|
Quotes of the Day:
"History is full of people who, out of fear, or ignorance, or lust for power have destroyed knowledge of immeasurable value, which truly belongs to us all. We must not let that happen again."
– Carl Sagan
"The chief cause of human errors is to be found in the prejudices picked up in childhood."
– Rene Descartes
"Education is conceived more in terms of indoctrination by most school officials than in terms of enlightenment. My own belief is that education must be subversive if it is to be meaningful. By this, I mean that it must challenge all the things we take for granted, examine all accepted assumptions, tamper with every sacred cow, and it's still a desire to question and doubt. Without this the mere instruction to memorize data is empty. The attempt to enforce conventional mediocrity on the young is criminal."
– Bertrand Russell
1. U.S. Arrests Hundreds in Raid at Hyundai Plant Construction Site in Georgia
2. How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart
3. The North Korean Way of Proliferation
4. US Policy Shift Complicates South Korean Semiconductor Operations in China
5. The Dark Side of China-North Korea Cooperation: Forced Labor
6. 'Natural allies': wrong term for China, Russia, Iran, North Korea
7. Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping diverge on korean peninsula issues
8. Kim Jong Un’s prominence at China parade raises security concerns: ROK general
9. South Korea’s Hypersonic Cruise Missile Emerges In New Test Photos
10. How North Korean propaganda spins Russia troop deployments for domestic glory
11. ROK military must do more to stop abuse of North Korean escapee soldiers: Report
12. Long-sought manufacturing gains are boosting North Korea arms buildup
13. Kim Jong-un flaunts Swiss watch; Kim Yo-jong carries Dior bag in Beijing
14. Kim Jong-un returns home with economic aid from China, security backing from Russia
15. Kim-Xi pledge to boost cooperation brings China's denuclearization goal into limbo
16. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold trilateral Freedom Edge exercise this month
17. S. Korea says rights must not be 'unfairly violated' after U.S. raid on Hyundai-LG battery plant site
1. U.S. Arrests Hundreds in Raid at Hyundai Plant Construction Site in Georgia
Sigh... Well this certainly does not help the alliance. Why is ATF involved?
Excerpts:
Around 450 people were arrested, said the Atlanta office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in a social-media post. The post described the people as “unlawful aliens.”
The raid and arrests come after months of tense negotiations between the U.S. and South Korea over tariffs and investment. In late July, the two countries agreed that a 15% tariff rate would be imposed on South Korean imports in exchange for South Korea investing $350 billion in the U.S.
The factory is being built by a joint venture between South Korea-based Hyundai Motor and a South Korean battery manufacturer, LG Energy Solution. It is located in the town of Ellabell, near Savannah, Ga., and is part of a $7.6 billion Hyundai complex that the state has described as the largest manufacturing project in Georgia’s history.
The plant, once completed, is set to supply batteries to Hyundai Motor’s nearby electric-vehicle manufacturing plant, which opened last year. Hyundai has pledged to employ 8,500 people there by 2031 as part of a $2 billion incentive package it received from Georgia.
Among those detained at the factory were South Korean employees of LG Energy Solution on business travel. LG Energy said Friday it was cooperating with the South Korean government and relevant authorities to ensure the employees’ safety and secure their prompt release from detention.
The joint venture said it was cooperating with authorities and paused construction.
U.S. Arrests Hundreds in Raid at Hyundai Plant Construction Site in Georgia
South Korea protests after Korean company workers are detained
https://www.wsj.com/us-news/u-s-arrests-hundreds-in-raid-at-hyundai-plant-construction-site-in-georgia-4e150feb
By Jiyoung Sohn
Follow
Sept. 5, 2025 5:24 am ET
The Hyundai complex in Georgia has been described as the largest manufacturing project in the state’s history. Photo: Elijah Nouvelage/Bloomberg News
Hundreds of people including South Korean workers were arrested in an immigration raid at a Hyundai Motor battery plant under construction in Georgia, weeks after the carmaker pledged $26 billion in U.S. investments.
South Korea protested the action to the U.S. and said it was trying to secure the release of its citizens.
Around 450 people were arrested, said the Atlanta office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in a social-media post. The post described the people as “unlawful aliens.”
The raid and arrests come after months of tense negotiations between the U.S. and South Korea over tariffs and investment. In late July, the two countries agreed that a 15% tariff rate would be imposed on South Korean imports in exchange for South Korea investing $350 billion in the U.S.
The factory is being built by a joint venture between South Korea-based Hyundai Motor and a South Korean battery manufacturer, LG Energy Solution. It is located in the town of Ellabell, near Savannah, Ga., and is part of a $7.6 billion Hyundai complex that the state has described as the largest manufacturing project in Georgia’s history.
The plant, once completed, is set to supply batteries to Hyundai Motor’s nearby electric-vehicle manufacturing plant, which opened last year. Hyundai has pledged to employ 8,500 people there by 2031 as part of a $2 billion incentive package it received from Georgia.
Among those detained at the factory were South Korean employees of LG Energy Solution on business travel. LG Energy said Friday it was cooperating with the South Korean government and relevant authorities to ensure the employees’ safety and secure their prompt release from detention.
The joint venture said it was cooperating with authorities and paused construction.
South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Friday expressed regret at the detention of Korean nationals at the Georgia site and said it had conveyed its concerns to the U.S. Embassy.
“The economic activities of our investing companies and the rights and interests of our citizens must not be unjustly infringed during the process of U.S. law enforcement,” the ministry said.
South Korean companies in strategic industries including semiconductors, shipbuilding and batteries have pledged tens of billions of dollars in new investments in the U.S.
The Hyundai raid could raise concerns for South Korean companies that are sending Korean personnel to the U.S. and hiring locally for their plants, said Hur Jung, an economics professor who studies international trade at Sogang University in Seoul.
If such crackdowns are repeated, it “would damage trust and hurt industrial cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea across various industries, with negative repercussions for local communities as well,” said Hur, who is also president of the Korean Association of Trade and Industry Studies.
In August, Hyundai Motor announced it would increase its U.S. investment to $26 billion through 2028, up $5 billion from its earlier pledge. Around the same time, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung met President Trump for their first summit.
In addition to Hyundai Motor, Samsung Electronics is expanding chip-making facilities in Texas while SK Hynix is planning an advanced chip-packaging plant in Indiana. South Korean battery makers, including LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI and SK On, have invested billions of dollars in building and operating U.S.-based factories across the Midwest.
South Korea is a key partner in the Trump administration’s push to “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again,” and recently promised to spend $150 billion to help the U.S. revive its ship manufacturing, which has fallen far behind China.
Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com
2. How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart
The Public Affairs Officers' phones are going to be ringing off the hook for some days to come.
If this is even true I am reminded of LTG Sam WIlsons' 20 Characteristics of Special Operations. If this did happen it is quite amazing that it was not revealed before today.
11. Special Operations Forces have a limited number of DIRECT roles:
Special Operations Forces are trained for specific missions. They are the most highly trained and proficient forces that the US possess but they are not the answer for every small contingency mission that comes along. Many conventional forces are more proficient at conventional type missions than the SOF. Even more specialized units exist and they should not be used outside their primary mission. Just because a select force is in being, does not automatically mean that it is the BEST to use. Politics will play in this decision, the HIGH RISK/HIGH GAIN nature of the specific operation may cause the political leaders to make this choice, even if better alternatives are available, i.e., such as have SEAL TEAM SIX do a routine beach recon.
Excerpts:
Several of those people said they were discussing details about the mission because they were concerned that Special Operations failures are often hidden by government secrecy. If the public and policymakers become aware only of high-profile successes, such as the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, they may underestimate the extreme risks that American forces undertake.
The military operation on North Korean soil, close to American military bases in South Korea and the Pacific region, also risked setting off a broader conflict with a hostile, nuclear-armed and highly militarized adversary.
The New York Times proceeds cautiously when reporting on classified military operations. The Times has withheld some sensitive information on the North Korea mission that could affect future Special Operations and intelligence-gathering missions.
It is unclear how much North Korea was able to discover about the mission. But the SEAL operation is one chapter in a decades-long effort by U.S. administrations to engage North Korea and constrain its nuclear weapons programs. Almost nothing the United States has tried — neither promises of closer relations nor the pressure of sanctions — has worked.
How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart
The 2019 operation, greenlit by President Trump, sought a strategic edge. It left unarmed North Koreans dead.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/05/us/navy-seal-north-korea-trump-2019.html?unlocked_article_code=1.jk8.fqaH.fYjiDeNXUfnD&smid=url-share
Listen to this article · 19:16 min Learn more
By Dave Philipps and Matthew Cole
Dave Philipps is a national correspondent for The New York Times, and Matthew Cole is a freelance journalist. Both have covered the military for more than 15 years.
A group of Navy SEALs emerged from the ink-black ocean on a winter night in early 2019 and crept to a rocky shore in North Korea. They were on a top secret mission so complex and consequential that everything had to go exactly right.
The objective was to plant an electronic device that would let the United States intercept the communications of North Korea’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-un, amid high-level nuclear talks with President Trump.
The mission had the potential to provide the United States with a stream of valuable intelligence. But it meant putting American commandos on North Korean soil — a move that, if detected, not only could sink negotiations but also could lead to a hostage crisis or an escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed foe.
It was so risky that it required the president’s direct approval.
For the operation, the military chose SEAL Team 6’s Red Squadron — the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden. The SEALs rehearsed for months, aware that every move needed to be perfect. But when they reached what they thought was a deserted shore that night, wearing black wet suits and night-vision goggles, the mission swiftly unraveled.
A North Korean boat appeared out of the dark. Flashlights from the bow swept over the water. Fearing that they had been spotted, the SEALs opened fire. Within seconds, everyone on the North Korean boat was dead.
The SEALs retreated into the sea without planting the listening device.
The 2019 operation has never been publicly acknowledged, or even hinted at, by the United States or North Korea. The details remain classified and are being reported here for the first time. The Trump administration did not notify key members of Congress who oversee intelligence operations, before or after the mission. The lack of notification may have violated the law.
The White House declined to comment.
This account is based on interviews with two dozen people, including civilian government officials, members of the first Trump administration and current and former military personnel with knowledge of the mission. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the mission’s classified status.
Several of those people said they were discussing details about the mission because they were concerned that Special Operations failures are often hidden by government secrecy. If the public and policymakers become aware only of high-profile successes, such as the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, they may underestimate the extreme risks that American forces undertake.
The military operation on North Korean soil, close to American military bases in South Korea and the Pacific region, also risked setting off a broader conflict with a hostile, nuclear-armed and highly militarized adversary.
The New York Times proceeds cautiously when reporting on classified military operations. The Times has withheld some sensitive information on the North Korea mission that could affect future Special Operations and intelligence-gathering missions.
It is unclear how much North Korea was able to discover about the mission. But the SEAL operation is one chapter in a decades-long effort by U.S. administrations to engage North Korea and constrain its nuclear weapons programs. Almost nothing the United States has tried — neither promises of closer relations nor the pressure of sanctions — has worked.
In 2019, Mr. Trump was making a personalized overture to Mr. Kim, in search of a breakthrough that had eluded prior presidents. But those talks collapsed, and North Korea’s nuclear program accelerated. The U.S. government estimates that North Korea now has roughly 50 nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach the West Coast. Mr. Kim has pledged to keep expanding his nuclear program “exponentially” to deter what he calls U.S. provocations.
Blind Spots
The SEAL mission was intended to fix a strategic blind spot. For years, U.S. intelligence agencies had found it nearly impossible to recruit human sources and tap communications in North Korea’s insular authoritarian state.
Gaining insight into Mr. Kim’s thinking became a high priority when Mr. Trump first took office. The North Korean leader seemed increasingly unpredictable and dangerous, and his relationship with Mr. Trump had lurched erratically between letters of friendship and public threats of nuclear war.
In 2018, relations seemed to be moving toward peace. North Korea suspended nuclear and missile tests, and the two countries opened negotiations, but the United States still had little insight into Mr. Kim’s intentions.
Amid the uncertainty, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed to the White House that they had a fix for the intelligence problem: a newly developed electronic device that could intercept Mr. Kim’s communications.
The catch was that someone had to sneak in and plant it.
Image
Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim met at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
The job was given to SEAL Team 6 in 2018, military officials said.
Even for Team 6, the mission would be extraordinarily difficult. SEALs who were more used to quick raids in places like Afghanistan and Iraq would have to survive for hours in frigid seas, slip past security forces on land, perform a precise technical installation and then get out undetected.
Getting out undetected was vital. In Mr. Trump’s first term, top leaders in the Pentagon believed that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke catastrophic retaliation from an adversary with roughly 8,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers aimed at the approximately 28,000 American troops in South Korea, and nuclear-capable missiles that could reach the United States.
But the SEALs believed they could pull off the mission because they had done something like it before.
In 2005, SEALs used a mini-sub to go ashore in North Korea and leave unnoticed, according to people familiar with the mission. The 2005 operation, carried out during the presidency of George W. Bush, has never before been reported publicly.
The SEALs were proposing to do it again. In the fall of 2018, while high-level talks with North Korea were underway, Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees Team 6, received approval from Mr. Trump to start preparing, military officials said. It is unclear whether Mr. Trump’s intent was to gain an immediate advantage during negotiations or if the focus was broader.
Joint Special Operations Command declined to comment.
The plan called for the Navy to sneak a nuclear-powered submarine, nearly two football fields long, into the waters off North Korea and then deploy a small team of SEALs in two mini-subs, each about the size of a killer whale, that would motor silently to the shore.
The mini-subs were wet subs, which meant the SEALs would ride immersed in 40-degree ocean water for about two hours to reach the shore, using scuba gear and heated suits to survive.
Image
A U.S. Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine takes part in exercises near Okinawa, Japan, in 2021. A similar submarine transported a Navy SEAL team to waters off North Korea in 2019. Credit...U.S. Marine Corps, via Department of Defense
Near the beach, the mini-subs would release a group of about eight SEALs who would swim to the target, install the device and then slip back into the sea.
But the team faced a serious limitation: It would be going in almost blind.
Typically, Special Operations forces have drones overhead during a mission, streaming high-definition video of the target, which SEALs on the ground and senior leaders in far-off command centers can use to direct the strike in real time. Often, they can even listen in on enemy communications.
