​Quotes of the Day:

"And every time I hear a political speech, or I read those of our leaders, I am horrified at having, for years, heard nothing which sounded human. It is always the same words telling the same lies. And the fact that men except this, that the peoples anger has not destroyed these hollow clowns, strikes me as proof that men attribute no importance to the way. They are governed; that they gamble – yes, gamble – with a whole part of their life and their so-called 'vital interests.'"

– Albert Camus

"Each generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it, and wiser than the one that comes after it. This is an illusion, and one should recognize it as such, but one ought also to stick to one's own world-view, even at the price of seeming old-fashioned: for that world-view springs out of experiences that the younger generation has not had, and to abandon it is to kill one's intellectual roots."

– George Orwell

"Let me never fall into the vulgar mistake of dreaming that I am persecuted whenever I am contradicted."

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

1. Voice of America - Analysis of allegations of left leaning bias

2. Shrouded in Mystery, Kim’s Young Daughter Softens His Image in China

3. The 5 key takeaways from China’s Victory Day military parade

4. Kim Jong-un’s New Hwasong-20 ICBM May Carry Multiple Warheads With Russian Help

5. Xi, Putin, Kim Jong Un unite at glitzy China military parade

6. Trust Before Disarmament: A Realistic Path To North Korea’s Denuclearization – OpEd

7. Modi, Lee, and Trump’s Nobel Prize Obsession

8. S Korea muscling into SE Asia's open arms market

9. North Korea’s Window on the World Is at Risk of Closing

10. Trump’s warning on digital rules was aimed at this country

11. North Korea's hidden wildlife trade: New research reveals state involvement

12. Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping hold first summit in six years

13. Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping hold talks in Beijing, day after China’s military parade

14. UN voices concern about North Korean experiments on people with disabilities

15. ROK lawmaker recounts cool reception from North Korean officials at China parade

16. What we know about Kim Ju-ae’s staged rise

17. S. Korean military to boost unmanned capabilities by training 500,000 ‘drone warriors’

18. Defense chief unveils plan to foster drone capabilities across military

19. S. Korea's arms agency, Polish gov't discuss bilateral defense cooperation

20. Hanwha Aerospace agrees to co-develop battlefield management system with Estonian firms

21. Nat'l Assembly speaker asks China's Zhao to 'prudently' handle Yellow Sea issue

22. North Korea orders trial deployment of nuclear underwater drones in East Sea

1. Voice of America - Analysis of allegations of left leaning bias

​I have been chastised by some for my support of Voice of America and my position that it is a serious national security mistake for our nation.

I have been told that the majority of the American people think it is a leftist organization that does not support America. I vehemently disagree with that allegation. So I decided to ask my "research assistant" (AI) to do some research for me and for anyone who is interested. 

However, to put VOA in context it is important to understand its mission, the "firewall," and the charter that it operates under. Please review these before you read my "research assistant's" analysis.

Here is the prompt I used. I focused on the CRInK since they are our main national security threat.

Prompt: Please analyze Voice of America for left leaning bias. Specifically look at the China, Russia, Iran, and Korean services. Are these services living up to the VOA mission statement and VOA charter and vision? Did they exploit the VOA charter and firewall? Or have they been exemplars of the free press and uphold American values as an example to the world and especially to oppressed peoples living under authoritarian regimes?

I​ offer this because most people who engage with me on this have no idea what VOA does and they have no first hand experience with it. They appear to be basing their criticism and judgement on the media they subscribe to. 

Of course the other issue is that this is merely a test case to prove the unitary executive theory of government and an interpretation of the Constitutional clause that says all executive power is vest in the president. VOA , USIP, USAID, etc are all tests of executive authority. It will be interesting to see how all this plays out in the Supreme Court eventually.

Mission, Firewall and Charter

insidevoa.com

VOA Mission

Voice of America (VOA) is the largest U.S. international broadcaster, providing news and information in nearly 50 languages to an estimated weekly audience of more than 354 million people. VOA produces content for digital, television, and radio platforms. It is easily accessed via your mobile phone and on social media. It is also distributed by satellite, cable, FM and MW, and is carried on a network of more than 3,500 affiliate stations.

Since its creation in 1942, Voice of America has been committed to providing comprehensive coverage of the news and telling audiences the truth. Through World War II, the Cold War, the fight against global terrorism, and the struggle for freedom around the globe today, VOA exemplifies the principles of a free press.

VOA is part of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), the government agency that oversees all non-military, U.S. international broadcasting. It is funded by the U.S. Congress.

VOA Firewall

An essential guarantee of the journalistic credibility of Voice of America content is the “firewall” enshrined in the 1994 U.S. International Broadcasting Act. The firewall prohibits interference by any U.S. government official in the objective, independent reporting of news, thereby safeguarding the ability of our journalists to develop content that reflects the highest professional standards of journalism, free of political interference. USAGM reforms contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 maintained the longstanding statutory firewall language protecting the professional independence of VOA and all other USAGM journalists. The firewall ensures that VOA can make the final decisions on what stories to cover, and how they are covered.

• 
  
• Who We Are, What We Do

VOA Charter

The Charter was signed into law by President Gerald R. Ford on July 12, 1976. The Charter protects the editorial independence and integrity of VOA programming.

The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts:

1. VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies.

insidevoa.com

​Response:

Here’s a sober, source-based check on whether VOA’s four language services you named skew “left,” abuse the Charter/firewall, or uphold the mission.

What VOA is supposed to do (the yardstick)

• VOA Charter (Public Law 94-350): (1) be a reliable, accurate, objective, comprehensive news source; (2) represent America, not any single segment of society; (3) present U.S. policies and responsible discussion of those policies. (USAGM)
• The “firewall”: legally protects editorial independence from political interference; it separates journalism from everyone else in the organization. (USAGM)
• Independent oversight reality check: State/OIG’s targeted inspection (covering mid-2020→late-2021) found some leadership actions during that period negatively impacted editorial independence, and also found VOA and other networks needed clearer procedures; the report issued nine fixes, which USAGM/VOA accepted and marked implemented. In short: some turbulence, then remediation steps. (Office of Inspector General)

China (VOA Mandarin/Cantonese)

Signals of independence / mission-fit

• Chinese authorities routinely censor or jam U.S. international media; USAGM documents this and invests in circumvention tools—consistent with VOA’s mission to reach blocked audiences. (USAGM)

Controversies often cited as “bias”

• 2017 Guo Wengui interview was cut short; critics alleged PRC pressure and internal bias; VOA leadership framed it as a standards call. It remains a lightning-rod incident used by critics. (USAGMWatch.com)
• 2025 “CCP infiltration” claims against VOA Mandarin were publicly rebutted by prominent China experts, who argued the accusations were misrepresented and that VOA remains a key counter to PRC disinformation. (The Washington Post)

Bottom line: No credible, independent study shows a systemic left-leaning tilt in VOA China coverage. What you do see are contentious editorial calls in a heavily targeted beat, plus recent political crossfire. On balance, available evidence points to a newsroom trying to meet the Charter under pressure, not to partisan capture. (Office of Inspector General, The Washington Post)

Russia (VOA Russian)

Signals of independence / mission-fit

• Blocked by Roskomnadzor in March 2022 for coverage of the Ukraine war; being censored by the Kremlin is a strong external indicator of adversarial, not pro-Kremlin, coverage. (Voice of America, Voice of America, Committee to Protect Journalists)
• USAGM expanded delivery via affiliates and circumvention tools around Russia, consistent with mission execution under censorship. (USAGM)

Bottom line: There’s no persuasive evidence of a left-leaning editorial line in VOA Russian. If anything, the platform’s blocking by Moscow and focus on independent reporting align with the Charter’s accuracy/independence mandate. (Voice of America, USAGM)

Iran (VOA Persian)

Signals of independence / mission-fit

• The IRGC and Tehran’s courts have targeted VOA Persian journalists (including secret convictions and a plotted assassination of a VOA host)—which is hard to square with claims that the service is friendly to the regime. (USAGM, Voice of America)

Controversies often cited as “bias”

• Long-running critiques from some U.S. officials and commentators (e.g., “Voice of the Mullahs” 2020 post; 2025 White House release referencing a 2022 lawsuit) claim poor performance or partisan tilt; these are allegations, not neutral audits. (2017-2021.state.gov, The White House)
• Academic work finds some VOA Persian programming can be advocacy-adjacent (“soft news in soft war”)—more about tone/format than left/right ideology. (SAGE Journals)

Bottom line: Evidence is mixed on quality/format over the years, but there’s no solid, peer-reviewed basis for a left-leaning partisan slant. Regime hostility toward VOA Persian suggests it’s perceived as oppositional, not sympathetic. (USAGM, Voice of America)

Korea (VOA Korean)

Signals of independence / mission-fit (until 2025 cuts)

• In 2023, VOA Korean quietly began TV broadcasts into North Korea using ROK government towers—a rare breakthrough for reach into a closed information space. (Columbia Journalism Review)

What changed in 2025

• Investigative reporting indicates the program—and then VOA Korean staffing—were abruptly ended amid USAGM/VOA cuts, undermining U.S. messaging into the North. This is about capacity and political interference, not “left bias.” (Columbia Journalism Review)

Editorial slant?

• Critics in Seoul sometimes argue all international media (VOA included) can over-index on “crazy North Korea” narratives; VOA editors counter they adhere to Charter standards in an extremely hard beat. That’s a debate about rigor, not left/right ideology. (Columbia Journalism Review)

Bottom line: No evidence of a left-leaning partisan skew. The bigger issue is strategic rollback of the service in 2025—counter to the Charter’s spirit of reaching oppressed populations. (Columbia Journalism Review)

Did they exploit the Charter or firewall?

• OIG documents leadership actions (2020 timeframe) that hurt editorial independence; it does not conclude the language services “exploited” the firewall. It recommended improvements—which VOA/USAGM implemented. (Office of Inspector General)
• 2025 turmoil (mass layoffs, attempted leadership removals, program shutdowns) raises fresh firewall concerns about political interference into journalism—not the other way around. Federal courts have stepped in to block some actions. (Politico, The Guardian, AP News)

Overall assessment (based on what’s publicly verifiable today)

• Systemic “left-leaning bias” across the China, Russia, Iran, and Korean services is not supported by credible, neutral evidence. You’ll find incidents and allegations, but also strong counter-indicators (censorship by adversary regimes; attacks on VOA journalists; and independent oversight insisting on standards). (Voice of America, Committee to Protect Journalists, USAGM)
• On mission: Historically, these services largely did operationalize the Charter under difficult constraints. The 2025 downsizing/shutdown moves—not newsroom ideology—are what most threaten mission delivery to oppressed audiences right now. (Politico, The Guardian)

If you want, I can run a compact, apples-to-apples content audit (e.g., 100-story samples per service, code frames for balance/sourcing/stance, and compare to the Charter). That would make any bias—or balance—quantifiable.

• The Washington Post
• Politico
• The Guardian
• AP News
• The Washington Post

Here’s the apples-to-apples content audit you asked for—focused on VOA’s China (Mandarin), Russia, Iran (Persian), and Korean services—and tested against the VOA Charter and the USAGM editorial firewall.

What I did (quick, comparable, and current)

• Window & sample: Feb–Sep 2025, 3 straight-news pieces per service (12 total). I prioritized hard news (not editorials or opinion) that directly touches the regimes you named or U.S. policy toward them.
• Rubric (mapped to the VOA Charter):

1. Multiple viewpoints (does the story include competing/contrasting perspectives?),
2. U.S. policy representation (does it present U.S. policy and, where relevant, the surrounding debate?),
3. Authoritarian accountability (does it scrutinize the target regime’s actions?),
4. Tone (emotive/adjectival language in the reporter’s voice),
5. Sourcing transparency (named, checkable sources),
6. Corrections/labels (clearly marked if present).

• Standards referenced: VOA Charter (Public Law 94-350) and USAGM firewall rules (statutory/editorial independence). (Voice of America, USAGM)

Stories sampled (12)

VOA Mandarin (China)

1. State Dept concern DPRK directly aiding Russia’s war. (美国之音)
2. White House to VOA: Hamas must disarm before “creative” Gaza plan advances. (美国之音)
3. USTR thread highlights unfair trade & Uyghur forced labor concerns. (美国之音)

VOA Russian

4) Live text: Trump’s 2025 address to Congress. (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)

5) Norway intel: likely Russian sabotage attempts in 2025. (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)

6) Zelensky vows to stop Russia in 2025 (New Year). (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)

VOA Persian (Iran)

7) Prisoner dies after denial of medical care (Ghezel Hesar). (Voice of America)

8) Activists protest executions outside Evin prison. (Voice of America)

9) Raids on Baha’i homes; arrests. (Voice of America)

VOA Korean

10) DPRK still blocks UN humanitarian workers; expert context. (Voice of America)

11) Concern in Washington/Seoul over PRC disinformation; State Dept + PRC envoy quoted. (Voice of America)

12) US Dep. SecDef nominee: DPRK threat & missile defense need. (Voice of America)

Side-by-side results (rubric scores)

Service

Sample (n)

≥2 viewpoints

U.S. policy presented

Authoritarian accountability

Emotive language in reporter voice

Sourcing transparency

Corrections/labels

Chinese (Mandarin)

3

1/3 (33%)

3/3

2/3

0/3

3/3

0/3

Russian

3

1/3 (33%)

1/3

2/3

0/3

3/3

0/3

Persian

3

0/3

0/3

3/3

0/3

2–3/3*

0/3

Korean

3

2/3 (67%)

2/3

3/3

0/3

3/3

0/3

*Persian #7 relies on “VOA has learned…” language; the others cite visible sources/records. (Voice of America)

Read-outs & quick examples

• Mandarin: Heavy use of U.S. official sourcing (State Dept, White House, USTR) and accountability of PRC/DPRK; fewer explicit opposing quotes in straight government-action stories (typical of “govt statement” format). (美国之音)
• Russian: Straight coverage of Trump address and security topics; neutral style; not much explicit “debate” inside the short pieces, but topical context is clear. (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)
• Persian: Human-rights accountability dominates (medical neglect, executions, Baha’i persecution). Stories rarely include regime rebuttal (hard to obtain and often absent in state media), but sourcing is generally checkable or linked to recognized reports/imagery; tone remains neutral. (Voice of America)
• Korean: Consistently includes multiple voices (UN rapporteur and experts; State Dept + PRC ambassador; U.S. nominee testimony), with clear attribution and restrained tone. (Voice of America)

Does the coverage align with the VOA Charter and firewall?

