Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them persuasively to make other countries behave."

– Thomas C. Schelling

"We must either learn to live together as brothers, or we are all going to perish together as fools."

- Martin Luther King, Jr.

"Society is like a stew. If you don't stir it up once in a while then a layer of scum floats to the top."

– Edward Abbey

1. Opinion Tomorrow’s Army is here. Can it get past yesterday’s bureaucracy?

2. ‘Trade steel for blood’ — The Army’s plan to bring soldiers into the 21st century

3. The US Army’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company: Weapon of the week

4. U.S. Army eyes drone-soaked Middle East to refine energy weapons

5. Exclusive: US expected to send senior Pentagon official to China military forum

6. The US Navy Is Going All In on Starlink

7. To Remain Relevant the Marines Must Adapt to a Changing World

8. The Evolving Context for Deterrence

9. Ukraine's Kursk Offensive: One Giant Blunder?

10. The U.S. Marine Corps Forest Warfare Legacy Intertwines with Finland and the Baltics

11. Commander of Navy Warship Relieved of Duty Months After Backward Rifle Scope Photo Flap

12. The U.S. Navy’s Chief Supplier Is in Peril

13. Warfighting, quality of life prioritized in USMC commandant guidance

14. Analysts: China tests US commitment to Indo-Pacific with maritime operations

15. NEWSFLASH: Zelenskyy shakes up cabinet, ministers resign

16. CISA moves away from trying to influence content moderation decisions on election disinformation

17. Trump’s Foreign-Policy Influencers

18. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

19. Operation Neptune Spear: The Most Important American Special Operation

20. Windows, not Walls: Conceptualizing Air Superiority for Future Wars

21. China’s new global charm offensive: Vocational training for the world, but is there a catch?

22. The War on Excess: The Army Has an Equipment Management Problem and Needs a Culture Change to Solve It

23. A Revolution Begins in Austin, Texas

24. China-linked 'Spamouflage' network mimics Americans online to sway US political debate

25. The Year of Elections Has Been Good for Democracy

26. How to Keep the Peace in Gaza

1. Opinion Tomorrow’s Army is here. Can it get past yesterday’s bureaucracy?

Pentagon = former Soviet bureaucrats. :-)

Excerpts:

A similar caution came from retired Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, who served as the Army’s director of program analysis. “What I saw in Louisiana was impressive,” he tells me. But he says there’s a mismatch between fast-moving technology and the glacial process used to acquire it.

Let’s be frank: The Pentagon procurement system is a menace that over decades has resisted nearly every attempt at reform. The rules are rigid. “We need better flexibility in planning and funding to pivot from one system to another as the technology evolves,” Gabe Camarillo, undersecretary of the Army, tells me in an interview.

“The Pentagon is where all the bureaucrats from the Soviet Union went when communism fell,” Ferrari jokes. That’s unfair, but only slightly. As George put it to me, “We don’t have a technology problem. We have a technology-acquisition problem.” Whoever becomes president in January needs to put this challenge of military modernization at the top of the inbox. Otherwise, our old systems are going to get people killed.

Opinion Tomorrow’s Army is here. Can it get past yesterday’s bureaucracy?

The gee-whiz factor was off the charts at an exercise at Fort Johnson. But how much of the fancy gear will be replicated across the military?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/09/03/army-pentagon-technology-military-future-exercise/?utm

6 min

243

Col. James Stultz, commander of the 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, briefs generals and the media last month at Fort Johnson, La. (Staff Sgt. Joshua Joyner/101st Airborne Division, Air Assault)

By David Ignatius

September 3, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. EDT

FORT JOHNSON, La. — It’s a hot, sweaty afternoon at an Army training base in the lowlands of Louisiana, and Col. James Stultz, his face smeared with greasepaint, is preparing his brigade for “fight night” with a simulated enemy force. He’s in a war game against an imaginary foe in Asia — but, really, he’s testing new technology for the Army.

Stultz’s brigade command post is tiny: Four Humvees backed into a square with a makeshift tent in the middle covering his operations center. About a dozen soldiers sit in the dark with laptops, their faces slightly illuminated by the glowing screens. The workspace is a fraction of the size of a usual command post. Stultz says he can set it up or tear it down in 15 minutes.

The post is nearly invisible to an adversary. It’s camouflaged to obscure it from drones and satellites. And more important, Stultz says, its electronic emissions are nearly zero. A fiber-optic cable carries the post’s signals to an antenna farm 100 yards away, where they’re beamed to satellites and then relayed back to Earth. To confuse his adversary, Stultz sends out drones that drop devices that emit radio and WiFi signals mimicking a real command post.

At the antenna farm, Chief Warrant Officer Vidal Perez is explaining how he bounces signals to the Starshield military satellite network run by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. In this high-tech combat drill, speed and stealth are everything. Within 45 minutes of dropping into the zone, Perez says, “I’m on the bird.” I ask him how he learned to use all this fancy tech. He shrugs and answers: “From the fire hose.”

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In a clearing nearby, the brigade’s reconnaissance company shows off more cutting-edge technology. Capt. Charles O’Hagan displays small quadcopters that can survey the battlefield, big quads that can drop mortar shells; Switchblade suicide drones; counter-drone systems to jam the enemy’s attack swarms; scanners to pick up enemy electronic emissions; and tiny Throwbots, that can use their big treads to sneak into enemy positions.

“We’ll trade robots for blood,” O’Hagan says. Parked nearby are futuristic infantry squad vehicles. With their open frames and big fenders, they look like vehicles from a “Mad Max” movie. They’re based on the Chevrolet Colorado, and the fastest of them can go up to 110 miles per hour off road. “Roads are lava,” a member of the brigade says.

Soldiers from the 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, in an infantry squad vehicle at Fort Johnson, La., last month. (Staff Sgt. Joshua Joyner/101st Airborne Division, Air Assault)

Welcome to the next war. The rules of this new battlespace are “concealment, displacement, dispersion and deception,” says Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, who commands the 101st Airborne Division, which staged the mock airborne assault led by Stultz’s brigade. Both sides in this exercise were equipped with drones, decoys, robots and jammers. It’s the closest the Army can come to mirroring what’s happening in Ukraine. Real artillery shells aren’t fired, but their trajectories are simulated by a laser known as the God gun that marks soldiers who would have been killed or wounded.

In the simulation at Fort Johnson, an Asian country called “North Torvia,” allied with a superpower called “Ovana,” has invaded its neighbor, “South Torvia.” The 101st has launched an airborne assault from 500 miles away to repel the invaders. It’s not hard to guess what this scenario represents.

Gen. Randy George, the Army chief of staff, brought a group of journalists and military analysts here to show off the weapons and concepts he’s developing in what he sees as a race to modernize the Army. He argues that rather than being wedded to hardware and doctrines that last for decades, the Army needs a “software mindset,” so that it can evolve at the speed of technological change.

The Army is now training to fight Russia and China, rather than the Taliban. The last time I visited Fort Johnson in 2018, the Army was testing “SFABs” — Security Force Assistance Brigades that were supposed to bolster the Afghanistan army. So much for that experiment. The mock Afghan villages back then have been replaced with simulated urban settings.

The Army organized a “capabilities showcase” for us that filled 23 stalls in a parking lot. It was a dizzying array of weapons. A project called “Lone Wolf” featured a robot dog that carries a machine gun. Imagine a phalanx of them advancing stiff-legged across a battlefield. An exhibit dubbed “HIMARS in a Box” displayed a missile launcher palletized to fit in a metal cargo container. Imagine an adversary trying to guess which of thousands of containers contains a missile array.

Electronic warfare is the frontier of combat in Ukraine. And here, too, the Army has been innovating. I saw transmitters that operate at ultrahigh frequencies that are nearly un-jammable; satellite antennas that can move quickly from low Earth orbit to medium and geocentric orbits; virtual-reality headsets that let commanders visualize every sensor feed in a combat theater; and a small communications device, no bigger than an iPad, that lets soldiers toggle among the state-of-the-art combat-information systems designed by four of the country’s top software providers.

The gee-whiz factor at Fort Johnson was off the charts. But how much of this fancy gear and doctrine will be replicated across the Army?

Two Army veterans who joined our trip were impressed by the innovations but worried they won’t be deployed across the military — unless there’s a revolution in the rigid rules of procurement.

“We have a system that will not allow us to catch up to the reality of war,” Gen. Jack Keane warned the group as we sat in conference room watching relays from the field as “fight night” began. Keane, a legendary retired vice chief of staff, is often credited with devising the “surge” strategy in Iraq.

‘Trade steel for blood’ — The Army’s plan to bring soldiers into the 21st century

Soldiers at the Joint Readiness Training Center took pages from the war in Ukraine to fight against one another for a battle in the woods of Fort Johnson, Louisiana.

Patty Nieberg

Posted on Sep 3, 2024 7:00 AM EDT

11 minute read

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

Soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade took to the Louisiana woods in August to compete against their most formidable enemy, the 1st Battalion 509th Infantry Regiment dubbed ‘Geronimo,’ with a deception plan in place.

Geronimo, the home team at Fort Johnson, Louisiana, faces off against units year-round at the Joint Readiness Training Center in realistic combat scenarios based on lessons learned in global conflicts. JRTC is designed to take away or add stressors on soldiers as well as hold units accountable with simulated casualties and hits that would take them out of the fight.

The 2nd Brigade came in knowing their enemy had the upper hand on home turf so they had to think ahead. Soldiers decided to use “raspberry pis,” which are single-board computers the size of a credit card that can be bought off Amazon to emulate a computer or show up as some kind of electronic signature to confuse their enemy.

“We came in with a deception plan because we wanted to show the enemy that we were in a place where we weren’t so that he would commit forces into our strongest defenses and not into our weakest,” said Capt. Charlie O’Hagan commander of the 101st’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company. “We created, with those decoys, battalion headquarters, company headquarters, and we put them throughout the southern area.”

O’Hagan said they wanted to make it seem like they had a larger presence in the West so on the first two nights they had a battalion in the south turn on their decoys to make it seem like they were moving west to east using the southern corridor.

The plan worked for one battalion, allowing it to hide for some time, O’Hagan said. He deemed it successful because their deception plan had the opposing force “allocating resources such as [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] and fires to these decoys,” which took away maneuver space and decision-making from the enemy commander.

The decoys not only protected units from detection but revealed where their enemy’s assets were.

“If anyone’s flying over, they’ll see the decoy, they’ll see the antenna farm,” he said. “Ideally, they’ll use something in terms of artillery to destroy the decoy, which means the enemy unmasks his artillery. We can pick up on it, and then we can counter-fire his artillery.”

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The exercise is just one takeaway from the war in Ukraine that the Army is studying to change its tactics and incorporate technology into its formations faster to keep up with the changing face of warfare where sensing capabilities are prolific and unmanned aerial systems, UAS, or drones overhead can easily pinpoint targets.

Soldiers participate in a combined arms rehearsal for a Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault at Fort Campbell, Kentucky on April 22, 2024. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Joseph Truesdale.

“Just the detection capabilities of an adversary with modern technology is changing the character of warfare,” said Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who previously served as the Army vice chief of staff and was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2020.

Lt. Col. Mason Thornal, commander for the 1-509th opposition force admitted that sometimes even Geronimo gets it wrong and “we get caught when we don’t get this right.” Their competitive advantage, he said, is that they get to fail fast and practice every month.

During their fight against the 101st, Geronimo units had gotten distracted and found themselves in trouble from staying static for too long.

“We got pulled into the fight. We got busy,” Thornal said. “I was static for too long, and I had a [Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company], small UAS appear over top of us. We had to displace.”

Thornal also said that the 101st had more sense and strike capabilities than units that the opposing force previously fought so they tried to change their own behavior as well.

“When we were infiltrating the area of operations, we had to use converging routes methods, so using multiple routes to make it harder to identify the main effort,” he said. “We had to serialize our movements so instead of sending eight tanks in at once — two here, two here, two here — it made us much slower.”

The takeaway for both sides, Thornal said, is the importance of concealment, dispersion, camouflage, and displacement. In layman’s terms that means moving quickly and quietly with smaller units to avoid detection by enemy forces via drone or having little to no signature on the electromagnetic spectrum which can be used to determine the size or makeup of a military’s assets like a refueling point or a battalion headquarters.

This also means changing the way soldiers think about how visible they are. At Fort Johnson, Thornal said the opposing force is using all of its sensing technologies to gain and maintain contact with the enemy using indirect fires, attack aviation, and electronic warfare jamming “to enable maneuver to allow our forces to have the advantage.”

The new type of battlefield threats also mean changing the behavior of soldiers. As soldiers were taught to tape down their dog tags during World War II to eliminate noise, now they have to perform pre-combat checks or inspections to make sure Bluetooth or WiFi isn’t being picked up from their personal devices. Even something like an electric shaver must be turned off.

“Treating em-comm [electromagnetic] emissions control like noise and light discipline, those are the best ways to counter it,” Thornal said.

Keane, a Vietnam veteran who once commanded the JRTC said the Geronimo “quite skillfully” replicated how the Russians are fighting in Ukraine where they’ve been hunting each other using soldier cell phone signals for targeting and flying drones attached with payloads to take out opposing units.

“The opposing force had significant surveillance and detection capabilities of both signal communications and detecting communications through electronic warfare. What the blue force had to do was change all their previous habits in terms of moving in large formations, having an electronic signature for something as simple as an iPhone watch,” Keane said.

A new way of waging war

The fight was part of the Army’s most recent JRTC rotation where units tested Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George’s so-called “Transformation in Contact,” approach which aims to bring new technology into formations faster with more user feedback.

“We’re taking lessons from everywhere,” George said. “We’re changing how we’re organized because I think that is what the current edition conditions require. We’re changing how we train and operate.”

In the past, units would generate requirements that would go through design and testing by defense contractors and eventually be put into formations. Now, the Army is taking technology before it’s fully mature, putting it into the units’ hands, and then designing the requirements. This means soldiers can test equipment in training to decide on its feasibility and offer feedback early on — something that was long missing from the military’s technology enterprise.

George said the Army is asking for more flexible funding to buy the newest technology.

“What we don’t want is to buy something and then say we’re going to have it for the next 20 years,” he said.

Soldiers from 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) conduct vehicle preparations during Operation Lethal Eagle 24.1, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky on April 21, 2024. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Joseph Truesdale.

Keane, who was offered the role of Defense Secretary in 2016 by former President Donald Trump and sits on a congressional committee that looks at the National Defense Strategy, said the Army’s culture is changing, but the way the Pentagon buys, develops and incorporates emerging technology is getting in the way of those efforts.

“The threat to the American people’s security is real, and we got a system that will not let this organization, the U.S. Army, the best land force in the world, catch up to the changing character of war,” Keane told a group of reporters who attended JRTC training. “We’re paralyzed. That’s the reality of what we’re facing.”

Over the last few years, the Pentagon implored experts to study how the Army can modernize the way it buys new technology and Congress has given the Department of Defense authorities that give the military services more flexibility to move faster. However, some experts, like Keane, say it’s still not good enough.

“This chief here is going to bang his head up against the wall trying to get these systems in the hands of his soldiers to face the threat that’s out there,” he said, referring to Gen. George.

George agreed with Keane but when talking to reporters, he focused on the parts of the system that he has authority over — like pushing new tech out to units for training like at the JRTC. He also said that the transformation “isn’t about just the tech,” but also the formations and people.

At the August JRTC rotation, the Army saw its first prototype mobile brigade combat teams take center stage to test new technology they had received weeks and sometimes days before as well as concepts that the service wants to make its formations lighter, simpler and more devastating.

Army makes shift to large-scale combat operations

At the JRTC, the Army tested new formations and units amid a greater shift in the type of combat that the Pentagon anticipates the U.S. military may have to face. During Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces were focused on conducting counterterrorism operations but in the future those might look more like large-scale combat operations.

With this type of combat, officials are looking at how to deploy smaller units faster while decreasing vulnerabilities in an environment where sensing technologies make it harder to move assets and personnel undetected.

The commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, said during one air assault simulation exercise they realized the Army was “extremely vulnerable” anytime it amassed its aircraft, so they needed to figure out how to be more dispersed, meaning “not landing at large airfields” all at once.

Brig. Gen. Bryan Babich, director of the Mission Command Center of Excellence said the emphasis on dispersing units to improve their chance of surviving against a “near-peer adversary” with equivalent capabilities to the U.S. military, will mean a test of soldiers’ stamina.

“Because we’re distributed, we don’t have those big staffs with 24-hour battle rooms. You got to keep moving so it’s the human endurance factor as well,” Babich said. While the changes that the Army is considering mean simplifying the work that the commander and the staff have to do, “that work’s got to go somewhere and now that’s becoming the division.”

The Army that fought in Operation Desert Storm was very division-centric and after 2004, the service moved to a modular construct by “making brigade combat teams as self-sufficient as we possibly could,” said Sylvia. When he deployed as a colonel to Mosul, Iraq for counter-ISIS operations in 2018-2019 with a Brigade Combat Team, the 101st Division staff were back at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, meaning he had to use the brigade’s resources like artillery and engineers with limited modern technology.

Now the Army is looking to strip brigade combat teams of the excess capabilities they built up over time and make them lighter and leaner. In a future fight, the division would deploy with multiple brigades, Sylvia said.

Infantry brigade combat teams are made up of just over 4,300 soldiers but the new design reduces that number to nearly 3,000 soldiers. Although there are fewer soldiers, the Army envisions generating “new forms of mass,” Sylvia said, referring to a greater emphasis on UAS.

“As we transition to a mobile brigade combat team, we take out many of those manned platforms and make them unmanned platforms with new constructs,” Sylvia said. “We’re able to trade steel for blood.”

For command and control, the new concept puts divisions in charge of managing the network to keep brigades focused on tactics — moving faster with less equipment to worry about. Brigades would no longer carry large radios but soldiers would have Android devices they can use with Starlink internet or nearby cell towers.

The Army is working through which devices and apps it wants to use but officials have emphasized the need for software to bring all of the systems together and have a simple user interface that’s intuitive to new users.

“We want to be able to control that drone from our end user device. We want to be able to do everything from one system,” O’Hagan said. “Ideally it’s one [a] stop shop.”

However, as the Army shifts to becoming more dispersed and mobile or as O’Hagan called it, “painfully light,” soldiers will have to forgo certain comforts they were allotted in bigger battalion formations: air conditioning, food, and water.

The two-week JRTC battle was just a peek at the Army’s plan to bring the U.S. land force into this decade, George said, adding that 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Liberty, North Carolina are finding new ways to do breaching with robots and the 3rd Infantry Division is exploring new drone tactics. Now the issue is modernizing the Army at scale and doing it faster, he said.

“In the last six months, just with this unit, we did that. We changed and we’ve adapted, and we’ve given them that technology,” George said. “We’re adapting our processes so that we can do that faster in the future.”

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Patty Nieberg

Sr. Staff Writer

Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She has covered the military and national defense for five years, including embedding with the National Guard during Hurricane Florence and covering legal proceedings for a former al Qaeda commander at Guantanamo Bay. Her previous bylines can be found at the Associated Press, Bloomberg Government, Washington Post, The New York Times, and ABC.

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

3. The US Army’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company: Weapon of the week

The US Army’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company: Weapon of the week

Ryan Robertson

Anchor/Reporter

https://san.com/cc/the-us-armys-multi-functional-reconnaissance-company-weapon-of-the-week/?mc_cid=ca6b6bf3c6&mc_eid=70bf478f36

3 hrs ago

By Ryan Robertson (Anchor/Reporter), Brett Baker (Senior Producer), Brian Spencer (Video Editor), Dakota Piteo (Senior Motion Designer)

The U.S. Army’s multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC) represents a new era in combat. The war in Ukraine remains an active conflict, but the lessons learned are reshaping how American military leadership views the future of combat.

Lighter, more lethal units, equipped with state of the art technology, are being seen as the way forward for the service. MFRCs, like the one with the 101st Airborne Division, represent the Army’s most significant transformation in more than 40 years.

This elite recon unit now has access to drones and a host of combat-ready technology, all designed to monitor the enemy while remaining concealed.

“We have been tasked with being painfully light and disproportionately lethal to sense, kill, and protect on behalf of the brigade,” said Capt. Charles O’Hagan, the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company commander.

This shift marks a departure from focusing on counterterrorism operations to equipping units to deter enemy forces and leverage current technology and warfighting trends. An MFRC consists of three “hunter-killer” platoons. One for drones, another for electronic warfare, and a third for robotics and autonomous systems.

Once airborne troops are on the ground, they need a way to reach their destination. Enter the Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle, essentially a stripped-down version of the Chevrolet Colorado. The vehicle is large enough to supply a recon team for several days, but light enough to navigate rough terrain.

Established in March, the MFRC has already participated in two large-scale field training exercises. The first was at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in April, and most recently at Fort Johnson, Louisiana.

Access the full Weapons and Warfare episode here.

Access all Weapons and Warfare podcast episodes here.

4. U.S. Army eyes drone-soaked Middle East to refine energy weapons

U.S. Army eyes drone-soaked Middle East to refine energy weapons

Axios · by Colin Demarest · August 28, 2024

U.S. Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo envisions a future battlefield swarming with sensors and electronics, swollen with digital chatter and interference, and starving for overhead defenses.

Why it matters: The Army is putting a premium on drone and counter-drone equipment in light of the Russia-Ukraine war and is scoping out sci-fi-style energy weapons to combat aerial threats.

Why he matters: Camarillo has for years served as the service's No. 2 civilian, working as its chief operating officer and keeping abreast of its weapon developments.

He sat down with Axios for a 40-minute interview at the Pentagon.

The intrigue: A directed-energy proving ground is emerging in the greater Middle East, where laser and microwave weapons face real-world, punishing conditions.

The Army this year dispatched to Iraq several laser weapons mounted on Stryker combat vehicles.
It plans to send Epirus-made high-power microwave prototypes to the region in the coming months.
Army Gen. Michael Kurilla, the U.S. Central Command boss, told Congress he would "love" to have additional directed-energy weapons in the area, especially as the Navy snipes Houthi drones launched from Yemen.

What they're saying: "We're going to learn quite a bit about the effectiveness and the maturity of these two directed-energy technologies against the range of unmanned aerial vehicle threats that exist in that area of responsibility," Camarillo said.

Also under consideration: lasers mounted to Joint Light Tactical and Infantry Squad vehicles, and launched effects (drones catapulted from larger aircraft and vehicles) strapped with electronic-sizzling payloads.
"I expect the maturity of those laser and high-power microwave systems to continue to evolve, to give us more solutions over time," he said.

How it works: High-energy lasers and high-power microwaves promise to zap incoming ordnance for pennies on the dollar.

Lasers fire at the speed of light and can burn through their targets. Microwaves can fry electronics en masse.
They boast unlimited magazines, so to speak, but efficacy can be stunted by atmospheric conditions and extreme distance. They also require power, which can be disrupted.
"This is another example where, I think, we need to be thinking about continuously innovating, continuously upgrading technology, and our adoption of it, so that we can always stay ahead of the threat," Camarillo said.

What we're watching: Epirus chief executive Andy Lowery is bullish that his company's rig will perform well overseas.

"We're going to put out this very elegant microwave energy field, and the bad guys are just going to be scratching their heads. 'What the hell is going on?'"

Be smart: Widespread adoption of directed-energy has yet to happen, despite years of experimentation and roughly $1 billion in yearly Pentagon spending.

Axios · by Colin Demarest · August 28, 2024

5. Exclusive: US expected to send senior Pentagon official to China military forum

Michael Chase, the deputy assistant secretary of defence for China, Taiwan and Mongolia

Exclusive: US expected to send senior Pentagon official to China military forum

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-send-more-senior-delegation-china-military-forum-2024-09-04/?mc_cid=ca6b6bf3c6&mc_eid=70bf478f36

By Idrees Ali and Laurie Chen

September 4, 20243:41 AM EDTUpdated 4 hours ago

U.S. and Chinese flags are seen in this illustration, taken January 30, 2023. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

WASHINGTON/BEIJING, Sept 4 (Reuters) - The United States is set to send Michael Chase, the deputy assistant secretary of defence for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, to China's top annual security forum in mid-September, a U.S. official told Reuters.

The choice of Chase has not been previously reported. He is more senior than the U.S. official who attended the Xiangshan Forum last year, but his rank is in line with historical norms for the Pentagon.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia attended the forum in 2019.

There is some hope that this could signal deeper working-level engagement with China amid regional disputes. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Chase's expected attendance was not unprecedented, but sent a message that the United States prioritises engagement at the military level with China even at a time of heightened tensions.

More than 90 countries and international organisations plan to send delegations to the Sept. 12-14 forum in Beijing, Chinese state media reported Wednesday.

Washington sent Xanthi Carras, China country director in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, when the forum resumed last year after a three-year hiatus due to the pandemic. It was a sign of thawing military ties; however Carras' title is of a lower rank than Chase or Sbragia.

Chase co-chaired U.S.-China military talks in Washington in January - the first such working-level talks since 2022, when most bilateral military engagement was suspended after then-U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.

Taiwan and the South China Sea remain contentious flashpoints in the U.S.-China relationship, with both sides unwilling to compromise on "core issues". U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said no new agreements had been reached on the South China Sea during a visit to China last week.

China has repeatedly criticised U.S. deployments in the Asia-Pacific region, including the placement of long-range missiles in the Philippines, as well as U.S. arms sales to democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own territory, over the strenuous objections of Taipei.

Meanwhile the U.S. has raised concerns over China's "aggressive" actions in the South China Sea, its frequent military manoeuvres in the air and waters surrounding Taiwan, and what it says is the opacity of China's nuclear buildup.

Official nuclear talks were halted by Beijing in July in protest over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. But both sides have agreed that U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders would soon speak by phone to their counterparts in China's southern theatre command, which covers its southern seas.

Get weekly news and analysis on the U.S. elections and how it matters to the world with the newsletter On the Campaign Trail. Sign up here.

Reporting by Idrees Ali and Laurie Chen in Beijing; Writing by Laurie Chen. Editing by Gerry Doyle and Raju Gopalakrishnan

6. The US Navy Is Going All In on Starlink

Excerpts:

The Navy isn’t the only service embracing Starlink to enable faster, persistent internet for deployed service members. The US Space Force signed a $70 million contract with Starlink parent company SpaceX in October 2023 to provide “a best effort and global subscription for various land, maritime, stationary and mobility platforms and users” using Starshield, the company’s name for its military products. The US Army currently remains reliant on Starlink, but the service has been casting about for fresh commercial satellite constellations to tap into for advanced command and control functions, according to Defense News. And SpaceX is actively building a network of “hundreds” of specialized Starshield spy satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office, Reuters reported earlier this year.

But Starlink is far from a perfect system, especially for potential military applications. According to a technical report obtained by The Debrief, Ukraine has claimed that Russia’s military intelligence agency has conducted “large-scale cyberattacks” to access data from the Starlink satellite constellations that have proven essential to the former’s military communications infrastructure since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. Indeed, significant hardware vulnerabilities have imperiled Starlink terminals at the hands of experienced hackers, as WIRED has previously documented.

More importantly, there’s the matter of Musk’s ownership of Starlink. The controversial SpaceX founder had previously refused to allow Ukraine to use the satellite constellation to launch a surprise attack against Russian forces in Kremlin-controlled Crimea in September 2022, prompting concerns among Pentagon decisionmakers that a private citizen with a questionable perception of geopolitics could drastically shape US military operations during a future conflict simply by switching off service branches’ Starlink access, according to an Associated Press report last year.

