Quotes of the Day:

"We shouldn't teach great books; we should teach a love of reading."

– B.F. Skinner

"What more is necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? Still one thing more ... a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from labor the bread it has earned." 

– Thomas Jefferson

"I have learned two lessons in my life: first, there are no sufficient literary, psychological, or historical answers to human tragedy, only moral ones. Second, just as despair can come to one another only from other human beings, hope, too, can be given to one only by other human beings." 

– Elie Wiesel

1. Not Today--and Tomorrow’s Not Good Either: The Mission of the US Army Pacific by John Nagl

2. State Department Actions to Counter Russia’s Election Interference and Foreign Malign Influence Operations

3. Ukraine’s Victory Plan

4. Former aide to New York governors charged with acting as an agent of the Chinese government

5. DOJ announces new crackdown on Russian disinformation in 2024 election

6. Mission to Mao:US Intelligence and the Chinese Communists in World War II (New book on the OSS in China)

7. Pentagon to set up military repair hubs in 5 Indo-Pacific countries

8. How the Marine Corps is testing a ‘narco-boat’ for resupply efforts

9. Right-wing influencers were duped to work for covert Russian influence operation, US says

10. Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Ely Ratner's Meeting With Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake Shingo

11. The Anonymous Military Leaders with the Weight of the Election on Their Shoulders

12. US forces should consider Ukraine’s freewheeling model for social media messaging, analysts say

13. Expect a $833B defense budget for FY25, but not on time, lawmaker says

14. Commentary: Can the US and China avoid a catastrophic clash?

15. Japan and Australia agree to increase joint military training

16. Small Units Need Protection from Drones—But What Capabilities Should a Light, Maneuverable Counter-UAS Platform Include?

17. China’s Disinformation and US Elections: What to Watch for in Congressional Contests

18. Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation

19. Dark Tunnels and Moral Beacons

20. Victor Davis Hanson: The Truth About World War II

21. Pseudo-Scholars and the Rise of the Barbarian Right

22. Biden Expected to Block U.S. Steel Takeover

23. Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

24. Teasing Putin says Russia backs Kamala Harris, cites her 'infectious' laugh

1. Not Today--and Tomorrow’s Not Good Either: The Mission of the US Army Pacific by John Nagl

A very good description of USARPAC today; nicely placed in historical context. 

Wed, 09/04/2024 - 4:15pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/not-today-and-tomorrows-not-good-either-mission-us-army-pacific

Not Today--and Tomorrow’s Not Good Either:

 The Mission of the US Army Pacific

By John Nagl

The Headquarters of the United States Army Pacific, or “USARPAC”, sits at Fort Shafter on the forward slope of a mountain on Oahu within sight of Pearl Harbor. Pearl, of course, was the site of the worst day in American military history on December 7th, 1941, when intelligence warnings of a Japanese surprise attack on the American fleet at anchor there were ignored at the cost of more than 2000 Americans killed and 1000 wounded. The Japanese attack was well planned and executed; American defenses were neither. A rudimentary Army radar installation on the north shore of Oahu picked up the incoming waves of Japanese planes and warned the Headquarters of the U.S. Army’s Hawaii Division before the strike, but the Army lieutenant who answered the phone at Fort Shafter decided that the radar signals indicated the arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. He didn’t notify the Navy.

The United States Army Pacific, and its higher headquarters the United States Indo-Pacific Command, exist to make sure that the United States is never caught flat-footed again. I was in Oahu a few weeks ago (tough duty) as part of a team from the United States Army War College, where I teach senior officers military strategy, planning, and operations; my students at USARPAC were mostly more junior, captains and majors and senior non-commissioned officers who worked at Fort Shafter and across the Indo-Pacific.

The course I taught is called “Theater Army”; it describes and analyzes the role of the USARPAC in “setting” the IndoPacom “Theatre”. We have five Theater Armies at present, covering North and South America, Europe/Africa, and the Middle East. Eighth Army, in Korea, fills a similar role for the command that is ready to “fight tonight” to defend South Korea against an attack from the North; one of our students was a Major from Eighth Army whose job is to coordinate the mobilization of Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers for service on the Korean peninsula.

Although my job was to teach parts of the Theater Army course, I didn’t understand the organization very well at the start of the week; my own Army service some decades ago was at higher levels of command, in the Pentagon, and lower, in tank divisions in Europe and the Middle East. When the first speaker at the course opined that the Army was the most important level of command, I kept a straight face but laughed inside; obviously, the levels at which I had served in Washington and on the ground, where the tank tread meets the mud, were of greater consequence. 

By the end of the week, I had changed my mind. It didn’t hurt that our concluding speaker was one of my favorite soldiers, retired General Vince Brooks, who commanded both USARPAC and ARCENT/3rd Army during his time in uniform (as well as U.S. Forces Korea) and made the same argument about the importance of this level of command.  General Brooks explained that operational units like divisions and brigades could be added to the theater or taken away and reassigned elsewhere as necessary, like appliances in a house, but they all needed the electricity and water and fuel that the theater army provides; some of our students came from the Theater Support Command that provides all of those necessities to fighting units when required.

Just as important, the job of the Theater Army is to know its theater like a homeowner knows his neighborhood. We heard from some of the intelligence officers who maintain persistent surveillance of the activities of China and Russia, guarding against a recurrence of a Pearl Harbor type attack. We repeatedly heard the phrase “unblinking eye” and gained an understanding of some of the capabilities—on the ground, at sea, in the air, in space, and in the cyber domain—that keep watch on possible adversary capabilities and attempt to discern their intentions. One of the major topics of discussion was whether China was a challenge, an adversary, or an enemy; its behavior provides support for all three descriptions even as it remains a significant trading partner. Whatever term was used, all agreed that the job of the theater army was to ensure that the leaders of possible hostile powers were convinced every day when they woke up that the capabilities of the United States military and our partners in the region meant that today wasn’t a good day to try us—and tomorrow wasn’t likely to be much better.

One of the most powerful tools to influence adversary decisions is an exercise program called Pacific Pathways that General Brooks employed and that current USARPAC Commander Charles Flynn has dramatically expanded. Pacific Pathways brings American units from the continental United States and Hawaii to conduct training with partners in the region like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. General Flynn schedules those training events during times when the waters of the Straits of Taiwan are calm and a Chinese leader might consider rolling the iron dice of war; the presence of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines on allied soil nearby increases deterrence of surprise attacks. Not today, China; not today. General Flynn is scheduled to relinquish his command to my West Point Classmate General Ron Clark in a few months; unlike General Short, the Army officer commanding in Hawaii on December 7th, 1941, General Flynn has done his job well as part of a Joint Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine team. 

As I write this, we don’t have a carrier in the western Pacific, a source of some concern despite all of the other capabilities we and our partners have in the region. (The carriers are in the Middle East dealing with other threats, a reminder that our global responsibilities are a challenge even for the greatest military in the world.) The Air Force is filling the gap by forward stationing B2 bombers in Australia, which has recently expanded its partnership with the United States at least in part due to concerns about the rising power of China. Not tonight, China, Russia, North Korea; not tonight.

One of the students in our Theater Army course was a Lieutenant Colonel from the Japanese Army; he works closely with the American Army and is fully integrated into an increasingly multinational USARPAC Headquarters where the Deputy Commanding General is an Australian. In fact, I saw a new security classification release authorization for the first time in Oahu. I knew that the United States military regularly shares information with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—“Five Eyes”, from the security code "AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY". At USARPAC, the information we shared were labelled "AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US/JAPAN EYES ONLY"—an extraordinary turnaround from that horrible day 83 years ago when the Japanese eyes on Pearl Harbor were not friendly ones. 

Today the Japanese, Australian, and American eyes are focused on China, Russia, and North Korea. The sailors whose remains still rest on the bottom of Pearl Harbor in the USS Arizona, sunk on that horrible Sunday morning so long ago, are overwatched by the USS Missouri; in a wonderful coda to history, the battleship in Tokyo Bay where the war in the Pacific ended is now a museum anchored next to the USS Arizona memorial at Pearl where the war started. And battalions of those sailors’ and Marines’ sons and daughters are standing watch across the IndoPacific to make sure that it never happens again. Not tonight, and not tomorrow.

John Nagl is Professor of Warfighting Studies at the US Army War College. This article reflects his views and not those of the United States Army War College, US Army, or USARPAC.

About the Author(s)

John Nagl

Dr. John Nagl is a 1988 graduate of West Point and a Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a master’s and a PhD from Oxford in International Relations, and a Masters from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He served in combat in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom and is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago 2005) and Knife Fights (Penguin 2014).  This article expresses his personal views and not those of the United States Army War College, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense.

2. State Department Actions to Counter Russia’s Election Interference and Foreign Malign Influence Operations 

Perhaps we need to re-establish the Active Measures Working group we had during the Reagan/Bush 1 Administration.

See this NDU report.

Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference

By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Strategic Perspectives 11

https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf

See als this CIA memo:

interagency Active Measures Working Group

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90G01359R000300010043-9.pdf

State Department Actions to Counter Russia’s Election Interference and Foreign Malign Influence Operations 

Press Statement

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

September 4, 2024

https://www.state.gov/state-department-actions-to-counter-russias-election-interference-and-foreign-malign-influence-operations/

As part of a series of coordinated actions across the U.S. Government, the Department of State is taking three steps today to counter Kremlin-backed media outlets’ malicious operations seeking to influence or interfere in the 2024 U.S. elections.

Moscow’s methods of targeting those it identifies as adversaries are well known – from its illegal and unwarranted invasion of sovereign nations to the unjust imprisonment of innocent persons, to cyberattacks and meddling in foreign elections, to conducting sham elections in Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine.

In addition, we now know that RT, formerly known as Russia Today, has moved beyond being simply a media organization. RT has contracted with a private company to pay unwitting Americans millions of dollars to carry the Kremlin’s message to influence the U.S. elections and undermine democracy. Moreover, RT’s leadership has direct, witting knowledge of this enterprise.

To counter Russia’s state-backed covert influence operations, the Department is acting to hinder malicious actors from using Kremlin-supported media as a cover to conduct such covert influence activities. The Department’s actions include introducing a new visa restriction policy, Foreign Missions Act determinations of RT’s parent company Rossiya Segodnya, and other subsidiaries RIA Novosti, RT, TV-Novosti, Sputnik and Ruptly, and announcing a Rewards for Justice offer.

Today’s announcement highlights the lengths some foreign governments go to undermine American democratic institutions. But these foreign governments should also know that we will not tolerate foreign malign actors intentionally interfering and undermining free and fair elections. The United States will continue to both expose those state-sponsored actors who attempt to undermine our democratic institutions and hold them accountable for those actions.

3. Ukraine’s Victory Plan

Excerpts:

We may be fortunate to see a public version of the Ukrainian victory plan released in due course. But, in the short term, it is likely to be kept close hold by the Ukrainians as they commence briefing its contents to the Americans and Europeans. It will be interesting to see how those briefed on the Victory Plan react.

There is much to be yet revealed about the Ukrainian Victory Plan. However, when I started thinking about this topic, and writing this piece, my mind drifted back (as it often does) to the writings of Clausewitz. He writes about victory in his book, On War, and has a chapter titled The Culminating Point of Victory. In it, he writes that:

The end is either to bring the enemy to his knees or at least to deprive him of some of his territory-the point in that case being not to improve the current military position but to improve one's general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiation.

I thought this was an interesting passage given the context of the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk, and because it speaks to larger goals beyond military endeavours. In the coming weeks, as Ukraine briefs its Victory Plan to its supporters, one can only hope that the plan – and the reaction from America and NATO – provides the thinking, resources and action to improve Ukraine’s general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiation.

Ukraine’s Victory Plan

Why theories of victory matter and what Ukraine’s victory plan needs to achieve'

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraines-victory-plan?utm

Mick Ryan

Sep 04, 2024

∙ Paid

Source: Office of the President of Ukraine

In a media conference last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussed the broad outlines of what he called a Victory Plan. Zelenskyy has also referred to this victory plan in comments in the past few days about the ongoing Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. The Ukrainian president has stated that the Kursk campaign was an element in a four-stage plan and that he would be briefing the U.S. president on the plan this month.

Victory is an important concept in the study of the phenomenon of war, and in how nations fight for political objectives. It is an idea with ancient origins. Aristotle called it the telos, or the final natural form, of military science. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu called victory the main object in war: “A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it from his subordinates.”

However, victory is more than the achievement of military objectives. In The Evolution of Strategy, Beatrice Heuser examines how military victory may not result in the lasting achievement of a nation’s war aims. Heuser expands on this exploration of victory in a 2013 article in Joint Forces Quarterly, writing that “the most important aim in any war must be ‘to make a just and durable peace.’ Victory is nothing if it does not lead to such a peace, and such justice must be seen as reasonable by both sides to make it durable.”

A contemporary concept of victory must therefore embrace objectives beyond military activity. Theories of victory must include economic, diplomatic, and societal long-term needs as well as short- and medium-term military outcomes. And, a theory of victory or a Victory Plan, should include how to win the war as well as win the peace.

In this article, I will explore why Ukraine is proposing a Victory Plan now, and what the Victory Plan might contain.

Why a Victory Plan Now?

It is important to understand why Zelenskyy is discussing his Victory Plan now.

First, it is important for Ukraine. A Victory Plan should (perhaps will) provide a clear vision of how Ukraine seeks to end the war on terms favorable to it. This underpins national unity but also informs the generation of military forces, their resourcing from Ukrainian and foreign sources, as well as the military and national costs that Ukraine is willing (and unwilling) to bear.

Importantly, the timing of the discussion about the Ukrainian Victory Plan exploits the Ukrainian success in Kursk. Notwithstanding the current challenges in the Donbas, and the fact that the Kursk campaign has not drawn Russian forces from their most dangerous advances in eastern Ukraine, Kursk has shifted the narrative on the war. Ukraine’s success has reinvigorated interest in the war and reinforced the idea that some form of victory by Ukraine might be possible.

The Ukrainian Victory Plan is also important for the U.S. and NATO. Countries providing aid want to see the strategy for how their resources, military and otherwise, will be employed to defend Ukraine. The Victory Plan may also inform future support but hopefully might also shape future U.S. and NATO strategy for supporting Ukraine. As I have written before, the strategy of ‘help Ukraine defend itself for as long as it takes’ is a strategy for defeat. Perhaps a Ukrainian Victory Plan can influence a shift in Western strategy to embrace the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.

A Ukrainian Victory Plan is also an important strategic message to Putin and Russia. Through the Victory Plan, Ukraine is demonstrating the will to continue resisting until it is able to achieve its own objectives in the war. The plan will telegraph to Putin that Ukraine will retain Russian territory and destroy Russian forces and strategic targets for as long as it takes to achieve the aims in its Victory Plan.

Source: Office of the President of Ukraine

Victory Plans and Theories of Victory

To win a war, a country should be informed by a theory of victory. As Brad Robert’s writes in On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue, a theory of victory “should comprise a plausible set of principles for overcoming an adversary, as well as a unifying idea”. This unifying idea is crucial. The 2017 U.K. publication Getting Strategy Right (Enough) describes how “a strategy which has no unifying idea is not a strategy…. The innovative and compelling ‘big idea’ is often the basis of a new strategy. It must not only bind the ends, ways and means but also inspire others to support it.”

In my book, The War For Ukraine, I explore what a Ukrainian theory of victory might look like and propose that there are six components: (1) defeating Russia in Ukraine, (2) obtaining security guarantees for the future of Ukraine, (3) economic aid and prosperity, (4) reconstruction, (5) social reintegration, and (6) justice.

More importantly however, what has the Ukrainian president said about the Victory Plan and its contents? Well, not a lot. He did however describe the broad themes in his media conference last week. There are four themes, which are:

1.    The campaign in Kursk.

2.    Ukraine’s strategic place in the security infrastructure of the world.

3.    A powerful package of forcing Russia to end the war in a diplomatic way.

4.    Economical.

Zelenskyy has added a little more detail in recent days. In one interview he notes that Ukraine will “hold” Kursk as it is integral to his Victory Plan. Not only will this be an ongoing liability for the Ukrainian armed forces to defend, but Ukraine will essentially own the oblast and have to administer it. That will require resources.

In another speech this week, Zelenskyy also raises the issue of making Russia feel what war is. This is part of the effort to get Russia to commit to meaningful negotiations – and to secure the ability to use U.S. long range strike weapons to strike military targets deep inside Russia. As Zelenskyy notes:

The terrorist state must feel what war is. We are working to ensure that as many Russian military facilities, logistics hubs, and critical components of their war economy as possible fall within the reach of our weapons. …With our drones and missiles, we can accomplish part of the missions. But true peace – a real end to this war – is a complex task. To force Russia into peace, to move them from deceitful rhetoric about negotiations to taking steps to end the war, to clear our land of occupation and occupiers, we need effective tools.

But apart from the Kursk element of the plan, the other three components have been left with little detail by Zelenskyy and his government. The second component, Ukraine’s strategic place in the security infrastructure of the world, clearly refers to Ukrainian membership in NATO as well as its other bilateral security agreements. The diplomatic and economic elements, besides ‘forcing’ Russia to end the war, probably also include areas such as reconstruction.

Developing a viable ‘theory of victory’ is harder than many assume. It must balance domestic and international political concerns, as well as resourcing, influence operations by the enemy and a range of other factors. And, it will need to adapt as Russia responds to its implementation.

The Road to Victory

We may be fortunate to see a public version of the Ukrainian victory plan released in due course. But, in the short term, it is likely to be kept close hold by the Ukrainians as they commence briefing its contents to the Americans and Europeans. It will be interesting to see how those briefed on the Victory Plan react.

There is much to be yet revealed about the Ukrainian Victory Plan. However, when I started thinking about this topic, and writing this piece, my mind drifted back (as it often does) to the writings of Clausewitz. He writes about victory in his book, On War, and has a chapter titled The Culminating Point of Victory. In it, he writes that:

The end is either to bring the enemy to his knees or at least to deprive him of some of his territory-the point in that case being not to improve the current military position but to improve one's general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiation.

I thought this was an interesting passage given the context of the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk, and because it speaks to larger goals beyond military endeavours. In the coming weeks, as Ukraine briefs its Victory Plan to its supporters, one can only hope that the plan – and the reaction from America and NATO – provides the thinking, resources and action to improve Ukraine’s general prospects in the war and in the peace negotiation.

