetsk Oblast, maintain control over the captured territories, and disrupt the Ukrainian Defense Forces' intensive actions in some directions.

The enemy is shelling the positions of Ukrainian troops along the contact line and conducts aerial reconnaissance. The Russian military continues striking civilian infrastructure and peaceful residential areas, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law and the laws and customs of war. The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

Over the past 24 hours, the enemy has launched 3 missile and 8 air strikes and carried out more than 82 MLRS rounds at military and civilian targets on the territory of Ukraine. Over 28 Ukrainian towns and villages were affected by enemy strikes, including Siversk, Bilohorivka, Yuryivka, Maryinka, Kryvyi Rih, Vyshchetarasivka, Mykolaiv, and Ternovi Pody. In addition, border areas of Senkivka and Bleshnya (Chernihiv Oblast) and Seredyna Buda, Gavrylova Sloboda, Khliborob, Myropilske, and Ryasne (Sumy Oblast) were shelled.

The enemy continues to send newly mobilized low-skilled personnel to the areas of hostilities. For example, on September 26, 7 Russian tanks went to Lyman in the Donetsk Oblast, and 2 of them were involved in a road accident during the pursuit. In addition, the crews did not undergo proper fire training using standard tank weapons.

The Russian military leadership continues to take measures to replenish manpower losses, in particular, to equip its units with [Russian] convicts. According to available information, about 400 people of the specified category [from Russian prisons] arrived at the "Kadamovsky" training center in the territory of the Rostov Oblast (Russia). Their training will last until September 30.

Aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 16 strikes, damaging three enemy strongholds, ten weapons and military equipment concentration areas, and three anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition, Ukrainian air defense units shot down 4 UAVs and 4 Kh-59 cruise missiles.

Ukrainian missile troops and artillery continue to inflict fire damage on enemy objects. During the day, they struck two enemy command and control posts, seven manpower, weapons, and

military equipment concentration areas, one repeater station, three EW stations, two ammunition depots, and one fuel warehouse.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Dissatisfaction is growing among the Russian military regarding the possible cancellation of the allowance payments for the performance of combat missions outside Russia. The "special military operation" [which, according to the Russian legislation, was carried out outside of RF] after the pseudo-referendums became an "inland" "counter-terrorist operation."

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Strilecha, Sosnivka, Krasne, Hrushivka, Senkove, Dvorichna and Kolodyazne.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The enemy shelled the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery near Novoselivka, Stary Karavan, Shchurove, Zakitne, Dibrova, Ozerne and Verkhnyokamianske.

Russian troops are conducting defensive operations and trying to prevent Ukrainian troops' advance.

To restrain the offensive actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, the enemy strengthened its grouping by transferring reserves:

•      BTG of the 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps of Nothern Fleet to the Petropavlivka region (Kharkiv Oblast);

•       BTG of the 30th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army of the Central Military District to Chervonopopivka (Luhansk Oblast) from Rovenky (Belgorod Oblast, Russia)

•      The 13th "BARS" detachment was transferred from Drobyshev (Luhansk Oblast) to Lyman.

In order to prevent units from being encircled in the Lyman area, the enemy plans to mine the terrain in the Derylovo-Stavky-Kolodyazi frontier; and use heavy TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" systems at the positions of Ukrainian troops in the Katerynivka and Nove areas.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Odradivka, Zaytseve, Vesela Dolyna, Toretsk, Opytne, Ivanivske, Yakovlivka, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Avdiivka, Berdychi, Pisky, Pervomaiske and Maryinka; launched a rocket attack on the positions of Ukrainian troops in the Malynivka area (one missile, probably S-300).

Over the past day, Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in Zaitseve, Mayorsk, Zalizne, Bakhmutske, Odradivka, Mykolaivka Druga, Ozeryanivka, Pervomaiske, Pobyeda, Novomykhailivka, Pavlivka, and Bezimenne areas.

Enemy units of the 6th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps attacked in the direction of Pokrovske, Bakhmutske, but were repulsed. PMC "Wagner" attacked in the directions of Mykolaivka, Kurdyumivka; Kodema, Zaitseve; and Klynove, Vesela Dolyna; the battle continues. In Mykolaivka Druga and Odradivka PMC mercenaries were defeated and retreated.

Enemy units of the 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps tried to advance in the direction of Pisky, Pervomaiske, but suffered losses and were repulsed.

Zaporizhzhya direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined

Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy did not take active actions. They carried out artillery fire near Novoukrainka, Neskuchne, Vremivka, Zaliznychne, Hulyaipole, Charivne, Chervone, Novopole and Uspenivka, and airstrikes at the positions of Ukrainian troops in the Poltavka area (with Su-25 echelon and Ka-52 pair).

The enemy tried to advance in the direction of Yehorivka and Pavlivka with the units of the 155th separate marines brigade of the RF Pacific Fleet, but the Ukrainian units forced the enemy to retreat.

On September 27, Ukrainian Defense Forces destroyed three Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile complexes in the Tokmak area.

Kherson direction

● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.

The operational situation is unchanged. On September 27, about two thousand people mobilized from Crimea were sent from Sevastopol to Kherson Oblast. In addition, the military commissars in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea received an order regarding the priority of conscripting Crimean Tatars into the ranks of the Russian occupying forces, with their subsequent assignment to combat units performing tasks in the areas of the most intense hostilities. Just on September 26, 21 Crimean Tatars nationals were mobilized only in Saky District [of Crimea].

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –

11.8 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th, and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.

Vyshchetarasivka, Nikopol, Osokorivka, Petrivka, Velyka Kostromka, Myrolyubivka, Novovoznesensk, Vysokopilya, Arkhangelsk, Ivanivka, Holgyne, Tverdomedov, Bila Krynytsia, Velyke Artakove, Bila Krynytsia, Andriivka, Bezymenne, Suhyy Stavok, Biloghirka, Novohredneve, Blahodativka, Kyselivka, Chervona Dolyna, Ternivka, Stepova Dolyna, Kobzartsi, Shyroke, Blahodatne, Zorya, Partyzanske, Lyubomyrivka, Ternovi Pody, Novohryhorivka, Myrne, Nova Zorya, Pravdyne, Lymany, Luch, Tavriyske, Oleksandrivka, and Maisky island came under enemy fire.

Russian military launched missile and air strikes on Mykolaiv, Myrolyubivka (with two Su-25 and two Mi-8) and Novovoznesensky (with two Mi-8) districts. The enemy made more than 45 UAV sorties to conduct reconnaissance, adjust fire and strike civilian infrastructure objects.

Enemy units of the 217th parachute airborne regiment of the 98th airborne division of Russian Airborne Forces attacked in the direction of Shchaslyve and Bezimenne but had no success and retreated.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.

Due to weather conditions, there are currently 6 enemy warships on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and control of navigation in the Azov-Black Sea waters. Up to 24 Kalibr missiles on three carriers, namely one 1135.6 frigate and two Buyan-M missile corvettes, are ready for a salvo.

All four project 636.3 submarines in the Black Sea are located in the port of Novorossiysk.

Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

No signs of the formation of amphibious groups for marine landings were detected. Landing ships are located at the Novorossiysk and Sevastopol bases; 3 of them are still under repair.

Five enemy Kalibr cruise missile carriers were detected in the Mediterranean Sea.

During the day, in the interests of the Russian Federation, the passage of the Kerch-Yenikal Strait was carried out by:

• 23 vessels to the Sea of Azov, of which 8 ships were moving from the Bosphorus Strait;

• 15 vessels to the Black Sea, of which 4 ships continued their movement toward the Bosphorus Strait.

Russia continues to violate the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) by turning off automatic identification systems (AIS) on civilian vessels in the Sea of Azov.

The Russian occupiers continue to carry out intensive missile, artillery, and air strikes on the objects of the civil and military infrastructure of the seaports of Ukraine. On September 29, the enemy used cluster munitions on Mykolaiv.

"Grain Initiative": 3 ships left the ports of Chornomorsk and Pivdenny on September 29, carrying on board 60.4 thousand tons of agricultural products for the countries of Africa and Asia. Among them is PATRONUS, which transports 27.5 thousand tons of Ukrainian wheat for Tunisia. In almost two months of operation of the "grain corridor", 238 ships with 5.46 million tons of agricultural products for the countries of Asia, Europe, and Africa left Ukrainian ports.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 29.09

Personnel - almost 58,580 people (+430);

Tanks – 2,325 (+13);

Armored combat vehicles – 4,909 (+20);

Artillery systems – 1,385 (+4);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 331 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 175 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,751 (+9); Aircraft - 262 (0);

Helicopters – 224 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level - 995 (+6); Intercepted cruise missiles - 246 (+4);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

President Zelensky is convening an urgent meeting of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine for tomorrow - press secretary of the head of state Serhiy Nikiforov announced. The agenda and other details are promised to be announced later.

The Security Service of Ukraine, during investigative and operational actions, established the identity of the Russian general who gave the order to capture Mariupol and storm "Azovstal". He has been charged in absentia under three articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The "I want to live" project, which informs the Russian military about the possibility of laying down their arms and saving their lives, has received more than 2,000 applications from soldiers of the Russian army or their relatives, Vitaliy Matvienko, the speaker of the project of the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, announced this at a briefing of representatives of the Security and Defense Forces, Ukrinform reports. "Both servicemen of the Russian army and their relatives are calling, who want their sons or husbands to remain alive," Matvienko said. "I want to live" is a Ukrainian state project designed to help servicemen from the Russian Federation safely surrender to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. "It was created specifically for Russian servicemen who do not want to carry out Putin's criminal orders and participate in this war," Matvienko emphasized.

International diplomatic aspect

Last weekend, some 17,000 Russians entered Finland, an increase of 80% compared to the previous weekend. As a result, the Finnish government decided to significantly limit passenger traffic on Finland's border with Russia, banning Russian citizens from traveling with tourist visas. That decision is because the continued arrival of Russian "tourists" in Finland endangers the country's international relations.

Meanwhile, Russia keeps its "border closed" for at least 323 Ukrainian children taken on holiday vacation to a Black Sea resort from the previously temporarily occupied region of Kharkiv Oblast. The parents trusted their children to the organizers of a summer camp while Russia occupied their territory. However, when their town was liberated from the Russians, the camp management refused to let the children go [home]. Overall, as many as 641,000 Ukrainian children have been forcefully deported to Russia, according to OSINT data of the National Information Bureau.

It's reported that the US will buy defense items worth $2.9 billion in South Korea and deliver them to Ukraine via the Czech Republic. The package might include munitions and MANPADS Cheron. The Pentagon clarified that the first two NASAMS haven't been delivered to Ukraine yet but will be deployed within two months. It was also elucidated that eighteen HIMARS were contracted in the industry and will be delivered within half a year to two years and aimed at meeting Kyiv's mid- and long-term needs. The Ukrainian Ambassador to the US said that according to an agreement, Ukraine couldn't hit Russian territory with HIMARS. At the same time, other weapon systems provided by the US don't have such limitations. Ukraine's defense minister announced that unnamed countries, including some that aren't supplying Ukraine with weapons, agreed to reverse-engineer downed Iranian operated by Russian forces for developing effective anti-UAV equipment.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.

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3. Pentagon working to form new command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine

Pentagon working to form new command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine | CNN Politics

CNN · by Oren Liebermann,Barbara Starr · September 30, 2022

Pentagon working to form new command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine

By Oren Liebermann and Barbara Starr, CNN

Updated 8:17 PM EDT, Thu September 29, 2022

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CNN —

The Pentagon is working to form a new command to coordinate arming and training Ukraine, according to two US officials, in an effort to streamline what was a largely ad hoc process rapidly created in the wake of Russia’s invasion.

The new command, which would be based at Wiesbaden in Germany, would fall under Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the commander of US European Command, which has led the multinational effort to train Ukrainian military forces on advanced Western weapons and deliver those weapons to the border with Ukraine, one official said. It is expected to be led by a 3-star general.

But the US has been careful in how it discusses the plans, which the officials emphasized is not a major change to the current system of organizing and administering shipments. Officials are careful not to give Russian President Vladimir Putin a reason to claim the US is party to the conflict, especially given the elevated rhetoric coming from the Kremlin about the threat of nuclear weapons usage.

The New York Times was first to report about the new command.

The Biden administration has openly signaled its ongoing and long-term support for Ukraine. This week, the Pentagon announced another $1.1 billion in additional military aid to Ukraine, which a senior defense official called a “multiyear investment” in the country’s defenses.

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in late-February, the US has committed more than $16 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. Much of the aid is meant for the demands of the current fight, but increasingly, the administration has also focused on Ukraine’s medium- and long-term needs.

Since the first weeks of the war, the US has looked for ways to quickly and effectively translate Ukrainian requests for different types of equipment into shipments of weapons, turning a process that normally takes weeks or more into a matter of days.

As Ukrainian forces proved they could stand up to the Russian invasion, and as Putin’s aspirational quick victory turned into a bruising war, the number of countries willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine grew.

The US and its allies and partners established the Ukraine Contact Group, consisting of more than 40 countries meeting monthly, to coordinate shipments of weapons and equipment into Ukraine.

The new command would create a more formal structure within the military to manage the shipments, officials said. Its anticipated location in central Germany also places it close to many of the training areas used by the US and Western countries to teach Ukrainian forces how to employ Western weaponry.

The command would also work closely with the International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), which has played a critical role in handling the logistics necessary to match the need for Ukrainian weapons with the available stocks of potential donor countries.

CNN · by Oren Liebermann,Barbara Starr · September 30, 2022

4. Putin Frames Illegal Annexation as Part of Existential Battle With West

Putin Frames Illegal Annexation as Part of Existential Battle With West

nytimes.com · by Anton Troianovski Andrew E. Kramer Edward Wong Andrew E. Kramer Andrew E. Kramer Carly Olson Jane Arraf · September 30, 2022

President Vladimir V. Putin on Friday asserted that Russia would take control of four Ukrainian regions and decried the United States for “Satanism” in a speech that marked an escalation in Moscow’s war against Ukraine and positioned Russia, in starkly confrontational terms, as fighting an existential battle with Western elites he deemed “the enemy.”

Speaking to hundreds of Russian lawmakers and governors in a grand Kremlin hall, Mr. Putin said that the residents of the four regions — which are still partially controlled by Ukrainian forces — would become Russia’s citizens “forever.” He then held a signing ceremony with the Russian-installed heads of those regions to start the official annexation process, before clasping hands with them and chanting “Russia! Russia!”

Mr. Putin’s address came against a backdrop of Russian embarrassments on the battlefield, where Ukraine’s forces have scored stunning victories in recent weeks in the east. Even as the Russian leader spoke, Ukrainian officials said their army had encircled the Russian-occupied town of Lyman, a strategically important hub in the Donetsk region that lies inside the territory Mr. Putin is claiming.

Even by Mr. Putin’s increasingly antagonistic standards, the speech was extraordinary, a combination of bluster and menace that mixed riffs against Western attitudes on gender identity with an appeal to the world to see Russia as the leader of an uprising against American power. He referred to “the ruling circles of the so-called West” as “the enemy,” a word he rarely uses.

“Not only do Western elites deny national sovereignty and international law,” he said in the 37-minute address. “Their hegemony has a pronounced character of totalitarianism, despotism and apartheid.”

Western leaders have condemned Russia’s annexations as illegal, and the “referendums’’ that preceded them — purporting to show local support for joining Russia — as fraudulent. The Biden administration has threatened new sanctions if the Kremlin moved ahead with its claims.

Ukraine’s government has rebuffed Mr. Putin’s claims and vowed to retake territory captured by Russia in the east and south. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Mr. Putin’s speech on Friday by announcing that he was fast-tracking his country’s application to the NATO alliance. In a video, he accused the Kremlin of trying to “steal something that does not belong to it” and of wanting to “rewrite history and redraw borders with murders, torture, blackmail and lies.”

“Ukraine will not allow that,” he said.

Mr. Putin insisted that Russia’s position on annexing the four territories was nonnegotiable, adding that the country would defend them “with all the forces and means at our disposal.”

“I call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease fire and all military action,” he said, and for the Ukrainian government “to return to the negotiating table.”

“But we will not discuss the decision of the people of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson,” he went on, referring to the four Ukrainian regions being annexed. “It has been made. Russia will not betray it.”