VOA Charter, in brief: 1) accurate/objective/comprehensive news, 2) balanced/authoritative representation of America, 3) present U.S. policy clearly and offer responsible discussion of it. (Voice of America)

USAGM firewall: legally protects newsroom independence from outside (including political) interference. (USAGM)

Findings vs. Charter:

• Accuracy/neutral tone: All 12 stories are written in straight-news style with neutral wording; no emotive adjectives in reporter voice detected.
• Balanced representation: The Korean service most consistently included opposing/alternate voices (2/3). Mandarin and Russian samples included some counter-perspectives but often focused on official statements (typical for “government says” news). Persian rights reports rarely carry regime rebuttals—which is common when officials do not comment—but still meet accuracy/attribution standards.
• U.S. policy & debate: Mandarin (3/3) and Korean (2/3) clearly present U.S. positions; debate/context appears where relevant (e.g., Korean piece quotes both PRC ambassador and U.S. State Dept; Mandarin White House story references outside reporting). (Voice of America, 美国之音)

Firewall/exploitation check:

Nothing in this sample suggests political “direction” or firewall breach. The prevalence of official U.S. sourcing in Mandarin items reflects routine newsgathering on U.S. policy (which the Charter explicitly requires VOA to report), not advocacy; Persian/Korean stories include non-U.S. voices (UN rapporteur, PRC ambassador, independent experts). The independence framework is explicit and current in USAGM/VOA policy. (USAGM)

“Left-leaning bias” test (operationalized)

I looked for: (a) systematic favoring of progressive/Democratic voices over conservative/Republican ones, (b) emotive/advocacy language, (c) consistent omission of counter-views when available.

Result: In this snapshot, no evidence of systematic left-leaning bias.

• Mandarin stories prominently cite the Trump administration’s statements/positions (White House, State, USTR). (美国之音)
• Korean disinformation piece quotes both a PRC ambassador and a U.S. State Dept spokesperson, plus experts across the spectrum (including CPAC voices), which cuts against a single-ideology tilt. (Voice of America)
• Russian items are standard straight news/live coverage. (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)
• Persian items are human-rights accountability pieces (not U.S. partisan). (Voice of America)

If anything, the Mandarin sample leans toward official U.S. policy sourcing (currently Republican administration)—which is consistent with Charter §3’s requirement to present U.S. policy clearly, not a sign of left lean. (Voice of America)

Bottom line by service

• VOA Mandarin (China): Charter-consistent in tone and sourcing; could add more “right of reply” from PRC/Russia/DPRK spokespeople in government-action stories to strengthen “responsible discussion.” (美国之音)
• VOA Russian: Neutral delivery on U.S./Ukraine/Russia topics; greater inclusion of dissenting analysis would boost balance scores in short updates. (ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ)
• VOA Persian (Iran): Strong accountability focus; neutral tone. Limited regime rebuttals (often unavailable). Consider adding “we sought comment from X; none received” lines to make the outreach explicit. (Voice of America)
• VOA Korean: Best multi-voice performance in this small sample; frequent juxtaposition of U.S., PRC, DPRK, and expert perspectives. (Voice of America)

Recommendations (to test/strengthen compliance)

1. Systematic “right-of-reply” attempts: Where feasible, document outreach to PRC, DPRK, Russian, or Iranian officials (or embassies) in each relevant story (“X declined to comment by deadline”).
2. Policy-plus-debate format: For U.S. policy stories, routinely add a brief paragraph summarizing competing U.S. viewpoints (Hill reactions, allied concerns, expert dissent) to hit Charter §3 cleanly. (Voice of America)
3. Source diversity tick-box in workflows to ensure at least one non-government source (academic/NGO/industry) where time allows.

Verdict (for your specific questions)

• Are these services living up to the Charter/vision?
• Generally yes in this snapshot: neutral tone, checkable sourcing, accountability journalism, and clear presentation of U.S. policy when relevant. (Voice of America)
• Did they exploit the Charter/firewall?
• No evidence of exploitation in this sample; coverage patterns align with the legal firewall and the Charter’s requirement to present U.S. policy while maintaining independence. (USAGM)
• Exemplars of free-press values?
• Korean and Persian samples particularly showcase watchdog/reportorial functions under difficult conditions; Mandarin and Russian are straight-news heavy and would benefit from more explicit counter-voices, but remain within professional norms.

Notes & limits

This is a small, recent sample (12 pieces). If you want, I can scale this to a larger, fixed-window audit (e.g., 50 stories per service over the last 90 days) with automated coding fields and side-by-side charts—same rubric, just more power.

2. Shrouded in Mystery, Kim’s Young Daughter Softens His Image in China

​Appears that Kim's gamble paid off. He seems to have won a major propaganda victory.

Like the WSJ journalist, Ms. Yoon's fair and balanced reporting (which is real and not a tagline), I remain skeptical whether she is possibly preparing for a bigger role in the regime. I have to wonder if KJU is playing us.

Shrouded in Mystery, Kim’s Young Daughter Softens His Image in China

The girl, in what may have been her first overseas trip, softens her father’s image—and possibly prepares for a bigger role in North Korea

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-daughter-china-parade-3a5f2d4b

By Dasl Yoon

Follow

Sept. 4, 2025 2:50 am ET

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter were greeted by Chinese officials at Beijing Railway Station on Tuesday. Photo: KCNA/AFP/Getty Images

Quick Summary

• Kim Jong Un brought his daughter to China’s World War II celebration, sparking speculation about succession.View more

SEOUL—When Kim Jong Un stepped off his bulletproof train in Beijing for this week’s extravagant commemoration of China’s victory in World War II, a smiling young woman dressed in a demure navy pantsuit stood close behind the North Korean leader as he greeted China’s foreign minister.

The woman wasn’t North Korea’s first lady—it was Kim’s daughter.

On the railroad platform, Kim’s daughter, whose name and exact age are shrouded in secrecy, stood ahead of North Korea’s foreign minister and other senior officials. Her presence at a celebration that included the leaders of Russia, Iran and Belarus kicked up fresh speculation that Kim is grooming her to succeed him one day.

In recent years, she has accompanied her father to missile and satellite launches—high-profile events that Kim has used to showcase North Korea’s status as a nuclear power.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Un with his daughter in November 2022. Photo: Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/ZUMA Press

To be sure, Kim’s daughter appeared to otherwise play a minor role in Beijing, remaining largely unseen apart from her arrival Wednesday.

But her presence—in what may have been her first overseas trip—sent a clear signal, analysts say. “The Kim regime is normalizing the idea of her being the successor, or at least a very powerful presence in North Korea’s political system,” said Peter Ward, a North Korea researcher at the Sejong Institute think tank in Seoul. “She also helps humanize Kim’s image.”

While Kim may be grooming his daughter, she is too young to formally be designated as successor, say analysts. Moreover, Kim is only 41. His father, Kim Jong Il died at 69, while his grandfather died at 82. Kim’s grandfather founded North Korea and his son took over as leader on his death in 1994. 

It is unprecedented for a woman to take power in a dynasty dominated by men, although female members of the Kim family—including Kim Jong Un’s sister—have wielded considerable influence.

Traditionally, North Korea hasn’t revealed much about the Kim family members’ childhood. That allows the regime to carefully control the propaganda surrounding how they grew up.

Kim himself was largely hidden from the public view as a child. It only became known that he was selected as successor around three years before he assumed office. Kim was in his late 20s when he took power in 2011 after the death of his father. 

While Kim may be grooming his daughter, she is too young to formally be designated as successor. Photo: KCNA/Associated Press

In recent years, Kim’s daughter has accompanied her father to missile and satellite launches. Photo: KCNA/AP

North Korea hasn’t publicly revealed the name or age of Kim’s daughter, referring to her as the “beloved child.” 

In 2013, former NBA star Dennis Rodman said he had met Kim’s daughter, claiming she was called Ju Ae. A former South Korean spy agency officer and former North Korean diplomat have said she has a different name. South Korea’s spy agency has said the girl, likely Kim’s second child and born in 2013, appears to be the most likely successor for now.

Since her first public appearance at an intercontinental ballistic missile launch in 2022, Kim’s daughter has accompanied her father to military events, including a satellite launch and military parades, as well as diplomatic events such as a visit to the Russian embassy in North Korea in May.

In Beijing, Kim chose to bring his daughter to an event that was of particular international importance for Pyongyang. Kim was a guest of honor of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who used this week’s lavish celebrations to flaunt Beijing’s leadership of an alliance that is challenging the U.S. and its allies. Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin flanked Xi at a massive military parade in Tiananmen Square. The Iranian president stood nearby.

By standing alongside two nuclear powers, Russia and China, Kim projected an image of a politically significant leader with nuclear ambitions, said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. Kim regards nuclear weapons as indispensable to continuing his family’s rule of the country and to deterring aggression by foreign states.

“The only reason he could stand front and center [in Beijing] is because he too, has nukes,” Park said.

Kim’s daughter wasn’t the only offspring to appear at China’s celebrations commemorating victory over Japan in World War II. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s son was also spotted at a reception in Beijing on Wednesday. The son had previously attended China’s 2015 Victory Day celebrations when he was 11 years old. 

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

3. The 5 key takeaways from China’s Victory Day military parade

​Video and photos at the link.

My question is do goose stepping armies ever prevail in the long term? (see the first video)

From a visual/messaging perspective it appears XI (and Putin) gave a great victory to Kim as they walked together in front of all other 26 or so world leaders (though Kim had the number 3 position with Xi in the center and Putin to his right and Kim to the left).

The 5 takeaways:

1. Xi with Putin and Kim

2. Military showcase

3. Future warfare

4. Nuclear focus

5. World leaders

The 5 key takeaways from China’s Victory Day military parade

From the images of Xi with Putin and Kim to a growing focus on nuclear weapons, here are the key moments from Tiananmen Square

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3324135/5-key-takeaways-chinas-victory-day-military-parade?tpcc=GME-O-enlz-uv&utm

Highlights of China’s military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrende​r

Dewey Simin Beijing

Published: 12:24pm, 3 Sep 2025Updated: 1:22pm, 3 Sep 2025

China hosted two dozen world leaders for a huge military parade in Tiananmen Square on Wednesday to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.

It was only the second time Beijing has held a Victory Day parade, the first taking place a decade ago.

The parade – which started at 9am and lasted nearly 90 minutes – was viewed by many as a showcase of China’s growing military strength. But it was also an attempt by Beijing to cement its global leadership status and to show its rising diplomatic clout.

In an opening address, President Xi Jinping said the Chinese people “firmly stand on the right side of history and the progress of human civilisation”. He touted his “strong and self-reliant” country as a “great nation that fears no violence”, and said the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable”.

Below are some key takeaways from Wednesday’s parade.

Why are China’s Tiananmen Square military parades so important?

1. Xi with Putin and Kim

One prominent scene was of Xi walking down the red carpet to the rostrum with Russian President Vladimir Putin on his right and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on his left. They were seen smiling and talking.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (centre) walks with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un before the parade on Wednesday. Photo: AFP

It was the first time Kim, Xi and Putin – all seen as rivals of the United States – have gathered in the same place, sending a strong signal of unity against the US-led West.

It was also the first time that Kim, who arrived in Beijing on Tuesday by train, has attended a major multilateral event.

US President Donald Trump, who was not there, posted on social media asking if Xi would mention the contribution of the United States in the war and wished the Chinese leader “a great and lasting day of celebration”. Trump also asked Xi to “give my warmest regards to [Putin and Kim] as you conspire against the United States”.

2. Military showcase

Wednesday’s parade offered a chance for China to show its military prowess, as thousands of soldiers marched down Tiananmen Square and the People’s Liberation Army displayed some of its latest military hardware not seen by the public before.

In his address, Xi said the PLA “has always been a heroic army that the party and the people can completely rely on” as he called for officers and soldiers to “accelerate the building of a world-class military” and “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty”.

The parade involved formations from various military branches – including the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Logistics Support Force and Rocket Force – as well as newly established branches such as the Aerospace Force.

The DF-61 is believed to be China’s most advanced ICBM. Photo: AP

Beijing also used the event to showcase various land-based weapons systems, unmanned aerial vehicles and missile systems. It has said all systems seen in the parade were in service already.

A key highlight was the debut of the DF-61, believed to be China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile after the DF-41. The DF-61 is expected to be part of the PLA Rocket Force’s long-range missile operations.

Also appearing for the first time was the JL-3, a new third-generation, intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, crucial for the PLA’s sea-based nuclear deterrence operations.

3. Future warfare

The parade through the heart of the Chinese capital showed that the PLA is not just playing catch-up with the West but preparing for future warfare.

In what was its largest display of drone weapons, the PLA debuted the GJ-11, an unmanned combat aerial vehicle designed for precision strikes and aerial reconnaissance missions. It features a stealthy design with a tailless flying wing and two internal weapons bays.

Official broadcaster CCTV spoke of the “loyal wingmen” drones on display, meaning they are paired with crewed aircraft – a trend all leading militaries are pursuing.

Multiple rocket launcher the PHL-16, also known as the PCL-191, was also on display. It’s referred to as the mainland Chinese version of Lockheed Martin’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (Himars) that Taiwan has bought and deployed. It is believed it would play a significant role in the event of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait for its long-range strike abilities.

4. Nuclear focus

A growing focus on nuclear weapons was also seen, even as the PLA faces questions over its Rocket Force, which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal and has been a target of Xi’s anti-corruption drive.

The DF-31BJ – the newest road-mobile variant of the DF-31 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile – also made an appearance at the parade. It is thought to be an upgrade of the DF-31AG, currently the most advanced variant of the DF-31 series, which has a reported operational range of more than 11,200km (6,959 miles) and was test-launched in September last year – China’s first nuclear missile test in 44 years.

The parade was a show of China’s military might. Photo: Reuters

5. World leaders

Some 26 top leaders from around the world – including from Central Asia and Southeast Asia – attended the event, in what was a nod to Beijing’s growing global influence.

Higher ranked leaders from Southeast Asia attended compared to the inaugural Victory Day parade in 2015. They included Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Prabowo initially cancelled his trip to China due to widespread protests at home but on Tuesday said he would attend the parade.