The US Navy Is Going All In on Starlink

The Navy is testing out the Elon Musk–owned satellite constellation to provide high-speed internet access to sailors at sea. It’s part of a bigger project that’s about more than just getting online.

Wired · by Jared Keller · September 3, 2024

Life aboard a US Navy warship at sea can be stressful, boring, and lonely, with separation from friends and family and long stretches between port calls both isolating and monotonous. Now, Elon Musk is here to take the edge off.

In a now deleted press release from the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR), the Navy recently announced that it is experimenting with bringing reliable and persistent high-speed internet to its surface warships. The connectivity comes via a new system developed under its Sailor Edge Afloat and Ashore (SEA2) initiative, which uses satellites from the Starlink network maintained by Musk’s SpaceX and other spaceborne broadband internet providers to maintain a constant and consistent internet connection for sailors—a system that NAVWAR says has “applications across the entire Navy.”

The US Defense Department has for decades relied on a network of aging satellites to furnish service members at sea with decidedly slow internet access, according to an updated release NAVWAR shared with WIRED. By contrast, commercial satellite constellations like Starlink and Eutelsat OneWeb, which number in the thousands and offer coverage from a significantly lower orbit, provide a far superior connection.

The resulting SEA2 system, dubbed the Satellite Terminal (transportable) Non-Geostationary (STtNG), allows a warship’s tactical feeds secure access to low-orbit satellites with a median connection speed of 30 to 50 megabits per second, according to NAVWAR. With the installation of additional Starlink antennas, the system can scale up to speeds of 1 gigabit per second.

NAVWAR said that it scrubbed its initial press release, which showed the installation of a Starlink terminal aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, from the Pentagon’s Defense Visual Information Distribution System (DVIDS) media portal to “address inaccuracies and ensure the information is correct,” Elisha Gamboa, a command spokesperson, told WIRED in a statement.

News of the Starlink terminal’s installation aboard the Lincoln in particular came as the aircraft carrier and its associated battle group were redirected to the US Central Command area of operations in the Middle East amid increased tensions between Israel and Iran following the former’s targeted killing of a Hamas leader in Tehran.

The Navy has not yet disclosed how many surface warships have received Starlink terminals. Defense officials told DefenseScoop in April that the DOD was at the time evaluating the system aboard two deployed vessels “with aims to field those broadband-providing capabilities across a fleet of up to 200 in the future.”

Originally a “passion project” of Lincoln combat systems officer Commander Kevin White, SEA2 systems were first installed aboard the next-generation aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford in February 2023, offering sailors the ability to quickly and easily communicate with loved ones back home no matter where they are in the world—a major boost to morale amid the doldrums of life at sea. The system even allowed hundreds of sailors to enjoy a live broadcast of Super Bowl LVIII through a normal TV streaming service aboard the warship this past year.

“Having the ability to reach out to friends or family allows our sailors the opportunity to decompress for a few minutes, and that in turn allows them to be able to operate more efficiently,” Richard Haninger, the Ford’s deployed resiliency educator, said following the installation of the SEA2 system aboard the carrier in February 2023. “It’s not just about reaching back to friends and family, the ability to pay a bill online, take an online class, or even just check the score of the game [...] all of this allows our Sailors the chance to access something that lowers their stress level, then return to work after a quick break more focused and able to complete the mission.”

But beyond morale-boosting applications, SEA2 also purportedly offers major benefits for “tactical and business applications” used by sailors on a daily basis, like, say, those used for air wing maintenance or for tracking pay and benefits. As White explained in a May release from the Navy on the initiative, most of these applications function at higher classification levels and are encrypted, but they’re still designed to operate on the commercial internet without jeopardizing information security.

“The fact that we’re not making use of that opportunity with modern technology to allow classified tactical applications to ride the commercial internet is where we are missing out, so we built [SEA2] to be able to do that in the future,” as White put it. “We’re close to demonstrating a couple of those applications, and I am fully confident it will be game changing.” (As of June, the Navy had not authorized the use of classified data with the system)

The Navy also expects to see broad “tangible warfighting impact” from the proliferation of SEA2 across the surface fleet, namely on “recruitment and retention, mental health, cloud services, and work stoppages due to slow and inaccessible websites,” as one service official told DefenseScoop in April.

The Navy isn’t the only service embracing Starlink to enable faster, persistent internet for deployed service members. The US Space Force signed a $70 million contract with Starlink parent company SpaceX in October 2023 to provide “a best effort and global subscription for various land, maritime, stationary and mobility platforms and users” using Starshield, the company’s name for its military products. The US Army currently remains reliant on Starlink, but the service has been casting about for fresh commercial satellite constellations to tap into for advanced command and control functions, according to Defense News. And SpaceX is actively building a network of “hundreds” of specialized Starshield spy satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office, Reuters reported earlier this year.

But Starlink is far from a perfect system, especially for potential military applications. According to a technical report obtained by The Debrief, Ukraine has claimed that Russia’s military intelligence agency has conducted “large-scale cyberattacks” to access data from the Starlink satellite constellations that have proven essential to the former’s military communications infrastructure since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. Indeed, significant hardware vulnerabilities have imperiled Starlink terminals at the hands of experienced hackers, as WIRED has previously documented.

More importantly, there’s the matter of Musk’s ownership of Starlink. The controversial SpaceX founder had previously refused to allow Ukraine to use the satellite constellation to launch a surprise attack against Russian forces in Kremlin-controlled Crimea in September 2022, prompting concerns among Pentagon decisionmakers that a private citizen with a questionable perception of geopolitics could drastically shape US military operations during a future conflict simply by switching off service branches’ Starlink access, according to an Associated Press report last year.

“Living in the world we live in, in which Elon runs this company and it is a private business under his control, we are living off his good graces,” a Pentagon official told The New Yorker in August 2023. “That sucks.”

In a post on X responding to this article following publication, Musk asserted that “Starlink was barred from turning on satellite beams in Crimea at the time, because doing so would violate US sanctions against Russia!”

“We received an unexpected request in the middle of the night to activate Starlink in Crimea in a matter of a few hours from the Ukraine government, but received no request or permission to override sanctions from the US government,” Musk added. “Had we done as Ukraine asked, it would have been a felony violation of US law.”

Musk previously said that enabling Ukraine to use Starlink to launch its attack would make SpaceX “explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation.”

Given these potential risks, it’s unlikely that Starlink will see deeper integration into the major tactical systems that govern the operation of a Navy warship at sea. But for the moment, it looks as though sailors will at least get a welcome reprieve from the stress and solitude of life on the high seas.

Update 1:50 pm ET, September 3, 2024: Added comments from Elon Musk in response to this article's characterization of Starlink's refusal to enable its service for the Ukrainian military.

Wired · by Jared Keller · September 3, 2024

7. To Remain Relevant the Marines Must Adapt to a Changing World

The opening paragraph is quite an indictment of the USMC.

Conclusion:

Marines have always adapted to change while retaining their relevance as America’s premier 9-1-1 force across the spectrum of conflict. As it has always done, the Corps must prepare now for future challenges without losing the flexibility to adjust to the uncertain demands of a dangerous world. To that end, Vision 2035 (Global Response in the Age of Precision Munitions), provides a sensible starting point for modifying Force Design to deter and, if necessary, defeat an ever-widening array of global adversaries.

To Remain Relevant the Marines Must Adapt to a Changing World

By Walter Boomer & James Conway , Anthony Zinni

September 04, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/04/to_remain_relevant_the_marines_must_adapt_to_a_changing_world_1055976.html?mc_cid=ca6b6bf3c6&mc_eid=70bf478f36

As remarkable as it sounds, the United States Marine Corps is currently organized and equipped for the wrong mission. The Service, once renowned for its offensive mantra as “first to fight”, has become too focused on defending against the highly unlikely scenario in which the Chinese navy projects from the South China Sea to engage U.S. forces and seize control of the Pacific and beyond. To meet this potential threat, the Marines embraced a new operating concept called “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations” (EABO) and significantly altered Marine Corps force structure and capabilities by implementing a supporting plan called “Force Design 2030” (now called simply “Force Design”).

The intent of Force Design was to convert existing Marine infantry and artillery formations into small, mobile, self-sufficient missile-equipped units spread across the Pacific Ocean’s first island chain through which the Chinese Navy ships must transit on their way to points east, south and north. It must be noted that these dispersed units are themselves unlikely to contribute in any meaningful way to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which is considered by planners as both the most likely and most dangerous course of action available to China.

If China elects to strike U.S. bases in Japan, Guam and Hawaii to support the attack against Taiwan, they could use land based missiles fired from Chinese territory and allow the Chinese air force and navy to concentrate on seizing and then defending Taiwan while remaining outside the range of Marine missile batteries.

Before proceeding, it’s worth reviewing why the Marines shifted their main focus from a global, offensive force-in-readiness to a regional, defense force-in-waiting.

The often repeated narrative that the 2018 National Defense Strategy mandated the Marine Corps to radically restructure and reorganize its forces to focus on China is incorrect. The 2018 National Defense Strategy and the current 2022 National Defense Strategy, while recognizing China as a “pacing challenge,” cast their nets more widely, identifying Russia as a second global threat, Iran and North Korea as significant regional threats, and various nonstate actors as inimical to U.S. security and interests. The intent of both strategies was to refocus the U.S. military on the Indo-Pacific region, but not at the expense of responding effectively to other global threats.

The Marines went too far in their shift from counterterrorism to great power competition with China. By divesting too much of their proven combat capabilities to invest in small, dispersed units (termed Stand-in Forces or SIFs), they lost the capability to remain relevant in other regions where U.S. interests are threatened and conflicts are more likely to occur.

Some argue that the Marines 2019 decision to implement Force Design was justified and even laudable. However, the world has since changed dramatically. At that time, Europe was at peace and the Middle East was on the brink of a diplomatic breakthrough (the Abraham Accords), which would begin the process of normalizing relations between Israel and various Arab states.

North Korea had reduced its threatening behavior towards neighboring countries and became more open to western engagement. China was identified as the most likely threat to U.S. national interests and thus, the “pacing challenge” that should directly inform U.S. Defense planning, but not at the expense of reducing agile and lethal general-purpose forces, along with the means to project them quickly to global trouble spots.

Improvements in long-range missiles, precision munitions, and unmanned systems were expected to change the character of war. Some believed that tanks and cannon artillery were on the verge of obsolescence. Like the French Army after WW1, strategists began to sense that defense had replaced offense as the dominant form of warfare.

The strategic and operational environments continue to evolve. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and combined arms warfare returned to the battlefield. To date, cannon artillery has accounted for at least 80% of the casualties on both sides. Tanks have proven to be combat multipliers, so long as they are properly supported as part of a combined arms team. Though UAVs and precision-guided munitions are widely employed, they no longer attack with impunity—countermeasures develop rapidly and 75% of small drones are lost to electronic warfare. The advantage now enjoyed by small aerial drones will someday be viewed as “a moment in history” and not a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).

Russian jamming of the guidance systems of modern Western weapons, including Excalibur GPS-guided artillery shells and HIMARS, has diminished Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory. Data shows the success rate for U.S. designed Excalibur shells to strike their intended targets fell to less than 10 percent causing Ukraine’s military to actually abandon them last year. Today, NATO is holding 500,000 troops at high readiness (including significant armored, mechanized and artillery formations) to guard against the looming risk of a larger war with Russia.

In early October 2023, Hamas attacked Israel. In the region’s most significant military engagement since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Defense Forces have interdicted and destroyed thousands of rockets fired by Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Supported by the United States and other countries, Israel interdicted 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles (none of which entered Israeli territory) and at least 110 ballistic missiles (of which a small number reached Israel) fired by Iran in a single attack. Today, Israel remains at war with Hamas in Gaza and on the brink of war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In late October 2023, emboldened by Hamas’ attack in southern Israel, the Iran-backed Houthi movement launched cruise missiles and armed drones at Israel. The Houthis conduct regular attacks on merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea and against Israel, while the U.S. Navy struggles to maintain freedom of navigation using predominately defensive measures that do nothing to deter future attacks. Today, Iran threatens an all-out attack on Israel, which could engulf the region in a wider war.

Among the lessons being learned in the Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea is that armed drones, precision guided munitions, and subsonic and ballistic missiles will not themselves be decisive on the battlefield. Infantry, supported by robust and resilient combined arms, will remain the final arbiter of the close and rear battles, where winners and losers will still be determined.

Diplomatic conditions are deteriorating as well.

China and Russia’s “no-limit” partnership formed in February 2022 has only deepened and broadened, to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea. According to the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, “this new alignment of nations opposed to U.S. interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multi-theater or global war.” An analysis of the report also states: “The Commission believes the United States needs a force-planning approach that is both global and prioritized. […] An exclusive focus on single adversary or single region, as some have suggested, is a fundamentally flawed response to the global nature of challenges posed by such adversaries as China and Russia and to the growing cooperation between adversaries across regions.”

Major changes have occurred in the security and operational environments that were not foreseen in 2019. DOD and all the Services must reevaluate previous transformation decisions and strive to create a balanced joint force that can meet global, not just regional challenges. Thus far, the changes made to support EABO and Force Design have resulted in a Marine Corps that is less ready and less capable of confronting global threats. The loss of conventional combined arms capabilities at the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Expeditionary Force levels are serious and will require time and money to redress.

The U.S. Navy received a green light from Marine Corps leadership to reduce the fleet of Amphibious Assault ships by 25% and Maritime Prepositioning ships by over 50%. To make matters worse, Military Sealift Command (MSC) recently announced a plan to de-crew 17 Navy support ships – to include two forward deployed Expeditionary Sea-bases - due to a lack of qualified mariners to operate the vessels across the Navy. Collectively, these platforms are essential to U.S. force projection capabilities and the ability to establish persistent regional presence across the globe during periods of peace and war.

Marines have always adapted to change while retaining their relevance as America’s premier 9-1-1 force across the spectrum of conflict. As it has always done, the Corps must prepare now for future challenges without losing the flexibility to adjust to the uncertain demands of a dangerous world. To that end, Vision 2035 (Global Response in the Age of Precision Munitions), provides a sensible starting point for modifying Force Design to deter and, if necessary, defeat an ever-widening array of global adversaries.

General Walter (Walt) Boomer, USMC (ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was the 24^th Assistant Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

General James (Jim) Conway, USMC (ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was the 34^th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

General Anthony (Tony) Zinni, USMC (ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was Commander, United States Central Command.

8. The Evolving Context for Deterrence

Download the 8 page report at this link: https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/The-Evolving-Context-for-Deterrence.pdf

The Evolving Context for Deterrence — Global Security Review

globalsecurityreview.com · by Stephen Cimbala · September 3, 2024

This article, “The Evolving Context for Deterrence” by Prof. Stephen J. Cimbala and Dr. Adam Lowther was published in the Joint Airpower Competency Center journal, viewpoints edition 38. Its main discussion centers on how NATO faces significant and evolving challenges in maintaining effective deterrence in the face of modern geopolitical and technological developments. The authors discuss the complexities introduced by cyber and space domains, the threat of Russian aggression, the potential for Chinese military action, and the role of advanced technologies such as hypersonic weapons and drones. It emphasizes the importance of a united NATO response and the need for both policy and technological advancements to ensure robust deterrence capabilities. They argue that modern deterrence is more uncertain and complex than during the Cold War, necessitating a comprehensive and adaptable approach to meet current and future threats, and highlight key challenges facing NATO’s deterrence strategy, including cyberattacks, space asset vulnerabilities, hypersonic weapons, missile defense, drones, conventional-nuclear integration, China’s nuclear capabilities, and political unity within member-states.

For NATO to improve its deterrence strategy it must prioritize cybersecurity, enhance space asset resilience, address hypersonic threats, improve missile defense systems, adapt to drone warfare, deter conventional-nuclear integration, monitor China’s nuclear capabilities, and strengthen political unity.

About the Author

Stephen Cimbala

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine.

Adam Lowther

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Read the full bio here.

globalsecurityreview.com · by Stephen Cimbala · September 3, 2024

9. Ukraine's Kursk Offensive: One Giant Blunder?

Ukraine's Kursk Offensive: One Giant Blunder?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Brent M. Eastwood · September 3, 2024

Published

21 hours ago

Aerial drone image of Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews from the 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, conducting Table XII gunnery at Fort Stewart, Ga. December 7, 2016.

Was the Ukrainian Kursk Incursion One Big Mistake?: It was bound to happen. One side would eventually break the stalemate and rush through an opening in the front lines in Ukraine. The Ukrainian army was the first to do so in the Kursk Oblast on August 6. The Ukrainians sent an estimated 1,000 troops with tanks and armored vehicles through a weak point in the Russian lines on the first day of the incursion.

The invasion was an initial success as Russian troops gave up and scattered or became prisoners. By the end of the first week, Ukraine controlled 390 square miles of Russian territory and later ended up with 500 square miles in gains.

But what happens next and can Kyiv keep the momentum going? That seems to be the question the entire world is asking–and the news is not all positive.

Kursk Offensive: Russia Paid the Price at First

Kursk was seen as a considerable triumph done with surprise and confidence. Ukraine finally had their breakthrough, and they were going to make Russia pay in territory, men, and material.

Ukraine could use the land they gained in Kursk (100 settlements, towns, and villages) as a jumping-off point to grab more territory from the Russians.

Hopefully, this would force the Russian army to bring in reinforcements from other parts of the front, weakening their overall defensive position.

Or, at least, that was the idea, according to many experts.

Zelensky Called a Blitz

Even though Ukraine set up an administrative body to hold the territory, the incursion had bogged down by the end of the month due to Russian conscripts making a stand to blunt the Ukrainian offensive.

Vladimir Putin had stopped the bleeding and did a curious thing. He ignored the Ukrainian gains and took advantage of the situation. To conduct the offensive in Kursk, Ukraine had used troops and armor from the Donetsk city of Pokrovsk. Much like a blitz in football, it creates an opportunity to focus an offensive play on the part of the field where the attacking player left open, the Russians pounced in Pokrovsk.

Key City Pokrovsk In Danger

Pokrovsk has an important road network and rail hub that Ukraine uses to move troops, ammunition, and other supplies in that part of the front. By August 4, Russia’s counter-attack placed pressure on that city. Meanwhile, the Russian army was striking back in Kursk and had regained territory east of Korenevo by September 2. They also built on gains in Donetsk to make Ukraine pay for their gambit in Kursk. According to the Institute for the Study of War, “Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions and southwest of Donetsk City.”

Now, the shoe is on the other foot. Ukraine is playing defense, and Russia is counter-attacking and making gains in Donetsk, while Putin’s forces are also on the comeback trail in Kursk.

Did Ukraine Make a Strategic Mistake?

This has raised criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He called a blitz, and the Russians reacted well. Should Ukraine have conducted the incursion of Kursk in the first place?

Zelensky was desperate for a win, and he achieved that. The Ukrainians should be credited for mass, initiative, and surprise, but they overplayed their hand. Russia was quick to recognize the weakness and acted accordingly in Donetsk.

Now the situation is tenuous in Pokrovsk. The Russians have seized the initiative and are advancing in both Kursk and Donetsk. Ukraine may have gained tactically in Kursk, although it appears that the incursion will turn out to be a strategic mistake if Russia wins Pokrovsk completely. But Kyiv needed some type of good news from the front and hitting Russia and taking territory was one way that Zelensky could show the world that Ukraine could punch a hole and punish the Russians inside their homeland. Putin decided to “deal with Ukraine later,” as the Center for European Policy Analysis described the situation.

Zelensky Did the Necessary Attack in Ukraine

It is still too early to determine whether the Kursk Ukrainian gambit was a masterstroke or a mistake. I side with Zelensky on the Kursk operation. Ukraine had to do it. It was a means to show that the friendly forces could break the stalemate. Ukrainian generals put together a solid plan and executed it well. Yes, they used troops that were on the frontlines in Donetsk, allowing Russia to strike back there, but Ukraine needed a tactical victory. Russia should be given credit, too, for eventually reacting strongly to the incursion and sending green troops into the void to stop the bleeding while counter-attacking in Donetsk.

Historians will likely point toward the Kursk incursion as a critical point of the war if Russia continues to counterattack successfully. Ukraine could be seen as becoming over-extended in Kursk and making a strategic mistake, or the Kursk incursion would be considered a critical win by Zelensky that gave a psychological boost to Ukrainian forces that had made no real gains during previous offensives. Ukraine has achieved a valuable buffer zone in Russia that could help give them a stronger position in future negotiations. National Security Journal will continue to update you on the war’s progress, and we will determine if the Kursk incursion will be deemed an ultimate success or failure.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

In this article:

Written By Brent M. Eastwood

Dr. Brent M. Eastwood is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Foreign Policy/ International Relations.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Brent M. Eastwood · September 3, 2024

10. The U.S. Marine Corps Forest Warfare Legacy Intertwines with Finland and the Baltics

The U.S. Marine Corps Forest Warfare Legacy Intertwines with Finland and the Baltics

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Julian McBride · September 2, 2024

Military Hardware: Tanks, Bombers, Submarines and More

Published

U.S. Marine from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) wears a camouflaging cobra hood during Baltic Operations 2024 (BALTOPS 24) in Ustka, Poland June 14, 2024. BALTOPS 24 is the premier maritime-focused military exercise in the Baltic Region. The exercise, led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, and executed by Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, provides a unique training opportunity to strengthen combined response capabilities critical to preserving freedom of navigation and security in the Baltic Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Sisi Lopez Barahona)

Against the backdrop of the Afghanistan withdrawal, Chinese military buildup in East Asia, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. military is looking for a faster and more crisis response force projection to prepare for any threats.

America and the NATO military alliance have a significant advantage with Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia now as members. Not only do the aforementioned countries have a history of fighting Russia, but they are also proficient in forest warfare, which can further enhance America’s elite fighting forces, such as the Marine Corps.

The Battle of Belleau Wood Helped Define the Marine Corps

“From the shores of Montezuma to the shore of Tripoli” are lyrics that helped define the United States Marine Corps as the use of American naval infantry turned the tide of the Barbary Wars. The Marines became globally known due to their fierce fighting against Ottoman Tripolitania but were also defined by gallant actions in Belleau Wood.

During World War One, the U.S. Marine Corps faced its first major continental-wide engagements, including the Battle of Belleau Wood. On June 6th, supplemented by an already war-battered French garrison, the Marines outnumbered themselves and fought valiantly to repel the German Army, saving a potential Central Powers advance towards Paris.

The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments fought fiercely, taking more casualties in three weeks than the entire U.S. Marine Corps did in its prior 143-year inception but holding their ground and using maneuver warfare in the forests. The Marines gained legend from their French counterparts and the Germans.

The legend of the nickname “Devil Dogs” to the Marines allegedly came from the German Army. The 5th and 6th Marine regiments were awarded the French fourragère for their gallantry. To this day, they are the only two Marine regiments authorized to wear such honor.

Forest Warfare Against Russia in the 20th Century

Preparing contingencies against Russia, America is enhancing military exercises with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The countries above are proficient in forest warfare—particularly in winter- and have a history of combating Russia for hundreds of years.

During the Russian Civil War, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland took advantage of inner turmoil in Moscow to gain independence by using their forestry topography to enact attrition against the already WWI-battered Russian Army.

Taking power from the White Russian faction during the 1917 crisis, the Bolsheviks, led by the then-Red Army, also attempted to re-annex the aforementioned countries between 1918 and 1920 but would fail due to lacking resources in protracted forest wars.

At the onset of World War Two, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin plotted a partition of Europe with fellow German dictator Adolf Hitler, known infamously as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Stalin’s proposed sphere was Eastern Europe and Parts of Northern Europe, putting the Baltics and Finland once again under direct threat of renewed imperialism from Moscow.

Stalin’s USSR would immediately declare war on Finland and then annex the Baltic states, deporting and murdering hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians. However, neither of these goals was easy and ultimately became Pyrrhic victories.

Finland, despite being vastly outnumbered by the Red Army, inflicted over 300,000 casualties on the Soviet military within three months. The Finnish military used its forestry terrain and the brutal Nordic winter to its advantage. The invasion of Finland ultimately backfired, as Stalin exposed Soviet weakness, which would factor into Operation Barbarossa the next year.

The annexation of the Baltics would also backfire as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact isolated Eastern Europe into the brutal fold of Stalin—forcing many to support Nazi Germany as the then “lesser evil initially.” Lithuania, particularly, would lead a two-decade resistance against Soviet occupation.

The guérilla war in the Baltics, led by Lithuanian partisans, became famous for the courage of the ‘Forest Brothers.’ The Forest Brothers inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet occupation forces by using dense forests in an act of attrition and guérilla warfare.

Lithuania’s guérilla warfare using forestry terrain allowed several thousand Forest Brothers to resist the Red Army for two decades—even past World War Two. Former US President Ronald Reagan emphasized the symbolism of Lithuanian resistance.

Enhancing Forest Warfare with the Baltics and Finland

Wanting to return to the conventional roots of warfare and deviate from the more unconventional counterinsurgency actions in the Middle East, the US military is enhancing quick reaction force capabilities in Europe—particularly with the Baltics and Finland. This year, America and its NATO allies emphasized BALTOPS (Baltic Operations).

BALTOPS 2024 was vastly different from prior exercises with the Baltic States. This year’s Baltic exercise was the first to have all NATO members, including Sweden, the alliance’s latest member.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit is enhancing America’s force projection capabilities across Europe, with Battalion Landing Team 1/8 conducting partnerships and exercises with the Baltic states. Likewise, US Marines were deployed to Finland for three years in 2023–the longest time US amphibious forces spent in the Nordic nation, displaying closer bilateral ties.

The II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) is currently embedded with Finland’s Nyland Brigade in cross-border and forestry warfare training. The Marines will participate in ‘Freezing Winds 24’ at the end of November this year.

‘Forest Brother’ Warfare will be Instrumental in a Faster, More Durable U.S. Military

Faced with a renewed threat from Russia, which wishes to enact 20th-century imperial glory, NATO is preparing defensive measures across the eastern flank. Some of NATO’s most at-risk points of a Russian invasion are the Suwalki gap between Poland and Lithuania and the Russian-speaking-majority city of Narva, which sits near the Russian border.

Wanting to find a way to quickly bring American forces to the Eastern flank as a quick reaction force, NATO can also use U.S. Marines in the strategic points of the Suwalki Gap and Narva and enact forestry warfare alongside the growingly capable Baltic states, Poland, and Finland. In this cross-border training, bilateral training is emphasized.

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, proficient in forest and winter warfare, continue to develop a growing partnership with American forces. U.S. Marines, challenging the spirit of the Devil Dogs of Belleau Wood, can be a quick reaction shield of Europe and execute forestry warfare in lieu of growing threats.

About the Author: Julian McBride

Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist, SOFREP contributor, and independent journalist born in New York. He reports and documents the plight of people around the world who are affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard. Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.” McBride is also a Contributing Editor to this publication.

In this article:

Written By Julian McBride

Julian McBride, a former U.S. Marine, is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist born in New York. He reports and documents the plight of people around the world who are affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard. Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.”

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Julian McBride · September 2, 2024

11. Commander of Navy Warship Relieved of Duty Months After Backward Rifle Scope Photo Flap

Sigh....Wa sthe scope the reason or just an indicator that something was wrong?