Mr. Putin cast the conflict with the West in even more severe terms than in previous speeches, reeling off centuries of Western military actions to denounce the American-led world order as fundamentally evil, corrupt and set on Russia’s destruction.

“The repression of freedom is taking on the outlines of a ‘reverse religion,’ of real Satanism,” Mr. Putin said, asserting that liberal Western values on matters like gender identity amounted to a “denial of man.”

But Mr. Putin offered few new details on the matter that is now perhaps of greatest concern in Western capitals — whether, and at what point, he may be prepared to use weapons of mass destruction to force Ukraine to capitulate. His spokesman said earlier in the day that after the annexation of the four regions — a move that virtually no other country is expected to recognize — an attack on those regions would be treated as an attack on Russia.

Without saying so directly, Mr. Putin hinted that the role of nuclear weapons in war is on his mind. Describing the West as “deceitful and hypocritical through and through,” Mr. Putin noted that the United States was the only country to have used nuclear weapons in war. He then added: “By the way, they created a precedent.”

Mr. Putin’s speech was appealing to three key audiences. To Russians, he was seeking to justify the expanding hardship his war has been causing by insisting they were fighting for their survival. To the West, he worked to telegraph his determination that he was unbowed by sanctions or arms deliveries to Ukraine, and would keep fighting — with the veiled threat of Russia’s enormous nuclear arsenal in the background.

And to the rest of the world, Mr. Putin sought to cast himself as the leader of a global movement against the “Western racists” he claimed were imposing American hegemony upon the world. The West, he claimed, had not changed from the centuries past in which it brutally colonized impoverished countries and fought wars to gain economic advantage.

Western countries, he insisted, had “no moral right” to condemn the annexation of parts of Ukraine.

“The Western elites remain colonizers as they always were,” Mr. Putin said. “They have divided the world into their vassals — the so-called ‘civilized countries’ — and everyone else.”

As Mr. Putin spoke, a crowd gathered on Red Square outside the Kremlin for a concert and rally celebrating the annexation. Russian media reported that Moscow universities had directed students to attend. After Mr. Putin’s speech, pro-Kremlin pop music figures belted out nationalist songs from a stage that said “Russia!” and was flanked with banners reading “Choice of the people!” and “Together forever!”

KYIV, Ukraine — President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine is formally applying for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under an accelerated procedure, responding to Russia’s claims to have annexed four Ukrainian provinces.

“We are taking our decisive step by signing Ukraine’s application for accelerated accession to NATO,” Mr. Zelensky said in a statement.

“De facto, we have already made our way to NATO,” he wrote. “We have already proven our compatibility with alliance standards.”

“They are real for Ukraine — real on the battlefield and in all aspects of our interaction. We trust each other, we help each other, we protect each other. This is an alliance, de facto. Today, Ukraine is applying to make it de jure.”

There was no immediate comment from NATO or the alliance’s secretary general.

In February, Mr. Zelensky stressed his country’s ambition to be admitted into NATO, an aspiration fixed in Ukraine’s Constitution since 2019. But this March, as war with Russia raged, Mr. Zelensky backed down, signaling that his country needed to accept that it might never join.

The Ukrainian president appeared to acknowledge the potential hurdles to accession, saying he was aware that all NATO members must reach consensus for a country to join.

“We know it’s possible,” Mr. Zelensky said in his statement, pointing to the recent examples of Finland and Sweden undertaking the accession process without a membership action plan.

“This is fair,” he added. “This is also fair for Ukraine.”

President Vladimir V. Putin has depicted the expansion of NATO as an existential threat that would leave Russia hemmed in with Western missiles on its doorstep.

• Annexation Push: After sham referendums, President Vladimir V. Putin plans to declare that four occupied regions of Ukraine will become part of Russia, an illegal annexation denounced by the West, but a signal that the Russian leader is prepared to raise the stakes in war.
• Nord Stream Pipeline: Explosions under the Baltic Sea and the rupture of major natural gas pipelines from Russia to Germany appeared to be a deliberate attack, European officials said, exposing the vulnerability of the continent’s energy infrastructure. But a mystery remains: Who did it?
• The Eastern Front: The battle for the critical Donbas region in Ukraine’s east is now centered on two strategically important cities: Lyman and Bakhmut. The fighting is fierce as both Russian and Ukrainian forces race to claim new ground before winter sets in.
• Russia’s Draft: The Kremlin has acknowledged that its new military draft has been rife with problems — an admission that comes after protests have erupted across Russia, recruitment centers have been attacked and thousands of men leave the country.

WASHINGTON — The Biden administration is enacting a round of new sanctions on Friday aimed at further crippling Russia’s defense and technology sectors and other industries, as well as cutting off more top officials and their families from global commerce, to punish Moscow for its efforts to annex a region in eastern Ukraine.

The Treasury and Commerce Departments will impose sanctions and export controls on any companies, institutions or people who “provide political or economic support to Russia for its purported annexation,” White House officials said.

The Treasury Department is also enacting sanctions against 14 international companies for supporting supply chains of the Russian military and putting nearly 300 members of the Parliament on a sanctions list, officials said. And it is listing Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina, the governor of the Central Bank of Russia, and Olga Nikolaevna Skorobogatova, the first deputy governor of the bank, as well as relatives of members of the National Security Council. U.S. agencies had already put security council members on sanctions lists.

The State Department is imposing visa restrictions on more than 900 Russian officials.

The Commerce Department is adding 57 entities to what it calls the entity list, which limits commercial transactions, and plans to try to ensure that companies outside the United States are restricted in the business they can do with those on the list.

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KYIV, Ukraine — Russia launched a flurry of rocket, drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian towns and cities overnight Thursday to Friday, creating scenes of destruction inside Ukraine as the Kremlin planned an elaborate, and widely rejected, annexation ceremony in Moscow.

The most lethal strike hit in Zaporizhzhia, one of the four Ukrainian provinces that Moscow plans to declare part of Russia on Friday as part of an annexation process that has been condemned by the West as a sham and comes after a humiliating battlefield defeat.

The attack killed at least 25 civilians who were waiting at a checkpoint and bus stop, and injured about 50, according to Ukraine’s prosecutor general — which would make it one of the deadliest single attacks against civilians in recent weeks.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine condemned the strike as the work of “terrorists” while Bridget Brink, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, called it “horrific news.”

“Amid its losses on the battlefield, Russia continues strikes on Ukrainian civilians, a further demonstration that Ukraine’s fight is not only a fight for freedom and sovereignty, but for survival,” she wrote on Twitter.

A strike also hit residential neighborhoods in Mykolaiv, killing at least three and wounding 19, the regional governor said. Russian strikes also hit a bus depot in the city of Dnipro, and Ukraine’s military said that at least half a dozen Iranian-made kamikaze drones had been fired at targets in southern Ukraine.

The governor of Zaporizhzhia, Oleksandr Starukh, said a rocket had hit a convoy of cars lined up at a checkpoint on the outskirts of the city. People in the convoy were waiting to be allowed into Russian-occupied territory to pick up relatives and deliver humanitarian aid, he said.

“All were civilians, our compatriots,” Mr. Starukh said in a message on the Telegram social media app. He declared Saturday a day of mourning.

Zaporizhzhia, a large regional center on the Dnipro River, is often the first port of call for civilians fleeing Russian-controlled territory further south.

But every day there are also long convoys of vehicles headed the other direction, into Russian-controlled territory. Those are typically people going to check on older relatives, and volunteers in trucks carrying humanitarian aid, particularly medicines.

Because the checkpoint on the outskirts of town does not operate on a schedule, people line up early in the morning and sometimes wait all day for a chance to pass through.

President Vladimir V. Putin declared on Friday that some 40,000 square miles of eastern and southern Ukraine would become part of Russia — an annexation broadly denounced by the West, but a signal that the Russian leader is raising the stakes in the seven-month-old war.

The Russian leader spoke in the chandeliered St. George’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace — the same place where he declared in March 2014 that the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea was part of Russia.

“This is the will of millions of people,” he said before signing decrees to declare four Ukrainian regions part of Russia. “This is their right, their inalienable right.”

Here is what we know:

Russia says it is annexing four provinces — Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — in the south and the east of Ukraine where intense fighting continues. Moscow hastily put the plan in motion after a humiliating battlefield defeat drove the Russian Army out of another province, Kharkiv, in early September and the Ukrainian advance appeared to be gathering force.

The move sets the stage for the Kremlin to assert that it is defending, not attacking, in the war in Ukraine — and so it is justified to use any military means necessary, a thinly veiled nuclear threat. Annexing the provinces could be used as a rationale for drafting Ukrainian men living there to fight other Ukrainians in the war, helping to solve a shortage of troops in the Russian Army.

The United States, its European allies and many other countries oppose Russia’s nuclear saber rattling and say that allowing a country to capture new territory militarily sets a destabilizing precedent. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, an article published by the Council on Foreign Relations observed that Russia, a member of the United Nations, was violating the United Nations Charter, which requires that U.N. member states refrain from the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

Western allies of Ukraine say the supposed referendums showing support for uniting with Russia were a sham, as some residents of occupied areas were forced to vote at gunpoint, and a large portion of the population had fled as internally displaced people or refugees. The final tallies could also have easily been falsified.

Much of the territory Russia is is claiming as its territory is occupied by the Russian army already. Russia captured and set up client states controlling about a third of two provinces, Donetsk and Luhansk, in a war that began in 2014. Its military advanced into the other two provinces, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, in the invasion that began in February.

The front lines have shifted in fierce, seesaw fighting over the seven months of the war, with Russia mostly losing ground. The Russian army now controls most of the Luhansk and Kherson regions and about half of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. Thousands of square miles of territory and hundreds of cities, towns and villages are now under firm Ukrainian control in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, including the capital of one province, the city of Zaporizhzhia.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine and his ministers and commanders say they will continue their fight to expel the Russian Army from Ukraine, regardless of whether Moscow calls parts of their country Russia.

What is the process, and what comes next?

The Kremlin is using pageantry and a show of adhering to Russian legal formalities to give the annexation a veneer of legitimacy. A rally was planned on Red Square on Friday to celebrate. The proxy leaders of the four provinces traveled to Moscow and appealed to Mr. Putin to accept their regions as part of Russia.

If the process follows the template laid down in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, Mr. Putin will submit a draft law to Russia’s Parliament proposing to expand the country’s borders.

The constitutional court will then review the proposal and both chambers vote on it. There should be no surprises: All members of Parliament are loyal to Mr. Putin. Mr. Putin would then sign the law on accession and claim the new territory.

As the Kremlin prepares to annex four Ukrainian territories, the United States has reiterated that it sees the move as an illegitimate takeover, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said on Thursday.

In a statement, Mr. Blinken said that the Kremlin’s move was a “further attempt at a land grab” that “violates international law,” and that the United States would only ever recognize the areas as part of Ukraine. He also condemned the “sham” referendums that concluded earlier this week, which have been widely dismissed by leaders around the world as rigged votes in which some Ukrainians were forced to cast ballots at gunpoint. “It is an affront to the principles of international peace and security,” he said.

Mr. Blinken said that the United States would continue to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” (On Wednesday, the Pentagon pledged an additional $1.1 billion in long-term military aid to Ukraine.)

Mr. Blinken made similar remarks at a news conference in Washington on Tuesday, when he denounced the referendums as a “diabolical scheme.”

Formalities intended to give Russia’s annexation plans a sheen of legitimacy have already been set in motion, as Russian proxy officials in the four occupied areas appealed to join Russia on Wednesday. This bureaucratic order is at odds with chaos back home, as hundreds of thousands have fled the country since President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia announced a military draft last week. On Thursday, Mr. Putin conceded that some men were wrongly drafted.

SALTIVKA, Ukraine — In her rundown apartment building on the edge of Kharkiv, a city in northeastern Ukraine, Antonina Andriyenko felt the vibrations but couldn’t hear the explosions when Russia invaded in late February. She knew something was happening only when her panicked neighbors rushed to leave.

“At first I thought it was an earthquake,” said Ms. Andriyenko, 74, who is deaf and lives with her 48-year-old daughter, Tanya, who is deaf and autistic. In an interview through a sign language interpreter, Ms. Andriyenko described the fear and confusion as the Russian forces pounded the city.

“We were afraid to sleep. We stayed in a corner hiding,” she said. “The windows were breaking.”

Like others with disabilities, for the estimated 40,000 deaf and hearing-impaired Ukrainians, the war is particularly dangerous and difficult to navigate. While several thousand deaf Ukrainians have been evacuated to safer areas or neighboring countries, Ms. Andriyenko was among the many more who remained.

She and her daughter were among only a handful of residents left in her 72-unit building in a heavily damaged apartment complex in Saltivka, a suburb on the northern edge of Kharkiv. She said that the remaining neighbors watched out for them.

Saltivka, with its sprawling Soviet-era apartment blocks, is just 20 miles from the border with Russia and took the brunt of the initial assault. Attacks and counterattacks continued for months.

Kharkiv is calmer now, but anxiety has not completely disappeared. Russia is still sending occasional rockets into the area amid reports that it is also massing troops along the border.

One day in July, Ms. Andriyenko, an outgoing woman who gestures animatedly and communicates by writing simple notes in Russian, was standing outside her apartment. Not far away, the sound of shells could be felt as well as heard. Muffled shrieks came from inside.

“Sometimes she screams, and I don’t know why,” Ms. Andriyenko said, referring to her daughter.

After the invasion, Ms. Andriyenko said, neighbors wrote her a note telling her that she and her daughter should leave.

“We stayed because we didn’t know where to go,” Ms. Andriyenko said. “We didn’t have any information.”

nytimes.com · by Anton Troianovski Andrew E. Kramer Edward Wong Andrew E. Kramer Andrew E. Kramer Carly Olson Jane Arraf · September 30, 2022

5. US Navy sailor charged with setting fire to the USS Bonhomme Richard found not guilty

US Navy sailor charged with setting fire to the USS Bonhomme Richard found not guilty

The decision ended a two-year legal ordeal for the sailor, who faced charges of aggravated arson and willfully hazarding a ship, for which the maximum sentence was life. 

BY MARTY GRAHAM | PUBLISHED SEP 30, 2022 12:53 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Marty Graham · September 30, 2022

On Friday, U.S. Navy Seaman Recruit Ryan Mays was found not guilty of charges that he started the fire that reduced the USS Bonhomme Richard from an upgraded $1.2 billion ship to scrap metal in July 2020.

The decision ended a two-year legal ordeal for the sailor, who faced charges of aggravated arson and willfully hazarding a ship, for which the maximum sentence was life.

Mays was 19 years old at the time of the Bonhomme Richard fire. He had dropped out of Basic Underwater Demolition School and was assigned to deck duty on the ship — painting and cleaning — but was trying to get back to BUD/S, according to testimony during the eight-day trial at Naval Base San Diego.

His peers didn’t like him, saying he was arrogant and difficult, and officers testified he lacked military bearing.

Days before the fire, Mays texted his supervisor that contractors were welding in berthing while he was trying to sleep.

“It’s dangerous as fuck,” he wrote. Lead prosecutor Capt. Jason Jones seized on the incident in closing arguments.

“This is a mischievous act by a disgruntled sailor meant to prove his point,” he argued.

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Defense lawyers asserted that the investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was intentionally set.

The ATF investigation found no fingerprints, DNA or any other physical evidence of how the fire started. Agents theorized that the fire was intentionally set by pouring a never-identified flammable liquid onto stacked tri-wall boxes.

Mays’ defense team found other potential sources for the fire and raised the specter of other suspects investigated by the ATF and the Naval Criminal Investigative Services.

The fire burned for four days and more than 60 people were injured. A 440-page report details the utter failure of Navy personnel to prepare for and to fight the fire in the first hours.

“The Navy loses the ship to (failed) firefighting but it didn’t have a chance once (Mays) started the fire,” Jones argued.

Lead defense lawyer Lt. Commander Jordi Torres scoffed at the prosecutor’s description of Mays as a criminal mastermind.

“That cheery-face, that goofy sailor who stays out all night working out, this is who Seaman Mays is,” Torres said.

Torres pointed out that Mays still believed he could get back to BUD/S and had been accepted into the Navy’s Search and Rescue school, thinking it would boost his chances.