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4. Former aide to New York governors charged with acting as an agent of the Chinese government

Here is the 64 page indictment: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nyed.519779/gov.uscourts.nyed.519779.4.0.pdf

Here is the summary of charges:

II. Summary of the Defendants’ Criminal Conduct

9.             While working for the NYS government, including in high-ranking posts for Politician-1 and Politician-2 and in multiple state agencies, the defendant LINDA SUN also acted as an undisclosed agent of the Government of the PRC and the CCP. Acting at the request of PRC government officials and CCP representatives, SUN engaged in numerous political activities in the interests of the PRC and the CCP, including blocking representatives of the Taiwanese government from having access to the NYS governor’s office; changing Politician-1 and Politician-2’s messaging regarding issues of importance to the PRC and the CCP; obtaining official NYS governor proclamations for PRC government representatives without proper authorization; attempting to facilitate a trip to the PRC by Politician-2; and arranging meetings for visiting delegations from the PRC government with NYS government officials.

10.          Additionally, the defendant LINDA SUN repeatedly violated internal rules and protocols within the NYS governor’s office to provide improper benefits to PRC and CCP representatives, including by providing unauthorized invitation letters from the office of the NYS governor that were used to facilitate travel by PRC government officials into the United States for meetings with NYS government officials. SUN’s unauthorized invitation letters for the PRC government delegation constituted false statements made in connection with immigration documents and induced the foreign citizens into unlawfully entering the United States.

11.          In return for these and other actions, the defendant LINDA SUN received substantial economic and other benefits from representatives of the PRC government and the CCP, including the facilitation of millions of dollars in transactions for the PRC-based business activities of SUN’s husband, the defendant CHRIS HU; travel benefits; tickets to events; promotion of a close family friend’s business; employment for SUN’s cousin in the PRC; and Nanjing-style salted

ducks prepared by PRC Official-1’s personal chef that were delivered to the residence of SUN’s parents. SUN and HU laundered the monetary proceeds of this scheme to purchase, among other items, real estate property in Manhasset, New York for $3.6 million, a condominium in Honolulu, Hawaii for $1.9 million, and various luxury automobiles, including a 2024 Ferrari. SUN never disclosed any benefits she received from representatives of the PRC government and the CCP to the NYS government, as she was required to do as a NYS government employee.

12.          The defendant CHRIS HU laundered unlawful proceeds through bank accounts opened in the name of a close relative but that were actually for HU’s exclusive use. To open these accounts, HU unlawfully used an image of the relative’s driver’s license.

13.          The defendant LINDA SUN never registered as a foreign agent with the Attorney General, and in fact actively concealed that she took actions at the order, request, or direction of PRC government and CCP representatives. Thus, neither the NYS government nor the greater New York and American public had the opportunity to evaluate her conduct, considering her long-standing relationships with the PRC government and the CCP and her status as their agent.

14.          In a voluntary interview with agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in July 2020, the defendant LINDA SUN misrepresented the purpose of one of her trips to the PRC, and concealed the fact that it was arranged and funded by co-conspirators representing the PRC government and the CCP.

15.          In a voluntary interview with the NYS Office of the Inspector General in February 2023, the defendant LINDA SUN claimed to attend Asian community events in her personal capacity and not in her new capacity at the Department of Labor. She falsely claimed that she had not requested any official gubernatorial proclamations since transferring to the

Department of Labor. In fact, she had procured and presented an official gubernatorial

proclamation for PRC Official-1.

Former aide to New York governors charged with acting as an agent of the Chinese government

https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/03/us/linda-sun-former-hochul-staff-arrest/index.html

By Gloria Pazmino and Mark Morales, CNN

 8 minute read 

Updated 10:56 AM EDT, Wed September 4, 2024

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CNN — 

A former aide to New York Gov. Kathy Hochul and former Gov. Andrew Cuomo was charged with acting as an agent for the Chinese government, US Attorney Breon Peace announced Tuesday.

Linda Sun, a former deputy chief of staff to Hochul and Cuomo aide, was charged with violating and conspiring to violate the Foreign Agents Registrations Act, visa fraud, alien smuggling and money laundering conspiracy, according to an unsealed copy of the indictment.

Her husband and co-defendant, Chris Hu, was also charged with money laundering conspiracy and conspiracy to commit bank fraud as well as misusing means of identification, prosecutors said.

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Their home was raided by federal investigators in July, according to sources.

Sun acted as “an undisclosed agent of the Chinese government while her husband, Hu, facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars in kickbacks for personal gain,” prosecutors said in a news release.

While working for state government, Sun influenced the messaging of high-level state officials regarding issues of importance to China, blocked Taiwanese government representatives from access to the officials, and obtained official New York State proclamations for Chinese government representatives without authorization, prosecutors alleged in the indictment.

The couple’s arrest comes at a time when US-China relations remain fraught over a host of frictions including Beijing’s aggressions in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan, and US trade controls targeting China.

Sun and Hu were arrested at their Long Island residence Tuesday morning.

Sun and Hu both pleaded not guilty to all charges in federal court Tuesday afternoon. Sun’s bond is set at $1.5 million and her husband’s is set at $500,000. Both will have their travel limited to New York City, Long Island, Maine and New Hampshire. Their next court date was set for September 25.

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00:34 - Source: CNN

During the hearing, prosecutors alleged the defendants used shell companies, iCloud accounts and WeChat messages – with everything in Mandarin – in their alleged crimes.

Defense attorney Seth DuCharme addressed reporters outside court Tuesday, saying “we have a lot of confidence in our case.”

“A lot of the allegations in this indictment are frankly perplexing, overly inflammatory,” he said. “As you heard in court today, we are looking forward to our day in court. The defendants are exercising their right to a speedy trial as soon as they can; we have a lot of confidence in Chris and in Linda.”

An attorney for Sun, Jarrod Schaeffer, told CNN the charges “are inflammatory and appear to be the product of an overly aggressive prosecution.”

“We are also troubled by aspects of the government’s investigation. As we said today in court, our client is eager … to defend against these accusations in the proper forum – a court of law,” Schaeffer said.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it was unaware of the aide accused of working for China.

“I am not aware of the situation you mentioned,” spokesperson Mao Ning said, adding, “I will not comment on the domestic cases in the United States, but we oppose malicious associations and slander against China.”

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US security official meets China’s Xi as American election looms large over relations

Sun held several government titles for more than a decade. Public employment records and her LinkedIn profile show positions spanned across several agencies focused on New York’s economic development, labor and the executive chamber.

In 2009, Sun was hired as chief of staff in Rep. Grace Meng’s office when Meng was in the State Assembly. The administration of then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo then hired Sun in 2012, naming her director of Asian American affairs and Queens representative. Sun then became director of external affairs for Empire State Development, which handles economic development across the state. In 2018 the Cuomo administration re-hired her, naming her chief diversity officer; she later took a job in the state Department of Financial Services.

After Hochul ascended to the state’s top office in 2021, Sun was hired as deputy chief of staff, serving for about a year before heading for a post as deputy commissioner for strategic business at the Department of Labor, which terminated her employment in March 2023.

That 2023 firing happened after the governor’s office discovered “evidence of misconduct,” Hochul’s press secretary, Avi Small, said in a statement to CNN without elaborating about the misconduct.

“(We) immediately reported her actions to law enforcement and have assisted law enforcement throughout this process,” Small said.

Rich Azzopardi, a spokesperson for Cuomo, said in a statement that national security “must be free from foreign influence.”

“While Ms. Sun was promoted to deputy chief of staff in the subsequent administration, during our time she worked in a handful of agencies and was one of many community liaisons who had little to no interaction with the governor.”

Allegations of unauthorized letters, money laundering and salted ducks from the Chinese government

Sun violated internal rules and state government protocols to benefit the Chinese government, according to court documents.

Among Sun’s activities, prosecutors say, she acted as an undisclosed agent of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, acting at their request and engaging in political activities to further the interests of the CCP.

The indictment details an effort by Sun to secure “unauthorized invitation letters” from the office of the governor which were then used to facilitate travel by government officials with the People’s Republic of China into the United States for meetings with state officials in New York.

An aerial view of the Saxony Court, home in Manhasset, New York, belonging to Chris Hu and Linda Sun, July 24, 2024. Sun is the former deputy chief of staff for New York Gov. Kathy Hochul. J. Conrad Williams Jr./Newsday RM/Getty Images

Sun’s unauthorized letters included false statements about immigration documents and “induced the foreign citizens into unlawfully entering the United States,” prosecutors wrote.

Prosecutors also allege she tried to “facilitate a trip” to China by a high-level, unnamed New York politician.

Sun and her husband received “substantial economic and other benefits” which included millions of dollars in transactions for PRC business activities of Hu, travel benefits, tickets to events, employment for Sun’s cousin in the PRC, a delivery of “Nanjing-style salted ducks prepared by a PRC official’s personal chef” that were then delivered to the residence of Sun’s parents, among others, according to the indictment.

They also laundered the monetary proceeds to buy real estate in New York and Hawaii and various luxury vehicles, according to the indictment.

Prosecutors allege Sun blocked Taiwanese diplomacy and ensured Cuomo praised China for help with Covid-19

Sun is accused of acting at the request of the Chinese government and the CCP to block representatives of the Taiwanese government from having access to state government officials because she knew CCP officials were “opposed to such diplomacy,” according to the court documents.

Prosecutors also said while the office of the governor did not have a position on recognizing Taiwan, Sun used her position to change both Cuomo’s and Hochul’s “messaging regarding issues of importance to the PRC and the CCP” and helped minimize interactions between the governor’s office and representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US. Also known as TECO, the office serves as a de facto, yet unofficial, embassy to Taiwan. TECO maintains offices that provide consular and other services across various cities in the US, including New York.

Court documents show Sun used her position to block small shows of diplomacy. In January 2020, a TECO representative wrote a letter to Cuomo informing him of the latest presidential election results in Taiwan and requested a congratulatory message to be forwarded to Taipei. After an employee in the governor’s office flagged the request to Sun, she quickly blocked the effort, responding, “No letter; would set off political firestorm.”

By the time the pandemic arrived in New York, Sun was working behind the scenes to give Chinese officials access to New York government officials, prosecutors say. In one instance, prosecutors say Sun added a Chinese official to a “private New York State government conference call concerning the health response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the administration’s response to rising hate crimes against Asian Americans.” The call was not open to the public.

As the pandemic took hold, court documents say, Sun worked to ensure Cuomo was heaping public praise on Chinese officials for sending medical equipment to the city while simultaneously blocking Taiwan, which also sought public acknowledgment for providing 200,000 masks at the height of the pandemic that was ravaging New York.

In April 2020, a PRC official informed Sun that several Chinese foundations would donate 1,000 ventilators to the Greater New York Hospital Association, according to the indictment. In return, Sun told the official that Cuomo would call him to thank him for the donation. After waiting two hours for the call, the official complained that he had not yet heard from Cuomo. In turn, Sun apologized and indicated that Cuomo would thank him in public and on social media for facilitating the donation which was scheduled to arrive in New York the next day, according to the indictment.

Cuomo is not identified by name in the indictment, but his tenure as governor aligns with the timeline of the allegations.

An archived X post shows Cuomo posted a message of thanks from his government account the next day.

“We finally got some good news today. The Chinese government helped facilitate a donation of 1,000 ventilators that will arrive in JFK today. I thank the Chinese government, Jack Ma, Joe Tsai, the Jack Ma Foundation, the Tsai Foundation and Consul General Huang,” the post reads.

Hochul says she’s furious and ‘absolutely shocked’

Hochul is furious, outraged and “absolutely shocked at how brazen” Sun’s behavior is alleged to have been, the governor said in an appearance Tuesday evening with WNYC radio.

“It was a betrayal of trust,” Hochul told WNYC about the allegations against Sun.

Hochul said her office fired Sun in 2023 “the second we discovered some levels of misconduct” and “alerted the authorities – and hence we ended up with what happened here today.”

When WNYC asked Hochul for details about why Sun was fired, the governor declined to give specifics, citing authorities’ investigation. The depth of the allegations against Sun were apparent to the governor and her staff only after reading details of the indictment, said Hochul, who emphasized to WNYC that Sun worked only 15 months for her administration and had initially been hired by the previous one.

New York State Senate Republican Leader Rob Ortt has called for an investigation into the alleged breach.

“The fact that a spy for a hostile nation was embedded at the highest levels of our state government under two administrations is an alarming security failure, jeopardizing both New York and the entire country,” Ortt said in a statement. “New York should be a beacon of freedom, a place where people flee from oppressive regimes, not a platform for spies to infiltrate our government and undermine our state and nation.”

This story has been updated with additional information.

5. DOJ announces new crackdown on Russian disinformation in 2024 election

Excerpts:

The seized sites were linked to a Russian campaign known as “Doppelganger,” one of the most prolific and public groups spreading disinformation linked to Moscow in recent years. Experts recently saw evidence of the group spreading Russian disinformation related to the failed assassination attempt against former President Donald Trump, and the Biden administration has worked to counter the group’s efforts in recent months.

The legal actions, which also included the indictment of two Russian employees of the Kremlin-backed media outlet RT, underscored previous warnings this year by the Biden administration that foreign adversaries are looking to interfere in the upcoming vote. The new details about the Russian efforts are likely to increase concerns about continuing interference by foreign governments as the U.S. presidential campaign enters its final stretch.

“The Justice Department’s message is clear: We have no tolerance for attempts by authoritarian regimes to exploit our democratic system of government,” Attorney General Merrick Garland said at a press conference announcing the crackdown.

DOJ announces new crackdown on Russian disinformation in 2024 election

By Josh Gerstein, Betsy Woodruff Swan and Maggie Miller

09/04/2024 02:40 PM EDT

Updated: 09/04/2024 03:25 PM EDT

Politico

The seized sites were linked to a Russian campaign known as “Doppelganger,” one of the most prolific and public groups spreading disinformation linked to Moscow.

The new details about the Russian efforts are likely to increase concerns about continuing interference by foreign governments as the U.S. presidential campaign enters its final stretch. | Kremlin pool photo by Vyacheslav Prokofyev

09/04/2024 02:40 PM EDT

The Justice Department has seized more than 30 web domains that it said were part of a broader, ongoing, surreptitious effort by the Russian government to influence the 2024 U.S. election and American public opinion, federal authorities announced Wednesday.

The seized sites were linked to a Russian campaign known as “Doppelganger,” one of the most prolific and public groups spreading disinformation linked to Moscow in recent years. Experts recently saw evidence of the group spreading Russian disinformation related to the failed assassination attempt against former President Donald Trump, and the Biden administration has worked to counter the group’s efforts in recent months.

The legal actions, which also included the indictment of two Russian employees of the Kremlin-backed media outlet RT, underscored previous warnings this year by the Biden administration that foreign adversaries are looking to interfere in the upcoming vote. The new details about the Russian efforts are likely to increase concerns about continuing interference by foreign governments as the U.S. presidential campaign enters its final stretch.

“The Justice Department’s message is clear: We have no tolerance for attempts by authoritarian regimes to exploit our democratic system of government,” Attorney General Merrick Garland said at a press conference announcing the crackdown.

Politico

6. Mission to Mao: US Intelligence and the Chinese Communists in World War II (New book on the OSS in China)

I am looking forward to reading this book when it is published. Can we learn lessons for today?

Mission to Mao

US Intelligence and the Chinese Communists in World War II

Sara B. Castro

https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/Mission-to-Mao

press.georgetown.edu · by Author

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US Intelligence and the Chinese Communists in World War II

Sara B. Castro

"Mission to Mao is an important book. It fills a void that recent scholarship on wartime US-China relations has not addressed: the US government's Dixie Mission to Chinese Communist Party–controlled areas in northern China. Research in US sources is exhaustive, and Castro's concise, engaging writing style makes the narrative more compelling and the book highly accessible." — Zach Fredman, Assistant Professor of History, Duke Kunshan

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119.95

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39.95

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An innovative history of US intelligence officers on the ground and the first official contacts between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party

From 1944 to 1947, the United States planted a liaison mission in the headquarters of Chinese Communist forces behind the lines. Nicknamed the "Dixie Mission," for its location in "rebel" territory, it was an interagency delegation that included intelligence officers from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the US Army, and the State Department.

Mission to Mao is a social history of the OSS officers in the field that reveals the weakness of US intelligence diplomacy in the 1940s. Drawing on over 14,000 unpublished records from five archives as well as white papers and memoirs from the participants, Sara B. Castro demonstrates how the US intelligence officers in China clashed with political appointees and Washington over the direction of the US relationship with the Chinese Communists. Interagency and political conflicts erupted over assessments of Communist capabilities and whether or not the mission would later involve operations with the Communists. Castro shows how potential benefits for the war effort were thwarted by politicization, rivalries, and the biases of US intelligence officials.

Mission to Mao is a fresh look at US intelligence in WW II China and takes readers beyond the history of "China Hands" versus American anticommunists, introducing more nuance.

Reviews

"Mission to Mao is an important book. It fills a void that recent scholarship on wartime US-China relations has not addressed: the US government’s Dixie Mission to Chinese Communist Party–controlled areas in northern China. Research in US sources is exhaustive, and Castro’s concise, engaging writing style makes the narrative more compelling and the book highly accessible."—Zach Fredman, assistant professor of history, Duke Kunshan University,

"This is an intriguing and important study of the singular group of men who staffed the Dixie Mission in World War II. It fills in a critical lacuna in our understanding of US intelligence activities in China during World War II."—Peter Lorge, associate professor of history, Vanderbilt University

"If you want to understand relations between the USA and the PRC today, you must read this book! Digging deep into primary sources, Sara Castro tells the dramatic and fateful World War II origin story. Along the way, she invites us to discard outdated assumptions that keep us from moving forward. This is an important book that China scholars, intelligence professionals, and generalists alike need to have on their bookshelves."—Nicholas Reynolds, author of Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence

"Mission to Mao offers a distinctive approach, using the Dixie Mission story as a way of analyzing the development (and failings) of US intelligence in the early Cold War. Specialists in this field will welcome this publication."—Harold M. Tanner, professor of history, University of North Texas

About the Author

Sara B. Castro is an assistant professor in the Department of History at the US Air Force Academy, the president of the Society for Intelligence History, and a former US intelligence analyst. Castro earned a doctorate in history from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Hardcover

272 pp., 6 x 9

7 b&w photos, 1 map

ISBN: 978-1-64712-450-2

Sep 2024

WORLD

Paperback

272 pp., 6 x 9

7 b&w photos, 1 map

ISBN: 978-1-64712-451-9

Sep 2024

WORLD

Ebook

272 pp.

7 b&w photos, 1 map

ISBN: 978-1-64712-452-6

Sep 2024

WORLD

Georgetown Studies in Intelligence History

Christopher Moran, Mark Phythian, and Mark Stout, Series Editors

press.georgetown.edu · by Author

7. Pentagon to set up military repair hubs in 5 Indo-Pacific countries

Professionals talk logistics.

