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Quotes of the Day:
"Knowledge is power. Information is power. The secreting or hoarding of knowledge or information may be an act of tyranny camouflaged as humility."
– Robin Morgan
“There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance—that principle is contempt prior to investigation.”
– Herbert Spencer
(Spencer warns that prejudice blocks knowledge. Rejecting ideas without inquiry ensures ignorance. True wisdom requires openness—examining before dismissing. Contempt for new truths closes the mind, preventing growth and enlightenment.)
“We have come out of the time when obedience, the acceptance of discipline, intelligent courage and resolution were most important, into that more difficult time when it is a man's duty to understand his world rather than simply fight for it.”
–Ernest Hemingway
1. Georgia Immigration Raid Targeting South Korean Factory Sets Back Korean-American Relations After Seemingly Successful White House Meeting
2. Kim Jong Un's wrong address
3. SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong
4. US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says
5. General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025 (New JSOC and EUSA Commanders among others)
6. Premier Army CBRNE Command Supports Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
7. Kim Jong-un Leaves Beijing With Big Diplomatic Wins
8. South Korea, Japan, US bolster ‘first island chain’ defence with Freedom Edge drills
9. How the Immigration Raid at Hyundai’s Factory Complex Unfolded
10. The Legal Status of North Korean Refugees & Survival Migration
11. The Variables of OPCON: One Wartime OPCON Transition, Multiple Plans
12. Seoul promises to help hundreds of Korean workers arrested in US in Ice raid
13. Dictator's staff scrub room clean after meeting with Putin
14. South Korea to integrate Trophy protective suite into K2 tanks
15. U.S., Japan, S. Korea officials meet for quantum computing summit
16. FM Cho says to consider U.S. visit to discuss immigration crackdown on S. Koreans with Trump administration
1. Georgia Immigration Raid Targeting South Korean Factory Sets Back Korean-American Relations After Seemingly Successful White House Meeting
Recall that Korea is the largest foreign director investor in the US.
I cannot see how this turns out well for Korea or the US. But at least ICE made their quota for arrests.
Excerpt:
Half a dozen agencies are now examining the rights and wrongs of the Korean employees, many of whom came to America on visas valid only for short-term stays, as tourists, students, and the like. Among those on the scene were agents of Homeland Security Investigations, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the George state police.
Georgia Immigration Raid Targeting South Korean Factory Sets Back Korean-American Relations After Seemingly Successful White House Meeting
Korean officials, caught by surprise by the raid, respond with alarm — and indignation — over what they view as an assault on South Korea’s attempts to placate President Trump by boosting investment in America.
DONALD KIRK
Sept. 5, 2025 01:07 PM ET
nysun.com
An immigration raid on the site of a large Korean factory under construction in Georgia has spread shockwaves among South Koreans striving to meet President Trump’s demands for vastly increased Korean investment in America.
Estimates vary, but as many as 300 Korean employees were among 450 rounded up in the raid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents at the construction site for a joint venture spawned by two of Korea’s biggest corporate names, Hyundai and LG. They reportedly were handcuffed and taken by bus to interrogation centers.
Twenty-eight miles west of Savannah, Georgia, the factory, called HL-GA Battery Company, owned jointly by LG Energy Solution and Hyundai Motor, will eventually produce batteries mainly for Hyundai electric vehicles. All told, the site employs about 1,400 employees on a project that represents one of the most important examples of Korea’s pledge to invest another $350 billion in factories on American soil. The cost of the factory is expected to rise to $7.6 billion.
Korean officials, caught by surprise by the raid, responded with alarm — and indignation — over what they viewed as an assault on South Korea’s attempts to placate Mr. Trump. Koreans hope to persuade him not to impose tariffs of about 15 percent on Korean products, or at least not to raise them.
At Seoul, a spokesman for Korea’s foreign ministry, Lee Jae-woong, warned, “The economic activities of our companies investing in the U.S. and the rights and interests of our nationals must not be unfairly violated,” according to Korea’s Yonhap News. Mr. Lee said the ministry had “conveyed our concern and regret” to the American embassy while Korean diplomats flew to Georgia to try to gain freedom for those being detained.
South Korea’s biggest-selling newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, said the raid, the first on a huge foreign factory site that precisely represents Mr. Trump’s pleas for increased foreign investment in America, “has left Korean companies in turmoil.”
Half a dozen agencies are now examining the rights and wrongs of the Korean employees, many of whom came to America on visas valid only for short-term stays, as tourists, students, and the like. Among those on the scene were agents of Homeland Security Investigations, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the George state police.
A Korean official blamed the arrests on “the immigration policy of the Donald Trump administration.”
Fears rose that raids could extend to other huge Korean plants, including the newly opened Hyundai Metaplant America at Marietta, Georgia, which Hyundai calls “the key pillar of the group’s $12.6 billion investment in Georgia and the largest economic development project in the state’s history.” Hyundai envisions the Marietta plant producing “up to 500,000 electric and hybrid vehicles annually for Hyundai, Kia and Genesis brands,” many to run on batteries produced at the LG-Hyundai plant.
Hyundai Motor has already invested $20.5 billion in American plants and is committed to investing another $21 billion in the next few years, but it’s not the biggest Korean investor. Samsung Electronics is committed to investing a total of $45 billion, including plants at Taylor and Austin, Texas, producing chips. Supply companies from Korea add to the total investment.
The raid on the LG-Hyundai site is likely to prove a headache for Mr. Trump, who got along great with South Korea’s president, Lee Jae-myung, at a recent White House summit at which they talked about tariffs and investment as well as defense — and their shared interest in reopening dialogue with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un.
“Raid at Hyundai-LG Plant Rattles Korean-American Relations,” a headline in the Georgia Asia Times read. “The meticulously planned operation,” it said, “has raised pointed questions about whether the massive foreign investment project was singled out for political messaging.”
nysun.com
2. Kim Jong Un's wrong address
The likely could not agree on a trilateral statement that all three could agree to sign on to.
I do not expect a sincere positive response to President Lee's "practical diplomacy" either. Any response will be in accordance with the Kim family regime political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies
Excerpts:
Although the leaders of China, Russia and North Korea stood together on the reviewing stand to project unity, the much-anticipated trilateral summit never took place.
...
Even so, analysts agreed Kim managed to elevate his stature. By standing alongside nuclear powers China and Russia, he bolstered his claim to be treated as their peer. North Korea's strategic relevance was underscored, and Kim demonstrated his ability to maneuver diplomatically after years of isolation.
...
South Korea's current leadership has also extended gestures of reconciliation. Within a week of taking office, President Lee Jae Myung unilaterally halted cross-border loudspeaker broadcasts, a longstanding North Korean grievance. He later curbed balloon launches carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets, persuading civic groups to desist despite their independence from government control.
These small, but sincere, steps signal that Seoul could be a vital partner for improving the lives of ordinary North Koreans. This, however small it may seem, is one of the reasons Kim Jong-un must ultimately seek alignment with the United States and South Korea.
The question is whether Kim will respond with equal sincerity. His willingness to endure a grueling train journey to Beijing in pursuit of Chinese favor suggests he can summon the commitment. If he approaches a Trump-Kim summit with that same determination, trust may finally take root. And trust, once established, can open the way to solving even the hardest problems.
Kim Jong Un has a choice. He can continue to bet on fading authoritarian allies, or he can turn toward the free world, where his nation's true interests lie. If he chooses the latter, he may yet find himself at the right address -- meeting the right partners, at the right time, for the right results.
Voices Sept. 5, 2025 / 11:28 AM
Kim Jong Un's wrong address
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/09/05/perspective-north-korea-true-opportunity/2821757084571/
By Nohsok Choi
Russian President Vladimir Putin (L), Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, along with the heads of foreign delegations, arrive to attend a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the end of World War Two, in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Wednesday. Photo by Alexander Kazakov/Sputnick/Kremlin Pool/EPA
SEOUL, Sept. 5 (UPI) -- The 80th anniversary of China's victory in World War II drew global attention, but also raised troubling questions.
Held under the shadow of President Donald Trump's mounting pressure campaign against Beijing, the celebration was widely seen as a showcase of "anti-American solidarity," with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un standing shoulder to shoulder.
Commentators warned of a new Cold War in Northeast Asia, with the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance facing off against a China-Russia-North Korea bloc. Images of Xi, Putin, and Kim together atop the reviewing stand were splashed across media worldwide, evoking the atmosphere of a bygone era of confrontation.
Korean outlets in particular recalled a similar tableau from 1959, when Mao Zedong, Nikita Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung appeared together at China's 10th anniversary parade. They suggested history was repeating itself.
The symbolism was hard to ignore: a military parade that resembled a weapons expo, attended largely by leaders of anti-Western states. Yet, a closer look reveals how shallow this display of unity really was.
Although the leaders of China, Russia and North Korea stood together on the reviewing stand to project unity, the much-anticipated trilateral summit never took place.
20-hour journey
Kim Jong Un endured a 20-hour journey by special train to Beijing, where he was warmly received by Xi Jinping and even held a bilateral summit with him. The substance of their talks was never disclosed.
Putin did sit down with Kim for three hours, but reports suggest their talks amounted to little more than Russian expressions of gratitude for North Korean support in Ukraine. If this was meant to prove the strength of an anti-American alliance, the result looked decidedly underwhelming. As one South Korean expert observed, genuine solidarity would require something more concrete -- like joint military exercises -- rather than staged photo opportunities.
Even so, analysts agreed Kim managed to elevate his stature. By standing alongside nuclear powers China and Russia, he bolstered his claim to be treated as their peer. North Korea's strategic relevance was underscored, and Kim demonstrated his ability to maneuver diplomatically after years of isolation.
He invited the Belarusian president to Pyongyang, accepted Putin's invitation to visit Russia, and presented himself in a Western-style suit instead of his customary Mao jacket. He even brought along daughter Ju Ae, long rumored to be his heir.
These gestures, while modest, subtly reshaped his international image. Some observers suggest this newfound confidence could influence his anticipated next encounter with Trump.
Greater rewards
But here lies the disappointment. If Kim had invested such energy in engaging with the free world, the rewards could have been far greater. The true opportunities for North Korea lie not with China and Russia, but with South Korea, the United States and Japan.
A glance at history makes this clear: The 1959 display of communist solidarity brought North Korea nothing of lasting value. Six decades later, its economy and power remain stagnant, even as China has risen to superpower status and Russia has been reduced to soliciting Pyongyang's military aid. If such an alliance yields only frustration, perhaps it is time for North Korea to reconsider its course.
There are precedents for a different path. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung met with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon and, following his counsel, opened the door not only to Mount Kumgang tourism, but also to broader inter-Korean dialogue and joint ventures, including investment in the automobile industry.
It was a dramatic break from the past -- a moment when North Korea briefly seemed willing to pursue engagement. Yet, the effort faltered because the South Korean government failed to grasp the larger vision and, instead of building on it, prosecuted Rev. Moon as an enemy of the state.
Later, the 2018 Singapore summit between Trump and Kim appeared poised to forge a new alignment with the free world, but that opportunity also slipped away.
Another chance
Now, another chance looms. Trump, once again president, has spoken of rekindling his personal rapport with Kim, and a summit could materialize as early as this year. If Kim seizes it, he could finally put his country on the path to real gains -- economic relief, international legitimacy and a role in global peace.