Just one witness placed Mays at the scene of the fire that started in the lower vehicle storage deck. Petty Officer Kenji Velasco testified that he saw a sailor in coveralls, a mask, and a hair covering — and carrying a heavy bucket — descend past him into the lower vehicle storage deck. But Velasco didn’t tell NCIS he was sure it was Mays at the first of his eight interviews with investigators. Velasco admitted he was worried that his shipmates thought he was the firestarter.

Mays was in the brig from August 2020 to October 2020, when the arson investigation took a hard turn toward a new suspect: a sailor assigned to engineering was seen running from the lower deck.

The second suspect was getting off-duty around the time the fire started. Investigators found Google searches for fire scales and colors made the day of the fire on his phone. They also learned he was writing a novel about a dragon living on a burned ship. Their investigation ended when the second suspect left the Navy.

Back in the courtroom on Friday, after the verdict was announced, Mays leaned forward heavily on the defense team table and sobbed loudly. Still sobbing, he hugged his wife, his father, and his mother.

“I never had any doubt,” said his dad, a retired police officer who attended the trial every day.

Outside the court, Mays read a brief prepared statement: “The past two years have been the hardest years of my life as a young man, ” he said. “I’ve lost time with my friends. I’ve lost friends. I’ve lost time with my family. My entire Navy career was ruined.”

“I am looking forward to starting over,” he added.

Mays did not take questions about future plans, including whether he will try to stay in the Navy. Military defense lawyer Gary Barthel said the Navy cannot boot Mays from the service since he’s been cleared, but an administrative severance is possible, Barthel said.

“We will never know exactly what started the fire,” Barthel added.

Update: 9/30/2022; This article was updated after publication with statements from Ryan Mays, his father, and his attorney.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Marty Graham · September 30, 2022

6. America's Four-Star Problem

A disgruntled colonel who did not make general? (said with only some tongue in cheek).

America's Four-Star Problem - The American Conservative

The next administration’s top priority must be a dramatic reduction in the four-star overhead.

The American Conservative · by Douglas Macgregor · September 29, 2022

Reflecting on the Battle of the Bulge during December 1944 and January 1945, Troy Middleton, former VIII Corps commander, said, “Patton’s principal worth was that he kept things moving. He kept everybody else moving—not only his juniors but his seniors. Otherwise, during the Battle of the Bulge, there would have been a tendency to play Montgomery—to dress up the lines instead of getting in there and hitting the Germans hard.”

Middleton’s observations are sound, but in 1939, the Army’s senior leaders had already selected the unpopular and irascible Patton for retirement and obscurity. Patton was not the only one. In the 1920s, the Army’s senior leaders sidelined Colonel Billy Mitchell and Brigadier General Adna Chaffee. Mitchell wanted to develop air power. Chaffee wanted to build the armored force. Thanks to the outbreak of wars in Poland and Western Europe, the ideas survived, and Patton survived, but only barely in time to be used in World War II.

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Today, the potential for high intensity conventional warfare between great powers looms large. The next president and his administration must recognize that high intensity conventional warfare demands much more character and competence than they will find in another cohort of three- and four-star “Yes Men” with brush cuts, and bright eyes wearing a uniform from the distant past (minus its gold buttons).

Adding more money to an already bloated defense budget will also not fix the problem. Still finding new senior officers who are focused more on service than promotion; senior military leaders with minds receptive to fundamental change in warfare is easier said than done. To understand why change must be imposed from above, Alfred G. Meyer developed a typology of leadership that explains the progressive evolution of leaders in a large military, political or industrial establishment from creative revolutionaries to plodding bureaucrats that maintain the institution.

1. Revolutionaries (1918-1942). The revolutionaries create the system. In the absence of conflict or crisis, they are usually neutered, and their influence suppressed, but their concepts and ideas triumph when war threatens.
2. System Builders (1942-1991). The system builders translate the creative visions of the revolutionaries into practice. They recognize how wrong-footed the Armed Forces are and make profound changes in structure, equipment, organization, and, most important, thinking.
3. System Maintainers (1991-Present). System Maintainers succeed the System Builders and become the ardent defenders of the system they inherited. Today’s three- and four-stars constitute the latest generation of system maintainers. They are satiated, convinced the system works perfectly because it rewarded them with promotion.

For the current generation of system maintainers, a fundamentally new military system with new organizations for a new kind of war is not only inconceivable; the idea is offensive. And therein lies the problem.

In conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan where the application of overwhelming American firepower substitutes for tactics and strategy because there are no enemy armies, air forces or air defenses to fight, the historic outcome is a collection of enormous headquarters manned with far too many generals or admirals. Even worse, the headquarters tend to fill up with weak, untested, but politically savvy senior officers or “Power Point Rangers,” as the saying goes.

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The numbers of four-star generals and admirals currently in the U.S. Armed Forces illustrates the problem. For a force of 1.1 million active-duty Service Members, the current U.S. Armed Forces are commanded by 40 four-star generals and admirals.

For readers who may think this command overhead is normal, they should know that for most of World War II when there were 12.2 million Americans in uniform, the nation relied on 7 Four Stars to command the Armed Forces: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Arnold for Army Ground and Air Forces; King, Nimitz, and Leahy for U.S. Naval Forces. Admiral Leahy, a former Chief of Naval Operations, served as President Roosevelt’s senior Military Advisor who interpreted FDR’s strategic guidance, but held no designated command.

Marshall deliberately kept the numbers of four stars to a minimum saying, “I don’t have time to argue.” More than 77 years after WW 2 it’s time to reinstate Marshall’s wise policy. The growth of numerous agencies, technical support organizations, and high cost logistical and acquisition programs have driven the rank and experience required to command operational fighting forces into a very small corner.

Marshall’s insistence on streamlined command and control, on simplicity of orders, and on unity of command is more relevant than ever. Instantaneous, redundant space-based communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, and missile technologies have wrought profound change in the way military operations can be conducted. The next administration must revisit the 1947 National Security Act and The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

The 1947 National Security Act resulted from the victory in the Second World War. It was designed to harmonize all the U.S. Armed Forces’ capabilities. Instead, it fostered bitter budget fights, single-service thinking, and dug deeper ruts for senior officers to follow. Goldwater-Nichols subsequently created a command structure that is no longer suited to the new multipolar international system.

The Services expect, get, and spend a predetermined piece of the funding pie, fostering waste and redundancy. Too much force structure remains wedded to the WWII designs modified in 1947. New force designs and new technologies that could be exploited to streamline command and control and make operations more effective are excluded from consideration.

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Other problems are caused by secretaries of Defense whose priorities were too often been driven by the politics of apportioning money and technology to the “right people,” or social engineering, and far less to the ruthless pursuit of building forces that can fight. The Biden administration’s divisive, racially charged policies and “woke” LGBT agenda may be the worst of these given their impact on military morale, discipline, readiness, and recruiting.

These points notwithstanding, the next administration’s top priority must be a dramatic reduction in the four-star overhead and a commensurate reduction in the numbers of regional unified and functional commands. System maintainers can’t do the job.

America’s military future must be shaped by two kinds of generals and admirals: System creators and builders; those who can theorize and design, and those who can harness people and technology with the ability to lead and inspire. These are the desired attributes that transcend the drill field, the parachute jump, or the routine exercise. Once the overhead is substantially reduced, these are the leaders the civilians-in-charge that populate the next Administration must identify and appoint. In a word, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s advice to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt remains valid: “No Service can or should be expected to reform itself.”

The American Conservative · by Douglas Macgregor · September 29, 2022

7. Putin’s Roulette

Excerpts;

Putin is taking a huge risk. The economy is doing badly and will certainly not improve by sending huge numbers of additional people to slaughter. Problems with the federal budget are also now obvious: revenues will fall—who will be left to tax?—and the Kremlin will be forced to spend ever more of its treasure on war. That will leave it with shrinking resources with which to buy the population’s loyalty. In such circumstances, what will the dictator’s message be as he seeks to prolong his rule yet further?

Having chosen to expand the war, Putin is broadening the arena of defeat: with the draft, Russia’s mental and moral defeat in Ukraine may now increasingly be complemented by the defeat of the illusions by which the “special operation” had until now been sustained at home. In a sense, Ukraine has already won, having gained a national identity and unity. But in the coming weeks, even minor victories for Ukraine will increase Putin’s irritation, and he will likely respond to them asymmetrically, with no shame or decorum. By now, there is little sign that peace talks are possible (especially after Russia’s staged referendums in the east) or that there is any way for the war to end with one side claiming victory. This horrifying conflict in Europe could continue even when Putin’s resources—both human and psychological—have run out.

A better outcome is possible, but by implicating the entire country in his war, Putin has now made it that much harder to obtain: a result in which Russia begins to move from authoritarianism to democracy. If it could somehow be accomplished, however, such a victory would be a joint one: for Ukraine, Europe, the West, and the entire world—including Russia. For it would mean a Russia free from Putin and Putinism.

Putin’s Roulette

Sacrificing His Core Supporters in a Race Against Defeat

By Andrei Kolesnikov

September 30, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · September 30, 2022

At least since Soviet times, Russians have used dark humor to cope with dictatorship. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization has already been colloquially dubbed the mogilizatsia, a wordplay on mobilizatsia, the Russian word for “mobilization,” and mogila, the word for “grave.” What is more, in practice, this move-to-the-graveyard is proving to be far from partial. Despite assurances by Putin and his defense minister that the draft would be limited to 300,000 people, primarily military reservists who had already served in the army and in conflict zones, Russians have already witnessed the forced conscription of men of all ages across the country. The mobilization has turned out to be almost general.

Even the most committed supporters of Putin and the regime can see that the Kremlin is aiming at a much higher figure: likely more than a million men, although Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has denied that. Such a figure would effectively double the size of the existing army, meaning that a total of two million people would be in uniform. (Although uniforms, like medicines, have become difficult to acquire: those who are mobilized are forced to buy their own uniforms and outfit themselves with first-aid kits.) Much depends, of course, on the administrative zeal of the authorities running regional recruitment offices, which, in many regions, are targeting all male citizens regardless of age or military rank or experience.

Russians may be mostly helpless to avoid this vast roundup, particularly now that Europe has shut its doors to them and there are few options other than to try to flee to countries where there are no visa restrictions for Russians. But this is also a bad situation for Putin, who has staked everything on this war. He can’t win, but he can’t afford to lose either, so he relies on cannon fodder. Putin appears to have forgotten that the real source of danger to his regime may not be the political opposition, which has mostly been jailed or otherwise silenced, or representatives of civil society, whose organizations have been systematically shut down and their voices suppressed, but rather the ordinary Russians who have long provided the foundations of his rule. As long as they were provided with economic stability and not too closely involved in the government’s “special operation,” they could be counted on to approve of it, or at least to do nothing to oppose it. But now that has changed, and already there are signs that Putin’s core support is weakening. A poll conducted by the independent Levada Center in late September, after the mobilization, shows that Putin’s approval has fallen six points, from 83 percent to 77 percent, and his level of trust has fallen four points, from 44 percent to 40 percent. These may seem like small shifts, but his numbers had been almost unmovable since April. That stability is now beginning to erode.

The mobilization is a sign of desperation on the part of Putin. So humiliating is the prospect of a defeat that he is determined to continue the war at any cost, because he hasn’t achieved the vague goals that he set for himself in February. And since Putin has long since turned his regime into a sultanate, nothing and nobody can stop him: not his advisers and not the leaders of the states that he regards as his allies, such as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who publicly distanced himself from Russia’s war during a meeting with Putin by saying the present moment is “not the time for war,” and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an opportunistic partner of Putin who has taken on the role of peacemaker and seems to be trying to appeal to what remains of Putin’s rational mind. So alarmed is Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that he has carefully distanced himself from the Kremlin and sought closer ties to Europe. The leaders of the countries of the former Soviet Union now treat Putin as a dangerous figure who imagines himself to be master of a nonexistent empire. Along with those Russians who are paying attention and are able to understand what is happening, they can see that one man has led Russia to the brink of a demographic catastrophe and the world to the brink of a nuclear war.

Anyone Who Can Hold a Gun

Putin’s frustration and fury about this losing war and his determination to escalate hostilities became apparent in the initial days of the successful Ukrainian counterattack. At first, his answer was missile strikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, such as electric power stations and waterworks. These tactics, however, were a clear admission of weakness rather than a display of strength. By destroying critical infrastructure on territories that he regards as his own, he was revealing that he knows Russia has no hope of actually subjugating and assimilating them.

Now, Putin has found a terrifying way out of the corner that he has backed himself into: partial mobilization. The autocrat has decided that anyone who can at least hold a gun must shift from silent approval to active participation in his “special operation.” People have to share responsibility for the war with him, not only with words but also with their bodies. But this, too, is evidence of weakness rather than strength: an admission that the human resources he has dedicated to the war are insufficient.

Putin may be seeking as many as a million additional troops.

Turning on his own people is dangerous for Putin. Crucially, Putin’s regime is supported by those sections of the population that are highly dependent on the state: the same people who are driven to attend the Kremlin’s rallies—so-called putings, a mixture of “Putin” and “meeting”—in support of the leader, the war, and the annexation of the occupied territories. Those whom Putin cannot conscript but who are equally dependent on the state will be forced to be even stronger and more public in endorsing and defending his actions. The Kremlin has already seen what happens when it takes actions that are unpopular with the masses: when it raised the retirement age in 2018, Putin’s approval ratings slid by 15 percent or more; his ratings took another hit when the regime imposed COVID-19 restrictions in 2020. In those cases, the dips were temporary, and his numbers were able to recover. With the mobilization, it is unclear where Russian’s darkening mood will lead. Perhaps it is the beginning of a larger fall in regime support—the world has witnessed how many Russians are voting with their feet, running from Putin and literally saving their lives. But Putin still has many ardent supporters, and it is possible that a sharp decline in the regime’s popular support may not happen. Whatever the case, discontent and depression seem certain to accumulate on a massive scale.

Rather than the democrats or liberals in Russia’s large cities, it is ordinary Russians who see the ruthless hunt for military recruits as a violation of their rights. More important, it is a violation of the unwritten agreement they have long had with Putin’s regime, the agreement that says that average Russian citizens won’t interfere with the Kremlin’s thieving and military adventurism as long as the Kremlin stays out of their private lives and out of their apartments, allowing them to earn a living for themselves. Military service in the name of unclear goals—and the forced exit from cozy indifference that has come with it—was definitely not in the contract. A new joke in the genre of very black humor has emerged on this subject: in the battle between the refrigerator (consumer needs) and the television (government propaganda), the television has won. But now the TV will have to fight a new battle with a different kind of refrigerator—the kind in which dead bodies are stored.

Average Russians have many reasons to view what Putin is doing now as unfair. That is how many people felt during the controversies over the retirement age and the COVID-19 restrictions. Now that sense of injustice will be heightened by the social and economic consequences of unprecedented militarization. Russia is isolated, and the chances that the economy can withstand these pressures are low. Equally significant is the fact that the majority of those being drafted come from poor families, from distinct ethnic groups within the Russian republics, and from the peripheries of Russian society. The political elites who launched and supported the war won’t be found in the trenches. Dictatorial self-interest is also apparent in the mechanics of who can be exempted from the draft: the authorities are calling up people with professions needed by the economy and society—people such as pilots, the owners of small and medium-sized businesses that provide vital parallel imports of consumer goods, and school teachers. But they are not calling up the professional purveyors of propaganda, for instance, whom the Communications Ministry has exempted. It is irrational and unjust. In the race to evade the draft and avoid fighting in the regime’s war, those who are closest to the regime are winning.

Children as Fertilizer

Even more significant than Putin’s betrayal of the masses, however, may be his betrayal of Russia’s youth. Young people who have the means to do so and have some sort of education are simply fleeing. They see a country that has no future and know that if they stay, they will have no future either. Remaining in Russia and being called up for service in an army that is waging a war “for illusory goals”— to quote Alla Pugacheva, the country’s most famous pop star—means sacrificing hopes and plans and, perhaps, one’s life. Rhetoric glorifying death for one’s homeland has become commonplace among Putin die-hards, with Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church asserting that if someone dies in the line of military duty, “this sacrifice washes away all the sins that the person has committed.” But such talk is entirely alien to modern society. By now, it is becoming clear, and not only to the younger generation, that Putin’s state can impose its rule only through violence.