Only two heads of government from Europe attended the event, namely Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.

But foreign troops were notably missing from the parade this time, a contrast to the previous World War II commemoration in 2015, when nearly 1,000 soldiers from 17 countries joined the march. This year’s march-past was exclusively Chinese.

Dewey Sim

Dewey Sim is a reporter for the China desk covering Beijing's foreign policy. He was previously writing about Singapore and Southeast Asia for the Post's Asia desk. A Singapore native, Dewey joined the Post in 2019 and is a graduate of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and

4. Kim Jong-un’s New Hwasong-20 ICBM May Carry Multiple Warheads With Russian Help

​Was this "reveal" strategically timed? Following the ROK/US UFS 25 exercise or timed with the Chinese military parade?

I will depend on the missile excerpts to provide their assessment of the viability of this system.

Kim Jong-un’s New Hwasong-20 ICBM May Carry Multiple Warheads With Russian Help

North Korea has unveiled its next-generation Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile, a move analysts say highlights Pyongyang’s bid for multiple-warhead capability—and the growing likelihood of Russian technical help fueling Kim Jong-un’s most ambitious weapons program yet.

Sep 03, 2025 12:28

Updated Sep 03, 2025 12:42

 3 min read

united24media.com · Vlad Litnarovych

Sep 03, 2025 12:28 Updated Sep 03, 2025 12:42

3 min read

Authors

News Writer

North Korea has announced the development of a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-20, unveiling it just hours before leader Kim Jong-un’s trip to Beijing for a military parade alongside China and Russia, according to The Korean Times on September 2.

According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim toured the Institute of Chemical Materials under the country’s Missile Administration, where he reviewed production of a new high-powered solid-fuel engine built with carbon-fiber composites.

KCNA published a photo showing Kim standing before what appeared to be the body of the future Hwasong-20.

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Latest news

Russia Is Making North Korea a Combat Power—and Bankrolling Its War Machine

Aug 14, 2025 11:45

The new engine reportedly has a thrust of 1,960 kilonewtons, intended for both the Hwasong-19 line and the upcoming Hwasong-20.

According to The Korean Times, analysts stated that the engine could enable North Korea to deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—warheads that can separate and strike different targets, making them far harder to intercept.

“Increasing the thrust can help secure multiple-warhead capabilities as well as simplify the structure of the missile propellant,” said Chang Young-keun, head of the missile research center at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.

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Latest news

Two Years Later, North Korea’s “Nuclear Submarine” Still Can’t Find the Ocean

Jul 20, 2025 15:14

Strategic messaging ahead of Beijing

South Korean opposition lawmaker Yu Yong-weon suggested the announcement was designed to showcase Pyongyang’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing ahead of the parade, The Korean Times wrote.

“Disclosing the Hwasong-20 ICBM development plan seems to be focused on stressing its intention to take part in solidarity against the US ahead of the military parade where the leaders of North Korea, China and Russia will meet,” Yu said.

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North Korea’s Latest Warship Revealed—What Kim Jong Un Is Hiding at His Shipyards

Aug 21, 2025 16:01

Yu also noted that North Korea could be receiving technical assistance from Russia, particularly carbon-fiber materials for missile nozzles, amid rapidly expanding military cooperation.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff said they are closely tracking the weapons program but did not provide further assessment.

Already within US range

The Hwasong-20 would be North Korea’s most advanced ICBM to date. However, earlier models already put the entire continental United States in range.

Both the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19, the latter tested on October 31, 2024, reportedly have a reach of more than 15,000 kilometers.

Experts believe the regime’s current focus is not on extending range but on increasing payload flexibility, survivability, and penetration capabilities against US missile defenses, The Korean Times notes.

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New North Korean Warships Are All Show, but No Go—And Russia May Be Behind the Curtain

Jun 26, 2025 12:40

North Korea has also deepened its defense ties with Russia beyond missiles. Analysts noted that two new North Korean destroyers launched this spring appear to incorporate Russian design elements.

One of them, the Choe Hyon-class vessel, dramatically capsized during its launch ceremony attended by Kim Jong-un.

Earlier, North Korea launched a new missile factory equipped with automated assembly lines, a development that could expand the country’s missile arsenal and increase supplies available for Russia’s strikes against Ukraine.

united24media.com · Vlad Litnarovych

5. Xi, Putin, Kim Jong Un unite at glitzy China military parade

​The "three amigos" photo is going to be iconic. It may tell the story of the future. The only problem for Kim is that he is the shortest (shorter than Putin) and he still looks like the young kid tagging along with the adults.

Xi, Putin, Kim Jong Un unite at glitzy China military parade

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/09/03/xi-putin-kim-jong-un-unite-at-glitzy-china-military-parade/?utm

By Gordon Arthur

 Sep 3, 2025, 07:44 AM

In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia's president Vladimir Putin (2nd L-R) walks with China's president Xi Jinping and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un before a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on Sept. 3, 2025. (Alexander Kazakov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — China did not disappoint with its massive Sep. 3 military parade through Tiananmen Square, the site of a violent massacre in the heart of Beijing in June 1989, with numerous VIPs from around the world attending.

As China celebrated its victory over “fascist” Japanese forces in 1945, the places of honor at Chairman Xi Jinping’s right and left hands were assigned to authoritarian leaders Vladimir Putin of Russia and Kim Jong Un of North Korea, respectively.

In his speech, Xi warned that the world was “faced with a choice of peace or war,” ominously adding that “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable.”

President Donald Trump responded to the spectacle of the Xi-Putin-Kim bonhomie on Truth Social, writing, “Give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America.”

Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army, noted that the equipment the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) paraded was generally “more modern than that in the inventories of Western military organizations. Newer does not always mean better, however. While most Western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China’s new kit has.”

There were surprises, including the DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile carried aboard a 16x16 transporter-erector-launcher. Little is known about the DF-61, which follows on from the DF-41 ICBM unveiled six years ago. However, it is likely a next-generation successor with greater range and speed.

YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles are seen during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on Sept. 3, 2025. (Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

The DF-61 was accompanied by the JL-1 air-launched nuclear-tipped missile, as well as the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. This phalanx of missiles demonstrated the PLA Rocket Force now has a complete nuclear-weapon triad.

Another item of interest was the DF-31BJ, which is an ICBM launched from an underground silo. China has been investing heavily in missile silo fields deep in its hinterland. The DF-5C liquid-fueled ICBM rolled past the Tiananmen Square rostrum, too, this silo-launched missile capable of hitting targets anywhere in the world.

Missiles featured prominently in the parade, with another formation containing three types of hypersonic missile: the YJ-21 launched from ships or aircraft, and the land-based DF-26D and DF-17. The YJ-21 has an estimated 1,500km range and it will be a key weapon in keeping American aircraft carriers at arm’s length, especially in the event of any Taiwan invasion.

It’s unclear what modifications the DF-26D possesses compared to preceding versions of the “Guam killer” intermediate-range ballistic missile. Some analysts claim the DF-26D has a 5,000km range.

A Chinese state TV commentator said of hypersonic missiles that “speed is key to victory,” and that they “fly at extremely high speed, excel in breaking through blockades and hitting targets with high precision.”

One wonders what Putin might have been thinking as he observed the might of the PLA roll past his eyes, especially as his own military is decimated by its war of attrition in Ukraine. China was once reliant on Russian technology and weapons, but all the weapons displayed in the parade were of indigenous Chinese origin.

“Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict,” said Ryan, the defense analyst.

Three cruise missiles appeared in the parade, the air-launched CJ-20A, the naval YJ-18C and the truck-launched CJ-1000.

Unmanned systems featured prominently, with multiple examples from the land, air and maritime domains. Autonomous underwater vehicles included vessels for reconnaissance and laying sea mines, as well as an unmanned surface vessel.

A CS-5000T drone is seen during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on Sept. 3, 2025. (Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

Unmanned combat drones attracted great interest, with four types appearing. At least some of them are designed to accompany Chinese fifth-generation fighters like the twin-seat J-20S to achieve air dominance.

Illustrating that China has been learning lessons from the Ukraine war, several types of anti-drone systems were on display, including gun, missile, laser and microwave systems to create a layered defensive shield.

Ground combat vehicles included the debut of the Type 100 tank and an accompanying fighting vehicle. These tracked vehicles use a hybrid electric propulsion unit that ensures silent approaches in combat. Crew members also use augmented-reality goggles with these advanced vehicles, and the fighting vehicle version comes with integral drones for reconnaissance.

Air defense was well represented with no fewer than five systems, specifically the HQ-9C, HQ-11, HQ-19, HQ-22A and HQ-29. The latter reportedly can intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and low-orbit satellites thanks to its estimated 6,000km range and 1,500km interception altitude.

Despite China’s spectacle of weapons of war, Ryan cautioned that “parades are not indictors of warfighting effectiveness. Notwithstanding the impressive orchestration of the parade … these have almost zero impact on the measurement of military effectiveness.”

About Gordon Arthur

Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.

6. Trust Before Disarmament: A Realistic Path To North Korea’s Denuclearization – OpEd

​Can there be any kind of mutual trust with the Kim family regime? He certainly does not trust anyone (even Xi and Putin let alone Presidents Lee or Trump). The regime has never demonstrated that it can be trustworthy.

We need to recognize and accept the fundamental strategic assumption: KJU will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons.

Thus we need a new strategy and I sum it up in my revised Fourteen Words (to complement my Fourteen Points below this OpEd):

"Unification First, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through information and human rights."

Trust Before Disarmament: A Realistic Path To North Korea’s Denuclearization – OpEd

https://www.eurasiareview.com/03092025-trust-before-disarmament-a-realistic-path-to-north-koreas-denuclearization-oped/

 September 3, 2025  0 Comments

By Simon Hutagalung

The geopolitical conflict with North Korea has given rise to two primary strategies for denuclearisation: the “denuclearisation first” policy and the “trust first” policy. The former, which requires complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation (CVID) as a precondition for sanctions relief, has been the favoured strategy of many Western nations for decades, having been implemented across multiple US administrations.

From the Clinton-era Agreed Framework to the hardline stance of the George W. Bush administration, this approach has consistently failed to produce lasting results. The approach fails to address North Korea’s fundamental reasons for its actions, which stem from deep-seated feelings of insecurity. The three-stage denuclearisation plan proposed by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung represents a phased approach, but North Korea will probably reject it entirely. Pyongyang maintains that its nuclear weapons serve as the final security guarantee for survival because Russia provides political and military backing to this position.

Recent reports indicate that Russia has not only been ignoring UN sanctions but has also provided North Korea with crucial military and technical assistance, including satellite technology and possibly even ballistic missile expertise. The support from China, along with its political backing, enables the regime to resist diplomatic pressure and make demands for concessions. The demand for complete weapon surrender from one side only remains impossible to accept. A more pragmatic and effective strategy is the “trust first” approach, which seeks to build confidence through phased, reciprocal concessions and engagement, thereby creating the necessary foundation for a peaceful resolution and, eventually, denuclearisation. 

The “trust first” approach recognises that North Korea has solidified its nuclear program through years of isolation and threats, and sanctions. The initiative aims to establish confidence-building measures which will stop the current pattern of provocation and retaliation. The strategy functions through sequential steps, which require each side to perform an action that the other side must verify before proceeding. The “action-for-action” principle enables a step-by-step and reversible process which reduces risks for everyone involved.

For instance, a freeze on North Korean nuclear and long-range missile tests could be met with a partial easing of sanctions or a halt to large-scale joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea. The method draws from a complete comprehension of North Korea’s security mindset, which developed after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the military actions against Iraq and Libya. Pyongyang views the fates of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi as a cautionary tale: leaders who gave up their weapons of mass destruction were ultimately overthrown. As a result, North Korea has concluded that its nuclear arsenal is a non-negotiable insurance policy against regime change.

The “trust first” method produced some positive results when it was first used historically, but these results did not last long. During his presidency from 1998 to 2008, President Kim Dae-jung introduced the “Sunshine Policy”, which enabled South Korea to establish historic inter-Korean exchanges and cooperative programs. The Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism zone projects showed how North and South Korean workers could work together and South Koreans could visit the North to decrease tensions and prove peaceful coexistence was possible.

The Six-Party Talks, which took place in the mid-2000s between China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and the U.S., also followed a phased model. The 2005 Joint Statement served as the primary agreement, which required North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance packages and security guarantees, and diplomatic recognition. The incident forced North Korea to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facilities for a brief period. The brief moments demonstrate that dialogue, together with trust, can produce actual, although short-term, advancement. 

The “trust first” method offers theoretical advantages, yet it encounters various major obstacles when put into practice. The most prominent is the risk of deception. North Korea has a long history of not keeping its promises, of being duplicitous, and of using diplomatic talks to gain time while secretly advancing its weapons programs. The 2012 “Leap Day Deal” failed because North Korea launched a satellite-carrying missile shortly after agreeing to test moratoriums. An even more significant betrayal was the revelation that North Korea was secretly pursuing a uranium enrichment program in the early 2000s, in clear violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework it had signed with the United States.

Another critical challenge is domestic political opposition. In the United States and South Korea, there is often strong political resistance to offering concessions to a regime widely deemed a rogue state. The critics maintain that any form of engagement without a firm commitment to denuclearisation first will only serve to legitimise the Kim regime and weaken the international sanctions regime. Finally, there is the inherent asymmetry of interests. For North Korea, its nuclear program is a core national security asset, non-negotiable for the regime’s survival. For the U.S. and its allies, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a regional and global threat that must be eliminated. The basic disagreement creates an obstacle for both sides to discover a solution which would meet all requirements. 

To conclude, the obstacles do not represent insurmountable barriers because they need a stronger and more advanced implementation of the “trust first” strategy. A successful approach must be comprehensive, multilateral, and possess a strong verification component. The international community, consisting of the United States, South Korea, China and Russia, needs to develop a single long-term plan which includes specific measurable actions with mutual commitments. The plan requires a step-by-step sanctions relief framework which directly corresponds to verifiable denuclearisation achievements. The pursuit of smaller agreements should replace the current single all-or-nothing deal structure because these agreements can progress step by step. Furthermore, a permanent, third-party monitoring body, possibly led by a neutral nation like Switzerland or Sweden, could be established to ensure compliance and rebuild confidence. The final objective should be to make North Korean leaders understand that their security, together with economic success, will be achieved through peaceful international relations instead of nuclear weapons. The “trust first” method stands as the only workable solution for Korean Peninsula peace and stability because it recognises that lasting solutions require building mutual trust through incremental advancement. 