But in North Korea, any drone would be spotted. The mission would have to rely on satellites in orbit and high-altitude spy planes in international airspace miles away that could provide only relatively low-definition still images, officials said.
Those images would arrive not in real time, but after a delay of several minutes at best. Even then, they could not be relayed to the mini-subs because a single encrypted transmission might give the mission away. Everything had to be done under a near blackout of communications.
If anything awaited the SEALs on shore, they might not know until it was too late.
The Operation Unravels
SEAL Team 6 practiced for months in U.S. waters and continued preparations into the first weeks of 2019. That February, Mr. Trump announced that he would meet Mr. Kim for a nuclear summit in Vietnam at the end of the month.
For the mission, SEAL Team 6 partnered with the Navy’s premier underwater team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1, which had been doing mini-sub espionage for years. The SEALs boarded the nuclear-powered submarine and headed for North Korea. When the submarine was in the open ocean, and about to enter a communications blackout, Mr. Trump gave the final go-ahead.
It is unclear what factors Mr. Trump weighed when approving the SEAL mission. Two of his top national security officials at that time — his national security adviser, John Bolton, and the acting defense secretary, Patrick M. Shanahan — declined to comment for this article.
The submarine neared the North Korean coast and launched two mini-subs, which motored to a spot about 100 yards from shore, in clear shallow water.
Mission planners had tried to compensate for having no live overhead video by spending months watching how people came and went in the area. They studied fishing patterns and chose a time when boat traffic would be scant. The intelligence suggested that if SEALs arrived silently in the right location in the dead of night in winter, they would be unlikely to encounter anyone.
Image
The coast of North Korea, pictured in 2018, is frequented by small fishing boats.Credit...Ed Jones/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
The night was still and the sea was calm. As the mini-subs glided toward the target, their sensors suggested that the intelligence was correct. The shore appeared to be empty.
The mini-subs reached the spot where they were supposed to park on the sea floor. There, the team made what may have been the first of three small mistakes that seemed inconsequential at the time but may have doomed the mission.
In the darkness, the first mini-sub settled on the sea floor as planned, but the second overshot the mark and had to do a U-turn, officials said.
The plan called for the mini-subs to park facing the same way, but after the second sub doubled back, they were pointing in opposite directions. Time was limited, so the group decided to release the shore team and correct the parking issue later.
Sliding doors on the subs opened, and the SEALs — all gripping untraceable weapons loaded with untraceable ammunition — swam silently underwater to shore with the listening device.
Every few yards, the SEALs peeked above the black water to scan their surroundings. Everything seemed clear.
That might have been a second mistake. Bobbing in the darkness was a small boat. On board was a crew of North Koreans who were easy to miss because the sensors in the SEALs’ night-vision goggles were designed in part to detect heat, and the wet suits the Koreans wore were chilled by the cold seawater.
The SEALs reached shore thinking they were alone, and started to remove their diving gear. The target was only a few hundred yards away.
Back at the mini-subs, the pilots repositioned the sub that was facing the wrong way. With the sliding cockpit doors open for visibility and communication, a pilot revved the electric motor and brought the sub around.
That was probably a third mistake. Some SEALs speculated afterward in briefings that the motor’s wake might have caught the attention of the North Korean boat. And if the boat crew heard a splash and turned to look, they might have seen light from the subs’ open cockpits glowing in the dark water.
The boat started moving toward the mini-subs. The North Koreans were shining flashlights and talking as if they had noticed something.
Some of the mini-sub pilots told officials in debriefings afterward that from their vantage point, looking up through the clear water, the boat still seemed to be a safe distance away and they had doubted that the mini-subs had been spotted. But the SEALs at the shore saw it differently. In the dark, featureless sea, the boat to them seemed to be practically on top of the mini-subs.
Image
A Navy mini-sub, known as a SEAL Delivery Vehicle, during a training exercise in 2007. Similar vehicles were used in the 2019 mission.Credit...U.S. Navy, via Department of Defense
With communications blacked out, there was no way for the shore team to confer with the mini-subs. Lights from the boat swept over the water. The SEALs didn’t know if they were seeing a security patrol on the hunt for them or a simple fishing crew oblivious to the high-stakes mission unfolding around them.
A man from the North Korean boat splashed into the sea.
If the shore team got into trouble, the nuclear-powered sub had a group of SEAL reinforcements standing by with inflatable speedboats. Farther offshore, stealth rotary aircraft were positioned on U.S. Navy ships with even more Special Operations troops, ready to sweep in if needed.
The SEALs faced a critical decision, but there was no way to discuss the next move. The mission commander was miles away on the big submarine. With no drones and a communications blackout, many of the technological advantages that the SEALs normally relied on had been stripped away, leaving a handful of men in wet neoprene, unsure of what to do.
As the shore team watched the North Korean in the water, the senior enlisted SEAL at the shore chose a course of action. He wordlessly centered his rifle and fired. The other SEALs instinctively did the same.
Compromise and Escape
If the SEALs were unsure whether the mission had been compromised before they fired, they had no doubt afterward. The plan required the SEALs to abort immediately if they encountered anyone. North Korean security forces could be coming. There was no time to plant the device.
The shore team swam to the boat to make sure that all of the North Koreans were dead. They found no guns or uniforms. Evidence suggested that the crew, which people briefed on the mission said numbered two or three people, had been civilians diving for shellfish. All were dead, including the man in the water.
Officials familiar with the mission said the SEALs pulled the bodies into the water to hide them from the North Korean authorities. One added that the SEALs punctured the boat crew’s lungs with knives to make sure their bodies would sink.
The SEALs swam back to the mini-subs and sent a distress signal. Believing the SEALs were in imminent danger of capture, the big nuclear submarine maneuvered into shallow water close to the shore, taking a significant risk to pick them up. It then sped toward the open ocean.
All the U.S. military personnel escaped unharmed.
Immediately afterward, U.S. spy satellites detected a surge of North Korean military activity in the area, U.S. officials said. North Korea did not make any public statements about the deaths, and U.S. officials said it was unclear whether the North Koreans ever pieced together what had happened and who was responsible.
The nuclear summit in Vietnam went ahead as planned at the end of February 2019, but the talks quickly ended with no deal.
By May, North Korea had resumed missile tests.
Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim met once more that June in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. It made for dramatic television, with Mr. Trump even stepping across into North Korea. But the brief meeting yielded little more than a handshake.
In the months that followed, North Korea fired more missiles than in any previous year, including some capable of reaching the United States. Since then, the United States estimates, North Korea has amassed 50 nuclear warheads and material to produce about 40 more.
Uneven Track Record
The aborted SEAL mission prompted a series of military reviews during Mr. Trump’s first term. They found that the killing of civilians was justified under the rules of engagement, and that the mission was undone by a collision of unfortunate occurrences that could not have been foreseen or avoided. The findings were classified.
The Trump administration never told leaders of key committees in Congress that oversee military and intelligence activities about the operation or the findings, government officials said. In doing so, the Trump administration may have violated federal law, said Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia University who served in national security positions under former President George W. Bush.
Mr. Waxman said the law has gray areas that give presidents some leeway on what they tell Congress. But on more consequential missions, the burden leans more toward notification.
“The point is to ensure that Congress isn’t kept in the dark when major stuff is going on,” Mr. Waxman said. “This is exactly the kind of thing that would normally be briefed to the committees and something the committees would expect to be told about.”
Many of the people involved in the mission were later promoted.
But the episode worried some experienced military officials with knowledge of the mission, because the SEALs have an uneven track record that for decades has largely been concealed by secrecy.
Elite Special Operations units are regularly assigned some of the most difficult and dangerous tasks. Over the years, the SEALs have had a number of major successes, including hits on terrorist leaders, high-profile rescues of hostages and the takedown of bin Laden, that have built an almost superhuman public image.
But among some in the military who have worked with them, the SEALs have a reputation for devising overly bold and complex missions that go badly. Team 6’s debut mission, which was part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, is a case in point.
The plan was to parachute into the sea, race to the coast in speedboats and plant beacons to guide assault forces to the island’s airport. But the SEALs’ plane took off late; they jumped at night and landed in stormy conditions, weighed down by heavy gear. Four SEALs drowned, and the rest swamped their speedboats.
The airfield was later seized by Army Rangers who parachuted directly onto the airfield.
Image
U.S. troops monitoring the Point Salines airfield after the invasion of Grenada in 1983. SEAL Team 6’s debut mission, directed at the island’s main airport, went badly awry.Credit...Associated Press
Since then, SEALs have mounted other complex and daring missions that unraveled, in Panama, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. During a rescue mission in Afghanistan in 2010, Team 6 SEALs accidentally killed a hostage they were trying to rescue with a grenade and then misled superiors about how she had died.
In part because of this track record, President Barack Obama curtailed Special Operations missions late in his second term and increased oversight, reserving complex commando raids for extraordinary situations like hostage rescues.
The first Trump administration reversed many of those restrictions and cut the amount of high-level deliberation for sensitive missions. A few days after taking office in 2017, Mr. Trump skipped over much of the established deliberative process to greenlight a Team 6 raid on a village in Yemen. That mission left 30 villagers and a SEAL dead and destroyed a $75 million stealth aircraft.
When President Joseph R. Biden Jr. succeeded Mr. Trump, the gravity of the North Korea mission attracted renewed scrutiny. Mr. Biden’s defense secretary, Lloyd J. Austin III, ordered an independent investigation, conducted by the lieutenant general in charge of the Army inspector general’s office.
In 2021, the Biden administration briefed key members of Congress on the findings, a former government official said.
Those findings remain classified.
Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous and Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.
Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon.
See more on: U.S. Politics, Kim Jong-un , Donald Trump, Navy Seals, United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Department of Defense
3. The North Korean Way of Proliferation
Wishful thinking?
Note the comment about Kim Jong Il and the US system.
U.S. policymakers can still discourage would-be proliferators from pursuing a bomb. Important pillars of American nonproliferation policy have stood the test of time through even the most challenging days of the Cold War and after. Remaining committed to, and enhancing, the United States’ extended deterrence architecture can reassure U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia so they do not seek the security blanket of their own nuclear bomb—and invite dangerous attacks on themselves by trying. U.S. officials should emphasize and clarify the costs of pursuing a nuclear weapon to any would-be proliferator, including by cutting off military aid, ceasing nuclear-related trade, levying sanctions and threatening military action. And most important, senior leaders should acknowledge and respect the impressive record of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime: that only nine states possess nuclear weapons, not the 25 that U.S. President John F. Kennedy once predicted, is not the result of blind luck. It is the product of decades of presidential-level attention during the Cold War, when nuclear policy was a matter of grand strategy and not an area of specialization, and strong and consistent nonproliferation diplomacy was prioritized in the U.S. foreign policy machine.
But a United States threatening to upend 80 years of largely successful nonproliferation policy practice and experience is creating incentives for allies and adversaries alike to look for their own nuclear insurance policies. The 12-day war will do nothing to disabuse them of that notion. For future would-be proliferators, relying on the United States to deliver on the promise of a deal like the one it signed with Iran in 2015 looks like a bad bet. Kim Jong Il eventually concluded that the risks of dealing with the United States, and the chaotic U.S. system, was not worth the benefit. His son doubled down on this view. Iranian officials may have assumed that Trump would pursue diplomacy more aggressively during his second term, as his administration’s approach to Iran in the spring of 2025 seemed to indicate. But that hope ended abruptly in June, with the destruction of the core facilities that had brought Iran closer than ever to the weapons threshold.
Even after this severe setback, Iran’s technical advances and knowledge base, and the substantial amounts of nuclear material it had previously amassed, probably remain. Tehran may yet find itself with an opportunity for a do-over, and if it does, it may well take the North Korean approach and not stop until it gets to a bomb. In doing so, it may find its own path to an insurance policy for a new, chaotic nuclear age. Paradoxically Washington’s military action against Iran’s nuclear program may have hastened, hardened, and hidden the march of would-be proliferators toward the bomb.
The North Korean Way of Proliferation
Foreign Affairs · More by Vipin Narang · September 5, 2025
What Aspiring Nuclear Powers Learned From Israel’s Strikes on Iran
September 5, 2025
An Iranian missile system in an undisclosed location in Iran, August 2025 Iranian Army / West Asia News Agency / Reuters
VIPIN NARANG is Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and Director of the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. From 2022 to 2024, he served as U.S. Principal Deputy and then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
PRANAY VADDI is a Senior Nuclear Fellow at the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. From 2022 to 2025, he served as Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation at the National Security Council.
Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.
Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.
Save Sign in and save to read later
In the months since Israel and the United States’ 12-day war with Iran in June, analysts and intelligence agencies have widely debated the extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear program and regime. It is still unclear how much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has survived and how quickly, if at all, it can be reconstituted. On a strategic level, however, the effect of the war is indisputable: it marks the eclipse of a nuclear strategy that the Islamic Republic had pursued, often successfully, since the 1980s.
For decades, Iran was the quintessential nuclear hedger. It sought the know-how and technology to weaponize its nuclear program but stopped short of doing so for political reasons. This threshold strategy was successful, at least for a time. Although both Israel and the United States tried to continually delay the nuclear program through sabotage and targeted assassinations, neither country overtly struck Iran’s nuclear facilities. Then, in 2015, with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it seemed as if the regime’s gamble had paid off: Iran received much-needed sanctions relief in exchange for accepting restrictions on its program. The threat created by Iran’s hedging, combined with the second Obama administration’s desire to find a comprehensive diplomatic solution, resulted in successful negotiation of the landmark deal that pushed Iran’s program much further away from a bomb.
But since the 12-day war, that strategy lies in tatters. U.S. and Israeli airstrikes caused substantial damage to key facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan and crippled Iran’s military leadership structure. Iran underestimated Washington’s willingness to support Israeli military action and join the campaign itself. Today, Iran finds itself vulnerable to existential territorial attack and regime change efforts, with a bomb likely far out of reach and its negotiating position with the West weaker than ever before.