For those unable to flee or who have family members up for the draft, one of the responses is to protest, even though it is extremely dangerous. This has been true most notably in Dagestan, a republic in which 99 percent of adults supposedly voted for Putin and his party. Now, protesters, mostly women, have taken to the streets with banners stating “Our children are not fertilizer!” These protests cannot be compared to the opposition rallies in Moscow: it is not the opposition that is protesting but rather members of the depoliticized strata of society, and they are doing so only in certain national republics, where people perhaps have special notions of human dignity. But other indications clearly show how frustrated Russians are. Within hours of Putin’s announcement, there were long columns of cars trying to reach the Georgian or Kazakh border. Flights to various foreign destinations, especially central Asian cities, Istanbul, and Tel Aviv, were sold out instantly, with prices soaring through the roof. Just three days after the announcement, the Federal Security Service, or FSB, recorded that more than 260,000 people had fled across various borders. All over the country recruitment offices were set on fire; in one instance, a recruiter was shot by a conscript, and in another, a draftee tried to commit an act of self-immolation rather than be sent to kill others.

Young Russians know that if they stay, they will have no future.

In Putin’s Russia, time has sped up, but in reverse, traveling at breakneck speed from this century to the darkest parts of the last one, with its stench of sweat and mud and its atmosphere of hopeless despair, the despair of the gulag camps and war. Several generations of Russians, including the very young, are now being driven back toward all that. If Russia’s path to greatness lies through the trenches and is to be paid for with their lives, then more and more young people are happy to give up the greatness.

Putin is dealing a powerful blow to another area in which Russia was already suffering: demographics. As it loses more of its youth, Russia’s aging and stagnating population will grow even older and smaller, providing Putin with support at elections but not giving his regime any legitimacy. He has already stopped being the president of all Russians. Those who don’t support him are deemed “national traitors,” a “fifth column,” and “foreign agents.” Russia’s population, what is left of it, will become even more dependent on the state, which will lead to record turnouts at pro-Putin rallies but won’t help the Kremlin gain a real understanding of what is happening in the country—and what it needs to do to save it.

A Fear Greater Than Putin

Putin’s mobilization and the upheaval it has caused is taking place just months before campaigning begins for the 2024 presidential election. In one respect, voting has already begun: men across the age groups are voting with their feet and fleeing the country. Nevertheless, a majority continues to approve of the government’s actions, with many blaming the escalation on U.S. President Joe Biden, Europe, NATO, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and suggesting that Putin had little choice.

Conditioned over decades to remain inert, public opinion in Russia tends to change very slowly, as the small slides in Putin’s ratings show. Undoubtedly, the majority of the population—the 50 percent who remain firmly in favor of the war—will support everything the regime does, perhaps up to and including nuclear strikes. This is the hyper-obedient section of the population. But for another 30 percent, those who—until now—have simply found it easier to support rather than oppose the regime, Putin’s actions could have much more far-reaching consequences. These Russians are filled with doubt and dissatisfaction; for them, it is already clear that the mobilization isn’t partial, and if this impression begins to spread more widely, then the general attitude of Russian society at large could begin to shift. In another finding by the new Levada poll, the percentage of Russians who believe that the country is going in the right direction decreased from 67 percent in August to just 60 percent a month later.

For now, Putin has decided to swiftly set his losses in stone, declaring them acquisitions and achievements. That appears to be the logic behind the inordinate haste to hold referendums in eastern Ukraine: a victory of some sort has to be declared. The referendums are another hurried, bitter response from Putin behind which, as with all his decisions in recent years, there is ever less rationale and ever more palpably powerful emotions. The intention was immediately apparent, however, because no one among the Russian authorities feels any shame any more: following the referendums, which have no legal basis and whose results cannot be verified, the occupied territories will be regarded as Russian. At that point, any Ukrainian counterattack on those territories can be regarded as an attack on Russia itself.

This could lead to a range of consequences, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. Talk of the use of Russia’s nuclear capability has become so casual and so frequent that it has almost become the new normal in the Kremlin’s discourse and in the narrative being put forward on its propaganda shows. Putin’s dark threats of using “all the means at our disposal,” apparently aimed at stirring up the population and girding them for battle, may at some point have the opposite effect: Is it wise to trust a leader who is dragging the nation into a nuclear winter? Russians may start fearing a nuclear war more than they fear Putin himself. Few people want to live inside an open-ended Cuban Missile crisis.

Beyond the Grave

Putin is taking a huge risk. The economy is doing badly and will certainly not improve by sending huge numbers of additional people to slaughter. Problems with the federal budget are also now obvious: revenues will fall—who will be left to tax?—and the Kremlin will be forced to spend ever more of its treasure on war. That will leave it with shrinking resources with which to buy the population’s loyalty. In such circumstances, what will the dictator’s message be as he seeks to prolong his rule yet further?

Having chosen to expand the war, Putin is broadening the arena of defeat: with the draft, Russia’s mental and moral defeat in Ukraine may now increasingly be complemented by the defeat of the illusions by which the “special operation” had until now been sustained at home. In a sense, Ukraine has already won, having gained a national identity and unity. But in the coming weeks, even minor victories for Ukraine will increase Putin’s irritation, and he will likely respond to them asymmetrically, with no shame or decorum. By now, there is little sign that peace talks are possible (especially after Russia’s staged referendums in the east) or that there is any way for the war to end with one side claiming victory. This horrifying conflict in Europe could continue even when Putin’s resources—both human and psychological—have run out.

A better outcome is possible, but by implicating the entire country in his war, Putin has now made it that much harder to obtain: a result in which Russia begins to move from authoritarianism to democracy. If it could somehow be accomplished, however, such a victory would be a joint one: for Ukraine, Europe, the West, and the entire world—including Russia. For it would mean a Russia free from Putin and Putinism.

ANDREI KOLESNIKOV is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · September 30, 2022

8. DOJ: Major in the United States Army and a Maryland Doctor Facing Federal Indictment for Allegedly Providing Confidential Health Information to a Purported Russian Representative to Assist Russia Related to the Conflict In Ukraine

Is this bizarre or what?

Major in the United States Army and a Maryland Doctor Facing Federal Indictment for Allegedly Providing Confidential Health Information to a Purported Russian Representative to Assist Russia Related to the Conflict In Ukraine

justice.gov · September 29, 2022

Baltimore, Maryland – A federal grand jury has returned an indictment charging Anna Gabrielian, age 36, and her husband, Jamie Lee Henry, age 39, both of Rockville, Maryland, with conspiracy and for the disclosure of individually identifiable health information (“IIHI”), related to their efforts to assist Russia in connection with the conflict in Ukraine. The indictment was returned on September 28, 2022 and unsealed today upon the arrest of the defendants.

Gabrielian is scheduled to have initial appearance at 11:30 a.m. today, in U.S. District Court in Baltimore before U.S. Magistrate Judge Brendan A. Hurson. Henry is also expected to have an initial appearance today, although a time has not yet been set.

The indictment was announced by United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Erek L. Barron and Special Agent in Charge Thomas J. Sobocinski of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baltimore Field Office.

As stated in the indictment, Gabrielian is an anesthesiologist and worked at Medical Institution 1, located in Baltimore, Maryland. Henry, a Major in the United States Army, who held a Secret-level security clearance, is Gabrielian’s husband and a doctor. During the time of the alleged conspiracy, Henry worked as a staff internist stationed at Fort Bragg, the home of the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, headquarters of the United States Army Special Operations Command, and the Womack Army Medical Center.

According to the eight-count indictment, Gabrielian and Henry conspired to cause harm to the United States by providing confidential health information of Americans associated with the United States government and military to Russia. Specifically, the indictment alleges that beginning on August 17, 2022, Gabrielian and Henry conspired to provide IIHI related to patients at Medical Institution 1 and at Fort Bragg to an individual they believed to be working for the Russian government in order to demonstrate the level of Gabrielian’s and Henry’s access to IIHI of Americans; their willingness to provide IIHI to the Russian government; and the potential for the Russian government to gain insights into the medical conditions of individuals associated with the United States government and military in order to exploit this information.

Gabrielian and Henry met with an individual they believed to be associated with the Russian government, but who was, in fact, a Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Agent (“UC”), in order to convey to the UC their commitment to aid Russia, and to discuss ways in which they could help the Russian government. Gabrielian told the UC that she had previously reached out to the Russian embassy by email and phone, offering Russia her and her husband’s assistance. Gabrielian told the UC that, although Henry knew of Gabrielian’s interaction with the Russian Embassy, she never mentioned Henry’s name to the Russian Embassy. Gabrielian wanted to make sure Henry could deny any knowledge of her actions. On August 17, 2022, Gabrielian met with the UC at a hotel in Baltimore. During that meeting, Gabrielian told the UC she was motivated by patriotism toward Russia to provide any assistance she could to Russia, even if it meant being fired or going to jail. Gabrielian proposed potential cover stories for meeting the UC and stressed the need for “plausible deniability” in the event she was confronted by American authorities about meeting with the UC. Gabrielian also told the UC that, as a military officer, Henry was currently a more important source for Russia than she was, because he had more helpful information, including how the United States military establishes an army hospital in war conditions and information about previous training provided by the United States military to Ukrainian military personnel. Gabrielian arranged to meet with the UC and Henry later that evening.

At about 8:10 p.m. that evening, the indictment alleges that Gabrielian and Henry met with the UC in the UC’s hotel room. During the meeting, Henry explained to the UC he was committed to assisting Russia and had looked into volunteering to join the Russian Army after the conflict in Ukraine began, but Russia wanted people with “combat experience” and he did not have any. Henry further stated, “the way I am viewing what is going on in Ukraine now, is that the United States is using Ukrainians as a proxy for their own hatred toward Russia.” Henry and Gabrielian allegedly offered to provide the UC with private medical records from the United States Army and Medical Institution 1 in order to help the Russian government. During the same meeting, Gabrielian demanded that if she were put at significant risk of arrest, she wanted her and Henry’s children to, “have a nice flight to Turkey to go on vacation because I don’t want to end in jail here with my kids being hostages over my head.” Henry also indicated that he was concerned about passing a background check for his security clearance, telling the UC, “I don’t want to know your name . . . because I want plausible deniability too. In a security clearance situation they want to know names and people and all this stuff.”

As detailed in the indictment, a few days later Gabrielian and the UC again met at the hotel in Baltimore to discuss providing Army medical records to the UC. Gabrielian told the UC that Henry was concerned about violating HIPAA, but Gabrielian had no such concerns. Gabrielian stated that she would check with Henry about providing medical records from Fort Bragg patients and get back in touch. The next day, Gabrielian sent a text to the UC, using coded language, to advise that Henry would provide Army medical records to the UC. On August 31, 2022, Gabrielian and Henry allegedly met the UC at a hotel room in Gaithersburg, Maryland. According to the indictment, Gabrielian provided the UC with IIHI related to two individuals, including the spouse of an employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence, whom Gabrielian pointed out had a medical condition Russia could “exploit.” Henry also allegedly provided IIHI related to five individuals who were military veterans or related to military veterans.

If convicted, the defendants face a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison for the conspiracy, and a maximum of 10 years in federal prison for each count of disclosing IIHI. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

An indictment is not a finding of guilt. An individual charged by indictment is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty at some later criminal proceedings.

United States Attorney Erek L. Barron commended the FBI for its work in the investigation and thanked the U.S. Army Counterintelligence for its collaboration Mr. Barron thanked Assistant U.S. Attorney Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, who is prosecuting the federal case.

For more information on the Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office, and its efforts to protect national security, please visit www.justice.gov/usao-md and https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/anti-terrorism.

# # #

justice.gov · September 29, 2022

9. Johns Hopkins doctor and spouse, an Army doctor, indicted for trying to leak medical information to Russia

Yes, bizarre. 

​Excerpt:

Henry received attention in 2015 after becoming the first known active-duty Army officer to come out as transgender. A Buzzfeed article from that time said she was also, to her knowledge and to the knowledge of LGBTQ advocates, the first and only active-duty service member who had changed her name and gender within the United States military.

​

Johns Hopkins doctor and spouse, an Army doctor, indicted for trying to leak medical information to Russia

thebaltimorebanner.com · by Justin Fenton

A Johns Hopkins anesthesiologist and her spouse, a doctor and major in the U.S. Army, were federally indicted for attempting to provide medical information about members of the military to the Russian government.

Anna Gabrielian and Jamie Lee Henry, who had a secret security clearance as a doctor at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, communicated and met several times with an undercover FBI agent whom they believed was from the Russian embassy, offering sensitive medical information on military members and their families, the indictment alleges.

Gabrielian, 36, touted the Rockville couple’s access to the health records as “a useful long-term weapon.”

During an initial Aug. 17 meeting in a Baltimore hotel room, Gabrielian told the agent she was “motivated by patriotism toward Russia to provide any assistance she could to Russia, even if it meant being fired or going to jail.”

Her spouse had access not just to medical information, she said, but insight into how the U.S. military establishes Army hospitals in war conditions and about training the military provided to Ukrainian military personnel. Henry participated in a second meeting later that night.

“My point of view is until the United States actually declares war against Russia, I’m able to help as much as I want,” Henry, 39, told the agent, according to the indictment. “At that point, I’ll have some ethical issues I’ll have to work through.”

“You’ll work through those ethical issues,” Gabrielian replied.

Henry also told the agent she had looked into volunteering to join the Russian Army after the conflict in Ukraine began.

In an Aug. 24 meeting with the agent at a Baltimore hotel room, Gabrielian called Henry a “coward” for being concerned about violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), a federal law that limits the disclosure of patients’ confidential medical information. She told the person she did not share those concerns because she violated the law “all the time.”

Gabrielian did fear what might happen to the couple’s children if she put herself at risk of arrest, demanding that the kids be put on “a nice flight to Turkey to go on vacation” if arrest seemed imminent. “I don’t want to end in jail here with my kids being hostages over my head,” she said, according to the indictment.

Gabrielian is listed as an instructor of anesthesiology and critical care medicine at Hopkins, and her profile page says she speaks Russian. She was placed on leave Thursday said Kim Hoppe, the vice president of communications for Johns Hopkins Medicine.

“We were shocked to learn about this news this morning and intend to fully cooperate with investigators,” Hoppe said. She declined to say what Hopkins does to prevent employees with access to patients’ records from taking or sharing them as Gabrielian did.

Henry received attention in 2015 after becoming the first known active-duty Army officer to come out as transgender. A Buzzfeed article from that time said she was also, to her knowledge and to the knowledge of LGBTQ advocates, the first and only active-duty service member who had changed her name and gender within the United States military.

During an Aug. 31 meeting at a hotel in Gaithersburg, Gabrielian provided the agent with medical information related to the spouse of a person currently employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence and medical information related to someone only described as a veteran of the Air Force.

“Gabrielian highlighted to the [agent] a medical issue reflected in the records of [the military member’s spouse] that Russia could exploit,” the indictment says.

During the same meeting, Henry also provided medical information related to five patients at Fort Bragg, including a retired Army officer, a current Department of Defense employee, and spouses of active and deceased Army veterans.

Some clues about the couple’s mindset were revealed earlier last month when Gabrielian told the agent about a 1986 book she instructed Henry to read. It describes the recruitment and training of a Soviet-era Russian spy. “It’s the mentality of sacrificing everything ... and loyalty in you from day one,” she said, according to the indictment. “That’s not something you walked away from.”

The indictment was handed up Wednesday and unsealed Thursday. The pair are charged with conspiracy and wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information. They made their initial appearance in court and were released on home detention.

The couple lives in a small neighborhood of a few dozen townhomes tucked inside a larger community of grand two-story colonials and Mediterranean-style homes with sculpted landscapes and large garages.

Neighbors awoke to a pre-dawn raid of the couple’s home. At least 10 FBI agents and other law enforcement officers were there. They were seen entering the couple’s two-story townhome and searching cars parked out front.

Neighbors said the two live there with their young children and generally kept to themselves. Henry was seen less often due to a commute to North Carolina for work, neighbors told The Banner. Gabrielian’s mother, who lives in a nearby townhome, was more likely to be seen with the couple’s children.