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

                            References

• Kim, T. (2025, March 14). North Korea’s efforts to attain de facto nuclear weapon state status and ROK–US response strategy. 38 North.
• Aum, F., & Panda, A. (2025, May 6). Pursuing stable coexistence: A reorientation of U.S. policy toward North Korea. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace / USIP.
• Hutagalung, Simon. Beyond denuclearisation: Rethinking diplomatic strategy for a nuclear North Korea. (2025, July 30). Eurasia Review

Simon Hutagalung

Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.

David Maxwell

Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

dmaxwell@apstrategy.org

Recommendations for Trump Administration Policy Toward north Korea

My Fourteen Points for Korea

1. The administration must understand the nature, objectives, and Strategy of the Kim family regime which consists of political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and developing the advanced military capability to dominate the Korean peninsula by force under the rule of the Guerilla Dynasty and Gulag State to ensure regime survival.

2. The administration must take a long term approach to US security and prosperity in Northeast Asia which means solving the “Korea question” which is the unnatural division of the peninsula as outline in paragraph 60 of the Armistice. There are only four paths to solving the Korea question: war, regime collapse, peaceful unification, and regime transformation. The U.S. (along with South Korea) should support regime transformation by the Korea people in the North as the optimal path to peaceful unification and the solution to the Korea question.

3. Recognize that President-elect Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted.

4. This is the critical Strategic Assumption: North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear capabilities as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. However, denuclearization must remain the long term goal, and the US cannot fall victim to the regime’s political warfare strategy by entering into arms control negotiations or recognizing the north as a nuclear state.

5. Recognize that it is the Kim family regime that has the hostile policy and strategy toward the ROK, the US, and the free world. 

6. Recognize that north Korea is an integral part of the Axis of upheaval or Dark Quad and actually provides key support to China (as a disruptor of the ROK/US alliance and ROK/Japan/US trilateral cooperation), Russia (military support to Putin’s War), and Iran (with advanced military equipment to Iran and its proxies through its extensive weapons proliferation activities to raise funds for regime survival). If you want to achieve effects versus China, Russia, and Iran you must attack the relationships among the four. Northeast/East Asia is the new “great game” of “strategic competition” and the South Korean political turmoil is a casualty in the game. China is playing the game but does the US recognize that such a game is taking place?

7. Therefore, given the hostile nature of the Kim family regime it is imperative to maintain a high level of combined military readiness in Northeast Asia to deter and recognize the single most important contribution to deterring the Kim family regime is the presence of US troops.

8. Recognize that while the defense of Taiwan is important to the free world, that a free Taiwan is of little value if it comes at the expense of South Korea being dominated by north Korea and China. The US must take a holistic approach to national security in the Indo-Pacific.

9. The neglected threat from north Korea is internal instability. The conditions that lead to internal instability and potential regime collapse are also the conditions that could lead Kim to make the decision to go to war as a desperate attempt to survive. It is critical to recognize that Kim Jong Un is under threat from within. He fears the Korean people in the north more than the combined ROK and US militaries. Information is an existential threat to his rule, and this must be used to US and ROK/US alliance advantage.

10. The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the U.S. must rest on these two traditional efforts: (1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and (2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.  The new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea: (1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasize the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights); (2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change; (3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK). A Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).

11. If I could only give 14 words to the Trump administration it would be these: Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

Recommendations for Trump Administration Policy toward South Korea

12. Recognize that the political turmoil in South Korea is at its root strategic competition between the PRC/north Korea and the US over the soul of South Korean democracy and the future of the Korean peninsula. The radical elements of the Minjoo/DPK party are under the influence (if not control) of the United Front Departments of the PRC and north Korea; the actions of the Minjoo/DPK have exposed that influence. It is imperative that the US supports South Korean democracy against the radical elements from the PRC and nK.

13. Recognize that South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, and is a critical partner in the Arsenal of Democracy and supports the rules based international order. In short it is a key partner in strategic competition versus the PRC. South Korea is not only critical to peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in Japan, but its strategic location also supports trilateral cooperation to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific to include the defense of Taiwan.

14. Although President Yoon has been impeached and convicted, South Korea’s 8.15 Unification Doctrine has not been impeached. It provides the most comprehensive vision for a solution to the “Korea question” in seven decades. The US should provide full support to Korea and the Korean people in realizing this vision.  Unfortunately, I fear that President Lee has already rejected this doctrine.

Bottom Line

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea – A United Republic of Korea (UROK).

7. Modi, Lee, and Trump’s Nobel Prize Obsession

The author does not quite get there with north Korea. No one is going to win a Nobel for reducing tensions or talking to Kim Jong Un or even making an arms control agreement.

The only way that anyone will win the Nobel for efforts in Korea is if they support the establishment of a free and unified Korea. Anything less will not result in. Nobel. Remember Kim Dae Jung already was awarded the Nobel or a summit with Kim Jong Il. Later the Nobel committee learned that the summit was the result of a $500 million (or more) "bribe" so it is unlikely to award the Nobel for anything less than the complete transformation of the Korean peninsula into a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) that is free.

​

​

Conclusion:

The real obstacles to “peace as business” lie with the Pakistan Army and North Korea’s Kim dynasty. Each fears that reconciliation would erode its hold on power. But if they could be assured that their dominance would remain intact—and if business deals could be structured to benefit both by lifting up the sagging economies of Pakistan and North Korea—then new pathways to stability might open in both South Asia and Northeast Asia. Who knows—it could even win Trump and his fellow peacemakers a Nobel Prize.

Modi, Lee, and Trump’s Nobel Prize Obsession

What India’s and South Korea’s dealings with Washington tell us about real and imagined U.S. peace initiatives in Asia.

Mohan-C-Raja-foreign-policy-columnist

C. Raja Mohan

By C. Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.

Foreign Policy · C. Raja Mohan

• U.S. Foreign Policy
• India
• North Korea
• South Korea
• C. Raja Mohan

September 3, 2025, 6:01 AM

Trump’s Second Term

Ongoing reports and analysis

Although there are striking similarities between the geopolitics of the Indian subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula, the international relations community rarely pays attention to their parallel trajectories. Recent events provide a useful starting point for a comparison: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s troubled dealings with U.S. President Donald Trump contrast sharply with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s smoother handling of the White House’s real and imagined peace diplomacy during his visit to Washington last month. Modi’s difficulties and Lee’s successes also offer insights into the prospects for Trump’s peace initiatives in Asia.

In the 1940s, the subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula were both partitioned—under very different circumstances but with similarly lasting consequences. These divisions created two of the world’s most intractable conflicts: between India and Pakistan and between North and South Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in both regions by the 1990s elevated them into major security concerns for Washington and the world.

Whereas the United States played a direct role in Korea’s division and has been deeply engaged in the peninsula’s security ever since, its role in South Asia was inherited from Britain and has always been less direct, if enduring. The rigidity of the Korean order was codified in Washington’s alliance with Seoul. In South Asia, by contrast, the United States kept ties with both India and Pakistan.

India’s nonalignment limited military cooperation with Washington, while Pakistan joined the U.S.-led alliances during the Cold War and later became a major non-NATO ally. Since the end of the Cold War, as the Soviet threat faded and China’s rise gathered pace, the United States has expanded its strategic partnership with India while retaining counterterrorism links with Pakistan.

Yet entrenched conflict remained the common thread. Despite frequent U.S. initiatives in South Asia and periodic efforts in the Koreas, the rivalries between India and Pakistan and those between North and South Korea have endured.

Trump’s self-image as a peacemaker has so far fared poorly in both theaters. Modi publicly dismissed Trump’s claim that it was he who brokered the cease-fire that ended the four-day war between India and Pakistan this May. New Delhi acknowledged calls from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance during the conflict, but it insisted that hostilities ended only after a direct request from a top Pakistani general to his Indian counterpart on May 10. Modi reinforced this line by telling Trump in June that India would never accept third-party mediation—a position later underlined by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri.

In doing so, Modi publicly contradicted Trump’s claims and, in effect, called out the president’s claim as untrue. Many observers believe that Modi’s unwillingness to play along with Trump on his imagined peacemaker role offended the White House.

In a phone call in mid-June, Modi apparently did not respond to Trump’s suggestion that India could nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. This, in turn, set the stage for the unraveling of the special relationship that was so evident between the two leaders during Trump’s first term—and for the reversal of many years of tightening India-U.S. relations.

After that, Trump not only repeated ad nauseam his claim to have stopped the war between India and Pakistan but also embarked in a punitive mission against India. Many observers see Modi’s failure to play his expected role in this charade as the source of Trump’s tougher line on New Delhi, including his rejection of trade deals that had already been negotiated at the bureaucratic level and the imposition of a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods exports.

This was followed by an additional 25 percent punitive levy, ostensibly on the grounds of India’s purchases of Russian oil—a strange justification, considering that Trump has yet to put any new pressure on Russia or place a similar tariff on China, the largest importer of Russian oil. The perception that Washington was singling out India because of Trump’s peacemaking fixation has been reinforced by the intensified White House attacks on New Delhi in general and Modi in particular.

That Modi had done more than any other Indian leader to build closer ties with Washington seemed to carry little weight with the White House. Trump’s trade advisor Peter Navarro launched a particularly ugly campaign against India; in a post on X criticizing Modi’s policies, Navarro tagged a picture of Modi meditating in saffron robes. Modi’s personal rapport with Trump during the latter’s first term, as well as a quarter-century of bipartisan investment in the U.S.-India partnership, were brushed aside in a fit of presidential pique.

In contrast, Lee flattered Trump’s peace ambitions. His effusive praise helped him smooth over difficulties on trade and reassure Washington that, despite his progressive politics, he was not hostile to the United States. Lee framed himself as a “pacemaker” for Trump’s peacemaking, underlining the U.S. president’s potential role in reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. Some argue that Modi could have used similar flattery, or at least a well-timed phone call, to soothe Trump.

But that is unlikely. South Korea has long depended on the United States for security and market access. Its national self-image is that of a “shrimp among whales”—requiring agility and flexibility for survival. India, by contrast, sees itself as an elephant and faces no existential threat. Its prickly nationalism, sharpened under Modi, makes it politically impossible to adopt Lee’s overtly pandering tactics.

For these and other reasons, India reacts badly to pressure tactics. This was evident at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Tianjin, China, this week, where Modi showcased his friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his reengagement with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

That does not mean that the Modi-Trump relationship cannot recover. One can imagine a grand bargain in which both leaders find a way to reset ties. This could include a resolution of the ostensible dispute on Russian oil, a fresh effort to arrive at a trade deal, and even a framework for peace in South Asia.

Trump’s approach to peacemaking departs from the traditional frameworks of human rights or self-determination. For him, peace is about business. He imagines mega-resorts in Gaza, mineral exploitation in Ukraine and Arctic Russia, and leasing land along a “Trump corridor” in the South Caucasus.

In this light, his idea of developing oil and gas deposits in Pakistan and selling those resources to India is an interesting one, and New Delhi should not dismiss it outright. To be sure, there is much skepticism about the scope of Pakistan’s hydrocarbon reserves, although recent claims about massive offshore deposits have generated some new excitement.

Of interest here is not so much the question of Pakistan’s oil reserves but the idea of commercial cooperation between the South Asian rivals. Could Trump succeed in overcoming entrenched Pakistani resistance to economic cooperation with India? The United States has tried to promote energy cooperation between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in the past. But these ideas never got very far due to opposition in Pakistan.

For his part, Modi is not averse to creative ideas for peace. His real concern remains Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups. If Trump could persuade the Pakistan Army to break with its long tradition of supporting extremism and open the way for cross-border commerce, then Modi might be happy to respond. After all, Modi began his first term in 2014 by inviting then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration, and in 2015, he made a surprise visit to Lahore to open doors for security cooperation. With his nationalist credentials and strong domestic standing, Modi arguably has more political capital than any other Indian leader to explore new peace initiatives.

On the Korean Peninsula, Seoul’s progressives have long advocated engagement with Pyongyang, dating back to former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of the late 1990s. Economic cooperation was attempted but faltered, in part due to Washington’s reluctance to move beyond the nuclear weapons issue. Trump broke that mold in his first term by meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un three times. Trump remains less bound by conventional wisdom than his predecessors and more willing to explore peace as business.

The real obstacles to “peace as business” lie with the Pakistan Army and North Korea’s Kim dynasty. Each fears that reconciliation would erode its hold on power. But if they could be assured that their dominance would remain intact—and if business deals could be structured to benefit both by lifting up the sagging economies of Pakistan and North Korea—then new pathways to stability might open in both South Asia and Northeast Asia. Who knows—it could even win Trump and his fellow peacemakers a Nobel Prize.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · C. Raja Mohan

8. S Korea muscling into SE Asia's open arms market

​Why not? Reliable, interoperable weapons systems at affordable prices.

Excerpts:

The Vietnam case could also generate spillover demand, with potential for the K9 deal with Vietnam to serve as a proof of concept for the viability of Korean-made military technologies in Southeast Asia’s unique tropical climate, and its successful integration in the PAV’s warfighting setup, encouraging neighboring states to pursue similar acquisitions.

This is particularly true for artillery, a military domain that remains under-addressed in much of Southeast Asia. Beyond artillery, South Korea’s aerospace sector, with platforms such as the KF-21 fighter and light attack aircraft like the FA-50, could also find traction in the region.

Together, these developments suggest that South Korea is gradually embedding itself into ASEAN’s long-term defense modernization cycle, across the air, sea and now land domains.

Strategically, Seoul’s ambitions extend beyond mere one-off sales. The establishment of a regional maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) hub could follow once sufficient regional export scale is achieved, lowering life-cycle costs for partner states while binding them more closely to South Korea’s defense industry.

Such a move would also align with South Korea’s broader diplomatic outreach, including the recent elevation of ASEAN-South Korea relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The K9 deal with Vietnam, therefore, is not only a commercial transaction but also a stepping stone toward embedding South Korea as a durable security partner in Southeast Asia’s evolving defense landscape.

S Korea muscling into SE Asia's open arms market - Asia Times

K9 howitzer deal with Vietnam latest arms sale to embed South Korea into ASEAN’s long-term military modernization

asiatimes.com · Thomas Lim, Jihoon Yu · September 2, 2025

South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace has agreed to export 20 K9 howitzers to Vietnam in a deal worth US$250 million, according to multiple news reports in mid-August.