South Korea's current leadership has also extended gestures of reconciliation. Within a week of taking office, President Lee Jae Myung unilaterally halted cross-border loudspeaker broadcasts, a longstanding North Korean grievance. He later curbed balloon launches carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets, persuading civic groups to desist despite their independence from government control.
These small, but sincere, steps signal that Seoul could be a vital partner for improving the lives of ordinary North Koreans. This, however small it may seem, is one of the reasons Kim Jong-un must ultimately seek alignment with the United States and South Korea.
The question is whether Kim will respond with equal sincerity. His willingness to endure a grueling train journey to Beijing in pursuit of Chinese favor suggests he can summon the commitment. If he approaches a Trump-Kim summit with that same determination, trust may finally take root. And trust, once established, can open the way to solving even the hardest problems.
Kim Jong Un has a choice. He can continue to bet on fading authoritarian allies, or he can turn toward the free world, where his nation's true interests lie. If he chooses the latter, he may yet find himself at the right address -- meeting the right partners, at the right time, for the right results.
Nohsok Choi is the former Chief Editor of the Kyunghyang Shinmun and former Paris correspondent. He currently serves as president of the Kyunghyang Shinmun Alumni Association, president of the Korean Media & Culture Forum and CEO of the YouTube channel, One World TV.
3. SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong
Setting taside the FAS test (feasibility, acceptability, and suitability) or the SOF mission planning criteria, What amazes me is that this ALLEGED activity was kept secret for so long. (if it happened at all). It seems like there were many who were aware of this. This could have easily been leaked in the previous administration. It could have been leaked by congress.
Historical or Traditional SOF Mission Planning Criteria
1. Must be an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) mission or activity.
2. Mission or tasks should support the joint force commander’s campaign or operation plan, or special activities.
3. Missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and fully coordinated.
4. Required resources must be available to execute and support the SOF mission.
5. The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.
There are so many unknowns about this (alleged mission). But do we really think that emplacing a listening device on a north Korean communications system would provide the intelligence we desire and need regarding KJU's intentions?
And note that a similar mission was allegedly conducted in 2005.
The New York Times reporting also revealed another infiltration by SEALs two decades prior. Per the paper, a team of Navy SEALs crossed into North Korea in 2005 under orders from then-President George W. Bush.
Note how many people supposedly know about this mission in the previous administration and congress. There were probably dozens. involved in the investigation. Why did this not leak before now? Who is talking out of school and why? Who are the "two dozen?"
The New York Times said it spoke with two dozen people familiar with the classified operation, and held back several details that its reporters felt would harm security or future operations if disclosed.
When Joe Biden took office in 2021 he and his defense secretary Lloyd Austin ordered an investigation into the 2019 mission. Key members of Congress were then informed of the findings.
Again why is this being revealed now? What is someone trying to accomplish with the release of this information? Discredit the administration? Discredit hardline efforts and support "engagement" and negotiation with the regime? Does someone think this is a "trust building" action? Or Discredit engagement by giving Kim an out on any agreement by calling attention to US "hostile action" and calling into question US veracity in any negotiation and agreement?
I am sure KJU and his inner circle and the Propaganda and Agitation Department are figuring out how to best exploit this. We may learn a lot from their response to this.
SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong
A report by the New York Times details a complex and risky operation in 2019 to spy on North Korea's leader that ended when the SEALs aborted the mission, killing three fishermen who had stumbled across them.
Nicholas Slayton
Published Sep 5, 2025 3:06 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · Nicholas Slayton
Navy SEALs infiltrated North Korea in 2019 in a mission that fell apart, according to a story published in the New York Times Friday. The investigation outlined extensive and massive planning that went into a secret move to plant a listening device inside North Korea and how the operation fell apart when SEALs came across a boat of civilians.
The New York Times said it spoke with two dozen people familiar with the classified operation, and held back several details that its reporters felt would harm security or future operations if disclosed. Task & Purpose reached out to the Department of Defense to confirm or comment on the New York Times’ revelations. A spokesperson for the department declined to comment.
The mission involved SEALs from Red Squadron of Seal Team 6, or DEVGRU, the same unit that killed Osama Bin Laden. The SEALs were tasked with sneaking onto a remote shore in North Korea to install an electronic listening device that would be able to intercept messages from Kim Jong-Un. At the time, tensions between the United States and North Korea were elevated with both Kim Jong-Un and President Donald Trump warning of conflict over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Trump had repeatedly taken to Twitter to issue threats to Kim. A summit in 2018 saw a pause in nuclear and missile testing and the two leaders were setting up a second summit, this time in Hanoi in February 2019. The military was tasked with installing the listening device so the U.S. could have better intelligence going into that meeting.
Trump authorized the mission, ordering U.S. military personnel to infiltrate a sovereign nation that had for decades prepared for a resumption of war on the peninsula against South Korean and American troops. Joint Special Operations Command prepared a massive operation that involved a submarine, SEAL Team 6, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 and several other military assets including Navy ships and aircraft carrying additional special operations forces held in reserve.
There were immediate problems. Due to North Korean security, the SEALs had to go in nearly blind, with no drones or aircraft overhead relaying pictures or intelligence. Once deployed, the SEALs would be mostly on their own.
In early 2019, the SEALs deployed on two mini subs from a Navy submarine. They parked about 100 yards from shore underwater — one having to make a U-turn after overshooting the landing spot — and swam closer, occasionally peeking above the water.
But a small boat carrying three people in diving suits was already in the otherwise empty landing spot. The boat moved towards the submarines and a man in a diving suit jumped into the sea. According to the Times’ reporting, the senior enlisted SEAL of the raid team opened fire, with the other SEALs following his lead.
All three men on the boat were killed and the mission aborted. The SEALs sank the dead bodies to the sea floor and returned to the submarine. It was later determined the three people killed were civilian fishermen.
Neither Pyongyang or Washington acknowledged the botched operation (it remained unclear if Pyongyang had caught on to the operation). Kim and Trump met for two days at the end of February in Hanoi and again in the summer at the Korean demilitarized zone.
When Joe Biden took office in 2021 he and his defense secretary Lloyd Austin ordered an investigation into the 2019 mission. Key members of Congress were then informed of the findings.
The New York Times reporting also revealed another infiltration by SEALs two decades prior. Per the paper, a team of Navy SEALs crossed into North Korea in 2005 under orders from then-President George W. Bush.
North Korea continues to maintain its nuclear program. It is believed to possess several dozen nuclear weapons.
Contributing Editor
Nicholas Slayton is a Contributing Editor for Task & Purpose. In addition to covering breaking news, he writes about history, shipwrecks, and the military’s hunt for unidentified anomalous phenomenon (formerly known as UFOs).
taskandpurpose.com · Nicholas Slayton
4. US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says
Ah yes, the "catastrophic retaliation." This is what has long provided strategic planning paralysis: our fear of the north's catastrophic retaliation?
Note in 2014 I wrote about our strategic planning paralysis (of course my conclusion then was we need to seek bottom up change in the north that results in a free and unified Korea, but I digress):
Korea: Strategic Patience = Strategic Paralysis
https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/korea-strategic-patience-strategic-paralysis/
We have to think about what are Kim Jong Un's red lines for going to war. The most important one is whether his personal safety is threatened - either by internal or external forces. Second is if his "treasured sword" (nuclear weapons) is threatened. DId this threaten his personal safety or the loss of his nuclear arsenal?
Also did the regime even detect this operation? What intelligence did we collect to determine if this mission was in fact compromised? Did the regime assess this was a smuggling operation gone wrong? Or an escape operation gone wrong? Also, this action could have been South Korea or even China - (I assume this took place in the West Sea and on the West Coast? China would have the easiest access. Recall relations at the time were frosty but then again China would not likely have to conduct such an operation to plant a listening device (so let's not mirror-image our operation with a potential Chinese one). But it could have been Chinese smugglers.
Excerpt:
Neither the US nor the North Korean government has made the botched operation public. Before approving the plan, the White House had been concerned that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke a “catastrophic retaliation”.
Let's consider some KJU Red Lines- would the compromise of this operation provoke a catastrophic retaliation? I think not. I think the regime will try to exploit the revelation of this operation as part of its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
I. Red Lines That May Trigger a Conventional Attack on South Korea
1. Perceived Imminent Regime Change or Decapitation
2. Internal Instability Combined with External Pressure
3. Unification by Absorption Perception
II. Red Lines That May Trigger Use of WMD (Including Nuclear Weapons) During Major Combat Operations
1. Collapse of Conventional Forces
2. Perceived Loss of Regime Survival
3. Severing of Escape or Survival Routes
4. Perceived Use-It-or-Lose-It Nuclear Posture
III. Red Lines That May Trigger a Preemptive Nuclear Strike (First Use)
1. Imminent Decapitation Perception
2. Deployment of Strategic Assets
3. Political or Diplomatic Signals of Imminent Regime Change
4. Trigger by Miscalculation
US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says
New York Times says Trump authorized mission to plant listening device; team killed fishers they encountered
The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025
US Navy Seals shot and killed a number of North Korean civilians during a botched covert mission to plant a listening device in the nuclear-armed country during high-stakes diplomatic negotiations in 2019, the New York Times reported on Friday.
Citing unidentified sources, including current and former military officials with knowledge of the still-classified details, the newspaper said Donald Trump approved the operation during his first administration, as he was involved in historic talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The plan was designed to fix a “blind spot” in US intelligence that would allow the US to intercept the North Korean leader’s communications, potentially giving Trump an advantage ahead of the summit between the two leaders in 2019.
But it unraveled when the detachment of Navy Seals came across North Korean civilians who appeared to be diving for shellfish, the Times reported. The American forces opened fire, killing all those on the small fishing vessel, the report said, without specifying the number of casualties.
Neither the US nor the North Korean government has made the botched operation public. Before approving the plan, the White House had been concerned that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke a “catastrophic retaliation”.
A classified Pentagon review later concluded the killings were justified under the rules of engagement, the report said.
In 2019, the Seals were dispatched to North Korean waters in a nuclear-powered submarine, and then deployed in two mini-subs in frigid waters to reach the shore. A group of eight Seals were then supposed to sneak past North Korean border forces, install the device, and then escape undetected. However, the operation was disrupted by the attack on the civilians, and the Seals left without installing the device.
The newspaper also revealed that the plan was based on a similar 2005 operation approved by George W Bush.
The White House, the Pentagon and the US embassy in Seoul did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the report.
Since Trump’s last summit with Kim in 2019, talks have fallen apart and North Korea has forged ahead with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program.
Trump this week said that US forces had killed 11 people in a strike on a boat in international waters that he claimed was carrying drugs to the United States. The White House has released few details about the operation, which it claimed targeted members of Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang.
The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025
5. General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025 (New JSOC and EUSA Commanders among others)
Release
Immediate Release
General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025
https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4294758/general-and-flag-officers-announcement-for-sept-5-2025/
Sept. 5, 2025 |
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced today that the President has made the following nominations:
Navy Vice Adm. Richard A. Correll for appointment to the grade of admiral, with assignment as commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Correll is currently serving as deputy commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
Navy Vice Adm. George M. Wikoff for appointment to the grade of admiral, with assignment as commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, Naples, Italy. Wikoff is currently serving as commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet and Commander, Combined Maritime Forces, Manama, Bahrain.