Commander of Navy Warship Relieved of Duty Months After Backward Rifle Scope Photo Flap

military.com · by Associated Press Published September 03, 2024 at 4:50 pm · September 3, 2024

SAN DIEGO — The commander of a Navy destroyer that’s helping protect the San Diego-based aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the Middle East has been relieved of duty about four months after he was seen in a photo firing a rifle with a scope mounted backward.

The image brought the Navy considerable ridicule on social media. The San Diego Union-Tribune reported that Cameron Yaste, commanding officer of the destroyer USS John McCain, was removed on Friday.

The Navy said Yaste was relieved of duty “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command the guided-missile destroyer” that's currently deployed in the Gulf of Oman. The statement didn't elaborate about why Yaste was replaced.

In April, a photo posted on the Navy's social media showed Yaste in a firing stance gripping the rifle with a backward scope.

The military news outlet Stars and Stripes reported that the Marine Corps took a dig at the Navy, sharing a photo on its social media of a Marine firing a weapon aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer. The caption read: “Clear Sight Picture.”

The post featuring Yaste was ultimately deleted. “Thank you for pointing out our rifle scope error in the previous post,” the Navy later wrote on social media. “Picture has been removed until EMI (extra military instruction) is completed.”

Yaste has been temporarily replaced by Capt. Allison Christy, deputy commodore of Destroyer Squadron 21, which is part of the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group that's also in the Gulf of Oman.

The Pentagon sent the carriers to the Middle East to be in position should Israel need help repelling an attack by Iran or other countries, if such a thing happens, military officials said.

The Roosevelt is the flagship of a strike group that has recently included three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, $2 billion vessels that are designed to shield carriers from attacks by air, sea and land.

military.com · by Associated Press Published September 03, 2024 at 4:50 pm · September 3, 2024

12. The U.S. Navy’s Chief Supplier Is in Peril

The U.S. Navy’s Chief Supplier Is in Peril

Seeing the Military Sealift Command lose ships and personnel will embolden America’s foes.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-navys-chief-supplier-is-in-peril-military-sealift-command-lose-ships-personnel-87334de3?mod=

By Seth Cropsey

Updated Sept. 3, 2024 4:37 pm ET

A U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer receives fuel in the Pacific. Photo: u.s. navy/Reuters

The U.S. Navy has struggled to maintain personnel and readiness across the fleet, which makes its new plan for the Military Sealift Command to lose 17 ships under a “force generation reset” deeply troubling.

The Military Sealift Command keeps the Navy supplied and operational. By losing ships, the Navy is severing critical sinews of combat power that will jeopardize deterrence across Eurasia, making it harder to threaten China. The Navy must persuade Congress to modify pay, leave and benefits for MSC to increase personnel. Congress also should appropriate funds to repair the antiquated Merchant Marine Academy in King’s Point, N.Y., thereby increasing the pool of qualified mariners.

To evaluate U.S. Navy combat power, the public and analysts often look at the number of fighting ships. That tally is shrinking. Since 2022 the Navy has decommissioned 10 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and plans to decommission the remaining 12 by 2027. Those cruisers are the Navy’s top air-defense assets, with more missile-launch cells than their Arleigh Burke-class destroyer counterparts. Typically, the Navy’s Carrier Strike Groups deploy with a Ticonderoga as the key air-defense platform. These ships are old, having entered service late in the Cold War. Retiring them nevertheless cuts into the Navy’s deployed missile-cell numbers, while forcing the Arleigh Burkes to cover another full mission, that of fleet air defense, which will further strain the destroyer fleet.

Less discussed but crucial for combat power are the Navy’s support ships. MSC operates these ships with some 5,500 civilian mariners and naval reserve officers, the latter group mostly U.S. Merchant Marine Academy graduates. MSC ships include several special-mission units, namely missile instrumentation ships and undersea surveillance and cable repair ships, alongside all the Navy’s oiler, ordnance, cargo and heavy-lift ships.

These 125 vessels sustain U.S. military operations, providing supplies to American warships from the Mediterranean to the Pacific and to ground forces at coastal bases. Without MSC ships, absent a robust logistical system, the U.S. Navy can’t fight for more than a few weeks. The Air Force’s heavy-lift aircraft are more flexible, but physical capacity constraints make it impossible to replace ship-based logistics with aerial logistics.

Personnel shortages are common across the fleet. The Navy missed every recruitment goal in 2023, even after raising the maximum enlistment age to 41 from 39 and lowering mental aptitude and physical fitness standards. Retention fared better: new promotion programs and higher re-enlistment bonuses encouraged experienced sailors to stay.

MSC is in a far worse situation than the broader Navy. MSC ships are civilian-crewed, meaning MSC must compete with traditional civilian contracts. Unionized private-sector mariners enjoy limits on sea time—for certain billets, this means a paid month on shore for every month at sea. By contrast, MSC’s current billet-to-personnel ratio is around 1.27, meaning there are only 27 replacement mariners on shore to relieve every 100 mariners deployed. This creates a brutal work schedule, requiring mariners to deploy for four months at sea for each month ashore.

MSC mariners operate complex ships fulfilling highly specific tasks, necessitating more training that reduces actual leave time. MSC uses the Pentagon’s pay system, reducing the financial incentive for senior mariners to stay in the fleet, while junior mariners don’t receive paid shore time without having accrued enough hours. This system may be tolerable for typical soldiers and sailors, but when combined with MSC demands, it makes it difficult for an MSC mariner to maintain a family.

The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated all these problems. MSC’s “Gangway Up” policy, maintained through summer 2021, prevented civilian mariners from leaving their ships for months to reduce viral exposure. This might have made sense as a precaution to keep the fleet in fighting shape, particularly during the pandemic’s first months. But after more than a year, experienced mariners nearing the end of their contracts began to quit. MSC hasn’t addressed this attrition due to the disparity between MSC pay and benefits and private-economy opportunities. Since late 2021, MSC deployments have also become more demanding, with MSC ships supporting U.S. naval forces in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific and sustaining a combat power buildup in Europe.

By retiring 17 MSC support ships, the Navy hopes to save around 700 billets, increasing MSC’s billet-to-personnel ratio to 1.5, while reducing the strain on its mariners. The problem is that those 17 ships are crucial to sustain American forces in a Eurasian war.

The ships on the chopping block include two Expeditionary Sea Bases, or ESBs, likely the Centcom-deployed USS Lewis Puller and the Eucom/Africom-deployed USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, along with the remaining 12 Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports, or EPFs. The four ESBs, with two under construction, are flexible. Designed off 100,000-ton oil tankers, each ESB provides logistical support to U.S. forces. They can also launch multiple helicopters and small patrol craft, allowing them to act as bases for special-operations forces and antimine units, as the Puller has done since Houthi attacks on shipping began in 2023.

The Spearhead-class EPFs are relatively small, at only 2,500 tons. Their 1,400-mile range and 49-mile-an-hour speed, however, allows them to shift supplies and specific units within a theater as large as the Indo-Pacific. These will be crucial to sustaining U.S. naval combat strategy, which relies on warships and Marine units to blunt a Chinese attack.

The Navy should address the root of the issue and make an MSC career more competitive and balanced. This requires the political advocacy from which the Navy has retreated since the Cold War’s end. Only congressional action can change MSC personnel regulations. The Navy must make this a priority and reverse a decline in U.S. sealift and logistics that is certain to embolden foes.

Mr. Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”

WSJ Opinion: U.S. Defense Response to Indo-Pacific Security Threat Too Slow

Warfighting, quality of life prioritized in USMC commandant guidance

marinecorpstimes.com · by Todd South · September 3, 2024

A year into his tenure as the top Marine, Commandant Gen. Eric Smith has released his planning guidance to the Corps.

The last commandant’s planning guidance, issued in 2019 when Gen. David Berger assumed the post, ushered in dramatic changes to the service, including shedding tanks, reducing conventional artillery, restructuring infantry battalions and the creation of a new type of regiment.

Such documents are used by the top Marine to outline his priorities for the force in a variety of areas and set a tone with leadership for those priorities, and Smith’s 24-page iteration continues the changes begun under Berger.

The general still wants Marines to balance crisis response missions with modernization, integrate with the Navy, improve quality of life, help recruit and retain other Marines and better use the Marine Reserve.

Smith also sees Force Design, which was the overarching plan to transform the Corps for modern combat under Berger, as the way to position the service to compete with China, Russia and other threats.

The Marine Corps has ‘to get smaller to get better,’ commandant says

The top Marine is building the Corps of 2030.

“I remain confident that we are on the right track as a service. Force Design remains a righteous journey, and we are in perhaps the most difficult phase — implementation,” Smith wrote.

Force Design has had its critics. More than a dozen retired generals and senior officers have written opinion pieces and openly criticized the changes started by Berger, which they say have made the Corps less combat ready.

Still, Smith remains steadfast to the plan in his guidance.

“Accepting near-term risk for long-term gain has, and always will be, the essence of Force Design,” he wrote.

The service’s prioritization of its three Marine Expeditionary Forces, or MEFs, remains unchanged.

The East Coast-based II MEF will remain as a “force-in-readiness” for crisis response and continue to organize in battalion or regimental-sized elements.

The West Coast-based I MEF “remains our globally deployable MEF,” Smith wrote. The MEF’s focus will continue to be the Pacific region.

And the Okinawa, Japan, based III MEF will stay leading the Corps’ ongoing deterrence against the Chinese military.

Within those MEF commitments, Smith wants a “continuous” Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU, presence, requiring “heel-to-toe deployments”, with one MEU each out of both I MEF and II MEF and the forward deployed 31st MEU in Okinawa being drawn out of forces deployed already to that region.

Smith also focused on quality of life in his guidance, noting the Barracks 2030 plan, which launched this year following a top-to-bottom inspection of all barracks in the Marine Corps.

Marine Corps Times reported in April that an estimated 87,000 Marines live in barracks and approximately 83% of those facilities are in “pretty good shape,” said Lt. Gen. Edward Banta, deputy commandant for installations and logistics.

The Marines have averaged more than $200 million in annual spending on barracks restoration and modernization in recent years, Marine Corps Times reported. The service renovated 30 barracks buildings in fiscal years 2022 and 2023 and received funding for renovations on 13 additional buildings in fiscal 2024.

But the backlog goes back years, and in his guidance, Smith asked Marines for patience, and help.

“I need all Marines to understand that this project will take time. Many of us will not see the completion of this task during our careers,” he wrote. “But I am committed to getting our junior Marines quick wins wherever possible – and if you have a good idea that can have a quick, low-cost and substantial effect on the morale or performance of your unit, I want to hear from you.”

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

14. Analysts: China tests US commitment to Indo-Pacific with maritime operations

Analysts: China tests US commitment to Indo-Pacific with maritime operations

By William Yang

voanews.com · September 3, 2024

China’s recently increased maritime and aerial operations near the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan is part of Beijing’s attempt to gauge the United States’ commitment to supporting allies in the Indo-Pacific region, say analysts. They noted the increased activity comes as Tokyo and Washington gear up for elections in the coming weeks.

“China sees an opportunity to test the United States’ commitment to the broader region. So, it is sending a signal to Washington that if they try to invest more in the Philippines and other relationships in the South China Sea, Beijing will try to complicate their security architecture and their ability to manage many issues at once,” said Stephen Nagy, a regional security expert at the International Christian University in Japan.

Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels collided at least twice since last month near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Sabina Shoal lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, or EEZ but Beijing says the partially submerged reef is part of its territory.

The latest collision happened shortly after noon on Saturday, August 31. Videos released by both China’s state broadcaster CCTV and the Philippine coast guard showed a Chinese coast guard vessel ramming into a Philippine vessel. Each side accused the other of “deliberately” causing the collision.

Meanwhile, Japan’s defense ministry says a Chinese military aircraft breached its airspace for the first time on August 26 and a Chinese survey ship intruded into Japan’s southwestern territorial waters on August 31.

Tokyo lodged formal complaints to the Chinese Embassy in Japan, describing the series of incursions as “unacceptable,” but Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said during a regular press conference Monday that the Chinese survey ship’s activity was “fully lawful and legitimate.”

In addition to areas near the Philippines and Japan, China has deployed at least 172 military aircraft and 87 naval vessels to areas around Taiwan since August 26. Some experts say China’s concerted activities in the three locations are aimed at “punishing its most vocal adversaries” in the Indo-Pacific region.

12 PLA aircraft, 6 PLAN vessels and 5 official ships operating around Taiwan were detected up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8) today. 6 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan%27s southwestern and eastern ADIZ. We have monitored the situation and responded accordingly. pic.twitter.com/GTDZU9mm5j

— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C. (@MoNDefense) August 26, 2024

“It seems that China believes it enjoys a certain amount of force overmatch and escalation dominance, so it is trying to make examples out of some countries that refuse to accept Chinese dominance in its near abroad,” Ray Powell, director of Stanford University's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, told VOA in a phone interview.

Warnings not enough

The United States and other democratic countries, including Japan, Australia, and those of the European Union, have issued statements to condemn China’s maritime aggression following the latest collision between Chinese and Philippine vessels near Sabina Shoal. Some experts, however, say Beijing’s persistent aggression in the South China Sea suggests these warnings are insufficient to force it to soften its stance.

Statement on a pattern of deeply concerning & dangerous actions in the SCS | ‘Govt urgesto cease these actions, resolve disputes peacefully and adhere to intl. law, particularly the UNCLOS & conventions on the prevention of collisions at sea’https://t.co/oSXsahqufZ

— Jennifer Parker (@JAParker29) September 3, 2024

“Over the last year, China has disregarded all the warnings from the United States and its allies and continues to do what they have been doing in the South China Sea,” Collin Koh, a maritime security expert at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told VOA in a phone interview.

Koh and Nagy both say the U.S. and its allies need to roll out more forceful measures to counter China’s persistent maritime aggression across the Indo-Pacific. These, they say, include conducting more transits through regional waters, increasing the presence of naval vessels in the region and initiating a consultation of the mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines.

“More countries need to conduct international transits through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, regularize the presence of their naval vessels in the Indo-Pacific region, increase the frequency of joint training between Southeast Asian countries and other allies, and consider imposing sanctions on China,” Nagy told VOA by phone.

According to reports, two German warships, the frigate Baden-Württemberg and its supply ship Frankfurt am Main, are waiting for orders regarding possible passage through the Taiwan Strait during their transit from South Korea to the Philippines.

Since the start of 2024, U.S. naval vessels have conducted at least four transits through international waters in the Taiwan Strait, the 180-kilometer-wide body of water between Taiwan and China’s southern Fujian Province. Naval vessels from Canada and the Netherlands have transited through the strait this year as well.

In this photo provided by the U.S. Navy, the USS Chung-Hoon observes a Chinese navy ship conduct what it called an "unsafe” Chinese maneuver in the Taiwan Strait, June 3, 2023. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard/U.S. Navy via AP)

In recent weeks, the U.S. has reiterated its willingness to support the Philippines’ resupply missions to the disputed reefs in the South China Sea while deploying extremely long-range air-to-air missiles to the Indo-Pacific, which experts say could erase China’s advantage in aerial reach.

While China is trying to test Washington’s resolve in the Indo-Pacific region and increase its military activities in the western Pacific, some analysts say it is not clear how long Beijing can sustain the intensity of its maritime operations.

“[While China] can still afford to put more money into defense and press its maritime claims, how much they can do so in the future remains an open question as their economy matures and their demographics provide more of a drain on growth,” Ian Chong, a political scientist at National University of Singapore, told VOA in a written response.

Last week, the Reuters news agency reported that China spent $15 billion in 2023, or 7% of its defense budget, on military activities in the waters off its coast in the north and in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific Ocean. The data was based on previously unpublished internal research conducted by Taiwan’s armed forces, the report said.

With Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party set to elect its new leader later this month and the U.S. presidential election entering its final weeks, Powell at Stanford expects China to maintain the same level of maritime aggression in the Indo-Pacific in the coming months.

“If China sees ways for them to advance their objectives when democratic governments are focused on elections, they do like to take advantage of that,” he told VOA, adding that the international community should closely monitor Beijing’s activities in the Indo-Pacific region in the next few months.

voanews.com · September 3, 2024

15. NEWSFLASH: Zelenskyy shakes up cabinet, ministers resign

NEWSFLASH: Zelenskyy shakes up cabinet, ministers resign

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/newsflash-zelenskyy-shakes-up-cabinet?utm

Some of the country's most senior ministers, including top diplomat Dmytro Kuleba, have resigned as part of a shakeup that Zelenskyy said would “give new strength” to the war effort.

Tim Mak, Mariana Lastovyria, Alessandra Hay, and 2 others

Sep 04, 2024

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In a major cabinet shakeup, President Zelenskyy is signaling that new personnel are needed for the war to come to a conclusion.

“Autumn will be extremely important for Ukraine. Our state institutions must be prepared to achieve all the necessary results,” he said last evening, foreshadowing today’s resignations. “We have prepared personnel decisions. And there will also be changes in the Office of the President. I am also anticipating a reevaluation of priorities in certain areas of our foreign and domestic policy.”

Screenshot from Zelenskyy’s address to Ukrainians on September 3, 2024

About half of the cabinet will be replaced, said David Arakhamia, who heads Zelenskyy’s party in the Ukrainian legislature. The resignations will occur today, and the replacements will be named tomorrow.

Zelenskyy is making drastic changes ahead of an expected plan for Ukrainian victory that he will propose to the United States later this month. While negotiations for an end to the war are not imminent, both Ukrainian and Russian government officials have spent more time recently discussing the prospect of negotiations.

After more than two and half years of war, Zelenskyy is putting together a team he believes can take the country across the finish line. Those who have resigned in recent hours are well-known figures in the West, including…

Newsflash updates are for paid subscribers only. For this briefing, and our next one on the new cabinet appointees, upgrade today!

Dmytro Kuleba (Foreign Minister)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba (right) and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Dutch Caspar Veldkamp (left) on July 6, 2024 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Eduard Kryzhanivskyi/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

Dmytro Kuleba has been the head of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for over four years, becoming one of the most recognizable Ukrainian figures abroad.

During his tenure, Ukraine was granted NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner status in 2020. Through negotiations with representatives of skeptical countries, he played a key role in securing the European Parliament's approval of Ukraine's EU candidate status. Additionally, he co-founded the Lublin Triangle, which fosters political, economic, and social cooperation between Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.

Oleksandr Kamyshin (Minister of Strategic Industries)

Oleksandr Kamyshin (left), and Siegfried Russwurm (right), BDI President, stand in front of a drone in Berlin, 13 June 2024. (Photo by Joerg Carstensen/picture alliance via Getty Images)

Oleksandr Kamyshin was formerly the head of Ukraine's largest railway company, and in 2023, he became the head of the Ministry of Strategic Industries. The Ministry plays a crucial role in the Ukrainian defense industry, as it is one of the key managers of financial resources.

In his first 100 days as Minister, the defense industry produced several times more products than in the entire year of 2022. Under his initiative, the state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom is being reformed, enabling Ukraine to create joint ventures with foreign defense companies. In 2023, defense production tripled compared to 2022.

Kamyshin was one of the key figures working with Western partners to attract investment in Ukrainian companies and establish joint production. This also concerns the trust between Ukraine and West, as networking and personal contacts are vital in this field. Previously, he was vital in connecting Ukrainian miltech companies with Western investors and manufacturers.

Olha Stefanishyna (European/Euro-Atlantic Integration)

Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Olha Stefanishyna attends a news conference in Kyiv on June 19, 2024. (Photo by Kaniuka Ruslan / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

Olha Stefanishyna has been the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine since 2020. She has been responsible for coordinating efforts to ensure that Ukraine implements reforms, and adapts its legislation to meet the requirements for joining the EU and NATO.

Additionally, she was possibly involved in an alleged bribery case related to one of Ukraine's oligarchs, Mykyta Mykytas. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine published a conversation in which the oligarch claims that because of his ties to Stefanishyna, the Ukrainian government could bypass regular processes to select a preferred company to repair the Kyiv subway.

Denys Maliuska (Minister of Justice)

Ukrainian Justice Secretary Denys Maliuska at a conference in London, May 20, 2023. (Photo by Yui Mok/PA Images via Getty Images)

During his tenure as minister, Denys Maliuska has faced repeated criticism from human rights activists. For instance, he launched paid prison cells that had better conditions than usual ones. He also made a controversial joke about the alleged rape of a transgender woman in a men's cell in a penal colony. Additionally, under his leadership, Ukraine began mobilizing former prisoners to bolster its resources for repelling the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine.

Ruslan Strilets (Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources)

Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine Ruslan Strilets signs document in Odesa, Ukraine August 15, 2024 (Photo by Nina Liashonok / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

During Ruslan Strilets’ tenure, he focused on implementing the President's Digital State program and initiated the development of a unified environmental state platform. In May 2022, Strilets launched the EcoThreat application, which provides real-time data on air quality and radiation pollution levels across Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists have also investigated his potential involvement in corruption schemes related to the purchase of electricity at inflated prices.

So now Ukraine is planning to change positions in key ministries that directly affect the outcome of the war with Russia. It is not yet known for certain whether these changes will be for the better or the worse, as it all depends on the candidates who will be appointed to these positions.

The wave of resignations began on Monday with the controversial removal of Ukraine’s energy chief, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi. Two board members of “Ukrenergo”, which Kudrytskyi headed, claimed that the reason for his removal was his failure to protect Ukrainian energy infrastructure from Russian strikes. However, amidst constant electrical outages, many have concerns about how Ukraine’s energy supply will fare in the coming months.

The cabinet reshuffling comes amid a grinding war that has now lasted two and a half years. Ukrainian morale has been lifted by recent gains on Russian territory in the Kursk region, but then brought back down by steady Russian advances in the Donbas. The Institute for the Study of War has found that Putin has not yet redirected experienced troops to Kursk, focusing instead on advancing in the Ukrainian east.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s allies are beginning to falter in its support. Anti-Ukrainian forces are on the rise in some key European countries – for example, parties opposed to aiding Ukraine won substantial victories in German state elections earlier this week. And the possibility of a Trump presidency remains a serious concern for Ukrainian strategy.

Many experts have criticized the decision to place so many experienced Ukrainian troops in Kursk and take them away from Ukraine’s east. Since August 6, Ukrainian troops have occupied over 620 square miles of Russian territory, which Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine plans to keep newly gained Russian territory indefinitely.

In Ukraine’s east, Russian troops are advancing quickly. In the month of August Russian forces made the largest territorial gains since October 2022, advancing over 477 square kilometers. Russian forces are currently less than 6 miles east of the city of Pokrovsk. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief has said that Russia has taken troops from other sectors but, in the Pokrovsk direction, it is only strengthening its advance.

Polling conducted last month by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center shows that only 19.8% of Ukrainians believe that peace talks are even possible at the present moment and 17.9% believe they are entirely impossible.

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NEWS OF THE DAY:

RUSSIAN LVIV STRIKES KILLS THREE CHILDREN: Following the deadly attack on Poltava on Tuesday, Russia attacked several other major Ukrainian cities, including Kryvyi Rih and Lviv. In the center of Lviv, 6 residential buildings were destroyed and 2 schools were damaged. The number of injured is estimated at about 50 citizens, 7 of whom were killed, reports Politico. Yaroslav Bazylevych lost three daughters and his wife in the attack. Since August 26, when Russia launched one of the largest air attacks against Ukraine, the intensity of Russian shelling has not decreased for the second week in a row.

UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER NOT OPERATING AT FULL CAPACITY: Nuclear power plants are responsible for generating more than half of Ukraine's electricity. Following continuous Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, several units at two Ukrainian NPPs have significantly reduced their generation capacity. While not directly targeting the nuclear power plants, Russia is trying to hit the electrical distribution stations near them, forcing the Ukrainian authorities to launch emergency blackouts on an almost daily basis.

US TO GIVE UKRAINE LONG-RANGE MISSILES FOR F-16: Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM), which can strike 300 kilometers deep into Russia, may be included in the US aid package as early as this fall, Reuters reported. The supply of these missiles to Ukraine will significantly enhance its ability to deter Russian offensives on the frontline and reduce Russia's ability to launch air strikes, as there are at least 30 air bases in Russia within the range of the JASSM.

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A guest post by

Oleksandr Miasyshchev

Ukrainian journalist. Covered war issues for The Guardian, Forbes Ukraine, OpenDemocracy, was a reporter for LIGA.net.

16. CISA moves away from trying to influence content moderation decisions on election disinformation

It is our responsibility as citizens, to be informed, educated, critical thinkers and to defend ourselves against malign influencers.

I will keep repeating from public service announcement from the 2017 NSS:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

CISA moves away from trying to influence content moderation decisions on election disinformation

Director Jen Easterly and other leaders said engaging social media firms to remove inaccurate posts is “not our role.”

Derek B. Johnson

September 3, 2024

cyberscoop.com · by djohnson · September 3, 2024

Leaders at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency continue to express confidence that the nation’s election infrastructure is well-protected for the 2024 elections, citing a litany of improvements to election security made since 2016.

One thing you shouldn’t expect CISA to continue this cycle? Petitioning social media platforms to take down false or inaccurate posts about elections.

In a briefing with reporters Tuesday, Director Jen Easterly said CISA continues to regularly communicate with technology companies, social media platforms and other stakeholders about services that tech companies can offer to state and local election officials and security measures for the election cycle, while also sharing observed tactics from malign actors.

In past election cycles, CISA’s work included sharing information and flagging specific accounts and posts spreading false information for removal or content moderation. However, Easterly made it clear that work would not be part of CISA’s election security mission this time around.

“To be clear, none of these engagements involve CISA discussing content that is to be removed,” Easterly said, adding that the practice is “not our role, that’s not what we do. We’re looking to work with our partners on overall threats to election infrastructure.”

That represents a step up from earlier this year, when CISA officials told reporters they had cut off all communication with social media platforms on election security while facing lawsuits from conservative groups that challenged the government’s authority to press private companies on their content moderation choices.

But it represents a notable shift in CISA’s previous approach to combating disinformation at the outset of the Biden administration. Until mid-2022, CISA regularly forwarded third-party reports of election-related misinformation to the platforms, though the agency also included disclaimers that it would not take any favorable or unfavorable action toward the companies based on how they used the information.

But even before the Supreme Court potentially allowed the federal government to continue those activities, CISA officials expressed interest in pursuing less politically contentious methods to mitigate election disinformation.

In 2020, President Donald Trump famously fired CISA’s founding director via Twitter for publicly rebutting false claims of widespread election fraud. Since then, some congressional Republicans have targeted the agency, accusing it of colluding with social media companies to censor and suppress conservative voices.

Cait Conley, a senior advisor and election lead at CISA, pointed to an explosion of new digital communication tools over the past decade, resulting in “more platforms, more applications, more means for information to be shared and distributed” than ever before. That reality can dilute the impact of removing content or users from any one particular site or platform.

Earlier this year, Conley was critical of what she characterized as the “whack-a-mole” approach to mis- and disinformation that had defined previous elections. On the call Tuesday, she said the agency has been concentrating more on directing voters to accurate or definitive sources for election information than on pressing companies to moderate election denialists and misinformation.

“Where we talk about the most effective way we’re going to be able to mitigate this risk,” she said, it’s “really by having those who are the trusted authoritative sources of information — state and local election officials — coming out and clearly articulating the realities on the ground in the election administration process that they know better than anyone else.”