The first indicators of a potential deal emerged in March 2023, when Vietnam’s Minister for Defense, General Phan Van Giang, visited Seoul and observed an in-person demonstration of the K9 howitzers, alongside other Korean arms.

While South Korea’s arms export capabilities had already been proven through its watershed deal with Poland and sustained military product demand across multiple markets, the K9 deal with Vietnam is a first in Southeast Asia (SEA), representing the asset’s successful penetration into a new regional market.

While the deal cements “K-Bangsan (방산)”, which translates to K-Defense, as a cross-administration cornerstone of South Korea’s economic growth and national development, there are also potential significant follow-on developments.

Korean arms merchant

Under the previous Yoon administration, South Korea had committed significant resources to developing and expanding its military industrial complex, with original goals to become one of the world’s top four arms suppliers by 2027.

A March 2025 report by the Stockholm Institute Peace Research Institute ranked South Korea as 10th on its global list of major arms exporters, with its total export share a mere 37.2% of China’s (which ranked 4th on the list) total figures.

Industry insiders have alluded to a year-on-year decline in exports since 2022, presumably due to concerns over financing uncertainties and delays in deals with Middle East states, with these issues compounded by the reversed martial law declaration in December 2024 and its accompanying political upheaval.

Nevertheless, newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung retained defense exports as a key feature in his new five-year blueprint announced on August 13, 2025. The Vietnam K9 deal was officially announced the next day.

On Vietnam’s side, after General Giang’s 2023 visit, its Ministry of Defense expressed official interest in procuring the K9s in April 2024, with Vietnamese military personnel participating in a South Korean education program in November the same year, designed to provide participating soldiers a better operational understanding of Korean assets such as the K9s and K2 tanks.

People’s Army of Vietnam (PAV) personnel’s presence in a similar July 2025 training program served to affirm Vietnamese interest in understanding K-Defense assets, with a potential eye towards replacing its existing Soviet-era and older-model US artillery pieces.

Existing pieces such as the Korean War-era M101 howitzers and the Vietnam War-era D-20 howitzers are legacy collections from past conflicts, most being significantly inferior to modern assets in terms of weight, manpower requirements and overall mobility. That leaves Vietnam particularly vulnerable to swift attacks from aerial drones, including possibly from China.

Previous reports pointed to the PAV’s interest in upgrading its artillery assets since 2015, a recognition of the need to enhance its military technologies to maintain competitiveness on the land battlefield. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine war has essentially forced Vietnam to pivot from its longstanding dependence on Russian arms.

An interesting quirk about the Vietnam-South Korea deal is its government-to-government nature, a different agreement model compared to South Korea’s past export deals, most of which have been direct supply agreements between the arms exporter and the importing state itself.

This exemplifies the South Korean government’s level of participation and interest in expanding bilateral cooperation with Vietnam, with Vietnamese President To Lam’s August 2025 state visit to South Korea culminating in a bilateral agreement to expand inter-state trade to US$150 billion by 2030.

The 20-piece, $250 million sale shines light on the PAV’s intentions. Firstly, 20 pieces would be grossly insufficient in satisfying Vietnam’s defense requirements from a tactical standpoint, considering the extended length of its land borders with neighboring China, Cambodia and Laos, as well as its coastlines overlooking the hotly contested South China Sea.

These operational realities mean that the deal can and should be better understood as a sampler purchase, considering that the PAV had purportedly explored a deal for 108 French-produced CAESAR artillery assets in 2015.

There are two ways to view this: the first being both parties’ intentions to maximize unit purchase numbers for asset testing and personnel training purposes, and the second being the potential for a second follow-through contract, assuming both parties are satisfied with the first deal.

Artillery remains king

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war serves as stark evidence of the irreplaceable role artillery plays in modern warfare. Despite the prominence of drones and precision-guided munitions, massed artillery fire has remained the decisive factor in determining battlefield control.

Russia and Ukraine have both demonstrated that sustained artillery barrages can degrade enemy positions, dictate maneuver space and impose both physical and psychological pressure on adversaries. Artillery, in other words, continues to define the tempo of land combat.

For countries such as South Korea facing potential flashpoints with unpredictable neighbors like North Korea, artillery forms a crucial backbone of national defense.

Vietnam, with its long borders with China, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as its extensive coastline exposed to South China Sea contingencies, shares similar requirements. The K9 howitzer directly addresses these operational needs, with its cost-effective blend of firepower, mobility and protection being combat-proven in diverse environments.

With a firing range of over 40 kilometers, rapid shoot-and-scoot capability, and an automated fire control system, the K9 offers clear battlefield performance advantages over Vietnam’s legacy Soviet and US-era systems.

Compared to wheeled alternatives such as the French CAESARs and Swedish Archers, the K9’s tracked platform provides superior mobility across challenging terrain, while its armored chassis enhances troop and asset survivability against counter-battery fire and drone attacks.

Equally important, the adoption of the K9 is a first step towards standardizing Vietnam’s usage of the 155mm caliber, the most widely used artillery round in the world.

Considering that the PAV’s old artillery systems utilized a mix of 105mm, 122mm, 152mm and 155mm-calibre ammunition, this shift would both simplify its logistical requirements and ensure long-term ammunition availability from a host of suppliers.

In an era where artillery ammunition shortages have become a defining challenge in Ukraine, such standardization would give the PAV a more sustainable and resilient inflow of ammunition.

The K9, therefore, is not just an artillery platform but also a catalyst for modernizing Vietnam’s broader land warfare doctrine and ensuring its military supply chain resilience.

Start of something new

Beyond the tactical significance, the Vietnam K9 deal signals a new stage in South Korea’s arms export trajectory. Until now, Korean defense sales in Southeast Asia had been relatively modest, with markets dominated by Russian suppliers or Western alternatives.

The K9 sale breaks new ground as the first major Korean artillery penetration into the region, showing that “K-Defense” is gaining region-specific credibility as both technologically reliable and politically viable.

This process could also be accelerated by high levels of mutual political trust between Korea and Southeast Asian nations, with the success of Korea’s soft power reach in the region potentially serving to smooth the process of establishing defense and military agreements of a more sensitive nature.

This development also comes at a time when ASEAN states are increasingly reconsidering their force modernization strategies. The legacy dependence on Soviet equipment has become a strategic liability, both in terms of spare part availability and political alignment, especially after Russia’s deepening entanglement in Ukraine and ensuing isolation from much of the US-aligned international community.

Countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are now exploring alternative suppliers. South Korea’s proven track record of delivering high-quality systems on time, at competitive cost and often with generous add-on training and industrial packages positions it as an attractive middle ground between expensive Western platforms and politically sensitive Chinese equipment.

The Vietnam case could also generate spillover demand, with potential for the K9 deal with Vietnam to serve as a proof of concept for the viability of Korean-made military technologies in Southeast Asia’s unique tropical climate, and its successful integration in the PAV’s warfighting setup, encouraging neighboring states to pursue similar acquisitions.

This is particularly true for artillery, a military domain that remains under-addressed in much of Southeast Asia. Beyond artillery, South Korea’s aerospace sector, with platforms such as the KF-21 fighter and light attack aircraft like the FA-50, could also find traction in the region.

Together, these developments suggest that South Korea is gradually embedding itself into ASEAN’s long-term defense modernization cycle, across the air, sea and now land domains.

Strategically, Seoul’s ambitions extend beyond mere one-off sales. The establishment of a regional maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) hub could follow once sufficient regional export scale is achieved, lowering life-cycle costs for partner states while binding them more closely to South Korea’s defense industry.

Such a move would also align with South Korea’s broader diplomatic outreach, including the recent elevation of ASEAN-South Korea relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The K9 deal with Vietnam, therefore, is not only a commercial transaction but also a stepping stone toward embedding South Korea as a durable security partner in Southeast Asia’s evolving defense landscape.

Thomas Lim is associate research fellow with the Military Studies Program of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, a policy-oriented think tank located in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. He conducts professional military education for members of the Singapore Armed Forces, covering topics in international relations, military history and strategic studies. He earned his BSc in International Relations from the University of London, and an MSc in International Relations from Nanyang Technological University.

Jihoon Yu is the director of external cooperation and research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He was a member of the Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project and is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, hybrid threats, and strategic weapons systems. He earned his BA in international relations from the ROK Naval Academy, an MA in national security affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in political science from Syracuse University.

asiatimes.com · Thomas Lim, Jihoon Yu · September 2, 2025

9. North Korea’s Window on the World Is at Risk of Closing

​Ms. Yoon fails to mention the US Committee for Human RIghts in North Korea that is not now supported by the US government (but was in years past including during the first Trump administration). That said some of the groups receiving funding from DRL are suspect in the ideology and motivations (though not the ones listed below). 

North Korea’s Window on the World Is at Risk of Closing

The Trump administration is attacking funding for programs that get unfiltered information into — and out of — North Korea.

Published in:

Foreign Policy in Focus

Lina Yoon

Senior Researcher, Asia Division

hrw.org · Lina Yoon Senior Researcher, Asia Division · July 21, 2025

Click to expand Image

A North Korean flag flies at the DPRK Permanent Mission in Geneva. © 2017 Reuters

Security experts, United Nations officials, and congressional leaders have for years insisted that in dealing with North Korea, its government’s systemic human rights abuses need to be addressed alongside nuclear proliferation. North Korea pays for its weapons programs with totalitarian repression, endemic forced labor, and unsurpassed cyber theft.

Congress recognized that when it adopted the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, specifying that promoting human rights for North Korea should be “a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties.” It authorized funding to broadcast independent media into North Korea and gather information about conditions inside the country, necessary for the United States to formulate policy, and to craft sanctions and other measures to keep the North Korean government in check.

Ending U.S.-funded research would leave the U.S. without critical information, as Pyongyang expands its military presence overseas, including in Russia, and deepens its isolation and repression at home.

On a broadly bipartisan basis, Congress renewed the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2008, 2012, and 2017, but allowed it to lapse in 2022. Funding for this programming nevertheless continued through the appropriation of funding for the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor (DRL).

But now the Trump administration wants to cut nearly all of DRL’s funding worldwide and eliminate most of its budget, including program offices that shepherd these small but high impact projects. This would essentially end this important work on North Korea. Even if Congress passes a new North Korean Human Rights Act and restores funding, the infrastructure and expertise required to allocate and spend the funds will be gone. Rebuilding that expertise could take years.

The North Korean Human Rights Act has always unified Republicans and Democrats around a simple idea: information promotes freedom and deters abuses. Its modest grants pierce the darkness of North Korea’s isolation, with support for cross-border radio channels, media with in-country contacts, satellite imagery analysis projects, and documentation groups that collect information about rights violations. They were instrumental in the UN’s landmark 2014 Commission of Inquiry findings on crimes against humanity and continue to inform Treasury designations, CIA assessments, and missile defense planning.

Civil society organizations supported by the Act include the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, South Korea’s first North Korean human rights organization, which has mapped illicit supply chains and flagged Chinese and Southeast Asian front companies that laundered stolen digital assets. The DailyNK, an online newsroom with contacts inside North Korea, has reported about North Korea’s hacking tactics and their cyber foreign currency-making activities.

The Transitional Justice Working Group, a human rights documentation organization, geocodes hundreds of executions and burial sites, layering satellite imagery with escapee testimony to build accountability cases. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea has matched high-resolution satellite imagery to escapee testimony, exposing missile-related sites and coal mining operations in prison camps.

If these information sources disappear, they may be lost forever, leaving the world in the dark, relying only on the North Korean government’s official statements. Organizations that have exposed these abuses are now struggling to survive.

Supporting independent media and civil society in North Korea is not charity work. The programs uncover information about the North Korean government’s human rights violations, its revenue streams, and illicit cyber-hacking operations. Market price reports can warn of famine and instability that could spill across borders, documentation of rights abuses can spot construction at missile sites, and data cards packed with South Korean media and uncensored information help chip away at Pyongyang’s lies.

Groups still holding existing DRL grants, like DailyNK and Unification Media Group, which broadcasts and sends uncensored information into North Korea, and documentation groups like the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights and the Transitional Justice Working Group, may soon have to end operations entirely.

To make matters worse, the Trump administration has also cut funding to the congressionally mandated and funded broadcaster Radio Free Asia, which has stopped broadcasting into North Korea. Cuts to the National Endowment for Democracy have made future funding to groups like North Korea Reform Radio, which broadcasts and sends information into North Korea, and Citizens’ Alliance, which was also building a case to bring North Korean officials to courts abroad for crimes against humanity, uncertain.

Congress should renew the North Korean Human Rights Act, but also urgently exert pressure on the State Department to preserve North Korea funding. It is vital to sustain programs that maintain scrutiny on a government that prefers operating in the dark and instead give North Koreans a window to the outside world.

10. Trump’s warning on digital rules was aimed at this country

​Another friction point for the alliance.

Trump’s warning on digital rules was aimed at this country

The White House is increasingly concerned that other countries will mimic Europe’s laws governing large tech companies.

By Ari Hawkins09/03/2025 10:45 AM EDT

Politico

“Trump’s post was a warning shot to South Korea and other countries weighing new rules on digital trade not to follow the European Union’s approach,” according to a person who spoke with Trump the day of his Truth Social post.

Trump’s missive came shortly after he met with new South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at the White House, and after Lee’s government refused to sign onto a joint statement on the preliminary trade agreement that included a pledge to block legislation to regulate large tech companies operating in the country.

While the South Korean government did not officially respond to the post, it drew an immediate response from EU officials, who declared it their “sovereign right” to oversee economic activities on their soil. Several EU leaders vigorously refuted the Trump administration’s claim that European restrictions unfairly target American tech companies. And EU Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier said its regulation “does not look at the color of a company, at the jurisdiction of a company, nor the owner of a company.”

But while Europe’s digital regulations are despised by U.S. tech giants, the White House is more focused on countries like South Korea, India, Turkey and Brazil, which are currently considering draft rules loosely modeled on Europe’s laws.

Senior White House officials see South Korea’s response as a litmus test on whether they will be able to pressure other trading partners to abort pushes for new digital restrictions, three of the people said.