Navy Rear Adm. Heidi K. Berg for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, with assignment as commander, Fleet Cyber Command/commander, Tenth Fleet/commander, Navy Space Command, Fort Meade, Maryland. Berg is currently serving as deputy commander, Fleet Cyber Command/deputy commander, Tenth Fleet/deputy commander, Navy Space Command, Fort Meade, Maryland.
Navy Rear Adm. (lower half) Brad J. Collins for appointment to the grade of rear admiral. Collins is currently serving as commander, Navy Region Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bradford J. Gering for appointment to the grade of general, with assignment as assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Gering is currently serving as deputy commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Army Lt. Gen. Jonathan P. Braga for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Braga is currently serving as commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Army Lt. Gen. Michele H. Bredenkamp for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Bredenkamp is currently serving as director's advisor for Military Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
Space Force Lt. Gen. David N. Miller, Jr. for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general with assignment as deputy chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Requirements, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Miller is currently serving as commander, Space Operations Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado.
Space Force Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Schiess for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy chief of Space Operations for Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Schiess is currently serving as commander, U.S. Space Forces – Space/Combined Joint Force Space Component Commander, U.S. Space Force, Vandenberg Space Force Base, California.
Army Maj. Gen. Winston P. Brooks for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy chairman, NATO Military Committee, Belgium. Brooks served as commanding general, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Joseph R. Clearfield for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Tampa, Florida. Clearfield is currently serving as the deputy commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Tampa, Florida.
Space Force Maj. Gen. Gregory J. Gagnon for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, U.S. Space Force Combat Forces Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. Gagnon is currently serving as deputy chief of Space Operations for Intelligence, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Army Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Hilbert for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commanding general, Eighth Army/chief of staff, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea. Hilbert is currently serving as commanding general, 11th Airborne Division and U.S. Army Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
Army Maj. Gen. James M. Smith for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commanding general, Installation Management Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas. Smith is currently serving as deputy commanding general, Installation Management Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.
Marine Corps Maj. Gen. William H. Swan for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy commandant, Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Swan is currently serving as the inspector general, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Space Force Maj. Gen. Steven P. Whitney for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general with assignment as director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Whitney is currently serving as director of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Col. Roderick T. Grunwald for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. Grunwald is currently serving as mobilization assistant to Commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.
6. Premier Army CBRNE Command Supports Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
Premier Army CBRNE Command Supports Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4294816/premier-army-cbrne-command-supports-ulchi-freedom-shield-in-south-korea/
Sept. 5, 2025 | By Walter Ham, 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command |
The U.S. military's premier joint task force-capable chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives formation participated in exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 in South Korea, Aug. 18–28.
Soldiers and Army civilians assigned to the 20th CBRNE Command's early entry command post exercised with 8th Army and Combined Forces Command units on the Korean Peninsula and employed capabilities from their home station located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. "It is always an honor to train together with our South Korean partners," said Army Brig. Gen. W Bochat, commanding general of the 20th CBRNE Command. "For more than seven decades, American soldiers have proudly defended liberty with our South Korean allies on freedom's frontier. This exercise is another chance to make one of the world's strongest alliances even stronger."
Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 is a defense-oriented exercise, featuring live-fire, constructive and field training exercises that engage allied forces and governmental agencies. The training is focused on conducting all-domain operations.
The annual exercise enhances the combined, joint, all-domain and interagency operating environment and the South Korea-U.S. alliance's response capabilities.
Soldiers and Army civilians assigned to the 20th CBRNE Command deploy from 19 bases in 16 states to confront and defeat the world's most dangerous hazards in support of joint, interagency and multinational operations.
Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground in northeast Maryland's science, technology and security corridor, the 20th CBRNE Command is home to the majority of the active-duty Army's CBRN specialists and explosive ordnance disposal technicians, as well as the 1st Global Field Medical Laboratory, CBRNE Analytical and Remediation Activity, weapons of mass destruction coordination teams and nuclear disablement teams.
Members routinely deploy to South Korea for exercises, and the command also deploys a chemical company to support rotational forces during deployments to the Korean Peninsula.
The Fort Hood, Texas-based 181st Chemical Company is serving in South Korea on a rotational deployment in support of the 23rd CBRN Battalion, 210th Fires Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division and 8th Army.
During their second deployment to South Korea in three years, the 181st Chemical Company is serving near the Korean Demilitarized Zone, the world's most heavily guarded border.
The 181st Chemical Company is part of the 2nd CBRN Battalion, 48th Chemical Brigade and 20th CBRNE Command.
Army hazardous response companies conduct CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance and decontamination operations in support of conventional and special operations forces around the world and provide support to civil authorities across the nation.
7. Kim Jong-un Leaves Beijing With Big Diplomatic Wins
Maybe. maybe not. We will have to see. Certainly on the surface (and I think the conventional wisdom) it appears that he has had a successful visit. It looked pretty good though he did not get all he wanted (e.g., trilateral summit and a statement from Xi backing his nuclear weapons - Xi continues to quasi-hedge on nuclear weapons)
The question is what from the spectacle can Kim exploit? Surely there will be short term domestic propaganda gains - cosmetic appearances).
How can he capitalize on this? The most likely way will be to continue economic, technical, and military support in various forms from China and Russia. But will he be able to turn all of this into successful political warfare and blackmail diplomacy to support regime survival? And ultimately will he develop sufficient military strength to dominate the peninsula by force after he achieves the key condition to coerce and eventually dominate the South - e.g., removal of US forces from the peninsula? We do nto have to allow him to achieve the conditions for his success.
Kim Jong-un Leaves Beijing With Big Diplomatic Wins
Mr. Kim’s presence at a Chinese military parade was a sign of his growing geopolitical leverage and that North Korea was being accepted as a de facto nuclear power.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/05/world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear.html
Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, leaving after meeting with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, in Beijing on Thursday. It was their sixth summit.Credit...Visual China Group, via Getty Images
By Choe Sang-Hun
Reporting from Seoul
Sept. 5, 2025
Leer en español
Before Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, arrived in Beijing this week on his personal train, he had held five summits with President Xi Jinping of China. Each time, their governments said, they talked about removing nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.
But their latest round of bilateral talks, on Thursday, appeared to be different in one important way. There was no mention of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula when both governments announced the results of the summit meeting on Friday.
The glaring absence marked another diplomatic win for Mr. Kim. He has long insisted that North Korea, which has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, be accepted as the world’s newest nuclear weapons power.
“China will not formally endorse North Korea as a nuclear power, but the latest meeting showed that it was no longer insisting on its denuclearization,” said Lee Byong-chul, an analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “It’s huge progress for Kim Jong-un’s strategy of getting his nuclear arsenal accepted as a fait accompli.”
Image
A photo released by North Korea’s state news agency shows Mr. Kim and Mr. Xi meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Thursday.Credit...Korean Central News Agency
Mr. Kim’s trip to Beijing this week highlighted his growing geopolitical value, which has helped persuade China and Russia to recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear power, analysts said.
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Mr. Kim has aided Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine by sending troops and weapons. As many as 2,000 North Korean troops died while fighting for Russia, according to a new estimate released this week by South Korean intelligence officials. On Wednesday, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia met with Mr. Kim in Beijing and again thanked him profusely.
As ties between Moscow and Pyongyang have deepened, Mr. Xi has tried to bring Mr. Kim back into his orbit by inviting him to the armed forces parade in Beijing on Wednesday. Their summit meeting on Thursday was their first in six years.
The parade was organized to show off China’s growing military might and its global leadership in pushing back against the United States’ dominance as a unipolar superpower. Mr. Kim stood to Mr. Xi’s left and Mr. Putin to Mr. Xi’s right on the viewing platform.
The globally televised scene of the three leaders, who share hostility toward the United States, standing in solidarity helped push Mr. Kim’s narrative of a “neo-Cold War” at home and abroad.
“Kim can also claim a diplomatic victory as North Korea has gone from unanimously sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council for its illegal nuclear and missile programs to being embraced by U.N.S.C. permanent members Russia and China,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international relations at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
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Watching footage of a rocket launch in Pyongyang in 2017.Credit...Kim Won-Jin/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
The North’s main state-run newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, dedicated the first half of its six-page Thursday edition to Mr. Kim’s trip to Beijing.
During their summit meeting on Thursday, Mr. Kim and Mr. Xi vowed to consolidate relations “no matter how the international situation may change,” according to North Korean and Chinese state media.
Mr. Kim also sought to expand “economic and trade cooperation with China,” according to the Chinese news agency Xinhua. Despite its growing ties with Russia, North Korea still depends on China for almost all of its external trade.
For many years, China and Russia shared the United States’ goal of rolling back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. They voted with the United States when the U.N. Security Council imposed harsh economic sanctions against North Korea in 2016 and 2017.
But that cooperation crumbled as the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing intensified, and in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Both Russia and China have used their veto power at the Security Council to scuttle U.S. attempts to impose fresh sanctions on North Korea in recent years, giving the country the freedom to test nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with impunity. In 2024, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia said that Moscow viewed the notion of “denuclearizing” North Korea as a “closed matter.”
North Korea’s growing ties with Russia and China mean that President Trump will find it harder to bring Mr. Kim to the negotiating table than when he first met him in 2018, analysts said.
“The threshold for a North Korea-U.S. summit has now become higher,” said Yang Moo-jin, a former president of the Seoul-based University of North Korean Studies.
Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.
8. South Korea, Japan, US bolster ‘first island chain’ defence with Freedom Edge drills
An important message in the headline and subtitle on a number of levels.
"Freedom Edge" is taking place at the edge of freedom defending the freedom of the countries located along what China calls the "first island chain."
South Korea, Japan, US bolster ‘first island chain’ defence with Freedom Edge drills
The exercise is the ‘most advanced demonstration of trilateral defence cooperation to date’, according to the US Indo-Pacific Command
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 3:08pm, 5 Sep 2025Updated: 3:52pm, 5 Sep 2025
South Korea, Japan and the United States will hold a trilateral military drill this month, in what analysts describe as a display of allied cohesion led by Washington to counter the perceived show of solidarity by regional rivals.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Friday that the “multi-domain” exercise, known as Freedom Edge, would take place in international waters east and south of Jeju Island from September 15 to 19.
“The drills are an annual exercise aimed at responding to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and guarding regional peace and stability while adhering to international law and regulations,” it added.
The announcement follows China’s Victory Day parade on Wednesday, which spotlighted growing strategic ties between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang.
The US Indo-Pacific Command described Freedom Edge as the “premier trilateral, multi-domain exercise” between the three nations, saying it showed their “shared commitment to collectively achieve and maintain peace in Asia-Pacific.”
“In addition to continuing to refine ballistic missile defence capabilities, this year’s exercise will incorporate Marine and Air Force aviation capabilities and introduce enhanced air defence exercises, medical evacuation training and maritime interdiction operation training,” it said in a press statement.
What did China’s military parade tell us about its capabilities and global standing?
The coming exercise will be the third of its kind, following previous rounds conducted in June and November last year.
Building on the exercise and trilateral ballistic missile defence and defensive counter-air drills held throughout 2024, this year’s Freedom Edge would represent the “most advanced demonstration of trilateral defence cooperation to date”, the US Indo-Pacific Command said.