Many other neighbors have connections to the former Soviet bloc. Russian-born neighbor Sergey Pinchuk said he would sometimes speak with Gabrielian about his ailing dog’s health in Russian.

Ryan Little and Jessica Calefati contributed to this report.

justin.fenton@thebaltimorebanner.com

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thebaltimorebanner.com · by Justin Fenton

10. Taiwan, And The World, Needs To Worry About the Western Disinterest In Protecting It

Excerpts:

But an alternative conclusion is that, if Biden does indeed want to help defend Taiwan militarily, he’d either be taking an immensely unpopular decision or that his government needs to do a better job (starting now) of explaining to the American public why he would need to take that decision. And, indeed, why this issue matters to them. Taiwan, too, needs to work harder to convince the Western public why its fate matters to them. If the surveys I’ve referenced can be trusted, there is scant recognition in the West of just how catastrophic a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be for the global economy and for post-Cold War geopolitics. And if Westerners, on average, want their governments to better arm Ukrainian forces (as surveys suggest) to defend liberal democracy, they should want to help defend a thriving Asian democracy, too. Arguably, defending democratic Taiwan from an authoritarian invader is just as important for international liberal values as defending democratic Ukraine from an authoritarian invader.

For Southeast Asian governments, who might seem distant in this story, another conclusion can also be drawn. Those contesting China’s claims in the South China Sea, chiefly Vietnam and the Philippines, have partly built their strategy on the belief that the U.S. and other Western military power would come to their assistance in the event of a Chinese attack. But if the Western public has little appetite to help Taiwan, which is far more economically important to the West than the features in the South China Sea, it’s hard to imagine they’d be more supportive of assisting Southeast Asian claimants. Unfortunately, there doesn’t appear to be any survey of Western public opinion on whether they’d support sending troops or weapons to help Vietnam or the Philippines (a U.S. treaty ally) if China attacks. The surveys on Taiwan ought to be a warning.

Taiwan, And The World, Needs To Worry About the Western Disinterest In Protecting It

Western publics appear to have little appetite for direct involvement in a future Taiwan Strait crisis.

thediplomat.com · by David Hutt · September 30, 2022

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To repeat a cliche, U.S. President Joe Biden has turned America’s decades-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” over whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion into one of “strategic unambiguity.” He has said on several occasions that the U.S. would, in fact, militarily come to Taiwan’s defense. He was asked the same question earlier this month. He replied: “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.”

The German Marshall Fund’s latest Transatlantic Trends survey, released on Thursday, makes for depressing reading if you’re sitting in the Oval Office, and especially if you’re sitting in Taipei. Amongst the 14 Western countries surveyed, the clear preferred option in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was diplomacy and sanctions. An average of 35 percent of respondents support their countries only taking diplomatic measures; 32 percent want joint economic sanctions.

And here’s the kicker: Just 4 percent would support their government sending arms or troops to Taiwan. And 12 percent want their country to take no action. In fact, some 15 percent of U.S. respondents favored no action if China invaded Taiwan, as did 14 percent of French, a tenth of Germans and 8 percent of Britons. On average across the major European states, only 1-2 percent of respondents want to send troops to Taiwan in the event of an invasion. Some 3 percent of Britons and 7 percent of Americans favor this. Only a slightly higher percentage want their governments to send arms to Taiwan: 3 percent of Germans and French; 5 percent of Britons, and 8 percent of Americans.

All of which, one might assume, implies there is almost no desire from Westerners to fight for Taiwan, even to help the Taiwanese defend themselves. For objectivity, this survey has to be compared with others. A poll released last year by the Chicago Council found that 52 percent of American respondents favor using U.S. troops to defend Taiwan if China were to invade, the highest level ever recorded since the think tank began asking this question in surveys in 1982.

What explains this vast disparity? I’m no statistician, but my guess is the different way the two surveys framed their questions. In the Chicago Council poll, which found most Americans support sending troops to help Taiwan, respondents were asked a binary yes-no question: “Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if China invaded Taiwan.” In the Transatlantic Trends, which found just 7 percent of Americans support sending troops, respondents were given a list of five choices to the question: “If China invades Taiwan, do you think your country should…” Given that most respondents said diplomacy or sanctions, and an average of 2 percent supported sending troops, it would appear that the Western public (as would be the case for Western governments) is more averse to militarily helping Taiwan when allowed to consider other options. When given a choice between diplomacy and sanctions or sending your own kin to help defend a distant island, most Westerners seem happier with the easier option. Maybe their governments will, too.

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The response amongst Southeast Asians also warrants attention. No one expects the region’s governments to help defend Taiwan, but their opinions are informative, not least because of just how momentous a Chinese invasion would be for the region. (Say goodbye to the South China Sea and “hedging” if Chinese troops occupy Taipei.) The Democracy Perception Index, published in June by Latana and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, asked respondents: “If China started a military invasion of Taiwan, do you think your country should cut economic ties with China?” Indonesians were in the top three national groups that wanted to maintain ties. A net majority of respondents from all six Southeast Asian states surveyed said their government should maintain economic relations in the event of an invasion. Filipinos were nearly divided on the question.

The question, though, is what to do with these public surveys. One conclusion is that Americans and Europeans have almost no desire to help defend Taiwan in any military sense. This could be considered a fait accompli; that’s the opinion of the populations of countries who could help defend Taiwan, and those opinions won’t be changed. It’s a pity that we have so few surveys from past years about public opinions on a possible Taiwan war. The German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends survey for 2021, for instance, didn’t ask this question. In fact, it’s rather suggestive of the argument I’m about to make that this topic has hardly ever been asked by pollsters in the West or in Asia before 2022. That’s because, it seems, the world has only suddenly woken up to China’s threat to Taiwan over the past 12 months or so. More problematic, the public in the West and Asia still seems to be very ill-informed about the stakes of this possible conflict.

A Pew Research Center survey conducted in March asked Americans which of several scenarios would be a problem for the U.S. Some 78 percent of respondents said tensions between China and Taiwan, but that was a smaller percentage than those who said, for instance, economic competition with China or China’s policies on human rights. Granted, the percentage of Americans who reckoned tensions between China and Taiwan was a “very serious problem” for the U.S. increased by 7 percentage points from a survey conducted a year earlier, up to 35 percent from 28 percent. However, Pew Research has tended to find that few Americans care about the Taiwan crisis. A survey conducted in 2015 found that Americans reckoned tensions between China and Taiwan were the least serious problem in U.S.-China relations. And Americans in this year’s survey still thought China’s human rights policy was a more serious problem for the U.S. than China’s tensions with Taiwan, which speaks of willful ignorance about just how catastrophic a Taiwan Strait crisis would be not just for the U.S. but for most of the world.

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But an alternative conclusion is that, if Biden does indeed want to help defend Taiwan militarily, he’d either be taking an immensely unpopular decision or that his government needs to do a better job (starting now) of explaining to the American public why he would need to take that decision. And, indeed, why this issue matters to them. Taiwan, too, needs to work harder to convince the Western public why its fate matters to them. If the surveys I’ve referenced can be trusted, there is scant recognition in the West of just how catastrophic a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be for the global economy and for post-Cold War geopolitics. And if Westerners, on average, want their governments to better arm Ukrainian forces (as surveys suggest) to defend liberal democracy, they should want to help defend a thriving Asian democracy, too. Arguably, defending democratic Taiwan from an authoritarian invader is just as important for international liberal values as defending democratic Ukraine from an authoritarian invader.

For Southeast Asian governments, who might seem distant in this story, another conclusion can also be drawn. Those contesting China’s claims in the South China Sea, chiefly Vietnam and the Philippines, have partly built their strategy on the belief that the U.S. and other Western military power would come to their assistance in the event of a Chinese attack. But if the Western public has little appetite to help Taiwan, which is far more economically important to the West than the features in the South China Sea, it’s hard to imagine they’d be more supportive of assisting Southeast Asian claimants. Unfortunately, there doesn’t appear to be any survey of Western public opinion on whether they’d support sending troops or weapons to help Vietnam or the Philippines (a U.S. treaty ally) if China attacks. The surveys on Taiwan ought to be a warning.

David Hutt

David Hutt is a journalist and commentator. He is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), a columnist at The Diplomat, and a correspondent for Asia Times.

thediplomat.com · by David Hutt · September 30, 2022

11. Norway's defense minister on how NATO expansion will, and won't, impact defense plans

Norway's defense minister on how NATO expansion will, and won't, impact defense plans - Breaking Defense

“I think we heard some discussion that, ‘Norway can do navy and Finland does army’ — that's way too simple. It's more complicated than that,” said Norwegian defense minister Bjørn Arild Gram.

breakingdefense.com · by Aaron Mehta · September 30, 2022

Norwegian defense minister Bjørn Arild Gram pictured during the Defender Europe exercise. (Norwegian Mod)

WASHINGTON — With Sweden and Finland nearing NATO membership, the question of how they will reshape the military alliance — and the military planning of the other Nordic nations — has been front and center especially in the mind of Bjørn Arild Gram, Norway’s defense minister.

Talking to a small group of reporters last week while visiting Washington, Gram made it clear that while he knows things will change, exactly how it all ends up will take some time to work out.

“The corporation has increased, and we will see that we have to look at our defense planning now. We can see where the geography as a whole, infrastructure, lines of communication [will change] for instance. And of course we have our attention in the high north,” Gram said. “Sweden, Finland to a certain degree also have [that], but they also look more at the Baltic Sea region and this will be more connected.

“So what happens in one area can affect the other, so we have to see this more as a whole and that will affect our planning or operations.”

Gram noted that in 2024, the biannual Cold Response exercise — an event organized by Norway which NATO states involves “around 30,000 troops from 27 countries from Europe and North America” operating in cold environs — will be rebranded Nordic Response and include Finland and Sweden as part of the operating area. That will serve as the first real test of concepts of operation when the two are members of the full alliance. (While both Hungary and Turkey remain to ratify Helsinki and Stockholm as full NATO members, alliance expansion is widely regarded as a when, not if, situation.)

The new geopolitical map would feature Finland as the front-line of NATO, with Sweden providing more defense depth on the map. In theory, that could free up Norway from having to invest as much in its frontline forces and instead shuffle funding elsewhere. But the minister, for his part, doesn’t predict major shifts in defense investments.

“I think we heard some discussion that, ‘Norway can do navy and Finland does army’ — that’s way too simple. It’s more complicated than that,” he said. “But we can be more complimentary [with other nations], I think.

The processes of & military integration into #NATO is steadily moving forward at the speed of relevance. Accession and Integration Working Groups are moving ahead and a formal update on their work will be provided in early December @NATO.#WeAreNATO #StrongerTogether pic.twitter.com/U61EAoqlwp

— NATO ACT (@NATO_ACT) September 27, 2022

“I agree that reinforcement from west to east, lines of communication across the Atlantic will be even more important. I think Norway can have an increased role even when it comes to reinforcing Sweden and Finland. So, we have to think this through again,” he added. “I agree that it gives some depth, but still, we still have a border with Russia. We have the Barents Sea and the Arctic area. So I think we still have an important role to play there and also responsibility on behalf of the alliance and our closest allies.”

After A Cancellation, A Race For Maritime Helos

On the acquisition side, Norway continues to look at options for replacing the NH-90 helicopter, which the government cancelled in June for what it described as a lack of capability. During the interview, Gram defended the decision, saying that the “shortest” way to get a new maritime helicopter was to cancel the program and start over, even though it will take a “process” to select a new option.

As to what those options may be, Gram said they were in talks with American firms about US made helicopters — presumably the Sikorsky-made MH-60R would be one option — but are also looking back to Europe. Regardless of what the long-term solution is, however, Norway is open to a shorter-term option that could help fill the gap between when a new helicopter would be available and when the NH90s were supposed to be ready for action.

“There may not be any quick fix because it takes time to produce these helicopters. We have raised this question with the Americans if there anything that can be done in both the short term and also on a more permanent basis to help us acquire maritime helicopters as soon as possible,” Gram said. “We’re also checking with other allies if there is some kind of solution maybe to lease something or help us in the short term.”

Filling that gap in the short-term is important not just from Norway’s need for anti-submarine capabilities in the high north, where Russian subs often operate, but because the Norwegian military needs to make sure it doesn’t suffer brain drain from the helicopter community. Or as Gram put it, “taking care of the those who are working on this — pilots and mechanics and so on, technicians, so we don’t lose their competence.”

12. Palantir to empower US DoD units with key AI/ML capabilities

Palantir to empower US DoD units with key AI/ML capabilities

army-technology.com · September 30, 2022

The contract will also allow the DoD to extend the capabilities to more mission areas. Credit: U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. 1st Class Terra C. Gatti/Flickr (Creative Commons).

The US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has extended a contract with Palantir Technologies to deliver advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities.

Through the one-year contract, worth $229m, the ARL seeks to equip all branches of the armed services, joint staff, and special forces within the Department of Defense (DoD) with key AI/ML technologies.

The latest contract follows a partnership between Palantir and the ARL in 2018 to deliver operational data and AI capabilities. Palantir’s platform has since handled the integration, management, and deployment of data and AI model training to all Armed Services and special operators worldwide.

Under the new contract, Palantir’s software will support soldiers, the data science community, and AI companies with AI/ML research and development within the DoD.

This will also allow the DoD to extend its capabilities to more mission areas.

The company’s open data standard architecture is expected to help troops assess advances in AI/ML to suit critical operational environments.

By collaborating with partner vendors and operators on the front lines, Palantir’s software will continue to upgrade key capabilities.

Palantir USG president Akash Jain said: “By bringing leading AI/ML capabilities to all members of the armed services, the Department of Defense continues to maintain a leading edge through technology and by delivering best-in-class software to those on the frontlines.

“We are proud to partner with the Army Research Lab to deliver on their critical mission to support our nation’s armed forces.”

The US Army has selected BigBear.ai as the sole source prime contractor to launch the Global Force Information Management (GFIM) system.

Under the nine-month contract worth $14.8m, the company, in partnership with Palantir Technologies, will introduce an intelligent automation platform.

As many as 14 legacy systems will be integrated into a single solution to support 160,000 army users with real-time data.

13.  The Tech Site That Took On China’s Surveillance State

Excerpts;

Healy told me he didn’t see IPVM as an advocacy organization, but Honovich endorsed Healy’s action. “How much does it really help people in Xinjiang?” Healy said. “Probably not that much, which made me sad.” Still, they agreed, it was the right thing to do.

The response from China to IPVM’s work has been predictable. In 2018, IPVM’s site was blocked in China, as many other Western news sites are. Earlier this year, China Daily, a state-backed newspaper, accused IPVM of being a “mass surveillance company.” Another Chinese outlet amplified a tech-forum comment that likened the IPVM site to a blog run by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who was sanctioned by China and continues to produce bombastic warnings about the country’s threats.

Hikvision, though majority-owned by a Chinese state company, has responded to IPVM’s reporting on its operations in that most D.C. of fashions: using its considerable lobbying presence in Washington to question IPVM’s impartiality and credibility. In January, Axios reported that Hikvision had asked congressional ethics officials to investigate IPVM for potential lobbying-disclosure violations.

The pressure campaign seems unlikely to change IPVM’s approach to journalism. To Honovich, you can’t “both sides” China’s use of surveillance technologies in Xinjiang, or any other topic with ethical implications. “I think it is very important that we clearly take ethical stands when ethical stands should be made,” he told me. “I don’t like this whole thing of ‘Well, there are Nazis and not-Nazis, but I’m not going to take a stand between the two.’”

The Tech Site That Took On China’s Surveillance State

How did a trade publisher in Pennsylvania become a principal source of investigative journalism on the repressive apparatus Beijing uses against the Uyghurs?

By Timothy McLaughlin

The Atlantic · by Timothy McLaughlin · September 29, 2022

BETHLEHEM, Pa.—Behind Heights Market & Deli (“Home of the Hoagie”) and next to Finishers Mixed Martial Arts gym, in a neighborhood of tidy lawns adorned with reflective gazing balls, sits a mundane warehouse that is the headquarters of an obscure news organization with an equally mundane name: Internet Protocol Video Market. The nondescript location gives little clue about what kind of journalistic enterprise goes on here.

IPVM’s office has no newsroom with reporters clacking on keyboards and TVs playing cable news. Instead, technicians run surveillance cameras and other security equipment through a litany of tests. Some journalist staff undertake more traditional reportorial tasks, digging through company filings and financial documents for reports that appear on IPVM’s website.