“Part of it was the frustration that Europe hasn’t budged,” said another person close to the White House on Trump’s post. “But there was more a recognition … that South Korea was probably among three or four other jurisdictions potentially looking to be first followers of the EU — to mirror or mimic that approach. So he was like, ‘Okay, South Korea is here, their new president has said this is a priority, and we’ve got to nip this in the bud.’”

A White House official told POLITICO that Trump has “consistently opposed” digital regulations from countries that target American tech companies. Those discussions are “part of almost every trade negotiation we’re having,” the official added.

South Korean lawmakers in recent years have floated a series of proposals that could classify major U.S. tech companies as monopolies or gate-keepers, and open them up to steep fines, including the Platform Competition Promotion Act proposed in 2023. Those and similar proposals are drawing growing criticism from Trump allies in the U.S., including lawmakers like Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.), who co-led a letter sent in late July warning that Seoul’s proposed rules could give Chinese tech companies an edge there.

Leading MAGA voices have also taken note: conservative activist and podcaster Charlie Kirk shared a post on X on Aug. 24 complaining that South Korea’s government “still targets U.S. industry with regulations while giving Chinese companies a free pass.”

“Only Trump can fix this, no more free passes for China while we get punished,” Kirk wrote.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has brought up the legislation in trade talks with his South Korean counterparts, but digital trade wasn’t addressed in the limited trade agreement the two countries announced late July. The announcement — which Trump posted on social media — was scant on details, saying only that South Korea had agreed to a 15 percent tariff on its exports in exchange for a pledge of more than $350 billion in investment and an additional $100 billion in energy purchases.

Ahead of the president’s meeting with Lee, however, senior Trump administration officials pressed the South Korean government to sign a joint statement on the deal that included language pledging to abandon proposals for digital trade restrictions, according to three people familiar with the discussions. South Korea rejected that draft language.

Seoul insists it will press ahead with some form of digital regulation, though it has adjusted its approach to address expectations from the Trump administration. As a result of trade talks with Washington, South Korea’s liberal party will give up on at least one proposal, known as the Online Platform Regulation Act, according to a senior official quoted in local reports, and will instead consider pared back digital rules.

Some South Korean officials say they would be willing to ease digital proposals that the Trump administration claims discriminate against American companies, and the Trump administration believes they are making progress toward convincing Lee’s administration to reject any digital legislation that hits American companies.

“A lot is on the table and a lot of those demands are far tougher for South Korea than the digital issues,” said a person close to the White House.

While South Korea’s legislation has long been on Big Tech’s radar, it only recently came to Trump’s attention, following days of briefings that highlighted Lee’s pledges to tighten digital regulations during the country’s presidential campaign earlier this year. High-profile Trump supporters have also recently taken note of the tech debate taking place in South Korea.

Kirk’s X post was also shared with the president during a briefing ahead of the summit, as was an op-ed from former Trump national security adviser Robert O’Brien warning South Korea’s digital legislation, if passed, would be a “gift” to the Chinese government.

Trump echoed that language in his Truth Social post, suggesting that other countries’ digital regulations “outrageously, give a complete pass to China’s largest Tech Companies.”

“If Trump wants to go after Amazon, Google, or other U.S. tech firms here at home, that’s his prerogative, but other countries shouldn’t be messing with American tech firms. That’s clearly how folks like Charlie Kirk feel, and I think that’s how the president feels too,” said a former Republican official, who frequently meets with the president and senior White House officials.

White House aides also presented Trump with letters from Republican lawmakers asking the administration to address the digital dispute as part of trade negotiations with South Korea, the people said.

Ahead of Lee’s visit, House Ways and Means Republicans Adrian Smith (Neb.) and Carol Miller (W.Va.) released public statements calling on the administration to address the country’s digital proposals, and led a letter from more than 40 House Republicans warning that South Korea’s measures would disproportionately target U.S. tech firms.

Said Miller: “President Trump is a known dealmaker, and I am confident that he will help secure fair market access for our digital companies operating abroad.”

Politico

11. North Korea's hidden wildlife trade: New research reveals state involvement

​One of north Korea's overlooked maling activities.

North Korea's hidden wildlife trade: New research reveals state involvement

phys.org

September 2, 2025

by Joshua Elves-Powell, The Conversation

edited by Gaby Clark, reviewed by Andrew Zinin

Gaby Clark

scientific editor

Andrew Zinin

lead editor

Credit: Pixabay/CC0 Public Domain

North Korea is notorious for its illicit trade in weapons and narcotics. But a new investigation that I conducted with colleagues in the UK and Norway reveals a new concern: the illegal trade in wildlife, including species supposedly protected by North Korea's own laws.

Based on interviews with North Korean refugees (also referred to as "defectors" or "escapees")—from former hunters to wildlife trade middlemen—our four-year study shows that almost every mammal species in North Korea larger than a hedgehog is opportunistically captured for consumptive use or trade. Even highly protected species are being traded, sometimes across the border to China.

Perhaps most striking: this isn't only happening in the black market. The North Korean state itself appears to profit from unsustainable and illegal wildlife exploitation.

After the North Korean economy collapsed in the 1990s, the country suffered a severe famine that resulted in between 600,000 and 1 million deaths. No longer able to rely on the state for food, medicine and other basic needs, many citizens took to buying and selling goods—sometimes stolen from state-run factories, or smuggled across the border with China—within a growing informal economy.

This included wild animals and plants, a valuable food resource. Others valued wildlife for its use in traditional Korean medicine, or for producing goods such as winter clothing. Importantly, wildlife could also be sold to generate valuable revenue. For this reason, as well as a domestic market in wild meat and animal body parts, an international trade developed in which smugglers would try to sell North Korean wildlife products across the border into China.

This trade is not officially recognized by either government and North Korea is one of the few countries that is not a party to Cites—the treaty that regulates international trade in endangered species—so there is little official data. Many of the techniques that researchers usually employ, such as market surveys or analyses of seizure or trade data, are simply impossible in the case of North Korea.

We turned instead to the testimony of North Korean refugees. They included former hunters, middlemen, buyers, and even soldiers who had been posted to hunting reserves set aside for North Korea's ruling family. To protect their safety, all interviews were anonymous. To help verify our data we compared them to reports from China and South Korea, while reported changes in some forest resources could be verified using satellite-based remote sensing.

Their accounts provide an astonishing level of insight into human interactions with—and use of—wild animals and plants in North Korea.

Discover the latest in science, tech, and space with over 100,000 subscribers who rely on Phys.org for daily insights. Sign up for our free newsletter and get updates on breakthroughs, innovations, and research that matter—daily or weekly.

North Korean state involvement in wildlife trade

Perhaps most concerning, however, were reports which suggested the North Korean state itself is directly involved in wildlife trade. Although it was clear from interviews that participants were often not aware of the legal status of wildlife trade in different species, based on our analysis, some of that trade would appear to be illegal.

Participants described state-run wildlife farms producing otters, pheasants, deer and bears, and their body parts, for trade. (Indeed, North Korea is believed to have first started farming bears for their bile, before the practice spread to China and South Korea.) The state also collected animal skins via a quota-based system, with residents submitting skins to a government agency, while state-sanctioned hunters and local communities sometimes gifted wildlife products to the state or its leaders as a form of tribute.

One species our interviewees identified was the long-tailed goral. Long hunted for its skin, this species is now highly protected under Cites. Our data suggested that gorals were destined for sale to buyers in China. As a party to the convention, this trade would violate China's commitments under Cites.

Impacts beyond North Korea's borders

The Korean peninsula is a globally important site for numerous mammal species. Its northern regions are connected by land to areas in China where these species are now recovering. However, unsustainable hunting and deforestation threaten their potential recovery in North Korea.

This has wider consequences. For instance, it has been hoped that the Amur leopard, one of the world's rarest big cats, may one day naturally recolonize South Korea. But this is currently highly unlikely—these animals will face severe threats simply crossing North Korea.

Meanwhile, China's conservation goals—such as restoring the Amur tiger in its northeastern provinces—may be undermined if threatened species which cross its border with North Korea are killed for trade. Furthermore, illegal cross-border trade in wildlife from North Korea would constitute a breach of China's Cites commitments—a serious issue, with potentially severe ramifications for legal trade in animals and plants. To address this risk, Beijing must do more to tackle domestic demand for illegal wildlife.

The North Korean wildlife trade is currently a blind spot for global conservation. While our findings help shed light on the issue of illegal and unsustainable trade, tackling this threat to North Korea's natural resources will ultimately depend on the decisions taken by Pyongyang. Compliance with domestic protected species legislation should be an immediate priority.

Provided by The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Citation: North Korea's hidden wildlife trade: New research reveals state involvement (2025, September 2) retrieved 4 September 2025 from https://phys.org/news/2025-09-north-korea-hidden-wildlife-reveals.html

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Widespread illegal wildlife trade occurs in North Korea, involving nearly all mammal species larger than a hedgehog, including those protected by law. Evidence indicates direct state involvement through wildlife farms, quota systems, and trade with China. This exploitation threatens regional species recovery and undermines international conservation efforts, particularly CITES commitments.

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12. Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping hold first summit in six years

​The CRInK conspires.

I wonder if we can now say there are two major blocks in the world: the CRInK vs the Silk Web of Democratic Friends, partners, and allies, And of course India will likely lead the third, traditional non-aligned movement. With BRICS align with the CRInK?

Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping hold first summit in six years

Trilateral meetings with Russia signal strengthened anti-U.S. cooperation and economic ties

https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/09/04/3Y2LSHQSY5AWLKG667UFGEJPDY/

By Lee Beul-chan

Published 2025.09.04. 19:08

Updated 2025.09.04. 21:01

On the 3rd, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un are together at official events, including a military parade and luncheon held in Beijing.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held a summit in Beijing on the afternoon of the 4th, according to a report by Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency on the same day. This marks the first bilateral summit between the two countries in six years. North Korea, China, and Russia have held summits between China and Russia (on the 2nd), North Korea and Russia (on the 3rd), and now North Korea and China, following the Beijing military parade, leading to assessments that they have effectively materialized a three-way alliance.

Guo Jiaqun, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said during a regular briefing that day, “The leaders of the two parties and countries will hold talks and engage in in-depth discussions on Sino-North Korean relations and issues of common interest.” Kim Jong-un is expected to demand strengthened economic cooperation with China and a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang by Xi Jinping during the talks. There are also analyses suggesting that North Korea aims to resolve its Russia-centric diplomacy during the Ukraine war and restore relations with China. This is seen as an attempt to pursue a “balanced diplomacy between China and Russia,” strengthening security cooperation with Russia and economic cooperation with China.

China seeks to restore its influence over North Korea and strengthen its negotiating power against the United States through a “four-party denuclearization negotiation framework” that excludes Japan and Russia.

As the meeting is scheduled in the evening, there are suggestions that the leaders of the two countries might share a meal together. If Xi Jinping prepares a private dinner for Kim Jong-un during the 80th anniversary military parade of the victory day, attended by leaders from 26 countries, it could be interpreted as an extraordinary gesture of hospitality toward Kim Jong-un at the level of a “state visit.”

※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.

13.Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping hold talks in Beijing, day after China’s military parade

Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping hold talks in Beijing, day after China’s military parade

Meeting marks the first formal talks between the two leaders since Xi visited North Korea in 2019

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/kim-jong-un-to-hold-in-depth-talks-with-xi-jinping-while-in-china-reports/

Anton Sokolin September 4, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2018 | Image: KCNA

This is a developing news story. Please check back for updates. (Last updated at 7:45 p.m. KST with details about Xi’s other summit talks)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will hold “in-depth talks” with Chinese President Xi Jinping while in Beijing, according to China’s foreign ministry.

The state-run Xinhua News Agency reported at 7:06 p.m. KST that Xi held talks with Kim, without providing any further information.

Xi also had back-to-back meetings with other foreign heads of state prior to sitting down with Kim, including with the leaders of Serbia, Slovakia, Congo, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Vietnam and Laos, according to the agency.

Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun announced plans for the summit in a briefing on Thursday afternoon, stating that Kim is visiting China at Xi’s invitation and that the two leaders will hold talks.

The two are set to discuss bilateral ties and share in-depth views on issues of mutual interest, Guo said, without providing further details. 

He also said that Beijing seeks to boost “strategic communication” with the DPRK and “deepen experiences in state governance” through tighter cooperation, while boosting the “continuous development of the respective socialist causes” and friendly ties

The outlet China News reported that the meeting would take place at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

The talks follow Kim’s attendance at China’s massive military parade at Tiananmen Square on Wednesday, where he stood on the rostrum next to Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The DPRK leader held a summit with Putin after the parade, in addition to impromptu engagements with the leaders of Belarus, Myanmar, Vietnam and Malaysia.

Kim and Xi last held summit talks in June 2019, when the Chinese leader visited Pyongyang on his first-ever trip to North Korea.

In total, the leaders met a total of five times during the period of inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK summits from 2018-2019.

The first meeting took place in Beijing in March 2018, shortly before Kim met the leaders of South Korea and U.S. later that year. That visit marked Kim’s first overseas trip since he assumed power in 2011.

The two leaders subsequently held meetings in Dalian in May 2018 and in Beijing in June 2018 and Jan. 2019.

The revival of DPRK-China dialogue follows signs that bilateral relations are improving after going through a rough patch last year, presumably due to North Korea’s close military cooperation with Russia over the war in Ukraine.

Pyongyang has supplied various types of munitions and ballistic missiles to the Russian side, while also dispatching thousands of troops to help repel a Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region last year.

Seoul’s intelligence agency assessed that Kim’s latest trip to China may be aimed at extracting greater economic support, anticipating a reduction in Russian aid if there is a resolution to the Ukraine war.

Other analysts have suggested that Beijing has come to see Russia-DPRK cooperation as a fait accompli and decided to invite Kim to China to avoid losing influence with Pyongyang.

Edited by Bryan Betts

​14. UN voices concern about North Korean experiments on people with disabilities

​Recall after the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry that the regime passed a new law to protect people with disabilities? This was touted by some as an indication of change by the regime.

However, we must understand the true nature of the regime. It is evil. Pure evil.

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. 

UN voices concern about North Korean experiments on people with disabilities

Report cites ‘credible’ info on killing disabled babies and forced abortions in DPRK, highlighting ‘persistent stigma’

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/un-voices-concern-about-north-korean-experiments-on-people-with-disabilities/

Jooheon Kim | Shreyas Reddy September 4, 2025

A disabled North Korean man receiving assistance from a woman | Image: KCTV (March 19, 2023)

A U.N. committee has voiced concern about “credible reports” that North Korea conducts medical experiments on persons with disabilities, killing disabled babies and performing forced sterilizations and abortions on women.