“The continued cooperation of all three nations tangibly shows strength and an unwavering commitment to the defence of our vital interests against shared threats and strengthens deterrence in Asia-Pacific through bolstering combat-credible forces inside the first island chain,” it added.
The first island chain refers to the arc of islands marking the eastern edge of the East China Sea and South China Sea – from the Japanese archipelago and the Ryukyu Islands, southward through Taiwan and the Philippines, and down to the Greater Sunda Islands – areas that Beijing is seen as seeking to dominate through its assertive maritime strategy.
Although the exercise was planned months ago, the timing of its announcement appeared intended to “counterbalance China’s military muscle flexing”, said Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University.
“China has displayed its military might, parading its powerful nuclear missiles, and the message was too clear for the United States and its allies to sit idle,” Chang said.
It’s mainly aimed at bolstering deterrence against North Korea’s missile threats
Kim Yeol-soo, Korea Institute for Military Affairs analyst on Freedom Edge
However, Kim Yeol-soo, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, cautioned against overstating the exercise’s broader geopolitical significance.
“It’s mainly aimed at bolstering deterrence against North Korea’s missile threats. It would be over-interpreting to say this exercise is fuelling a new Cold War-style bloc-against-bloc confrontation,” Kim said.
The name Freedom Edge draws from key bilateral exercises the US conducts with its Asian allies – Freedom Shield with South Korea and Keen Edge with Japan.
This will be the first iteration of the trilateral drill since South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and US President Donald Trump took office.
An official from the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff said this year’s Freedom Edge would be held on a scale similar to last year’s, but with the notable exclusion of US aircraft carriers.
“The absence of US aircraft carriers from Freedom Edge 25 is a message from Washington” to express dissatisfaction with Seoul’s lack of a clear commitment to intervening in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, said Lee Il-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defence Network.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied
9. How the Immigration Raid at Hyundai’s Factory Complex Unfolded
We still do not have all the details on this but there is a buried lede here. It will be important to see how this sad story for our alliance plays out.
But this excerpt is a key point to almost all South Korean investment in the US. There are two different elements in these excerpts:
Those arrested on Thursday had allegedly crossed the border illegally, entered through a visa waiver program that prohibited them from working or had overstayed their visas, said Steven Schrank, a special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Atlanta.
“Those who exploit our workforce, undermine our economy, and violate our federal laws will be held accountable,” Schrank said. No criminal charges have been filed yet, and the investigation is continuing, he said.
...
Investigators are continuing to look at which company employed the individuals, Schrank said, but he noted a network of subcontractors worked at the site.
The South Korean nationals were largely given visas suitable for training purposes, such as the B-1 visa, and many there were working as instructors, the South Korean government official said.
I doubt many (if any at all) of the Korean nations crossed the border with Mexico as implied by Special Agent Schrank. It is likely that some of the subcontractors may have employed migrants who crossed the border which is likely taking place at every construction site across the country.
But as noted most of the Korean nations were on visas for training purposes. The problem that Korea (and Taiwan) and others who are investing in high tech factories in the US have is finding American workers who are suitably educated for work in advanced technology factories. I heard from a Korean businessman that Korea needs about 30,000 B-1 visas to train an American work force (especially in the hip factories out west) but I imagine in car manufacturing plants in Georgia as well - this is no longer Henry Ford's Model T assembly line).
The bottom line: while there are likely visa violations among the Korean workforce, the majority, if any, were not sneaking into the country illegally with the purpose of staying in the US as illegal aliens. Of course this episode will have a chilling effect on Koreans who desire to come to the US legally. inthe future. And that will have a long term impact on Korean manufacturing and advanced technology investments in the US.
Also note how both Hyundai and the ROK government are handling this with professionalism. Some would expect a knee jerk emotional reaction (which will come from some) calling for an end to the Korean investments just promised to POTUS at the summit last month. But Hyundai and the ROK government will not do that.
How the Immigration Raid at Hyundai’s Factory Complex Unfolded
Hundreds of South Korean workers arrested at Georgia manufacturing complex that Trump had previously hailed
https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/hyundai-ice-raid-factory-213ff58f?st=nS7wLr&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Sharon Terlep
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and Ryan Felton
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Updated Sept. 6, 2025 6:45 am ET
Inside the Hyundai Motor assembly plant near Savannah, Ga. Photo: Anna Ottum for WSJ
ELLABELL, Ga.—Hundreds of federal agents mustered just outside a sprawling Hyundai Motor 005380 -0.68%decrease; red down pointing triangle complex here about a half-hour from Savannah that is called the “Metaplant.” Behind the walls, workers assemble electric vehicles in a $7.6 billion site that is so new that some buildings are still under construction.
Immigration officers entered the property around 10:45 a.m. Thursday, and began separating a large group of workers by nationality and visa status. Groups were processed and then loaded onto buses. Some attempted to flee—a handful ran into a sewage pond.
The government’s target: evidence to back up an investigation into alleged illegal employment practices at an EV battery plant under construction on the nearly 3,000-acre site. What resulted is the largest single-site enforcement operation in the history of Homeland Security Investigations, an official said Friday.
In the end, about 475 people were detained. Many of them worked for subcontractors for Hyundai and its joint venture partner, LG Energy Solution. On Saturday, LG Energy said 47 of its employees—all South Koreans except one Indonesian—plus roughly 250 employees of partner companies, most of them South Korean, were among the detainees.
Kia Burke, a logistics manager at another part of the Hyundai site, said she wasn’t surprised the facility was raided given the large number of employees who are immigrants. The scope of the operation, however, was unexpected.
“I was amazed,” she said, adding that she was grateful it didn’t involve her teammates. “I just thought, ‘It wasn’t us—this time.’ ”
The immigration raid and a continuing criminal investigation represent a stunning turn for Hyundai, which for months has been courting goodwill from the Trump administration by announcing a steady stream of manufacturing investments in the U.S.
Hyundai said Friday it is committed to compliance with all laws and regulations, including employment verification requirements and immigration laws.
“We expect the same commitment from all our partners, suppliers, contractors, and subcontractors,” the company said. Hyundai has since opened an internal investigation to ensure all suppliers and their subcontractors at the site are in compliance with the law and regulations.
LG Energy said Saturday it was suspending most business trips to the U.S. and directing employees on assignment in the U.S. to return home immediately or stay put in their accommodations.
Hyundai executives have touted the ever-expanding production operations at the Georgia site as a job-creating boon for the economy and the company—all the while reducing exposure to massive automotive tariffs imposed earlier this year.
The centerpiece of Hyundai’s $21 billion in investments announced in March is what the Korean automaker has dubbed the “Metaplant,” a collection of production facilities that are already pumping out Ioniq 5 and Ioniq 9 sport-utility vehicles.
The sprawling complex includes plans for a battery plant to supply EVs made by Hyundai at the site. Photo: Anna Ottum for WSJ
The compound, which will make EV batteries as well as other cars from Kia and Genesis, is the cornerstone of the company’s plan to expand local EV and hybrid-vehicle production. It is a point of pride for the state of Georgia—and President Trump.
“This investment is a clear demonstration that tariffs very strongly work,” Trump said during a March press conference announcing Hyundai’s various projects, which include a steel mill in Louisiana.
In the Oval Office on Friday, Trump defended the raid. “I would say they are illegal aliens and ICE was just doing its job,” he said.
Once the Georgia complex is complete, Hyundai says it will employ 8,500 workers and have the capacity to make a half million vehicles a year. In late March, the company officially opened the plant with a ceremony featuring Republican Gov. Brian Kemp, who called the project a “once-in-a-generation opportunity, made possible by our commitment to working with job creators to build fruitful partnerships for decades.”
The heap of praise was followed by a string of months where Hyundai, which also owns the Genesis luxury brand and has a major stake in rival Kia, largely refrained from imposing price increases on its models and chose to absorb Trump’s auto tariffs.
On Wednesday, the company reported record U.S. monthly sales for August, and an executive said it plans to keep growing, no matter what “comes out of left field,” be it a pandemic, a microchip shortage or new, costly tariffs.
“Really the best way to beat the tariffs is to continue to invest in the United States,” said Randy Parker, CEO of Hyundai Motor America.
By then, the government had already secured a search warrant on the Hyundai-LG battery plant site, according to a court filing this week.
Hyundai expects to employ 8,500 workers at the Georgia Metaplant once it is completed. Photo: Anna Ottum for WSJ
The arrests caught South Korean government officials and Hyundai by surprise. Seoul, a close U.S. ally, wasn’t given prior notice by the Trump administration, according to a South Korean official.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Saturday ordered his government to make an all-out effort to ensure the rights of Korean citizens and Korean businesses investing in the U.S. aren’t violated, the country’s foreign minister said.
Those arrested on Thursday had allegedly crossed the border illegally, entered through a visa waiver program that prohibited them from working or had overstayed their visas, said Steven Schrank, a special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Atlanta.
“Those who exploit our workforce, undermine our economy, and violate our federal laws will be held accountable,” Schrank said. No criminal charges have been filed yet, and the investigation is continuing, he said.
The battery plant is meant to supply power cells for EVs Hyundai makes at the Metaplant. It is located away from buildings that house Hyundai’s production lines, where some workers said they didn’t see the raid taking place across the vast site.
In one fluorescent-lit space with desks and cubicles, workers stood still as law enforcement officers monitored the area, according to a video posted on social media.
“We have a warrant for this entire construction site, OK?” said an officer who wore a neck gaiter and sunglasses. “We’re Homeland Security. We have a search warrant for the whole site. We need construction to cease immediately.”
Several people fled the area and jumped into a sewage pond, and were followed by agents in a boat, the Justice Department said. The site is partially outdoors, making it an uncomfortable day for workers who were being questioned, as temperatures approached 90 degrees on Thursday.
Investigators are continuing to look at which company employed the individuals, Schrank said, but he noted a network of subcontractors worked at the site.
The South Korean nationals were largely given visas suitable for training purposes, such as the B-1 visa, and many there were working as instructors, the South Korean government official said.
On Friday afternoon, cars trickled in and out of the facility, which is surrounded by freshly laid roads with names like Kia Drive and Elantra Avenue. Outside, a dozen bucket trucks sat idle, surrounded by shipping containers, temporary trailers and parked cars. Construction had stopped.
News of the raid reverberated through Savannah-area businesses that serve the region’s fast-growing South Korean population.
Minh Nguyen, who manages a Korean barbecue restaurant, read about the raid on Facebook and thought it was fake. As customers and employees trickled in throughout the day, he realized it was real.
Nguyen was bracing for the impact it would have on the night’s dinner rush.
“This is really going to affect us,” he said. Neither he nor the restaurant owners are South Korean, he said, yet the restaurant still gets a large influx of diners from Hyundai. Many come in larger groups, including one last weekend of more than 30 people.
“Tonight, we’ll find out how bad this is going to be,” he said.
Write to Sharon Terlep at sharon.terlep@wsj.com and Ryan Felton at ryan.felton@wsj.com
10. The Legal Status of North Korean Refugees & Survival Migration
From our Young Professionals writing program at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
Excerpt:
Conclusion
The legal status and survival migration of North Korean refugees underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in international refugee law and humanitarian practices. The case studies of North Korean defectors in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China reveal significant gaps and ambiguities in their protection and resettlement. Addressing these challenges requires a hybrid approach that incorporates normative and institutional reforms, enhanced collaboration with NGOs, and the reauthorization of the NKHR Act. By prioritizing the fundamental human rights of North Korean refugees and adopting adaptive frameworks, the international community can better support their survival and integration, ultimately fostering a more just and humane global refugee system.