For most of its 18 years of publishing, the company existed as a niche, industry-focused outlet, read by professionals and technicians who generally worked in the field of commercial surveillance. In recent years, though, IPVM has delivered a string of highly impressive scoops, many in collaboration with major news organizations such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times, that have revealed alarming and sinister aspects of what Chinese surveillance companies have been up to. A December 2020 report by The Washington Post based on a document unearthed by IPVM detailed efforts by the Chinese tech giant Huawei to develop a face-scanning system that could trigger a “Uyghur alarm”—referring to the mainly Muslim ethnic group of northwestern China that has faced heavy state repression. The article prompted a European executive to resign from Huawei shortly after, and in February 2021 to speak out about the company’s technology.

The same month, the Los Angeles Times published a report based on a user guide found by IPVM in which the Chinese firm Dahua claimed that its camera technology could identify Uyghurs and automatically alert authorities when it did so. The revelation prompted a group of U.S. senators to write to Amazon demanding to know why the company had signed a multimillion-dollar deal with Dahua. Both the bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the U.S. State Department have noted IPVM’s work in their reports on China.

This record of breaking important stories has made IPVM a closely read publication among not just people interested in surveillance technology but those who want to understand Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions, as well as the deeply strained relations between the United States and China, arguably the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship.

Read: Seeking sanctuary in the old empire

IPVM was founded in 2008 by John Honovich, who was then a disaffected exile from the surveillance industry after a couple of unpleasant experiences at security-technology firms that overpromised and under-delivered. In a recent interview, Honovich, now 46, told me he had been taken aback by the number of “deceptions and lies that were so commonplace,” which involved a lot of “fake-it-’til-you-make-it–type stuff.” These experiences made him realize that “being unethical is one of the greatest sources of competitive advantage.”

Honovich holds trade publications in low regard. Many, he believes, have been “bought” by advertisers who hold sway over reviews and content. To avoid this, he said, he started IPVM with his own money and refused to run ads. At first, the site focused on aggregating news about the surveillance-and-security-technology industry. Later, he added commentary and analysis, and before long he started running his own, rudimentary tests of camera equipment.

“He was shooting stuff in parking lots and out of his balcony door,” Ethan Ace, one of the company’s first employees, told me. “But nobody else was doing any independent testing at all.” Today, the site employs about 25 people and has more than 15,000 subscribers.

Ace is now the head of testing at IPVM, whose facilities have evolved from “the back of my Volvo in a field” to a cavernous 12,000-square-foot hall with lockers holding some 600 cameras that have been tested and broken down. During a visit in August, I noticed a collection of Bowie knives on a set of shelves. Don Mayne, IPVM’s head of operations, explained that these were for testing the effectiveness of AI scanning technology whose makers say it can detect concealed weapons. Companies marketing such tools have seen a surge of interest since May’s school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. Ace and Mayne were highly skeptical of the claims made for the technology.

Read: China’s surveillance state should scare everyone

Ace, who describes himself as “the proudest card-carrying ACLU member in the security industry,” showed me another bay where a thermal camera made by a Chinese firm was being tested. This was an example of technology that proliferated during the coronavirus pandemic, in what Ace called the “fever-camera craze.”

Calamitous episodes, such as mass shootings and terrorist attacks, create booms for the security industry. COVID-19 was no exception. “We are an industry that is specifically marketing towards people’s fears,” Ace said. “That is the nature of it.”

A nearby screen displayed our images and supposed body temperatures. When Ace wore his eyeglasses, everything was fine. When he removed them, an alarm sounded to indicate that his temperature was too high. This was only an impromptu experiment, but it showed how unreliable the readings can be. (Ace was a co-author, along with other IPVM employees, of a March 2021 paper in the Journal of Biomedical Optics describing how thermal-camera manufacturers can manipulate readings to compensate for imprecise measurements and thus undercut the medical usefulness of the technology.)

Honovich remains IPVM’s public face, which has made him a target of anonymous blogs and Twitter accounts. Some accuse him of being a self-promoting gadfly or a bully who uses IPVM to besmirch companies he dislikes. Honovich occasionally tangles with his detractors in IPVM’s comment section and on LinkedIn.

“He obviously pisses people off,” Gordon Haupt, who worked with Honovich in the early 2000s and is now a software engineer for Spotify, told me. “But it is because he is trying to tell the truth.”

According to Honovich, the site made no conscious decision to concentrate on China. If there was a “bad actor” that IPVM set out to cover, “it was Silicon Valley, not the PRC,” he said. But as Chinese firms made inroads into the U.S. market, offering cheap hardware that was upgrading all the time, the site couldn’t ignore them. “The industry coming out of China was a lot bigger than we realized,” Ace told me.

This was something he grasped only when he attended the enormous China Public Security Expo trade show in 2015. When he visited the offices of companies such as Hikvision, the world’s largest maker of surveillance equipment, Ace glimpsed a piece of what Josh Chin and Liza Lin of The Wall Street Journal have described as one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “grandest ambitions”—“the creation of a new type of modern government, powered by data and mass digital surveillance, that can rival democracy globally.”

As IPVM-enabled investigative journalism has helped bring to light, some of the most disturbing and dystopian elements of this plan have played out in Xinjiang, the region where Uyghurs and members of other largely Muslim groups face a “consistent pattern of invasive electronic surveillance,” in the words of a United Nations report published last month. China’s actions in the region, the UN concluded, “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”

IPVM’s focus on Chinese surveillance technology has come as tensions—military, economic, and ideological—between the U.S. and China have been growing. Besides the human-rights situation in Xinjiang, Beijing’s more belligerent approach to Taiwan, which it regards as part of China despite the Chinese Communist Party’s never having controlled it, and the crushing of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement have made relations between the two powers difficult. In Washington, a distrust of Beijing and the desire to confront China more aggressively are rare examples of bipartisan consensus.

Read: ‘I never thought China could ever be this dark’

“Every single business relationship in China deserves serious scrutiny. That is especially true when it comes to technology,” Marco Rubio, the Republican senator from Florida, who has made this issue a personal cause, told me in an email. “Research from firms like IPVM is critical to helping the media, policy makers, and the American people understand the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party and the extent some companies will go to bypass American laws.” Hikvision and Dahua were blacklisted by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019, over Beijing’s treatment of the Uyghurs and other minorities.

Xinjiang has not been the only focus of IPVM’s investigative work. Documents it procured formed the basis of a 2021 Reuters report about how the authorities in Henan, one of China’s largest provinces, had commissioned a surveillance system that they hoped could track journalists and international students as well as other “suspicious people.” This past June, an investigation by The New York Times of how China uses surveillance to reinforce social and political control drew partly on records obtained by IPVM.

Beijing has in recent years restricted the work of foreign journalists, often under the guise of public health as it continues to pursue a zero-COVID policy, and curtailed the number of reporters who can work on the ground. Enterprising researchers have instead scoured the internet, where social-media posts, satellite images, and technical documents can provide a new way into one of the world’s most watched stories. Even this is becoming a challenge.

“That information is still out there,” Dahlia Peterson, a research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology who focuses on China, told me, “but it is increasingly becoming a cat-and-mouse–type situation, where they are throwing up more technical barriers to the outside world.”

IPVM continues to uphold Honovich’s pledge of independence, and does not accept advertising, sponsorship, or consulting fees from manufacturers. “They could just be a company that runs objective tests on video-surveillance technology and leave it at that, and not get involved on the ethical side,” Peterson said. “However, they very much take a moral stance against the abuse of surveillance technologies, and their contributions are invaluable.”

That ethos was on full display last year when Conor Healy, who researches for IPVM the ways governments use surveillance technologies, traveled to Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, to meet a man named Ovalbek Turdakun. A Christian Chinese national who had spent 10 months in a Xinjiang detention camp, Turdakun was able to travel to Kyrgyzstan but feared that he could be deported back to China and face detention again. Healy, working with a friend and contacts in Kyrgyzstan, arranged for Turdakun and his family to fly to Turkey. Healy and his friend escorted them on the trip. From there the family was granted permission to travel to the U.S., and in April this year the Turdakuns arrived in Washington, D.C.

Read: The military-style surveillance technology being tested in American cities

Healy told me he didn’t see IPVM as an advocacy organization, but Honovich endorsed Healy’s action. “How much does it really help people in Xinjiang?” Healy said. “Probably not that much, which made me sad.” Still, they agreed, it was the right thing to do.

The response from China to IPVM’s work has been predictable. In 2018, IPVM’s site was blocked in China, as many other Western news sites are. Earlier this year, China Daily, a state-backed newspaper, accused IPVM of being a “mass surveillance company.” Another Chinese outlet amplified a tech-forum comment that likened the IPVM site to a blog run by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who was sanctioned by China and continues to produce bombastic warnings about the country’s threats.

Hikvision, though majority-owned by a Chinese state company, has responded to IPVM’s reporting on its operations in that most D.C. of fashions: using its considerable lobbying presence in Washington to question IPVM’s impartiality and credibility. In January, Axios reported that Hikvision had asked congressional ethics officials to investigate IPVM for potential lobbying-disclosure violations.

The pressure campaign seems unlikely to change IPVM’s approach to journalism. To Honovich, you can’t “both sides” China’s use of surveillance technologies in Xinjiang, or any other topic with ethical implications. “I think it is very important that we clearly take ethical stands when ethical stands should be made,” he told me. “I don’t like this whole thing of ‘Well, there are Nazis and not-Nazis, but I’m not going to take a stand between the two.’”

The Atlantic · by Timothy McLaughlin · September 29, 2022

14. Guarding the Pacific: How Washington can Counter China in the Solomons and Beyond

Conclusion:

​The lesson of the last several years in clear: Beijing is determined to gain a foothold in the South Pacific, posing a direct threat to long-term U.S. and allied interests. Without a coherent strategy of denial and the projection of appropriate U.S. power across this region, fundamental American interests will be threatened. It is time for the United States to support a robust array of defense initiatives across Oceania, including in countries where we remain openly, and rightly, concerned about democracy. By increasing our presence in and political connections to this dynamic region, the United States is more likely to play a constructive role in promoting good governance than if it continues to cede the field to Beijing and its proxies. By deploying more resources now, Washington has the opportunity to prevent an entirely unnecessary strategic surprise in the future.

Guarding the Pacific: How Washington can Counter China in the Solomons and Beyond - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Alexander B. Gray · September 30, 2022

We are seeking to fill two positions on our editorial team: An editor/researcher and a membership editor. Apply by Oct. 2, 2022.

By now, it should be abundantly clear that Solomon Islands, under Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, is abandoning democracy and falling ever deeper into the orbit of the People’s Republic of China. Since coming to power in April 2019, the Sogavare government has taken a series of steps increasingly hostile to the interests of the United States, its allies, and broader regional stability. Fortunately, the dangers inherent in Chinese dominance of the Solomons seems to have aroused Washington to a heightened appreciation of the strategic importance of the South Pacific. Rather than facing the threat of Chinese power projection across Oceania in the event of conflict, the United States should act quickly to strengthen its South Pacific position and aid Canberra and Wellington’s efforts to do the same.

For a relatively small investment, Washington can dramatically up its game in the region. Currently, only three countries in Oceania have standing militaries: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga (Vanuatu uses a paramilitary police, the Vanuatu Mobile Force, as its primary armed force). For too long, Beijing has been permitted to gain significant inroads as the security partner of choice for these countries, primarily by filling gaps created when Western powers curtailed support in protest of domestic backsliding. Washington now has an opportunity to set aside past mistakes and enhance these important relationships. To do so, it should deepen its diplomatic engagement, enhance cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, and expand the popular State Partnership Program through which host governments can work with National Guard units of U.S. states.

Growing Risks

The strategic logic of a robust American commitment to the South Pacific has remained unchanged since the 19th century, when President John Quincy Adams advocated a government-sponsored voyage of exploration to chart the region. Adams understood the South Pacific as a critical stepping stone to East Asia, both commercially and militarily. Later presidents would follow in Adams’ footsteps by acquiring U.S. coaling stations and naval bases across the Pacific, including in American Samoa. Through both world wars and the Cold War, it was understood by U.S. strategists that the South Pacific must remain free from domination by a rival power to facilitate U.S. forces moving from the West Coast and Hawaii to East Asia, as well as to ensure the resupply of Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, allied campaigns in World War II — from Coral Sea to Guadalcanal to New Guinea — were in part driven by this logic.

Become a Member

Were Beijing to acquire military access in the South Pacific, whether a permanent base or merely regular air or naval transit and refueling rights, it would represent a serious challenge to Washington’s centuries-old strategy. The Solomons are roughly 1,100 miles from northern Australia. A Chinese presence on the archipelago, or at Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, would serve as a useful power projection tool into the critical sea lanes to and from Australia. The United States has recently become aware of the danger of China’s ambitions for potential military access in the Eastern Pacific nation of Kiribati, just 1,800 miles from Hawaii.

Now, developments in the Solomons are amplifying this threat. One of Sogavare’s first acts in office was switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Since then, the Solomons have been moving quickly toward China’s embrace, signing a security pact with Beijing in April 2022 and utilizing Chinese advisors to train the Solomon Islands police. The country has also inked a $66 million Chinese loan to build Huawei telecommunication towers.

In the meantime, Sogavare has made clear his disdain for the Solomons’ traditional security partners: the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. When U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and U.S. Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy visited the Solomons in August, Sogavare pointedly declined to attend a ceremony commemorating the Battle of Guadalcanal, where over 7,000 Allied servicemen gave their lives. Shortly thereafter, his government failed to respond to requests from U.S. Coast Guard and British Royal Navy vessels for port calls. In the ensuing furor, Sogavare banned all foreign warship visits (although it is unclear whether this applies to China, given their security pact). Australia was later permitted to resume visits, while ships from the United States and the United Kingdom have remained restricted.

Ominously, Sogavare has paired his preference for Beijing with a decidedly authoritarian bent, proposing to postpone scheduled parliamentary elections on the dubious grounds that Solomon Islands cannot afford to host the upcoming Pacific Games while also upholding its democratic values. When Australia offered to fund the elections so they could occur as planned, Sogavare accused Canberra of inappropriate meddling in Honiara’s domestic affairs.

These developments in Solomon Islands are not an isolated incident in the South Pacific. It has been publicly reported that Beijing has actively sought military basing opportunities at Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, Black Rock in Fiji, and Luganville Wharf in Vanuatu. Chinese economic influence, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative, has been pernicious across the South Pacific, from Samoa to Vanuatu and even the Cook Islands, a self-governing island country in free association with New Zealand. As a result, China has saddled these states with unsustainable debt, while destabilizing local politics and disrupting traditional social patterns.

The Limits of Outsourcing

To date, the United States has attempted a logical division of labor across the Pacific Islands that utilizes the historical ties, geographic proximity, and cultural affinities of its Australian and New Zealand partners. Canberra has often focused on the Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, while Wellington devotes its resources to Polynesia: Samoa; Tonga; and Tonga’s affiliated islands of Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. The United States, through its Compacts of Free Association, has been traditionally interested in the Central and North Pacific states of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

In the current environment, with Chinese ambitions growing across the region (and U.S. direct interests under increasing threat), Washington can no longer afford to outsource its South Pacific diplomacy to Canberra and Wellington. Now is the time to expand the level of U.S. participation in the multilateral fora that dot the South Pacific, from the Pacific Community to the Forum Fisheries Agency. The Biden Administration’s decision to increase U.S. representation at the Pacific Islands Forum is a positive start, but embedding diplomatic and security observers and liaisons across multilateral organizations, ensuring high-level participation at regional meetings, and following through on the deliverables announced after these gatherings is a critical part of being a “Pacific Power” in both word and deed.

Washington’s regional policy effectiveness is often a direct result of its bureaucratic organizational chart. While the State Department has a deputy assistant secretary for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands within its Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Department of Defense places Oceania under a deputy assistant secretary for East Asia. Needless to say, the Pacific does not always receive the attention it requires when vying for visibility between Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The Pentagon should create a counterpart to the State Department’s position to ensure that the United States is bringing its full strategic attention to this critical region and that a senior official is directly responsible for implementing an aggressive agenda promoting U.S. interests.