Indo-Pacific

Pentagon to set up military repair hubs in 5 Indo-Pacific countries

U.S. eyes global network of sustainment, expanding to Europe and Latin America

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/Pentagon-to-set-up-military-repair-hubs-in-5-Indo-Pacific-countries

KEN MORIYASU, Nikkei Asia diplomatic correspondent

September 4, 2024 23:17 JSTUpdated on September 4, 2024 23:57 JST

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Department of Defense will launch military repair hubs in the Indo-Pacific countries of Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines, sources told Nikkei Asia, as it envisions a global network of repair hubs for key warfighting platforms.

The Pentagon's new Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) envisions utilizing existing industrial capabilities of its allies and partners so that it can conduct maintenance, repair and overhaul of its ships, planes and vehicles closer to their area of operation instead of bringing them back to the continental U.S.

The plan is to launch pilot programs in five Indo-Pacific countries this year, then expand it to NATO partners in the European Command's area in 2025 and to Latin American partners under the Southern Command in 2026.

Of the five countries, four are treaty allies. Singapore, though not an ally, has had a long tradition of hosting U.S. warships on a rotational basis.

The Pentagon is expected to announce more details this month, according to one of the sources familiar with the matter.

A Pentagon spokesperson told Nikkei Asia that it does not have anything to announce at this time. “We do not want to get ahead of negotiations that are still underway,” the official said. 

The program stems from an understanding that the U.S. alone cannot compete with China's industrial prowess. In July 2023, the defense news website The War Zone published a U.S. Navy briefing slide that showed China, the world's largest shipbuilding nation, having about 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the U.S.

A U.S. Air Force member based at Misawa Air Base in Japan's Aomori prefecture conducts a post-flight inspection on an F-16C Fighting Falcon during an exercise at Sam Ratulangi International Airport in Indonesia. (U.S. Air Force)

The department has been signaling progress on the RSF since early this year. The Pentagon's point man for the project, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment Christopher Lowman, said at the U.S. Naval Institute-sponsored West 2024 conference in February that military logistics was shifting from the traditional "reactive" stance to a "proactive" stance that offers solutions before the point of failure.

"In today's strategic context, where near-peer competitors are increasingly capable of contesting our operational reach," methods of repairing key warfighting platforms "need to evolve as the national security environment evolves around us," Lowman said.

He said that having repair hubs in various locations adds to deterrence. By distributing maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities across the region and integrating them with those of allies and partners, the U.S. adds layers of complexity to any adversary's planning process, Lowman said.

In March, Lowman led a delegation of senior logisticians to Australia, Japan and the Philippines to discuss the matter.

When the Pentagon announced the RSF concept in May, it said industrial-base integration with allies and partners would contribute to "predictable demand" and help defense contractors make the decision to invest in capabilities.

Lowman told a July media roundtable that the repairs will address not only "wear and tear," but also "battle-damaged equipment" in conflict.

Offering the theater commander multiple options for the repair of unserviceable platforms "creates a higher level of uncertainty within adversaries' planning cycle and thereby enhancing deterrence and the deterrence value," he said.

Asian allies, for their part, are actively preparing for the business opportunity. South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean announced in August a U.S. Navy contract to perform maintenance on a roughly 40,000-tonne American logistics support vessel at its Geoje shipyard on the southern end of the Korean Peninsula.

This came only weeks after the company announced that it had signed a Master Ship Repair Agreement with the U.S. Navy to allow such missions.

Hanwha had announced in June a deal to acquire Philly Shipyard in Pennsylvania, part of the former Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, for $100 million.

Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has been spearheading efforts to utilize private Japanese shipyards to repair American warships forward-deployed to Japan.

“Repairing and maintaining ships in theater can be as effective of a deterrence as training is,” he told Nikkei Asia.

8. How the Marine Corps is testing a ‘narco-boat’ for resupply efforts

Can anyone guess where the Narco traffickers got the idea for semi-submersibles? Anyone? Bueller? (hint: two letters. nK)

Recall 1998 Yeosu submersible incident Korea: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_Yeosu_submersible_incident

How the Marine Corps is testing a ‘narco-boat’ for resupply efforts

marinecorpstimes.com · by Diana Stancy

The U.S. Marine Corps is testing out an autonomous system inspired by a “narco-boat” to bolster resupply efforts, as the service focuses on island hopping and projecting power from land to sea, according to the head of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.

In addition to delivering two Naval Strike Missiles for the Corps’ anti-ship missile system, the autonomous low-profile vessel the Marine Corps is experimenting with also aims to better get critical supplies like food to forward deployed and distributed Marines, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Simon Doran said at the Defense News Conference on Wednesday.

“Truth be told, this is just a narco-boat,” Doran said. “We stole the idea from friends down south. And so this is 55 feet long, completely autonomous. It’s able to go hundreds or thousands of miles. It’s able to carry weapon systems that we have that are new. … It can carry pretty much anything you want to put in it.”

RELATED

Marines expect ‘big year’ for drone, ship and logistics testing

Aerial and maritime drones coupled with a new shore-to-shore connector aim to overcome logistical hurdles.

By Todd South

Inspired by narco-boats, which are used by traffickers to smuggle illicit substances across bodies of water, the unmanned vessel remains close to the water-surface level to cut down on the likelihood of detection as it assists with logistics capabilities.

The service tested the logistics supply drone at the Army’s Project Convergence Capstone in February at Camp Pendleton, California, where the Marine Corps trained a cook in 21 days to operate the system off the islands of Japan.

The Army spearheads the Project Convergence to test out advanced technology and capabilities in modern warfare as part of a joint, multinational exercise.

The autonomous low-profile vessel is particularly important because it allows forces to resupply food, fuel and ammunition without jeopardizing the safety of Marines, Doran said.

“If you have that unit located inside a weapons engagement zone, contested logistics and the ability to maneuver in the littorals becomes key,” Doran said. “And for that, what we’re looking at is trying to acquire systems that we deem risk worthy, meaning that we don’t necessarily want to just waste them, but we’d rather put something in there that’s autonomous, that doesn’t have humans on it that can do some of these higher risk missions without having personnel put in that riskier situation.”

This system is something the Marine Corps wanted “yesterday,” but testing is ongoing, Doran said. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory received two prototypes in 2023.

The vessel is expected to join the III Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa, Japan, for further evaluation this fall, he said.

The service hopes to purchase the vessels in the next several years, Marine Corps leaders said at the 2023 Defense News Conference.

9. Right-wing influencers were duped to work for covert Russian influence operation, US says

I should not have to keep including this statement from the 2017 NSS but I do not think we can be reminded of this enough.:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Right-wing influencers were duped to work for covert Russian influence operation, US says

By ALAN SUDERMAN and ALI SWENSON

Updated 8:20 PM EDT, September 4, 2024

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AP · by ALAN SUDERMAN · September 5, 2024

NEW YORK (AP) — They have millions of followers online. They have been major players in right-wing political discourse since Donald Trump was president. And they worked unknowingly for a company that was a front for a Russian influence operation, U.S. prosecutors say.

An indictment filed Wednesday alleges a media company linked to six conservative influencers — including well-known personalities Tim Pool, Dave Rubin and Benny Johnson — was secretly funded by Russian state media employees to churn out English-language videos that were “often consistent” with the Kremlin’s “interest in amplifying U.S. domestic divisions in order to weaken U.S. opposition” to Russian interests, like its war in Ukraine.

In addition to marking the third straight presidential election in which U.S. authorities have unveiled politically charged details about Russia’s attempted interference in U.S. politics, an indictment indicates how Moscow may be attempting to capitalize on the skyrocketing popularity of right-wing podcasters, livestreamers and other content creators who have found successful careers on social media in the years since Trump was in office.

The U.S. Justice Department doesn’t allege any wrongdoing by the influencers, some of whom it says were given false information about the source of the company’s funding. Instead, it accuses two employees of RT, a Russian state media company, of funneling nearly $10 million to a Tennessee-based content creation company for Russia-friendly content.

After the indictments were announced, both Pool and Johnson issued statements on social media, which Rubin retweeted, saying they were victims of the alleged crimes and had done nothing wrong.

“We still do not know what is true as these are only allegations,” Pool said. “Putin is a scumbag.”

In his post, Johnson wrote that he had been asked a year ago to provide content to a “media startup.” He said his lawyers negotiated a “standard, arms length deal, which was later terminated.”

Kostiantyn Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva are charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering and violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act. They are at large, and it was not immediately clear if they had lawyers.

U.S. officials have previously warned of Russia’s use of unwitting Americans to further influence operations in the 2024 election, but Wednesday’s indictment is the most detailed description of those efforts to date. Intelligence officials have said Moscow has a preference for Trump.

Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized influence operations to help Trump in the 2020 election, while his 2016 campaign benefited from hacking by Russian intelligence officers and a covert social media effort, according to U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials.

With the decline of traditional media like newspapers and limits on direct advertising on social media platforms, influencers are increasingly playing a key role in politics and shaping public opinion. Both the Republican and Democratic parties invited scores of influencers to their respective national conventions this summer. But with little to no disclosure requirements about who is funding influencers’ work, the public is largely in the dark about who is powering the messaging online.

Though the indictment does not name the Tennessee-based company, the details match up exactly with Tenet Media, an online media company that boasts of hosting “a network of heterodox commentators that focus on Western political and cultural issues.” Tenet’s website lists six influencers who provide content, including Pool, Johnson, Rubin, Lauren Southern, Tayler Hansen and Matt Christiansen.

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Tenet Media’s six main influencers have more than 7 million subscribers on YouTube and more than 7 million followers on X.

Fueled by public outrage and online fandom, the influencers who make up the bench of talent at Tenet Media have amassed millions of loyal followers who agree with their staunch conservatism and brazen willingness to voice controversial opinions. Their channels also have created communities for conservative Americans who have lost trust in mainstream media sources through Trump’s 2020 loss and the COVID-19 pandemic. Several of them have faced criticism for spreading political misinformation.

The indictment shows that some of the influencers were paid handsomely for their work. One unidentified influencer’s contract included a $400,000 monthly fee, a $100,000 signing bonus and an additional performance bonus.

Tenet Media’s shows in recent months have featured high-profile conservative guests, including Republican National Committee co-chair Lara Trump, former Republican presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy and U.S. Senate candidate Kari Lake. The nearly 2,000 videos posted by the company have gotten more than 16 million views on YouTube alone, prosecutors said.

Pool, a journalist-turned-YouTuber who first gained public attention for livestreaming the Occupy Wall Street protests, hosted Trump on his podcast earlier this year.

Johnson is an outspoken Trump supporter and internet personality who was fired from BuzzFeed after the company found evidence he’d plagiarized other works.

Rubin was previously part of the liberal news commentary show “The Young Turks” but has since identified as a libertarian. He boasts the largest YouTube following of Tenet’s influencer roster and hosts a show called “The Rubin Report.”

Tenet Media President Liam Donovan is the husband of Lauren Chen, a Canadian influencer who has appeared as a guest in several Tenet Media videos. Chen is affiliated with the conservative youth organization Turning Point USA and has hosted shows for the right-wing network Blaze Media. RT’s website also lists her as a contributor of several opinion articles from 2021 and 2022.

___

Suderman reported from Richmond, Virginia. AP reporter Garance Burke contributed from San Francisco and researcher Rhonda Shafner contributed from New York.

___

The Associated Press receives support from several private foundations to enhance its explanatory coverage of elections and democracy. See more about AP’s democracy initiative here. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

AP · by ALAN SUDERMAN · September 5, 2024

10. Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Ely Ratner's Meeting With Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake Shingo

Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Ely Ratner's Meeting With Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake Shingo

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3895057/readout-of-assistant-secretary-of-defense-dr-ely-ratners-meeting-with-japanese/

Sept. 4, 2024 |   

Department of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Pete Nguyen provided the following readout:

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs Dr. Ely Ratner met with Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake Shingo today at the Pentagon to advance key Alliance modernization priorities following the successful July 28 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Meeting in Tokyo. The officials shared perspectives on a range of bilateral issues, including command and control, bilateral presence in the Southwest Islands, defense industry cooperation, and opportunities for multilateral engagement. Assistant Secretary Ratner and Vice-Minister Miyake committed to enhancing the U.S.-Japan Alliance through close collaboration to tackle shared security challenges.

11. The Anonymous Military Leaders with the Weight of the Election on Their Shoulders

Hopefully discussions are taking place in PME seminars across the services as well as in the Pentagon. This is a useful essay to help frame the discussion.

Conclusion:

To conclude, this commentary explored the complex constitutional, professional, and legal considerations that both civilian and military leaders must reflect on when making decisions about domestic military use. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the 54 state Adjutant Generals, represent the upper echelons of the U.S. military who interact with civilian authorities and are the anonymous leaders who may encounter ethical dilemmas during the upcoming election. As outlined in this essay, these leaders will be guided by relevant legislation, established norms of civil-military relations, and their oaths to the Constitution. These considerations often intersect and may conflict, creating a classic ethical dilemma. Although navigating these factors will be challenging, collectively they shape how these leaders provide military advice and implement executive orders.

The Anonymous Military Leaders with the Weight of the Election on Their Shoulders

by Paul Rasmussen

September 4, 2024

https://www.justsecurity.org/99802/military-leaders-democracy/?utm

Lawmakers fear the military could be drawn into the politics of the 2024 election. In a recent congressional letter to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top civilian and military leaders were reminded not to use the military illegally to carry out unlawful orders. Most members of the Profession of Arms would scoff at this notion, with something to the effect of: “We are apolitical and will know what to do when the time comes.” But will they?

Critical reflection shows that this subject is complex, making a review of the relevant authorities and norms regarding the domestic role of the U.S. military essential. Regardless of who wins the election, federal and state senior military leaders may face decision-making dilemmas critical to the future of U.S. democracy.

As outlined by the Constitution, other laws, and norms, the U.S. military is an apolitical institution and not intended to be a check on the three branches of government. Its role is to provide advice and implement the military instrument of power to support the policies established by elected leaders. Tragically, with the heightened risk of political violence in 2024 fueled by hyper-partisanship, some senior military leaders are currently having to reflect on their apolitical role within the U.S. constitutional structure.

This reflection is uncomfortable, multifaceted, and will lead to an ethical dilemma — a situation where two moral principles conflict — as following orders from the chain of command may clash with their oaths to the Constitution or personal convictions. Key considerations in this reflection include the structure of the Constitution, the norms of U.S. civil-military relations, and various laws enacted by Congress that define the domestic role of the U.S. military. These laws include the Hatch Act, the Insurrection Act, the Posse Comitatus Act, National Guard authorities, and other guidelines designed to ensure the government can “provide for the common defense” while maintaining an apolitical military. Although these frameworks might appear straightforward, they may prove quite challenging to apply in some extraordinary circumstances. Deliberate consideration of these factors is a professional duty for senior civilian and military leaders.

No Role by Design

The nation’s Founders, informed by Western thought and disillusioned by King George’s arbitrary rule, embedded provisions in the Constitution that have shaped the military’s role for over 250 years. Their beliefs centered on fears of standing armies, the need for inter-branch checks and balances, and the principle of civilian control. The resultant structure was designed to uphold democratic principles, prevent abuses of power, and ensure the military serves rather than dominates the republic. Designating the President as Commander-in-Chief, for example, institutionalized civilian control over the military. The President also possesses the authority to appoint senior military leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders. Despite challenges like General Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination during the Korean War, civilian oversight remains a cornerstone of the U.S. military.

The U.S. Congress also plays a crucial role in shaping military policy, including solidifying the principles of checks and balances to prevent executive overreach. The Constitution grants Congress several key powers: budgetary authority, the power to declare war, and the power to raise and support armies and maintain a navy. Additionally, Congress can “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and “provide for calling forth the Militia.” These provisions enabled Congress to later codify the Founders’ principles into laws that define the relationship between the President and the military.

On June 1, 1789, Congress passed its first bill, Statute 1, Chapter 1, which established the oath of office for military members. Initially, both officers and enlisted personnel took the same oath. However, modifications were made during and after the Civil War, and the enlisted oath was further revised in 1962. Today, officers and enlisted personnel each take separate oaths. Of note, the National Guard’s oath includes a pledge to support the Governor and the state constitution, highlighting their role in serving both federal and state governments.

A comparison of the oaths reveals similar language and intentions, with some key differences relevant to this commentary. All three oaths pledge support and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, not to an individual or office. However, the enlisted oath includes a commitment to obey the orders of the President and of the officers appointed over them “according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” In contrast, the officers’ oath omits a specific mention of obedience, and universally officers speak of an oath to the Constitution. This difference implicates military decision-making and ethical considerations, particularly when orders from civilian leaders are unlawful or unconstitutional. What’s more, these details of the oaths underscore a reference in the congressional letter to “the principle that there can only be one President at a time and that your oath to the Constitution and the chain of command require you to act on the orders of the sitting President.”

IMAGE: Oregon Governor Tina Kotek administers the Oath of Office for Brig. Gen. Alan R. Gronewold during the Investiture Ceremony held at the Oregon State Library, Salem, Oregon on November 28, 2023. (Photo credit: John Hughel, Oregon Military Department Public Affairs)

While the Constitution and the oath of office set the foundations of the U.S. military’s apolitical position, political neutrality is codified by law in the 1939 Hatch Act and enforced through DoD Directive 1344.10. These red lines create a clear separation between government functions and restricted political activities, emphasizing political neutrality within the military and guiding armed forces members’ political conduct. Together, these legal instruments help senior military leaders navigate their advisory and decision-making roles as professionals.

The United States Military as a Profession

Over time, the structure of civilian control over the military has been tested by various conflicts and societal changes but has remained crucial for preserving democratic governance. Political scientists extensively study this dynamic, under the rubric of civil-military relations, providing insights into the foundational importance of the U.S. military’s apolitical norms in a democratic society. In contrast to some countries where the military poses an internal threat, the American military’s commitment to professionalism has contributed to nearly 250 years of relative domestic stability. Key scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Peter Feaver, Eliot Cohen, and Risa Brooks have examined the maintenance and value of military professionalism and the risks of deviating from it. When navigating challenging ethical dilemmas, leaders in the Profession of Arms will stand to benefit by reflecting on this research.

Written at the start of the Cold War, a period when the United States shifted from relative isolationism to maintaining a standing army, Huntington’s The Soldier and the State remains a foundational text. Huntington argues that a professional military is vital to a democratic society, defining professionalism through expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. He contends that a professional military should remain apolitical, concentrating on its core competency of the management of violence while deferring to civilian authority on policy issues. His “objective control” model underscores the necessity of keeping a clear boundary between military and political spheres.