The Legal Status of North Korean Refugees & Survival Migration
By Isabella Grace Packowski
Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate
Introduction
The plight of North Korean refugees presents a complex and multifaceted challenge within the realm of international refugee law and human rights. This paper examines the legal status and survival migration of North Korean escapees, exploring the historical context of refugee law, specific case studies of North Korean refugees in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, and the broader implications of survival migration. By analyzing the institutional frameworks, national policies, and humanitarian efforts, this study aims to shed light on the critical issues faced by North Korean refugees and propose viable solutions to enhance their protection and resettlement.
Historical Background | Refugee Law
Before delving into the case studies and offering potential solutions, it is first crucial to analyze the institutional and legal history of the leading body in global governance concerning refugee aid, status, and protection – the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, hereafter). The emergence of refugees as an international concern dates back as early as the 17th century, when religious persecutions and wars in the Middle East and Europe were a concern. This concern continued into the early 20th century, with provisions under the League of Nations and its Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (1921), following events such as the First World War and the Russian Civil War. However, the grounds on which these provisions were built were shaky at best, with minimal legal aid provided and catering to only specific national groups.
It wasn’t until the aftermath of World War II, and the founding of the UN in 1946, that global collaboration solidified and accelerated. This was hastily supplemented by the birth of the UNHCR (1950) as one of its key sub-bodies, replacing the International Refugee Organization (IRO -1947) and its predecessor, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA -1943). However, it would not be without its own complexities. There was limited financial and governing autonomy amongst other UN bodies. They also held only specific functions and strict definitions that constituted refugee status, limiting the scope to which such aid could apply (i.e., its mandate to provide international protection for refugees and to find durable solutions to their plight, not including material assistance, the inclusion of “internal refugees,” etc.)
Representative of this ambiguity, the United States initially sought to establish a temporary international body with limited authority and a focus on international legal protection. This was contrary to the varying perspectives of other Western States, who sought more operational cost and geographic considerations, and South Asian states, who fought for the permanency of the organization. During the Cold War, international refugee law underwent shifts in its priorities and foundations within a context shaped by Eurocentrism, resolutions passed by the General Assembly expanding mandates, sovereignty and non-intervention, and the emerging concept of “moral authority.” Consequently, after this era ended, contradictions within refugee law, particularly regarding its non-political foundations, attitudes toward interventionism, and emerging security threats such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, profoundly shook the international sphere in the realm of human rights scenarios.
North Korean Refugees Case Study
To better understand how refugee law operates in complex geopolitical contexts, the following section focuses on the resettlement process of North Korean refugees in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, and proposes considerations and solutions. Due to geographical vicinity, shared history, and cultural similarities, many North Korean escapees, desperate to flee the social inequalities and human rights abuses sustained by the Kim regime, often seek refuge in two of North Korea’s neighboring states: China and South Korea.
Although South Korea has taken in over 34,000 refugees from the North – drawing on its constitution, which recognizes, with some limitations, that anyone born on the Korean Peninsula as a South Korean national is entitled to the protection of the Republic of Korea – many defectors still face significant discrimination and stark cultural and political differences. As such, some will opt to be resettled to Western states.
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, North Korean defectors qualify as refugees sur place, meaning “...individuals who are not considered refugees upon leaving their country but become refugees later due to the persecution they are subjected to if they were to be deported.” However, differences in how countries recognize North Korean refugees stem from the varying diplomatic relationships each nation maintains with North Korea, leading to ambiguities in their refugee status, asylum claims, and perceived legitimacy. The United Kingdom, for example, with a higher refugee intake than other European nation, recognizes these difficulties but does not view them as grounds for asylum. As such, North Korean secondary asylum seekers are subject to refoulement to South Korea under the 2012 UK-ROK Agreement on the Readmission of Persons.
Furthermore, the UK aligns with the European Union's (EU) policies, engaging critically with North Korea via cultural exchanges and humanitarian aid. As such, it makes its decisions based on its diplomatic approach to how South Korea handles relations with North Korea while adhering to the aforementioned EU protocols. It is such that the UK Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (UKUT) has made compromises in accepting asylum seekers, respecting the South Korean Constitution, correlating with the length of time (+/- 10 years) spent in or out of the Korean peninsula: “... if the appellant is known to not have resided outside of the Korean Peninsula for 10 years, they are sent to South Korea; if they are recognized to have been outside for over 10 years, they are accepted. For the latter, UKUT recognizes that if an appellant is not a national at the time of the case and ‘may be refused nationality’, they shall not be treated as a dual national.” Thus, such arguments maintain that these national birthright interpretations remain only within the realm of South Korean domestic policies.
Despite aspirations to resettle in Western nations, to date, a total of only 220 North Korean refugees reside in the United States. The limited number is due to an extensive and time-consuming immigration process, which offers fewer benefits compared to South Korea, and mercurial American foreign policy affairs. However, such decreasing trends are not only applicable to the United States, as, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, only 229 persons were resettled in 2020, a stark contrast to the 1,047 defectors aided as seen in 2018. Both of these examples not only showcase stricter border controls implemented, especially under the Kim regime, reduced funding from aid countries, and the effects of Covid-19 on financial and physical flexibility.
The primary legislation at play for asylum implementation of North Korean refugees in the United States is the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA), which was first signed into law by former President George W. Bush in 2004, then extended in 2008, 2012 and 2018. Most recently, the NKHRA was submitted for reauthorization in May 2022, and, despite the House of Representatives having passed it in May 2024, the Senate failed to address it in time, leaving the Act in legal limbo.
The US’s approach to this concern is argued to be highly reflective of President Bush’s aggressive and conservative stance on North Korea at the time and its proliferation of nuclear weapons. This forward-leaning approach was maintained through its long-standing military alliance with South Korea, which dates back to the end of the Korean War, as well as through diplomatic affairs with North Korea. Lastly, refugees’ asylum in the United States is not barred for those who have already accepted their South Korean citizenship, further exposing the complexity of foreign affairs and international refugee law.
The exact number of North Korean refugees in China remains unknown, but estimates range expansively from 5,000 to 250,000 defectors. This uncertainty and lack of documentation of North Koreans in China is caused primarily by China’s claiming they are “illegal economic migrants,” China’s refusing to grant them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status, Covid-19, and the precarious nature of legalities, citizenship, and violations of international law. China, therefore, presents a much more complex and egregious view of North Korean defectors, their status, and the lack of protection outside of the discriminatory practices that refugees typically face. Most importantly, China blatantly violates the UN’s 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, infringing, in particular on Article 33.1 of the Convention:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
Article 33.1 is violated by China as it, more often than not, willingly expels and forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees to North Korea despite the known persecution or harm that would await them once returned to their home country. Those repatriated are imprisoned in the detention system of the country, either sent to labor camps, 교화소 “kyo-hwa-so”, or to political prison camps, 관리소 “kwan-li-so,” where they face a credible fear of persecution, harsh interrogation, torture, imprisonment, or even death. North Koreans who tried to escape the Kim regime are obstinately sent to political prison camps for severe punishment, as these detention facilities are known for the inhumane conditions that are imposed on prisoners. Since 2014, it is estimated that at least 2,000 North Korean refugees have been deemed illegal migrants and are at risk of being returned to North Korea while being held in Chinese detention centers.
North Korean women in particular are subjected to human rights abuses in China. This can be mainly in relation to the conditions of China’s “Red Zone,” in which “... it is estimated that up to 500,000 female North Koreans, some as young as twelve, hide in this region. They are subjected to systematic rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, forced labor, and cybersex trafficking.” With women and girls being lured into China under the pretense of finding work, as many as 80% are instead forced into the sex trade, and such abuse has become common practice. The trafficking of North Korean women and girls is reported to generate more than $105 million annually for organized crime networks in both China and North Korea.
Moreover, North Korean women are often sold to Chinese men as wives. Due to China’s one-child policy, children born in China to North Korean and Chinese parents remain undocumented/stateless children of illegal “mixed marriages.” They are thus deemed “stateless” as they are not in possession of official Chinese citizenship and are born outside of North Korea. In some cases, such as in rural Heilongjiang Province, women who have married Chinese men and have given birth to at least two children are more likely to be issued temporary identification papers.
These children then become registered in the 户口 “hukuo” system, in which said practice is to place hardships on the father, especially if the mother is forcibly repatriated. These human rights violations that North Korean escapees face are due to their labelling by China as “illegal economic immigrants.” Escapees thus often remain undocumented without fundamental rights in education, welfare, and health services to avoid repatriation.
Lastly, beyond any potential illicit financial gains through transnational crime networks, China’s strategic alliance with North Korea significantly shapes its approach to North Korean refugees. Under a longstanding bilateral agreement and despite pressure by the international community, China continues to classify these individuals as illegal economic migrants rather than refugees and routinely repatriates them. This practice not only contradicts the humanitarian principles of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, in particular Article 33.1 and the principle of non-refoulement, but also raises serious concerns about complicity in human rights violations upon their return.
The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) found that 90% of all forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees sent to detention facilities eventually die from the harsh conditions and violence they are subjected to. Women are additionally routinely subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, from torture to forced abortions or infanticide if they became pregnant with Chinese men.
Survival Migration
Throughout this policy analysis, a recurring theme has been the importance of fundamental human rights, comprehensive international law, and protection relative to the treatment of refugees. This leads to the next area of study, “survival migration.” This term refers to “Persons outside their country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.” While focusing primarily on cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Andrew Battes expresses how, in addition to the mass exodus example from Zimbabwe, “In Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, and Myanmar, for example, significant numbers of people have fled to neighboring countries not because of a well-founded fear of individualized persecution, but more often because of serious deprivations of socioeconomic rights related to the underlying political situation.”
In the case of Myanmar, for example, the Rohingya people face similar disparities in legal status and discrimination after fleeing to India in response to a military junta’s rule and a 2017 genocide. India, not being a signatory of the Convention, acknowledges the fervent prosecution of the Rohingya but national security trumps everything else. Thus, India stresses a ‘right to life’ vs. a ‘right to settle’ approach. As an ethno-religious minority, survival migrants are now the world’s largest group stateless people, having become a serious global issue.
The term “survival migration” itself is not mentioned in the 1951 Convention, and, although in theory those who fall under this category have rights under international law, there is no set framework for those who do not fit the rigid definitions that already exist. This is most reflective of the way international bodies and states view the situation, a dichotomy of economic migrant and refugee, without consideration to other factors outside of generalized violence or individualized persecution, including environment, state fragility, and livelihood failure, in addition to socioeconomic deprivation of rights, as seen with North Korea. It thus shows how the process of becoming and being classified as refugees is not monocausal, but is intertwined with these factors and institutional gaps, which, in turn, affect how refugees are assisted. “Regime stretching,” as Betts describes, furthers this thought, in that institutions are not themselves “fixed,” but can be adaptive.