The failure of Iran as a threshold nuclear power vindicates the strategy of another U.S. adversary: North Korea. In contrast to Tehran, Pyongyang largely avoided delays in weaponizing its program; it made steady progress toward a bomb, using periodic engagement to test U.S. resolve over possible agreements, routinely relied on feints and stalling tactics, and weathered tremendous diplomatic and economic pressure along the way. When diplomacy broke down, North Korea rapidly advanced its program so its Kim regime was prepared to approach any future engagement from a position of greater strength. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempts to regroup in Iran, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with one of the world’s most rapidly expanding and diversifying arsenals and strategic partners in Beijing and Moscow, looms as an example of what could have been. For would-be proliferator states, the lessons are dangerously clear: do not wait to get the bomb, assume major powers will attack, and do not trust that diplomacy is within reach. In other words, be like Kim, not like Khamenei.
MISSED THE MOMENT
As early as the 1970s, Tehran possessed the necessary ambition and expertise to expand its nuclear energy program for potential military purposes. The program had begun two decades earlier under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi and Iran joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Islamic Republic began covert exploration of more sensitive technologies, such as uranium enrichment, and continued to gain expertise with the assistance of third countries. Beginning in 1989 the regime formulated the so-called AMAD plan, which established a roadmap for the theoretical and engineering work required to weaponize once the country had enriched enough uranium for a bomb.
But Iran did not cross the weaponization threshold. It stopped short for political, rather than technical, reasons: after Iran’s secret nuclear activities were exposed at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Iranian leaders iced the AMAD plan, preferring to trade away its pursuit of a bomb in exchange for economic and diplomatic relief. They continued to conclude that crossing the threshold as a member of the NPT, despite heightened U.S. military presence and freedom to act in the Middle East, was not in Iran’s security and strategic interests. Nonetheless, Iran retained—at enormous expense—the technical expertise, bureaucratic organs, and industrial infrastructure needed to advance civilian nuclear research, medical isotope production, and electricity generation and repurpose it for military use if it were to ever choose to do so. The regime wagered that this threshold program would serve three geopolitical purposes: it would give Iran the ability to quickly develop a bomb if an existential threat appeared imminent; it would deter a military attack from Israel or the United States by keeping both countries uncertain about how close Tehran was to building a bomb; and it would provide leverage with its antagonists in the West by using limits on the program as a bargaining chip for relief from punishing economic sanctions.
For the nearly two decades since pausing the AMAD plan, Iran voluntarily stopped short of crossing the weapons line. Even as Iran’s nuclear scientists envisioned an initial arsenal of five weapons, Tehran’s political leaders were ambivalent about whether the aim of the country’s program was to achieve a nuclear weapons arsenal or to trade away large chunks of it for economic and political concessions. They were, however, largely convinced that walking just up to the weaponization threshold would safeguard the nation from existential attack. After years of brinkmanship with the George W. Bush and first Obama administrations, they seemed to be proved right with the conclusion of the JCPOA, which allowed Tehran to trade away parts of the program to bolster Iran’s reputation and economy.
But the JCPOA did not mandate that future U.S. administrations adhere to the agreement and under the first Trump administration, the United States withdrew, in 2018. After this perceived betrayal, Iran began stockpiling large quantities of enriched uranium, including at levels of purity much closer to that required for a nuclear bomb. These actions created negotiating leverage for a future deal but also a potential insurance policy against the unpredictable first Trump administration and Israel, which made little secret of its desire to attack Iran. The targeted killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020 likely calcified these concerns in the minds of Iran’s leaders.
After inconclusive indirect talks during the Biden administration and Israel’s increasingly offensive regional military actions in the wake of Hamas’s brazen October 7 attacks, Iran, according to some estimates, crept to within days of being able to enrich enough uranium for a bomb. Finally, with President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, the potential for a U.S.-backed Israeli attack on Iran suddenly became a reality and the flaws of the threshold strategy were laid bare. In June, Tehran paid the price for wavering, and the United States, for the first time in the nuclear era, struck the nuclear facilities of another state. Had Iran crossed the nuclear Rubicon back in 2003, the United States might well have avoided such a direct confrontation, which would have invited all the risks of attacking a nuclear-armed adversary.
NORTH STAR
Here’s where the contrasting case of North Korea becomes instructive. In the 1960s, Pyongyang, facing a conventionally superior U.S. ally South Korea on its border under a condition of armistice, not peace, initiated a program focused on nuclear energy. But throughout the Cold War, it sought support to develop a nuclear weapon from the Soviet Union and China. North Korea sparked a crisis in the early 1990s by refusing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address its incomplete declarations regarding its nuclear program, leading to international suspicion that it was conducting illicit weapons-related activities. The United States seriously contemplated striking North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor in 1993, even drawing up military plans to attack the site with penetrating munitions delivered by stealth bombers. But the Clinton administration aborted the idea out of fear that an attack could result in retaliation against South Korea and a broader war, and instead sought a diplomatic solution. The result was the 1994 Agreed Framework, which required that North Korea freeze the construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being used in weapons production and placed the country’s existing plutonium production capabilities under the IAEA inspection regime. In return, the United States and other partners agreed to provide nuclear reactors less capable of use for nuclear weapons work and to supply fuel to address the energy needs cited by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung as the rationale for building nuclear reactors.
But Pyongyang approached the Agreed Framework (and every subsequent nuclear diplomatic initiative) disingenuously, often as a stalling tactic, while successive members of the Kim dynasty prioritized the nuclear weapons program and devoted as many resources as possible to pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Unlike Iran,North Korea showed little interest in trading meaningful chunks of its program for sanctions reliefbefore obtaining a nuclear weapon once the Agreed Framework fell apart in 2003. When foreign intelligence or international monitors would reveal an undeclared activity during the course of nuclear diplomacy, North Korea would ratchet up pressure by testing missiles or provoking Seoul. When the United States and its allies threatened reprisal or attack, as in the Yongbyon episode, or after the United States placed bombers on alert in response to North Korea’s restarting facilities shuttered under the Agreed Framework, its breaching of NPT obligations, and its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003, Kim Il Sung and, later, Kim Jong Il pivoted toward diplomacy, deceitfully promising to halt weapons-related activities and engage in good-faith diplomacy. All the while, North Korea continually advanced its nuclear infrastructure, weapons designs, and missile programs, often accelerating work between high-profile moments of engagement with the United States.
Today, Kim Jong Un is sitting on one of the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenals, with a variety of options for striking South Korea and Japan, including possible tactical nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles to target the United States.With this arsenal, the North Korean leader is more confident in his ability to deter a U.S. or South Korean attack or attempt at regime change. Iran’s situation could not be more different. With his military and nuclear program at least temporarily shattered and his regime fragile, Khamenei has paid the price for failing to secure nuclear insurance. Iran’s hardliners may feel that failing to weaponize and pursuing diplomacy with great powers made Iran vulnerable to the kind of attacks North Korea’s decisive proliferation strategy has helped it avoid.
GOING DARK
As the experience of Iran has shown, a threshold proliferation strategy not only appears to be insufficient to deter counterproliferators; it may instead increase their willingness to preemptively attack the program as they remain in the dark about the actual state of weaponization. Maintaining the technical basis to be able to quickly develop nuclear weapons—what nuclear strategists call latency—does not deter nearly as effectively as actually having nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, a state with a latent nuclear program presents a ripe target for adversaries and counterproliferators seeking to prevent weaponization who may be tempted to act swiftly before the window to do so closes and the state can plausibly threaten nuclear retaliation.
Israel saw such a window in June and took full advantage, executing a strike Netanyahu and the Israeli right had dreamed of for years. For aspiring nuclear powers, the lesson was clear: advertising and brandishing a nuclear program against far stronger military powers, without yet having a nuclear bomb to deter a preventive attack, is a risky game. Would-be proliferators will be unlikely to repeat this mistake. In addition to not postponing weaponization as long as Iran did, potential proliferators such as Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates will likely prioritize higher operational security and will attempt to hide their programs from counterproliferators more effectively than Iran did. Future proliferators will likely seek to weaponize as rapidly as they can and will do so covertly.
Unlike Iran’s program, which could not remain covert over the long hedging period and the on-and-off diplomatic process during which Tehran was forced to be more transparent about its activities, these potential programs may be revealed not in their pre-weaponization stages as a point of diplomatic leverage, but only after a nuclear weapon is announced—or tested. Future proliferators may thus be willing to sacrifice speed for security by driving their program fully underground, repurposing what they can from their civilian nuclear industry and technology. Such an approach may be easier for tightly closed regimes than for democracies. Nevertheless, it is possible even for open democracies to have small, effective covert weapons programs—India, allegedly Israel, and South Africa all undertook covert weaponization efforts. Proliferators, including democracies, may be willing to accept the eventual international opprobrium that comes with violating or withdrawing from nonproliferation accords in the name of national security.
Take the case of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, as Iran paused the AMAD plan, Syria rushed to build, and nearly completed, a covert nuclear weapons program. But in 2007, Israeli intelligence serendipitously stumbled on evidence of a Syrian nuclear reactor—a miniature replica of North Korea’s Yongbyon facility—that was housed in a nondescript, aboveground complex in the hinterland near the Euphrates River. With the reactor potentially just weeks away from being fueled (after which it would have been environmentally hazardous to attack), Israel leveled it with airstrikes. Still, the episode provided a stark lesson in covert programs. Despite being high on the West’s nuclear proliferation watchlist, Syria was nonetheless able to maintain impressive operational security for an aboveground nuclear reactor. Only a determined intelligence effort—and a lot of good luck—uncovered the nuclear weapons program. Even if they forswear a North Korean rush to the bomb, future nuclear proliferators are more likely to look to the covert Syrian model than to the more transparent Iranian one.
FINAL OFFER
In addition to spelling the end of the threshold nuclear strategy, the 12-day war will likely have another important consequence. It will make diplomacy with future aspiring nuclear weapons states exceptionally difficult. In the case of Iran, hardliners may now have greater power within the regime and more influence with the supreme leader. They can also convincingly portray the United States and Israel, which struck as Tehran was engaged in talks with Washington, as incapable of and unwilling to find a diplomatic path forward. Indeed, Washington and Tehran now face what the scholar James Fearon has characterized as a “commitment problem.” Both parties may prefer a diplomatic outcome but have strong incentives to avoid negotiations, especially since each side has little trust in the other and assumes it will renege on any future deal. In the United States, fierce polarization will continue to stand in the way of a suitable, bipartisan replacement for the JCPOA.
The supreme leader did not emerge from the war trusting the United States or the P5+1—the group of permanent UN Security Council countries party to the 2015 deal. Instead, he may now believe that the only insurance policy that Iran’s adversaries will honor is a nuclear weapon. He will also likely want to pursue any future negotiations from a position of strength. As France, Germany, and the United Kingdom pursue the reimposition of “snapback” UN sanctions in response to Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear commitments, the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, is considering legislation to recommend withdrawal from the NPT, echoing the crucial step taken by North Korea in its path to a bomb two decades ago.
U.S. policymakers can still discourage would-be proliferators from pursuing a bomb. Important pillars of American nonproliferation policy have stood the test of time through even the most challenging days of the Cold War and after. Remaining committed to, and enhancing, the United States’ extended deterrence architecture can reassure U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia so they do not seek the security blanket of their own nuclear bomb—and invite dangerous attacks on themselves by trying. U.S. officials should emphasize and clarify the costs of pursuing a nuclear weapon to any would-be proliferator, including by cutting off military aid, ceasing nuclear-related trade, levying sanctions and threatening military action. And most important, senior leaders should acknowledge and respect the impressive record of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime: that only nine states possess nuclear weapons, not the 25 that U.S. President John F. Kennedy once predicted, is not the result of blind luck. It is the product of decades of presidential-level attention during the Cold War, when nuclear policy was a matter of grand strategy and not an area of specialization, and strong and consistent nonproliferation diplomacy was prioritized in the U.S. foreign policy machine.
But a United States threatening to upend 80 years of largely successful nonproliferation policy practice and experience is creating incentives for allies and adversaries alike to look for their own nuclear insurance policies. The 12-day war will do nothing to disabuse them of that notion. For future would-be proliferators, relying on the United States to deliver on the promise of a deal like the one it signed with Iran in 2015 looks like a bad bet. Kim Jong Il eventually concluded that the risks of dealing with the United States, and the chaotic U.S. system, was not worth the benefit. His son doubled down on this view. Iranian officials may have assumed that Trump would pursue diplomacy more aggressively during his second term, as his administration’s approach to Iran in the spring of 2025 seemed to indicate. But that hope ended abruptly in June, with the destruction of the core facilities that had brought Iran closer than ever to the weapons threshold.
Even after this severe setback, Iran’s technical advances and knowledge base, and the substantial amounts of nuclear material it had previously amassed, probably remain. Tehran may yet find itself with an opportunity for a do-over, and if it does, it may well take the North Korean approach and not stop until it gets to a bomb. In doing so, it may find its own path to an insurance policy for a new, chaotic nuclear age. Paradoxically Washington’s military action against Iran’s nuclear program may have hastened, hardened, and hidden the march of would-be proliferators toward the bomb.
Foreign Affairs · More by Vipin Narang · September 5, 2025
4. US Policy Shift Complicates South Korean Semiconductor Operations in China
Excerpts:
This move by the Trump administration is also an interesting contrast to what it did with Nvidia and AMD. Part of the reason that the Trump administration decided to allow the sale of the H20 and MI308 chips in China was to keep Chinese firms dependent on U.S. AI chips and slow the transition to Chinese competitors. In the case of memory, the United States seems to be taking the opposite approach and easing the rise of Chinese competitors by ending the ability of Samsung and SK Hynix to upgrade their Chinese facilities.
While Samsung and SK Hynix still lead their Chinese competitors in market share, over time an inability to upgrade equipment at their Chinese fabs will force them to continue to cede market share as these facilities become less competitive. To an extent, China’s subsidization of domestic firms in the semiconductor industry and drive to have Chinese firms use domestic semiconductors would have produced the same result. But if the Trump administration excludes planned upgrades to South Korean fabs in China from licenses, it will hasten this process.
In the short term, Samsung and SK Hynix will likely look to move some production back to South Korea. SK Hynix has extra capacity at its M16 facility in Incheon and will be bringing online the new M15X facility in Cheongju later this year. Samsung is also considering restarting construction on its P5 facility in Pyeongtaek. Moving some production back to South Korea will address the issue of producing more advanced chips, but not the larger competitive issues Samsung and SK Hynix face from YMTC and CXMT.