In contrast, Cohen, who describes Huntington’s work as the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, challenges the idea of the military as merely an implementer of civilian decisions. He advocates for a more collaborative relationship between civilian and military leaders, where military input actively shapes policy. Cohen characterizes this interaction as an “unequal dialogue,” and better reflects the evolving nature of U.S. civil-military relations.

Feaver adds depth to civ-mil theories through his application of principal-agent theory. According to Feaver, government principals can be either “intrusive or unintrusive,” while military agents can either “work or shirk.” He blandly concludes that civil-military relations are healthier with better civilian leaders, but more provocative is his conception that military officers have agency in disobeying orders. Notably, after recognizing the military’s agency, he advises that the military should oppose “bad” policies but not prevent their implementation, arguing that “in a democracy, civilians have the right to be wrong.” Feaver’s contributions emphasize the delicate balance between valuing military advice and preventing undue military influence over policy.

Finally, Brooks has expanded the debate by addressing modern challenges in civil-military relations. Her work incorporates contemporary issues such as technological advancements, legal and ethical dimensions, and the evolving nature of warfare. Furthermore, Brooks has issued stark warnings about the dangers of politicization within the U.S. military, emphasizing that increasing partisanship among military personnel could cause profound damage to national security. She also argues that many military leaders are neglecting their role in safeguarding U.S. institutions, labeling this neglect as “a luxury that the country can no longer afford.” This warning is especially pertinent for the anonymous leaders discussed in this essay.

IMAGE: A book collage featuring (L to R) The Soldier and the State, by Samuel P. Huntington; Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, by Peter D. Feaver; Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, by Eliot A. Cohen; and Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations: The Military, Society, Politics, and Modern War, by Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks, and Daniel Maurer.

Congress and the Limitations of the Military Domestically

Today the United States has a standing army of over one million personnel, with a total end-strength of over two million as covered in the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Although many members are stationed overseas, the military’s professionalism and apolitical nature have eased concerns about maintaining a standing army at home. Additionally, certain federal statutes guide the executive branch and greatly affect military authorities. While this essay does not cover their historical contexts, identifying the relevant laws in force is important. Their layers of complexity make policy integration challenging, and attention to their legal and ethical implications is vital for civilian and military leaders alike.

Posse Comitatus and the Insurrection Act

Established in 1878 as part of a post-Civil War appropriations bill, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) limits the use of U.S. federal troops domestically. The Act restricts the conditions under which the executive branch can employ the military to enforce civilian laws “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” Despite these restrictions, military involvement in domestic events has occurred under multiple legal exceptions.

The explicit language of the PCA acknowledges constitutional provisions and the Insurrection Act of 1807. As mentioned, the Constitution authorizes Congress to call forth the Militia (National Guard). However, in the early days of the Republic, delays in decision-making due to congressional recesses highlighted the need for more immediate action. Consequently, Congress enacted laws culminating in the Insurrection Act, which delegated these powers to the President, allowing mobilization of the armed forces without congressional approval. The statute has been invoked in response to 30 different crises, and its interpretation is increasingly scrutinized with critics and other legal experts advocating for reform to limit executive overreach. Despite ongoing debates, the Insurrection Act remains in effect and continues to pose ethical challenges. As the National Guard is usually the first military force called upon for domestic response, understanding the role of these forces is essential.

Role of the National Guard

Examining the National Guard’s structure, roles, and responsibilities sheds light on its potential domestic use, especially in Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO). The United States has 54 National Guards units, including those in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Each unit is led by the Adjutant General (TAG) who is appointed by and reports directly to the Governor. They serve as both military advisor and operational commander for state forces. Although the National Guard is linked to the National Guard Bureau for planning, doctrine, and funding, it typically operates under State Active Duty (SAD) authority to support local and state entities. Often to train, or in response to national disasters, guard forces also are mobilized for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Here they are federally funded but remain under the Governor’s control in a Title 32 status. Under Title 32 and SAD, they are exempt from the PCA.

IMAGE: Organizational chart of the National Guard Bureau. (Photo credit: New Jersey National Guard via Wikimedia Commons)

National Guard forces can also be “federalized” under Title 10 authority when “state, local, tribal, or territorial resources are overwhelmed; and federal assistance is requested.” Although Title 10 forces are generally subject to the PCA, exceptions such as the Insurrection Act allow federalization without PCA restrictions. Once federalized, command shifts from the Governor to the federal government necessitating a review of post-9/11 legislation and authorities.

Before delving into decision-making, it is important to address the unique aspects of the DC National Guard (DCNG). As Washington D.C. is not a state, command responsibilities are assigned directly to the President, with authority delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Army through the Secretary of Defense. Unlike state National Guards, the 2700-member DCNG is led by a Commanding General (appointed by the President) rather than a TAG. These distinctions are highly important, as they affect the applicability of the PCA and other authorities.

The Anonymous Leaders and Presidential Decision-Making

Although the Constitution does not define the military’s role in shaping strategy and policy, subsequent laws provide clarity. Learning from WWII and anticipating Cold War needs, Congress passed the 1947 National Security Act (NSA), which significantly restructured U.S. military and intelligence services, and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman position. Coupled with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), all three statutes created frameworks for integrating military and civilian advice in developing and implementing national security policy.

The 1947 legislation also established the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President on integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies. Statutory NSC members include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Treasury, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to the 1986 GNA, the Chairman, as the senior Armed Forces member, is the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. While not always present, other Joint Chiefs members include the heads of the six military services and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The GNA specifies that the service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for Combatant Commanders and are not in the operational Chain of Command. Alongside the NORTHCOM Commander and the 54 TAGs, these senior military leaders are currently reflecting on the subject matter of this essay to prepare for the various simmering and crisis scenarios they may encounter.

Incorporating these considerations leads to the following points:

1. Checks and balances are the bedrock of our democracy. Typically, the military is not considered one of these checks. Unfortunately, in today’s environment the military (whether it likes it or not) needs to consider its role as a possible check when asked to respond to civil disobedience. General Milley seemed to understand this in his actions during the 2020-2021 transfer of power.
2. Military members are trained to follow lawful orders and face penalties for disobedience. However, deciding whether to obey or shirk an order and when to engage in “strategic communications” presents complex challenges, such as loyalty, career risks, and identifying the legal boundaries of orders from a President, a Governor, or commanding officer.
3. The National Guard is not as apolitical as some think as the TAG position is essentially a political appointment. This situation could raise questions about state versus federal control, creating challenging post-election scenarios.
4. Congress has granted the President broad powers under the Insurrection Act, which are not restricted by the PCA. Coupled with the unique structure of the DC National Guard, this creates potential loopholes in the checks and balances system.
5. While military leaders generally have strong character traits, the situational factors in Civil Disturbance Operations could complicate decision-making. The verbal expression of disobeying or challenging orders may be perceived by some as insubordination and could even raise concerns about a coup.

Conclusion: A Tough Ethical Dilemma

To conclude, this commentary explored the complex constitutional, professional, and legal considerations that both civilian and military leaders must reflect on when making decisions about domestic military use. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the 54 state Adjutant Generals, represent the upper echelons of the U.S. military who interact with civilian authorities and are the anonymous leaders who may encounter ethical dilemmas during the upcoming election. As outlined in this essay, these leaders will be guided by relevant legislation, established norms of civil-military relations, and their oaths to the Constitution. These considerations often intersect and may conflict, creating a classic ethical dilemma. Although navigating these factors will be challenging, collectively they shape how these leaders provide military advice and implement executive orders.

Credit for top image: Members of the D.C. National Guard stand on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial as demonstrators participate in a peaceful protest against police brutality and the death of George Floyd, on June 2, 2020 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

12. US forces should consider Ukraine’s freewheeling model for social media messaging, analysts say

No kidding. Our information risk averseness is a strategic weakness.

Excerpts:

Fear of embarrassing publicity if communication efforts go wrong is one of the driving factors that is holding back the U.S. military, the Rand Corp. said in a study of Ukrainian communication tactics released Tuesday.

“The result of such concerns over risk is that senior (U.S.) government leaders and military commanders often implement cumbersome approval processes that slow response times and are emblematic of a reluctance to take risks in implementing programs,” the report said.

By contrast, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s flexibility enabled it to give various outside communication specialists control of its account on Twitter, now known as X, which was a key part of its success in attracting a large audience, Rand said.

“The United States will need to assess its own doctrine, training, and wargaming efforts to ensure it is able to counter disinformation during conflict,” Rand said.

US forces should consider Ukraine’s freewheeling model for social media messaging, analysts say

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · September 4, 2024

Col. Adisa King, commander of 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, listens to a soldier during Super Garuda Shield 2024 at Puslatpur 5, Indonesia, on Aug. 31, 2024. Ukraine's efforts at countering Russian disinformation campaigns have worked because its troops aren’t bogged down by a risk-averse U.S.-style chain of command, according to a new Rand Corp. report. (Mariah Aguilar/U.S. Army)

Ukrainian efforts at countering Russian disinformation campaigns have seen success because their troops aren’t bogged down by an overly cautious U.S.-style chain of command, according to a new report that suggests the American military needs to loosen up.

Fear of embarrassing publicity if communication efforts go wrong is one of the driving factors that is holding back the U.S. military, the Rand Corp. said in a study of Ukrainian communication tactics released Tuesday.

“The result of such concerns over risk is that senior (U.S.) government leaders and military commanders often implement cumbersome approval processes that slow response times and are emblematic of a reluctance to take risks in implementing programs,” the report said.

By contrast, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s flexibility enabled it to give various outside communication specialists control of its account on Twitter, now known as X, which was a key part of its success in attracting a large audience, Rand said.

“The United States will need to assess its own doctrine, training, and wargaming efforts to ensure it is able to counter disinformation during conflict,” Rand said.

A Ukrainian officer supporting his defense ministry’s communication efforts told Rand that their approach was “trust based” and that it freed up troops to “leverage soldier creativity.”

The U.S. military should learn from the Ukrainian experience, which put a premium on the value of loose coordination to ensure speed in countering Russian propaganda, Rand said.

Capt. Matthew Dougherty, a company commander with the 101st Airborne Division, joins other soldiers in a live-fire exercise at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, on May 7, 2024. Ukrainian efforts at countering Russian disinformation campaigns have proved successful because of greater freedom to produce content than the risk-averse U.S.-style model affords, according to a new Rand Corp. report. (Omar Joseph/U.S. Army)

“However, U.S. government communication efforts are notoriously risk averse and involve significant bureaucratic approval processes,” Rand said. “Senior U.S. government leaders must be willing to accept risk and allow communicators to quickly (without obtrusive senior leader approval chains) create unique, humorous, and engaging content.”

For Ukraine, an aggressive communication campaign that called out false Kremlin narratives in the run-up to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 has carried on throughout the conflict. The effort has helped galvanize international support for Ukraine, whose military relies heavily on Western aid.

Russia has produced large volumes of false content targeted at Ukrainians and global audiences, with the aim of undermining international backing. Rand in the past has described the Kremlin campaign as a “firehose of falsehood.”

False stories about Ukraine included tales about corrupt leaders selling donated weapons on the black market and social media campaigns highlighting high winter heating costs in Europe because of a cutoff from Russian gas.

An onslaught of social media posts calling Ukraine a Nazi state was another common propaganda tactic.

The Russian disinformation campaign also has included deepfake videos of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urging Ukrainians to surrender and false stories about Ukrainian forces shelling civilian rail stations.

The Ukrainian response has involved a wide array of players, ranging from Zelenskyy himself to Ukrainian social media influencers who have gained international traction.

“The Ukrainian military has also pursued a similar approach with its own social media, with individual soldiers posting directly,” Rand said.

One memorable instance early in the war involved a social media post by a Ukrainian soldier screwing a silencer to the barrel of his gun and telling the camera, “Guys, you’re f----d.”

“Other soldiers, marines, and airmen have used their social media feeds to share slice-of-life videos from the front lines,” the report said.

Such social media posts serve as a “force multiplier” for Ukraine and reach a far greater audience than any centralized command effort could, Rand said.

“The result is that many Americans and Europeans are reminded of the war, its costs, and Ukraine’s tactical victories every time they scroll through Twitter or TikTok,” Rand said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · September 4, 2024

13. Expect a $833B defense budget for FY25, but not on time, lawmaker says

Expect a $833B defense budget for FY25, but not on time, lawmaker says

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · September 4, 2024

House Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman Rob Wittman is confident Congress will pass a short-term budget extension in the next few weeks and eventually finalize plans for $833 billion in defense spending for fiscal year 2025.

But the Virginia Republican congressman acknowledged that the details of how lawmakers will get there is still a mystery.

Wittman’s comments at the Defense News Conference on Wednesday came just 26 days before a potential partial government shutdown if House and Senate leaders cannot pass a budget extension by Oct. 1, the start of the new fiscal year.

“I think we know we’re not going to get the seven remaining appropriations bills done between now and the end of the fiscal year,” he said. “In light of that, it looks like there’s going to be another continuing resolution that will come up next week, probably the middle of next week. The debate has been how long should that last.”

With the presidential and congressional elections in 64 days, lawmakers have begun debating whether to extend the budget into mid-November or early 2025, after the new Congress is seated.

Either way, defense planners likely won’t have their allotment of the federal budget until multiple months into the new fiscal year.

Wittman called the short-term budget extensions necessary, but “the worst way for us to be able to manage the defense enterprise,” given the uncertainty surrounding when new programs and initiatives will be fully funded and can start.

But he believes that Pentagon officials can count on the House-passed $833 billion target for total defense spending next fiscal year, whenever the federal budget is finally finalized.

“With the Fiscal Responsibility Act, it actually appropriates to that, and I think that’s the number you’re actually going to have to live with,” he said. “And I think that the Pentagon should be able to do most of the things that it needs to do with that number.”

White House officials have signaled they expect to request supplemental funding to deal with some outstanding defense fiscal needs. During a separate panel at the conference, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said her service will need extra money to cover the rising cost of installations services.

“Not only are our barracks and housing in need of investment, our power projection infrastructure is in need of investment as well,” she said. “It’s really hard to do that all inside the existing Army top line.”

Both the House and Senate return to Capitol Hill work next week.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

14. Commentary: Can the US and China avoid a catastrophic clash?

Excerpts:

The United States and China, therefore, are probably relegated to tackling disagreements on the margins with the aim of controlling the mutual tension that exists. Although these nuts-and-bolts interactions won’t get diplomats and leaders into the history books, it’s the best Washington and Beijing can do at this specific time.

A key component of this tension-reduction strategy is face-to-face dialogue that is long-lasting, durable, and persists for the long term regardless of who happens to be sitting in the Oval Office. To its credit, the Biden administration understood this from the beginning, even if its actions - the hysterical reaction to “Balloongate” in early 2023 being the most infamous - can complicate the very dialogue it hopes to preserve.

Sullivan’s discussion with Wang last week was just the latest in a series of exchanges dating back to May 2023, when the two agreed to establish a diplomatic channel among themselves to address crises as they arise.

China hawks in Washington will continue to dismiss meetings such as these as pointless at best, and borderline appeasement at worst. What, they may ask, is the point of entertaining meetings when the sole deliverable is more meetings? But there’s another question that all too often gets sidestepped: Is a form of diplomatic isolation a viable alternative?

Commentary: Can the US and China avoid a catastrophic clash?

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s trip to Beijing was about managing tension and that’s the best that can be hoped for, says this foreign affairs columnist.

Daniel R DePetris

05 Sep 2024 06:00AM

channelnewsasia.com · by Daniel R DePetris

NEW YORK: Last week, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan travelled to China for a multi-day trip in an attempt to keep relations between Washington and Beijing on a somewhat even-keel as the United States prepares for a political transition in several months’ time.

The trip was notable in several respects. It was the first time in eight years that a US national security adviser made the trip to Beijing, and Sullivan managed to grab a meeting with General Zhang Youxia, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The mere fact that this specific meeting occurred, after a two-year freeze in communications with its military officials, suggests that China’s President Xi Jinping is as interested in maintaining stability over the proceeding months as the Biden administration is.

The readouts of the conversations don’t tell us much. On the US side, the word of the day was “responsibility,” as in both superpowers have a responsibility to ensure the competition between them doesn’t veer into a conflict. While this phrase has taken on a robotic-like character over the years, it happens to be true.

EQUAL PARTS SCATHING AND DIPLOMATIC

The consequences of a direct US-China conflict, either over Taiwan, the disputed shoals of the South China Sea or by sheer miscalculation, are unfathomable. One war-game conducted earlier in the year assessed that tens of thousands of US service members would be lost in addition to dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft. The economic repercussions would be just as gargantuan, with perhaps as much as 10 per cent of global gross domestic product wiped out.

Systemic rivalry aside, the US and China don’t have an interest in flirting with such a catastrophic scenario. To the extent Sullivan’s meetings reinforced this theme, then they were time well spent.

But nor is there much room for problem-solving among US and Chinese officials at this particular time. Indeed, just as Sullivan stressed the urgency of responsibly managing relations, he also made it clear that Washington wasn’t going to reorient its China policy.

American technologies that could contribute to the modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to be restricted. Sullivan called out China for its repeated use of so-called “grey zone” tactics around the Sabina and Second Thomas Shoals, designed to interrupt Philippine re-supply missions. Taiwan will remain the biggest point of contention, with Sullivan yet again denouncing any moves by China to settle the issue by force.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was equal parts scathing and diplomatic during his time with Sullivan, arguing that the United States needed to start treating China as an equal rather than a systemic competitor. In fact, Chinese officials completely disagree with the notion that the United States and China can be a competitor and a partner at the same time.

On the South China Sea, Beijing wants the United States to stay out entirely. Xi remains emphatic that US export controls are as much about preventing Chinese economic development as they are about constraining the PLA. Short of outright US capitulation to Chinese demands, there is little Washington can do to assuage Beijing on any of these matters.

THE BEST CHINA, US CAN DO AT THIS TIME

Sullivan’s trip notwithstanding, US-China relations at an institutional level won’t improve dramatically. The reasons for this have less to do with individual personalities - US foreign policy analysts have a habit of obsessing about Xi’s personal qualities - and more to do with high politics.

Structurally speaking, the United States and China may be bound for an inherently confrontational relationship for the next several decades by virtue of their respective positions in the world.

The United States seeks to maintain its dominance over international relations to the extent possible, whereas China (as all aspiring superpowers do) is intent on translating its greater wealth and military capacity into more power in the international system. The latter will obviously rub up against the former, resulting in the type of bilateral tension that is not easy to rectify.

Throw in completely different governing ideologies as well as a tendency by US politicians to browbeat China for domestic political reasons, and the long-term trajectory of relations looks ominous to even the most optimistic observer.