Government Organizations
Domestic-based government organizations can also play a significant role in refugee resettlement. For example, the 하나원 (hanawon), a South Korean government-regulated resettlement facility, established in 1999 by the Ministry for Unification of South Korea 통일부 “tong-il-bu.” Situated in Seoul, the organization provides a place for North Korean defectors to “graduate” before joining South Korean society. The facility consists of two facilities, a school and a hospital, and is heavily guarded. North Korean refugees who recently escaped North Korea participate in a 12-week program where they learn invaluable life skills and are exposed to concepts such as democracy, human rights, and religious freedoms in order to adapt to South Korean society. After “graduating,” defectors receive financial resettlement support, and further facilitative aid can be provided by the South Korean government, such as the Elm House for women. However, despite the success of this rigorous and involved program, discrimination, difficulties in securing full-time work, and losing connections with other North Korean refugees often plague the trainees.
NGOs
Alongside formal governance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can also play a prominent and direct role in aiding refugees. An NGO that helps address topics of human trafficking prevention and rescue for women is the Nomi Network. With over 20,000 aided since 2012, from India to the United States, the organization seeks to empower and protect victims by its mission statement, expressing how “Nomi Network aims to end human trafficking by creating pathways to safe employment, empowering women and girls to break cycles of exploitation in their families and communities.”
Although no direct aid to North Korean defectors has been made so far, initiatives represented by global results similar to those provided by the Nomi Network could greatly help prevent or support those trafficked, especially in China. Refugees International, another organization based in Washington D.C., also works to advocate for “...lifesaving assistance, human rights, and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.” They have worked largely with the Rohingya people's crisis thus far.
Proposed Solutions
In response to criticisms about the legalities, exclusions, and ambiguities in international refugee law, a multitude of solutions can be proposed, ranging from broader institutional reforms to specific policy adjustments targeting North Korean refugees. Betts suggests two different approaches: normative and institutional. At the normative level, options include working with the existing legal framework, developing a “soft law framework,” consolidating human rights law through guidance from survival and migration principles, and, lastly, adding an additional protocol to the 1951 Convention. The implementation of this method would incorporate “survival migration” into current legislation, pertaining to refugees, escapees, and defectors, such as those from North Korea.
For institutional recommendations, Betts presents five ways forward: 1) applying a “cluster approach,” where “...the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed in the context of UN humanitarian reform,” 2) designating responsibility to a single agency, 3) creating a new, efficient body that could work on a temporary basis to help coordinate other agencies, 4) creating a special representative that can oversee these coordination, and finally, 5) “...creating an issue-based consultative process.” Overall, Betts argues that such reforms are political in nature and would inevitably lead to disagreements and tensions between states. As such, commitments to helping aid survival migrants should be achieved within existing frameworks, especially when also considering all the other interwoven factors as aforementioned.
From a case-study approach, HRNK’s recommendations provide a plethora of solutions, including: 1) Clarifying the number, status and humanitarian situation of the North Korean refugees and workers in China. 2) The imperative for China to address its violations of international law, recognize North Korean escapees as refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulment. 3) The recommendation to the United States to seek more direct ways to reach refugees in China and to help with asylum in the USA. 4) North Korean refugee protection and rescue must become a pillar of the North Korean Human Rights Act. 5) The reauthorization of the NKHR Act, which expired in 2022.
Ultimately, I recommend a hybrid solution, considering a mix of these proposed recommendations and results seen in current legislation and advocacy. This alternative would encapsulate Betts’ soft law framework, emphasizing the need to incorporate “survival migrants” and other factors not currently addressed in legislation, particularly the 1951 UN Convention, working more extensively with South Korea’s government-run organizations such as the Hanawon, NGOs such as the Nomi Network and Refugees International, and reauthorizing the NKHR Act, thereby securing a more prominent place in American foreign policy.
Conclusion
The legal status and survival migration of North Korean refugees underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms in international refugee law and humanitarian practices. The case studies of North Korean defectors in South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and China reveal significant gaps and ambiguities in their protection and resettlement. Addressing these challenges requires a hybrid approach that incorporates normative and institutional reforms, enhanced collaboration with NGOs, and the reauthorization of the NKHR Act. By prioritizing the fundamental human rights of North Korean refugees and adopting adaptive frameworks, the international community can better support their survival and integration, ultimately fostering a more just and humane global refugee system.
Isabella Grace Packowski is a graduate student at Indiana University Bloomington pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in security, diplomacy, and governance. She holds a BA in Korean Language and Culture with a minor in Political Science, where her studies focused on U.S.–ROK/DPRK relations, foreign policy, and international security. Her research experience includes archival analysis of North Korea’s Juche ideology. As an intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in 2023, she contributed to the translation of publications. She also conducted international media monitoring supported the production of daily newsletters highlighting key developments in North Korean human rights and policy. With a strong foundation in cross-cultural engagement, political history studies, and policy analysis, Isabella aims to advance diplomacy and proliferation security through future work with the U.S. State Department or international NGOs.
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[1] Betts, Alexander, Loescher, Gil, and Milner, James. 2012. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed April 27, 2025. ProQuest Ebook Central. (pg. 7)
[2] Ibid, 8-9.
[3] Ibid, 9.
[4] Ibid, 8,10,13.
[5] Ibid..
[6] Ibid, 15.
[7] Ibid, 14.
[8] Ibid., 13-14.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 2, 19-20, 28-29.
[11] Ibid., 55, 57, 62.
[12] “Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum.” n.d. Journal of Public and International Affairs. https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/seeking-safer-shells-analysis-interpretations-justifications-and-rationales-behind-decisions.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ryu, Eric. 2021. “Why the Number of North Korean Refugees in the United States Is so Low.” Edited by Sophia Hapin and Rosa Park. NKHIDDENGULAG. August 10, 2021. https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/why-the-number-of-north-korean-refugees-in-the-united-states-is-so-low.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Seeking Safer Shells…”; Young Kim. 2024. “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.” Congresswoman Young Kim - Representing California’s 40th District (blog). December 26, 2024. https://youngkim.house.gov/2024/12/26/us-congress-fails-to-extend-north-korean-human-rights-act/.
[28] Kim, Young, 2024, “US Congress Fails to Extend North Korean Human Rights Act - Congresswoman Young Kim.”; H.R.3012 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023. (n.d.). Congress.gov | Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3012?s=1&r=21.
[29] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Scarlatoiu, Greg and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023. “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China.” https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Scarlatoiu-CECC-Response-HRNK-FINAL-.pdf. (pg. 1, 4)
[33] Ibid., 4.
[34] Ibid; United Nations General Assembly & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (n.d.). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf (pg. 30)
[35] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 2.
[36] Ibid., 3,7.
[37] Ibid., 7.
[38] Ibid., 3-4.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 6-7.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 2-3, 8.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Seeking Safer Shells…”
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] “Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China,” 7.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Betts, Alexander. “Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework.” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (2010): 361–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29764952.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India - Refugees International.” 2025. Refugees International. January 2, 2025. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 362, 364.
[60] Ibid, 361-362, 364.
[61] Ibid., 362.
[62] Ibid., 363.
[63] “Hanawon - North Korean Resettlement Facility in South Korea | Crossing borders.” (n.d.). Crossing Borders - Helping North Korean Refugees and Orphans. https://www.crossingbordersnk.org/hanawon
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] “Year in Review | Nomi Network.” n.d. Nomi Network. https://nominetwork.org/year-in-review/.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] “A Lifetime in Detention…”
[72] Ibid., 377.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 377-378.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Scarlatoiu, 8.
11. The Variables of OPCON: One Wartime OPCON Transition, Multiple Plans
Actually I have a fourth option that I am working on after spending the last month in Korea observing our great ROK and US combined military force.
A light bulb went off for me as I delved deeply into the plans and observed the simulation and activities.
But I am not ready for prime time yet (sorry to be a tease).
However, I will say this: one other option is to sustain the ROK/US CFC and rotate commanders. The Commander to follow General Brunsan would be (or would have been the current DEPCOM, General Kang (or his replacement)). General Brunson's replacement would remain as the UNC Commander, the commander of the subunified command fo USFK and the SUSMOAK - the senior US military officer in Korea and a permanent member of the Military Committee which is arguably the most important organization in Korea as it oversees the ROK/US CFC for both nations). The US general after that would reassume command of CFC. The new ROK DEPCOM would then right seat ride and fleet up to be the Commander on the next rotation and this would continue in perpetuity until we achieve a free and unified Korea.
I wrote about the importance of sustained the ROK/US CFC in 2013.
The Elephant in the Room? North Korea and the Myth of ROK/U.S. “OPCON Transfer”
https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2013/12/10/the-elephant-in-the-room-north-korea-and-the-myth-of-roku-s-opcon-transfer/
Again, the below article is a very important analysis from Clint Work. No one has done as deep a dive into the OPCON transition issues as Clint and his informed background is crucial to thinking through the way ahead.
Excerpts:
Each option above – from jettisoning transition to staying the course to shifting back to a parallel structure – presents certain pros and cons. However, the above analysis is only a start. Each option (as well as other potential pathways) requires more thorough cost-benefit analysis. Most commentary on wartime OPCON transition merely scratches the surface of the complexities involved. To be fair, even the informed public is generally ignorant of and disinterested in detailed analysis of command structures.
Yet it is important to review how the alliance has shifted between different command structures as it moved from one wartime OPCON transition plan to the next. After all, the devil is in the details. The different command structures are more than just organizational charts, operational processes, and command relations. They reveal each ally’s strategic priorities, which while mostly consistent over time, can and do evolve and could gradually diverge.
Ultimately, regardless of what command structure the alliance adopts, if both sides uphold regular, transparent, and honest communication, they will be able to navigate any future arrangement. If communication and allied trust are solid, unity of effort will persist, no matter the choice of command structure. Alternatively, even the most precisely designed and cohesive integrated structure will falter if trust is broken.
Authors
The Variables of OPCON: One Wartime OPCON Transition, Multiple Plans
Across several transition plans, the South Korea-U.S. alliance has devised different types of command structures to follow the wartime OPCON transition.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-variables-of-opcon-one-wartime-opcon-transition-multiple-plans/
By Clint Work
September 05, 2025
Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea Commanding General, and Republic of Korea Army Brig. Gen. Won-Jun Cha, Commander of Combined Military Information Support Operation Component Command, exchange coins following Brunson’s visit to CMISOCC Headquarters, March 1, 2025.
Credit: U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Ian Vega-Cerezo, UNC/CFC/USFK Public Affairs
The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition in one form or another has been an official alliance policy for two decades, if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and ROK administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.
Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and ROK officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.
This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. After exploring the “control rod” logic and South Korean “sovereignty narrative” in the first several articles, this article explores variations in alliance command structures over the last 20 years to help chart the path ahead.
Subsequent articles will explore the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan, how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment.
When thinking about the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s future options, it is instructive to review past efforts. Wartime OPCON transition has been an official alliance policy since the spring of 2007. However, the policy process has been fitful and marked by several different transition plans: the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) from 2007 to 2010, the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan (SA-2015 Plan) from 2010 to 2014, and the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) from 2014 to the present day.
Along the way, wartime OPCON transition was first delayed (in the summer of 2010) from a 2012 transition date to 2015, and then in 2014 it was set on a conditions-based rather than time-based trajectory. COTP has gone through its own revisions and purportedly is far from complete, further demonstrating the ever-shifting nature of the process.
The various delays and planning shifts have been driven by a complex combination of factors, including partisan politics and swings in policy agendas between South Korean progressive and conservative leadership, the U.S. control rod logic, shifting strategic and diplomatic conditions, advancements in adversary capabilities and technologies, and evolving (though not always aligned) threat perceptions within the alliance.