Even if the Trump administration does not seek to monetize export control licenses for Samsung and SK Hynix’s operations in China as it has for the sale of Nvidia and AMD AI chips, Washington could use the new export controls as leverage for more investments in production in the United States. With the Trump administration also threatening tariffs on semiconductors and suggesting it might try to take a equity stake in semiconductor firms that received CHIPS Act funds, the shift in export licenses is one more complication for Samsung and SK Hynix’s operations from shifts in U.S. policy.
US Policy Shift Complicates South Korean Semiconductor Operations in China
The revocation of VEU status for Samsung and SK Hynix threatens the long-term viability of their facilities in China.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/us-policy-shift-complicates-south-korean-semiconductor-operations-in-china/
By Troy Stangarone
September 03, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
In a significant setback for Samsung and SK Hynix, the Trump administration has revoked Validated End-User (VEU) status – a designation that streamlined their ability to continue using U.S. technology in China. Instead, the U.S. government will now require Samsung and SK Hynix to seek individual licenses for the use of U.S. equipment at their facilities in China. The shift not only threatens the long-term viability of their Chinese facilities but also signals a continuing shift in the U.S. approach to allies and technology.
Samsung and SK Hynix initially received VEU status during the Biden administration after it implemented export controls. The export controls announced on October 7, 2022, were designed to slow China’s development of its own semiconductor industry, as well as ensure that the United States maintained a lead in the development of artificial intelligence (AI).
The October 7 export controls, however, also impacted Samsung and SK Hynix’s facilities in China due to the restrictions on both the export of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment and the ability of U.S. firms to service existing equipment. KLA, one of the semiconductor equipment manufacturers used by SK Hynix, for example, quickly halted sales and service for advanced fabs in China. As the Biden administration’s intent was not to hobble Korean facilities in China, it quickly provided a one-year waiver that was followed with the VEU status.
In ending the VEU statuses the Trump administration indicated that it is taking this step to close “export control loopholes – particularly those that put U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage.” However, with the completion of the sale of Intel’s facilities in China to SK Hynix earlier this year, no U.S. semiconductor firm still maintains a fab in China. Any efforts by a U.S. firm to set up a new fab in China would likely be opposed by the Trump administration.
The Bureau of Industry and Security, which manages U.S. export controls, indicated that it planned to “grant export license applications to allow former VEU participants to operate their existing fabs in China. However, BIS does not intend to grant licenses to expand capacity or upgrade technology at fabs in China.”
Both SK Hynix and Samsung already faced strict restrictions on the expansion of their Chinese facilities for a decade due to the CHIPS Act guardrails. The more significant consequence from losing the VEU status is the inability to upgrade facilities in China to fend off increasing competition from Chinese competitors.
In the NAND (flash memory) segment, China’s homegrown Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (YMTC) increased its share of global production to 8 percent and has plans to expand that share to 15 percent by 2026. It is also further along than other Chinese semiconductor firms in integrating Chinese equipment into production and plans to test a plant fully utilizing Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment next year. If successful, YMTC would be able to continue its expansion without access to U.S., Japanese, or European semiconductor equipment.
The competition with China’s ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) in the DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) segment is perhaps more intense. CXMT is rapidly gaining market share by focusing on commoditized RAM and is projected to reach production levels similar to Micron within the next year. This would place it only behind Samsung and SK Hynix in this part of the memory segment.
Samsung, which produces between 35-40 percent of its NAND in China, is in the process of upgrading its plant from 128-layer NAND to 286-layer NAND to better compete with YMTC, which recently began producing 294-layer NAND. SK Hynix which produces 40 percent of its DRAM in China and 20 percent of its NAND at the plant it acquired from Intel, was planning on updating its DRAM facility. It’s unclear whether any of these upgrades will be allowed to be finalized.
The switch to annual licensing could create other complications. The Trump administration is taking a 15 percent share of revenue from Nvidia’s and AMD’s sales of their H20 and MI308 AI chips in China to issue licenses. Samsung and SK Hynix cannot preclude the possibility that this move is an initial step to seeking a share of revenue in return for the issuance of licenses needed to continue or upgrade their operations in China.
This move by the Trump administration is also an interesting contrast to what it did with Nvidia and AMD. Part of the reason that the Trump administration decided to allow the sale of the H20 and MI308 chips in China was to keep Chinese firms dependent on U.S. AI chips and slow the transition to Chinese competitors. In the case of memory, the United States seems to be taking the opposite approach and easing the rise of Chinese competitors by ending the ability of Samsung and SK Hynix to upgrade their Chinese facilities.
While Samsung and SK Hynix still lead their Chinese competitors in market share, over time an inability to upgrade equipment at their Chinese fabs will force them to continue to cede market share as these facilities become less competitive. To an extent, China’s subsidization of domestic firms in the semiconductor industry and drive to have Chinese firms use domestic semiconductors would have produced the same result. But if the Trump administration excludes planned upgrades to South Korean fabs in China from licenses, it will hasten this process.
In the short term, Samsung and SK Hynix will likely look to move some production back to South Korea. SK Hynix has extra capacity at its M16 facility in Incheon and will be bringing online the new M15X facility in Cheongju later this year. Samsung is also considering restarting construction on its P5 facility in Pyeongtaek. Moving some production back to South Korea will address the issue of producing more advanced chips, but not the larger competitive issues Samsung and SK Hynix face from YMTC and CXMT.
Even if the Trump administration does not seek to monetize export control licenses for Samsung and SK Hynix’s operations in China as it has for the sale of Nvidia and AMD AI chips, Washington could use the new export controls as leverage for more investments in production in the United States. With the Trump administration also threatening tariffs on semiconductors and suggesting it might try to take a equity stake in semiconductor firms that received CHIPS Act funds, the shift in export licenses is one more complication for Samsung and SK Hynix’s operations from shifts in U.S. policy.
Authors
Contributing Author
Troy Stangarone
Troy Stangarone is the former director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center.
5. The Dark Side of China-North Korea Cooperation: Forced Labor
How can we make the world understand just how evil the Kim Family regime is and the complicity of the PRC in north Korean human rights abuses and crimes against humanity?
Excerpts:
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, North Korea was required to repatriate all overseas workers by December 2019. Yet thousands of workers remain in northeastern China and Russia, and the foreign currency they generate continues to fund the North Korean regime’s operations.
Despite being a signatory to ILO conventions and a permanent U.N. Security Council member, the Chinese government tolerates human rights violations within its borders. Companies importing these seafood products also bear responsibility for participating in human rights violations by continuing transactions without carefully examining forced labor in their supply chains.
The North Korean worker issue easily remains in surveillance “blind spots” for three reasons. First, North Korea’s thorough control structure blocks external information flows. Second, Chinese authorities remain passive about human rights investigations, citing “non-interference in internal affairs.” Third, differing international positions on sanctions implementation prevent consistent coordination.
This makes the current moment crucial. As China-North Korea relations enter a new phase, the international community must prepare creative responses to establish worker protection mechanisms and understand the actual situation. Specifically, we need to institutionalize systems for securing field testimonies, supply chain tracking investigations, and labor rights education and safe reporting mechanisms through collaboration between civil society organizations, media, academia, and international organizations.
Simultaneously, we need “evidence-based response strategies” that secure and analyze materials like contracts between North Korean authorities and Chinese companies, import-export documents, and fraudulent labeling.
The moment when Xi and Kim shook hands again represents both a diplomatic event and a turning point for resolving transnational oppression. If we continue to turn a blind eye, North Korean workers in China will be pushed further into silent existence, unreachable by the rest of the world.
North Korean authorities have already formulated plans to counter resistance by increasing surveillance personnel and proactively preventing whistleblowing. In response, it is essential that our actions become more systematic and coordinated. This situation extends beyond a human rights concern; it also pertains to issues of justice in Northeast Asia and the obligations of the international community.
The Dark Side of China-North Korea Cooperation: Forced Labor
The Kim-Xi bonhomie shouldn’t overshadow the suffering of North Korea’s “state-dispatched workers” to China.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-dark-side-of-china-north-korea-cooperation-forced-labor/
By Lee Sang-yong
September 04, 2025
Chinese leader Xi Jinping (left) greets North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on his arrival at the military parade held in Beijing, China, Sep. 3, 2025.
Credit: KCNA
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is visiting China for the first time in five years. After appearing right beside Chinese President Xi Jinping for a viewing of the military parade in Beijing on September 3, Kim and Xi held a bilateral summit the next day.
This marked the resumption of high-level China-North Korea diplomacy after a lull following the failed Hanoi summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019. Five years later, strategic cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang is back in earnest.
However, behind this diplomatic thaw lies a group that has long been overlooked: North Korean workers laboring in silence on Chinese soil.
According to a recent report by Daily NK AND Center, titled “Forced Labor Report on North Korean Workers in Chinese Fisheries,” North Korean workers endure 12-14 hour workdays in Chinese seafood processing plants while “donating” 80-90 percent of their wages to the state. The remaining 10-20 percent never reaches the workers directly – instead, managers distribute only a portion as living expenses. Some officials testified that “most of the profits are transferred to North Korean Ministry of Fisheries accounts.”
The contract and wage payment structures offer limited transparency, and workers have restricted autonomy regarding refusing work, negotiating wages, selecting working hours, or their ability to move and communicate. Their lives are restricted to the factory and the dormitory. This meets virtually all the key conditions for forced labor as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO).
Even more shocking is that just before deployment, female workers suffer sexual humiliation from officials in exchange for obtaining “life assessment certificates.” This underscores that worker deployment is not “voluntary contracting” but structural exploitation accompanied by sexual and economic predation. According to the report, some women face additional layers of violence within Chinese factories, including sexual threats, harassment, and forced abortions.
The gravity of this issue lies not in isolated human rights violations, but in the exploitation mechanism systematically designed by the North Korean regime. During COVID-19 lockdowns, North Korean authorities even imposed foreign currency quotas on overseas female workers, effectively condoning or encouraging prostitution. This transcends simple labor exploitation to become structural human rights crimes that fundamentally violate human dignity. The fact that similar forms of control continue across various industrial sites today makes this an urgent matter requiring international intervention.
North Korean workers’ suffering is embedded in the exported seafood that flows worldwide. Between 2021-2023 alone, approximately 4,360 tons of seafood were distributed through 36 Korean companies. These products, processed into pollack, salmon, clams and other items, reached Korean consumers’ tables through major retailers and fish markets labeled as “Made in China.”
Western countries like the United States, Canada, and Spain are not exempt. Seafood produced with North Korean labor has entered global supply chains disguised as Chinese products, with many companies and consumers unknowingly purchasing goods based on forced labor. This represents not mere ignorance, but a fundamental failure of human rights due diligence.
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, North Korea was required to repatriate all overseas workers by December 2019. Yet thousands of workers remain in northeastern China and Russia, and the foreign currency they generate continues to fund the North Korean regime’s operations.
Despite being a signatory to ILO conventions and a permanent U.N. Security Council member, the Chinese government tolerates human rights violations within its borders. Companies importing these seafood products also bear responsibility for participating in human rights violations by continuing transactions without carefully examining forced labor in their supply chains.
The North Korean worker issue easily remains in surveillance “blind spots” for three reasons. First, North Korea’s thorough control structure blocks external information flows. Second, Chinese authorities remain passive about human rights investigations, citing “non-interference in internal affairs.” Third, differing international positions on sanctions implementation prevent consistent coordination.
This makes the current moment crucial. As China-North Korea relations enter a new phase, the international community must prepare creative responses to establish worker protection mechanisms and understand the actual situation. Specifically, we need to institutionalize systems for securing field testimonies, supply chain tracking investigations, and labor rights education and safe reporting mechanisms through collaboration between civil society organizations, media, academia, and international organizations.
Simultaneously, we need “evidence-based response strategies” that secure and analyze materials like contracts between North Korean authorities and Chinese companies, import-export documents, and fraudulent labeling.
The moment when Xi and Kim shook hands again represents both a diplomatic event and a turning point for resolving transnational oppression. If we continue to turn a blind eye, North Korean workers in China will be pushed further into silent existence, unreachable by the rest of the world.
North Korean authorities have already formulated plans to counter resistance by increasing surveillance personnel and proactively preventing whistleblowing. In response, it is essential that our actions become more systematic and coordinated. This situation extends beyond a human rights concern; it also pertains to issues of justice in Northeast Asia and the obligations of the international community.
Authors
Guest Author
Lee Sang-yong
Lee Sang-yong is the director of Daily NK AND Center
6. 'Natural allies': wrong term for China, Russia, Iran, North Korea
It is because the CRInK is not an alliance but a grouping of authoritarian rulers based on fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
But the author and I do not agree. Her idealism and hopefulness is still intact. I see evil as (I think) it exists.
Excerpts:
Terming countries “natural allies” acts as a band-aid of convenience that covers up the possibility of interrogating the nuances and deep scars of such partnerships. The term also burdens Japan and Korea with more of the responsibility for fixing their relationship – rather than encouraging mutual partners, starting with the US, to mediate and help the pair navigate their relationship.
This label can hinder international progress by closing up opportunities to cooperate with unconventional allies. Alienating and grouping countries together, terming them the “Axis of Upheaval” and laying sanctions only strengthens external and internal perceptions that these countries are a bloc although evidence suggests otherwise. Thus, this grouping enables an oppositional framework for these countries to operate in instead of creating opportunities for engagement.
This misalignment in perceptions can, in turn, prompt other illiberal countries to side with the “Axis of Upheaval” in a fight against a liberal democratic order.
Lastly, this isolating term treats China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as lost causes, when the US could, instead, find ways to exercise its soft power to drive wedges into adversarial partnerships.
'Natural allies': wrong term for China, Russia, Iran, North Korea - Asia Times
Their tie-up, like that of South Korea and Japan, is more superficial than natural, and the term oversimplifies
asiatimes.com · Lina Chang · September 4, 2025
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.
Support of Russia’s war efforts through military technology supply by China, Iran and North Korea has understandably exacerbated Western fears of an emerging bloc. Cooperation among what experts label as “natural allies” to form a united front against the US-led international order has earned them the title “Axis of Upheaval.” And now China, Russia, Iran and North Korea even have an acronym: CRINK.
Russia has signed agreements dedicated to increased defense cooperation with Iran and North Korea and has continuously reaffirmed its “no-limits” partnership with China, notably through increased joint military and logistical developments in the Arctic. Beyond defense, the four countries are crucial to each other’s economies and work together in money-laundering schemes and cyberattacks.