The United States and China, therefore, are probably relegated to tackling disagreements on the margins with the aim of controlling the mutual tension that exists. Although these nuts-and-bolts interactions won’t get diplomats and leaders into the history books, it’s the best Washington and Beijing can do at this specific time.

A key component of this tension-reduction strategy is face-to-face dialogue that is long-lasting, durable, and persists for the long term regardless of who happens to be sitting in the Oval Office. To its credit, the Biden administration understood this from the beginning, even if its actions - the hysterical reaction to “Balloongate” in early 2023 being the most infamous - can complicate the very dialogue it hopes to preserve.

Sullivan’s discussion with Wang last week was just the latest in a series of exchanges dating back to May 2023, when the two agreed to establish a diplomatic channel among themselves to address crises as they arise.

China hawks in Washington will continue to dismiss meetings such as these as pointless at best, and borderline appeasement at worst. What, they may ask, is the point of entertaining meetings when the sole deliverable is more meetings? But there’s another question that all too often gets sidestepped: Is a form of diplomatic isolation a viable alternative?

Daniel R DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist at various publications. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.

15. Japan and Australia agree to increase joint military training

The silk web of the multiple alliances and relationships among US friends, partners, and allies.

Japan and Australia agree to increase joint military training

05 Sep 2024 05:07PM

channelnewsasia.com

QUEENSCLIFF, Australia: Japan vowed to bolster military ties with Australia during a high-ranking visit on Thursday (Sep 5), with Tokyo's top diplomat saying the "likeminded" partners must stick together to combat shared regional threats.

Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defence Minister Minoru Kihara met their Australian counterparts at an old army fort outside Melbourne, striking deals on greater air force cooperation and expanded military exercises.

They also agreed to jointly help the Philippine Coast Guard, which is locked in an escalating tussle with Chinese ships in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

"Amidst the increasingly difficult security environment in the Indo-Pacific, we need to constantly raise Japan-Australia security cooperation to a new height," Kamikawa said after the meeting, touting a "likeminded partnership".

China's growing economic and military clout in the Asia-Pacific region - and its assertiveness in territorial disputes - has rattled the United States and allies such as Japan and Australia.

Tokyo has in recent weeks accused China of deliberately sailing a naval ship through its waters and flying a surveillance plane into its air space.

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said the meeting raised "serious concerns" about recent "incursions" into Japanese territory.

The meeting produced broad agreements for Japan and Australia to boost air force cooperation, and to join each other in military exercises alongside the United States.

Japan's elite Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade could soon take part in US Marines rotations based in Australia's key northern base near Darwin.

Defence Minister Kihara said Japan was considering whether its fleet of F-35 stealth fighters could be deployed to Australian air fields, but said an agreement on this was yet to be struck.

"As for the rotation of the Air Self-Defence Force aircraft, we would like to continue to have consultations between Australia and Japan," cautioned Kihara.

BEIJING BULWARK

The two countries promised joint support for the Philippine Coast Guard, although it was unclear what this help would look like.

Japan and northern Australia offer strategically important military gateways to potential flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea.

Both are part of the Quad alliance alongside the United States and India, a grouping seen as a bulwark against Beijing.

Tokyo has recently shown an interest in parts of the landmark AUKUS security accord between Washington, London and Canberra - particularly helping with the development of advanced military technologies.

Staunchly pacifist for decades, Japan has been ramping up defence spending with US encouragement.

Australia has meanwhile embarked on its own military overhaul, ploughing money into long-range strike capabilities and the development of nuclear-powered submarines.

Source: AFP/ec

16. Small Units Need Protection from Drones—But What Capabilities Should a Light, Maneuverable Counter-UAS Platform Include?

Drones certainly are creating both dilemmas and opportunities for tactical operations at the shoot, move, and communicate elvel. I wonder how the battle drills of the old FM 708 are being revised and updated. Squads, platoons, and companies have to be able to operate at a level far superior to what we experienced in the Cold War and certainly during the GWOT. Units that are maneuvering have to pay even greater attention to the air space to defend against both attack and detection from the air while the employment of drones by maneuvering forces can increase surveillance and detection of the enemy and provide another element of fires that maneuver units have never had access to.

Small Units Need Protection from Drones—But What Capabilities Should a Light, Maneuverable Counter-UAS Platform Include? - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Iain Herring, Gavin Berke · September 5, 2024

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Imagine you are an infantry platoon leader, moving with your soldiers in a tactical formation toward your objective. Suddenly, indirect fire is raining down on your position. You have plan to react to indirect fire, and you order your formation to execute the plan. Your soldiers are well trained and well led by their capable squad leaders, and they start to move, immediately and rapidly, from the impact area. But as you move, you realize the indirect fire is walking with you—your soldiers can’t escape it. What you haven’t realized is that there is a small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) observing your movement, allowing the indirect fire to follow you and your soldiers through the woods.

Now imagine the same scenario, except this time you have a mobile counter-UAS (C-UAS) system that can track and shoot UAS on the move. Once again, your platoon is engaged with indirect fire. And once again, your platoon has a plan and executes it on your order, Your light, maneuverable C-UAS vehicle can move with you, detect the UAS observing your platoon’s movement, and neutralize it. Within a matter of seconds, the indirect fire ceases. Your platoon can safely regroup and continue mission.

Because of the C-UAS vehicle, traveling with and ready to support the platoon, the second scenario leads to mission accomplishment. Unfortunately, the first scenario is much more likely for Army small units today. C-UAS systems currently used are static or only semimobile, meaning they cannot move when C-UAS systems are operating. These systems proved sufficient during Operation Inherent Resolve—as we experienced while integrating airspace and countering UAS threats in support of the operation. But they will not fit with maneuver units’ mission sets in large-scale combat operations. For that environment, the Army needs a truly maneuverable C-UAS platform for light maneuver units. This platform capable of detecting and kinetically or nonkinetically engaging UAS threats on the move and light enough to be air-assaulted or air-dropped from the back of fixed-wing aircraft. And it must be able to counter both sides of the future UAS threat coin: on one hand, increasingly affordable UAS will be fielded in growing numbers, potentially even as swarms, and must be engaged with electronic warfare (EW) effectors; on the other hand, there is the prospect of increasingly sophisticated UAS completely resistant to EW that may therefore be best neutralized through kinetic interception.

With this in mind, what might an appropriate platform look like? Although components of an optimized system would need to be procured, many of them are already in service with the Army and could be adapted to meet future C-UAS needs while allowing for future innovation.

Vehicle Platform

Potential vehicles that could form the foundation of a light, maneuverable C-UAS system include:

• M1301 Infantry Squad Vehicle (payload 3,200 lbs., maximum gross weight 5,000 lbs)
• M1297 Ground Mobility Vehicle (payload 3,200 lbs., maximum gross weight 7,300 lbs)
• MRZR Alpha 4 Light Tactical Vehicle (payload 2,000 lbs., maximum gross weight 5,090 lbs)
• M3 RIPSAW Remote Controlled Vehicle–Light (tracked vehicle, predicted payload 3,000 lbs., maximum gross weight 16,000 lbs.)

Most of these vehicle platforms are just beginning to be fielded by maneuver units throughout the Army including the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Depending on the final gross vehicle weight, some may be better suited than others for a C-UAS vehicle with air-assault or low-velocity air-drop capability. Ideally, this vehicle could accompany dismounted troops as close as possible to their objective area. Then it would remain close enough to provide protection while the dismounted soldiers conduct their tasks on the objective area.

Weapons and Effectors

C-UAS Air-Burst Weapon

A 25-millimeter or 40-millimeter grenade launcher with “smart” ammunition could be specifically tailored for C-UAS engagements. The projectile would detonate in flight, one to three meters before the UAS target. The range would be calculated by a laser range finder built into the scope or sight system. Upon pulling the trigger, a three-to-five-round burst of projectiles would fly toward where the UAS was predicted to be located, then explode at and around that location. The burst would create a cloud of shrapnel in case the UAS changes direction or speed. The shrapnel from the explosive would neutralize the UAS propulsion or flight control systems.

Electronic Warfare Effectors

An EW system is necessary to jam UAS signals. The Titan RF system with an amplifier, for example, may be well suited to disrupt or degrade small UAS. Any EW system included on the vehicle would not have to be co-located with or mounted on the platforms kinetic weapons. The proposed effective range for this system is greater than five kilometers.

Larger UAS Threat Engagement

An option to engage larger UAS kinetically is the FIM-92 Stinger Missile, which could be used to defend against UAS groups 4 and 5 (the largest two classes of DoD’s five-category classification system) and air-breathing threats. Due to the Stinger’s backblast area, the weapon would have to be mounted slightly above other systems on the vehicle and only operate within certain degrees of freedom relative to those other systems. This could reduce the need for a dedicated MANPADs (man-portable air defense system) operator. The effective range for this system is four kilometers.

Distance- or time-defined programmable detonation air-burst grenade rounds would be less expensive per munition and engagement than firing radar-guided missiles or hundreds of high-caliber munitions at UAS threats. Low-cost munitions and compact firing systems are an answer to system fatigue and munition supply constraints that currently limit C-UAS deployment in combat theaters.

A heavier solution for target acquisition and engagement could incorporate a system like the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS). A system like the CROWS could be a well-suited firing platform in conjunction with a remote-controlled vehicle platform like the RIPSAW. A system with these capabilities is still recommended to have man-in-the-loop engagement control to prevent fratricide of friendly or neutral UAS.

Detection

Before engaging UAS, either kinetically or nonkinetically, the C-UAS platform must first be able to detect UAS. This could be done passively or actively, but the detection capability will also be dependent on a reliable power source.

C-UAS Detection System Power

An UPS (uninterrupted power supply) battery pack that provides electricity for four hours or more with a tactical quiet vehicle-mounted generator should be used to maintain noise discipline. The generator would supply power to C-UAS systems while the vehicle is moving. The aim should be for the generator to provide eight hours per full tank of fuel to supply power for C-UAS systems and charging the UPS battery pack. The power output required of the generator is probably between three and ten kilowatts. The UPS battery pack would primarily be used while the generator is shut off. This design course of action increases unit survivability by reducing noise signature from combustion engines or generators near the objective area.

Passive-Active Combination Detection System

Passive radars could be used to detect UAS by measuring the change in electromagnetic frequencies made by the motion of a potential UAS. That detection must occur amid a wide range of commercial electromagnetic waves already present in an area of operation. Common sources and types of electromagnetic signals present in areas with infrastructure include Wi-Fi, cellular, civil radio and television, commercial satellite communications, satellite PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing), civil air radar, and weather radar. An excellent attribute of passive radars is that they do not reveal the observer’s position because they do not emit radiation. This style of detection may be degraded in areas where commercial electromagnetic signals are not constantly present or in a scenario where sources of electromagnetic radiation do not have electricity.

Another sensor form of detection utilizes light detection and ranging, or LiDAR. It works by emitting and receiving laser pulses of nonvisible light that reflect off physical objects. The reflected light is received by the sensor and is converted to create a digital image of that object. LiDAR could be used in conjunction with a passive radar to create high confidence air tracks at short range. LiDAR is commonly used on automobiles in the United States to detect other cars, pedestrians, or obstacles in a roadway. When used for this purpose, LiDAR currently has an approximate range of 250 meters while the vehicle moves.

A system that fuses acoustic and optical sensors—multimodal unmanned aerial vehicle 3D trajectory exposure system (MUTES)—was tested at a distance of 480 meters by Siyi Ding, Xiao Guo, Ti Peng, Xiao Huang, and Xiaoping Hong, who published the results of their test in 2023. The conclusion of their report read:

Our results demonstrate that MUTES, which integrates a 64-channel microphone array, a camera, and a lidar, can provide wide-range detection (90° × 360°) and high-precision 3D tracking for UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. A coarse-to-fine and passive-to-active localization strategy software was implemented in MUTES, with a well-designed microphone array capturing acoustic features and estimating the coarse position of the sound source, and the optical modules being used for further verification and tracking. Additionally, we trained an environmental denoising model to extract drone acoustic features, overcoming the drawbacks of traditional sound-source-localization approaches. A Kalman filtering algorithm for the fusion of three sensors proved to be effective and achieved the accuracy of RTK [real-time kinematic]. In terms of both hardware and algorithm, MUTES represents an innovative multimodal detection and tracking system.

This demonstrates a combination detection and tracking method of UAS can be effective. Future system combinations could use passive radar, LiDAR, camera, or acoustic sensors.

Active Radar Option

An active radar capable of detecting group 1-3 UAS (the categories of the smallest systems) while moving is ideal to be prepared for future threats. The RPS-42 MHR, used with the M-SHORAD Stryker platform may be suitable for this vehicle. This would include multiple radars fixed at different points of the vehicle to provide real-time detection, early warning, and engagement capability for the maneuvering company or platoon. This could also allow for tracks to be pushed over a joint force tracker such as Link 16 to adjacent units and higher echelons. Optimally, the proposed detection range for this system is fifteen to twenty kilometers.

Positive Identification Enhancers

Multiple identification capabilities are highly recommended for the human-in-the-loop operator to identify UAS and prevent fratricide. Thermal and night vision are also necessary due to probable hostile threat windows and friendly maneuver operation timelines. The following systems have shown to improve soldier lethality with air defense systems: thermal sight, night vision, laser range detector for air-burst grenade programming, and a friendly UAS IFF (identification friend or foe) interrogator.

Network Connectivity

Tactical SIPRNet (Secure Internet Protocol Router Network) connectivity on the move would allow this system to send and receive air tracks, which would help filter out unknown air tracks. Furthermore, this would help with communication between multiple systems, making it easier to decide which system on the battlefield has the highest kill probability.

A mobile broadband kit or Starlink could be used to obtain connection to a tactical SIPRNet,. One Starlink system, one wireless router, one KG-175D TACLANE, two PacStar switches, and one four-port router could be configured to provide this capability, with all of the components fitting in a medium-sized rucksack. This network, in conjunction with a Forward Area Air Defense laptop, would allow tracks to be uplinked from the detection sensor on the light, maneuverable C-UAS vehicle to adjacent units and the higher command while also enabling tracks to be downlinked from higher echelons. This capability provides two functions: first, it provides commanders quick notice of air threats around their platoons or companies; second, it would provide even earlier warning to maneuver elements of threats in the airspace.

If these capabilities were packaged into a single vehicle light enough to be sling-loaded by a helicopter, detection could occur as far away as twenty kilometers, EW engagement at more than five kilometers, and kinetic engagement within two kilometers. This would allow crews to see tracks approaching their positions and have enough time to warn adjacent units and their leadership, and then engage targets with EW and kinetic fires on the move. A lightweight solution like this could also provide advanced C-UAS capabilities to remote areas where a helicopter is the primary mode of entry.

To be sure, until such a system is built and fielded, the discussion remains entirely conceptual. But if the Army makes it a priority and works toward a light, maneuverable C-UAS vehicle that consumes minimal fuel and electricity, then it could be exactly what the platoon leader from the opening vignette needs to protect US soldiers from constantly evolving UAS threats and accomplish the mission.

First Lieutenant Iain Herring is an air defense artillery officer and assistant S-3 for the 2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He holds a bachelor of science from the United States Military Academy. Herring deployed as an indirect fire protection capability platoon leader to the Middle East to conduct C-RAM and C-UAS activities supporting counterinsurgency.

First Lieutenant Gavin Berke is an air defense artillery officer and an air and missile defense operations officer for the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He holds a bachelor of arts from Temple University. Berke deployed as an indirect fire protection capability platoon leader to the Middle East to conduct C-RAM and C-UAS activities supporting counterinsurgency.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Henry Villarama, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Iain Herring, Gavin Berke · September 5, 2024

17.  China’s Disinformation and US Elections: What to Watch for in Congressional Contests

It is not just the presidential election.

Excerpts:

From this perspective, there are a number of U.S. lawmakers – both Democrats and Republicans – who might be deemed ripe targets. IPAC itself includes eight U.S. senators and representatives in a bipartisan delegation. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), which holds hearings and publishes an annual report on PRC rule of law violations, counts among its members nine representatives and nine senators from both parties.

Twelve of those 18 members are running for re-election in November, as are five of the eight members of the U.S. IPAC delegation. A small number of U.S. lawmakers – including Representative Jim McGovern (a Democrat from Massachusetts) and Senator Ted Cruz (a Republican from Texas) – have faced sanctions from Beijing in retaliation for their own or the U.S. government’s outspokenness on rights violations in China, including Hong Kong. Both are running for re-election this year.

Representative Chris Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, co-chair of the CECC, and the sponsor of various pieces of legislation on human rights and religious freedom in China is also running and could be a tempting target for Beijing, but has also typically won a large proportion of votes in his district. Democrat Sherrod Brown, an articulate and outspoken critic of the CCP’s authoritarian rule in China and its implications for the United States, as well as a long-standing member and former co-chair of the CECC, could be more vulnerable given how tight a race he is facing in Ohio.

Let’s hope that the CCP and its proxies do not try to influence U.S. public opinion about these lawmakers or tilt these electoral contests. However, if recent events in elections around the world are any indication, their campaigns, relevant U.S. agencies, and major social media platforms should still keep their eyes peeled for PRC-linked disinformation in the run-up to November.

China’s Disinformation and US Elections: What to Watch for in Congressional Contests

thediplomat.com · by Sarah Cook

Beijing’s track record of targeting parliamentarians spans multiple countries, with implications for the United States.

By

September 03, 2024

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The Kremlin may be the primary culprit regularly attempting to influence foreign elections, but since 2018 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also stepped into the ring, often with a different set of goals, priorities, leverage points, and tactics. In fact, over the past five years, the CCP has notably increased the use of online information operations, fake accounts, and disinformation (the deliberate spreading of false and misleading content) to target the United States.

With under three months to go until major U.S. elections, how likely is a People’s Republic of China (PRC)-linked campaign to occur and what forms might it take?

An attempt to influence the presidential race in favor of one candidate or the other seems unlikely for various reasons – including the relatively strong bipartisan consensus on China in Washington and the evident policy continuity between the last two administrations.

Still, based on research and investigations surrounding the 2020 and 2022 midterm U.S. elections, ongoing activity by PRC-linked fake accounts and social media influencers, and recent incidents in Taiwan, Canada, Australia, and Europe – it is almost certain that there will be some attempt made to meddle in the U.S. information environment and influence voters between now and November 5, and possibly in the election aftermath.

What might this look like? First, Beijing-linked accounts have already started to amplify existing political polarization, sow distrust in U.S. democracy, and attempt to influence policy debate on China-related issues.

Second, when it comes to electoral politics, a review of recent academic research, news reports, and tech firm investigations reveals multiple cases of PRC-linked actors trying to mar the reputation of legislative candidates or even entire parliaments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America. Thus, it is not out of the question that an emergent campaign could smear the reputation of non-presidential targets, including congressional candidates critical of Beijing.