Moreover, across several transition plans, the alliance has devised different types of command structures to follow the wartime OPCON transition. From 2007 to 2014 – under both the STP and SA-2015 Plan – the alliance would have dissolved the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), an integrated, combined command structure. Two separate, independent national commands would have been taken its place: the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS) and U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), the latter evolved from United States Forces Korea (USFK). ROK JCS would have been the lead (“supported”) command, and KORCOM the “supporting” command. This would have been a parallel rather than an integrated command structure.
A couple of key factors underpinned the plan for a parallel structure. The administration of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) promoted a narrative about taking back Korean sovereignty through wartime OPCON transition, a policy of self-reliant national defense, and a desire for a more equal alliance. Meanwhile, the Geroge W. Bush administration (2001-2009) – and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in particular – was eager to inject flexibility into a static, Cold War-era U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula yet highly reticent to put U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander. A parallel structure served each side’s preferences.
Interestingly, some defense officials in Seoul initially cited the command relationship between U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) as a potential model for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to emulate. Upon closer inspection, however, Korean officials dropped the idea. In the early 2000s, Washington and Tokyo were still years away from their recent effort to integrate U.S. and Japanese forces; USFJ and JSDF were simply too separate from one another. South Korean defense officials sought to avoid such a stark separation since it would be too large a move away from combined command structure within the South Korea-U.S. alliance and potentially result in too much flexibility for U.S. forces for Seoul’s liking.
Consequently, the plan for a parallel structure that existed from 2007 to 2014 retained combined elements, and is more accurately called a parallel, combined structure. The post-OPCON transition structure would have maintained combined air, amphibious, and counter WMD components, each of which would have remained under the OPCON of a U.S. officer, not only because of the United States’ more advanced capabilities in these areas but also due to their strategic import. Also, the post-transition architecture would have retained the Military Committee (MC) structure to provide unified higher-level operational and strategic guidance and direction to the national commands and would have established a military coordination center to synchronize operations at the tactical and operational levels. It would have been a parallel structure – without a single strategic commander – but had within it mechanisms for alliance coordination to maintain unity of effort.
Even so, a groundswell of conservative opposition within South Korea, among other factors, eventually led to the alliance to return to an integrated, combined command structure. Under COTP, the plan moved toward the Future-CFC (F-CFC), which will be led by a 4-star commander from South Korea. However, despite the alliance’s shift back to an integrated command concept, the effort to gradually empower the ROK JCS and USFK at the expense of the CFC as the alliance moved toward a parallel structure from 2007 to 2014 was not entirely reset even well into the late 2010s. Bureaucratic inertia toward a more parallel arrangement belied the official readoption of an integrated command construct. The recent annual Joint Communiques from the annual Security Consultative Meeting seem to indicate a concerted effort to correct that inertia and build greater integration back into alliance command relations.
There are several future options worth exploring for the alliance. These include keeping the current CFC structure and formally ending wartime OPCON transition as alliance policy; moving forward with the current policy under COTP toward a South Korean-led F-CFC; or returning to a parallel command structure. Each option presents certain pros and cons and raises important questions.
Option 1: Jettison Wartime OPCON Transition
To be clear, the first option – keeping the CFC and officially jettisoning wartime OPCON transition as alliance policy – is unlikely. Nonetheless, there may be certain benefits to doing so.
The CFC has existed and been refined for about 50 years. To be sure, there are powerful political critiques of the CFC, including the possibility it perversely incentivizes free riding by Seoul and a penchant for escalatory counter-provocation doctrine (particularly by conservative South Korean administrations). Nevertheless, it is a well-institutionalized and successful example of an integrated command. Additionally, certain thorny issues, such as how and to what degree South Korea’s Strategic Command (ROK STRATCOM) integrates with CFC, may be better addressed within an established structure rather than while that structure is being evolved.
If, moving forward, wartime OPCON transition continues to follow the same fitful trajectory as it has in the past, marked by repeated delays and conceptual shifts, might it be preferable to definitively change course and maintain CFC until the security environment on the peninsula fundamentally changes? Such a move would also preserve U.S-led unity of command and help the alliance avoid spurring further institutional and legal incongruity between a South Korean-led F-CFC and a still U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC).
However, the drawbacks of keeping the CFC unchanged are likely to exceed the benefits. Keeping it would require setting aside two decades of established policy, which itself is tied to a broader effort to transform or modernize the alliance. For Seoul, such a move is a political non starter, especially under the Lee Jae-myung administration. Furthermore, keeping CFC would signal a turn away from the U.S. push for allied burden sharing, which President Lee has embraced.
Also, if seeking greater flexibility for U.S. forces on the peninsula is a policy goal and an integrated, combined structure hinders that goal, then keeping the CFC unchanged is not a good option. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear why USFK could not recalibrate its force structure to support the current CFC yet simultaneously be flexibly postured for off-peninsular operations. This would seem to be more a function of a new access, basing, and overflight (ABO) agreement between Washington and Seoul than specifically a function of the alliance’s command structure.
Option 2: Stay the Course With COTP
The second option – completing COTP and transitioning to a South Korean-led F-CFC – is current policy and the most likely course of action. This option is advantageous in that F-CFC preserves the CFC’s integrated, combined structure. The bilateral consultative mechanisms and processes developed and refined over the last five decades would remain in place as would unity of command and effort. Furthermore, COTP requires Seoul to increase defense spending and take on more of a defense burden, which aligns with U.S. policy and Lee’s embrace of a more “leading” role on the peninsula.
Moreover, bureaucratically speaking, COTP is the path of least resistance. Although it has undergone revisions and updates, COTP has been the policy framework since 2015, with alliance officials working to refine the process. If the alliance decided to again shift gears and adopt another plan, it would be disruptive and potentially result in further delays.
Still, there are difficult issues and questions surrounding COTP. The question of ROK STRATCOM’s relationship to CFC would be more pertinent in a post-transition context. Once the alliance moves forward and Seoul leads F-CFC, achieving greater “military sovereignty,” there is no going back. Seoul will – as it already does – jealously guard its key capabilities and what it deems as essential autonomous space within which to operate. Additionally, in a lead role might Seoul try to employ U.S. forces under its OPCON in ways that do not suit U.S. interests or operational preferences, resulting in pressures for divergence along national lines? Joint alliance planning, exercises and training will help mitigate these risks in the future just as they do today. Yet such questions cannot be dismissed.
Another important post-transition issue for the alliance is the relationship between the chair of the ROK JCS and the 4-star ROK commander of the F-CFC. The ROK JCS serves the South Korean government in multiple ways, performing national-level man, train, and equip functions, mobilization and martial law functions, and operational command functions, while managing day-to-day security of the country. What will the dynamic be between the ROK JCS chair and the ROK commander of F-CFC if and when F-CFC is activated in a future crisis or conflict? Will the ROK CFC commander be properly empowered to make decisions in an alliance context without undue intervention or influence from the ROK JCS chair?
Also, completing COTP would make managing the relationship between the F-CFC and a still U.S.-led UNC more complicated. The two theater-level commands would no longer be led by the same individual as they are today. The 1994 transfer of peacetime or armistice OPCON from the United States back to South Korea already opened some gaps between the ROK JCS and the UNC: the former took over daily security and the lead in responding to North Korean acts of aggression while the latter continued to enforce and ensure friendly forces’ (i.e. ROK forces’) compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Wartime OPCON transition could widen those gaps. The UNC would likely continue to be responsible for armistice enforcement and remain the optimal institution for coordinating multinational support for South Korea’s security, but South Korean leaders would have to embrace it. Disgraced former President Yoon Suk-yeol did so, unlike any previous ROK president. It is unclear if his successors will continue that trend.
These various questions and issues point to a larger challenge for U.S. officials, namely, overcoming the psychological hurdle of relinquishing, even if only to a relative degree, U.S. control or influence over the environment. Although the F-CFC would maintain the essentials of the CFC structure, with most decisions made on a binational basis, completion of COTP means placing U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander. Not only does this run into a deep-seated operational aversion of U.S. leaders but the optics run counter to an America First policy.
Option 3: Return to a Parallel Structure
As a third option, the alliance could return to a parallel command structure. A parallel structure would address some of the drawbacks of the other options yet simultaneously amplify or create others.
As was the case in the alliance’s 2007-2014 wartime OPCON transition plans, a parallel structure can retain combined elements. In other words, there are degrees of “parallel,” which could mitigate against too stark a break from the current integrated, combined structure. Moreover, if moving forward with COTP and F-CFC fits the political imperative of the moment for increased allied burden sharing, a parallel structure would require even more effort on the part of Seoul.
Furthermore, politically and psychologically speaking, adopting a parallel structure would achieve a long held ROK desire for full “military sovereignty.” Concurrently, for U.S. officials, a parallel structure would sidestep the difficult question of having to put U.S. forces under OPCON of a foreign commander. Importantly, though, if the parallel structure retained combined elements, U.S. officers would still be able to shape important aspects of crisis response and conflict.
The parallel structure offers another potential advantage. In theory, the parallel structure and shifting division of labor within the alliance it entails may allow U.S. officials more leeway to adopt a flexible force posture on the Korean Peninsula. Since the United States would no longer assign its forces to an integrated alliance command, a parallel structure may reduce existing encumbrances to the off-peninsula deployment of such forces. It is conceivable a parallel structure and, relatedly, an evolved U.S. theater command on the peninsula, would allow for an increase in the rotational attachment of U.S. forces. These forces might rotate to the peninsula for extended exercises and training amid regular deployments throughout the broader Indo-Pacific region. Once again, such flexibility would not be guaranteed simply by a parallel structure, and may still require a new ABO agreement with Seoul.
Despite such potential benefits, a parallel structure raises various challenges. If the alliance shifted its wartime OPCON transition plan back to a parallel concept it would likely elicit political blowback from South Korea’s conservative camp, like it did in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Although many of the most fervent opponents of the earlier parallel plans have passed away, such opposition still exists and could pose problems.
Also, bureaucratically speaking, another shift in wartime OPCON transition plans would be disruptive. Shawn Creamer, who has produced the best analysis of the interconnections and evolution of the multiple theater-level commands on the Korean Peninsula, argued that previous delays and shifts in command concepts resulted in ad hoc and unsynchronized personnel environments. He also rightly noted that bold shifts require dedicated multi-year commitments. If the alliance is prepared to change course, once again, back to a parallel command structure, it must be prepared to devote the proper amount of time, attention, and resources to see it through. Yet, even if such a commitment is made, if a conservative administration comes to power in Seoul, the political opposition to a parallel structure within South Korea might disrupt the transition process, as it has before.
There are also strategic and operational risks to a parallel command structure. By definition, a parallel command structure forgoes unity of command since no single force commander would be designated. Although the alliance likely would aim to keep certain combined elements intact within the parallel structure, relinquishing unity of command opens more potential space for bifurcation along national lines or simply greater discordance in overall unity of effort despite a shared mission. In a parallel structure, the United States would avoid putting U.S. forces under OPCON of a foreign commander. However, unless Washington intended to abrogate its mutual defense treaty with Seoul and withdraw all U.S, forces from the peninsula after wartime OPCON transition, the United States would remain treaty bound to come to Seoul’s defense.