Politicians and pundits have more often used the vague term “natural allies” to bolster a potential South Korean-Japan alliance. On the surface, this label makes sense: The two neighboring countries value human rights, rule of law, democracy and free and open trade.
However, both of these alliances are more superficial than natural, and liberally using the term “natural allies” is an oversimplification of the complexities of cooperation.
The Tokyo-Seoul case
Underneath South Korea and Japan’s celebration of 60 years of diplomatic normalization lies long-standing resentment regarding historical disputes. Promises of “future-oriented cooperation” between “inseparable” partners seem less credible, remembering
-
Japanese prime ministers’ continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors class-A war criminals from the imperial period when Japan colonized the Korean Peninsula, and
-
South Korea’s fickle attitude toward Japan, as shown by incidents ranging from striking down the supposedly irreversible 2015 comfort women agreement to President Lee Jae Myung’s backtracking from his previous anti-Japan posture.
Such historical issues have previously dampened economic relations, and what’s been done to resolve tensions only shows that the pair’s growing closeness is not a product of nature but a conscious choice of pragmatic diplomacy over reactionary impulse.
Seeds of distrust in CRINK
Past contentions have also sown seeds of distrust in CRINK. Iran’s suspicion of Russia stems from its painful historical memory of the Russian Empire’s capturing Persian territories in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Soviet invasion of Iran in World War II.
This legacy continues as the two engage in an espionage war, with Iran allegedly stealing military-technological information and spreading religious propaganda in Russian communities and Russia taking measures to suppress such efforts.
Like Iran, China is a victim of territorial losses at the hands of Russia, and the resulting historical resentment dating back to the Qing Dynasty fuels young, well-educated Chinese citizens’ cautious attitude toward Russia.
These deep insecurities are double-sided, with a recent leaked Russian memo labeling China as an enemy and raising flags about Chinese spies and reclamation of Vladivostok and other former Qing territories. Such worries are not unfounded, as the Chinese government has in fact launched a hacking campaign since the beginning of the war in Ukraine for Russian military secrets despite the two pledging not to hack each other.
North Korea has a history of switching alignment between Russia and China, depending on strategic need. Its relationship with China, in particular, is hot and cold, with Kim Jong Un once having described China’s attempt to reform the North Korean economy as a “filthy wind of bourgeois liberty.”
In recent history, Russia and China have both supported sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear programs, showing the limits to friendship when North Korea proves to be a strategic liability.
Diverging strategic interests
Beyond history, both of these so-called natural alliances have diverging strategic interests that hinder smooth cooperation. Japan and South Korea, for one, have different threat perceptions of China – Japan has had a more antagonistic approach since the 2010s due to the escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, while South Korea has fluctuating alignment with China based on Beijing’s approach to North Korea.
South Korea’s dependence on both China and the US for economic and security purposes and its bandwagoning tendencies between its two rival partners has created a recipe for disaster. The THAAD incident, in which South Korea’s deployment of a US missile defense system prompted economic retaliation from China, highlights South Korea’s vulnerable position in balancing its alliances with the US and China.
The fact that South Korea’s alliance with Japan has strengthened despite such varying interests is less natural and more proof of hard diplomatic work of maintaining multilateral partnerships and preventing the emergence of adversarial coalitions.
Strategic interests also often clash between Russia and the other members of CRINK. Russia competes with Iran for oil markets, maintains ties with Iran’s enemies Israel and Saudi Arabia and aims to contain Iran’s growing influence in the South Caucasus.
Contrary to popular belief, it is in China’s best interest for Russia not to come out as the winner of the Ukraine war, as Russia would become an immediate threat to China and prevent China from building influence in Europe. In fact, China is already preparing for a post-war Ukraine, signaling its interest in Ukrainian reconstruction efforts and signing agricultural cooperation agreements.
Russia and China also differ on North Korean nuclear capability, with China finding North Korea’s nuclear program a threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula while Russia aims to leverage North Korea’s nuclear program to distract the US.
Bandaid of convenience
Terming countries “natural allies” acts as a band-aid of convenience that covers up the possibility of interrogating the nuances and deep scars of such partnerships. The term also burdens Japan and Korea with more of the responsibility for fixing their relationship – rather than encouraging mutual partners, starting with the US, to mediate and help the pair navigate their relationship.
This label can hinder international progress by closing up opportunities to cooperate with unconventional allies. Alienating and grouping countries together, terming them the “Axis of Upheaval” and laying sanctions only strengthens external and internal perceptions that these countries are a bloc although evidence suggests otherwise. Thus, this grouping enables an oppositional framework for these countries to operate in instead of creating opportunities for engagement.
This misalignment in perceptions can, in turn, prompt other illiberal countries to side with the “Axis of Upheaval” in a fight against a liberal democratic order.
Lastly, this isolating term treats China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as lost causes, when the US could, instead, find ways to exercise its soft power to drive wedges into adversarial partnerships.
Lina Chang (lina@pacforum.org) is a Young Leaders program intern at Pacific Forum who studies public policy analysis and media at Pomona College. Her research interests include the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral, nonproliferation and Northeast Asia security dynamics.
asiatimes.com · Lina Chang · September 4, 2025
7. Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping diverge on korean peninsula issues
Some interesting analysis for consideration.
KJU has to listen to the Stones: "You can't always get what you want."
Can our infromation campaign exploit the differnces?
Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping diverge on korean peninsula issues
Analysts highlight disagreements on denuclearization, 'hostile two states' stance amid omitted joint statements
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/05/BOSNONLTYBGKTE2KUHKZ7WUHYA/
By Kim Min-seo
Published 2025.09.05. 13:23
Updated 2025.09.05. 17:24
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed their willingness to restore traditional friendly relations between the two countries through their first summit in six years, but analysis suggests they failed to reach a consensus on issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including denuclearization and North Korea’s stance on the “hostile two states.” Rodong Sinmun, on the 5th, did not mention Kim Jong-un’s gratitude for China’s long-standing aid to North Korea or his hope to expand economic cooperation between the two countries.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, visiting China to attend the 80th anniversary Victory Day military parade, is shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a bilateral meeting on the afternoon of the 4th. /The Korean Central News Agency-Yonhap
Rodong Sinmun reported the results of the summit between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping, held at the Great Hall of the People on the 4th, stating that the leaders “exchanged frank opinions on strengthening high-level exchanges and strategic communication” and “mutually informed each other about the independent policy positions maintained by the two countries’ parties and governments in foreign relations.” The phrase “mutually informed” implies that each side shared its stance with the other, differing from reaching an agreement. While Xinhua News Agency reported that Kim Jong-un “highly evaluated China’s fair stance on the Korean Peninsula issue,” Rodong Sinmun did not include this statement. The newspaper mentioned only that “the two sides discussed strengthening strategic cooperation and protecting common interests on international and regional issues” without referencing the Korean Peninsula.
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “There appears to have been a disagreement between the two leaders on their positions regarding the Korean Peninsula, preventing them from reaching a unified view.” He added, “North Korea has requested China’s support for its push to define inter-Korean relations as a ‘state-to-state’ relationship, including constitutional amendments, under its ‘hostile two states’ stance. However, it is possible that China took a reserved or opposing position.” Hong further noted, “As a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, China likely feared that a ‘state-to-state’ relationship between the two Koreas would render the agreement ineffective and lead to a loss of influence over the Korean Peninsula.”
Unlike the previous four summits between the two leaders, the recent joint statements omitted any mention of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. During Kim Jong-un’s first visit to China in March 2018—a three-day, four-night trip—he stated in his first summit with Xi Jinping that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would be realized according to the bequest” and that “the issue of denuclearization would be resolved through phased measures.” He also exchanged opinions with China on denuclearization. Subsequent summits in May and June 2018, and January 2019, also included discussions on denuclearization and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
China has traditionally maintained three principles regarding the Korean Peninsula: denuclearization, peace and stability, and resolving issues through dialogue and negotiation. However, this time, China only mentioned “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” without referencing denuclearization. Hong Min stated, “It is difficult to rule out the possibility that China has tentatively shifted its stance to support the legitimacy of North Korea’s nuclear possession.” He explained that while China’s principle of denuclearization aimed to deter not only North Korea but also South Korea’s nuclear armament, recent discussions between South Korea and the U.S. on the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and modernization of the alliance might have led China to indirectly support North Korea’s nuclear possession as a means to pressure the U.S. and South Korea. Yang Mu-jin, a chair professor at the North Korea University Graduate School, commented on the omission of denuclearization from China’s three principles, saying, “It gives the impression that China is suspending its stance on North Korea’s denuclearization,” adding, “China seems concerned that recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status could lead to the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, visiting China to attend the 80th anniversary Victory Day military parade, is holding a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the afternoon of the 4th. /The Korean Central News Agency-Yonhap
Rodong Sinmun did not report Kim Jong-un’s expressions of gratitude for China’s long-standing aid to North Korea or his hope to expand economic cooperation. Xinhua reported that Kim “expressed gratitude for China’s steadfast support and valuable aid to North Korea’s socialist cause over the years,” but Rodong Sinmun omitted this. Additionally, Kim’s remarks about “sharing experiences in party building and economic development to promote the development of North Korea’s party and state-building projects” and “deepening mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation to achieve more fruitful results” were also absent from Rodong Sinmun. The newspaper also did not cover Kim’s statement that “North Korea firmly supports China’s position on issues related to its core interests, such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet.”
During the previous four summits between 2018 and 2019, North Korea publicly disclosed that Kim Jong-un invited Xi Jinping to visit Pyongyang during the first and fourth summits. This time, no such invitation was mentioned, but analysts suggest a high possibility of Xi Jinping visiting North Korea next month for the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a major political event. Yang Gab-yong, a senior research fellow at the National Security Strategy Institute, said, “Given the atmosphere of this summit, I think Xi Jinping will visit North Korea next month.” He added, “Although the exact date of China’s Fourth Plenary Session has not been announced yet, considering the anticipated U.S.-China summit at the APEC leaders’ meeting in Gyeongju, a sudden visit by Xi Jinping to North Korea seems highly likely.”
※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
8. Kim Jong Un’s prominence at China parade raises security concerns: ROK general
General Jin, along with General Brunson as the SUSMOAK, is a permanent member of the MIlitary Committee which oversees the ROK//US Combined Forces COmmand so we need to pay attention to his statements and views. This article has more tuna the headline. It mentions OPCON transition and the north-South Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).
Kim Jong Un’s prominence at China parade raises security concerns: ROK general
Nominee to lead South Korean military stresses need to monitor cooperation between North Korea, China and Russia
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/kim-jong-uns-prominence-at-china-parade-raises-security-concerns-rok-general/
Joon Ha Park September 5, 2025
(From left) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stand side-by-side on the Tiananmen Square rostrum on Sept. 3, 2025. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 4, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s prominent position at China’s military parade points to a regional power shift that could affect Seoul’s security, the nominee to lead South Korean armed forces said Thursday.
ROK air force General Jin Yong-sung added that the transfer of wartime operational control from Washington should happen only when both countries are fully prepared, while emphasizing the need to maintain readiness as the Lee administration pushes to restore a military pact with Pyongyang.
Jin, whom President Lee Jae-myung has nominated for the post of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, made the comments to reporters as he arrived at the Army Club in Yongsan to prepare for his parliamentary confirmation hearing on Thursday.
“The fact that Kim Jong Un stood beside the leaders of China and Russia carries serious implications for South Korea and our military,” Jin said.
The air force general contrasted the North Korean leader’s position on the Tiananmen Square rostrum this week with that of his grandfather Kim Il Sung, who appeared in 1959 beside Mao Zedong in what he called a “marginal” role.
“The difference today is that Kim Jong Un was placed at the center, showing how much North Korea’s standing has advanced over the past 66 years,” he said, assessing that Pyongyang has deepened cooperation with Russia by sending troops and now appears to be drawing closer to Beijing as well.
Jin’s remarks came a day after Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted North Korean leader Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing for the 80th anniversary of China’s Victory over Japan Day. The three leaders stood shoulder to shoulder at the event in a tightly choreographed display that highlighted their strategic alignment against the U.S. and the West.
The nominee for JCS chief also raised concern over China’s display of advanced strategic systems at the parade, singling out the newly unveiled DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile as a weapon “capable of threatening the Korean Peninsula.” The system is reported to reach hypersonic speeds and carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), allowing a single launch to strike several targets at once.
“We also need to watch closely for possible collaboration between North Korea, China and Russia, including technology transfers,” he said.
ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman nominee Gen. Jin Yong-sung answers questions from reporters at the Army Club in Seoul on Sept. 4, 2025 | Image: Defense Media Agency (Korea Forces Network) via YouTube
OPCON TRANSFER AND INTER-KOREAN MILITARY PACT
Asked about the Lee administration’s interest in carrying out OPCON transfer by the end of the president’s five-year term, Jin said a handover is “indeed necessary” but should only take place when both sides are “fully prepared and the required conditions are met.”
OPCON refers to the authority to command combined South Korean and U.S. forces during wartime, a responsibility Seoul handed to U.S. military leadership during the Korean War in 1950. In 2014, the allies agreed to three conditions for a transfer, involving Seoul’s ability to lead combined operations, readiness to counter North Korean threats and a stable security environment.
Under that agreement, South Korea passed the initial operational capability stage in 2019 and conducted full operational capability testing in 2022. The final full mission capability certification remains pending.
“Both South Korea and the United States are making efforts to meet the necessary conditions for the transition,” Jin added.
On Lee’s plan to gradually reinstate parts of the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), Jin said easing tensions and building trust with Pyongyang remain important goals.
“When the president referred to the Sept. 19 agreement, it seemed to reflect his strong desire to improve the quality of life for our citizens,” Jin told reporters. “He appears to believe that easing tensions along the border and fostering trust will allow people to carry on their daily lives and economic activities with greater security.”
The air force general added that while such measures are important, the military must also ensure there are no gaps in South Korea’s defense readiness.
The two Koreas signed the CMA in Sept. 2018 in a bid to reduce tensions by restricting military activity near the border, but both Pyongyang and the previous Yoon Suk-yeol administration scrapped the agreement in recent years.
Jin was promoted to four-star general on Tuesday along with other service chiefs but must still be approved by parliament following a confirmation hearing before the National Assembly. Lawmakers have not yet set a date for the session.