This roadmap for an enhanced U.S. role in the South Pacific does not mean that Canberra and Wellington should no longer lead in Melanesia and Polynesia, respectively. In an era of constrained resources and vast commitments, the United States should make full use of its allies and partners. But recent events have also shown that, with Beijing’s march in the South Pacific accelerating, Washington should step up. American interests in Oceania can no longer be outsourced without risk.

Call In the National Guard

The U.S. National Guard is already playing an important role in expanding U.S. influence in the Pacific. For example, the Nevada National Guard’s program in Fiji and Tonga has served as an important link with military establishments that are being aggressively wooed by Beijing. In 2020, the Wisconsin National Guard established a State Partnership in Papua New Guinea. Under this program, local militaries are paired with U.S. National Guard units, who provide mentorship in key areas. In the Pacific Islands, training and practical advice on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-narcotics, and even unexplored ordnance disposal can build important relationships while providing invaluable skills.

But these programs must go further to include the police and paramilitary forces who serve as the primary armed force in most of Oceania. The Vanuatu Mobile Force, for instance, has been the recipient of significant attention from Beijing and should be included in the State Partnership Program. Police and law enforcement agencies across the region would benefit from the expertise brought by U.S. National Guard units. The Civic Action Team program is another effort that fits well in Oceania, and it is already being used in Palau and elsewhere. This program brings inter-service teams together with communities to conduct small-scale projects that produce material benefits and vast goodwill, whether by repairing bicycles for local children or helping harden key infrastructure during typhoon season. The ties accrued by these relationships will directly strengthen U.S. regional influence and provide a positive counterbalance to Beijing, particularly in the aftermath of events like the 2022 Tonga earthquake, where the U.S. response was pitiably lackluster compared to China’s.

The U.S. Coast Guard is another significant force multiplier for U.S. interests in Oceania. Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing is among the greatest security challenges facing the Pacific islands, eroding sovereignty and devastating local economies and ecologies. China, with its global fishing fleet and disregard for basic norms of good behavior at sea, is a major perpetrator across the South Pacific. In this fight, the U.S. Coast Guard can partner with regional police and coast guards through Shiprider Agreements that embed local officers on U.S. vessels to patrol for illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing. The Coast Guard needs more presence in the South Pacific and a more aggressive engagement strategy with Pacific partners like Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. To that end, the Biden Administration can complete its predecessor’s initiative to establish a permanent Coast Guard station on American Samoa. Stationing fast response cutters there would expand the Coast Guard’s presence in Oceania, counter illegal fishing and Chinese gray zone activities, and deepen ties with South Pacific countries who would reward increased American presence with trust, openness, and candor.

​The lesson of the last several years in clear: Beijing is determined to gain a foothold in the South Pacific, posing a direct threat to long-term U.S. and allied interests. Without a coherent strategy of denial and the projection of appropriate U.S. power across this region, fundamental American interests will be threatened. It is time for the United States to support a robust array of defense initiatives across Oceania, including in countries where we remain openly, and rightly, concerned about democracy. By increasing our presence in and political connections to this dynamic region, the United States is more likely to play a constructive role in promoting good governance than if it continues to cede the field to Beijing and its proxies. By deploying more resources now, Washington has the opportunity to prevent an entirely unnecessary strategic surprise in the future.

Become a Member

Alexander B. Gray is a senior advisor at the Marathon Initiative. He previously served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council (2019–2021) and as director for Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security at the National Security Council (2018–2019). He is currently writing a history of U.S. strategy in the Pacific Islands.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Quavaungh.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Alexander B. Gray · September 30, 2022

15. Ukraine Submits Application to join NATO, With Big Hurdles Ahead

Ukraine Submits Application to join NATO, With Big Hurdles Ahead

By Andrew E. Kramer and Dan Bilefsky

• Sept. 30, 2022
• Updated 3:57 p.m. ET

nytimes.com · by Dan Bilefsky · September 30, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine — President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine responded to Russia’s claims to have annexed four Ukrainian provinces by announcing Ukraine is applying for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

“We are taking our decisive step by signing Ukraine’s application for accelerated accession to NATO,” Mr. Zelensky said in a statement posted on the presidential website. He said Ukraine was already cooperating closely with NATO and argued that Ukraine’s army has already helped secure alliance members in Europe against Russian aggression by inflicting battlefield defeats on the Russian army in Ukraine.

“It is in Ukraine that the fate of democracy in the confrontation with tyranny is being decided,” he said. “It is here, with the firmness of our state borders, that we can secure the firmness of the borders of all European states. Mr. Zelensky said Ukraine’s application could be fast-tracked similarly to the applications of Sweden and Finland.

There was no immediate comment from NATO or the alliance’s secretary general.

Ukraine’s desire to join the alliance has long been a source of conflict with Russia, which sees the eastward expansion of NATO as a existential threat. President Vladimir V. Putin has said the expansion of NATO would leave Russia hemmed in with Western missiles on its doorstep, and it appeared to be one of the pretexts for his invasion.

In February, Mr. Zelensky stressed his country’s ambition to be admitted into NATO, an aspiration fixed in Ukraine’s Constitution since 2019. But by March, as war with Russia raged, Mr. Zelensky had backed down, signaling that his country needed to accept that it might never join.

Ukraine’s application to join NATO likely faces big hurdles — which the Ukrainian president appeared to acknowledge, noting that he was aware that admitting a country requires unanimous consent from all of NATO’s 30 members.

“We know it’s possible,” Mr. Zelensky said in his statement, pointing to the recent examples of Finland and Sweden undertaking the accession process. “This is fair,” he added. “This is also fair for Ukraine.”

There is no question that Ukraine would benefit from NATO’s defining credo, which says that “an armed attack” against any member is considered an attack against them all. But, as an alliance predicated on the doctrine of mutual defense, it would be highly unlikely to admit a country ensnared in war.

U.S. officials have said that they will not appease Mr. Putin by quashing Kyiv’s ambition to join the alliance. But Washington and its European allies have also been wary of further antagonizing Russia and risking a wider war, and it remains to be seen how Mr. Putin’s annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory may alter the alliance’s calculus.

France and Germany, among others, have in the past opposed or been skeptical of Ukraine’s inclusion. And analysts say that President Biden, wary of further U.S. military commitments, has also been reluctant to support Ukraine’s membership in the past.

Even if Ukraine could overcome those hurdles, it could face other challenges.

NATO observes an “open-door policy” that says that any European nation that wants to join can do so, if it meets certain requirements. Among them is demonstrating a commitment to democracy, individual liberty and support for the rule of law. While Ukrainian leaders say their country meets that threshold, some American and European officials have argued otherwise.

nytimes.com · by Dan Bilefsky · September 30, 2022

16. How disinformation shut down US special operators

Here is the link to the GAO report on the information environment that is referenced in the article ebow.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104714.pdf

How disinformation shut down US special operators

theruck.news · by Paul Szoldra

A U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAM could not operate in combat for a month because of disinformation.

It was March 26, 2006, and American Green Berets and their Iraqi partners had just fought insurgents from the Mahdi Army, a brutal death squad in Iraq.

After a brief gun battle, they cleared the target compound and tallied the score: A dozen or so enemy dead, a similar number of detainees to interrogate, a weapons cache found and destroyed, and one hostage rescued. Mission complete.

The special operators had finished a typical no-knock raid and were headed home. But they weren’t prepared for what came next: After leaving, someone went to the compound, removed the weapons, and rearranged the insurgents’ bodies to make it seem like they were murdered during prayer.

“They then took pictures, uploaded them to the web, and issued a press release explaining that U.S. soldiers had entered a mosque and killed men peacefully at prayer,” the Government Accountability Office said in a new report to Congress demonstrating how disinformation can threaten national security and have real-world impact.

“Literally they had their story, their propaganda, out on the wires before the assault force was back at the compound…” Col. Kenneth Tovo, the group commander, recalled to an Army War College researcher in 2009. “That’s how brilliant [this was. It] really surprised us that first time.”

Back then, photos of empty bullet casings on a blood-stained floor the insurgents claimed as a mosque appeared on the AP wire. The story was picked up in American and Arab news media, outraging Iraqis and fueling violent protests and suicide bombings in the ensuing days.

“As a result of this disinformation activity, this special operations unit was not allowed to conduct any military operations for 30 days while the Army conducted an internal investigation,” the GAO wrote.

In other words, a team of elite soldiers was bested on the battlefield not by bullets but by information. “…essentially neutralized for a month by those same forces using a cell phone camera,” the War College researcher concluded.

Fortunately, U.S. soldiers had helmet cameras documenting the raid, which showed the insurgent propaganda was bogus. But the incident convinced at least one Army officer to never again go out without considering visual documentation of a mission.

I HAD NEVER HEARD this story before reading the report. But it sounded familiar, having personally felt the power of flawed reporting a year prior: I was a U.S. Marine in May 2005 when all hell broke loose in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after Newsweek reported that Guantanamo guards flushed Qurans down the toilet. It wasn’t true, but that didn’t matter as we braced for an attack on our base that, fortunately, never came. The retraction and apology came too late for Afghans killed during violent protests.

The Ruck is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Things have gotten worse in the years since. And today’s information environment “poses new and complex challenges for national security” according to the GAO report, which is based on surveys of numerous Pentagon and intelligence officials, DARPA, and all the military services.

7 takeaways:

1. “Russian media regularly skews, twists, and misrepresents information to Latin American audiences on DOD activities, missions, intentions, and motivations to increase negative perceptions of DOD among foreign audiences,” according to U.S. Southern Command officials.

• They also say that servicemembers’ “exposure to adversary propaganda and disinformation can influence DOD perceptions and decision-making.”

1. China conducts several information ops that “threaten Air Force missions and operations,” Air Force officials said. “China maintains a worldwide information collection program to advance its weapons development programs and national influence/disinformation activities.”

• China was targeting “critical Air Force information by conducting sophisticated computer network intrusion and data exfiltration operations against the Air Force and its industry partners.”
• (The Senate Intel Committee recently warned that U.S. spy agency efforts to stop China from stealing secrets are hampered by an unclear mission, miscommunication, and lack of funding for the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.)

1. Local Pacific military officials “are less inclined to speak negatively about strategic competitors or confront malign influence in the same manner as the United States,” U.S. Pacific Command officials reported (China is unnamed as the strategic competitor in question, but that’s who they’re talking about!). “The command added that this is particularly the case when in matters such as maritime presence and freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.”

• Also of note: “Violent extremist organizations are using the narrative of the Taliban’s victory over the U.S. in Afghanistan to influence extremists in the Philippines and Indo-Pacific region.”

1. Here at home as reported by U.S. Northern Command, “China has exfiltrated plans for fighter jet aircraft from a DOD contractor’s system,” and a February cyber alert “noted that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors had exfiltrated DOD information from cleared defense contractors.”
2. “The alert noted that this incident granted the actors significant insight into U.S. weapons platforms development and deployment timelines, plans for communications infrastructure, and specific technologies employed by the U.S. government and military.”

• The command also claimed that foreign terrorists target “sympathetic U.S. service members on social media, attempting to convince them to commit an active-shooter scenario at a U.S. military installation to atone for perceived atrocities committed by the U.S.”

1. And something no one worried about in 2006 but hey, times change: “Deepfakes could also lead audiences to disregard legitimate evidence of wrongdoing and, more generally, undermine public trust in audiovisual content.” We haven’t even scratched the surface of how these incredibly realistic videos will likely be used to manipulate audiences in the future.
2. Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Defense “stated that training for its personnel and leadership related to the information environment and IT systems are limited.” Cool.

17. AUKUS Is Not the New Asian NATO, nor Even a Start at One

Conclusion:

AUKUS and its partner institution, the Quad, will contribute greatly to a more vigorous diplomacy and enhanced deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But much work needs to be done at the senior-most levels of the U.S. government to rectify faltering economic and diplomatic strategies in the region and put the sinews of a new national approach in place. Our allies can help. News reports indicate that AUKUS originated with the Australians, who first took the idea to their British colleagues. Even while we continue the work of adapting our own strategic footing, the deal provides us with a good example of how our nimbler allies can prod us to take bold and meaningful action.

AUKUS Is Not the New Asian NATO, nor Even a Start at One - Security & Defence PLuS Alliance

securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org · by David B. Shear

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the National Broadcasting Company’s (NBC) Meet the Press conducted a war game in June based on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chuck Todd presided for NBC, while former U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Undersecretary for Policy Michelle Flournoy and CNAS CEO Richard Fontaine respectively joined the American (Blue) and Chinese (Red) teams. The American side also included Reps. Mike Gallagher (R-Tenn.) and Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ), two well-informed members of the House Armed Services Committee. The NBC/CNAS report could not have been timelier, given the noisy Chinese military exercises in the area following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s early August visit.

NBC and CNAS are also to be congratulated for kicking off what will likely be a lengthy process of educating the American people on what more needs to be done to deter the Chinese from conducting a serious provocation, like a blockade or an outright invasion of Taiwan. The war game dramatized the difficulties the United States will face in a Taiwan Strait contingency. In the end, China detonated a nuclear device over the eastern Pacific; both sides escalated to conventional attacks on each other’s territory; and American forces failed to achieve air superiority over Taiwan. They also failed to prevent the Chinese from establishing a lodgment on the northern end of the island.

For all its success in encouraging greater public discourse around a potential conflict with China, the game itself had its faults. Only Chinese and American teams played, while a more realistic scenario would have included, at a minimum, teams from our allies Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. The broadcast included only snippets of each team’s deliberations, which must have been difficult and complicated. The report did not reveal the initial conditions leading to a Chinese invasion or the military balance in the region at the outset of hostilities, in which the United States is at a growing disadvantage. Nor did it tally the staggering losses in materiel and lives, both military and civilian, suffered by all sides.

The closing session of the report, in which participants enumerated lessons learned, was particularly illuminating. The American team made it clear that our current regional military posture cannot deter the Chinese much longer. The team acknowledged the immense challenge to adequate military force generation posed by our lengthy trans-Pacific lines of communication. Players recognized that the Chinese can deploy formidable naval, air-, and land-based missile forces capable of denying American aircraft carriers access to the seas within the “first island chain,” that area of the Western Pacific bordered by the Chinese coast in the west and the island nations of the Pacific littoral in the east. Finally, American players underscored the necessity of relying on our allies, and not just for bases on their territory—they will need to join the fight. “We need to build an Asian NATO,” Todd exclaimed.

The alliance managers in London, Canberra, and Washington who devised the AUKUS agreement deserve a pat on the back for acting in concert with calls for increased allied cooperation. The September 2021 agreement established a broad trilateral technology exchange program, including the transfer of nuclear-powered submarine know-how from the British and American Navies to the Australian Navy. The deployment of new attack submarines will be a long-term project. Experts don’t expect the subs to hit the water until the 2030s or ’40s, and the gap in capabilities poses a problem for the allies. But the prospect of advanced, high-endurance Australian attack submarines operating in the approaches to the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits will greatly complicate Chinese war planning and, hopefully, give pause to future PLA Navy officers with itchy trigger fingers. Meanwhile, AUKUS will better weld together three of the world’s most technologically advanced militaries in a partnership bound, in the shorter term, to strengthen our forces’ overall interoperability.

The attack sub’s 10- to 20-year deployment horizon notwithstanding, the surprise announcement of AUKUS was of immediate diplomatic value to the allies. It put the Chinese on their back feet—the asperity of their response demonstrated that. The agreement sent a high-decibel signal to China and the region that the United States will remain engaged in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. It also signaled that, after much domestic debate in the late teens, Australia has committed itself to joining a possible fight. The region now knows that growing Chinese military capabilities and the increased assertiveness that has come with them have imposed a diplomatic price—the strengthening of a diplomatic and military coalition.

The back-patting stops there. For while the AUKUS agreement reflects the deftness with which the three allies approached regional diplomacy, it also reflects the yawning deficiencies in American regional strategy, posture, and, most of all, leadership. First, the United States is falling behind militarily. For example, last year’s DoD China Military Power Report revealed that the U.S. Navy had 293 ships compared to the PLAN’s 350. The U.S. Navy, however, has global responsibilities, and the USINDOPACOM website states that there are only 50–70 American warships and submarines present in the Western Pacific at any one time. As early as 2015, a RAND comparison across 10 different military capabilities found that U.S. forces face a “receding frontier…of dominance” in multiple areas, particularly in a confrontation over Taiwan.