Learning Lessons From Elsewhere

In Taiwan’s general elections in January, for example, alongside a well-documented operation by the Chinese regime to sway the presidential race, reports have also emerged of troll attacks and disinformation targeting parliamentary candidates from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) disfavored by Beijing. In one case, DPP legislator Lin Ching-yi had her social media posts swamped with vulgar accusations and sexual overtones. False information also spread claiming that she had plagiarized her thesis.

It is hard to determine the impact of these attacks on voters, but ultimately Lin lost her seat in parliament. Indeed, the DPP lost its majority, though displeasure over the economy and social issues, as well as a third party gaining many seats – rather than PRC disinformation – is considered by experts to have contributed to that outcome.

In Europe, seven French MPs were the target of a phishing attack linked to China. Another French candidate in June’s European Parliament elections was warned that PRC-linked accounts were spreading claims he was a “Trojan Horse” for the United States and even a CIA agent.

In Canada, two sets of China-linked influence operations are worth noting. One targeted four MPs – three of Asian descent – using various tactics to harm their reputation and cut off access to constituents. These included coordinated attacks and false information spread about the candidate on WeChat, a social media platform owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent and used widely in the diaspora. They also involved offline pressure on Chinese community organizations not to invite disfavored candidates to events or urging ordinary voters not to volunteer with their campaigns.

In August-September 2023, another campaign in Canada combined social media posts on multiple platforms and AI-enhanced videos that made it appear as if a prominent Chinese dissident was accusing Canadian politicians across the political spectrum of ethical and criminal violations, all the while making anti-Muslim comments. Although the attempt was exposed and debunked, it demonstrated the potential for PRC-linked operations to try to achieve dual goals at once: harm the reputations of both Canadian lawmakers and critics from among the Chinese diaspora.

In Australia in early 2023, amid actual scandals emerging from misdeeds in parliamentary offices, China-linked accounts were found to be generating new, false information and circulating it to further undermine trust in the institution.

Implications for Upcoming U.S. Congressional Races

Several dimensions of these campaigns are notable when considering the implications for the U.S. political landscape and upcoming congressional or local races.

First, with the exception of Taiwan, all of these operations were party-agnostic. In other words, they were not trying to turn voters away from or toward a particular political party or segment of the domestic political spectrum.

Second, there was a common factor shared by these disinformation campaign: The targets were individual lawmakers known for being vocal critics of the Chinese government and its rights abuses. Some of those targeted by hacking or disinformation targeted were lawmakers who have been sanctioned by Beijing for their outspokenness or are members of entities like the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). IPAC is a coalition of over 250 lawmakers from 40 countries who take joint action to support victims of Beijing’s repression or counter malign CCP influence targeting foreign countries.

From this perspective, there are a number of U.S. lawmakers – both Democrats and Republicans – who might be deemed ripe targets. IPAC itself includes eight U.S. senators and representatives in a bipartisan delegation. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), which holds hearings and publishes an annual report on PRC rule of law violations, counts among its members nine representatives and nine senators from both parties.

Twelve of those 18 members are running for re-election in November, as are five of the eight members of the U.S. IPAC delegation. A small number of U.S. lawmakers – including Representative Jim McGovern (a Democrat from Massachusetts) and Senator Ted Cruz (a Republican from Texas) – have faced sanctions from Beijing in retaliation for their own or the U.S. government’s outspokenness on rights violations in China, including Hong Kong. Both are running for re-election this year.

Representative Chris Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, co-chair of the CECC, and the sponsor of various pieces of legislation on human rights and religious freedom in China is also running and could be a tempting target for Beijing, but has also typically won a large proportion of votes in his district. Democrat Sherrod Brown, an articulate and outspoken critic of the CCP’s authoritarian rule in China and its implications for the United States, as well as a long-standing member and former co-chair of the CECC, could be more vulnerable given how tight a race he is facing in Ohio.

Let’s hope that the CCP and its proxies do not try to influence U.S. public opinion about these lawmakers or tilt these electoral contests. However, if recent events in elections around the world are any indication, their campaigns, relevant U.S. agencies, and major social media platforms should still keep their eyes peeled for PRC-linked disinformation in the run-up to November.

Authors

Guest Author

Sarah Cook

Sarah Cook is an independent researcher and author of the UnderReported China newsletter.

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thediplomat.com · by Sarah Cook

18. Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation

The 96 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2700/RRA2771-1/RAND_RRA2771-1.pdf

I will be studying this and I expect all our PSYOP professionals and Special Forces and Civil Affairs personnel will study this in detail.

Hopefully the GEC will be able to use this as well.

Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation

Lessons for Future Conflict

Todd C. Helmus, Khrystyna Holynska

ResearchPublished Sep 3, 2024

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2771-1.html??cutoff=true&utm

Russia has disseminated large volumes of false content targeted at Ukrainians, those living in Russia, and global audiences, including those in the United States and Europe. Both Russia's attempts to sow false narratives and the Ukrainian response during the war provide a unique laboratory for considering how nations can counter disinformation and propaganda during conflict. In this report, the authors seek to distill some of those lessons. They offer a broad case study of Ukraine's information and counterdisinformation war and highlight key lessons that can help the U.S. national security establishment prepare for and counter disinformation during U.S. contingency operations.

Key Findings

Ukraine's key initiatives launched before the war, referred to as shaping operations, helped lay the groundwork for successful Ukrainian counterdisinformation initiatives

• Its intelligence-driven "prebunk" informed Ukrainian and international audiences about a planned Russian operation to falsify a Ukrainian attack on its forces and thereby provide a casus belli for the Russian invasion.

In Ukraine's efforts during the war to counter Russian disinformation in the three theaters of its information war — inside Ukraine, inside Russia, and in the international community — it has largely experienced success in countering it domestically within Ukraine

• To fight Russia's attempts to undermine Ukrainian unity and sap their will to fight, Ukraine has responded with a diverse campaign that enlisted both government and civil society institutions to debunk Russian disinformation, prebunk emerging narratives, build the capacity of key frontline communities, and promote media literacy education among the populace.

Ukraine has fared the worst in countering Russia's domestically targeted disinformation inside Russia during the war

• While Ukraine has attempted to undercut Russian support by highlighting the costs of the conflict to both Russian soldiers and Ukrainian citizens, such efforts have largely proved unsuccessful.

Success in the international arena can best be measured in international support for the war, which has slipped over time, maybe particularly so in the United States

• Ukrainian narratives hailing from the internationally popular President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as well as a band of online Ukrainian influencers helped to enlist early international support.
• Cracks in the international coalition have emerged of late.

Recommendations

• The United States should consider innovative ways to reach and communicate with populations residing in totalitarian countries like Russia or China; rally international institutions to more effectively identify, debunk, and prebunk adversary campaigns targeting the rest of the world; and support a broader array of institutions residing in host nations.
• U.S. and allied governments should look to identify key at-risk countries early. The goal, as in Ukraine, is a civil society and government that have the necessary skills and resources to counter foreign disinformation and the interconnections to coordinate such efforts.
• The United States will need to assess its own doctrine, training, and wargaming efforts to ensure it is able to counter disinformation during conflict.
• The U.S. military, as well as the Department of State, should not only invest in building civil society organizations in advance of future conflict but support and be willing to work closely with such institutions when conflict does arise.
• The U.S. military should develop a mandatory media literacy education campaign that can help both deployed and garrison personnel recognize malign influence attempts and foster safer online behavior.
• Senior U.S. government leaders must be willing to accept risk and allow communicators to quickly (without obtrusive senior leader approval chains) create unique, humorous, and engaging content.
• The U.S. Department of State, as well as the U.S. military, will need to ensure that initiatives to debunk (fact checking), prebunk, and promulgate proactive information narratives are effectively resourced, implemented, and integrated in military theaters of operation.

19. Dark Tunnels and Moral Beacons

So tragic. So sad.  Photos of those killed are at the link: https://www.thefp.com/p/bari-weiss-dark-tunnels-and-moral. Remember their faces.

Imagine Hersh Goldberg-Polin spending 330 days in captivity as a hostage after losing his arm to a Hamas grenade in the Oct 7th attack.

Dark Tunnels and Moral Beacons

thefp.com · by Bari Weiss · September 2, 2024

Today at The Free Press, we mourn the six innocent Israelis murdered by Hamas terrorists who stole them nearly a year ago.

They are:

Eden Yerushalmi, a 24-year-old from Tel Aviv, who attended the Nova music festival with friends.

Eden Yerushalmi (courtesy of family)

Ori Danino, a 25-year-old from Jerusalem who escaped the Nova music festival, but returned to help save others and was captured.

Ori Danino (courtesy of family)

Alex Lobanov, 32, the head bartender at the Nova music festival, who leaves behind two children, one who was born while he was held captive.

Alex Lobanov (courtesy of family)

Carmel Gat, a 40-year-old yoga instructor and occupational therapist from Tel Aviv. She had been visiting her mother in Kibbutz Be’eri on October 7. Released hostages reported that Carmel had been seen practicing yoga with other hostages.

Carmel Gat (courtesy of family)

Almog Sarusi, 27, from Ra’anana, north of Tel Aviv, who attended the Nova music festival with his girlfriend. She was murdered there.

Almog Sarusi (courtesy of family)

And Hersh Goldberg-Polin, 23, the American-Israeli citizen who lost part of his left arm reportedly fending off grenades, and was taken hostage from the Nova music festival.

Hersh Goldberg-Polin (courtesy of family)

It is that last name that will be most familiar to you.

Hersh’s father, Jon Goldberg-Polin, was one of the first people The Free Press interviewed in the hours after we learned of the October 7 massacre. Jon told us that at 8:11 a.m. that morning, he and his wife, Rachel, received two text messages from their only son. “Message number one said ‘I love you.’ Message number two said ‘I’m sorry,’ ” Jon told us on Honestly. “It’s been chaos ever since.”

Listen to Jon and so many of the family members and friends of the hostages here:

The chaos Hamas ushered in that day with the mass rape, abduction, torture, and slaughter that marked the start of Iran’s multifront war against Israel exposed a moral confusion in the West that has compounded the chaos wrought by war.

But Jon and Rachel Goldberg-Polin have brought order, drawing for the rest of us the bright line between good and evil.

In the 330 days since Hersh’s arm was blown off by a Hamas grenade and he was thrown, bloodied, into the back of a pickup truck headed for Gaza, his parents have not stopped. They’ve had audiences with the president and the pope. They went to the border with Gaza to scream their son’s name.

And, somehow, Rachel also made time to sit down with us in Jerusalem this past January.

“The word pain is a privilege compared to what we feel,” she told us about the experience of Hamas stealing her son. “Trauma is being hit by a truck after the truck has moved on. The truck is still on us. It’s like asking someone who is being raped what being raped was like.” And yet she also said: “I still think we have so many blessings.” She invoked Psalm 23—the poem King David wrote about his cup overflowing. “Right now it overflows with tears,” Rachel said, “but I know it will overflow with joy again.”

You can watch my conversation with Rachel Goldberg-Polin here:

In their strength, dignity, and moral clarity, Rachel and Jon have entered not just into the annals of Jewish history but of the history of the free world.

The names of Eden Yerushalmi, Ori Danino, Alex Lobanov, Carmel Gat, Almog Sarusi, and Hersh Goldberg-Polin should be seared into the minds of anyone who wishes to live in a civilized world. Instead, we read headlines in our most storied media outlets describing these six Israelis as having “died” in Gaza. We are told that those defending their murderous captors “have a point.”

As Matti Friedman writes in his searing column today from Jerusalem: “Hersh was an American citizen, born in California—and in California and elsewhere, we learned that other Americans would tear down his poster and those with the faces of other Israeli hostages. We’ve seen the support of the American administration wane as the war wears on, including an explicit demand by the White House to stay out of the southern Gaza city of Rafah—the city where Hersh and the five other hostages were just found by our soldiers, but too late.”

In a time of so much darkness—“The idea of being kidnapped by terrorists became a familiar one in our home, a subject discussed in my son’s third-grade class like kids in other countries talk about what they’ll be when they grow up,” Matti writes—I wonder how we will see ourselves out of the tunnel.

As students return to campus, and a number of them renew the anarchy that proved so many administrators morally and physically unprepared to defend their Jewish students, there will be those prepared to tear down the hostage posters once more. Those eager to erase the faces and the meaning of those innocents who still remain in Gaza. I think about Hersh’s face and all of their faces. I think about the foundational principle of our civilization, that every human life has dignity.

It is this very principle that Hamas and its barbaric ilk are trying to turn on its head. Much as they turn the people of Gaza into sacrifices, denying them shelter as they fire missiles from schools, mosques and hospitals, secure in the belief that the country they attacked will be found guilty of the bloodshed.

Many will rightly point out that Americans should be especially outraged by today’s horrific news because Hersh Goldberg-Polin was an American citizen. But it’s not just that one of Iran’s terror proxies murdered an American citizen. It’s that he and those and all of those murdered by Hamas are on the front lines of a wider war that America is already part of—whether we like it or not.

In other words: This is not only about Israel. Or about special sympathy for allies who share our values, though they are and they do. It is about the reality that those who burn Israeli flags burn them alongside American ones.

Hersh, and those executed beside him in the tunnels under Rafah, were killed by Iran. It’s a country, now in league with China and Russia, that calls for death to America in the same breath it calls for the destruction of Israel. It is a country that began its tyrannical rule in 1979 by taking Americans captive, and that, as I write this, is actively targeting Americans on American soil.

That is what we face.

Statements of sorrow from the leaders of the free world are insufficient. The message to terrorists and those who support them should be that the defenders of civilization will defeat them. No matter the cost.

A few weeks before he was captured by Hamas terrorists, Hersh Goldberg-Polin and his family had Shabbat dinner with our columnist Matti Friedman. They were friends—part of the tight-knit English-speaking community of Jerusalem.

“The events that have unfolded since the day Hersh disappeared are bewildering,” writes Matti. “But today, here in his neighborhood in Jerusalem, for a moment they regained a kind of terrible simplicity, reduced to one beautiful human face.”

Please read Matti’s column: “Among the Mourners of Zion and Jerusalem.”

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thefp.com · by Bari Weiss · September 2, 2024

20. Victor Davis Hanson: The Truth About World War II

The simple lesson: appeasement does not work.

Excerpts:

As terribly as the German and Japanese people suffered, it was minuscule in comparison to the tens of millions of innocents that Germany and Japan butchered in their respective campaigns to absorb Russia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and China—not to mention the Holocaust.

In sum, Germany and its fascist allies started World War II, initiated the mass warring on civilians, and institutionalized genocide. And they felt empowered to do so not because of Allied aggression or terrorism, but because of initial Western European appeasement, American isolationism, and Russian collaboration. That is what enticed Hitler and the Axis powers into starting a war they soon had no chance of winning, once their formidable enemies sized up their true intentions and likewise embraced the prior Axis notion of total war.

Victor Davis Hanson: The Truth About World War II

Germany and its fascist allies started the war. They felt empowered to do so not because of supposed Allied aggression, but because of Western appeasement and isolationism.

By Victor Davis Hanson

September 5, 2024

thefp.com · by Victor Davis Hanson · September 5, 2024

In a recent and now widely seen Tucker Carlson interview, a guest historian named Darryl Cooper casually presented a surprising number of flawed theories about World War II. He focused his misstatements on the respective roles of Winston Churchill’s Britain and Adolf Hitler’s Germany—especially in matters of the treatment and fate of Russian prisoners, the Holocaust, the systematic slaughtering of Jews, strategic bombing, and the nature of Winston Churchill.

Because of the size of the audience Carlson introduced him to, and because of the gravity of Cooper’s falsehoods, his assertions deserve a response.

On the Treatment of Russian Prisoners

It is simply not true, as Cooper alleges, that Hitler’s Wehrmacht was completely surprised and unprepared for the mass capitulation of the Red Army and some two million Russian prisoners who fell into German hands in summer 1941.

The virtual extinction of these POWs in the first six months of the war was a natural consequence of a series of infamous and so-called “criminal orders” issued by Hitler in spring 1941 to be immediately implemented in his planned “war of extermination” in the East.

The edicts variously targeted for elimination prominent Soviet officials, intellectuals, Jews, and commissars. Just as importantly, Hitler exempted German soldiers from any criminal liability in what was expected to be the mass killing of Russians and Jews in general.

In Mein Kampf, during the lead-up to the war, and even through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact years, Hitler had planned eventually to invade Russia, destroy the Soviet Union, put an end to what he called Jewish Bolshevism, and annex and then eventually resettle almost all of European Russia. In part he was encouraged by the German success in briefly absorbing much of Western Russia in late 1917 and early 1918.

Accordingly, Hitler and his planners envisioned a quick Russian campaign. Chief of the Army General Staff, General Franz Halder, believed that Operation Barbarossa, which began on June 22, 1941, had essentially been won in its first eleven days. Halder matter-of-factly wrote in his diary that the Russian population would have to be disposed of during that first winter to save Germans the effort of feeding and maintaining them.

Hitler further assumed the liquidation of Soviet-style Marxism was inseparable from the destruction of all the Jews in the East, whose wartime persecution began in Poland just days after the German invasion in September 1939 and well before any Allied response.

True, some of the invading Wehrmacht officers may have been disturbed at the sheer mass of captives and Germans’ inability to offer even the bare essentials of humane treatment. But they quickly learned from Berlin’s doubling down on earlier eliminationist directives that they were not to worry about the millions of doomed Russian prisoners or the murders of Jews, given their deaths were consistent with prior Führer directives for the future resettling of western Russia.

At Nuremberg and after the war, many veteran generals of the Eastern Front claimed they privately opposed Hitler’s orders of total war that entailed liquidation of communists and Jews and assumed the mass death of Russian POWs. But very few could prove that they had not received such orders or had bravely opposed their implementation.

Who Was Responsible for Starting World War II?

As for Cooper’s claim that the Allies were to blame for starting a world war, nothing could be further from the truth. Hitler may have been frustrated that Britain and France declared war on him after his unprovoked invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. But he had been warned by some advisers that the two allies would be finally forced to war, given that he had broken almost all his prewar promises to them about ceasing his serial territorial acquisitions.

Incidentally, the much-maligned Versailles Treaty was nevertheless far more lenient to Germany than what the Kaiser had envisioned in 1914 under the Septemberprogramm memorandum for a conquered France, the German-imposed peace on a defeated Bolshevik Russia under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918, or any of of Nazi Germany’s postwar treatments of conquered nations.