He previously led the ROK Strategic Command as its inaugural commander, which formally oversees South Korea’s “three-axis system” but in practice concentrates on the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) component. If confirmed, Jin would be the first air force officer to assume the country’s top military post since 2020.
Edited by Bryan Betts
9. South Korea’s Hypersonic Cruise Missile Emerges In New Test Photos
If anyone is going to criticize this as a peninsula arms race, we should keep in mind this is in response to north Korea's hostile policy and decades of north korea development of advanced missiles and nuclear weapons. If there is an arms race, it is a result of the Kim family regime's strategy and actions. South Korea has every right to defend itself and develop advanced capabilities to do so. Unilateral disarmament of restraint will not defend South Korea.
South Korea’s Hypersonic Cruise Missile Emerges In New Test Photos
Seoul’s Hycore hypersonic cruise missile is being eyed for launch from warships, submarines, and aircraft, as well as from the ground.
twz.com · Thomas Newdick
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
South Korea has presented, for the first time, imagery of its Hycore hypersonic cruise missile, showing the actual weapon during its flight testing. The Hycore is part of a fast-growing arsenal of advanced weapons that Seoul is developing, primarily to counter North Korea. As well as the hypersonic cruise missile, South Korea is notably also working on an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and sea-based ballistic missiles, including for submarine launch.
Until now, the Hycore missile had only been seen in public in the form of scale models and renderings. The new imagery includes the weapon being fired from a ground-based vertical launch platform, as well as the in-flight separation of the missile from the first of its two booster sections.
Test launch of a Hycore missile from a ground platform. via @mason_8718
Separation of the first-stage booster from a Hycore missile. via @mason_8718
There is also a new image showing a wind-tunnel test, which reveals more details of the missile’s appearance.
via @mason_8718
Based on earlier reports, South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and defense company Hanwha began research on the Hycore project in 2018.
In 2021, a model of the hypersonic cruise missile was publicly unveiled, confirming that it had a two-stage rocket booster. At this point, it was reported that the Hycore was slated to start flight testing (from ground launch) in 2022, with service entry projected for some time in the mid-2020s.
An earlier model of the Hycore missile. via @mason_8718
A DAPA spokesperson told Janes in 2022: “The Agency for Defense Development is currently researching core technologies to study the high-temperature characteristics that occur during hypersonic flight and the aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle at high speed.”
The same source published estimated specifications for the Hycore missile, including a length of 28.5 feet (8.7 meters), a weight of 5,290 pounds (2,400 kilograms), and a maximum speed of Mach 6.2. The weapon’s range remains unclear.
The Hycore has a relatively typical layout for a scramjet-powered hypersonic weapon. This involves using a booster motor to accelerate the missile to near-hypersonic speed in order for the scramjet to work properly, before falling away. The South Korean missile differs from others in its class by using a two-stage solid-fuel rocket to bring it up to the required speed, rather than a single one.
Once at high supersonic speed, ensuring the required airflow into the scramjet engine, while also keeping drag to a minimum, is a complex task. The South Korean designers have adopted the same kind of design as seen on Boeing’s experimental X-51A Waverider. This is engineered to ensure the missile ‘skips’ on top of the shockwaves produced during high-speed flight to produce additional lift. This kind of concept is in contrast to a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, which is unpowered, but which also sits atop a rocket booster to get to the desired altitude and speed before being released.
Boeing’s X-51A Waverider. U.S. Air Force
Unconfirmed reports from South Korea claim the Hycore has already achieved a speed of Mach 6 in tests last year.
It’s understood that South Korea aims to field the Hycore in land-based and naval applications and, reportedly, also for air launch.
A version of the missile launched from a surface combatant would likely be schemed for compatibility with the Korean Vertical Launch System II (KVLS-II), as installed on the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) 12,000-ton KDX-III Batch 2 destroyers.
The KVLS-II test configuration on a KDX-III Batch 2 destroyer appears to have four cells, seen on the left, next to the earlier KVLS launcher. via X
While initially expected to accommodate long-range surface-to-air missiles, the 24 KVLS-II cells on each of the KDX-III Batch 2 vessels are also planned to add ballistic missiles, and Hycore would appear to be another option. The KVLS-II cells are intended to accommodate bigger missiles. According to available data, the KVLS-II is at least 3 feet (0.9m) wide and 30 feet (9.1m) deep, providing considerable internal volume.
There are also suggestions that the Hycore could find itself arming ROKN submarines, in particular, the boats developed under the Korean Attack Submarine program. In the third phase of this program, KSS-III, the 3,000-ton displacement subs each have provision for six vertical launch system (VLS) cells that will be able to accommodate ballistic or cruise missiles. Subsequent vessels in the class are expected to increase the capacity to 10 VLS cells.
The KSS-III submarine ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho during trials. Defense Acquisition Program Administration
For air-launch, the Hycore is apparently being pitched as armament for Seoul’s KF-21 fighter. Earlier this year, TWZ reported on plans to develop a new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) for the aircraft, which would see South Korea join a group of nations that are looking to introduce this capability, or which already have weapons of this kind in operational service.
While ALBMs are sometimes described as hypersonic missiles, this is somewhat misleading, since most ballistic missiles arrive at their target with a hypersonic or near-hypersonic terminal velocity. A ‘true’ hypersonic missile like Hycore would be a significant addition to the KF-21’s weapons options. In theory, using the KF-21 as the Hycore launch platform would ease the process of integration, since this can be done locally, without the involvement of a foreign original equipment manufacturer. On the other hand, even with a different booster section, the Hycore will be a very large weapon, and it’s questionable if the KF-21 can carry it under its wing.
First flight of the KF-21. YouTube screencap YouTube Screencap
Alternatively, South Korea also operates the F-15K Slam Eagle, which has a prodigious load-carrying capability and would better lend itself to being armed with outsize weapons like hypersonic cruise missiles.
A South Korean F-15K carries a Taurus cruise missile under the wing. Photo by South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images A South Korean F-15K fighter jet flying with a Taurus missile during an exercise on September 12, 2017, in Taean-gun, South Korea. Photo by South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images
Overall, regardless of its method of launch, a hypersonic cruise missile would offer South Korea considerable advantages when it comes to conducting short-notice standoff strikes, especially against highly defended and time-sensitive targets.
There have been reports that the Hycore will have an anti-ship capability, especially relevant now that North Korea is actively working on surface combatants with their own powerful cruise missile capabilities. However, the ability to strike moving targets of any kind is much more complicated to achieve, requiring a seeker for terminal guidance. The missile would also benefit from being paired with and tied into a deeply networked ‘kill web’ for targeting updates.
More broadly, South Korea’s hypersonic cruise missile plans should be seen in the context of increased tensions with North Korea in recent years, as well as that country’s own missile developments, which also include hypersonic missiles.
The North Korean Hwasongpho-16B hypersonic missile, which uses a boost-glide vehicle concept. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, wearing a black leather jacket, is seen to the right. KCNA
As long as North Korea continues to develop its nuclear capabilities as well as reinforce its air defenses, something it’s apparently now doing with Russian assistance, South Korea’s need for harder-hitting weapons will be seen as increasingly critical.
More broadly, South Korea’s wider missile development plan calls for weapons “with significantly enhanced destructive power” as part of its response to North Korea’s growing missile capabilities. Once again, a hypersonic cruise missile would fit the bill.
As well as North Korea, China is a growing concern for South Korea, a fact reflected in Seoul increasingly looking to security challenges beyond the peninsula. China is meanwhile busily pursuing hypersonic weapons development, and South Korea may well see the Hycore as a useful counter to those diverse and expanding capabilities.
Experience has shown that hypersonic cruise missiles are a notoriously tricky category of weapon to master, but with more traditional cruise missiles, dedicated bunker-busting weapons, and a variety of ballistic missiles also fielded or in development, Hycore is likely seen as a risk worth taking.
Thanks to @mason_8718 for bringing details of this development to our attention.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
Staff Writer
Thomas is a defense writer and editor with over 20 years of experience covering military aerospace topics and conflicts. He’s written a number of books, edited many more, and has contributed to many of the world’s leading aviation publications. Before joining The War Zone in 2020, he was the editor of AirForces Monthly.
10. How North Korean propaganda spins Russia troop deployments for domestic glory
The regime's Propaganda and Agitation Department is the mast of ... well... er... propaganda and agitation.
The regime is a learning organization.
Despite that we should still be looking for ways to exploit the growing schism among the the regime, the elite, and the people over the sacrifice of these soldiers to fight in Putin's War.
How North Korean propaganda spins Russia troop deployments for domestic glory
DPRK has learned from Soviet mistakes in Afghanistan to preempt public anger at sending soldiers to die fighting Ukraine
https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/how-north-korean-propaganda-spins-russia-troop-deployments-for-domestic-glory/
Tatiana Gabroussenko September 5, 2025
North Korean and Russian soldiers in a state TV documentary about the deployment to the Ukraine war | Image: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025)
North Korea’s deployment of troops to the battlefields of the Ukraine war has brought major political and material benefits for Pyongyang, enabling its soldiers to gain valuable combat experience while further boosting ties with Russia.
But inside the DPRK, Kim Jong Un’s orthodox move has also posed a political problem: how to justify the dispatch of soldiers to fight and die on foreign soil.
After months of silence on the issue, North Korean propagandists have gone into overdrive in recent weeks to construct a narrative around the troop deployment and the deaths of hundreds in Russia’s Kursk region, celebrating their sacrifices for the state and showing the leader comforting their bereaved families.
What’s remarkable is how acutely the DPRK seems to have learned the lessons of the Soviet Union’s troubled war in Afghanistan: State media has avoided detailed explanation of the circumstances of the Ukraine conflict and refrained from rationalizing support for an ally’s war effort.
Instead, North Korea has focused on presenting troop sacrifices as expressions of loyalty to the leader, transforming overseas battlefields into the place where its soldiers have won domestic glory.
State media footage of Kim Jong Un’s reported deployment order | Image: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025)
HOME-FOCUSED VISION
Military philosophy in North Korea is based on the idea that the main goal of the Korean People’s Army is to repel attacks on DPRK territory. In official culture, North Korean soldiers are always portrayed as defending the motherland from two designated enemies, Japan and the U.S.
On top of this, the DPRK long presented Russians and Ukrainians as allies that were part of an inseparable entity, the Soviet people. Ukrainians were the protagonists of many North Korean cultural texts, including the famous short story “Hat” (모자, 1946) by Han Sorya in which a Ukrainian soldier helped liberate Korea in 1945.
The new political situation and DPRK troop deployment to the Ukraine war was thus shockingly unusual: North Koreans were expected to fight Ukrainians far from home, in a war that looked to them like family strife and had no visible relation to their own country’s affairs.
Ukrainian psy-ops emphasized these points in leaflets spread on the battlefields. They encouraged North Koreans to surrender “because this is not your war” and “there is no reason to die for Vladimir Putin.” Other leaflets asserted that Kim Jong Un “starved you to death and starved your families,” urging soldiers to shout for “freedom” and surrender to receive a “bowl of hot food.”
North Korean propaganda had to counter these arguments and clearly explain to the population why the leadership had sent soldiers on an overseas mission from which many would not return.
But it could not employ cynical geopolitical rhetoric: The social role of the army in the DPRK is heavily idealized, so the explanation had to be idealistic.
Soviet military vehicles in Afghanistan in 1986 | Image: RIA Novosti via Wikimedia Commons
THE AFGHANISTAN TRAP
In the 1980s, Soviet propaganda faced a similar challenge when it had to explain the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. To justify the war, Soviet propaganda resorted to stale rhetoric of the “communist internationalist duty” to keep Afghanistan socialist.
This propaganda was utterly unsuccessful. At that time, Soviet society was skeptical about the concept of an “international socialist camp,” and the idea of citizens losing their lives to keep a socialist system working in a far-away land was highly unpopular.
Another key mistake was that instead of worshipping Soviet “internationalist warriors,” Soviet media actively promoted images of “new progressive Afghanistan,” which the public could not care less about.
At the same time, the government refused to comment on the coffins that the families of fallen Soviet soldiers had begun to receive.
The fact that many Soviet soldiers were freshly conscripted young men who had no experience, material incentives or choice further exacerbated the situation. The war irritated people and contributed to the loss of legitimacy of the Soviet government and, eventually, perestroika.
North Korean propagandists have surely learned this Soviet lesson.
North Korean and Russian soldiers waving the countries’ flags | Image: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025)
CHOOSING ANOTHER WAY
DPRK media broke its silence about the deployment only after the mission was complete, with state TV airing a special report in late August devoted to the “ceremony of awarding state commendations to Commanding Officers and Combatants of KPA Overseas Operation Unit.”
The two-hour show featured footage of North Korean troops fighting, Kim Jong Un standing reverently before the coffins of fallen soldiers, his warm communications with the members of bereaved families and an official concert in memory of the war “heroes.”
The ceremony and documentary showed that DPRK had constructed a different discourse around the deployment than the Soviet Union did for the war in Afghanistan.
State media briefly described the mission of the overseas operation unit (해외작전부대) as a battle against American and Western intruders of Russia. But the report avoided any mention of the Russian military or commanding officers, instead showing Kim Jong Un giving commands to officers as if he organized the operation.
Russian soldiers appear sporadically in the footage, hugging and smiling next to North Korean troops. Russian military officials only appear when they deliver the remains of fallen DPRK troops to Pyongyang.
At the same time, the ceremony glorifies North Korean soldiers for their perfect military skills, brave exploits and loyalty to the leader. Following the tradition of patriotic propaganda, state media portrayed soldiers as badly missing the leader while abroad, while making no mention of them missing their own families.
The commemoration ceremony itself was emotionally touching and deeply personal. Kim Jong Un hugged commanding officers, solemnly kneeled before coffins, bowed to the bereaved families of the heroes and kissed their orphaned children.
Photos of the fallen soldiers appeared on a wall, under a big golden star for the order they had been posthumously awarded. Belonging to a “hero family” has many practical benefits in the DPRK, and in addition, the deployed soldiers reportedly received good wages of around $2,000 a month from Moscow.
Kim Jong Un shaking hands with soldiers deployed to Ukraine | Image: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025)
1
2
3
FIGHTING FOR THE MOTHERLAND
The concert that followed the ceremony consisted of patriotic songs and showcased the tears of both performers and the audience, appealing to the public’s emotions to bury any doubts about the value of the military deployment.