Conley pointed to the swift coordination earlier this year between New Hampshire state officials when responding to an AI-generated robocall of President Joe Biden as a “textbook example” of successful communication in the face of a disinformation campaign.

Kathy Sullivan, the former state Democratic official whose cell phone number was spoofed in the incident, made a similar argument in an interview with CyberScoop earlier this year.

She and other party officials immediately alerted supporters about the fake audio, contacted media outlets for broader coverage, and engaged agency lawyers to contact law enforcement and the state attorney general.. Within days, the New Hampshire Attorney General announced an investigation into potential voter suppression.

That doesn’t mean CISA is stepping back from its role on election-related disinformation. This past week, Easterly responded to a post on X from owner Elon Musk that suggested the U.S. was overly reliant on paperless voting machines.

Easterly said her response to Musk’s post was her way of “helpfully pointing out what we saw was additional context that was really important to a story that came out.”

“We want to ensure that the media understands who to go to, those state and local election officials, who are working this mission day in and day out so that you can help get that accurate information to voters so they can have confidence that their votes will be counted as cast,” she said.

Written by Derek B. Johnson

Derek B. Johnson is a reporter at CyberScoop, where his beat includes cybersecurity, elections and the federal government. Prior to that, he has provided award-winning coverage of cybersecurity news across the public and private sectors for various publications since 2017. Derek has a bachelor’s degree in print journalism from Hofstra University in New York and a master’s degree in public policy from George Mason University in Virginia.

cyberscoop.com · by djohnson · September 3, 2024

17. Trump’s Foreign-Policy Influencers

Trump’s Foreign-Policy Influencers

Meet the 11 men whose worldviews are shaping the 2024 Republican ticket.

August 26, 2024, 2:00 AM

By FP Staff

Foreign Policy · by FP Staff

U.S. Foreign Policy
Elections
United States

A drawing of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump overlapping with the words "Election 2024"

If former U.S. President Donald Trump wins the White House again, what might his foreign policy look like? The Republican candidate often shoots from the hip—consider his grand declaration that he can end the Russia-Ukraine war in a single day as just one example. Trump is also quick to distance himself from policy shop documents, such as the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, when they become politically inconvenient.

But beyond the noise of the campaign trail, one way to gauge the possible foreign-policy agenda of a second Trump term is to profile the key national security thinkers in his orbit: Who are the advisors he listens to? What is the genesis of the ideas that animate the former president’s current worldview?

Consider the list below a handy guide in the days and weeks leading up to Nov. 5. But first, a few disclaimers. The men listed below (and yes, they’re all men—the picks reflect what our sources told us) are ranked not in order of importance but in alphabetical order. The names are not earmarked for any particular roles, such as national security advisor or secretary of state; we thought it best to just describe the people whose views and ideas could have a meaningful impact on Trump’s foreign-policy decisions. And lastly, the spirit of this endeavor is to add some texture to what is a common parlor game in Washington these days—nobody, of course, can actually claim to know exactly what Trump will do.

And now, here’s the list you came here for.—The Editors

JUMP TO ADVISOR

Elbridge Colby

A black and white headshot of Elbridge Colby inside a red circle.

Elbridge Colby, a once and possible future Trump administration defense official, is the loudest and perhaps most cogent voice in Washington advocating a complete shift away from Europe, NATO, and Russia and toward the growing challenge from China.

Colby served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense for more than a year in the Trump administration, where he helped put teeth into the belated U.S. pivot to Asia. He then joined with other Trump administration veterans to co-found the Marathon Initiative, a Washington-based think tank focused on great-power competition. If he gets another shot in a future Trump administration—and his name has been floated for another defense position or even a job with the National Security Council—he would hammer home his overarching point: China, not Russia, is America’s biggest problem.

In a series of articles, books, and speeches, Colby has for years made the case for the United States to use its limited defense resources to prevent a hostile hegemonic power from gaining ascendancy over the Asia-Pacific region. China has already economically cowed many of its smaller neighbors, and it continues to chip away at regional security in places such as the South China Sea. But Taiwan is the real test: A Chinese effort to reincorporate the island by force would mean a conflict with the United States and likely Japan—and, if successful, would open China up to domination of the entire Pacific Basin, the world’s most important economic region by far.

Colby’s ideas are a timely reprisal of one of the original blueprints of U.S. grand strategy, written by Nicholas Spykman in the middle of World War II, but turned on its head: Asia, not Europe, is now the economic and political center of gravity of the world, and its domination by Beijing would severely constrain America’s future prospects and freedom of action.

One problem for Colby is that his potential future boss, while willing to be plenty hostile to China at times, is also utterly transactional, and Trump has already signaled his willingness to barter away Taiwan’s autonomy. Realist hawks such as Colby tend to sit uncomfortably with a foreign policy that has no true north.

Another problem is that Colby’s vocal and repeated urgings to use limited U.S. resources exclusively for the big China fight that may one day come, even if that means abandoning Ukraine in the middle of a war, are grist for the Kremlin’s goons; Russian state television cheers Colby’s foreign-policy priorities.

Lawmakers may not buy an Asia-only defense strategy anyway, in a future Trump administration or a future Kamala Harris one. A congressionally mandated defense review panel argued in July that the United States should prepare to defend its vital interests in both Europe and Asia.

—Keith Johnson

Former President Trump pumps his fist at 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Decoding Trump’s Foreign Policy

Former Pentagon policymaker Elbridge Colby makes the case for a more transactional, common-sense approach to the world.

Fred Fleitz

A black and white headshot of Fred Fleitz inside a red circle.

Despite being a longtime member of the U.S. national security community, Fred Fleitz is a hard-nosed proponent of the Trump-driven anti-establishment MAGA ideology that roiled Washington for four years. Fleitz is a Trump administration veteran who has emerged as one of the former president’s few top advisors on national security on the campaign trail.

Fleitz, alongside Keith Kellogg, drafted a plan for Trump to review aimed at ending the war in Ukraine if Trump wins reelection. The plan entails pushing Ukraine and Russia to come to the negotiating table and brokering a temporary cease-fire at the current battle lines, which would be sustained during the peace talks. The Trump administration would pressure Ukraine on one side by threatening to cut off U.S. aid if it didn’t negotiate, and Russia on the other by threatening to open the floodgates on U.S. military aid to Ukraine without peace talks. The proposal marks the most detailed preview yet of what a Trump White House’s Ukraine policy could look like if Fleitz and others in his orbit joined the administration.

Fleitz is vice chair of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute, the think tank founded in 2021 to keep MAGA boots on the ground in Washington as Team Biden took power. He is a regular commentator on the right-wing news channel NewsMax and the author of Obamabomb: A Dangerous and Growing National Security Fraud and The Coming North Korea Nuclear Nightmare: What Trump Must Do to Reverse Obama’s ‘Strategic Patience.’

Fleitz has garnered controversy over his past comments and affiliations with hard-right and anti-immigrant groups that opponents refer to as fringe and Islamophobic. (He later distanced himself from some of those past affiliations.)

Fleitz spent more than two decades working in the U.S. government, bouncing between posts at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department, and the Republican side of the House Intelligence Committee. For significant chunks of his career, he circled the orbit of the pugnacious neoconservative hawk John Bolton, serving as his chief of staff in the George W. Bush administration when Bolton was the undersecretary of state for arms control, and then later as the National Security Council chief of staff when Bolton was Trump’s national security advisor.

Bolton has since broken very publicly with Trump, but Fleitz remains nestled in the MAGA world. While Trump has given no indication of who would staff his administration if he won, many Republican insiders say Fleitz is near the top of the list.

—Robbie Gramer

Ric Grenell

A black and white headshot of Richard Grennell inside a red circle.

Within hours of presenting his diplomatic credentials to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2018, Trump’s new ambassador to Berlin, Ric Grenell, took to Twitter to demand that German companies doing business with Iran should “wind down operations immediately.” The diplomatic relationship went downhill from there.

Disagreements with the German government were aired publicly, as Grenell—a political appointee—threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany over the country’s lackluster defense spending and impose sanctions over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have increased the country’s dependency on Russian energy. Wolfgang Kubicki, the vice president of the German Parliament, at one point accused Grenell of acting as if the United States was “still an occupying power.”

The pugilistic diplomat’s approach may have horrified Berlin’s mild-mannered political establishment. But if ambassadors are judged by their ability to convey their boss’s message, Grenell was an effective foot soldier. He was later appointed as the special envoy to the Balkans—where he was accused of causing the government of Kosovo to collapse—and acting director of national intelligence, becoming the first openly gay person to hold a cabinet-level position.

A graduate of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, Grenell worked as a spokesperson for a number of prominent Republicans before joining the 2000 presidential campaign of former Sen. John McCain—who would later become one of Trump’s most vehement critics.

From 2001-2008, Grenell served as the director of communications for the U.S. mission to the United Nations under four ambassadors, including John Bolton, who would go on to serve as Trump’s national security advisor.

Long before the Trump presidency, Grenell was known for his combative tweets—which, like those of his future boss, often took swipes at journalists and mocked the appearance of prominent women Democrats.

While several senior figures in the Trump administration broke with the former president during the ignominious end to his tenure, Grenell remained loyal. In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Grenell was dispatched to Nevada to help challenge the results of the vote—despite knowing that there was no basis to the claims, according to a recent profile in the New York Times.

Since leaving government, Grenell has served as Trump’s envoy, traversing the world, meeting with far-right leaders, and undercutting the State Department—including in Guatemala. It’s that loyalty that is likely to land him a senior foreign-policy job in a future Trump administration.

A secretary of state needs to be “tough” and a “son of a bitch,” Grenell said during an appearance on the Self Centered podcast in March.

—Amy Mackinnon

U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell

Report

Richard Grenell: Pundit, Envoy, Spokesman. Spy?

His ascension to the highest intelligence post in the United States heightens fears that the Trump administration is politicizing intelligence.

Keith Kellogg

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When Michael Flynn was fired from his role as U.S. national security advisor just 22 days into Trump’s first term after lying about conversations with the Russian ambassador to the United States, Keith Kellogg was one of the first people considered to replace him. He didn’t get the job, which went to another three-star Army officer: H.R. McMaster. Instead, Kellogg advised Vice President Mike Pence and served as the chief of staff to the National Security Council.

In those roles, Kellogg was caught up in some of the most pivotal moments of Trump’s presidency. Kellogg said he heard “nothing wrong or improper” on the July 2019 call where Trump urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate Biden. And Kellogg privately urged Pence to certify the 2020 election “TONIGHT” while a pro-Trump mob was still being cleared from the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. But Kellogg nonetheless endorsed Trump over Pence in August 2023, criticizing Pence for concentrating on “political maneuvering” and his image. (Pence withdrew from the presidential race in October 2023 and has not endorsed Trump.)

Since then, Kellogg has sought to become a key member of Trump’s national security brain trust at the America First Policy Institute, a pro-Trump think tank that is seen in Washington as a White House in waiting. Kellogg—a Vietnam War veteran who was serving as a three-star Army general in the Pentagon when al Qaeda flew a Boeing 757 into the west side of the building on Sept. 11, 2001—is at once pro-Ukraine and pro-NATO and yet willing to exact Trump’s famous brand of leverage on both. He’s tried to put teeth behind Trump’s pledge to end Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine “in a day,” mapping out a plan that would cut U.S. military aid to Ukraine if Kyiv refused to go to the bargaining table, but boost it if the Kremlin refused to negotiate.

At the July NATO summit in Washington, where European officials sought out Trump insiders, Kellogg was one former official taking meetings with U.S. allies. But the message they got might not have been the one that they wanted to hear. Kellogg has said that NATO countries that don’t meet the alliance’s defense spending target are violating the Washington Treaty (Trump threatened at a campaign rally earlier this year not to defend NATO allies that weren’t hitting the bloc’s spending mark of 2 percent of GDP ).

—Jack Detsch

Robert Lighthizer

A black and white headshot of Robert Lighthizer inside a red circle.

Few members of the Trump administration still maintain a large degree of influence on policy. But Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s trade representative, current advisor, and perhaps future Treasury secretary, has become such an influential economic voice, especially through his back-to-the-past vision of trade, that he has helped shape the Biden administration’s newfound love of trade wars.

Lighthizer, a longtime trade lawyer who began his public service career in the Ronald Reagan administration, turned Trump’s inchoate notions on trade and the economy into a more or less coherent policy. Now, with Trump campaigning to return to the White House, Lighthizer is eager to double down on the policies he pursued the first time around.

Those famous Trump tariffs—on steel, aluminum, and many products from China—were the fruit of Lighthizer’s vision, and he was just getting started. He believes raising taxes on American consumers and businesses for things they import will make them import less; in an ideal world, it would also make American businesses manufacture and export more things as well.

His plans for the future, as laid out in books and writings since he left office, include much higher tariffs on a bigger range of countries (all of them, actually) in order to balance the ledger of American imports and exports, with a particular eye on China—one of America’s biggest trading partners and its top geopolitical rival. Ultimately, his objective is to get much closer to full “decoupling” from China than the lukewarm and partial “de-risking” now favored by the Biden team.

It’s of little concern to Lighthizer and some of Trump’s other still-influential trade advisors such as Peter Navarro (who was released from prison in July) that the avalanche of tariffs and belligerent trade policy achieved none of their stated aims. The trade deficit, the main concern for tariff hawks such as Trump and Lighthizer, grew under their watch. U.S. exports shrank, as did, in the end, manufacturing jobs (thanks to COVID-19).

Retaliatory tariffs by friends and allies curbed U.S. trade options abroad and weakened the prospects for an anti-China coalition. Consumer prices, juiced by import taxes, rose. China did not moderate any of the predatory economic behavior that prompted the trade wars in the first place, and in fact has made its own form of turbocharged, export-driven industrial policy the very centerpiece of its own economic rejuvenation.

But, as Lighthizer himself has argued, it takes time to right a ship that’s on the wrong course. Maybe this time the same old remedies will produce dramatically different results.

—Keith Johnson

A pencil-drawn portrait of Robert Lighthizer seen in profile, wearing glasses and looking to the right.

Profile

The Man Who Would Help Trump Upend the Global Economy

As a potential U.S. Treasury secretary, Robert Lighthizer has more than trade policy to revolutionize.

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer speaks at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on U.S. trade in Washington on June 17, 2020.

Review

Trump Trade War Mastermind Is Back With a Dangerous New Plan

Robert Lighthizer wants total decoupling from China—without thinking through the consequences.

Johnny McEntee

A black and white headshot of John McEntee inside a red circle.

In the summer of 2020, as Trump was running for reelection, an email from the White House invited Pentagon officials to sit down for interviews with a pair of staffers, where they would be evaluated for positions in a second Trump administration. After a spate of high-profile resignations in the building as the White House increasingly sought to assert itself over the Defense Department, officials saw the interviews as a test of loyalty to Trump.

The man behind the email was White House Presidential Personnel Office Director John McEntee. A onetime walk-on quarterback at the University of Connecticut, McEntee served as the president’s “body man” for the first year of the administration. He was fired by White House Chief of Staff John Kelly in 2018 for failing a background check due to a gambling investigation, only to return two years later, this time in charge of the powerful personnel office.

It’s often said in Washington that personnel is policy. Many of Trump’s early appointments came from the traditional Republican foreign-policy pool: more international, pro-trade, pro-NATO, and pro-ally than the standard MAGA crowd. Kelly, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson formed the “axis of adults” that largely controlled the levers of foreign policy for Trump’s first two years in office—even as the commander in chief finger-wagged at Washington’s perceived “deep state” for allegedly slow-walking his agenda.

But late in the game, McEntee would help get MAGA-approved people into top jobs. He helped orchestrate Trump’s reshuffling of the Pentagon brass, including the firing of then-U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper. He also tried, with others, to stack the Pentagon’s top policy boards with close Trump allies. Had Trump won, McEntee would have played a key role in trying to implement Trump’s planned “Schedule F” reforms that would have essentially turned tenure-track government jobs into at-will employees.

Since then, loyalty tests have become standard practice in Trump world. McEntee is now at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, where he’s helping to spearhead Project 2025—an initiative that calls for the next president to “confront the Deep State.” If you want in on a list of would-be Trump appointees, you have to send in your phone number and fill out a detailed questionnaire, largely predicated on loyalty to Trump.

—Jack Detsch

Christopher Miller

A black and white headshot of Christopher Miller inside a red circle.

Christopher Miller had some early missteps after being named Trump’s acting secretary of defense in November 2020—literally. First, he tripped on his way up the steps and into the Pentagon. And then when he got up to give his first public speech at the U.S. Army’s national museum two days later, he forgot his prepared remarks under his seat.

It set the tone for perhaps the wildest two-month tour that any Pentagon chief has ever had. Trump moved Miller from the National Counterterrorism Center to take over for Esper as acting secretary of defense. Trump announced via tweet that Esper had been fired, less than 48 hours after the networks began calling the presidential election for Biden.

Miller, a former Green Beret, was given an ambitious lame-duck agenda for the Pentagon ahead of Biden’s inauguration. The Pentagon was tasked with withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Syria, and Somalia—all in the course of two months.

Miller faced widespread criticism for his failure to approve the deployment of the National Guard to contain the Jan. 6, 2021, pro-Trump insurrection at the U.S. Capitol for more than three hours after the Pentagon became aware of the breach. Miller said later that he feared creating “the greatest Constitutional crisis” since the Civil War by deploying active-duty U.S. troops. He has also said that Trump deserves blame for stoking the riots—but he hasn’t explicitly ruled out working for him again.

“I thought he was really good,” Trump told radio host Hugh Hewitt in a December interview, describing Miller and his short stint at the Pentagon. “I thought he was very good.”

—Jack Detsch

Stephen Miller

A black and white headshot of Stephen Miller inside a red circle.

Throughout Trump’s term, Stephen Miller made a name for himself as the radical architect of the president’s hard-line—and highly controversial—immigration policies. If Trump triumphs in November, he is widely expected to again lean heavily on Miller, who has already outlined sweeping new proposals to overhaul U.S. policy and crack down on immigration.

As Trump’s then-senior advisor and speechwriting chief, Miller played a pivotal role in shaping his presidential agenda. He drove forward some of the former U.S. leader’s most contentious schemes, including his family separation policy, known as zero tolerance, and the so-called Muslim ban, which barred travel and refugee resettlement from several Muslim-majority countries to the United States. Beyond pushing to slash refugee admission numbers, he reportedly also wanted to deploy troops to close off the United States’ southern border and proposed banning student visas for Chinese nationals.

Miller was known for encouraging some of Trump’s more hard-line positions, even in situations where other advisors reportedly urged the president to exercise restraint. In 2019, Miller came under fire after a batch of leaked emails published by the Southern Poverty Law Center, a legal advocacy group, revealed that he privately touted white nationalist views. The emails, which were exchanged between Miller and conservative news site Breitbart News, date back to 2015 and 2016.

Today, Miller spends much of his time waging legal battles against “woke corporations,” despite having no formal legal training. In 2021, he founded the America First Legal Foundation, a conservative legal advocacy organization focused on challenging the Biden administration and the practices of private companies, including Kellogg and Starbucks. “America First Legal is holding corporate America accountable for illegally engaging in discriminatory employment practices that penalize Americans based on race and sex,” the company said.

If Trump defeats Harris in November, Miller has vowed an overhaul of U.S. immigration policy. “Any activists who doubt President Trump’s resolve in the slightest are making a drastic error: Trump will unleash the vast arsenal of federal powers to implement the most spectacular migration crackdown,” he told the New York Times. “The immigration legal activists won’t know what’s happening.”

Under a potential second Trump term, Washington would dramatically expand policies aimed at cracking down on immigration, including by halting the U.S. refugee program and reinstalling some variation of the Muslim travel ban, the New York Times reported. Trump envisions conducting sweeping public workplace raids, enacting mass deportations, and constructing “vast holding facilities” to detain those awaiting deportation, Miller said. The former U.S. leader is also eager to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, or DACA, he said.

“I don’t care what the hell happens in this world,” Miller told right-wing personality Charlie Kirk in a podcast interview earlier this year. “If President Trump gets reelected, the border’s going to be sealed, the military will be deployed, the National Guard will be activated, and the illegals are going home.”

—Christina Lu

Robert O’Brien

A black and white headshot of Robert O’Brien inside a red circle.

Trump cycled through three national security advisors during the first two years of his tenure before settling on one who fit just right: Robert O’Brien. He stuck around for the remainder of Trump’s presidency.

A Los Angeles lawyer, O’Brien began his White House role as special envoy for hostage affairs. He helped to secure the release of Americans from prisons in Turkey and Yemen, as the Trump administration prioritized the plight of Americans wrongfully detained abroad.

More memorably, O’Brien led the administration’s efforts to lobby Sweden, an ally, to release the American rapper A$AP Rocky following a request from the rapper Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, according to the New York Times. Rocky had been convicted on assault charges.

As national security advisor, O’Brien had significantly less experience than his predecessors. He proved to be low-key and loyal, and served out the remainder of the Trump administration without major controversy.

In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, O’Brien became one of the first senior Trump officials to acknowledge, if grudgingly, that Biden had won the vote. “If the Biden-Harris ticket is determined to be the winner, and obviously things look that way now, we’ll have a very professional transition from the National Security Council. There’s no question about it,” he said at a virtual meeting of the Global Security Forum.

O’Brien has remained close with the former president and is likely to be tapped for a senior role should Trump return to the Oval Office.

In an essay in Foreign Affairs published in June, O’Brien sketched out the contours of a future Trump foreign policy: “A Trumpian restoration of peace through strength.” China is the primary focus, as O’Brien calls for a muscular posture in the Indo-Pacific, including the deployment of the entire Marine Corps to the region and for a U.S. aircraft carrier to be transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

O’Brien also advocated for the United States to resume nuclear weapons testing, not carried out since 1992. “Washington must test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety in the real world for the first time since 1992—not just by using computer models,” O’Brien wrote.

—Amy Mackinnon

A mural depicting a female saint-like figure holding a Javelin missile is shown on the side of an apartment block.

Argument

How to Teach Beijing a Lesson in Ukraine

What China learns from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inform its decision-making on Taiwan.

Taiwanese soldiers use U.S.-made weapons.

Shadow Government

After the Debacle: Six Concrete Steps to Restore U.S. Credibility

Each has bipartisan support and could be taken in short order.

Kash Patel

A black and white headshot of Kash Patel inside a red circle.

Kash Patel had a meteoric ascent during Trump’s tenure, rising from little-known staffer on the House Intelligence Committee to chief of staff to the acting secretary of defense in the last months of the administration, despite having no military background. As an aide to Rep. Devin Nunes, who was then chair of the House Intelligence Committee, Patel was central to efforts to challenge accusations that the Trump team had inappropriate contact with Russian government officials while on the campaign trail.

Patel was reportedly the lead author of a controversial 2018 memo that alleged that law enforcement officials had acted improperly when they sought permission to surveil the communications of former Trump campaign aide Carter Page. While Democrats slammed the decision to release the document, describing it as a partisan attack on the justice system, a court later found that some of the surveillance warrants against Page were unjustified.

After a stint at the National Security Council as senior director for counterterrorism, Patel moved to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2020 as a senior advisor to the director of national intelligence, where he became integral to the former president’s attacks on the intelligence community, pressing for declassification of documents from the investigation into Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.

In the waning days of the Trump administration, the former president reportedly considered firing CIA Deputy Director Vaughn Bishop and replacing him with Patel, according to Axios. If then-CIA Director Gina Haspel resigned in protest—which she threatened to do—Patel or another Trump ally would be appointed to lead the sprawling intelligence agency, according to reports.

Patel would likely play an integral and senior role should Trump return to the Oval Office. In an appearance on Steve Bannon’s podcast in December, Patel said a second Trump administration would target and prosecute journalists. “Yes, we’re going to come after the people in the media who lied about American citizens, who helped Joe Biden rig presidential elections—we’re going to come after you. Whether it’s criminally or civilly, we’ll figure that out,” he said.

Patel has also authored a children’s book titled The Plot Against the King, a revisionist fairy-tale rendering of the Russia investigation in which Patel appears as a wizard who informs the kingdom that King Donald “did not work with the Russonians.”

—Amy Mackinnon

Mike Pompeo

A black and white headshot of Mike Pompeo inside a red circle.

Mike Pompeo was one of the few Trump cabinet officials to maintain a strong relationship with the brash and mercurial president throughout his term in office. Trump plucked Pompeo from relative obscurity as a Kansas congressman to be his first CIA director. As head of the premier U.S. intelligence agency, Pompeo forayed into diplomacy by secretly traveling to North Korea to lay the groundwork for direct talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

In 2018, as Trump sacked his first secretary of state, Tillerson, he announced Pompeo as his replacement. Pompeo joined the State Department vowing to restore “swagger” to the diplomatic corps after the Tillerson era, prompting relief among some longtime diplomats and eye rolls from others. While at the State Department, Pompeo was careful to ensure he remained a top player in Trump’s inner circle, even when it put him at odds with the embattled diplomatic corps—during Trump’s tumultuous first impeachment hearing, for example, and other scandals involving harassment, mismanagement, and watchdog investigations into Trump appointees at the State Department.

Pompeo, a California native, graduated first in his class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, served as a U.S. Army officer, and attended law school at Harvard. He moved to Kansas in the 1990s and served as a member of Congress for the state’s 4th district from 2011 to 2017 before joining the Trump administration. After Trump was voted out of office, Pompeo did not join other top Trump administration officials in condemning the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, and Trump’s demonstrably false claims of election fraud.

Pompeo briefly toyed with the idea of running for president but bowed out of the race early on when he failed to raise his national profile or as much money as other Republican challengers to Trump like Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis or former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley. In June, he established a new private equity firm with veteran financiers that aims to back mid-sized technology companies.

Pompeo still maintains close ties with Trump and his inner circle, and many Republican insiders believe he would be a top contender for a senior administration role, such as secretary of defense, if Trump is reelected.

In Trump’s circle, Pompeo is among the most outspoken advocates of Ukraine. He visited Kyiv in early April and told Fox News that arming Ukraine was the “least costly way to move forward.” Many European officials believe that the appointment of Pompeo to a senior cabinet position would be a good thing for Ukraine and NATO, and bad news for Russia.

An ardent hawk, he was also a primary driver of Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and architect of the former president’s muscular approach to China that now largely has bipartisan backing.

—Robbie Gramer

Foreign Policy · by FP Staff

18. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Can we go back to the future? Some important recommendations for consideration below.

Download the PDF here: https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/The+US+Should+Support+the+National+Resistance+Front+of+Afghanistan+-+Luke+Coffey.pdf

Conclusion:

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, which the Biden administration’s policies enabled, gravely harmed America’s interests. The National Resistance Front faces a desperate situation against a determined and emboldened enemy. The NRF also feels abandoned by the international community, especially the US. Washington is left with few good options, but the next administration has a chance to begin a course correction. Below are 12 specific policy recommendations to put America’s Afghanistan policy back on track.

The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Luke Coffey

hudson.org ·

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More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism.

This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.

In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country.

On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001.

Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support.

Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon.

The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.

Supporting the NRF would be a good place to start. This assistance can include:

1. Establishing formal contact with NRF leadership and inviting organization leader Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC.