Hitler, remember, had betrayed and humiliated Neville Chamberlain by unapologetically reneging on the agreements he made in Munich, and he had erased an autonomous Czechoslovakia. Yet, Hitler strangely saw his Munich Agreement victory as a sort of temporary setback, despised the compliant Chamberlain, and often blamed him for talking him into delaying for even a brief period his planned wars of aggression.

Hitler ended the eight-month phony war after the destruction of Poland by invading Western Europe in April and May 1940, but not because he was frustrated that France and Britain had not taken up his initial peace offers. Instead, for all his hysterics and frustrations, he understood well that they had grasped the envisioned permanently subservient roles for both nations in a postwar Hitlerian world. And Germany knew that it had finally shocked naive European governments to their senses by the precivilizational brutality it displayed in Poland.

Instead, Hitler restarted the war in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France because he wished to complete his pan-European conquests both before his long-planned and inevitable turn eastward against his erstwhile partner but existential enemy the Soviet Union, and before America inevitably entered the war on the side of the Allies. (Hitler sometimes whined that America’s late 1917–18 entrance had doomed imperial Germany’s supposedly certain last chance of victory).

On Britain’s Supposed Warmongering

Britain was, in fact, the only one of the six major belligerents in World War II that went to war on the principle of a third-party nation’s territorial integrity, without either invading another country or being itself invaded. Britain was also the only major power that saw World War II through from the first day to the very last. And of the victorious Big Three, it alone foresaw well before the war that it would likely end any cataclysmic war strategically diminished, its empire gone, and without its centuries-long global stature.

After the fall of France in June 1940, and the occupation and de facto control of most of Europe, there was discussion again in London, as during the phony war between October 1939 and April 1940, of finding a way for the British Empire to survive—given it was without any help from a now-occupied Europe, an isolationist America, and a collaborationist Russia.

So as early as late May 1940, after the German Ardennes invasion seemed unstoppable, some British and desperate French leaders advised the new Churchill government to seek out Mussolini to craft a modus operandi with Hitler.

Initial peace feelers followed. But all were quickly revealed to be impossible, given the buoyant and hubristic German-Italian agenda for a newly conquered Europe. That entailed a likely end of ongoing British rearmament, the surrender or flight to Canada of the British fleet, and fears that “peace” likely meant at worst something like a Nazi-imposed Oswald Mosley Quisling dictatorship, and at best a David Lloyd George Pétain-like collaborationist government—with a ceremonial role for the abdicated-but-still-lurking Edward VIII.

To the degree Hitler at any time wanted peace with the British Empire so that he could concentrate on Russia, that notion was largely predicated only on realpolitik—mostly his own growing fear and warning from his military advisers that the proposed invasion of Britain in 1940 was impossible anyway, given the unquestioned superiority of the British fleet.

By late 1940, even the idea of defeat of Britain by air alone was growing futile. In any case, Hitler always feared that he could neither invade nor permanently occupy Britain and felt, mirabile dictu, that invading Russia would be far easier for the land-based Wehrmacht than amphibious operations across the Channel. Destroying and pillaging communist Russia was of course far more consistent with his lifelong plans to obliterate Soviet Marxism and its supposed Jewish architects.

In sum, Hitler wanted “peace” with Britain only in the sense that he could envision no way of conquering it by land, sea, or air. In perhaps the war’s greatest miscalculation, Hitler believed that the supposedly easier conquest of Russia would then force a completely orphaned Britain to sue for peace on his terms.

On Churchill, the Supposed Warmonger and Terrorist

Cooper describes Churchill as a supposed terrorist and warmonger. Yet in the dark days of late May and June 1940, to avoid factionalism among his new war cabinet, Churchill was willing to allow his colleagues temporarily to sound out peace possibilities through the intervention of Mussolini. But he darkly predicted that any ensuing humiliating Axis terms would likely shock even the more malleable and naive of his war cabinet.

In fact, by May 1940 Churchill had proved very magnanimous to the disgraced Chamberlain, whom he insisted stay on in his wartime cabinet, believing either that a naive or misguided Chamberlain might have sincerely sought to delay Hitler at Munich in order for Britain to find time to rearm, or blindly but genuinely thinking Hitler had no additional territorial agendas in Western Europe.

In any case, by May 1940, a once disgraced, chastised, and now far more realistic Chamberlain was well treated by an ally of Churchill and opposed any further obsequious concessions to Hitler. Chamberlain knew from bitter experience trusting Hitler would not bring peace but just guarantee war and a weaker and ultimately defeated Britain.

Churchill far more often blamed the earlier Stanley Baldwin government for Britain’s 1939–1940 predicament. It had stubbornly resisted and then delayed British rearmament in the foolish belief in either collective security, Hitler’s benign intentions toward Britain, or some sort of fantasy of redirecting Hitler permanently and exclusively eastward against Stalin.

In sum, Churchill was not eager for war, and on occasion expressed hope that Hitler would focus on rebuilding Germany, settle down, and stay within his borders. Nonetheless, throughout the late 1930s he had begged and cajoled the Baldwin, and later, the Chamberlain governments to rearm to the teeth to deter what he felt would be inevitable and destructive Nazi and Japanese offensive wars.

It is true Churchill wanted to preserve the British Empire at all costs. Yet integral to that strategy was rearming to a degree that would deter both Germany and Japan, given he privately grew despondent that post–Depression British financial and military weakness signaled to both Hitler and the Japanese that London would not be able to hold on to its empire or deter its enemies and thus would inevitably invite aggression.

So, if believing a strong military would deter Hitler and avoid war is somehow bellicose, then Churchill might conceivably have pled guilty.

As far as being a “terrorist,” Churchill soon and almost alone grasped the ultimate fantasies of Hitler’s planned genocide, world domination, the end of free nations, and a nightmarish global future. He had good reason for such pessimism after Hitler had once again, for the nth time, broken his word; he invaded Poland and began a policy of slaughtering civilians, and rounding up and murdering Jews. Most of his military planners realized after summer 1940 that the evacuated and depleted British army could not stop Hitler in Europe. Even the British fleet could not guarantee a successful blockade of German ports. That bleak reality left the RAF’s bomber command as the only tool to slow Hitler down.

Who started a systematic campaign of terror bombing?

The Luftwaffe first indiscriminately bombed civilian targets in Poland to instill panic, terror, and mass death. It continued that tactic unapologetically in Holland by destroying the center of Rotterdam during the first two weeks of May 1940. And despite Hitler’s false claims that the Allies had started bombing civilians first, he soon honed his air strategy of incinerating civilians against Coventry and London.

In terms of soldiers lost versus civilians killed, Britain waged a less lethal war than most of the other belligerents, losing fewer soldiers than its two allies and killing far fewer of their enemies as well. Dresden and Hamburg paled before the American incendiary campaigns against Japanese cities between March and July 1945, followed by the two atomic bombs. And America’s bombing of civilian targets paled before the Japanese’s army systematic and decade-long slaughter of millions of Chinese civilians, not to mention Hitler’s agendas of destroying European Jewry.

Cooper cites as proof of British terror Operation Razzle, designed to torch German forests. But it proved a pipe dream and fizzled, indicative of the weakness and desperation of the RAF of 1939–1941 that could not conduct successful precision bombing daylight raids across the occupied European continent—lacking fighter escort, updated radar, effective navigation, and reliable four-engine heavy bombers.

The RAF, having learned from bitter experience, warned Americans in 1942 that it was suicidal to fly daylight, unescorted precision bombing raids over occupied Europe into Germany and eastern Europe. After thousands of lost B-17s and dead airmen, the Americans gradually agreed and found success only in mid- to late 1944 with the onset of fighter escorts, the liberation of France, improved tactics, and a depleted Luftwaffe.

Thus, in 1939–1940, how else was Britain to stop Hitler’s rampages, given his overwhelming momentum and unquestioned strength on the continent?

Again, true terror might be properly gauged by the number of civilians a military killed versus the number of its soldiers lost. Japan mostly likely won that sick contest by butchering some 15 million to 20 million Asians, Chinese, and Pacific Islanders, although Hitler came close through the Holocaust, the deaths of millions of Red Army prisoners, and unrestricted butchery waged against Polish and Russian civilians.

As terribly as the German and Japanese people suffered, it was minuscule in comparison to the tens of millions of innocents that Germany and Japan butchered in their respective campaigns to absorb Russia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and China—not to mention the Holocaust.

In sum, Germany and its fascist allies started World War II, initiated the mass warring on civilians, and institutionalized genocide. And they felt empowered to do so not because of Allied aggression or terrorism, but because of initial Western European appeasement, American isolationism, and Russian collaboration. That is what enticed Hitler and the Axis powers into starting a war they soon had no chance of winning, once their formidable enemies sized up their true intentions and likewise embraced the prior Axis notion of total war.

Victor Davis Hanson is the author of hundreds of articles, book reviews, and newspaper editorials on Greek, agrarian, and military history. He has written or edited 24 books, including The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won.

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thefp.com · by Victor Davis Hanson · September 5, 2024

21. Pseudo-Scholars and the Rise of the Barbarian Right

Carlson, the ultimate capitalist. He is providing what sells.

As an aside, note the three articles I provided from the Free Press today, one on the tragic loss of the hostages in Gaza, one by Victor David Hanson and this one. They certainly provide some diverse views by diverse journalists and commentartors.

Pseudo-Scholars and the Rise of the Barbarian Right

Odious views like the Nazi apologia aired by a guest on Tucker Carlson’s podcast this week threaten to make their way from the fringe to the mainstream.

By Sohrab Ahmari

September 5, 2024

thefp.com · by Sohrab Ahmari · September 5, 2024

For many of the conservatives who embraced it—myself included—the Trumpian moment promised a more populist, pro-worker GOP. Yet the latest iteration of Donald Trump has dashed these hopes, playing down the themes that propelled his 2016 campaign, and sounding more and more like a conventional Republican nominee—only more erratic.

In the realm of right-wing ideas, meanwhile, something far grimmer is afoot: the rise of a cohort of writers, pseudo-scholars, and shitposters dedicated to reviving some of the darkest tendencies in the history of thought, including the idolatry of strength (as cartoonishly personified by the likes of Andrew Tate); the notion of supposedly “natural” hierarchies; IQ-based eugenics; overt racism and antisemitism.

Call them the Barbarian Right: The master subject of this worldview is the Nietzschean barbarian or “aristocrat of the spirit” who overthrows the egalitarian—and essentially feminine—structures that have long shackled him, restraining his yearning for adventure and excellence. Nazi apologia is par for the course.

Dubious charges of Nazism are a dime a dozen in U.S. political rhetoric, but I use the term advisedly—and literally: How else to describe Tucker Carlson’s recent interview with Darryl Cooper? In it, the amateur historian argued that Winston Churchill was “the chief villain of the Second World War” and that the Nazi death camps were the result not of malice, but a logistical mishap: a failure to plan for the Wehrmacht’s oversupply of POWs. “Nazi Germany,” Cooper said, “launched a war where they were completely unprepared to deal with the millions and millions of prisoners of war, of local political prisoners. [They] went in with no plan for that, and they just threw these people into camps, and millions of people ended up dead.”

Carlson, a journalist I used to admire, hailed Cooper as the “best and most honest popular historian working in the United States today,” and lent him the same credulous, uncritical treatment he now seems to reserve for all the crackpots who frequently grace the podcast he hosts on X, the social media service formerly known as Twitter. As Cooper insinuated that unnamed “financiers” leaned on an indebted Winston Churchill to prolong the war, Carlson didn’t bother to ask, To whom, specifically, are you referring, Darryl?—like a curious journalist could be expected to do.

Long before he appeared on Carlson’s show, Cooper had made known his nutty views about the Jews as well as his sympathy for the Third Reich. In July, he declared that the Nazi takeover of France—which resulted in the deportation of 75,000 Jews to concentration and death camps—“was infinitely preferable in virtually every way” than the admittedly offensive drag queen “Last Supper” staged at the opening ceremony of the Paris Olympics in July.

Two months earlier, Cooper posted a rant on X in which he urged Christians to “reckon” with the fact that “no god in any religious tradition is as consistently brutal and bloodthirsty as the Yahweh of the Old Testament”—a rehash, in other words, of Marcionism: a second-century gnostic heresy that posited that the God of the Hebrew Bible is a capricious demon and not the God of Jesus. In 2019, Cooper agreed with an online interlocutor that “non-racist fascist” is a “decent description” of his politics.

As of this writing, Carlson’s interview with Cooper has garnered some 26 million views on X, boosted by Elon Musk, who called it “very interesting” and “worth watching.” (He later deleted the post.) The denizens of the Barbarian Right space seem to have gotten what they wished for out of the Cooper interview. “A lot of good points,” said one. “Only thing missing is naming the group behind the majority of subversions.” Another chimed in: “The mass migration into Europe and America is a Jewish-led operation.”

The Barbarian Right ecosystem extends beyond virtual life. Like any (still) fringe movement, it’s riven by internal fault lines, making it hard to delineate the various camps. There are the likes of the Groyper sect led by Nick Fuentes and old-fashioned racist-fascist goons. Then there are other strands. Some count among their ranks people who aren’t exactly of Viking extraction. One of the Barbarian Right’s leading lights is the Romanian Jewish academic Costin Alamariu (a.k.a. Bronze Age Pervert, or BAP for short).

Generally speaking, the BAPist camp is more urbane and aesthetically minded, with its fans clustered in places like Lower Manhattan and the Bay Area. The core group is made up of academic exiles like BAP and the writer and publisher who goes by Lomez, formerly a writing instructor in the University of California system. The academics are joined by a diverse mix of fashionistas, tech bros, and social scenesters. While they traffic in edgy racial memes and eugenic ideas, they generally eschew crude antisemitism, in part because some of their leading lights, not least BAP and Lomez, are part-Jewish. And that’s just what sets them apart from the likes of the Groypers, for whom the Jews are imagined to be the supreme enemy.

Yet there are shared elements. One common denominator is that the barbarians rarely promote their odious views earnestly or systematically. Rather, they typically advance their beliefs via jokes and by playing around with an existing set of highly mobile memes and symbols. This allows them to preemptively escape serious scrutiny, even as those in the know understand that they really mean it. Thus, when critics of Cooper pointed to a tweet in which he suggested that Hitler is in heaven as evidence of antisemitic animus, the typical response was: Hey, he was just joking.

Another shared element is the pretension to gnosis: the possession by a sort of master or guru of a secret knowledge that “they” would keep from you. BAP, for example, claims to have unlocked the true secret of classical philosophy: The likes of Plato and Aristotle were most fundamentally concerned with “the problem of breeding”—that is, eugenics. Only, you have to know how to read the ancient sages to really get this.

Steve Sailer, an amateur race scientist, is another of the movement’s gurus. His contribution is the art of Noticing (the title of a recently published anthology of his blog posts). By noticing, he means the recognition that hereditary differences among large human groups, delineated by race, give rise to what Sailer calls “human biodiversity.”

Those willing to venture into this realm of hard racial science notice the deep truths lurking behind mundane realities, such as the fact that “Barbados, despite an average IQ of 78, is one of the most pleasant countries in the Third World due to its commitment to maintaining a veddy, veddy English culture.” And also: “Since there are so many unmarried Asian men and black women, they should find solace for their loneliness by marrying each other. Yet, when was the last time you saw an Asian man and a black woman together?”

Cooper and Carlson likewise feigned a secret knowledge. “We’re not allowed” to discuss the social and economic misery that led to the rise of Hitler, they claimed at the outset of their interview. It was among the most preposterous claims in a two-hour discussion chock-full of them: Thousands of pages of serious history have been devoted to studying just that.

The third and final element of the Barbarian Right is a revulsion for the mildly egalitarian conservatism that took hold across the West in the postwar period. That conservatism made its peace with the civil rights movement and marginalized Jew-haters. The barbarians cannot stand the resulting state of affairs, since it has meant granting the grubby demands of the “dysgenic” many.

Therefore, they feel compelled to attack what they see as the founding “mythology” of the postwar world, not least of which is that the obvious fact—even to a third-grader—that the Nazis were actually, you know, evil. Hence Cooper’s perverse moral inversion, in which Churchill is cast as the “villain,” while Hitler is a victim who was only seeking an “acceptable solution to the Jewish problem.”

As Carlson’s Cooper fiasco shows, there is no limit to how far the Barbarian Right will go in seeking to delegitimize the actually existing American order. The rest of us—especially those on the right who adhere to the precepts of Abrahamic faith and dare not venture beyond good and evil—must say no.

Sohrab Ahmari is a founder and editor of Compact and a contributing writer to The New Statesman. His latest book is Tyranny, Inc. Follow him on X @SohrabAhmari.

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thefp.com · by Sohrab Ahmari · September 5, 2024

22. Biden Expected to Block U.S. Steel Takeover

How will this impact the Japan-US alliance?

And what will happen to US Steel?

Biden Expected to Block U.S. Steel Takeover

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is expected to raise national security concerns about selling the iconic steel producer to Japan’s Nippon Steel.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/04/us/politics/biden-us-steel-nippon.html

President Biden is preparing to soon block an attempt by Japan’s Nippon Steel to buy U.S. Steel on national-security grounds.Credit...Gene J. Puskar/Associated Press

By Andrew DuehrenAlan Rappeport and Lauren Hirsch

Andrew Duehren and Alan Rappeport reported from Washington, and Lauren Hirsch from New York.

Sept. 4, 2024

President Biden is preparing to soon block an attempt by Japan’s Nippon Steel to buy U.S. Steel on national security grounds, according to three people familiar with the matter, likely sinking a merger that became entangled in election-year politics in the United States.

A decision to block the takeover would come after months of wrangling among lawmakers, business leaders and labor officials over whether a corporate acquisition by a company based in Japan — a key U.S. ally — could pose a threat to national security. A move by Mr. Biden to block the deal on those grounds could roil relations between the two nations at a moment when the United States has been trying to deepen ties with Japan amid China’s growing influence in East Asia.

For months, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, has been scrutinizing the deal over potential risks. There has been mounting speculation that the Biden administration could intervene before the November election.

A White House official told The New York Times that CFIUS “hasn’t transmitted a recommendation to the president, and that’s the next step in this process.”

CFIUS is made up of members of the State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy and Homeland Security Departments, and is led by the Treasury secretary, Janet L. Yellen.

The committee sent a letter to U.S. Steel in recent weeks saying that it had found national security concerns with the transaction, one of the people familiar with the situation said.

The $15 billion deal, announced in December, has attracted scrutiny from lawmakers across the political spectrum. President Biden said in the spring that U.S. Steel should remain American-owned, and former President Donald J. Trump, the Republican presidential nominee, has also said he would block the sale.

On Monday, Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential nominee, said the industrial icon should remain American-owned.