“Stars of the Motherland” (조국의 별들), performed by a crying Kim Okju, celebrates the inner beauty of the fallen sons of Korea who “were the people of dignity and all became our stars.”
“Motherland, do not forget your sons,” the lyrics state. “Their eternal life begins in our common memory. They all gave their lives for the motherland’s glory.”
The same message also featured in another song performed at the event — “We Will Remember” (기억하리) — which urges Koreans not to forget their brave warriors who “fought for the motherland.”
Other songs broadcast optimism. The performance of “Only Victory” (오직 승리) featured images of victorious warriors holding Russian and North Korean flags together. The lyrics claim that despite pain and difficulties, DPRK soldiers fulfilled the leader’s orders and achieved the desired victory.
If Koreans “will fight one hundred times, they will achieve one hundred victories” bringing dignity and glory to the motherland, the song says.
The final song “We Are Koreans!” (우리는 조선사람) was filled with expressions of national pride. It was accompanied by a military chorus and a lively show of the young men dancing with the North Korean flag, which seemed to be inspired by Russian pop star Shaman’s recent performance in Pyongyang.
After the concert, Kim Jong Un went again to the soldiers in the front seats, talked to them and kissed them.
Overall, state propaganda exalted soldiers who served overseas in the mode of conventional Korean heroes. In this narrative, their deaths on Russian battlefields brought glory to North Korea, not Russia.
Thus, the DPRK state has turned a military operation in far-flung lands into another case of domestic hero-making centered around loyalty and trust in the leader.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. ROK military must do more to stop abuse of North Korean escapee soldiers: Report
Our ROK allies have to do better than this. The north Korean diaspora/escapees are key to the future of Korea and can be the bridge between north and South during the unification processes. Having soldiers from the north in ROK military units can provide much needed expertise and any unit that has to operate in the north will benefit from having their expertise.
And then there is the demographic chalen to the ROK military. They will need all the manpower they can acquire.
Excerpts:
“Amid the continuous decline in the number of eligible conscripts due to South Korea’s sharply falling birth rate, the proportion of soldiers with multicultural backgrounds within the military service pool is expected to increase further,” the NHRCK stated, stressing the need to assess soldiers’ Korean-language comprehension.
Citing data from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, the report said that the number of multicultural soldiers surpassed 1,000 in 2018 and is expected to reach 10,000 by 2030.
The NHRCK report comes after a young South Korean soldier of North Korean and Chinese descent reportedly jumped from a building earlier this year after being bullied by fellow soldiers over his limited Korean-language skills.
“When soldiers with immigrant backgrounds or North Korean defectors are part of the unit, they deserve special attention and care. If the unit failed to do that, then that would be a clear example of poor leadership,” retired ROK Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum told NK News.
ROK military must do more to stop abuse of North Korean escapee soldiers: Report
South Korean human rights commission cites cases of mocking DPRK accent and insulting soldier from China
Jooheon Kim September 5, 2025
ROK army soldiers take part in a group march. | Image: Screenshot from ROK army's Facebook (Dec. 27, 2022)
South Korea’s human rights commission has called for the military to improve the service environment for North Korean escapees, citing cases of abuse against those born in the DPRK and other countries.
In a report published Friday, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) cited a case in which an ROK soldier used an exaggerated North Korean accent in the presence of a DPRK-born soldier.
The senior ROK soldier allegedly wore a South Korean flag patch upside down while mockingly imitating a North Korean-style greeting (반갑습네다) meaning “Nice to meet you” in front of fellow soldiers.
But the NHRCK report noted that the soldier who made the remark appeared to be unaware that a North Korean defector was serving in the same unit.
An official from the NHRCK told NK News that a different ROK soldier — who was not involved in the incident — reported the case during an interview. The soldier also described the unit’s general atmosphere as being prank-heavy or overly playful.
The official said that it was unclear whether the defector had heard the mocking remarks, but said that most of the soldiers in the unit seemed to have no idea that a defector was serving among them.
The spokesperson also questioned whether proper diversity education had been provided. “It made me wonder. If proper education had been given, would jokes like this still have happened?”
Kim Eun-chul, CEO of The Round, a Seoul-based NGO focused on North Korea-related issues, said that prejudice against escapees can lead to harassment and urged military authorities to pay special attention to the matter.
The defector-turned-entrepreneur cited cases where the parents of defector soldiers reported that their children had been bullied.
“Some have even contacted the National Assembly about these incidents. I personally witnessed two cases where defector soldiers were ostracized,” he told NK News.
Kim noted that male defectors born in North Korea are not required to perform military service but can still choose to serve.
“They went to serve their country, so I think the country needs to protect them to prevent these kinds of issues from happening,” he stressed.
NHRCK personnel also documented other cases of abuse against soldiers from migrant backgrounds during their visits to 10 military units in April and May.
In one case, a superior used a derogatory term for Chinese people (“짱개,” jjanggae) toward a South Korean soldier who lived in China for a long time, according to the NHRCK official.
Despite finding numerous cases where multicultural and overseas ROK soldiers struggled with Korean language proficiency, their deployment assignments did not take these difficulties into consideration, the commission stated.
The commission expressed concern about the possibility that such soldiers could be assigned to operate weapon systems or work at guard posts responsible for verifying the identity of outsiders, stating it could lead to a decrease in combat effectiveness and potential safety incidents.
“Amid the continuous decline in the number of eligible conscripts due to South Korea’s sharply falling birth rate, the proportion of soldiers with multicultural backgrounds within the military service pool is expected to increase further,” the NHRCK stated, stressing the need to assess soldiers’ Korean-language comprehension.
Citing data from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, the report said that the number of multicultural soldiers surpassed 1,000 in 2018 and is expected to reach 10,000 by 2030.
The NHRCK report comes after a young South Korean soldier of North Korean and Chinese descent reportedly jumped from a building earlier this year after being bullied by fellow soldiers over his limited Korean-language skills.
“When soldiers with immigrant backgrounds or North Korean defectors are part of the unit, they deserve special attention and care. If the unit failed to do that, then that would be a clear example of poor leadership,” retired ROK Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum told NK News.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. Long-sought manufacturing gains are boosting North Korea arms buildup
Quid pro quo. Piad for with the blood of soldiers of the nKPA who are fighting an dying for Putin in Putin's War. Only KJU benefits.
Long-sought manufacturing gains are boosting North Korea arms buildup
Defense News · Linus Höller · September 5, 2025
BERLIN — When North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un visited what state media called an “automated missile factory” in late August, he pranced past endless rows of ballistic missiles, each capable of accurately delivering a nuclear warhead to Seoul with minutes’ notice.
The remarkable success of the hermit regime’s missile program is a direct consequence of Pyongyang’s concerted effort to make up for decades of shortcomings in defense manufacturing processes, according to experts and open-source information.
Visiting the unnamed missile facility days before heading to China to watch a big military parade in Beijing, North Korean state media said Kim Jong Un “was greatly satisfied to hear the report that the automated assembly-line production system was established.”
According to the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s tightly controlled foreign news outlet, the automated equipment in the factory dealt with “precision processing, measuring and assembling different parts,” included quality control stations, and resulted in “increasing the productivity and ensuring the qualitative character of the products.”
The focus on automated machining that North Korean leadership has preached for the past decade, experts say, has played a key role in allowing the country to develop a missile-based nuclear deterrent much faster than the Soviet Union and the U.S. did during the Cold War, despite Pyongyang being under strict international sanctions.
What’s more, there are indications that the drive for automation is paying dividends for North Korea’s defense industry at large.
“While previous policies focused heavily on nuclear and missile development, the current approach has expanded to include the modernization of conventional weapon systems, innovation in production processes, and the incorporation of advanced technologies such as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence,” wrote Sang-jung Byun and Seungwoo Kim, researchers with South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy.
“These accelerated and diversified modernization efforts, especially in conjunction with technology transfers from Russia, have the potential to significantly enhance not only North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities but also its conventional military forces,” they assessed.
The sharing of knowledge and technology that could be used for military purposes with North Korea remains illegal under UN rules passed with Moscow’s support.
From lathes to computers
For most of its existence, North Korea’s weapons industry – the “second economy,” as it is often called in domestic parlance – was built on cheap mass labor and support from the Soviet Union. And while at least the former still exists today, it presented a natural upper limit for both the quality and quantity of military production that the country could output.
This started to change in the 2000s under Kim Jong Il, the father of the current leader and also the man who oversaw the development of North Korea’s own nuclear weapons.
Jong Il emphasized the development of computerized machine tools, both for the domestic economy and, crucially, as a money maker in the form of exports. The country, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has been chronically cash-strapped for decades, and the situation has been worsened by UN-imposed sanctions in response to its weapons of mass destruction programs.
So great was the enthusiasm about the new technology that the state even produced a bizarrely upbeat propaganda song exalting the glory of the CNC machine.
Unfortunately for the father Kim, the domestic CNC machining industry reached maturity just as the world plunged into the depths of the years-long Great Recession and the financial crisis that began in 2007. He died in 2011.
After Kim Jong Un’s accession to power in 2012, the focus for North Korea’s newfound domestic CNC abilities appears to have shifted from being an export endeavor to being used as a boost for the domestic industry. This shift coincided with a rethinking of the country’s defense doctrine: Instead of relying on 20th-century weapons, Kim Jong Un placed a much heavier emphasis on missiles, strategic deterrence and cutting-edge technology than previous leaders.
Missiles, however, are tough to get right even for the most technologically advanced countries, said John Ford, a research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies who studies North Korea and has kept abreast of its propaganda output for years.
Manual production processes were simply too imprecise – and too slow – to build up an effective missile force.
“For something as complex and as explosive as a missile, minor differences in components can lead to rapid unscheduled disassembly … your missile can just blow up because a bolt that’s supposed to be this size is actually slightly too small because your lathe operator has a different idea of what a bolt looks like,” said Ford.
Enter: the CNC machine
CNC tools provide uniform components and better reliability across production cycles. Previously, North Korea had to clandestinely import foreign CNC machines for the most critical components.
For example, propaganda photographs released from inside the Chamjin Missile Factory showed a German-made, five-axis machine tool that was imported in violation of sanctions, possibly by way of Taiwan, and likely used to produce impellers, a key part of the turbopump powering the engine of liquid-fueled missiles.
By the mid-2010s, North Korea had developed a reliable domestic supply of machine tools, allowing it to systematically upgrade its industry. In 2015, Pyongyang’s Automation Institute at Kim Chaek University of Technology received a fancy new glass and steel building, and the organization began sending consultants around the country to re-skill factories from lathes to CNC machines, according to Ford.
While likely not the sole factor, missile testing success rates have improved in parallel with the automation efforts, and North Korea made big strides toward the ultimate goal of a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile – a target that Kim Jong Un’s team reached in 2023 with the successful test of the Hwasong-18 missile.
“They can make a nuke go up, they can make it go a very long distance, and they can make it come down, and so that’s kind of all you need,” Ford said.
Now, it’s about expanding the arsenal and doing so at scale. The reference to “serial production” in North Korean media coverage of Kim Jong Un’s recent missile factory visit likely plays to this.
An eye on exports
And it likely also is a message to a key foreign audience member: Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has emerged as a major client for North Korean weapons, including missiles, for use in his invasion of Ukraine.
The DPRK’s rockets, including the type Hwasong-11 that Kim Jong Un inspected at the factory on Aug. 31, have rained down on Ukrainian cities and soldiers with devastating results, fired by Russian troops and an increasing number of North Korean soldiers that have been dispatched to assist the Kremlin in its war of aggression.
Most trade with North Korea and all support for its military programs remains internationally prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions that were passed with Russia’s and China’s agreement to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.
However, with the multilateral system in crisis, Russia has begun openly cooperating with North Korea, including in prohibited fields, and China has long been suspected of only selectively enforcing the sanctions against its Korean neighbor.
North Korea has long sought to export its weapons as a source of cash, and has done so with some success in the past. It maintains a global web of front and shell companies to engage in sanctions circumvention and sell weapons to the highest – or only – bidder, a Defense News investigation has shown.
With the country’s decade-long automation program bearing fruit, and buoyed by a more favorable international environment, there is a new risk that Pyongyang may be successful in sending destabilizing military equipment to indiscriminate buyers abroad.
About Linus Höller
Linus Höller is Defense News' Europe correspondent and OSINT investigator. He reports on the arms deals, sanctions, and geopolitics shaping Europe and the world. He holds a master’s degrees in WMD nonproliferation, terrorism studies, and international relations, and works in four languages: English, German, Russian, and Spanish.
13. Kim Jong-un flaunts Swiss watch; Kim Yo-jong carries Dior bag in Beijing
Indication of successful sanctions evasion.
Kim Jong-un flaunts Swiss watch; Kim Yo-jong carries Dior bag in Beijing - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, wearing a watch on his left wrist, circled in red, embraces Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing, Wednesday. Captured from Kremlin website
By Hankookilbo
- Published Sep 5, 2025 10:22 am KST
- Updated Sep 5, 2025 11:16 am KST
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Hankookilbo
Published Sep 5, 2025 10:22 am KST
Updated Sep 5, 2025 11:16 am KST
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong have once again drawn attention for flaunting luxury European brands during their recent trip to Beijing, despite Pyongyang’s own crackdowns on capitalist culture and an international ban on luxury imports.
According to analysis by NK News on Thursday, photos released by the Kremlin show Kim Jong-un wearing what appears to be an IWC Schaffhausen Portofino Automatic wristwatch while embracing Russian President Vladimir Putin during Victory Day events in the Chinese capital.
The Swiss timepiece retails for $14,100 on the manufacturer’s website and has frequently been spotted on Kim’s wrist in recent years, including during his September 2023 visit to Russia.
Kim’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, also appeared at the event carrying a black Lady Dior handbag made from lambskin, which is estimated to cost over $7,500.
The bag is the same model she carried during her brother’s Russia trip in 2023, when other delegation members were also photographed with high-end designer accessories.
Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of North Korea’s Workers’ Party, circled in red, carries a black handbag as she walks toward Russian President Vladimir Putin’s official car with her brother Kim Jong-un for a separate meeting in Beijing, Wednesday. Captured from Kremlin website
Such displays stand in stark contrast to Pyongyang’s official stance. North Korea has long denounced luxury goods as symbols of “bourgeois culture,” with authorities harshly punishing citizens found in possession of them.