2. Participating in the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan.

3. Refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

4. Providing the NRF with lethal and nonlethal assistance.

5. Allocating a certain percentage of frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing.

6. Consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnically Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.

A Bleak Situation

Now that the Taliban is in power, the group’s leaders are realizing it was far easier to fight the Afghan government than to govern the country. Fractures at the top of Taliban leadership have made governing even more challenging. This poor governance has caused the worst humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan since the 1990s.

According to a report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “more than half of Afghanistan’s population will require humanitarian assistance” in 2024. The same report said that Afghanistan remains in a state of humanitarian crisis characterized by “high levels of protracted displacement, mine and explosive ordnance contamination, restrictions to freedom of movement, increased risk of gender-based violence, child labor, early marriage, and increased needs for mental health and psychosocial support.” Minority ethnic groups—such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras—have faced widespread persecution. Women’s rights have also eroded. Outside limited roles in education and healthcare, women are generally barred from the workplace. Girls are denied an education beyond sixth grade. Under such conditions, the future of millions of Afghans is in doubt.

Additionally, natural disasters have compounded the humanitarian crisis. In the summer of 2023, deadly flash floods struck the country. Meanwhile, other parts experienced droughts. Late the same year, a series of major earthquakes hit the western part of Afghanistan, killing about 1,500 people and leaving hundreds of thousands more without shelter, basic healthcare, and access to clean water. To make matters worse, last winter was particularly cold in Afghanistan.

Terrorism has also increased in Afghanistan. The Trump administration’s agreement with the Taliban stated that the group would take steps to “prevent any group or individual, including [al-Qaeda], from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.” Yet the Taliban has done nothing to prevent terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), from growing stronger in Afghanistan.

IS-K has been able to take advantage of the chaos that emerged in some parts of the country when the Afghan state collapsed. It has boosted its recruitment and has conducted a series of high-profile attacks inside the country, usually aimed at the Shia Muslim Hazara community.

Al-Qaeda also benefited from the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. A recent UN report says that al-Qaeda “remains strategically patient, cooperating with other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and prioritizing its ongoing relationship with the Taliban” and that the terror group’s “cells are operating in multiple Afghan provinces, mainly in the southeast of the country.” The group has established new training camps in Afghanistan, and Arab fighters are arriving in the country. A report from 2022 stated that al-Qaeda’s “leadership reportedly plays an advisory role with the Taliban, and the groups remain close.” Perhaps the most visible example of al-Qaeda’s reemergence in Afghanistan was in July 2022, when a US drone strike killed the group’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Kabul.

The Taliban’s rule has also affected the broader region. Weapons from Afghanistan are finding their way to the bazaars in Indian-administered Kashmir. Al-Qaeda has “sought to establish cooperation with” the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement and Jamaat-e Ansarullah “to intensify activities and strengthen positions within Taliban military structures in the north to conduct joint operations and move the center of terrorist activity to Central Asia.” The Taliban has reportedly handed control of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border to Jamaat-e Ansarullah and has provided the group “with new military vehicles, weaponry, and other equipment.” The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), founded in 1999, has well-established links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and operates freely in northern Afghanistan. According to media reports, the IMU, which has both ethnic Uzbek and Tajik factions, fought alongside the Taliban during its takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

How Afghanistan Compounds America’s Border Crisis

Because of America’s porous southern border, Taliban control of Afghanistan has security implications for the US homeland. For example, according to a recent UN report, “authorities intercepted a large shipment of small arms and light weapons from Afghanistan to South America, destined for narcotics traders.” Weapons from Afghanistan will only strengthen the criminal organizations in Latin America that oversee the drug trade and human trafficking, compounding the threats Americans face from their southern border.

It is well known that IS-K and al-Qaeda have previously recruited, trained, and deployed ethnically Tajik and Uzbek fighters from Afghanistan. In recent years, the number of people from Central Asia crossing America’s southern border has increased. About 1,500 Tajiks have tried crossing the southern border since 2020, including an estimated 500 already this year. To put this into perspective, only 26 Tajik nationals crossed in the 14 previous years.

Last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation caught a smuggling network with connections to the Islamic State trafficking dozens of Uzbeks across the southern border. This raised alarm bells all the way to the White House. And earlier this year, eight Tajiks with ties to IS-K were arrested in New York City, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia—all of whom were thought to have crossed the southern border. It is worth pointing out that Tajiks from IS-K perpetrated the terrorist attack in Moscow in March 2024 that killed 144 people. While the vast majority of Central Asians are likely seeking entry into the US out of desperation for a new life, policymakers cannot ignore the terrorist threat. The Taliban’s track record of supporting terrorist groups makes the situation at the southern border even more concerning.

What Is the NRF?

Soon after the Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, Ahmad Massoud Jr., son of the late Northern Alliance leader and Soviet resistance fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, relocated to his family’s ancestral homeland in the Panjshir Valley to begin the NRF. The Panjshir Valley is a predominantly ethnic Tajik region located 60 miles northeast of Kabul and is famous for its ability to resist outside aggression. It is strategically located in Afghanistan, and its unforgiving mountainous terrain and valleys make it easily defensible.

During the 1980s, the Soviet army launched nine different major military operations to capture Panjshir. Each of them failed. Although the Soviets would often capture much of the main valley and its villages, they always failed to capture the side valleys, which sheltered the resistance. In the 1990s, after the Taliban first swept into Kandahar and Kabul, the main resistance movement also began in the Panjshir Valley. Ahmad Shah Massoud never lived to see the defeat of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda assassinated him in Takhar Province two days before the 9/11 attacks. The younger Ahmad Massoud was only 12 at the time.

Ahmad Massoud has a noteworthy background, and his establishment of the NRF should come as no surprise. He earned degrees from esteemed institutions in the United Kingdom and is a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Although he did not engage significantly in Afghan politics until 2018, he has dedicated years to developing and expanding a grassroots movement in Panjshir. His efforts are now bearing fruit, bolstered by a wide following thanks to his father’s legacy.

Little is known about the current situation of the NRF in Panjshir in terms of supplies and equipment, and next to nothing is known about the status of their ammunition and weapons stockpiles. While Panjshir has plenty of water thanks to the many streams in the valley, food and other commodities will likely be in short supply until the NRF develops reliable and enduring supply lines that are safe from Taliban attack. The Taliban has encircled the region and has captured large sections of the main valley. According to some estimates, the NRF controls all the side valleys, equal to about 60 percent of the province. The NRF’s manpower situation is also unknown. Many former Afghan military, police, and special forces fled to Panjshir soon after the Taliban’s takeover, and the total number of NRF fighters is measured in the low thousands. Most NRF fighters are the same Afghans that were trained by, and fought alongside, US and Western forces for the past two decades.

Not only has America failed to support the NRF in any practical way, but the US State Department has even said that it does “not support organized violent opposition to the Taliban, and . . . would discourage other powers from doing so as well.” This rebuke of the NRF echoes the Clinton administration’s lack of interest in the Northern Alliance and Ahmad Shah Massoud in the late 1990s. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel reportedly advised Ahmad Shah Massoud to “surrender to the Taliban to bring peace to the country.” Thankfully, Shah Massoud did not follow this advice.

The NRF’s Goals

The NRF’s goals can be divided into three categories: military, diplomatic, and political.

Military

The NRF’s military goal is to grow its grassroots armed resistance across the whole of Afghanistan. In the short term, the NRF will need to maintain its stronghold in the Panjshir Valley while conducting asymmetrical attacks against Taliban targets across the country. In the longer term, the resistance’s goal will be to control some districts outside Panjshir, ultimately building toward a larger base of operations to use against the Taliban similar to the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. The NRF’s limited access to weapons and munitions means that convincing local powerbrokers to defect to the resistance will be a key component of this strategy.

Diplomatic

The NRF’s diplomatic goal is to discourage formal international recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan by raising awareness in the international community that a credible alternative exists. NRF leadership can accomplish this by expanding the size and scope of the Vienna Process (see below) and maintaining a steady drumbeat of other diplomatic activity. For example, last October, Massoud traveled to France to meet government officials and activists. He then continued to Brussels, where he met with members of the European Parliament. A month later he was invited as a special guest by French President Emmanuel Macron to take part in the Paris Peace Forum. At the event, he was seated next to other heads of state and senior officials. Meanwhile, Ali Maisam Nazary, the NRF’s head of foreign relations, has worked tirelessly across Western capitals to raise awareness of the resistance front.

Political

Politically, Massoud and other senior members of the organization have been quite clear that they are willing to negotiate with the Taliban to form an inclusive government that represents all Afghans. However, the NRF has also made it clear that protections of basic human rights—especially equal rights for women and minorities—are nonnegotiable. While the NRF is largely composed of ethnic Tajiks, the group has stressed that it is open to all Afghans who want to resist the Taliban. The ethnic diversity among the groups that participate in the Vienna Process is a positive sign. It is also worth noting that Ismail Khan, the former resistance fighter and governor of Herat, left Iran for the first time since fleeing from the Taliban in 2021 when he traveled to Tajikistan in November 2023. During Khan’s visit to Tajikistan, he met with Massoud and Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan. Khan’s visit demonstrates a growing alliance between northern and western Afghans against the Taliban.

A Dual-Track Approach

In order to achieve these goals, the NRF takes a dual-track approach.

The Military Track

Ahmad Massoud is the head of both the military and political councils of the NRF.The head of the NRF’s military committee is former Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army General Qadam Shah Shahim. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, thousands of former members of the Afghan army, special forces, and police have made their way to Panjshir to join the opposition effort. After fending off an early Taliban offensive in the fall of 2021 and surviving its first winter in the side valleys of Panjshir, the NRF launched a modest but effective offensive in spring 2022. By then, the group had started to carry out ambushes and limited attacks against Taliban forces in provinces near Panjshir and the predominantly ethnically Tajik regions of northeastern Afghanistan. The scope of the NRF’s attacks has since expanded to include most of Afghanistan.

In the spring and summer of 2023 and 2024, not a week went by without the NRF attacking Taliban positions somewhere in the country. A count of social media posts shows that the front launched almost 200 attacks in the first half of 2024. There have even been several attacks in 2024 on Taliban targets in Herat Province, hundreds of miles from the NRF’s typical area of operations in northern Afghanistan. The group has also hit targets in the heart of Kabul, which is considered to be the Taliban’s sanctuary. In total, the NRF has attacked Taliban targets in 20 Afghan provinces including Panjshir, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunar, Kunduz, Kabul, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Samangan, Balkh, Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, and Sar-i-Pul (see map 1).

Map 1. National Resistance Front Attacks against the Taliban since September 2021

Source: Author’s research.

The NRF is mindful of its limited military capabilities. After all, the Taliban inherited billions of dollars’ worth of US military hardware, including rifles, armored vehicles, night-vision devices, and even helicopters. Meanwhile, the NRF gets no outside military support and relies on existing arms stockpiles or the purchase of weapons from corrupt Taliban officials. Therefore, while the group is continuously looking for opportunities to attack and weaken the Taliban, its efforts will remain limited until international partners provide some level of military support.

The Diplomatic Track

The NRF is pursuing significant diplomatic goals through the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan. The Vienna Process offers a way for disparate anti-Taliban groups to meet and, when appropriate, coordinate and align their efforts. The Vienna Process serves as an alternative to the Taliban-dominated UN talks in Doha, Qatar. So far there have been four meetings of the Vienna Process with more planned for the future.

First round, September 2022. The first Vienna Process meeting took place one year after the Taliban regained power. More than 30 participants, representing various minority and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, joined the gathering. The diverse members of this group agreed to issue a joint statement outlining their belief that the status quo under the Taliban is not acceptable for Afghanistan. The most notable outcome of this first meeting was that Massoud became the de facto leader of the anti-Taliban resistance.
Second round, April 2023. The second gathering in Vienna attracted an even more diverse group of participants, including activists from many backgrounds, ethnic groups, and religious affiliations. Although Massoud and the NRF were the conference’s center of gravity, the National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan (also known as the Ankara Coalition) played an important role. In addition, leaders and representatives of the Hazara and Uzbek minorities were present at the conference. Almost half the participants were women. This time, the participants agreed to “support all forms of resistance against the Taliban, including armed resistance.” This is a step further than the first round of Vienna talks.
Third round, December 2023. This time more than 50 representatives from different anti-Taliban groups gathered in Vienna. Many senior figures in the anti-Taliban movement participated for the first time. The notorious Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek Afghan commander and longtime Afghan powerbroker, sent a personal representative to deliver his message to the attendees. Also for the first time, the Vienna Process hosted international observers from the US and Europe.
Fourth round, June 2024. At the most recent meeting in Vienna, the number of political and civil society groups in attendance increased to 70. Important first-time participants included ethnically Hazara former member of parliament Mohammadi Muhaqeq, former vice president of Afghanistan Yunus Qanuni, and Anarkali Hunaryar, an Afghan Sikh, participated in person. Parwana Ibrahimkhel, a prominent women’s rights activist who was arrested by the Taliban in January 2022 and imprisoned for four months, also took part in the meeting. To formulate a path forward for the process, the participants deliberated in four groups: political, foreign policy, human rights, and economics.

Supporting the NRF Is in America’s Interest

The Biden administration’s policy toward the NRF has lacked strategic foresight. Whether or not policymakers acknowledge it, Afghanistan will remain an important part of America’s foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Below are four reasons the US should engage with the NRF.

Improving counterterrorism efforts. The Taliban’s assurances that it would keep out transnational terrorist organizations have proven hollow. Al-Qaeda is more active in Afghanistan than it has been since the 1990s, and IS-K has also taken advantage of the chaotic situation to grow its movement. The worsening terrorism situation in Afghanistan, combined with America’s inability to secure its southern border, means that it is only a matter of time before there is another major terrorist attack against the US homeland. While support for the NRF is not a silver bullet, having a local partner would help America meet its counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan.
Following through on moral commitments. The events of summer 2021 damaged America’s national prestige and honor. The US forces’ rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan placed many of America’s former Afghan allies and partners in deadly situations. Sensing American weakness, America’s adversaries were willing to test US resolve in ways that were previously very unlikely. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurred roughly six months after the US withdrew. Meanwhile, many of America’s allies and partners were questioning Washington’s commitment to their countries. Supporting the NRF is a step in the right direction for the US to restore its image in the region.
Protecting America’s geopolitical interests. Afghanistan is at the heart of the Eurasian landmass and has served as an important geopolitical crossroads for centuries. The country borders Iran and China, two major US adversaries. To the south, Afghanistan shares a complicated and porous border with Pakistan in a region that accounts for a sizeable number of transnational terrorist organizations. And to the north, Afghanistan borders Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—nations where Russia is trying to increase its influence. It is in America’s interest to have a regional partner to engage with. Afghanistan’s location makes it ideal for this purpose.
Heeding historical lessons. History shows that Afghanistan is too important to ignore. Since the early nineteenth century, there have been 19 instances of American or European intervention—a rough average of once every 10 years (see appendix). Nobody expects that American troops will return to Afghanistan anytime soon. But nobody expected a US military intervention into Afghanistan in August 2001 either. If unforeseen circumstances require the US to return to the region, it would be useful to have a morally and strategically aligned local partner. Thus, a relationship with the NRF is a good insurance policy for the US.

Figure 1. Foreign Interventions in Afghanistan

Click here to expand.

Source: Author’s research.

Recommendations

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, which the Biden administration’s policies enabled, gravely harmed America’s interests. The National Resistance Front faces a desperate situation against a determined and emboldened enemy. The NRF also feels abandoned by the international community, especially the US. Washington is left with few good options, but the next administration has a chance to begin a course correction. Below are 12 specific policy recommendations to put America’s Afghanistan policy back on track.

Establish contact with the NRF’s political office. The US government needs to establish formal contacts with Tajikistan-based members of the NRF to learn more about the group, its goals, and its needs. To do this, US Central Command (CENTCOM) could assign a liaison officer to the NRF based out of the US embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. If Washington is comfortable engaging with the Taliban, there is no reason it cannot do the same with the NRF.
Consider moving America’s diplomatic mission to Afghanistan from Qatar to Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, the US relocated its diplomatic presence from Kabul to Doha, Qatar. This was a Taliban-centric move that does not align with America’s long-term interests in Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia. The US should consult Tajikistan about the possibility of relocating the diplomatic mission to Dushanbe. This would put American diplomats closer to Afghanistan and the NRF. At a minimum, the US should consider opening a second diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in Dushanbe while maintaining the existing one in Doha.
Send senior-level officials to the next Vienna Process meeting. At previous Vienna Process meetings, a representative from the US embassy to Austria attended. At the next meeting, the US chargé d’affaires for Afghanistan, Karen Decker, and the US special representative for Afghanistan, Thomas West, should attend as observers. If these diplomats are willing to meet with Taliban authorities, then there should be nothing stopping US officials from meeting with senior members of different opposition and civil society groups.
Send a congressional delegation to the next Vienna Process meeting. Members of Congress have been some of the strongest critics of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. In recent years, the legislative branch has wielded tremendous influence over American foreign policy. A bipartisan congressional delegation should attend the next Vienna Process meeting to better inform the debate about Afghanistan on Capitol Hill.
Advocate for the NRF on the global stage. In the 1990s the US recognized the Northern Alliance, the predecessor to the NRF, as the legitimate opposition to the Taliban regime. This included diplomatic support and efforts to highlight the Northern Alliance’s cause in international forums. The US should now do the same for the NRF and work with other countries and international organizations to provide political backing to the group.
Invite Ahmad Massoud to Washington. Ahmad Massoud is an inspirational leader for millions of Afghans who may otherwise have lost hope after the Taliban’s takeover. US policymakers and the American public would benefit from hearing Massoud’s message and the story of the NRF’s resistance against the Taliban.
Refuse to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban would benefit from international legitimacy, and the US should do everything it can to prevent the group from receiving it. At least 13 members of the Taliban’s so-called government are under some sort of United Nations sanctions. The Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is a notorious terrorist with a $10 million FBI bounty on his head. This alone makes US recognition of the Taliban unconscionable.
Supply the NRF with winter weather gear and other nonlethal aid. Providing the NRF with winter weather gear would be a humanitarian act. The NRF needs to survive the winter if it is to ramp up its resistance measures in the spring and summer. Providing this gear would be an uncontroversial way to help the group. It would also help build trust and confidence between the NRF and the US government, which could aid future cooperation. The next administration should also consider providing other nonlethal aid, such as secure communications, night vision, and medical kits.
Consider lethal support to the NRF. The Biden administration clearly has no appetite to provide weapons to the NRF. However, the next administration should consider covertly doing so. The NRF has survived more than three years of Taliban rule and has proven that it will remain a formidable partner. Alternatively, the US should fund the NRF to allow the group to purchase weapons. The US can easily afford this without slowing support to Ukraine, Israel, or Taiwan.
Consider ways that the NRF can advance America’s counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan. Even though the NRF is the only credible non-terrorist force inside Afghanistan, neither the US nor its partners have done anything to build a relationship with the group. While America has a very limited number of over-the-horizon strike capabilities in Afghanistan, Washington should explore how the NRF could help with counterterrorism operations on Afghan soil.
Allocate a percentage of the Central Bank of Afghanistan’s frozen assets to support the NRF. The US currently holds about $7 billion in frozen assets from Afghanistan’s central bank. US policymakers should explore legal ways to divert some of these frozen assets to the NRF’s political office.
Consult with Tajikistan. Of all the Central Asian states, Tajikistan has been the most critical of the Taliban and is the most sympathetic to the NRF’s cause. In the 1990s, Tajikistan played an important role in supporting the resistance against the Taliban. The US needs to identify Tajikistan’s intentions with the NRF and find common ground for cooperation.

While there is no silver bullet to correct the Biden administration’s geopolitically costly mistakes in Afghanistan, the above steps would be a good start to restoring order and protecting American interests in the region.

Appendix: Foreign Interventions in Afghanistan

First Herat War (1837–38). The Persian Empire, supported by Russia, sought control over the key city of Herat. This led to British diplomatic and military actions in the region.

First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42). British forces invaded Afghanistan to install a favorable ruler and counter Russian influence.

Second Herat War (1856). Persia attempted to expand its influence in the region only for British pressure to force a withdrawal.

Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80). A renewed British military action aimed to assert control and counter Russian threats.

The Panjdeh Incident (1885). Russian forces seized the Panjdeh Oasis (then in Afghanistan but in modern-day Turkmenistan), leading to a diplomatic crisis with Britain.

Niedermayer–Hentig Expedition (1915). Germany attempted and failed to coerce Afghanistan to join the Central Powers in World War I.

Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). Afghanistan reclaimed its full independence from British control.

Kabul Airlift (1928–29). British and Indian troops evacuated foreigners during a rebellion.

First Red Army Intervention in Afghanistan (1929). The Soviet Union provided military and political support to one of the factions of an Afghan civil war.

Second Red Army Intervention in Afghanistan (1930). A more direct military intervention to support the Afghan government of Nadir Shah.

Afghan Tribal Revolts (1944–47). The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force conducted air operations to support the Afghan government in suppressing tribal revolts.

US Development and Foreign Aid Interventions (1950s–60s). The US initiated large-scale aid economic and infrastructure support programs to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89). The Soviet Union staged a major invasion to support a communist government in Afghanistan.

Operation Cyclone (1979–89). The US supported the mujahideen against the Soviet Union.

British Support to Mujahideen (1979–89). The UK also supported the mujahideen against the Soviet Union.

US Cruise Missile Attack (1998). The US targeted al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on US embassies.

US-Led Invasion of Afghanistan (2001–21). A major military operation following the September 11 attacks, with a major focus on dismantling al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban. This resulted in America’s withdrawal and the return of the Taliban to power.

NATO Intervention (2003–21). Aimed at stabilizing the country and building Afghan security forces.

Killing of the Leader of al-Qaeda (2022). Despite promises from the Taliban, Ayman al-Zawahiri was in Kabul, where he was killed in a US drone strike.

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hudson.org · by Walter Russell Mead

19. Operation Neptune Spear: The Most Important American Special Operation

Actually I disagree. The most important American Special Operation was Operations Eagle Claw, our failure at Desert One in Iran. With that failure we could not have executed Operation Neptune Spear. Neptune Spear was the culmination of all the reforms and the successful development of a joint special operations capability that resulted from our failure. Without that failure we would not have USSOCOM, JSOC, and all the service special operations components.

Operation Neptune Spear: The Most Important American Special Operation

Strategy Central

By Practitioners, For Practitioners

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/operation-neptune-spear-the-most-important-american-special-operation?utm

September 3, 2024

On May 2, 2011, the world received a historic announcement from President Barack Obama: Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, was dead. The news echoed worldwide, signifying a significant turning point in the War on Terror. The U.S. Navy SEAL Team 6 successfully conducted the raid, known as Operation Neptune Spear, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. This operation not only eliminated the most wanted terrorist in the world but also showcased the unmatched capabilities of American special operations forces. This essay will delve into the circumstances leading up to the operation, the meticulous planning and execution of the mission, the command structure involved, and the impact of the operation on the Global War on Terror. Lastly, it will explore why Operation Neptune Spear is considered the most critical and successful special operation in American history.

Osama Bin Laden and the Need for His Elimination

Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, became a household name on September 11, 2001, when his terrorist organization orchestrated the deadliest attack on American soil, killing nearly 3,000 people and forever altering the course of U.S. foreign policy. Bin Laden's vision was to wage a holy war against the United States and its allies, whom he perceived as enemies of Islam. His ability to inspire and coordinate acts of terror worldwide made him an extreme threat to global security. Following the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden became the prime target of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Despite an intense manhunt, he managed to evade capture for nearly a decade, moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan, shielded by loyal followers and a sophisticated network of supporters.

The United States viewed bin Laden's elimination as crucial for several reasons. First, his death would deliver a psychological blow to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, undermining their ability to recruit and operate effectively. Second, removing bin Laden from the equation would deny al-Qaeda its charismatic leader and ideological figurehead, creating a leadership vacuum that could lead to organizational fragmentation. Lastly, capturing or killing bin Laden would serve as a form of justice for the victims of the 9/11 attacks and their families, reaffirming America's commitment to protecting its citizens and holding perpetrators of terror accountable.

The Hunt for Bin Laden: Intelligence and Planning

The breakthrough in locating Osama bin Laden came in 2010, nearly a decade after the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. intelligence community, spearheaded by the CIA, painstakingly tracked a courier known by the code name "Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti." This individual was believed to be one of bin Laden's trusted messengers. The trail led to a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, an unlikely location for a high-profile terrorist but one that raised immediate suspicions due to its fortified nature and high walls, coupled with the lack of telephone or internet connections.

CIA operatives began surveillance of the compound, using satellite imagery, signals intelligence, and human intelligence to gather as much information as possible. Analysts meticulously pieced together patterns of life within the compound, identifying a tall man who rarely left the premises, referred to as "the Pacer." After months of surveillance, they were convinced that this individual was indeed Osama bin Laden. However, confirming his identity with absolute certainty was impossible without setting foot inside the compound, a prospect fraught with risk given the diplomatic sensitivities involved with conducting an operation in a sovereign nation without its knowledge.

The decision to proceed with a raid was not taken lightly. After a series of high-level meetings with his national security team, including CIA Director Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, President Obama decided that a surgical strike by U.S. Special Forces would be the best course of action. The president's order set in motion one of the most meticulously planned operations in U.S. military history.

Planning and Command Structure of Operation Neptune Spear

Operation Neptune Spear was assigned to the U.S. Navy's SEAL Team 6, also known as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), an elite counterterrorism unit with extensive experience in high-risk operations. The operation's planning was overseen by Admiral William McRaven, the head of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), who coordinated the various military and intelligence assets involved.

The mission's success depended on the element of surprise, precision, and minimal collateral damage. A full-scale rehearsal was conducted in April 2011 at a mock-up of the Abbottabad compound built on a U.S. military base. The SEALs trained rigorously, familiarizing themselves with the compound's layout, practicing insertion and extraction techniques, and preparing for various contingencies. The final plan involved two modified Black Hawk helicopters, designed to fly low and evade radar detection, transporting the assault team from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to Abbottabad, Pakistan.

The command structure was clearly defined: Admiral McRaven remained in overall charge, coordinating with CIA Director Panetta, who operated from the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The assault team, composed of 23 SEALs, a Pakistani-American translator, and a Belgian Malinois military working dog named Cairo, was led on the ground by a seasoned SEAL officer. The SEALs were divided into two squads, each with specific responsibilities: one to secure the compound's perimeter and the other to clear the buildings and locate bin Laden.

The Raid: Execution of Operation Neptune Spear

In the early hours of May 2, 2011, the two Black Hawk helicopters took off from Jalalabad under the cover of darkness. As they approached the compound, one of the helicopters experienced a hazardous vortex condition due to the high walls surrounding the compound, causing it to make a hard landing. The pilot skillfully maneuvered the aircraft to a safe landing outside the compound, and the SEALs quickly disembarked, initiating the operation.

The assault team breached the compound's walls using explosives and swiftly moved through the buildings, clearing rooms and neutralizing threats as they advanced. The SEALs encountered resistance from bin Laden's couriers and family members, resulting in a brief but intense firefight. Within minutes, they reached the third floor of the main building, where they found Osama bin Laden. After positively identifying him, the SEALs shot and killed bin Laden, ending his reign of terror.