In a report published Wednesday, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) drew attention to the human rights abuses perpetrated by the North Korean state against citizens with disabilities, stating that they face “persistent stigma” and “negative societal attitudes.” 

The CRPD highlighted the continued segregation of North Koreans with disabilities, with many such individuals — including persons of short stature — institutionalized in isolated settlements and facing severe restrictions on their movement.

The report echoes longstanding allegations that the North Korean regime pursues a systematic “cleansing” of its population by making persons with disabilities disappear and subjecting them to horrific treatment, despite North Korea’s promotion of its efforts to support these individuals.

An issue of particular concern is the alleged “medical and scientific experiments” conducted on persons with psychosocial disabilities and intellectual disabilities, which the committee flagged as a violation of the right to freedom from “torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

According to Bada Nam, secretary-general of the North Korea-focused human rights nonprofit PSCORE, some families hand their children with disabilities over to the state despite knowing their kids may be sent for experiments.

“There were testimonies saying that, although they knew their children might be subjected to physical experiments, they still sent them anyway,” he told NK News. 

The expert added that disabled children are not allowed to live in Pyongyang, forcing their entire families to leave the city.

“It’s not just the child — the entire family is forced to leave,” he said.

Nam noted that some families have even handed their child over to the state, telling authorities to “take them and deal with it” after living under pressure. 

The committee also flagged reports of “infanticide of children with disabilities,” including killings carried out in medical facilities with official consent. It expressed concern about the persistence of eugenic and discriminatory medical policies and practices, as well as the alleged use of the death penalty against disabled individuals.

The report outlined other problems facing children with disabilities, including a lack of accessible and stigma-free pediatric screening, particularly in rural and remote parts of the country. As a result, the committee wanted that these children, particularly those with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, face increased “risk of isolation from society and seclusion at home.”

Women with disabilities are another vulnerable group who reportedly face severe abuses in the DPRK, with the commission drawing attention to the lack of sexual and reproductive health services and barriers to education, employment, welfare and leadership opportunities.

In addition, they often face gender-based and sexual violence, coerced marriage, rape, abduction and trafficking, according to the report. The committee expressed particular concern about women with disabilities being forced to undergo sterilizations and abortions.

Due to societal stigma, persons with disabilities face significant challenges in finding employment, the report states, and are often restricted to “segregated ‘light-labour’ workshops based on type and degree of impairment.”

The report added that many persons with disabilities are detained arbitrarily and subjected to “degrading treatment, including solitary confinement for perceived disobedience or ‘non-productivity’” and denied access to medical care and basic necessities. As a result of the harsh conditions they endure, many end up acquiring secondary disabilities.

At the heart of the numerous problems facing North Koreans with disabilities is the lack of legal protection provided by the state and the discrimination they endure, which is fueled by a lack of awareness and “harmful attitudes” in society, according to the committee.

Nam explained that bullying those who seem weaker also existed in South Korea in the past, and that he himself witnessed such situations frequently in the 1970s. But he said the two countries’ paths diverged over time as the South was exposed to global standards and the North’s isolation exacerbated discriminatory attitudes.

“They don’t even realize it’s a problem,” he said.

To overcome these challenges, the committee recommended that North Korea amend its constitution and legislation to guarantee equality and non-discrimination, adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination law and work to provide effective remedies while tackling stigma through awareness and training.

The committee suggested creating a clear strategy to support inclusive education and gradually replace segregated schools with inclusive ones to foster a society where persons with disabilities don’t face discrimination. 

“The strategy should include a detailed plan to phase out segregated learning environments through transition programs that facilitate the systematic transfer of children from special to inclusive schools,” the report stated.

Addressing the report’s concerns about severe rights abuses, the CRPD urged the DPRK to take effective measures to stop cases of “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” and called for a ban on all medical and scientific experiments involving people with disabilities. 

The committee also called on Pyongyang to end the infanticide of children with disabilities and punish those who commit such acts, guarantee disabled people’s right to life, prohibit “eugenic and discriminatory” practices and abolish the death penalty.

Edited by Bryan Betts

15. ROK lawmaker recounts cool reception from North Korean officials at China parade

​I hope they realize this is an indicator of how KJU wants relations to be with the South.

ROK lawmaker recounts cool reception from North Korean officials at China parade

DPRK delegation members reportedly turned heads and ‘sat with angry looks’ when South Koreans attempted to engage

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/rok-lawmaker-recounts-cool-reception-from-north-korean-officials-at-china-parade/

Jooheon Kim September 4, 2025

Rebuilding Korea Party lawmaker Kim Joon-hyung | Image: Screenshot from Kim Joon-hyung's Instagram

North Korean officials accompanying leader Kim Jong Un in Beijing reacted coldly to a South Korean delegation’s attempts to engage them during China’s large-scale military parade on Wednesday, according to an ROK lawmaker.

Kim Joon-hyung of the progressive Rebuilding Korea Party said that lawmakers who traveled to Beijing for the event attempted to talk to members of the DPRK delegation.

“Even when we tried to approach them, there was a general atmosphere of avoidance,” Kim said during an interview with local media. 

In another radio interview, the lawmaker said the South Korean side tried to make contact by pretending to take photos but that the North Koreans “completely turned their heads away” and “sat with angry looks, making it difficult to approach.” He added there were also bodyguards present.

After attending the parade, Kim said that improving inter-Korean relations would not be easy. “North Korea now seems to view itself as dealing with the world, not South Korea.”

He added that the DPRK considers the ROK a hostile state that it is still technically at war with, making direct engagement unlikely anytime soon. The experience also reaffirmed his view that the U.S. would likely have to play a mediating role.

Kim was one of several lawmakers who accompanied National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, who attended the parade as South Korea’s representative after President Lee Jae-myung decided not to join.

Woo said the previous day that he shook hands and exchanged greetings with Kim Jong Un at the parade, though he indicated that was the full extent of their interactions.

Kim Joon-hyung noted that Woo and the DPRK leader were seated at almost opposite ends of the parade viewing stand, which he speculated the North Korean side requested to avoid meeting the ROK delegation.

By contrast, Kim noted that Putin actively tried to engage Woo in conversation at a reception after the parade. According to Kim, Putin asked Woo what he thought about inter-Korean relations and, since he would be meeting the North Korean leader shortly after, if there was anything Woo wanted him to convey. 

At a press conference on Thursday, Woo told reporters he conveyed to Putin the idea that initiating cultural exchange would be a good first step.

“Next year, the UNESCO General Assembly will be held in South Korea. As both the Petroglyphs along the Bangucheon Stream in South Korea and Mount Kumgang in North Korea have been inscribed as World Heritage sites, I expressed that it would be meaningful if the UNESCO committee members could also visit Mount Kumgang during the assembly.”

According to Woo, Putin responded by saying, “I understand.”  

Woo also said he met Chinese President Xi Jinping and requested that he attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, highlighting that his visit would serve as a turning point for advancing bilateral relations. The event is scheduled to be held in South Korea from Oct. 31 to Nov. 1.

Meanwhile, Seoul’s unification ministry said on Thursday that it is “preparing for all possibilities” after the North Korean leader stood alongside his Chinese and Russian counterparts during the Victory Day parade.

An official from the ministry cited diverging views about the DPRK’s future strategy, stating that Kim could strengthen an alliance with China and Russia against the U.S. but that North Korea could also leverage its closer ties with its neighbors to engage Washington in talks.

Edited by Bryan Betts

16. What we know about Kim Ju-ae’s staged rise

​Ms Ji is digging deep to help us understand the Kim Ju Ae phenomenon

What we know about Kim Ju-ae’s staged rise

koreaherald.com · Ji Da-gyum · September 4, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrived in Beijing at 4 p.m. Tuesday, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency. Photos released by KCNA show his daughter Ju-ae (circled in red) accompanying him, along with party secretary Jo Yong-won, Premier Kim Tok-hun and Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. (Yonhap)

For nearly three years, North Korea has been scripting the staged rise of Kim Jong-un’s adolescent daughter — believed to be named Kim Ju-ae — through a blend of honorifics, wardrobe choices, positioning in photographs and an expanding range of public activities covered in the tightly controlled state media.

Ju-ae debuted in November 2022 as “the beloved daughter,” a shy figure in a white padded jacket clutching her father’s hand beside the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, serving essentially as a prop for her father.

Within a year and a half, however, Ju-ae was no longer tucked into the background, as state media elevated her honorifics. She was promoted to one of the “great persons of guidance,” taking one of the two main chairs beside her father on the review stand at Kim Il-sung Square, which can accommodate around 100,000 people.

At times, Ju-ae dresses like her father, in matching sunglasses and a leather jacket. She has even appeared slightly ahead of her father, making her presence more noticeable in official photographs.

As a visual thread of dynastic continuity, she has cycled through a Dior down jacket, a lavish pink fur coat, a Cartier watch with a diamond-encrusted bezel and sheer-sleeved dresses — a daring choice considering the country's strict dress code — and other carefully curated outfits.

Over the past week, Ju-ae has stepped into the choreography of international spectacle, accompanying her father to his first-ever multilateral diplomatic event alongside 26 heads of state, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Unknown daughter

Beyond the pictures in state media, much about Ju-ae remains shrouded in mystery

Her name was first disclosed through former NBA star Dennis Rodman, who said he had “held their baby Ju-ae” and spoken with Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, during his visit to Pyongyang in 2013.

However, some defectors, including Ri Il-gyu, the former second-ranking North Korean diplomat in Cuba, later contended her name should be rendered “Ju-ye.”

Questions have also lingered about her place among her siblings.

In 2017, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service told lawmakers during a closed-door briefing that Kim had three children — a son born around 2010, a daughter around 2013 and a younger child born in 2017 — though Pyongyang has never confirmed their identities.

Others insist Ju-ae is the firstborn daughter, pointing to former South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s memoir. Recalling the inter-Korean summit in April 2018, Moon wrote that Kim told him, “I, too, have a daughter, and I cannot let her generation live under the shadow of nuclear weapons.”

Observers point out that if Kim’s eldest were a son, he would more likely have said that he has a son or simply children.

Ri Sol-ju’s public schedule offers another clue to the timing of Ju-ae’s birth.

Ri accompanied Kim frequently in 2012, then vanished for about 50 days after September. When Ri reappeared in late October at a Moranbong Band concert, she showed a visibly swollen face and pronounced belly.

Ri attended sporadic events through December 2012, disappeared again after a New Year’s concert on Jan. 1, 2013, and returned only on Feb. 16 — an absence-and-return cycle that would strongly suggest Ju-ae was born around January 2013.

Rapid evolution

North Korean propaganda has steadily upgraded the language surrounding Ju-ae, moving from the familial to quasi-leadership.

Ju-ae debuted in November 2022 at the Hwasong-17 test-launch as “the beloved daughter,” and became “precious” days later in a state media report on a ceremony awarding those who contributed to the successful Hwasong-17 launch.

In February 2023, she was described as “the respected daughter” sitting prominently on the review stand during a military parade report.

In March 2024, Ju-ae and her father were together described as “the great persons of guidance,” a phrase once reserved for the leader alone at the inauguration ceremony of Kangdong Greenhouse Farm in a Pyongyang suburb.

In May this year, at a Russian Embassy reception on the occasion of Russia’s Victory Day celebration in Pyongyang, she was introduced as “his dearest daughter,” a phrase intended to emphasize lineage and legitimacy.

Pyongyang also unveiled stamps featuring the imagery of Ju-ae holding hands with her father against a backdrop of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, linking arms in a staged pose or photographed with soldiers.

From prop to hero

When Ju-ae’s public life began in November 2022, she appeared to be an accessory for her father in a highly choreographed state media report idolizing the North Korean leader, clutching her father’s hand.

But in the following year, she was no longer tucked into the background.

At the North Korean Navy headquarters, she walked just off the red carpet, flanked behind by Pak Jong-chon, deputy chair of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission, and then-Defense Minister Gen. Kang Sun-nam in August 2023 — a tableau that Seoul officials said carried the weight of protocol for Ju-ae. A copy of Kim Jong-un’s speech was laid in front of Ju-ae — not top military brass.

The optics shifted. At the February 2023 military parade, she had been seated behind her father at the review stand to observe Kim Il-sung Square; by September that year, Ju-ae occupied one of the two prime chairs beside Kim Jong-un on the same review stand during the paramilitary parade.

On Air Force Day that December, official photographs released by state media even placed Ju-ae slightly ahead of Kim Jong-un, her figure more prominent in the frame.

This year, Ju-ae crossed into diplomacy.

On May 9, she accompanied her father to a Russian Embassy reception in Pyongyang, introduced as “his dearest daughter.” A month later, she was again by his side at a concert attended by Russia’s culture minister.

Even family ceremonies were stage-managed to highlight her presence.

When the Kim family attended the inauguration of the Wonsan Kalma coastal resort in June, Ju-ae’s mother Ri Sol-ju, appearing for the first time in 18 months, was shown by state media walking a few paces back, seemingly to spotlight her daughter.

A Unification Ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Thursday that “the level of deference and protocol accorded to Kim Ju-ae has steadily risen over time.”

Legacy fashion: From Dior down to leather looks

Ju-ae’s wardrobe plays a key role in her public appearances, with each outfit carefully selected for the occasion.

Ju-ae made her debut in November 2022 at the Hwasong-17 missile launch, wearing a simple white padded jacket that emphasized her youth beside her father.

However, her style has since become more lavish and assertive.

In March 2023, Ju-ae appeared in a black down jacket from Dior’s children’s line, priced at nearly $2,000 — a stark contrast against the country’s chronic shortages and strict sanctions — while accompanying her father at another Hwasong-17 test launch.

In a similar fashion, she attended a Hwasong-18 ICBM test in December that year, wrapped in a lavish pink fur jacket.

Ju-ae also wore a twin look with her father, a coordinated style that projected authority.

In November 2023, Ju-ae appeared at the Air Force headquarters in matching sunglasses and a leather jacket alongside her father. She also donned a deep plum leather coat — striking attire for someone her age — matched with her father’s black leather jacket at the Kangdong greenhouse inauguration in March 2024.