Second, we are lagging diplomatically. Successive presidents have paid insufficient attention to the region, and President Biden appears to be guilty of the same inattention to Southeast Asia displayed by many of his predecessors. He failed to include any Southeast Asian leaders in his initial round of post-inauguration phone calls, and he has yet to visit the region. A successful U.S.-ASEAN Summit in May compensated to some extent, but American ambassadors to our allies the Philippines and Thailand were not confirmed by the Senate until May and August respectively, more than a year after Biden’s inauguration. The president’s attention has been justifiably riveted on Ukraine since early this year, but Southeast Asia still takes notice of imbalances in American engagement. Hopefully, the president will remedy this with an autumn trip to the region for the East Asia and APEC summits.

Third, the United States continues to stumble economically. Economic growth and expanded trade are the highest items on Southeast Asia’s agenda. When President Trump threw out the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, he sacrificed strategic as well as economic advantages. My experience as Ambassador to Hanoi underscored this. In addition to offering economic benefits to participants like Vietnam, the TPP also offered them the opportunity to diversify their trading partners and further solidify American regional presence. The Vietnamese understood this instinctively, as did President Obama, despite his dilatory approach to Congressional approval. In May, the Biden administration offered up a damp squib—the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)—as an alternative to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which garnered a decidedly mixed regional response. While the framework provides opportunities in such areas as digital trade, it offers no market opening, giving regional players little incentive to make concessions to the United States in areas like labor practices and the environment.

Fourth, structural challenges in the region will likely prevent us from establishing an “Asian NATO” (sorry, Chuck!). Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presence in Northeast Asia has remained remarkably stable. We can boast strong, capable allies in Northeast Asia. We deploy significant forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK), and both allies field formidable forces of their own that are eyeing new roles that will be advantageous to the United States.

It’s just the opposite in Southeast Asia, where we station few forward deployed forces and our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand are adrift. Secretary of State Blinken had what looked like an encouraging exchange with President Marcos on the importance of the alliance, but doubts about Manila’s reliability remain. This is especially concerning since Philippine cooperation during a Taiwan or a South China Sea contingency will be particularly important. Nor can other Southeast Asian countries offer immediate alternatives to reliance on the Philippines in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made this clear in a much-cited 2020 Foreign Affairs article. Southeast Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing, Lee declared. “They cannot afford to alienate China, and other Asian countries will try their best not to let any single dispute dominate their overall relationships with Beijing,” he wrote.

The Southeast Asian propensity to hedge between the powers presents a stark challenge to American diplomats and military planners who wish to diversify our military access arrangements to strengthen deterrence. Even front-line-state Vietnam is reluctant to move too quickly to support the American military for fear of a Chinese backlash.

Rebuilding a credible deterrent in Southeast Asia will require more than the revival of John Foster Dulles’s Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), an ill-fated 1950s attempt to rally the region to a multilateral alliance. It will require the kinds of networking we have been working at since the Obama administration, not only to include AUKUS and the Quad, but the proactive security networking of our allies as well, particularly Japan and Australia. It will take the development of new operational concepts that do not rely solely on the ability to initiate combat missions from allied territory. It will also take determination to shift Pentagon resources in ways that support new operational concepts and the tools necessary to implement them.

Finally, and most importantly, we appear to be lacking in presidential leadership. President Trump’s deficiencies in this regard were well known. He threw American domestic politics down the rabbit hole, pulled us out of TPP, abused our allies, ignored three out of four East Asian Summits, and postured his way through a series of carnivalesque encounters with Kim Jung Un. We can credit Trump’s administration with the release of a National Security Strategy that put great power competition front and center, but in the absence of meaningful decisions on national priorities and resource allocations, it was all talk.

Presidential inattention may extend to the task of gearing up the U.S. government to compete credibly with China. The Biden administration has yet to articulate a China strategy. The presidential leadership required for establishing priorities, making the hard resource choices, and adopting new operational concepts also appears to be lacking. The Department of Defense and the military services, for example, require a strategic vision and a timetable imposed by the president in order for the Pentagon’s many agencies to agree on how to proceed. While DoD civilians and our Indo-Pacific Commander agree that we need more resources, they have appeared, until recently, unable to agree on how much money we need or what that money should buy. In the same vein, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger, the only military service chief who has tackled the China challenge creatively, appears to be under sustained fire from members of Congress, other services, and even retired Marine officers with an interest in maintaining the status quo.

AUKUS and its partner institution, the Quad, will contribute greatly to a more vigorous diplomacy and enhanced deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But much work needs to be done at the senior-most levels of the U.S. government to rectify faltering economic and diplomatic strategies in the region and put the sinews of a new national approach in place. Our allies can help. News reports indicate that AUKUS originated with the Australians, who first took the idea to their British colleagues. Even while we continue the work of adapting our own strategic footing, the deal provides us with a good example of how our nimbler allies can prod us to take bold and meaningful action.

About the Author

David B. Shear

David Shear served 34 years as an American diplomat. He served in Washington, Sapporo, Beijing, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi. Ambassador Shear spent ten years of his career working on U.S.-Japan relations at the American Consulate in Sapporo, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and in the State Department’s Office of Japanese Affairs. He was Chief of Political-Military Affairs at U.S. Embassy Tokyo from 1994-97 under Ambassador Walter Mondale and Political Minister from 2001-2005 under Ambassador Howard Baker. Shear was Deputy Director of the Office of Korean Affairs 1999- 2001 and travelled to Pyongyang with Secretary Albright in late-2000. He also served in the U.S. Embassy, Beijing from 1987-89 as a political officer and as Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China, Hong Kong, and Mongolia (2008-11). Shear was the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 2011-14 and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs 2014-2017.

18. Afghan Resistance Leaders See ‘No Option’ but War

Afghan Resistance Leaders See ‘No Option’ but War

Foreign Policy · by Lynne O’Donnell · September 29, 2022

Analysis

But first they must present a united front to win the support they need to dislodge the Taliban.

ODonnell-Lynne-foreign-policy-columnist

Lynne O’Donnell

By Lynne O’Donnell, a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author.

Afghan resistance movement and anti-Taliban uprising forces rest.

Afghan resistance movement and anti-Taliban uprising forces rest as they patrol on a hilltop in Darband area in Anaba District, Afghanistan, on Sept. 1, 2021. AHMAD SAHEL ARMAN/AFP via Getty Images

Afghanistan is now perhaps the most dangerous country in the world, controlled by Taliban terrorists who are sheltering dozens of anti-Western jihadi groups while torturing, raping, starving, and killing their Afghan opponents. Yet the one person who could make a credible claim to be the leader of an opposition group to overthrow the Taliban has been unable to draw international support or unite fellow Afghans behind him.

Ahmad Massoud, the 33-year-old son of an anti-Taliban war hero, leads the National Resistance Front (NRF), which is concentrated in the Panjshir Valley, a lush and mountainous province close to the capital, Kabul, where the Taliban have been struggling to dislodge them in the year since they took control of Afghanistan. The NRF is one of at least 22 resistance groups the United Nations says have emerged since the Taliban’s takeover last year. A few thousand men are fighting in disparate groups, taking and holding territory in a dozen provinces mainly across the north, where anti-Taliban sentiment is strongest. But they’ve yet to form a cohesive opposition to the Taliban, who have an increasingly tenuous hold on power as factional feuds emerge and international legitimacy remains elusive.

Not that the Afghan resistance is getting any help from Washington. The Biden administration has insisted it will not support an armed opposition and seems to regard the Taliban—led by dozens of sanctioned terrorists—as partners in counterterrorism rather than part of the problem.

Despite repeated warnings of the Taliban’s long-standing relationship with al Qaeda and its affiliates, the world only just awoke to the danger, Massoud said, when a U.S. drone killed al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a Kabul villa associated with Taliban deputy leader and interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani.

“Now the world is paying attention,” Massoud told Foreign Policy during a recent trip to Europe. “Afghanistan is turning into a hub for terrorism. And the goal of this terrorism is not to only have Afghanistan; the idea is to spread worldwide.” Afghanistan is a recruitment and training center, he said, where terrorist groups teach skills like bomb-making “in the languages of Central Asia.” The killing of Zawahiri, he said, brought home to countries like Qatar, Pakistan, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan that “the export of terrorism has already started.”

Like many Afghans, Massoud finds it difficult to understand U.S. policy toward the Taliban. “It’s very confusing and will leave a very bad stain on the reputation of the United States as a great country which always stands for great values,” he said. “I believe it is happening because it is cheaper [than an armed presence], but it is a catastrophic mistake.” He pointed to the consequences from the last time Washington ignored a Taliban power grab in the 1990s: A few years later, the Taliban’s guest, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, launched the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.

“We had the experience in the ’90s of not paying attention to the situation. And it can be catastrophic again,” he said.

Massoud’s inability to forge a united opposition in the year since the Taliban’s takeover isn’t due to a lack of name recognition. Massoud regularly invokes the name of his late father, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who led the Northern Alliance in its fight to keep substantial swaths of territory out of Taliban hands the last time they ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The elder Massoud was assassinated by al Qaeda two days before the huge attacks on the United States that sparked the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban.

After the fall of the Afghan republic, he said he tried and failed to negotiate his inclusion into Afghanistan’s government with Taliban leaders. He is now based, alongside other NRF figures, in neighboring Tajikistan, from where he travels widely to drum up support, arms, and money. But he has assumed a Ernesto “Che” Guevara air rather than becoming the fulcrum of an effective anti-Taliban opposition.

And there are blocks to build on. In many regions of the country, the NRF fights alongside the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), which is led by Lt. Gen. Yasin Zia, a former Afghan deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff. Like Massoud, he travels widely, pleading the case for support to dislodge the Taliban. But he describes a Catch-22: Without victories, the resistance cannot attract arms and funding; without arms and funding, victory over the Taliban will be difficult.

Demonstrating the fundamental problem of the anti-Taliban resistance, Zia said he and Massoud have not met. Massoud and Zia stand out as patriotic democrats, but neither have grabbed the imagination of Afghanistan’s war-weary people or governments whose support they need to win a war both say is now the only option.

“We could win a big uprising, but only if we come together,” Zia said. “Brother Massoud” has the ability, charisma, and recognition inside and outside Afghanistan to build a team. “Anti-Taliban groups say they are working for the good of the people. We all say that we want democracy; there is no difference between us and our aims. But if we work individually and independently, it will take too long. Only by bringing our resources together will we be able to bring changes on the ground.” Along with others who claim to have the best interest of their country at heart, it seems they’re just too busy pursuing their own interests to pool resources—an enduring condition of Afghan leadership that arguably led to the fall of the republic.

Despite the Biden administration’s hands-off approach, both NRF and AFF leaders say they are getting some support. Both are attracting former members of the U.S.- and NATO-trained Afghan army, special forces, and police, as well as financial support from diaspora Afghans. And on Capitol Hill, there has been a smattering of support for the Afghan resistance among top lawmakers, including Sen. Lindsey Graham, who has advocated for both Massoud and his NRF colleague, former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh.

But Massoud and Saleh recently met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in an effort to build a regional support base, according to a source who accompanied them, in a move that could lead to a backlash for the resistance in Europe and on Capitol Hill, as Russia’s war in Ukraine deepens economic hardship for hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

Still, the Taliban’s support for terror is wiping off any lingering smiles among countries that cheered the Taliban’s rise and America’s ignominious departure. Pakistan supported the Taliban’s insurgency, but it is now a target of their terrorist partner Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which seeks the overthrow of the Pakistani state and enjoys safe haven in Afghanistan. China’s demand that the Taliban eliminate the anti-Beijing Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement) has gone unheeded. Central Asia fears a variety of Taliban allies, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Jamaat Ansarullah, which targets Tajikistan. But none of this has stopped China, Russia, and Pakistan from pursuing economic opportunities with the Taliban, their lack of legitimacy notwithstanding. Russia just inked a provisional deal on oil, gas, and wheat supplies; China is keen on minerals, including gold, uranium, and lithium; and Pakistan is getting cheap coal.

Even as he struggles to win international support and unify the resistance, Massoud said the Taliban “leave us with no option” but war.

“I believe that even with the slightest support of the world, we will be able to liberate some portion of our country because the people are not happy. The people are not with the Taliban,” Massoud said. “By establishing a fair, just, democratic system that will be a role model for the rest of the country and attract internal migration so people do not have to leave Afghanistan, this will encourage more people to rise against the Taliban’s tyranny and authoritarianism. Then resistance will continue and will grow stronger.”

Lynne O’Donnell is a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author. She was the Afghanistan bureau chief for Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press between 2009 and 2017.

Foreign Policy · by Lynne O’Donnell · September 29, 2022

19.  Russian hackers' lack of success against Ukraine shows that strong cyber defences work, says cybersecurity chief

Some good news?

Russian hackers' lack of success against Ukraine shows that strong cyber defences work, says cybersecurity chief

In the face of the 'most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record', Ukraine shows that a sound cybersecurity strategy can protect assets in even the most trying circumstances, says NCSC boss.

Written by Danny Palmer, Senior Writer on Sept. 29, 2022

ZDNet

Image: Getty

Russia has engaged in a sustained, malicious cyber campaign against Ukraine and its allies since the February 24 invasion – but its lack of success shows that it's possible to defend against cyberattacks, even against some of the most sophisticated and persistent attackers, says the UK's cybersecurity chief.

"Try as they might, Russian cyberattacks simply have not had the intended impact," said Lindy Cameron, CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) – the cyber arm of GCHQ – speaking at Chatham House in London.

"But if the Ukrainian cyber defence teaches us a wider lesson – for military theory and beyond – it is that, in cybersecurity, the defender has significant agency. In many ways you can choose how vulnerable you can be to attacks."

In the run-up to and since the invasion of Ukraine, the country has been hit by a series of cyberattacks that have been attributed to Russia. These include distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against the Ukranian government and financial sector, as well as wiper malware campaigns designed to destroy systems by rendering them unusable.

These weren't the first offensive cyberattacks linked to the Russian state that have targeted Ukraine; attacks previously caused power outages in the winters of 2015 and 2016. Then, in 2017, Russia launched the NotPetya wiper malware attack against Ukraine, but the impact spread further, causing billions of dollars of damage around the world.

Since the invasion, Cameron said, "what we have seen is a very significant conflict in cyberspace – probably the most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record." But she also pointed to the lack of success of these campaigns, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian cyber defenders and their allies.

"This activity has provided us with the clearest demonstration that a strong and effective cyber defence can be mounted, even against an adversary as well prepared and resourced as the Russian Federation."

Cameron argued that not only does this provide lessons for what countries and their governments can do to protect against cyberattacks, but there are also lessons for organisations on how to protect against incidents, be they nation-state backed campaigns, ransomware attacks or other malicious cyber operations.

"Central to this is a commitment to long-term resilience," said Cameron. "Building resilience means we don't necessarily need to know where or how the threat will manifest itself next. Instead, we know that most threats will be unable to breach our defences. And when they do, we can recover quickly and fully."

The NCSC has previously suggested that organisations should be operating at a heightened threat level, and has made recommendations that should be followed to help protect against cyberattacks, or collateral damage as a result of wide-scale cyber events.

These recommendations, which Cameron reiterated at Chatham House, include verifying that all software is up to date with the latest security patches, checking that backups are working properly, and having an incident response plan in place – because cyberattacks continue to represent a major threat.

"There may be organisations that are beginning to think 'is this still necessary?' as in the UK we haven't experienced a major incident related to the war in Ukraine. My answer is an emphatic 'yes'," Cameron said.

"UK organisations – and their network defenders – should be prepared for this period of elevated alert to be with us for the long haul. Across the UK, we need to focus on building long-term resilience. Just as the Ukrainian defenders have done," she added.

MORE ON CYBERSECURITY

• Ukraine stopped Russian hackers who were trying to attack its power grid
• It's time to stop hoping that cybersecurity problems will just go away
• Using Russian tech? It's time to look at the risks again, says cybersecurity chief
• Ukraine is building an 'IT army' of volunteers, something that's never been tried before
• Endless cyber-threat pressure could leave security staff burnt out. Here's what you need to change

ZDNet

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com