Simultaneously, the SEALs secured the remaining inhabitants, gathered valuable intelligence materials, and prepared for extraction. The team faced a critical decision: the damaged Black Hawk could not be flown out, so they destroyed it with explosives to prevent its technology from falling into enemy hands. The SEALs and their captives were loaded onto the remaining helicopter and a backup Chinook that had been dispatched from Afghanistan as a contingency plan. The entire operation lasted approximately 40 minutes, and the SEALs left the compound as Pakistani military forces began to mobilize in response to the incursion.

Impact on the Global War on Terror

The successful execution of Operation Neptune Spear had significant implications for the Global War on Terror. First and foremost, it marked an important victory for the United States and its allies, demonstrating their unwavering commitment to pursuing justice for the 9/11 attacks. The death of bin Laden delivered a crippling blow to al-Qaeda, both strategically and psychologically. The organization's morale suffered, and its operational capabilities were severely diminished without its leader and ideological figurehead.

Furthermore, the raid underscored the importance of intelligence-sharing and collaboration among international partners in combating terrorism. The operation's success was a testament to years of painstaking intelligence work, interagency coordination, and the ability of U.S. special operations forces to execute complex missions with precision and professionalism. It also sent a clear message to other terrorist organizations: the United States possesses the capability and resolve to pursue its enemies anywhere in the world, no matter how long it takes.

The operation also had significant geopolitical ramifications. It placed a spotlight on Pakistan's role in harboring terrorists, straining the already fragile U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The revelation that bin Laden had been living in relative comfort near a Pakistani military academy for years raised questions about Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts and its commitment to fighting extremism. The United States, while careful to avoid directly accusing Pakistan of complicity, used the opportunity to pressure Islamabad into taking more decisive action against terrorist networks operating within its borders.

The Importance of Operation Neptune Spear

For several reasons, Operation Neptune Spear stands out as the most successful special operation in American history. It achieved its primary objective—eliminating Osama bin Laden—without U.S. casualties, a remarkable feat given the operation's complexity and the hostile environment in which it was conducted. The mission demonstrated the exceptional capabilities of U.S. special operations forces, particularly the Navy SEALs, and their ability to carry out high-risk, high-stakes missions with precision and effectiveness.

The operation also set a new standard for counterterrorism operations, combining advanced intelligence, meticulous planning, and seamless execution. It showcased the U.S. military's ability to adapt and innovate in response to evolving threats, using cutting-edge technology and tactics to achieve strategic objectives. The lessons learned from Operation Neptune Spear have been invaluable in shaping subsequent U.S. counterterrorism strategies and operations, reinforcing the importance of agility, adaptability, and interagency collaboration.

Moreover, the successful execution of the mission had a galvanizing effect on the American public and the international community. It provided a sense of closure for the victims of the 9/11 attacks and their families, serving as a form of justice and reaffirming the United States' commitment to combating terrorism. It also bolstered the morale of U.S. troops and intelligence personnel, who had spent years tirelessly working to bring bin Laden to justice.

Conclusion

Operation Neptune Spear was a high-watermark moment in the history of U.S. special operations. The mission demonstrated the extraordinary capabilities of American forces and underscored the strategic value of precise, intelligence-driven military actions in achieving national security objectives. By successfully eliminating Osama bin Laden, the operation dealt a significant blow to al-Qaeda, disrupted its leadership, and marked a turning point in the Global War on Terror.

The raid's success showed the effectiveness of combining careful intelligence gathering with expert tactical execution. The operation was a result of collaboration between the CIA, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the broader intelligence community. The raid's impact was felt worldwide, demonstrating U.S. resolve and the ability to bring even the most elusive adversaries to justice.

Operation Neptune Spear is remembered for its tactical brilliance and broader implications in the fight against terrorism. It reaffirmed the United States' commitment to defending its citizens and upholding justice, solidifying its leadership in global counterterrorism efforts. As the most significant and successful special operation in American history, it is a defining example of how determined, well-executed military action can achieve strategic outcomes and shape international security policy.

Bibliography

Bergen, Peter. Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012.
Bowden, Mark. The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012.
CNN Library. "Osama Bin Laden Fast Facts." CNN, May 2, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/02/world/osama-bin-laden-fast-facts/index.html.
Gellman, Barton. "The Body in Question." The Washington Post, May 6, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-body-in-question/2011/05/06/AFu1j6qG_story.html.
National Security Archive. "The Bin Laden Situation Room Documents." The George Washington University, April 30, 2012. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/pakistan/2012-04-30/bin-laden-situation-room-documents.
Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.
Priest, Dana, and William M. Arkin. Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011.
Schmidt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda. New York: Times Books, 2011.
Smith, Alexander. "Osama Bin Laden Raid: A Timeline of Operation Neptune Spear." NBC News, May 2, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/osama-bin-laden-raid-timeline-operation-neptune-spear-n1265946.
U.S. Department of Defense. "Operation Neptune Spear Fact Sheet." Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 3, 2011. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News-Releases/Release/Article/612794/operation-neptune-spear-fact-sheet/.
Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

20. Windows, not Walls: Conceptualizing Air Superiority for Future Wars

Conclusion

The fastest path to defeat might be overestimating oneself while underestimating the opponent. The aim of this article is to provoke leaders and commanders to consider the possibility of not achieving air superiority. The alliance should have a Plan B, particularly in light of current experiences in Ukraine, which imply the need for alternative strategies. That said, we acknowledge that war is highly contextual and making generalizations is exceedingly difficult — specifically when it comes to Russia. It wouldn’t be the first time their military capabilities have fallen short of expectations. However, relying on that assumption alone would not be a prudent approach.

Fortunately, there are numerous ways to be supportive even without the ability to maneuver freely in contested airspace. These measures include denying the opponent from exploiting the air domain, employing long-range fires, intercepting enemy strikes, conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and more. These actions contribute directly to mission success, unlike air superiority, which is only the first step. What follows is what truly matters and deserves thus further attention. An open-minded approach to addressing the actual operational objectives of the air component might lead to novel ideas on how to achieve them, which would be far more intriguing than pursuing an uncertain aim simply because it is what we are used to doing.

To clarify, since we serve in the forces of a frontline NATO nation and therefore represent those who would likely be among the first in line in a larger conflict, we would appreciate nothing more than the total dominance of the air domain. And if anyone can achieve it, it is this mighty 75-year-old alliance. However, given our understanding and experience with modern ground-based air defense and integrated air defenses in general, we emphasize the need to differentiate what can sometimes be described as wishful thinking from the harsh reality we are now witnessing on the battlefield. There is a difference between how things are and how they ought to be, and one shouldn’t confuse the two.

Windows, not Walls: Conceptualizing Air Superiority for Future Wars - War on the Rocks

Peter Porkka and Vilho Rantanen

warontherocks.com · by Peter Porkka · September 4, 2024

In Western military thinking, air superiority has long been considered the key to victory. However, achieving complete dominance of the skies not only comes with excessively high costs but is also unrealistic, especially in a near-peer fight. It’s time to reconsider this assumption and focus on building an air force that can support the fight even when the skies are contested. As two Finnish air defense officers, we are more closely acquainted with this than most, sharing as we do a 1,300-kilometer-long border with Russia.

The argument presented in this article may be new to some but is also in the process of being developed by American and allied airpower thinkers. Gen. David W. Allvin, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, has recently expressed similar views, notably on the War on the Rocks podcast earlier this year. Addressing air superiority, he remarked, “We need to understand that it can no longer be ubiquitous air supremacy for days and weeks on end. It has to be synchronized for the time and space and region of our choosing.” We believe this perspective is worth reiterating, as it does not yet seem to be widely embraced among air warfare professionals. Additionally, this approach has already been the modus operandi of one of NATO’s newest members. The Finnish air force has a deep-rooted tradition of fulfilling its mission in a non-permissive operational environment.

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Insights from Ukraine

Drawing from the lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian war, NATO’s air component is prioritizing the development of the capabilities needed to conduct counter anti-access/area denial strategies, as well as the suppression of enemy air defenses. In addition to the commander of the Allied Air Command, Gen. James B. Hecker, analysts are advocating the importance of enhancing these capabilities in Europe. It is argued that the stalemate in Ukraine results from the absence of air superiority.

While air superiority would be exceptionally beneficial to either side, many other analysts point to other factors contributing to the lack of progress on the front lines. These factors include for example munition shortages, the pervasive presence of drones, and the inability to conduct combined-arms operations, none of which would be resolved solely through air superiority.

Suppressing enemy air defenses is challenging and air forces generally lack the capabilities and magazine depth to conduct such operations at scale. The U.S. Air Force may possess the necessary tools and skills, but even the most powerful air force in the world lacks extensive experience in operations against modern air defenses. Although usually used as a benchmark, achievements in the Gulf War do not adequately compare to the challenges faced by today’s airmen with regard to contemporary integrated air defense systems.

On the other hand, ground-based air defenses have proven to be extremely lethal. Both Russia and Ukraine have faced significant losses, and while we cannot be certain of the exact reasons behind each shoot-down, we know that ground-based capabilities have played a crucial role.

Given the lethality of modern integrated air defenses and other recent technological advancements, we argue that instead of aiming for the traditional objective of air superiority, the allied air component should shift its focus towards enhancing capabilities that support the broader joint force in contested airspaces, where dominance is never fully guaranteed. This approach not only resonates with Allvin’s views but also reflects the concept of “‘windows of dominance” articulated by retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula and Christopher J. Bowie. We believe there are several compelling reasons for this change in strategy.

First, the currently observed mutually denied air environment is likely to become the new status quo. Achieving total air dominance against a peer adversary seems unlikely given recent experiences. Second, there are more efficient and less risky ways to achieve some of the effects that were once the sole responsibility of the air component. Third, achieving air superiority alone does not address the myriad challenges present on today’s battlefield.

Peer Adversary

Russia managed to damage or destroy 75 percent of Ukraine’s fixed air defense assets at the very beginning of the 2022 offensive. They achieved this without a long-lasting air campaign using precision fires and air strikes deep into Ukrainian territory. Despite lacking the capability to conduct large-scale composite air operations, Russia still managed to inflict significant damage on Ukrainian air defenses. From this perspective, one might conclude that the West would have no problem achieving air superiority against a peer adversary, especially given the successes during the Gulf War in 1991.

We have a different view. Firstly, the experiences in the Gulf War hold little relevance on today’s battlefield. Although the Iraqi air defense system is often portrayed as extremely sophisticated and capable, it has been correctly noted that its actual performance bore little resemblance to the systems currently employed by Russia. A brief examination of the Iraqi air defenses’ force composition at that time reveals that their ground-based air defenses lacked the range and mobility of contemporary systems. While this difference may seem subtle, it is, in fact, a profound distinction between past and present capabilities. And by saying this we do not intend to take anything away from the achievements of the U.S.-led coalition.

It’s already known that fixed air defense assets are likely to be destroyed during the first hours of a conflict. As mentioned, this occurred in Ukraine and has happened elsewhere. However, what is often overlooked is that the mobile systems faced almost no losses during the same period. Only around 10 percent of the systems capable of redeployment were estimated to be affected. Unlike in Iraq, all contemporary ground-based air defense systems are mobile, although the time needed for redeployment varies from system to system.

Additionally, some take a rather one-sided approach to the problem. For instance, when discussing the suppression of enemy air defenses, it is often highlighted how strike packages penetrate defended areas with the help of electronic warfare capabilities. While this is certainly true, some tend to forget that adversaries might employ similar tactics and such capabilities of their own.

For example, Russia has passive sensors within its integrated air defenses. If incorporated effectively, these sensors can significantly reduce the time needed for active emissions by ground-based units, making them harder to detect and evade. Emission control is therefore relevant not only for ground-based air defenses but similarly for aircraft. Balancing situational awareness and survivability is thus a challenge for both sides. The same applies for offensive electronic warfare capabilities. The reality is more nuanced than often portrayed, and this is just one example.

The task of the air defender is indeed “far more complex than most-non specialist discussion would suggest.” On top of that, due to the mobile nature of present-day ground-based air defense systems and the situational awareness provided by a truly integrated system-of-systems, we argue that suppressing, let alone destroying, air defenses is far more challenging than many realize. This was already demonstrated in Kosovo in 1999, where air defenders, through tactical maneuvers, were able to enhance the survivability of ground-based systems and hamper the allies’ ability to suppress air defenses, even though the systems employed were largely the same as those used in Iraq years before. We believe that the current situation in Ukraine serves as further evidence of our claim.

It should also be considered that while Iraqi forces fired Scud missiles against allied forces during the Gulf War, the scale and accuracy of these attacks are not comparable to the Russians’ use of long-range precision fires against their opponents. When planning maneuvers against anti-access/area denial capabilities, it is essential to recognize that the opposing forces have a say as well. Their capabilities can reach far, as exemplified by the Russian Kinzhal ballistic missile, which is estimated to have a range of up to 2000 kilometers.

Analysts are quick to underline how the Russians managed to mislead not only themselves but many Western thinkers as well when they failed to replicate their successes from operations in Syria in Ukraine. At the same time, some seem to have no problem emphasizing their own capabilities to suppress air defenses based on decades-old experiences from the Persian Gulf. Therefore, we are slightly concerned that Iraq could become the West’s own Syria, in the sense that we might too eagerly apply and generalize lessons from a different context without sufficient criticism.

Alternative Methods

While the coalition forces managed to dominate the air domain during the Gulf War, considering the aforementioned perspectives this may not be the case in future conflicts. When properly orchestrated, modern multi-layered air defenses are extremely difficult to overcome.

We are not claiming that people are taking air superiority for granted, but there still may be a hint of overconfidence in our belief that NATO can overcome the core capability and development priority of the Russian armed forces, especially while at the same time acknowledging that the alliance is not even sufficiently prepared to do so.

The plan to target Russian integrated air defenses can also be seen to contradict the maneuverist approach, the philosophy that NATO has adopted to guide its operational art. One of the classical interpretations of the maneuverist approach is to exploit the adversary’s weaknesses rather than confront their strengths head-on. Directly engaging Russian air defenses means attacking one of their highest priorities, which could be seen more as an attritional way of war rather than a maneuverist one.

Therefore, larger questions arise. Should the alliance indeed prioritize the suppression of enemy air defenses above all else, even when there are no guarantees of success? Or would it be more beneficial to also explore alternative ways to support the joint force? After all, air superiority is merely a means to an end.

So, what is the actual objective of the air component? If it is to protect the joint force from airborne attacks, does air superiority truly achieve that in today’s threat environment? Or if it is to extend fires into enemy territory, are cruise missiles and ground-based fires not sufficient? While not perfect examples, Ukraine’s recurring ability to employ long-range fires with even quite rudimentary equipment offers a glimpse into what can be achieved with more technologically advanced weapons.

Or if it is to create situational awareness with highly advanced sensor suites, why risk manned aircraft when similar tasks can be done with smaller and simpler drones and space-based capabilities? Alternative methods may not work every time as well as the traditional way, but purely from the cost-benefit standpoint we believe the opportunity is attractive and worth at least investigating.

All in all, we believe that no one can be certain of the effort required to achieve air superiority. The alliance simply lacks a precedent for this against an opponent as capable as Russia, or any other similarly equipped adversary. While it might be premature to conclude that defenses will dominate future wars based on the war in Ukraine, what if that holds true in the air domain?

We are not implying that air force has become obsolete — far from it. However, pursuing any goal inevitably involves opportunity costs. Investing in one capability means that resources cannot be allocated to other competing capabilities. This balance between different skill sets is crucial, especially when Europe lacks, for example, deep strike capabilities and has a number of other equally important capability deficits. Therefore, we encourage making investments that have the most significant effect. Even as the alliance increases military spending, resources remain limited.

Beyond Air Superiority

True joint operations will be achieved only when personnel from each service are able and willing to identify the underlying factors affecting the battlefield beyond their own backgrounds and core competencies. To a hammer, every problem looks like a nail — and while this perspective is understandable, it is also one of the biggest obstacles to a truly aligned force employment and joint action.

This phenomenon is well-documented. Analysts and high-ranking officers within the air domain often view the inability to achieve air superiority as the greatest failure and the most critical factor leading to the prolonged conflict between the Russians and Ukrainians. However, there are equally frequent differing assessments, highlighting the complexity of the issue. Many of them do not view the lack of air superiority as a significant problem.

Air superiority cannot, for example, be used to capture and hold territory. Although this might seem outdated in the context of various effect-centric and multi-domain discussions, it remains an indisputable part of modern warfare. In this overall context, the role of airpower and crewed aviation remains substantial, but has this role been overstated?

As discussed, both Russia and Ukraine are already conducting aerial reconnaissance, target acquisition, and fire control using drones and satellites. Bombings are being replaced with cruise and artillery missiles, while ground troops are protected by ground-based air defenses. One might therefore ask if aircraft are even needed anymore? We definitely wouldn’t go that far, but there is nevertheless sound reasoning there.

Air superiority, once the exclusive realm of superpowers, is no longer their sole privilege. In what is now described by some as the air littoral, drones have transformed the battlefield, allowing smaller actors to achieve capabilities that were previously out of reach. At the same time, the nature of the airspace has become more complex and crowded, and complete freedom of action may no longer be achievable to anyone.

However, in high intensity peer-to-peer warfare, maneuver units conducting large-scale combat ground operations do not need an air force that can only operate effectively in uncontested airspace. Divisions and brigades need an air component that can support operations every day of the week, regardless of the threat environment. Hence, air superiority should not be considered a definitive requirement for air support but rather only a beneficial condition. Especially considering that during these turbulent times, there are no guarantees that the alliance will always have the comfort of choosing when and where the joint force is needed.

To make it clear, we are not suggesting that achieving air superiority is entirely unfeasible, especially bearing in mind that it is not a dichotomous issue but rather a continuum with various degrees of control. This concept is well-established and discussed widely in military doctrine. But it’s not that doctrines don’t allow for less ambitious and more realistic objectives regarding air superiority — rather, it’s about managing our expectations. Just as we don’t expect artillery to achieve complete destruction across the entire battlefield, infantry to repel the enemy at every point along the front, or command-and-control connections to be flawless, we shouldn’t expect air combat to be frictionless. War is not a game of perfection. Success lies in the ability to adapt and manage imperfections effectively.

Conclusion

The fastest path to defeat might be overestimating oneself while underestimating the opponent. The aim of this article is to provoke leaders and commanders to consider the possibility of not achieving air superiority. The alliance should have a Plan B, particularly in light of current experiences in Ukraine, which imply the need for alternative strategies. That said, we acknowledge that war is highly contextual and making generalizations is exceedingly difficult — specifically when it comes to Russia. It wouldn’t be the first time their military capabilities have fallen short of expectations. However, relying on that assumption alone would not be a prudent approach.

Fortunately, there are numerous ways to be supportive even without the ability to maneuver freely in contested airspace. These measures include denying the opponent from exploiting the air domain, employing long-range fires, intercepting enemy strikes, conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and more. These actions contribute directly to mission success, unlike air superiority, which is only the first step. What follows is what truly matters and deserves thus further attention. An open-minded approach to addressing the actual operational objectives of the air component might lead to novel ideas on how to achieve them, which would be far more intriguing than pursuing an uncertain aim simply because it is what we are used to doing.

To clarify, since we serve in the forces of a frontline NATO nation and therefore represent those who would likely be among the first in line in a larger conflict, we would appreciate nothing more than the total dominance of the air domain. And if anyone can achieve it, it is this mighty 75-year-old alliance. However, given our understanding and experience with modern ground-based air defense and integrated air defenses in general, we emphasize the need to differentiate what can sometimes be described as wishful thinking from the harsh reality we are now witnessing on the battlefield. There is a difference between how things are and how they ought to be, and one shouldn’t confuse the two.

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Peter Porkka and Vilho Rantanen are ground-based air defense officers and general staff officer students from the Finnish Defence Forces. The views expressed in this article are their own.

Image: 144th Fighter Wing

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Peter Porkka · September 4, 2024

21. China’s new global charm offensive: Vocational training for the world, but is there a catch?

Our daughter took her car to a garage for repairs. One of the mechanics was a high school classmate of hers (class of 2018). He is now making over 6 figures in wages. Our daughter, with a masters degree, is making considerably less as a high school English teacher.

Excerpts:

As the demand for vocational education and training increases amid this era of rapid technological advancement, experts foresee Chinese vocational skills and training programmes to continue their rise around the world.

Such schemes are unlikely to gain traction in western countries like the US, due to the current geopolitical climate, said Dr Lim from NUS.

“This includes the US, which is in the midst of an election season marked by strong bipartisan caution towards China,” he said, noting that developed nations already have established vocational training systems and a better grasp of their own social trends.

China’s new global charm offensive: Vocational training for the world, but is there a catch?

While critics draw parallels between China’s vocational training workshops with the controversial Confucius Institutes, Beijing insists the focus is on practical skills and mutual benefit. CNA recently attended two such workshops in Singapore organised by a local Chinese university with the support of the government.

Lee Gim Siong

04 Sep 2024 04:00PM

(Updated: 04 Sep 2024 04:41PM)

channelnewsasia.com

SINGAPORE: It was almost 9pm and Ms Angelica Zhang, a 31-year-old Singaporean tech professional, remained intently focused on the task at hand: adding the final touches to a delicate flower motif she was painting on a wooden bangle.

Guided by a seasoned arts teacher from southern China’s Guangdong province, Ms Zhang meticulously applied layer by layer of wax to complete the piece.

The three-hour workshop she was attending was organised and funded by Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University (GIPU) as part of its Qinggong programme, an annual initiative in Singapore since 2023.

Held daily for a week at a private school in Singapore's Mountbatten area, the workshop is part of China's broader push to expand its global network of vocational training programmes and education centres.

The classes, offered free of charge, cover a range of topics such as Chinese lacquerware, paper quilling, and enamelwork. Each session typically sees around 20 to 30 participants and GIPU anticipated around 300 participants for this year's campaign.

Last year, workshops ran for two weeks and drew over 500 participants, organisers say.

Completed pieces from the Chinese lacquerware workshop on display. (Photo: CNA/Lee Gim Siong)

For years, China has been building an extensive network of vocational colleges and training centres around the world, a move which analysts say has been part of its soft approach to diplomacy.

Attendees like Ms Zhang who sign up for workshops and classes, said they do so out of personal interest and appreciation for Chinese language and culture – and by extension, China.

“China’s rich history and craftsmanship provide a wealth of knowledge,” she told CNA, adding that such classes were rare and usually expensive in Singapore. “Here, I learn directly from native experts and it is also a perfect opportunity to see if I want to pursue (the craft) on my own,” she said.

TRAINING THE WORLD – THE LUBAN WAY

The world’s second largest economy also boasts the largest overseas vocational training network, experts say – with over 200 institutes offering skills, academic, and language courses in 70 countries, according to official figures.

Overseas workshops, classes and courses, usually funded by Chinese companies, institutions and local governments, are conducted by Chinese trainers and professionals and cover a wide range of fields, including technology, railway maintenance, traditional arts, Chinese cuisine, and medicine.

And recent remarks by Chinese officials show an intent to double down on expanding its vocational training footprint globally, despite criticism from the West.

The largest and most prominent of China’s vocational education initiatives is the Luban programme, launched by the Tianjin government as part of the ambitious yet contentious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The first Luban workshop was launched in Thailand at the Ayutthaya Technical College in 2016 and “addressed the needs of less affluent, developing countries”, experts say.

While the BRI has been hailed for driving economic growth in developing countries by funding vital infrastructure like ports and railways, it has also faced criticism over concerns about debt dependency, environmental impact, and China's geopolitical ambitions.

But the Luban brand has been going strong in recent years.

According to Chinese media reports and official announcements, these workshops now operate in around 30 countries including Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia, and Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan – as compared to just 20 countries 18 months ago. The scheme also extends beyond BRI states, with Chinese culinary courses in London and engineering and machinery courses in Portugal.

“(Some developing countries) may not be able to afford high-profile BRI projects like high-speed railways but might instead be willing to invest in enhancing their skilled workforce through assistance offered by China,” Dr Kong Tuan Yuen, a China observer and research fellow at the National University of Singapore, told CNA.

China also sees several advantages in funding and hosting vocational training programmes abroad, said Dr Rush Doshi, senior fellow for Asia studies and China Strategy Initiative director at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“Worker training is cheaper than traditional capital-intensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and is more popular given the focus on building skills," he told CNA. "It's also less controversial since worker training raises fewer concerns over corruption, resource extraction, debt traps, or military access than BRI infrastructure projects.”

An introductory Chinese enamels course by Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University, held in July 2023. (Photo: Chingnic International Consultancy)

Several Chinese-funded programmes, similar to the nature of GIPU’s Qinggong workshops in Singapore, have been introduced in recent years.

These include the "Chinese Workshop" backed by the Chinese Education Ministry's Center for Language Education and Cooperation; "Modern Craftsman College" led by Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; and "Dayu College" run by Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute.

To illustrate the pace of expansion, the Guangxi government announced in February that it had secured government support to establish 17 "Modern Craftsman Colleges" across Southeast Asia. To date, at least six of these colleges are already operating in countries such as Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

The aim is to train “technical experts who are well-versed in Chinese technology, appreciate Chinese craftsmanship and are familiar with Chinese products,” wrote Mr Peng Binbai, director of the Chinese Education Ministry’s Department of Vocational and Adult Education, in a Jul 15 article published in a magazine dedicated to China’s international education sector.

In the piece, Mr Peng praised the growth of China’s international education sector, highlighting the benefits of expanding vocational training programmes abroad and expressing strong support for establishing more of these initiatives.

“As Chinese companies broaden their international presence and participate in global capacity building, vocational education is vital for national development. It should meet the specific talent requirements of these enterprises by developing a training system that merges practical skills with academic credentials,” he wrote.

He also noted that China was "rapidly advancing" and Luban workshops had a "crucial role" to play in countering Western influence and suppression.

“With the rise of the East and the decline of the West becoming notable trends… (Such schemes) play a crucial role in countering Western containment, it (also) supports China’s educational ambitions and aids the advancement of national diplomacy, while facilitating the global expansion of Chinese enterprises,” he said.

GOODWILL EFFORT OR CHARM OFFENSIVE?

Beijing’s push to expand its overseas vocational schemes has drawn scrutiny from critics who have raised questions about government autonomy as well as financial transparency.

Parallels have also been drawn with Confucius Institutes, which faced significant setbacks in the US in 2019 over accusations of serving as Chinese propaganda tools. Since 2004, these institutes have promoted Chinese language and culture worldwide through university partnerships, operating in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

Concerns about Chinese government influence and security issues have led to their closure across the US, Canada, and Europe, though China continues to view them as platforms for cultural exchange.

Kung Fu masters from China’s Shaolin temple pose during an inter-cultural martial arts demonstration with an Islamic religious school, as part of an inauguration of Shaolin Kung Fu classes run by the Confucius Institute in Jakarta on August 9, 2023. (Photo: AFP/Adek Berry)

A Washington Post article published on Jul 10 examined the global impact of Luban workshops and said they had “echoes of Confucius Institute learning centres.”

“When they were first introduced in 2016, the workshops were a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global network of infrastructure projects to cement China’s industrial power and economic influence,” the article said.

“They have expanded in reach and sophistication, emblematic of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to extend his country’s soft power alongside its economic might, especially in the Global South.

It added: “They showcase an accelerating effort by Beijing to wield its companies and educational institutes as an arm of diplomacy, positioning China as an alternative power and model to the United States by harnessing China’s technological prowess.”