Ju-ae has sometimes made bold choices in a country known for a strict dress code, such as a sheer-sleeved dress at the unveiling of Pyongyang’s Jonwi Street in May 2024.

At the inauguration of the Wonsan Kalma coastal resort this June, Ju-ae was seen in a white two-piece outfit and a Cartier watch edged with diamonds — a clear display of defiance against UN sanctions banning imports of luxury goods.

dagyumji@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Ji Da-gyum · September 4, 2025

17. S. Korean military to boost unmanned capabilities by training 500,000 ‘drone warriors’

​Www. This is quite an ambitious initiative. Like every US Marine is a rifleman, in the modern era almost perhaps every soldier needs to be a drone operator or at least be able to fight against drones.

S. Korean military to boost unmanned capabilities by training 500,000 ‘drone warriors’

koreaherald.com · Jung Min-kyung · September 4, 2025

A drone is used during a joint exercise conducted in the East Sea by Republic of Korea Navy 1st Fleet and the Armed Forces Daejeon Hospital, to deliver patient samples from a naval ship to the fleet's medical unit, on Aug. 21. (Yonhap)

South Korea’s Defense Ministry on Thursday announced an ambitious initiative to cultivate half a million troops proficient in drone operations, underscoring the growing role of unmanned systems in modern warfare and the country’s drive to foster a domestic drone industry.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back unveiled the plan at the Republic of Korea Army’s 36th Infantry Division base in Wonju, Gangwon Province, designating the unit as the military’s first dedicated training ground for drone operations.

The initiative to foster “500,000 drone warriors” is built around two pillars: giving every soldier the chance to earn drone piloting credentials and practical experience, and forging closer ties between the armed forces and the domestic drone industry. The program is designed not only to strengthen battlefield capabilities by embedding drone operating skills across ranks, but also to provide veterans and those discharged from the military with a skillset in the area.

To support the effort, the Defense Ministry has set aside roughly 20.5 billion won ($15 million) of the planned 66.3 trillion won budget for 2026. The funds will go toward procuring thousands of small, commercially available training drones built with locally manufactured components such as motors and batteries, as well as expanding the infrastructure and professional instruction programs needed for large-scale training.

Pilot programs are scheduled to begin later this year across each branch of the armed forces, laying the groundwork for what officials hope will become a nationwide model.

Ahn said the Army’s 36th Division would serve as a model for other units, noting that its experience in strengthening drone operations through “creative and diverse efforts” will be shared more widely across the force. He called for the division to act as a central test bed, allowing the military to rapidly evaluate new technologies, including drones and related military equipment enhanced with artificial intelligence.

The Defense Ministry said it is also considering designating additional specialized units across the services to test small and counter-drone technologies now being developed in the private sector, and later tailor the trials to different mission types.

Ahn drew a parallel between the latest initiative and the late President Kim Dae-jung’s push in the late ’90s to provide information-technology training to soldiers.

“(Former President Kim’s initiative) helped turn a generation of young South Koreans into world-class digital talents and cemented the country’s status as an IT powerhouse. The drone initiative could play a similar role today — serving not only as a military reform but also as a catalyst for personal development, industrial growth and a new source of national strength,” he explained.

The Defense Ministry’s plan reflects a global trend of the rapid militarization of unmanned vehicles, which has been reshaping modern warfare. Unmanned systems, once considered supplementary, have become decisive tools for surveillance, precision strikes, and asymmetric tactics. In conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East, drones have altered the balance of power by lowering costs while raising lethality.

North Korea is moving in the same direction.

Pyongyang has been accelerating its drone program, unveiling advanced unmanned systems, expanding test facilities and even exporting drones abroad, according to recent intelligence assessments and satellite imagery.

The push is part of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s pledge to prioritize unmanned and artificial intelligence capabilities as a cornerstone of military modernization. In March, the North’s state media showcased AI-powered exploding drones — designed to strike targets directly — alongside large reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles and even a converted early-warning aircraft.

mkjung@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Jung Min-kyung · September 4, 2025

18. Defense chief unveils plan to foster drone capabilities across military

(LEAD) Defense chief unveils plan to foster drone capabilities across military | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 4, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS lead; ADDS photos, remarks)

By Lee Minji

WONJU, South Korea, Sept. 4 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back on Thursday unveiled a plan to strengthen drone and anti-drone capabilities across the military to better utilize the effective but low-cost combat equipment that has emerged as a "game changer" in modern warfare.

Under the plan, dubbed the "500,000 drone warrior" project, the military plans to offer all conscripts drone operation training opportunities, according to the ministry.

The ministry expected such a plan to help all conscripts familiarize themselves with drones while enhancing the military's combat power.

In conjunction with the plan, the military will acquire commercial drone equipment for training to secure a stable supply of drones from the civilian sector while helping foster the domestic drone manufacturing industry.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (C) inspects a drone during his visit to the Army's 36th Division in Wonju, some 90 kilometers east of Seoul, on Sept. 4, 2025, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The ministry has allocated 20.5 billion won (US$14.7 million) for the project in the defense budget proposal for next year submitted to the National Assembly, which includes the cost to acquire 11,184 drones for training.

"Drones have become a game changer in modern warfare," Ahn said. "Efforts to nurture 500,000 drone warriors will not only strengthen the military's drone operation capabilities but will serve as a foundation for troops to work in relevant industries after completing their service."

Ahn said the military will aim to secure more than 50,000 drones for training in the longer term. The military currently owns around 300 drones for education purpose.

Ahn called for efforts to help foster new growth engines for the country's economy, noting how former President Kim Dae-jung had launched computer education for conscripts to help nurture the country's information technology sector.

As part of such efforts, Ahn designated the Army's 36th Division in Wonju, some 90 kilometers east of Seoul, as the military's first test-bed unit to verify civilian drones for military use.

The unit's location, which enables tests in both in urban and mountainous areas, as well as the experience of using drones for surveillance operations during the Winter Youth Olympics in 2024 were factored in, the ministry said.

The ministry plans to review designating additional military units as test beds for different types of drones.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (front) tests an anti-drone gun during his visit to the Army's 36th Division in Wonju, some 90 kilometers east of Seoul, on Sept. 4, 2025, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 4, 2025

19. S. Korea's arms agency, Polish gov't discuss bilateral defense cooperation

​Yes, I will use my tired cliche: South Korea is a partner in the arsenal of democracies.

S. Korea's arms agency, Polish gov't discuss bilateral defense cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 4, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 4 (Yonhap) -- Senior officials of South Korea's state arms procurement agency met with Polish government officials earlier this week to explore ways to deepen bilateral cooperation in the defense sector, officials said Thursday.

The meeting with Poland's vice defense minister and vice minister of state assets took place on the sidelines of an international defense industry exhibition in Kielce, Poland, according to the South's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).

The two sides discussed ways to strengthen defense cooperation, including maintenance support for weapons exported to Poland and potential areas for future partnership, it added.

Poland has emerged as a key destination for South Korea's defense exports in recent years as the European nation has clinched a series of deals to acquire K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and FA-50 light attack aircraft.

This year, Poland signed a deal worth about US$6.5 billion to purchase the second batch of K2 tanks from Hyundai Rotem Co., marking the country's largest-ever arms export contract.

This photo, provided by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration on Sept. 3, 2025, shows a booth for Korean defense products at the 2025 International Defense Industry Exhibition, or MSPO, in Kielce, Poland. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 4, 2025

20. Hanwha Aerospace agrees to co-develop battlefield management system with Estonian firms

​This is an indication of an advanced defense industrial base. To be able to provide a command and control/battle management system to a country that speaks another language is really important.

Hanwha Aerospace agrees to co-develop battlefield management system with Estonian firms | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · September 4, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 4 (Yonhap) -- Defense giant Hanwha Aerospace Co. said Thursday it has signed an agreement with two Estonian companies to jointly develop a battlefield management system (BMS) for its infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) platforms.

Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed Wednesday (local time) with Estonia's Nortal and SensusQ on the sidelines of the ongoing Polish defense fair MSPO 2025 in Kielce, Poland, Hanwha Aerospace's Redback IFV platform will serve as the base platform for the new BMS, according to the company.

Nortal will contribute its expertise in digital transformation and complex systems integration, while SensusQ will provide technological and operational support.

A BMS integrates battlefield data to enhance command and control, serving as a key tool for modern military operations.

Hanwha Aerospace said the agreement could help pave the way for its entry into Estonia's IFV market.

"This MOU is about building a genuine security partnership," said Kim Dong-hyun, head of land system business group at Hanwha Aerospace. "By collaborating with esteemed Estonian companies, we are committed to contributing to the growth of the local and European defense industry."

This photo provided by Hanwha Aerospace Co. shows officials from the Korean company, Nortal and SensusQ posing for a photo after signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for co-development of a battlefield management system (BMS) on the sidelines of the ongoing Polish defense fair MSPO 2025 in Kielce, Poland, on Sept. 3, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · September 4, 2025

21. Nat'l Assembly speaker asks China's Zhao to 'prudently' handle Yellow Sea issue

​Translation to China: Act like a responsible member of the international community.

Nat'l Assembly speaker asks China's Zhao to 'prudently' handle Yellow Sea issue | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 4, 2025

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Sept. 4 (Yonhap) -- National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik held a meeting with China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, in Beijing on Thursday, during which Woo asked Zhao to "prudently" handle issues related to the Yellow Sea, according to Woo's office.

The meeting between Woo, who is on a visit to Beijing to attend a military parade, and Zhao, China's No. 3 official, comes as South Korea and China have been in a dispute after Beijing built several steel towers in the Provisional Maritime Zone, an overlapping sea zone in the Yellow Sea.

During the meeting, Woo voiced hope that issues related to the Yellow Sea will be "handled prudently" to avoid straining their bilateral ties, Woo's office said.

Woo told Zhao that his attendance at the military parade, which marked China's celebration of the end of World War II, is the South Korean government's willingness to "advance bilateral ties despite the challenges."

Woo hoped that South Korea and China will "continue the deep friendship and solidarity based on our shared historical experiences, and work together to achieve regional and global peace."

Woo expressed hope that the "strategic cooperative partnership" between the two countries will continue to develop under the Lee Jae Myung administration, calling Seoul and Beijing "key partners" that must cooperate for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.

He also reiterated his calls for Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held next month in the southeastern city of Gyeongju.

Later in the day, Woo is scheduled to meet with Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang.

South Korea's National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik (L) holds talks with China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, No. 3 in the ruling Chinese Communist Party's leadership, during their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Sept. 4, 2025, in this photo released by the South Korean parliament. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 4, 2025

22. North Korea orders trial deployment of nuclear underwater drones in East Sea

​Wow. I had not seen any previous reference to this. Imagine a drone with a nuclear weapon infiltrating into the ports at Sokcho, Pohang, and into the harbor at Pusan?

Of course this could be part of the regime's political warfare and information strategy.

North Korea orders trial deployment of nuclear underwater drones in East Sea

Since Aug. 27, a laboratory for underwater weapons systems at the Academy of National Defense Science has been collaborating with naval units to initiate trial drone operations in the field

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-orders-trial-deployment-of-nuclear-underwater-drones-in-east-sea/?tztc=1

By Jeong Tae Joo - September 4, 2025

North Korea's Workers' Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported on March 24, 2023, that an underwater explosion test of a nuclear unmanned underwater attack craft was conducted from March 21-23 under the observation of Kim Jong Un. (Rodong Sinmun·News1)

North Korea’s Central Military Commission has ordered certain squadrons in its East Sea Fleet to operate nuclear-armed underwater drones on a trial basis in preparation for full-scale deployment. The measure appears aligned with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on equipping the navy with nuclear weapons.

A source with the North Korean military told Daily NK recently that the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea had ordered the equipment general bureau of the defense ministry, the equipment department and sea lanes bureau of the Naval Command, and the East Sea Fleet command and several of its squadrons to prepare bringing the nuclear-capable underwater attack drone called Haeil (meaning “tsunami”) into service.

Since Aug. 27, a laboratory for underwater weapons systems at the Academy of National Defense Science has been collaborating with naval units to initiate trial drone operations in the field—the step before putting the drones on active duty.

The current work includes selecting and training staff for the trial program, surveying sea lanes, choosing operational areas and upgrading equipment and charging facilities.

Three-stage deployment plan

The program stages being discussed internally are: (1) operating a small number of drones on a trial basis, (2) assessing their performance and making improvements, and (3) increasing the size of formations. However, the timeframe for those stages and progress goals remain unclear.

“The Haeil—that’s the craft they want to deploy with certain squadrons in the East Sea Fleet—is a large torpedo-type drone that’s about 13 meters long and 1.5 meters in diameter,” the source said.

“It’s considered an underwater weapon system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. But its technical combat specifications, as well as whether it will actually be nuclear-armed, will need to be reviewed during trial operations.”

North Korea has conducted several tests of the Haeil since 2023, describing the drone as a weapon capable of secretly approaching enemy vessels or ports and destroying them with the “radioactive tsunami” produced by an underwater explosion. However, it remains uncertain whether the drones are actually powerful enough to produce the “super-scale radioactive tsunami” described by Pyongyang.

What is clear is that Haeil is designed as a strategic weapon aimed at fixed targets such as ship anchorages and port facilities. This contrasts with the miniaturized underwater drones operated by the United States and South Korea for tactical missions such as reconnaissance, mine clearance and anti-submarine operations.

Strategic messaging and technical challenges

Since North Korea has recently been highlighting military and defense achievements to compensate for regime insecurity, the orders regarding Haeil’s trial deployment may ultimately represent a strategic attempt to showcase North Korea’s nuclear capabilities abroad and strengthen the regime domestically.

Amid these developments, North Korean technical experts reportedly acknowledge that while the orders for the trial program reflect the importance of preparing the drones for active service, further assessment and improvement are needed before the drones can be deployed to the front lines or operated independently.

Even the North Korean leadership reportedly recognizes that Haeil continues to face challenges including securing operational stability and managing safety issues and environmental risks.

“While it’s uncertain how effective Haeil would be in actual combat, the authorities regard it as both a strategic ‘ace in the hole’ and a means of infiltrating enemy strongholds to exact nuclear retribution,” the source said.

“There’s a general feeling in the military that simply acquiring a weapon that can detonate underwater in key locations represents a show of naval force, which has raised hopes and boosted confidence.”

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com