Yet, members of the Kim family and other elites continue to appear with items from Dior, Gucci, and Bulgari, and Kim himself was recently seen driving a Maybach SUV even as parts of the country reeled from devastating floods.
Kim Jong-un departed Pyongyang on Monday, arrived in Beijing on Tuesday, and attended the Victory Day commemoration the following day. He held separate talks with Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping before returning home by special train Thursday.
This article from the Hankook Ilbo, the sister publication of The Korea Times, is translated by a generative AI and edited by The Korea Times.
14. Kim Jong-un returns home with economic aid from China, security backing from Russia
And I think it is also correct to assess that he has returned home with a propaganda bonanza.
The subtitle here is correct. The ball is in Preisner Lee's court> Can he make "practical diplomacy" work?
Lee Jae Myung's 'pragmatic diplomacy' put to test amid emboldened NK-China- Russia ties
Perhaps when that practical diplomacy is found to be impractical the Lee administration will shift to a real strategy that has never been fully tried: the practical pursuit of a free and unification Korea as a way to solve the Korea question and the only way to end the nuclear threats and the crimes against humanity beginning committed by the regime (with the support of the CRInK).
Kim Jong-un returns home with economic aid from China, security backing from Russia - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un departs to Pyongyang from Beijing in his private train on Thursday, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. Yonhap
By Lee Hyo-jin
- Published Sep 5, 2025 3:50 pm KST
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Lee Hyo-jin
Published Sep 5, 2025 3:50 pm KST
Lee Jae Myung's 'pragmatic diplomacy' put to test amid emboldened NK-China- Russia ties
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s three-day visit to China secured key assurances from Pyongyang’s traditional allies: economic backing from Beijing and a security guarantee from Moscow.
With China and Russia apparently expanding their influence on Korean Peninsula affairs, observers say South Korea faces an increasingly complicated diplomatic landscape, needing to balance its alliance with Washington while managing relations with Beijing and Moscow in the face of Pyongyang’s nuclear threats.
Kim concluded his rare visit to Beijing on Thursday night, returning to Pyongyang aboard his armored train after attending a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
On the final day of his visit, Kim held a bilateral summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, their first meeting in nearly seven years.
The two leaders reaffirmed that the friendship between their countries would remain unchanged "no matter how the international landscape evolves," according to North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency on Friday. Xi described the nations as "good neighbors, friends and comrades" who share a common destiny and stand by each other.
Chinese media reported that Kim said North Korea is ready to expand mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation with China to achieve greater results.
Analysts interpreted the remarks as Beijing signaling expanded economic support for Pyongyang, which is grappling with a prolonged economic crisis. China — North Korea's largest trading partner — is largely seen as a critical lifeline for the heavily sanctioned country.
"China used to have significant influence over Korean Peninsula affairs, but has been somewhat sidelined over the past few years amid growing military ties between North Korea and Russia. With this Victory Day celebration and the Kim-Xi meeting, its influence on North Korea has been restored," said Yang Moo-jin, former president of the University of North Korean Studies.
Notably absent from statements released by either side was any reference to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — contrasting sharply with the four Kim-Xi summits in 2018 and 2019, when the North pledged steps toward denuclearization and Beijing expressed support.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, clasps hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a bilateral meeting in Beijing, Thursday, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. Yonhap
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, clasps hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a bilateral meeting in Beijing, Thursday, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. Yonhap
"It will be hard to expect any visible efforts from China toward North Korea’s denuclearization, as Beijing has increasingly shunned what it sees as an unrealistic goal," said Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
The South Korean government, however, emphasized that China will maintain its position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
An official at Seoul's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Friday that China "has confirmed on multiple occasions, including during the recent visit of the presidential envoy to China, that its basic position on Korean Peninsula issues remains unchanged."
"Denuclearization is the shared goal of the international community," the official added.
The presidential office declined to comment on the issue.
The Kim-Xi summit came just two days after the North Korean leader received a security guarantee from Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting in Beijing. Putin praised the bravery of North Korean troops sent to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, while Kim pledged continued backing for Moscow.
"Returning home, the Kim regime will begin to heavily promote its foreign policy line of 'security guarantee from Russia, economic support from China' both domestically and internationally," Yang said.
For Seoul, Kim's high-profile diplomacy underscores the complex challenges now confronting the Lee Jae Myung administration. Analysts say South Korea must carefully navigate its cooperation with Washington while also keeping channels open with China and Russia for inter-Korean communication.
The Lee administration will presumably use upcoming multilateral forums to raise its diplomatic profile.
The president is scheduled to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Sept. 23, where he is expected to seek broader international backing on North Korea-related issues.
The government also plans to leverage the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in late October in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, as another platform to rally international support for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrive for a reception marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Wednesday. Reuters-Yonhap
From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrive for a reception marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Wednesday. Reuters-Yonhap
Meanwhile, analysts say the absence of a formal trilateral summit between Kim, Xi and Putin on the sidelines of the military parade underscored the limits of their partnership. After talks with Xi on Tuesday, Putin returned to Russia, while Kim went back to Pyongyang on Thursday.
Despite public displays of solidarity, the three nations' core interests appear somewhat misaligned, making formal talks or a joint statement difficult. Some analysts suggested that Xi avoided a trilateral meeting to prevent provoking the United States by forming an overtly anti-U.S. bloc ahead of planned tariff negotiations with President Donald Trump.
The U.S. and China recently extended a tariff truce until Nov. 10, fueling speculation that a deal could be reached in late October or early November. South Korea expects the upcoming APEC meeting to bring Trump and Xi together ahead of the high-stakes deadline.
15. Kim-Xi pledge to boost cooperation brings China's denuclearization goal into limbo
(News Focus) Kim-Xi pledge to boost cooperation brings China's denuclearization goal into limbo | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 5, 2025
SEOUL, Sept. 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping's pledge to increase cooperation, including in the economy, could put Beijing's long-standing goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula in limbo, experts said Friday.
The previous evening, Kim and Xi held talks in Beijing, their first meeting in more than six years, while Kim was visiting Beijing to attend China's military parade on Wednesday.
Xi hailed China and North Korea as "friends who share a common destiny," saying China "highly values" the bilateral friendship. He expressed support for strengthening and advancing ties with North Korea, stressing that this stance will never change no matter what, according to Chinese and North Korean state media.
Kim stressed his readiness to deepen "mutually beneficial" economic and trade cooperation with China, expressing willingness to increase bilateral exchanges at various levels.
This photo, published by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 5, 2025, shows leader Kim Jong-un (L) holding hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their talks the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The leaders' pledges signal the North Korea-China relations may see a rapid increase in economic cooperation and high-level exchanges, bringing their ties, strained by Pyongyang's military alignment with Russia, back on track.
Observers, however, warn restoring China's economic cooperation with North Korea could undermine Beijing's long-running goal of denuclearizing Pyongyang at a time when the North has maintained its stance of "never giving up" its nuclear weapons.
They point out that China's rolling out the red carpet for Kim's international diplomatic debut at the parade is tantamount to turning a blind eye to Pyongyang's illegal development of nuclear programs.
China has long maintained a policy stance in support of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, albeit perhaps only superficially.
The outcome of the latest talks, however, made no mention of Korean Peninsula denuclearization, marking a major departure from the four summits Kim and Xi held between 2018 and 2019.
The omission came as Pyongyang remains adamant about seeking recognition as a nuclear-armed country. In a statement last month, Pyongyang called its nuclear weapons program "the prestige and honor of the state," vowing that it will remain "unchanged in our stand not to abandon the nuclear weapons."
The regime has also recently warned it will not engage in dialogue with the United States if Washington's aim is to denuclearize the country.
China's pledge of support for North Korea against this backdrop could be tantamount to "recognizing North Korea's ultimate goal of securing a strategic status through the advancement of its nuclear weapons," Hong Min, a senior researcher at South Korea's Korea Institute for National Unification, said.
"China may make it a custom not to mention denuclearization anymore" following the latest talks, he warned.
Analysts also said that China's apparent turnaround in its denuclearization stance may reflect its growing need to recover influence over North Korea, particularly at a time of increasing geopolitical uncertainties amid a stiffening China-U.S. rivalry.
Growing prospects for the resumption of dialogue between North Korea and the U.S., fueled by U.S. President Donald Trump's interest in reopening a summit with Kim, may have also prompted China to reach out to North Korea again, said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.
"It may be a direct message from China that it will take the lead in future (North Korea-U.S.) negotiations" once they begin, Yang said.
He also voiced concerns that it may be too early to conclude that China is discarding its denuclearization goal, saying that its recent moves may reflect a calculation that no realistic progress in denuclearizing North Korea is possible now under the current circumstances.
This photo, published by Tass on Sept. 3, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) appearing next to Chinese President Xi Jinping at a reception following China's military parade in Beijing. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 5, 2025
16. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold trilateral Freedom Edge exercise this month
Excellent. Demonstrate the strength and power of our silk web of friends, partners, and alliances versus the CRInK.
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold trilateral Freedom Edge exercise this month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 5, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 6-7)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Sept. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan will hold their trilateral multi-domain Freedom Edge exercise this month, the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Friday, in their continued efforts to deepen security cooperation against North Korea's military threats.
The five-day exercise will take place in international waters east and south of South Korea's southern island of Jeju from Sept. 15-19, the JCS said.
"The three countries will bolster their multi-domain operational capabilities in areas including the sea, air and cyberspace and enhance their interoperability to maintain a solid and stable trilateral cooperation," the JCS said in a statement.
The upcoming exercise will mark the third round of the trilateral drills, following two rounds of the exercise conducted in June and November last year, respectively.
It is the first such exercise to be held since President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump took office.
Warships of South Korea, the United States and Japan, including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier, the South's ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong destroyer and Japan's JS Haguro destroyer, take part in the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise in international waters south of South Korea's southern resort island of Jeju on Nov. 13, 2024, in this photo provided by the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff the following day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The JCS said the exercise will span across an array of areas, including air defense, anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy and defensive cyber training activities.
"The drills will take place on a similar scope compared with last year," a JCS official said, adding that the duration of the exercise has been extended to five days compared with last year's three-day period, as it is held once a year starting this year, compared with two rounds last year.
North Korea has protested against joint drills among the three nations, warning of military action against the previous Freedom Edge drills that have involved U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Following the inaugural exercise in June last year, the North criticized the drills as an attempt to strengthen a U.S.-led military bloc.
The JCS stressed the upcoming exercise is part of their regular drills.
"The drills are an annual exercise aimed at responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and guarding regional peace and stability while adhering to international law and regulations," it said.
The exercise takes its name from key bilateral exercises the U.S. holds with the Asian neighbors -- Freedom Shield with South Korea and Keen Edge with Japan.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · September 5, 2025
17. S. Korea says rights must not be 'unfairly violated' after U.S. raid on Hyundai-LG battery plant site
Unfortunately I fear for these Korens because it seems the operating philosophy of ICE is that anyone who looks and sounds "different" must be illegal.
(3rd LD) S. Korea says rights must not be 'unfairly violated' after U.S. raid on Hyundai-LG battery plant site | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · September 5, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS Hyundai Motor's quote in paras 15-16)
By Kim Seung-yeon and Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, Sept. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea on Friday voiced "concern and regret" after more than 300 South Koreans were taken into custody in a major U.S. immigration raid at an electric vehicle (EV) battery plant site in Georgia, urging that individuals' rights must not be unfairly infringed.
The foreign ministry issued the statement after the U.S. authorities detained as many as 450 workers at the EV batter plant construction site operated by Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution Ltd. in Ellabell, located in Bryan County, west of Savannah, on Thursday (local time).
Among them, more than 300 workers are South Koreans, a diplomatic source said.
The U.S. authorities said it was part of an investigation into undocumented individuals and they face possible charges of illegal stay, according to local media reports quoting immigration authorities.
"The economic activities of our companies investing in the U.S. and the rights and interests of our nationals must not be unfairly violated," ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing.
"We conveyed our concern and regret through the U.S. Embassy in Seoul today," Lee said.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong speaks during a press briefing regarding the U.S. raid on a South Korean electric vehicle battery plant construction site in Georgia, at the foreign ministry in Seoul, on Sept. 5, 2025. (Yonhap)
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Homeland Security Investigations sent agents to the construction site to carry out a search warrant.
Seoul did not receive any prior notice through diplomatic channels from Washington regarding the raid, a ministry official said on condition of anonymity.
The official declined to give further details, such as specific reasons for the raid and detainment, saying that the government is doing its best to grasp the situation at this stage to respond appropriately.
"We understand that there have been arrests or detainments under the immigration policy of the Donald Trump administration, and we're providing all necessary consular support," the official added.
Seoul dispatched embassy and consular officials in Washington and Atlanta to the site, and instructed local diplomatic missions to set up an on-site task force to deal with the matter, the ministry said.
The individuals from Seoul arrived in the United States on a B1 visa, issued for business purposes such as attending meetings or signing contracts, or under the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) visa waiver program for short-term stays.
The South Korean consulate in Atlanta is forming a legal team, including Korean American lawyers, and they plan to visit the facility where the workers are being held, a consulate official said.
LG Energy Solution said it is "currently assessing the specific situation," adding, "We are actively cooperating with the South Korean government and relevant authorities to ensure the safety and swift release of our employees and partner staff."
This photo, captured from the social media X account of the Atlanta bureau of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, shows agents carrying out a raid at the Hyundai Motor-LG Energy Solution venture's electric vehicle battery plant construction site in Ellabell, located in Bryan County, west of Savannah, in Georgia, on Thursday. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
An official at Hyundai Motor Group's Seoul headquarters said none of its employees have been confirmed among those detained so far.
"We are currently identifying the specific situation and intend to make utmost efforts to take necessary measures for the safety of those on site," the official added.
Concerns have also been raised over potential disruptions to Hyundai Motor Group's other projects in the U.S., as multiple construction works are planned.
Upcoming projects include a new robot plant with an annual capacity of 30,000 units and the construction of a steel mill in Louisiana with a production capacity of 2.7 million tons.
The South Korean auto giant also plans to expand its production capacity from 300,000 to 500,000 vehicles at Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America, the group's newly opened EV and hybrid car manufacturing plant, in Georgia.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · September 5, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