When asked about controversies surrounding Luban workshops and other overseas Chinese vocational programmes, Dr Lim Tai Wei, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute, said China had framed these schemes as “acts of goodwill, focusing on relationship-building and talent development.”

“It’s part of China’s charm offensive, and they are transparent about that,” Dr Lim told CNA, adding that “not all courses served a specific purpose or agenda” and much like physical BRI projects, it was up to recipient countries to “assess and weigh the costs and benefits” of any vocational training scheme before accepting it.

He also noted that countries like the US, Japan and Germany, as well as global bodies like the World Bank, had also been implementing similar vocational training programmes for decades.

For example, the “BridgeUSA” training programme, managed by the US State Department, aims to "expose foreign professionals to American culture and provide them with training in US business practices relevant to their fields", as stated on its webpage.

“The key to globalising such programmes is maintaining openness and transparency, as demonstrated by some countries and international bodies for decades,” Dr Lim said. “China, through its media and official channels, has also been striving to achieve this.”

THE ROAD AHEAD

As the demand for vocational education and training increases amid this era of rapid technological advancement, experts foresee Chinese vocational skills and training programmes to continue their rise around the world.

Such schemes are unlikely to gain traction in western countries like the US, due to the current geopolitical climate, said Dr Lim from NUS.

“This includes the US, which is in the midst of an election season marked by strong bipartisan caution towards China,” he said, noting that developed nations already have established vocational training systems and a better grasp of their own social trends.

Under the Luban vocational training initiative, teacher training programmes are also offered. One such programme was launched in Kazakhstan in July 2024. (Photo: Tianjin Vocational Institute)

A representative from the agency coordinating the courses on behalf of Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University in Singapore told CNA that the institute plans to continue engaging with local partners to assess the needs of trainees.

For now, the focus will remain on Chinese handicraft and trending technological skill sets, which have garnered significant interest over the past two years.

Plans of possibly more new courses are welcomed by Singapore residents like Ms Crystal Wang, a masters student in finance, who is learning the basics of artificial intelligence at another Qinggong workshop by GIPU at the same location.

A participant in Guangdong Industry Polytechnic University's introductory Chinese lacquerware class in Singapore sands a wooden bangle in preparation for painting. (Photo: CNA/Lee Gim Siong)

Ms Wang told CNA that she had discovered the class through the Chinese social media app Xiaohongshu.

“China is very advanced in AI with various practical applications in operation,” she said, citing how the class featured an advanced tech specialist from the university, offering hands-on experience in integrating AI functions into mobile phones.

“These courses will help me stay up to date with the latest trends, which could be useful in my studies or career,” she added.

channelnewsasia.com

22. The War on Excess: The Army Has an Equipment Management Problem and Needs a Culture Change to Solve It

What is old is new again. As a young Lieutenant in the early 1980s I was detailed to a post wide tasking at the then-Fort Hood to conduct an inventory of all repair parts in this huge outdoor facility full of conexes and other containers. They partnered new Lieutenants with experienced Warrant Officers and went through all the parts that were undocumented. The Warrant Officers were incredulous when they found parts they had been waiting for months for that were backordered from the depot. There was so much excess. The inspectors said it was worth tens of millions of dollars.

The War on Excess: The Army Has an Equipment Management Problem and Needs a Culture Change to Solve It - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ian W. Black, William Parker · September 4, 2024

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Excess equipment is an albatross hanging from the Army’s neck. Two decades of conflict, increasing operational requirements since the end of the post-9/11 wars, and lack of placing mundane requirements on training plans has left the service with a severe problem: too much stuff, too often in the wrong places. Worse, given changes in the Army’s equipment transfer standard policy, excess problems may mutate into decreased equipment readiness due to increases in unforeseen maintenance costs. Efforts over the years to address the issue—with Unit Equipping and Reuse Working Groups, for example, and All Army Excess Campaign Plan—have been unable to make progress toward solving the problem. The latest effort, Rapid Removal of Excess (R2E), is in its nascent stages. But applying new practices to the same problem without addressing why the excess problem occurs will only lead to more rounds of R2E-like programs. R2E isn’t the answer; culture change is.

On April 27, 2021, the Senate Committee on Armed Services received testimony from leading authorities on management challenges and opportunities within the Department of Defense. Among the three witnesses, Dr. Adam Grant, an organizational psychologist and tenured professor at the Wharton School of Business, provided particularly candid insights. “I worry that DoD culture is a threat to national security,” he told members of the committee.

As Grant explains elsewhere—in his book Think Again—a willingness to rethink assumptions and revise opinions is a hallmark of the best minds. It is not, however, a hallmark of the DoD culture, or the culture of DoD’s chief landpower service—a culture that is slow to adapt and stuck in its ways. While his testimony centered on people rather than technological innovation, his description of the 1950s-era management practices DoD uses is applicable to both. These practices decrease innovation opportunities and decision-maker willingness to accept new ideas. To address this national security threat, the Army must reflect on and change these dated practices.

Stuck in the ‘50s

Grant identifies three hallmarks defining the “1950s-era management” embodied in DoD culture: “that is too risky,” “that is not the way we have always done it,” and “that will never work here.” To find a sustainable solution for excess management, the Army must be willing to accept risk and challenge these outdated notions.

As we look deeper into Grant’s three points, the Army’s goal setting and planning methodology is deeply entrenched in a real-world management style developed in the 1950s by Peter Drucker, an economist, author, and teacher often called “the founder of modern management.” The management style Drucker created is called management by objectives, or MBOs for short. Within the MBO design, managers set and track goals using five steps:

Define the goal.
Share the goal with employees.
Encourage employees to participate.
Monitor progress.
Evaluate and reward.

A commander’s role within the Army operations process directly correlates to MBO goal setting methodology, or in Army parlance, achieving a desired end state. Army Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process defines that role with a six-part model: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. Returning to the initial problem of addressing excess equipment and R2E, the similarities become immediately apparent. A hypothetical operations process approach is:

Understand – The Army has excess equipment causing readiness issues.
Visualize – The Army must develop a solution addressing commander requirements to train and maintain equipment readiness standards and accountability.
Describe – Commanders must be unburdened from excess equipment and quickly transfer it to where there is need in the Army.
Direct – The Army will change its equipment transfer standards and use the Army Field Support Battalion Modernization Displacement and Repair Sites to expeditiously unburden commanders from unneeded and under-maintained equipment.
Lead – The Army will issue an order directing affected Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units to conduct R2E operations.
Assess – The Army will measure the level of equipment turned in for redistribution or divestiture to determine level of unburdening via weekly updates.

If we use Drucker’s five-step MBO approach, a pattern emerges:

Define the goal – Commanders will be unburdened from excess equipment.
Share the goal – Senior leaders must generate discussion and publish an execute order.
Encourage subordinates – Commanders will be incentivized by the prospect of more time to execute training and maintain higher readiness instead of endless inventories and maintenance schedules.
Monitor progress – Commands will provide weekly updates on turn-in process during R2E operations.
Evaluate and Reward – As excess equipment is reduced, units and commanders will be rewarded with additional white space on calendar and increased training funds.

In this management scenario using R2E, whether defined in terms of the operations process or MBO, excess equipment may have been reduced and commanders unburdened, but the method has not fixed the overarching problem of why excess and deferred maintenance existed in the first place. One of the criticisms of the MBO approach is the tendency of goals to grow stagnant due to plans driven from the top down receiving minimal buy-in from the employee (this is not to say that the bottom-up approach of Unit Equipping and Reuse Working Groups–Enhanced was any better eight years ago). While the carrot for unburdening commanders of excess equipment is present, we have no quantifiable metric to measure the level of unburdening a command should go through to achieve its desired end state. Additionally, opponents of MBOs point out when targets are set without clear direction, results will be achieved by any means necessary. This can and has led in other organizations to ethical fading, which occurs when we convince ourselves the ends justify our means and slowly continue down a path of unethical behavior.

OKR: A Better Way

Although some private sector organizations have successfully used MBOs, there are alternative solutions that better align with the Army’s hierarchical structure and management style. By pivoting toward a similar process evolving from MBO, the Army can adopt a more effective approach This will allow the Army to escape from the 1950s-style culture by accepting prudent risk and being open to new approaches for old problems. Furthermore, it will enable flexibility, produce creative solutions, and allow for goals to be used for not only excess management, but planning most aspects of our training calendars.

Initial R2E pilot programs at Fort Liberty, North Carolina and Fort Stewart, Georgia determined that over three hundred thousand man-hours could be saved by reducing the time for prescribed accountability and maintenance events on all equipment on hand. What if those mundane inventory, maintenance and excess reduction activities were placed on training calendars, as part of the overall goal of increasing readiness? While adding events may seem counterproductive, this practice will generate time for training in the future.

The current R2E approach is stopgap tool to address excess and makes us feel good in the short term, but the dopamine rush only lasts until excess appears again. Incorporating the mundane into our planning process will achieve amazing results if we are willing to shift our perspective and use a different tool for establishing objectives and goal setting.

An alternative planning tool is a system known as objectives and key results (OKR), developed by Andy Grove at Intel in the 1970s. While we acknowledge potential skepticism about replacing a seventy-year-old goal-setting system with another that came of age during the Nixon administration, Grove’s idea grew out of the inadequacy of MBOs. His method provides a way to clearly define goals with three to five measurable metrics to assess progress toward desired results. John Doerr, a venture capitalist, best-selling author, and mentee of Andy Grove, brought the OKR concept to Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Doerr’s contribution to Google enabled Page and Brin to chart Google’s meteoric success. Doerr later wrote about how OKRs subsequently transformed the Gates Foundation, Apple, YouTube, and Adobe into the businesses and organizations we know today.

Andy Grove’s OKR system is characterized by the following elements based on clearly defined goals, written down and shared freely.

Focus and commitment to priorities.
Alignment and connections for teamwork.
Tracking for accountability.
Stretching for remarkable results.

Where OKRs fit into current Army framework begins with the defining the goal (desired end state). The objective is what is to be achieved (mission). The key results are how we get to the objective (essential and key tasks) and are specific, time bound, metric driven, shared, and measurable. Compared with the MBO-derived SMART objectives (specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, and time bound), the nature of OKRs holds everyone involved accountable.

By reframing OKRs into an Army methodology via course of action (COA) development, an objectively measured end state appears. The key difference from current COA development is that the proposed process shifts the evaluation definitions for measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). A COA is what we want to achieve meeting the desired goal (i.e., the objective). MOPs are the incremental steps we take to meet the larger COA (i.e., key results). And MOEs determine how well we achieved the incremental steps (i.e., a means of measurement).

The OKR methodology also, fortuitously, aligns with the mission command philosophy. Higher-level leaders provide their intent and allow subordinates to develop their own execution plans. Lower-level commands then develop their own OKRs to meet the higher-level intent.

An example of a structured OKR dealing with R2E and excess may look like this at the Army level:

Objective: Reduce excess equipment across the Army to increase time and funding for training.
Key Results:
Establish R2E program at two Modernization Displacement Repair Sites (MDRS) allowing for no less than 320 hours at each site for duration of eight weeks with a time utilization rate of 90 percent.
Cross-level excess equipment within each installation unit to reach fill rate no less than 90 percent.
Increase training calendar white space by 10 percent while decreasing aggregate inventory time by 10 percent.
Increase combat slant readiness by 5 percent over ninety days for three quarters maintaining a mechanic utilization rate of 80 percent.

Transforming this into a COA would yield the following elements:

COA: Reduce excess using R2E.
MOP 1: Establish R2E at two MDRS.
MOE 1: Create 320 hours on each unit’s training calendar over a period of eight weeks for turn-in of excess equipment at MDRS.
MOE 2: Maintain 90 percent utilization rate of 320 hours at MDRS.
MOP 2: Cross-level equipment across units on installation.
MOE 1: Fill equipment shortages up to minimum of 90 percent.
MOP 3: Increase training time by reducing quantity excess equipment inventories.
MOE 1: Decrease time for inventories per month by eight hours.
MOE-2: Add additional small arms range.
MOP 4: Increase equipment readiness.
MOE 1: Increase maintenance ratings by 5 percent over three months while dropping zero scheduled maintenance activities.

Google’s track record with OKRs created a culture that enabled a large organization to react quickly to a dynamic business environment. As a much larger organization, the Army needs responsive capabilities in a dynamic environment characterized by strategic competition.

We acknowledge implementing OKRs in the Army may face resistance due to entrenched management practices and a culture of risk aversion. However, these challenges can be mitigated by providing training and support for leaders at all levels, demonstrating the tangible benefits of OKRs through pilot programs, and gradually integrating OKRs into existing processes.

As Grant pointed out in his testimony, the Army’s management culture of risk aversion and resistance to change poses a national security risk. By reexamining our planning and goal-setting methodologies and adopting a system like OKRs, the Army can address the excess equipment problem more effectively and create a more adaptable and innovative organizational culture. The Army should use this opportunity for a hard conversation addressing organizational growth instead of searching for an elusive quick win. In the long run, implementing R2E as an enduring program will be a pyrrhic success institutionalizing failure. But by embracing change, the Army can win the war on excess.

Major Ian W. Black is a logistics operations officer currently serving at with Army Sustainment Command. He holds a master in military art and science and a bachelor of artis in history, and is a combat veteran.

Colonel William Parker is the garrison commander for Rock Island Arsenal. He is a former Army War College fellow at MIT for transportation and logistics, holds a master of arts in procurement and acquisition management, master in military art and science, master of operational art and science, and bachelor of arts in communications.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, United States Army Materiel Command, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Vincent Levelev, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ian W. Black, William Parker · September 4, 2024

23. A Revolution Begins in Austin, Texas

I was unaware of this new school.

Excerpts:

Intellectual humility is not fashionable. Nor is the passionate pursuit of truth. We live in a schizophrenic age. On the one hand, this is the Age of I, an age of solipsism, of narcissism; we are so ensorcelled by the idea that the self is primary and inviolable that we have collapsed into nihilism. On the other hand, this is the Age of Ideology, a time when a regnant and totalizing system of thought, grounded in the fundamental error that all human relations are exclusively relations of power, is ascendant; we find ourselves stranded in a stark landscape, where the bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, rages, only to be mitigated, we are told, by the imposition of a technocratic, censorious, and absolute Leviathan. Our institutions, including our institutions of higher learning, have been overwhelmed by both the relativism of the Age of I and the absolutism of the Age of Ideology. They are shaken, unsteady, adrift.

So let us begin again. Let us be revolutionaries, radicals, returning to the headwaters of our tradition, reviving the spirit of curiosity, of courage, following the great chain of conversation across the ages, where orthodoxy and heterodoxy contend, carried out in books, in works of art, in the progression of the sciences. Our university, like Plato’s Academy, is a sort of sacred grove, a place set apart, from which we can observe the vicissitudes of our times, but not become enslaved to them. Let us ask, again and again, “Is this the best answer?”

From these humble beginnings, if we embrace the simplicity of our purpose and the clarity of our mission, becoming ourselves pioneers, founders, mavericks, and heroes, bringing into to the world not only this institution but also the remarkable things that we will each build, create, fashion, and forge, we will indeed look back at this moment, at this occasion, as truly historic.

A Revolution Begins in Austin, Texas

Three years ago, the University of Austin was announced in these pages. Yesterday, the school welcomed the class of 2028. This is what the president told them.

By Pano Kanelos

September 3, 2024

thefp.com · by Pano Kanelos · September 3, 2024

On November 8, 2021, a college professor named Pano Kanelos set off what felt like a bomb in these pages when he announced that in a country with more than 4,000 colleges and universities, he was moving to Austin, Texas, to start a new one.

“We are done waiting. We are done waiting for the legacy universities to right themselves. And so we are building anew,” Kanelos wrote. “I mean that quite literally. As I write this, I am sitting in my new office (boxes still waiting to be unpacked) in balmy Austin, Texas, where I moved three months ago from my previous post as president of St. John’s College in Annapolis.”

(Read the original piece: We Can’t Wait for Universities to Fix Themselves. So We’re Starting a New One.)

Many people said it was impossible. But yesterday, less than three years after that original essay, the University of Austin opened its doors to the class of 2028.

I cannot claim objectivity on this subject: I have been part of UATX, along with Kanelos, Joe Lonsdale, and Free Press columnist Niall Ferguson, since its inception. (This is the talk I gave at the inaugural summer school.) I am so proud of what the school is—and more, what it aspires to become. I think you’ll understand why when you read Pano Kanelos’s convocation address to the founding class, published just below.

In an era of so much brokenness—and it’s hard to think of an area of American institutional life more degraded than higher education—sometimes the only thing to do is to begin again. —BW

Sometimes the only thing to do is to begin again. Meet the first students of UATX.

Good morning. It is a sincere pleasure and profound honor to welcome you to the inaugural Convocation of the University of Austin.

We often hear of occasions referred to as historic. Usually this is a sort of feeling or sense that a particular moment or event is elevated or heightened, that something noteworthy or novel is occurring—a new this, a first that. This to me seems a rather tepid use of the term historic.

What is truly historic is that which sends the trajectory of history, and lives lived within the stream of history, shooting in a direction other than that toward which they were tending. History is not a story unfolding; it is an epic being written. And its authors are those bold enough to exercise their agency in the pursuit of higher things.

As I look across this room, I do not see students or faculty or staff or loved ones. I see a room filled with the courageous, the bold, with pioneers, with heroes. I see a room filled with those who have said, emphatically, we will not accept passively what we have been handed, the givens are not good enough, we will create anew. We have come together, all of us, as founders.

Ours is a revolutionary institution—revolutionary in the proper sense. False revolutions propose only the tearing down of the established order; they are an exercise in nihilism. Yet the word revolution—in its original sense, revolvere—means to revolve, to turn back to a point of origin, with the purpose of renewing an original spirit or ideal.

To what are we returning? Not to some pallid vision of what universities looked like a decade or two or three ago, before their current malaise. Not to some nostalgic notion of ivy-covered quads and fusty dons. Our return is even more radical, radical in the sense of radix, roots, in that we are returning to the very roots of the Western intellectual tradition, to the very roots of the civilization that brought forward these extraordinary institutions called universities.

We are returning to a time when living the life of the mind was itself a bold adventure, when the world was afire with contending and clashing ideas, when everything under the sun was scrutinized, and measured, and queried, which gave birth to a civilization that was restless, and curious, and risk-taking, a Promethean civilization that sought the light of truth, even when that light was searing or sometimes even blinding.

Higher education is often referred to blandly as the “academy” or “academia.” This occludes how extraordinary the original Academy actually was. In 387 BC, Plato, very much like we are doing today, founded a school, which took its name from the place where it met, an olive grove on the fringes of Athens called the Akademia. Here, the great philosopher gathered students who were passionate about pursuing the fundamental human questions: What is justice? How do we acquire knowledge? What is the source of beauty?

There were other schools in Greece that coalesced around such figures as Empedocles, Epicurus, Thales, Democritus, and many others, all of whom believed that the world could be understood through sustained rational inquiry, and each of whom offered particular answers to the mysteries of the cosmos.

What distinguished Plato’s Academy, however, was doctrinal pluralism and a variety of intellectual approaches. There were no easy answers. Every discussion branched outward with ever-greater complexity. The Academy did not commit to a particular school of philosophy, but was a place where knowledge was comprehensively debated, analyzed, and advanced; it was, in the words of Shakespeare, the “quick forge and working house of thought.”

The range of topics was vast, the curiosity of the students ardent, their appetite for ideas voracious. From just a selection of the works of one of Plato’s students, Aristotle, we can come to understand how wide-ranging were the intellectual concerns of the age: On the Heavens, Meteorology, On the Soul, On Memory, On Sleep, History of Animals, Movement of Animals, On Colors, The Situations and Names of the Winds, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Economics, Rhetoric, Poetics. Plato and his students were not narrow specialists, not pedants, not ideologues; they were rather propelled to dispute, to discover, everything there was to know, and to test the boundaries of knowing itself.

The animating spirit of the Academy was Plato’s great teacher, Socrates. Socrates was famous, perhaps infamous, for engaging the citizens of Athens in frank conversations about philosophical topics. He was restless, persistent, infuriating. He cornered his fellow Athenians and pressed them to answer his questions: Is virtue taught or does it come to us by nature? What is the purpose of love? Is the soul immortal?

As each would offer a response, Socrates would push harder, “Is this truly the best answer?” His persistence did not make him popular, and he was ultimately put to death after trial by his fellow Athenian citizens. Yet his mode of inquiry, the Elenchus or Socratic Method, is the fountainhead of the entire Western intellectual tradition.

“Is this truly the best answer?” This turn of mind, this unalloyed commitment to truth-seeking, which takes both humanity’s passion for understanding along with the realization that, as individuals, our capacity to apprehend what is true is limited, this is the very reason we create these collective enterprises known as universities; it is why this university is dedicated to the fearless pursuit of truth.

Sacred institutions rest upon the revelation of settled truths, truths from the mouths of prophets and from the pages of hallowed texts. For human institutions engaged in human matters, however, given that, as Kant opined, “Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made,” our confidence in received opinion ought to be tempered. Our work is to stir up settled ideas, not as puerile exercises in contrarianism, but to see if, once they settle back into place, they have the same shape as before.

The term education derives from the Latin educare, and means “to lead out of.” To lead us out of what? Out of ignorance. A liberal education is one that presumes that human beings have freedom and agency, and that in liberating us from ignorance we will learn how to use our freedom well. Its purpose is not simply knowledge, but wisdom.

The great cautionary tale in the West is that of Doctor Faustus, who sold his soul to master every area of knowledge—law, medicine, theology, philosophy—but who, with all the power in the world at his fingertips, could think of nothing better to do than to satisfy his most trivial desires, and he surrendered his life at the allotted time in despair. His tale is tragic. Knowledge without wisdom is enslaving. Faustus had limitless knowledge in every domain. But he failed to come to know himself, and in the end was struck down by his own pride.

This is the great insight of the Western tradition, that all knowledge begins with self-knowledge. “Know thyself”—Γνῶθι σαυτόν—proclaimed the Oracle at Delphi. We must brush away the veils, dispel the shadows, unshackle ourselves from the chains of ignorance, beginning within and working ever outward.

Francis Bacon, the great Renaissance statesman and father of the scientific method, understood the manifold ways that humans compound our ignorance. He identified four “idols,” or false images, that distorted our understanding of the world. Looking at each in turn, we can come to understand the mission of a liberal education and perhaps come to understand some of the pathologies that afflict our own culture and society.

The Idols of the Tribe represent our tendency to leap to conclusions that accord with our desires, to ignore evidence that countermands our prejudices. To remedy this, we should seek objectivity, to see the world as it really is.

The Idols of the Cave reflect our limited, often warped, perspectives; what we know of the world is circumscribed by our narrow experience and often arbitrary circumstance. To remedy this, we should seek to be intellectually expansive, to search for sources of authority outside ourselves or those we have inherited.

The Idols of the Marketplace are those that arise from confusion in human communication, largely out of the imprecise nature of words and symbols and our failure to agree on common meaning. To remedy this, we should lead with empathy and grace, seeking to master the art of dialogue.

Finally, the Idols of the Theater are those errors that arise from the totalizing theories and abstract formulations that we construct to explain the human experience. To remedy this, we should embrace intellectual humility, rightly sizing the scope of human ambition, and be wary of those who claim to have found all the answers.

Universities, like Plato’s Academy, are the places that we have dedicated to these very ends: Seeing the world clearly, seeking to be intellectually expansive, learning from one another through conversation, asking fundamental questions. The word university comes from the Latin universitas, or a community convened toward a common end. As we pursue this common end, a quest for clarity that is often elusive, we must remember that each of us has only a fragmentary understanding of the world, that each of us, at best, adds a small piece to the great mosaic of learning.

Intellectual humility is not fashionable. Nor is the passionate pursuit of truth. We live in a schizophrenic age. On the one hand, this is the Age of I, an age of solipsism, of narcissism; we are so ensorcelled by the idea that the self is primary and inviolable that we have collapsed into nihilism. On the other hand, this is the Age of Ideology, a time when a regnant and totalizing system of thought, grounded in the fundamental error that all human relations are exclusively relations of power, is ascendant; we find ourselves stranded in a stark landscape, where the bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, rages, only to be mitigated, we are told, by the imposition of a technocratic, censorious, and absolute Leviathan. Our institutions, including our institutions of higher learning, have been overwhelmed by both the relativism of the Age of I and the absolutism of the Age of Ideology. They are shaken, unsteady, adrift.

So let us begin again. Let us be revolutionaries, radicals, returning to the headwaters of our tradition, reviving the spirit of curiosity, of courage, following the great chain of conversation across the ages, where orthodoxy and heterodoxy contend, carried out in books, in works of art, in the progression of the sciences. Our university, like Plato’s Academy, is a sort of sacred grove, a place set apart, from which we can observe the vicissitudes of our times, but not become enslaved to them. Let us ask, again and again, “Is this the best answer?”

From these humble beginnings, if we embrace the simplicity of our purpose and the clarity of our mission, becoming ourselves pioneers, founders, mavericks, and heroes, bringing into to the world not only this institution but also the remarkable things that we will each build, create, fashion, and forge, we will indeed look back at this moment, at this occasion, as truly historic.

So let us begin. Convocatum est!

Follow along with the founding class—and don’t miss a thing—by subscribing to Inside UATX. If you’re reading this and wonder how you can support this new school, please click here.

The Free Press exists because of our subscribers. To support our work, and make sure you never miss anything, become a subscriber today.

thefp.com · by Pano Kanelos · September 3, 2024

24. China-linked 'Spamouflage' network mimics Americans online to sway US political debate

It is our responsibility as citizens to contribute to defending ourselves against this.

China-linked 'Spamouflage' network mimics Americans online to sway US political debate

As voters prepare to cast their ballots in the November election, U.S. adversaries like China are making their own plans

ByDAVID KLEPPER Associated Press

September 3, 2024, 6:14 AM

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

WASHINGTON -- When he first emerged on social media, the user known as Harlan claimed to be a New Yorker and an Army veteran who supported Donald Trump for president. Harlan said he was 29, and his profile picture showed a smiling, handsome young man.

A few months later, Harlan underwent a transformation. Now, he claimed to be 31 and from Florida.

New research into Chinese disinformation networks targeting American voters shows Harlan's claims were as fictitious as his profile picture, which analysts think was created using artificial intelligence.

As voters prepare to cast their ballots this fall, China has been making its own plans, cultivating networks of fake social media users designed to mimic Americans. Whoever or wherever he really is, Harlan is a small part of a larger effort by U.S. adversaries to use social media to influence and upend America’s political debate.

The account was traced back to Spamouflage, a Chinese disinformation group, by analysts at Graphika, a New York-based firm that tracks online networks. Known to online researchers for several years, Spamouflage earned its moniker through its habit of spreading large amounts of seemingly unrelated content alongside disinformation.

“One of the world's largest covert online influence operations — an operation run by Chinese state actors — has become more aggressive in its efforts to infiltrate and to sway U.S. political conversations ahead of the election,” Jack Stubbs, Graphika's chief intelligence officer, told The Associated Press.

Intelligence and national security officials have said that Russia, China and Iran have all mounted online influence operations targeting U.S. voters ahead of the November election. Russia remains the top threat, intelligence officials say, even as Iran has become more aggressive in recent months, covertly supporting U.S. protests against the war in Gaza and attempting to hack into the email systems of the two presidential candidates.