Senators from Ohio and Pennsylvania, where U.S. Steel has large factories, have also objected to the takeover. In part, they have questioned the prospect of a critical U.S. steel producer being sold to a foreign owner and warned that a foreign owner could be more likely to move jobs and production overseas. The United Steelworkers union had vigorously opposed the deal, and its prospects were seen as a pivotal issue in Pennsylvania, a key swing state in the presidential election.

Shares of U.S. Steel dropped about 20 percent on Wednesday after The Washington Post and The Financial Times initially reported the expected move.

A spokesman for U.S. Steel said that the company had not received any updates or executive orders related to the CFIUS process and that it saw no national security issues with the transaction. He added that the company planned to continue to pursue all legal options to ensure that the transaction closed.

Nippon Steel said in a statement that the company had “not received any update related to the CFIUS process.” The statement added that “we have been clear with the administration that we do not believe this transaction creates any national security concerns.”

“U.S. Steel and the entire American steel industry,” the statement continued, “will be on much stronger footing because of Nippon Steel’s investment in U.S. Steel.”

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Employees of U.S. Steel who were in favor of the deal held a rally at its headquarters on Wednesday.

“Today’s rally is about displaying support for the transaction with Nippon Steel,” David B. Burritt, the company’s chief executive, said in a statement. “We want elected leaders and other key decision makers to recognize the benefits of the deal as well as the unavoidable consequences if the deal fails.”

If the agreement were blocked, it would mark the conclusion of a protracted fight between U.S. Steel and the steelworkers union, which has raised concerns about the status of existing pension agreements and expressed doubts about Nippon’s promises to preserve jobs and invest in manufacturing facilities.

Last year, U.S. Steel rejected a $7.3 billion bid made by Cleveland-Cliffs, an Ohio-based steel manufacturer, that had the support of the union. The company said in April that it remained interested in buying U.S. Steel if the Nippon deal faltered.

It is not clear that blocking the deal would necessarily benefit Pennsylvania, where U.S. Steel employs about 4,000 workers. The company has warned that if the deal with Nippon does not close, the company could have to cut jobs and move its headquarters from Pittsburgh.

Senator John Fetterman, a Pennsylvania Democrat who has opposed the merger, criticized U.S. Steel executives on Wednesday for threatening potential cuts to union jobs if the deal fell through.

“As I’ve always said, I will follow and stand with the United Steelworkers against the shameless executives looking for a golden parachute,” Mr. Fetterman said in a statement.

If the Biden administration blocked the transaction, it could also have broader ramifications for foreign investment.

Legal experts who specialize in international mergers and acquisitions said a decision to block the deal would appear overtly political and could damage America’s reputation for having open markets.

“The U.S. will lose all standing to argue that F.D.I. screening regimes around the world should not be politicized,” said John Kabealo, a Washington-based lawyer who specializes in cross-border transactions, referring to foreign direct investment.

The decision could also be a blow to American relations with Japan, a close ally and economic partner.

“It is far from clear how this deal could pose a national security threat,” said Nancy McLernon, chief executive of the Global Business Alliance, a lobbying group that promotes open investment in the United States. “The circus around this transaction is particularly concerning, given the importance of the U.S. relationship with Japan.”

Although objections to the deal became a rare instance of bipartisan agreement between Republicans and Democrats, some prominent former Trump administration officials were pushing for the deal to go forward.

Mike Pompeo, who served as Mr. Trump’s secretary of state, has been advising Nippon. Wilbur Ross, Mr. Trump’s former commerce secretary, has argued that holding up the deal was election-year “xenophobia.”

“As to the substance of it, I don’t see a national security issue,” Mr. Ross, who made a fortune buying, restructuring and selling off struggling American steel makers, said in a recent interview. “I’m not Trump’s spokesperson on the steel deal — I disagree that it was a problem in the national interest.”

Andrew Duehren covers tax policy for The Times from Washington. More about Andrew Duehren

Alan Rappeport is an economic policy reporter, based in Washington. He covers the Treasury Department and writes about taxes, trade and fiscal matters. More about Alan Rappeport

Lauren Hirsch covers Wall Street, including M&A, executive changes, board strife and policy moves affecting business. More about Lauren Hirsch

A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 5, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Biden To Oppose U.S. Steel’s Sale To Japanese Firm. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

23. Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

Photos and visuals at the link: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/burma-military-drone-program-irregular-warfare/

Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Beau Chapman, Alexander Suster, Steven Ahart · September 5, 2024

Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Air Power, which explores and advocates for the totality of air, aviation, and space power in irregular, hybrid, and gray-zone environments. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help influence the future of air and space power. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event.

In the heart of Southeast Asia, a desperate struggle for power has been unfolding. The Burmese (Myanmar) military junta, facing its most significant challenge since seizing control in 2021, is struggling to maintain its grip on the country. As rebel forces gain ground, the junta has needed to rapidly modernize its approach to the threats posed by Burmese groups opposed to the regime.

Recent research conducted at the Global Disinformation Lab (GDIL) at The University of Texas at Austin has shed new light on the junta’s drone pursuits. Through analysis of commercial satellite imagery, ground photography, and open-source intelligence, our team has pieced together a clearer picture of Burma’s drone program. Our findings form the backbone of this article, offering new insights into the junta’s military aspirations and the stark realities on the ground.

Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale – Insider: Short of War

For irregular warfare practitioners, this analysis offers several insights. It highlights the increasing accessibility of drone technology to non-state actors and authoritarian regimes, emphasizing the need for adaptive counter-drone strategies. The case of Burma demonstrates how even technologically limited actors can leverage a mix of foreign-sourced drones and domestically produced munitions to significant effect. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of comprehensive intelligence gathering on adversaries’ drone capabilities, including their supply chains and manufacturing processes. Lastly, it serves as a reminder that in modern conflicts, the technological playing field is rapidly leveling, necessitating constant innovation in offensive and defensive irregular warfare tactics.

In the past, the junta has harbored dreams of joining the ranks of nations capable of producing advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The allure is clear: combat drones offer a potent mix of surveillance capabilities and striking power, at a fraction of the cost of traditional manned aircraft. In an era where irregular warfare is increasingly common, drones have become a game-changer on battlefields worldwide.

However, Burma’s attempts at domestic drone production have been fraught with setbacks. In place of their grandiose manufacturing plans, the junta has turned to foreign suppliers like Russia, China, and Iran to support their efforts.

The Seeds of Ambition

The roots of Burma’s drone aspirations can be traced back to the early 2000s when a video showed the alleged first flight of a UAV at an air base near Rangoon (Yangon). Soon after, the Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University (MAEU) began its UAV research and development program. Early drone prototypes, with the names “UX-1” and “UX-2M”, showed promise—at least on paper. These fixed-wing designs resembled simple remote-controlled planes, a far cry from the sophisticated combat drones employed by major military powers.

The UX-1 UAV. Source: Leak from “Naing Naing Sanay Myanmar News”

The UX-2M UAV. Source: Leak from “Naing Naing Sanay Myanmar News”

As the years progressed, the Burmese military, which has remained essentially the same through successive governments, has taken a keen interest in UAV development, seeing potential applications in air defense training, battle damage assessment, and surveillance. Collaboration between the MAEU and the Burmese Air Force intensified, with uniformed personnel observed looking over prototypes and satellite maps and discussing drone applications.

Burmese military personnel looking over an early UAV. Source: Leak from “Naing Naing Sanay Myanmar News”

MAEU collaboration with the Burmese air force (identified by their arm patch). Source: PowerPoint released by the MAEU

Aspirations vs. Reality

Despite initial signs of progress, Burma’s actual achievements in combat drone production were limited. The only claimed victory for the junta’s UAV program is the “Yellow Cat” or “Yellow Bird.” This drone has been a source of confusion, as it has been described on separate occasions as a domestic variant of both the Chinese CH-3 and Chinese Sky-02 UAVs.

Early models of the Yellow Cat were simplistic, lacking the sophisticated sensors, controls, aerodynamic refinements, or payload capacities of its supposed Chinese counterpart.

Images of the Yellow Cat UAV in 2007. Source: Facebook

The above image is the latest publicly available information on the UAV, meaning the drone’s design and capability have likely evolved. Since then, the only reference to the Yellow Cat’s existence was in 2022, when rebel Telegram scouting channels reported its sightings.

However, in May of 2021, a crashed UAV was photographed in Mandalay. Conflicting claims state that this drone was the domestically produced Yellow Cat while others report it as the Chinese-made “Sky-02.” The junta has been confirmed to operate the Sky-02, but features of the crashed drone do not align, particularly with the undercarriage and the tail’s connections to the wing.

Crashed drone in Mandalay. Source: X

2012 image of the Sky-02 in Burma. Source: Facebook

This lends credence to the possibility that the crashed UAV was indeed a domestically produced variant of a Chinese drone. If true, this indicates some success in the UAV program’s practicality in post-coup Burma, but the fate of this particular drone suggests a struggle to perfect the technology.

The crashed drone may be the only remaining remnant of the junta’s dreams to produce drones domestically. Reports on the UAV production program have been almost nonexistent since 2012, and after the 2021 coup, the MAEU has likely been hesitant to collaborate with the junta on research and development. The program has fallen short of its lofty ambitions.

This gap between aspiration and reality is a persistent theme in the Burmese military’s self-sufficiency efforts. The junta has shown some success in assembling aircraft like the K-8, and manufacturing a trainer known as the “MTX-1A”, but their big plans for local production of the Austrian-designed DART-450 have been halted due to lack of parts. Furthermore, the junta still depends on foreign suppliers for more sophisticated manned aircraft, such as the recently acquired Su-30.

Burma’s “MTX-1A”, produced domestically. Source: Facebook

A Web of International Connections

Because Burma’s aircraft production capabilities do not match its needs, they have turned to a rogues’ gallery of international partners to aid in their pursuits.

China has been crucial for Burma’s drone ambitions. According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, China supplied 12 CH-3 drones to the junta between 2014 and 2015. The CH-3s are medium altitude, long-endurance fixed-wing craft with payload, thermal imaging, and strike capabilities developed by the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). They have been spotted at Shante Air Base near Meiktila, where they serve as tools to monitor protests and likely play a prominent role in the surveillance of rebel activities.

Chinese CH-3 drones at Shante airbase. Source: China Defence

A CH-3 visible on satellite at Shante airbase. Copyright Google Earth 2022.

Furthermore, there have been reports of the Chinese CH-4 being used by the junta. The CH-4 builds on its predecessor with a longer flight endurance and increased payload capacity. A report by Radio Free Asia claimed that the Burmese military recently acquired CH-4s, and has been using them in operations as recently as April. However, GDIL found no photo or video evidence to validate these claims.

The regime has also turned to Russia to pursue its goals. In 2021, Moscow sold an unspecified number of Orlan-10E drones to the junta. The Orlan-10E is Russia’s export variant of the Orlan-10, a small surveillance UAV with data collection, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare capabilities. Crashes have confirmed their presence in Burma.

A crashed Orlan-10E allegedly in Northern Sagaing. Source: Reddit

While Russia has been one of Burma’s most important weapon suppliers for years, the two regimes appear to be getting even closer. Earlier this year, state media footage showed the junta’s Director of Procurement examining drones in Russia. It has since been rumored that this visit resulted in the purchase of more Orlan-10 and new Orion-2 UAVs.

Iran, too, has played a part in Burma’s drone saga. In January 2022, a 747 from Iran was observed unloading mysterious crates at Naypyidaw International Airport. While the exact contents remain unconfirmed, an army defector claims that the shipment included drone engines or components—possibly to support the maintenance of Burma’s existing UAVs which were showing wear and tear.

Imagery showing people unloading into trucks from an Iranian Fars Air Qeshm 747. The plane’s identity is confirmed by Flightradar24 data. Copyright Google Earth 2022.

These international pursuits highlight the junta’s desperation to acquire drone capabilities while emphasizing their inability to reliably develop these technologies indigenously.

Small Drones, Big Punch

Rebel groups have been operating small drones for years to great effect. These drones are cheaper, more intuitive, and easier to use than larger Chinese and Russian MALE UAVs, which require extensive training and technical know-how to operate and maintain. The junta has had no choice but to respond by bolstering their drone teams and expending precious resources on small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAV). According to Min Zaw Oo, the executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, the Burmese military started to procure thousands of Chinese drones at the beginning of 2024.

A repurposed agricultural drone carrying a drop bomb. Members of the Burmese military (identified by the arm patch) are seen in the background. Source: Reddit

Burmese military training with agricultural drones and smaller FPV drones with munitions attached. Source:Reddit

Disturbing footage released by the Burmese military shows the newly acquired sUAV being used in combat – dropping small munitions onto unsuspecting targets. Notably, however, the bombs raining down on the rebels are being manufactured in the junta’s domestic production system. A report released by the Special Advisory Council last year details the junta’s arms production capability through their “KaPaSa” network. The findings provide information on markings that signify munitions produced by the junta.

Landmines produced by KaPaSa factories. Source: Special Advisory Council Myanmar

One of the key indicators for junta munitions is the visible lot designation in a distinct bold yellow font, discernible on the landmine in the above image. These markings have recently been seen on junta crates labeled as “DROP BOMB”.

An image of junta bombs with the lot designation and KaPaSa font visible on the crates. Source: X

Additionally, these markings are visible on the previous image of the repurposed agricultural drone, verifying their usage with the newly acquired hardware.

Drop bomb crate with lot designation and KaPaSa munition attached to drone.

This use of domestically produced drop bombs is a concerning development as it allows the junta to offset costs and subvert sanctions while continuing to apply pressure on rebel groups.

Lessons for the International Community

Burma’s drone pursuits offer valuable warnings for the international community:

1. Determined actors will seek military capabilities through any available channels. Despite sanctions and export controls, the Burmese regime has acquired a fleet of small, medium, and large drones. This underscores the need for more robust international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technologies. However, actors like China, Russia, and Iran will continue proliferating drones, stunting any such cooperation.

2. Domestic industry can augment foreign equipment. The use of locally produced munitions in conjunction with imported drones suggests dangerous levels of customization and versatility. This highlights the importance of monitoring not just finished products, but also components and manufacturing capabilities.

3. The proliferation of drone technology complicates conflict resolution and supports repression. The junta’s use of drones to monitor protests and attack rebel groups sends a message to the rest of the world about the risks of this technology in the wrong hands. International bodies like the UN, EU, or ASEAN may need to consider new frameworks for regulating the export and use of drone technology.

Looking Ahead

As the junta continues its military modernization efforts, the people of Burma continue to suffer. The ongoing civil conflict has displaced 3.2 million people internally and created 1.3 million refugees. It has also devastated the economy and plunged the country into a humanitarian crisis.

Despite potential shortcomings with the junta’s domestic drone program, they have been able to take advantage of readily obtainable alternatives from foreign suppliers. However, as coordinated rebel military advances continue, the systems that support Burma’s drone fleet are in danger. The junta’s network of “KaPaSa” factories could become prime targets for opposition forces hoping to degrade the regime’s ability sustain its war effort.

Ultimately, the junta’s efforts to achieve drone supremacy indicate its drive for dominance. As the bloody war continues and the country teeters on the brink of transformative change, one can only hope that whatever government emerges from the current upheaval will choose a path of genuine development and reconciliation.

Beau Chapman is a rising junior at the University of Texas at Austin, majoring in Government and pursuing minors in Arabic and Philosophy.

Alexander Suster is a rising senior at the University of Texas at Austin, majoring in International Relations and Global Studies with a focus on Security and the Middle East and minoring in Hebrew and Business.

Steven Ahart is a rising senior at the University of Texas at Austin, majoring in International Relations & Global Studies and European Studies with a focus on International Security and US-German relations through his German language certificate.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Delegation of Myanmar military junta. 10th international exhibition of arms and military machinery (Homoatrox via Wikimedia Commons)

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​24. Teasing Putin says Russia backs Kamala Harris, cites her 'infectious' laugh

Putin's political warfare.

I doubt he really cares who wins. He is only concerned with fomenting chaos and distrust to try to undermine American democracy. The question is will some party apparatchiks fall for this and claim he is trying to put his thumb on the electoral scale.

Teasing Putin says Russia backs Kamala Harris, cites her 'infectious' laugh

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-moscow-supported-its-own-citizens-major-east-west-prisoner-swap-2024-09-05/

By Vladimir Soldatkin

September 5, 20245:57 AM EDTUpdated 3 hours ago

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a plenary session of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia September 5, 2024. Sputnik/Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Summary

• Putin quips that the way Harris laughs is a good signKremlin leader has made series of comments on candidatesUS acts over alleged Russian scheme to influence vote

VLADIVOSTOK, Russia, Sept 5 (Reuters) - Russia wants Kamala Harris to win the U.S. presidential election, President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday in a teasing comment that cited her "infectious" laugh as a reason to prefer her over Donald Trump.

Putin made the ironic remark a day after the U.S. Justice Department charged two Russian media executives over an alleged illegal scheme to influence the November election with pro-Russian propaganda.

Before President Joe Biden withdrew from the race, Putin had said earlier this year - in another comment widely seen as not to be taken at face value - that he preferred Biden over Trump because the former was a more predictable "old school" politician.

U.S. intelligence agencies believe Moscow actually wants Trump to win because he is less committed to supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia.

Asked how he viewed the election now, Putin told an economic forum in Russia's far east that it was the choice of the American people.

But he then added that as Biden had recommended his supporters to back Harris, "we will do the same, we will support her".

Putin and the moderator were both smiling as he made the remark, which drew applause from the audience.

Expanding on his view of Harris, Putin said: "She laughs so expressively and infectiously that it means that everything is fine with her."

He added that maybe this meant she would refrain from further sanctions against Russia. By contrast, Putin said that Trump, as president, had introduced more sanctions against Russia than anyone in the White House before him.

"Ultimately, the choice is up to the American people, and we will respect that choice," the Kremlin leader concluded.

U.S. intelligence has determined that Russia ran a disinformation campaign to boost Trump's campaign against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election and sought to undermine Clinton's.

The Kremlin has repeatedly denied meddling in U.S. elections, though late Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who founded the Wagner mercenary group and was accused by the U.S. of running Russian "troll farms", boasted in 2022: "We have interfered, we are interfering and we will continue to interfere".

On Wednesday, the U.S. Justice Department filed money-laundering charges against two employees of Russian state broadcaster RT for what was described as a scheme to hire a U.S. company to produce online content to influence this year's election.

Moscow will target U.S. media in response, Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Thursday.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin, Olesya Astakhova, Anastasia Lyrchikova, Darya Korsunskaya, Maxim Rodionov, Elena Fabrichnaya; writing by Mark Trevelyan Editing by Andrew Osborn, William Maclean

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com