China, however, has taken a more cautious, nuanced approach. Beijing sees little advantage in supporting one presidential candidate over the other, intelligence analysts say. Instead, China's disinformation efforts focus on campaign issues particularly important to Beijing — such as American policy toward Taiwan — while seeking to undermine confidence in elections, voting and the U.S. in general.

Officials have said it's a longer-term effort that will continue well past Election Day as China and other authoritarian nations try to use the internet to erode support for democracy.

Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu rejected Graphika's findings as full of “prejudice and malicious speculation" and said that "China has no intention and will not interfere” in the election.

X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, suspended several of the accounts linked to the Spamouflage network after questions were raised about their authenticity. The company did not respond to questions about the reasons for the suspensions, or whether they were connected to Graphika's report.

TikTok also removed accounts linked to Spamouflage, including Harlan's.

“We will continue to remove deceptive accounts and harmful misinformation as we protect the integrity of our platform during the US elections,” a TikTok spokesperson wrote in a statement emailed on Tuesday.

Compared with armed conflict or economic sanctions, online influence operations can be a low-cost, low-risk means of flexing geopolitical power. Given the increasing reliance on digital communications, the use of online disinformation and fake information networks is only likely to increase, said Max Lesser, senior analyst for emerging threats at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a national security think tank in Washington.

“We’re going to see a widening of the playing field when it comes to influence operations, where it’s not just Russia, China and Iran but you also see smaller actors getting involved,” Lesser said.

That list could include not only nations but also criminal organizations, domestic extremist groups and terrorist organizations, Lesser said.

When analysts first noticed Spamouflage five years ago, the network tended to post generically pro-China, anti-American content. In recent years, the tone sharpened as Spamouflage expanded and began focusing on divisive political topics like gun control, crime, race relations and support for Israel during its war in Gaza. The network also began creating large numbers of fake accounts designed to mimic American users.

Spamouflage accounts don't post much original content, instead using platforms like X or TikTok to recycle and repost content from far-right and far-left users. Some of the accounts seemed designed to appeal to Republicans, while others cater to Democrats.

While Harlan's accounts succeeded in getting traction — one video mocking President Joe Biden was seen 1.5 million times — many of the accounts created by the Spamouflage campaign did not. It's a reminder that online influence operations are often a numbers game: the more accounts, the more content, the better the chance that one specific post goes viral.

Many of the accounts newly linked to Spamouflage took pains to pose as Americans, sometimes in obvious ways. “I am an American,” one of the accounts proclaimed. Some of the accounts gave themselves away by using stilted English or strange word choices. Some were clumsier than others: “Broken English, brilliant brain, I love Trump,” read the biographical section of one account.

Harlan's profile picture, which Graphika researchers believe was created using AI, was identical to one used in an earlier account linked to Spamouflage. Messages sent to the person operating Harlan’s accounts were not returned.

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

25. The Year of Elections Has Been Good for Democracy

We must ensure a peaceful transfer of power regardless of the victor. If we are not committed to that, all may be lost.

The Year of Elections Has Been Good for Democracy

But the Biggest Test Will Come in America

By Francis Fukuyama

September 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Francis Fukuyama · September 4, 2024

Liberals have engaged in a lot of catastrophic thinking during this “year of elections.” Many feared that authoritarian and populist politicians, from Hungary’s Viktor Orban to India’s Narendra Modi, would consolidate their gains by increasing their shares of the vote. According to Freedom House’s February 2024 Freedom in the World analysis, the world has been in a phase of democratic backsliding for nearly two decades, exacerbated by the rise of authoritarian great powers such as China and Russia, hot wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the ascendance or advancement of populist nationalists in countries that seemed to be securely democratic—Germany, Hungary, India, and Italy.

For liberals who want to preserve a world safe for democracies, perhaps the most alarming point came in mid-July, when Republicans confirmed former President Donald Trump as their party’s presidential nominee and ultra-MAGA JD Vance as his running mate. Although Trump tried to overturn the 2020 U.S. election, he was nonetheless the enthusiastic choice of his party. He had just survived an assassination attempt; his raised fists and call to “fight, fight, fight” drew a sharp contrast with the elderly sitting president, Joe Biden, whose debate performance the previous month made him a clear underdog.

But liberals’ fears that this year would reflect the global triumph of illiberal populism have so far been proved wrong. Although authoritarian ideologies have made clear gains in several countries, democracy in many parts of the world has shown surprising resilience and may yet prevail in the United States. Their belief in the trend of democratic decline has led many liberals to wring their hands and ask despairingly whether they can do anything to reverse it. The answers to this question are simple and boring: go out with your fellow citizens and vote or, if you are more actively inclined, work hard to mobilize like-minded people to help democratic politicians win elections. Liberal democracy is all about personal agency, and there is little evidence that traditional political engagement no longer works.

THE YEAR OF ELECTIONS

The year of elections is so named because an all-time-high number of citizens worldwide went to the polls; nearly 30 countries are holding elections that are both defining and competitive. This pivotal year really began in late 2023, most critically with the Polish election on October 15 that dethroned the populist Law and Justice party (PiS) and replaced it with a coalition of liberal parties. Law and Justice had been following a path blazed by Hungary’s right-wing Fidesz party, but the strong cooperation between Poland’s Civic Platform and other left-of-center parties—whose members worked hard to overcome their past differences and held massive rallies to get out the vote—drove a 41-seat loss for PiS, which also lost its majority in Poland’s lower house of parliament, the Sejm. This represented a major setback for populism in Europe, depriving Hungary of a major ally within the EU. The only other country in eastern Europe to move in a populist direction was Slovakia, as Robert Fico returned as prime minister in October and vowed to end his country’s strong support for Ukraine. Slovakia’s pro-Western president, Zuzana Caputova, declined to run for a second term and was succeeded this June by Fico’s ally Peter Pellegrini, who, like Fico, is more sympathetic to Russia. Although populists made gains, Slovakia remains a deeply polarized nation; in May, a would-be assassin shot Fico because of the prime minister’s opposition to military aid for Ukraine.

In November 2023, Javier Milei defeated Sergio Massa in the second-round presidential vote in Argentina. Many in the United States understood Milei to be an Argentine Trump, given his antiestablishment personal style and embrace of the former U.S. president. But Milei was riding a wave of popular disgust with the ruling Peronists, who had led the country into deep economic stagnation. Although many populists embrace a strong state bent on enforcing conservative cultural values, Milei is a genuine libertarian. The early success of his economic stabilization program allowed him to retain his popularity despite having a weak base in the Argentine National Congress. The chief danger Milei poses is not that he will move in an authoritarian direction but that he will go too far in weakening the Argentine state.

Liberals’ fears that this year would reflect the global triumph of illiberal populism have so far been proved wrong.

Early 2024 saw mixed results for democracy. In January, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party defeated the pro-Chinese Kuomintang, and Finland remained in a solidly democratic camp. In both cases, the winning parties had worked quietly but vigorously to build their legislative majorities. On the other hand, the following month, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele was reelected president with a remarkable 85 percent of the vote—a reward for having dramatically decreased crime by using extrajudicial means to incarcerate a large part of the country’s gang leadership. In running for a second term, Bukele flouted the Salvadoran constitutional prohibition against consecutive reelection; he may well remain in power for years to come. The trend toward rewarding strongmen continued with the election of Prabowo Subianto to the Indonesian presidency. Human rights groups have accused Prabowo, a former special forces commander, of committing war crimes during Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste in the 1980s and 1990s; he had been banned from traveling to the United States from 2000 until 2020, when Trump’s State Department granted him a visa. But his victory may not have reflected anything more than the enormous popularity of his predecessor, Joko Widodo, whose legacy Prabowo has claimed he will perpetuate.

In Bangladesh, the corrupt Awami League party led by Sheikh Hasina held on to power in January amid countrywide protests against her rule. Her success, however, would prove to be transitory, as renewed protests after the election led Hasina to flee the country in early August. Whether Bangladesh can reclaim a democratic mantle is not certain, but it is clear that a huge number of citizens were fed up with a ruler who had been in power for 20 of the last 28 years.

POPULIST REMEDIES REJECTED

The middle of the year brought two important elections, in South Africa and Mexico, that did not fit easily into the populist-versus-liberal framework. In South Africa, the African National Congress, which had dominated the country’s politics since it transitioned to democracy in 1994, lost 71 seats and its majority in the National Assembly. The rise of a new party, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), associated with the country’s corrupt former president Jacob Zuma, was troubling, but in the aftermath of the election, the ANC went into a coalition not with MK but with the Democratic Alliance, a party that tends to represent white and so-called colored, or mixed race, voters. The DA gained three parliamentary seats, and the radical left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters party lost five. For all the corruption scandals and economic decline that South Africa has experienced in the past decade, the 2024 election was in some ways reassuring. Voters held the ANC accountable for its corrupt stewardship of the country and did not turn wholeheartedly to populist remedies.

Mexico similarly demonstrated the strength of its democratic culture. Liberal analysts have characterized the country’s sitting president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, as a Latin American populist, but he was popular against the backdrop of a corrupt and ineffective establishment. In daily speeches, he railed against the corrupt oligarchy that had ruled Mexico for decades. He dialed back the war against narcotraffickers, whichbrought a momentary reduction of violence while failing to solve an underlying problem that will plague Mexico for years to come.. And he initiated a number of pro-poor policies while largely maintaining fiscal discipline. As the country’s first decidedly left-wing president since the 1920 Mexican Revolution, he became extremely popular, and his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, won the presidency in June by more than 30 points over her conservative rival. Sheinbaum’s party, Morena, also won a supermajority in the Mexican Congress, giving it the option of changing the constitution after she takes office. López Obrador displayed many illiberal tendencies during his presidency, and his parting gift to the country will be a so-called reform of Mexico’s judiciary that, in fact, will severely weaken the institution’s independence. But it is not clear how Sheinbaum will use her substantial power once she comes into office. She does not seem to have inherited any of López Obrador’s zealotry. Barring any surprises, she is better thought of as a left-of-center Latin American politician than a left-wing populist.

Another pivotal election was in India, where the vote occurred in stages between mid-April and early June. Prime Minister Modi—a charter member of the populist-nationalist club who had weakened his country’s media, courts, and civil liberties—was expected to increase the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s majority in India’s lower house, the Lok Sabha. Instead, the BJP lost its majority and was forced to enter into a coalition with other parties. Its losses were particularly great in its former northern Indian heartland, where it shed 49 seats, including 29 in the poor state of Uttar Pradesh.

Less globally influential but still significant was the election in Mongolia at the end of June. Wedged between Russia and China, the country has been the only state in central Eurasia to realize and maintain a democracy after exiting Moscow’s orbit following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But the ruling Mongolian People’s Party, the successor to the Soviet-era Communist Party, turned in an increasingly authoritarian and pro-Russian direction between 2022 and 2024. The election, however, saw the opposition Democratic Party more than double its seat count as voters rejected a system pervaded by corruption. This outcome did not make headlines in the West, but it demonstrated the power ordinary voters can wield to defend democracy.

UNSETTLING SHIFTS

Elections to the European Parliament took place in early June. Populist parties such as the Freedom Party in Austria, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) in France, the Alternative for Germany, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy all made gains. Across the 27-member bloc, the biggest losers were the Socialists and the Greens. This shift was unsettling but did not amount to the earthquake that some had predicted. Center and center-right parties such as Germany’s Christian Democratic Union and Poland’s Civic Platform hung onto or even increased their vote shares. Poland’s Law and Justice party lost seats, as did Fidesz in Hungary, where a dissident party member, Peter Magyar, split the vote by forming his own party following a corruption scandal in Fidesz.

The European Parliament election’s two most disturbing results came in France and Italy. Le Pen’s RN party swamped French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist coalition, winning more than twice the vote share. This caused Macron to declare a snap national election at the end of June. The RN gained 37 seats, and the leftist alliance, the New Popular Front, added 32; for a moment, it looked as if the RN’s young standard-bearer, Jordan Bardella, was headed toward the prime minister’s office. But in the second round of voting in early July, the center and left parties withdrew their weaker candidates, and the RN was once again locked out of power. This happened only because the left-wing parties’ cooperated to streamline their candidates—the boring but necessary work of politics that previous coalitions had failed to do.

In Italy, the situation is less promising. In the European Parliament elections, Meloni’s populist Brothers of Italy increased its vote share substantially, and her right-wing coalition holds a comfortable majority in the Italian parliament. Meloni, who became prime minister in late 2022, initially portrayed herself as a centrist. Early in her tenure, she broke with pro-Russian populists such as Orban and Fico by expressing strong support for Ukraine, and many commentators speculated that she would back European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s bid for a second term. But after the EU parliament vote, she shifted to the right, and her party voted for only conditional support for Ukraine and opposed von der Leyen’s reelection.

The one large European country to hold an election without the threat that a rising populist party would gain power was the United Kingdom, where in early July, the Labour Party achieved a decisive victory over the Conservatives. The Tories had been in power for 14 years under five prime ministers and had led the country into prolonged economic stagnation by, among other things, supporting Brexit. When the Labour Party replaced its far-left leader, Jeremy Corbyn, with the more moderate Keir Starmer, voters responded favorably. Populist firebrands such as Nigel Farage were still around; his right-wing Reform UK party won 14 percent of the vote, more than the Liberal Democrats, who secured 12 percent. But Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system kept him far from power.

DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

There are still a number of important elections to come: in Moldova, where the liberal President Maia Sandu is likely to win reelection, and in Georgia, where the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party has a good chance of retaining power. But the most important election by far is the one occurring on November 5 in the United States between Trump and the Democratic candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris. At the time of the Republican National Convention in mid-July, a Trump victory against an aging Biden looked likely, but with Biden’s decision to step aside, the Democrats have been suddenly energized. Numerous polls, both nationally and in many of the critical swing states, now show Harris ahead of her opponent.

The outcome of the American election will have huge implications both for American institutions and for the world. Trump has expressed strong admiration for authoritarian leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, and at home, he has promised to weaken checks on executive power. He will almost certainly end U.S. support for Ukraine and has expressed great skepticism about the value of alliances such as NATO. He has vowed to end trade relations with China and to impose a ten percent across-the-board tariff on all foreign-produced goods. The Republican Party has decidedly abandoned the libertarian policies of the Ronald Reagan years and pledges to wield state power in the service of conservative ends.

But thus far, the year of elections has not been a terrible one for democracy worldwide. Populist and authoritarian parties and leaders have made gains in some countries, but they have lost in others. Citizens have expressed their opposition to authoritarian governance in other ways, as well. In July, Venezuelans voted overwhelmingly in favor of the opposition candidate Edmundo González, leading the regime of Nicolás Maduro to commit massive fraud in declaring him the winner. Maduro’s regime can survive only by turning openly authoritarian and abandoning any shred of democratic legitimacy. And in Myanmar, where a military junta abolished elections following a coup in 2021, an armed insurgency that allies the junta’s democratic opposition to a number of ethnic militias is making substantial territorial gains.

The outcome of the American election will have huge implications both for American institutions and for the world.

Elections by themselves do not guarantee good policies or outcomes. What they provide is the opportunity to hold leaders accountable for policy failures and to reward them for perceived successes. Elections become dangerous when they elevate leaders who do not just seek to impose questionable policies but also hope to weaken or undermine basic liberal and democratic institutions. In this respect, the United States has become something of an outlier. In no European or Asian democracy has a leader recently arisen who has blatantly refused to accept the outcome of an election or provoked popular violence to avoid stepping down from power. The willingness of many Republican voters to normalize the events of January 6, 2021, is a symptom of weakening democratic norms in the world’s leading democracy—a signal that will be picked up by like-minded populists (such as the supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who imitated the January 6 rioters when they stormed their Congress in 2023) if Trump returns to the White House in November.

The lesson to be drawn from the year of elections so far is that the rise of populist and authoritarian politicians is not inevitable. Democratic backsliding can and has been resisted in many countries that hold elections. But democratic norms cannot be secured with violence, judicial remedies (for example, the use of the 14th Amendment to disqualify Trump), the rise of a new charismatic leader, or any other quick fix. What remains effective is the steady, often boring work of democratic politics: making arguments, convincing and mobilizing voters, adjusting policies, building coalitions, and, if necessary, making compromises where the best gives way to the possible. Even in a dispiriting time for global democracy, citizens still have agency to move toward better futures.

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and is Director of Stanford’s Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy.

Foreign Affairs · by Francis Fukuyama · September 4, 2024

26. How to Keep the Peace in Gaza

Excerpts:

In the meantime, there are steps the United States can take to lay the groundwork for a successful international mission, even if circumstances are far from perfect. UN Security Council Resolution 2735, which outlines the contours of a cease-fire, was adopted in June and forms the basis for the ongoing mediation between Israel and Hamas. The United States should build on this success by creating a contact group to support the resolution and coordinate the international response in Gaza. The contact group could also deploy a multinational maritime force off the coast of Gaza to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and counter weapons smuggling.

The United States should also reopen channels of communication between Israel, the PA, and UN agencies. Doing so would help ease the flow of aid and ensure that the appropriate types of assistance reach the right places. For now, the safety of aid workers remains a serious concern, and the internal distribution of aid is frequently blocked by the ongoing fighting and by Israeli security procedures.

As unrealistic as it seems today, the eventual deployment of an international peacekeeping mission may be the best hope to solidify a cease-fire and begin the long road toward recovery for Gazans. Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders must do everything in their power to set the stage for such a mission. The people of Gaza cannot wait for the perfect conditions to emerge.

How to Keep the Peace in Gaza

Once the Fighting Stops, an International Mission Would Be the Least Bad Option

By Jonathan Lincoln

September 4, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Lincoln · September 4, 2024

For more than ten months, the war in the Gaza Strip has raged on with catastrophic consequences. Israel has considerably weakened Hamas’s military capabilities, but at the cost of a staggering death toll and massive destruction. Although Hamas may no longer be a serious threat to Israel, the group will likely survive in some form.

As Washington and governments in the region desperately search for an end to the fighting and an arrangement for the day after, many are turning to the idea of deploying an international peacekeeping mission to Gaza. They hope that an international mission might enforce a cease-fire, stabilize the devastated territory, and eventually rebuild it. And although the authorization and deployment of such a mission seems far-fetched now, there are indications that Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA)—which governs parts of the West Bank—and a growing number of Arab countries are becoming more amenable to the idea. In July, Lana Nusseibeh, an Emirati diplomat, announced that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would be willing to contribute forces to a “temporary international mission” in Gaza, making it the first country to do so.

A peacekeeping mission may be the best way to help Gaza heal. Indeed, the brutality of Hamas’s October 7 attack and the subsequent carnage in Gaza have made a return to the status quo ante impossible. Rebuilding Gaza will take years and require extraordinary levels of funding and mobilization. Potential donors are unlikely to send the necessary funds as long as Hamas remains in power. The PA in its current form can’t stabilize or rebuild Gaza on its own. And if Israeli forces remain on the ground, their presence will hamper any meaningful effort to provide relief. A massive international effort is required to provide law and order, reopen schools and hospitals, clean up the rubble, and remove unexploded ordnance.

Recent peacekeeping missions hardly have a perfect record. The United States, for example, catastrophically failed to create an alternative to Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and the UN mission in Mali was kicked out by a military junta last year. A growing number of critics argue that peacekeeping interventions are ineffective and simply cannot manage complex political transitions. Although many of the criticisms are valid, it is a mistake to conflate peacekeeping missions with the political processes they are meant to accompany. Peacekeeping operations are meant to be only short-term measures to facilitate political changes, never solutions to conflicts in and of themselves. And some peacekeeping missions, including in the Middle East, have helped end wars, reinforce agreements, and prevent military escalations.

An international mission can work in Gaza, but Israel, the PA, and the United States will have to set the conditions for its success. Washington must better coordinate humanitarian efforts among its partners. Israeli and Palestinian leaders will need to make tough concessions to convince countries that a mission is worth joining. And, above all, Israel and Hamas will have to agree to a cease-fire.

THE BIRTHPLACE OF PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping as a concept was born out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first modern armed multinational peacekeeping body, the UN Emergency Force, was created following the 1956 Suez crisis, when the United Kingdom, France, and Israel invaded Egypt to seize the Suez Canal. UNEF oversaw Israel’s withdrawal from the Egyptian territories of Sinai and Gaza and remained deployed on the Egyptian side of the cease-fire lines for just over ten years to reduce tensions and deter fighting. UNEF was initially seen as a massive success for the nascent UN. Member states clamored to contribute troops. The Eisenhower administration considered it a major diplomatic victory, especially since it came during the Soviet invasion of Hungary, one of the tensest moments in the Cold War.

But just a decade after the force’s creation, the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt that was bolstered by UNEF’s deployment collapsed. UNEF’s fatal flaw, which plagues most peacekeeping missions to this day, is that it required the legal consent of a belligerent to deploy on its territory—Egypt, in UNEF’s case. As a result, UNEF was vulnerable to Cairo’s whims, and in 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser revoked his consent for the mission, and the UN decided to withdraw the emergency force. Nasser’s decision helped spark the Six-Day War, which profoundly transformed the nature of the conflict and resulted in Israel’s occupation of Gaza.

Peacekeeping as a concept was born out of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Peacekeeping forces continued to deploy to various fault lines in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1974, for example, the UN Disengagement Observer Force was created to strengthen the agreement between Israel and Syria that ended the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This force, still in place today, maintains a buffer zone along the cease-fire lines in the Golan Heights. Despite periods of volatility, both countries continue to abide by it. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, brokered by the United States, created the Multinational Force and Observers, a non-UN peacekeeping force that supervises the implementation of the treaty and is now made up of troops from 13 countries.

Other missions have been more fraught. The history of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon shows the difficulties of working in a territory with strong nonstate actors and a governance vacuum, as is the case in Gaza today. UNIFIL originally deployed in 1978 to oversee Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory that the Israelis had seized while battling Palestinian militants. UNIFIL’s current mandate derives from UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia considered by most Western governments to be a terrorist group. The resolution outlined the cease-fire provisions and called for a significant increase in the deployment of troops to act as a deterrent. At the time, that was enough to facilitate a cessation of hostilities.

But Resolution 1701 was never fully implemented. Hezbollah, it turned out, was determined to rebuild its arsenal in southern Lebanon in violation of the resolution. UNIFIL was never in a position—nor did it have the mandate—to confront Hezbollah. For a time, many considered even a hamstrung UNIFIL better than no mission at all. But the October 7 attack and subsequent renewal of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah have changed things. Now, any international force deployed along the Blue Line dividing Lebanon from Israel will need to be overhauled.

A MODEL FOR GAZA?

The peacekeeping missions that have been deployed in the Middle East to date all belong to the first generation of peacekeeping, known as “interposition” forces. These missions are limited to basic and mostly symbolic tasks. They serve as buffers between belligerent forces and can report on and facilitate the implementation of treaties or agreements. They might, for example, check that each side is abiding by limits on the deployment of weapons in a specific area.

But Gaza requires something far more complex, a mission along the lines of the those deployed in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. These more comprehensive missions involve a broad configuration of UN and international agencies and, in addition to providing security, can serve as temporary administrations. They can help offer humanitarian and development assistance; support local authorities by reinstating law and order; provide critical services such as health, education, and electricity; and facilitate an internationally supported rebuilding effort. Still, people in Gaza have experienced more death, destruction, and lawlessness than those did in either Kosovo or Timor-Leste.

For an international deployment to work, several conditions must be met. For starters, Israel and Hamas must agree to a cease-fire. Hamas must give way to a new administration of Gaza led by the PA, which would ask the Security Council to deploy a mission. At the same time, in exchange for a peacekeeping mission, Israel would need to agree to pull its forces out of the mission’s area of operations. Israel would also have to cooperate with a reformed PA and allow the movement of goods and people into the territory with international supervision. A peacekeeping mission can’t be effective if it is seen as an extension of Israel’s regime.

A peacekeeping mission can’t be effective if it is seen as an extension of Israel’s regime.

Given the level of acrimony between Israel and the UN, the Israeli government is unlikely to accept a mission that is run fully by the UN. Israeli officials have made no secret of their disdain for the international body, which they blame for some of their security concerns. Israel, for example, has accused some UN staff of participating in the October 7 attacks, has argued that UN support in Gaza has entrenched Hamas’s rule, and has criticized UNIFIL for failing to stop Hezbollah’s rearmament. Although these criticisms are not entirely fair, bad relations between Israel and the UN could poison a peacekeeping mission. Regardless of exactly whose aegis a peacekeeping mission was under, UN agencies would still need to form the backbone of the actual humanitarian and development response on the ground. There is precedent for the UN taking a supporting role: in Timor-Leste, for example, Australia led an international peacekeeping force that laid the groundwork for a subsequent UN mission. Most of the actual troops for a mission in Gaza, meanwhile, would have to come from the UAE and other Arab states, with the United States orchestrating the overall effort. This means devising the concept of operations for the mission and supporting its logistics—but stopping short of deploying American boots on the ground.

If a peacekeeping mission is going to have buy-in from Arab countries—which would make it more palatable to the Palestinians—Israel and the PA will need to make some tough concessions and reforms. The UAE has said that it is willing to contribute to a peacekeeping force only if, first, the PA invites the deployment, undergoes significant reforms, and is empowered by Israel to take the lead in rebuilding Gaza and, second, the United States makes a renewed commitment to a two-state solution. Other Arab countries would likely demand at least as much in exchange for joining a mission.

Neither Israel nor the PA appears ready to meet the UAE’s conditions. Both sides suffer from political polarization, the trauma of extreme violence, and bad leadership. The PA is corrupt, repressive, and deeply unpopular. Israel is ruled by its most right-wing government in history, one that is deeply hostile to the PA and has presided over the country’s worst military disaster ever. Opposition to a Palestinian state within Israel has also skyrocketed since October 7. The United States and its partners should apply pressure to encourage the transformations needed on both sides. Although these probably won’t materialize any time soon, the imperative for intervention in Gaza will only grow. It is unlikely that every condition for successful peacekeeping will be met before such a mission becomes essential.

MISSION: POSSIBLE

In the meantime, there are steps the United States can take to lay the groundwork for a successful international mission, even if circumstances are far from perfect. UN Security Council Resolution 2735, which outlines the contours of a cease-fire, was adopted in June and forms the basis for the ongoing mediation between Israel and Hamas. The United States should build on this success by creating a contact group to support the resolution and coordinate the international response in Gaza. The contact group could also deploy a multinational maritime force off the coast of Gaza to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and counter weapons smuggling.

The United States should also reopen channels of communication between Israel, the PA, and UN agencies. Doing so would help ease the flow of aid and ensure that the appropriate types of assistance reach the right places. For now, the safety of aid workers remains a serious concern, and the internal distribution of aid is frequently blocked by the ongoing fighting and by Israeli security procedures.

As unrealistic as it seems today, the eventual deployment of an international peacekeeping mission may be the best hope to solidify a cease-fire and begin the long road toward recovery for Gazans. Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders must do everything in their power to set the stage for such a mission. The people of Gaza cannot wait for the perfect conditions to emerge.

JONATHAN LINCOLN is Director of the Center for Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. From 2017 to 2021, he served as Senior Coordination Officer at the office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

Foreign Affairs · by Jonathan Lincoln · September 4, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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