A parallel structure – depending on the process by which it came about and the type of U.S. force structure, posture, and capabilities that remained on the peninsula thereafter – may cause unintended effects in the minds of adversaries and allies alike. The arrangement could be seen as less credible and perceived to be marked by new vulnerabilities or fissures. Pyongyang may seek to exploit perceived weaknesses , while Seoul may seek its own ultimate deterrent to shore up credibility, namely, through indigenous nuclear armament. After all, another consequence of shifting to a parallel structure would be Seoul’s need to reassess the capabilities required to lead its own independent, national command on the peninsula. Those capabilities would differ from the capabilities required to meet the conditions for wartime OPCON transition under COTP, which, as noted, would result in the continuation of the alliance’s integrated, combined command structure, if in an evolved form.
Command Structures Are Important, But Trust Matters More
Although driven by a range of cacophonous variables, the delays and conceptual shifts in the alliance’s wartime OPCON transition policy over the last two decades indicate U.S. and South Korean officials have grappled with different command structures. That said, COTP is established policy and, unless Washington and Seoul officially decide otherwise, defense and military officials will continue moving toward the Future-CFC. But if history is any indication, officials may again decide to shift gears.
Each option above – from jettisoning transition to staying the course to shifting back to a parallel structure – presents certain pros and cons. However, the above analysis is only a start. Each option (as well as other potential pathways) requires more thorough cost-benefit analysis. Most commentary on wartime OPCON transition merely scratches the surface of the complexities involved. To be fair, even the informed public is generally ignorant of and disinterested in detailed analysis of command structures.
Yet it is important to review how the alliance has shifted between different command structures as it moved from one wartime OPCON transition plan to the next. After all, the devil is in the details. The different command structures are more than just organizational charts, operational processes, and command relations. They reveal each ally’s strategic priorities, which while mostly consistent over time, can and do evolve and could gradually diverge.
Ultimately, regardless of what command structure the alliance adopts, if both sides uphold regular, transparent, and honest communication, they will be able to navigate any future arrangement. If communication and allied trust are solid, unity of effort will persist, no matter the choice of command structure. Alternatively, even the most precisely designed and cohesive integrated structure will falter if trust is broken.
Authors
Contributing Author
Clint Work
Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed are the author’s alone.
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12. Seoul promises to help hundreds of Korean workers arrested in US in Ice raid
As I said, I think the ROK government and Hyundai are acting professionally and will not let this incident break the alliance. Both may have been blindsided by the subcontracting environment. (e.g., were perhaps used to "this is the way it's always done" – everyone turns a blind eye on the subcontractors)).
Excerpts:
South Korea’s foreign ministry said that “many of our nationals” have been detained and expressed concern about the impact of the raid.
“The economic activities of our companies investing in the United States and the interests of our citizens must not be unduly violated during the course of US law enforcement,” ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a statement on Friday.
The battery production facility, a joint venture between South Korean battery maker LGES and Hyundai Motor, was due to start operations at the end of this year, according to LGES, to power electric vehicles.
A spokesperson at the Hyundai-GA battery company in Georgia said in a statement that it was cooperating fully and that it had paused construction work.
Seoul promises to help hundreds of Korean workers arrested in US in Ice raid
Total of 475 detained in Georgia at construction site of factory to make batteries for Hyundai and Kia cars
The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025
Hundreds of workers at a factory being built in Georgia to make car batteries for Hyundai and Kia electric vehicles were detained in a massive raid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Ice) on Thursday that stopped construction.
The facility is part of what would be the biggest industrial investment in the state’s history and had been hailed as a huge boost for the economy by Georgia’s Republican governor, Brian Kemp.
At least 450 people were arrested, according to the Atlanta office of the US justice department agency, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
However the Korea Economic Daily later reported around 560 workers at the Hyundai facility and LG Energy Solution (LGES), had been detained, citing unidentified industry sources. Some 300 are South Korean nationals, according to local media reports. Hyundai Motor is a South Korean automotive company but has many international plants.
The raid on Thursday has dealt a setback to the company’s substantial project in Georgia and was a dramatic iteration of the Trump administration’s harsh crackdown on immigrants in the US.
From Uncle Sam to social media memes: inside homeland security’s push to swell Ice ranks
Read more
It also showed the disruptive impact that Donald Trump’s mass deportation agenda is having on businesses, even as the White House tries to spur more inflows from foreign investors.
An agent at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said multiple federal agencies, including Ice, the FBI and the DEA “conducted a judicially authorized enforcement operation, as we are actively conducting an investigation into unlawful employment practices”.
“Arrests are being made,” Steven Schrank, the special agent in charge of homeland security investigations for Georgia, said in a news briefing.
A government official representing South Korea, the home of Hyundai Motor, said those arrested were being held at an Ice detention facility.
South Korea’s foreign ministry said that “many of our nationals” have been detained and expressed concern about the impact of the raid.
“The economic activities of our companies investing in the United States and the interests of our citizens must not be unduly violated during the course of US law enforcement,” ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a statement on Friday.
The battery production facility, a joint venture between South Korean battery maker LGES and Hyundai Motor, was due to start operations at the end of this year, according to LGES, to power electric vehicles.
A spokesperson at the Hyundai-GA battery company in Georgia said in a statement that it was cooperating fully and that it had paused construction work.
Hyundai Motor said its production of electric vehicles at the sprawling site was not affected.
In 2023, Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution (LGES) announced the $4.3bn venture to produce EV battery cells, with each company holding a 50% stake. The plant will supply batteries for Hyundai, Kia and Genesis EV models.
The battery factory is part of Hyundai’s $12.6bn investments in Georgia, including the automaker’s just-opened car factory, in what would be “the largest economic development project in the state’s history” and is part of a bigger investment in US industry by the South Korean company, announced in March as Trump was ramping up on tariffs.
A social media video footage showed a man wearing a vest with the letters HIS, an acronym for Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), telling workers in yellow safety vests: “We have a search warrant for the whole site. We need construction to cease immediately. We need all work to end on the site right now.”
Trump has said he wants to deport “the worst of the worst” criminals, but Ice figures have shown a rise in non-criminals being picked up. Rights advocates have denounced such raids.
While homeland security investigations led the raid, federal officers were assisted by the Georgia department of public safety and state troopers, according to local media.
Dozens of warehouse workers detained in New Jersey immigration raid
Read more
Meanwhile in upstate New York, another significant Ice raid took place at the Nutrition Bar Confectioners facilities near Syracuse, where snack bars are made at a family-owned concern, drawing anger from the state governor.
Officers forced entry to the industrial facility and detained dozens of workers.
“I am outraged by this morning’s Ice raids in Cato and Fulton, where more than 40 adults were seized, including parents of at least a dozen children at risk of returning from school to an empty house,” Kathy Hochul, New York’s Democratic governor, said in a statement released by her office.
“I’ve made it clear, New York will work with the federal government to secure our borders and deport violent criminals, but we will never stand for masked Ice agents separating families and abandoning children,” Hochul added.
Migrant advocacy group Rural & Migrant Ministry said on Facebook that it estimated that more than 70 workers had been arrested.
Reuters contributed reporting
The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025
13. Dictator's staff scrub room clean after meeting with Putin
Are all these leaders "germophobes?"
Dictator's staff scrub room clean after meeting with Putin
9news.com.au
Staffers remove all trace of North Korea dictator Kim Jong-un's presence after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing
By Adam Vidler
8:02am Sep 5, 2025
Video has emerged of North Korean staffers meticulously removing all traces of leader Kim Jong-un's presence after he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing.
The two leaders were invited by Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend an event commemorating the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II, followed by a parade showcasing China's military arsenal.
Kim had sit-down meetings with both Xi and Putin, the leaders of the only two nations in the world with which North Korea has mutual defence treaties.
Staff remove all traces of Kim Jong-un's presence after he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (9News)
After the Putin meeting, Kremlin reporter Alexander Yunashev posted a video to Telegram showing two of Kim's staffers thoroughly cleaning the room the pair had used.
"After the negotiations were over, the staff accompanying the head of the DPRK carefully destroyed all traces of Kim's presence," he wrote.
The Japanese news outlet Nikkei also reported Kim had taken his own toilet to the event.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, from left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un walk to attend a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (AP)
Such protocols are standard procedure for the reclusive nation, even when Kim meets with friendly nations.
"The special toilet and the requisite garbage bags of detritus, waste and cigarette butts are so that a foreign intelligence agency, even a friendly one, does not acquire a sample and test it," US-based North Korea expert Michael Madden of the Stimson Centre told Reuters.
"It would provide insight into any medical conditions affecting Kim Jong-un."
Putin and Kim have strengthened ties in recent years. (AP)
Kim travelled to Beijing in a special train so heavily armoured its top speed is just 60km/h.
In recent years, North Korea has moved closer to Russia as Putin turned to Kim for weapons and troops to sustain his war on Ukraine.
Last year, the two leaders signed a landmark mutual defence pact in Pyongyang, committing to provide immediate military assistance to each other if under attack – a move that has rattled the US and its Asian allies.
Analysts say Xi was likely watching warily as Putin and Kim forged a new alliance that could complicate East Asia's fragile security balance, draw more US focus to the region, and undercut Beijing's efforts to manage stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The parade in Beijing. (Liu Xu/Xinhua via AP)
Beijing is worried that Moscow's assistance to Pyongyang in return for its weapons and troops – especially on military technology – would further enable and embolden the erratic Kim regime, which has drastically accelerated the buildup of nuclear weapons and missile programs.
Edward Howell, a lecturer in politics at the University of Oxford, said China is not "angry" at the rapprochement between North Korea and Russia, but "emetic, nauseous, and uneasy."
"After all, prior to the Russia-North Korea (mutual defence) treaty…North Korea was the only country with whom China had a mutual defence pact, and vice versa," he said.
Were China truly angry about the deepening cooperation, it could put an end to it by no longer helping North Korea evade sanctions or no longer enabling Russia's war through trade in dual-use goods, Howell noted.
"China has done neither of these things, and will only continue to assist North Korea in evading sanctions whilst refraining from getting involved in any Russia-North Korea dynamics," he said.
"China wants to ensure that North Korea knows of Beijing's desire to maintain influence over the Peninsula, but on the part of Pyongyang, it will keep trying to extract benefits from both Moscow and Beijing."
With CNN.
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14. South Korea to integrate Trophy protective suite into K2 tanks
South Korea to integrate Trophy protective suite into K2 tanks
Defense News · Tzally Greenberg · September 5, 2025
JERUSALEM — Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Hyundai Rotem have teamed up to integrate, produce and support the Israeli Trophy vehicle-protection system on the South Korean K2 battle tank and future platforms of the Asian nation, the companies announced this week.
The firms noted in a joint statement that the move marks the first time the Korean tank will be equipped with such a system.
The agreement includes the Poland-specific K2PL version, following the supply of a 180 K2 tanks deal signed between Poland and South Korea.
The Israeli-South Korean collaboration was signed at the MSPO 2025 Defense Exhibition in Kielce, Poland, a day after the Chinese military parade and amid the tripartite summit of China, Russia and North Korea.
The companies stated in their announcement that the pact “reflects the mutual commitment to deliver next-generation active protection capabilities tailored for Korean land forces, while also pursuing co-development, local production, and export opportunities.”
The Trophy integration deal also provides a boost for the upcoming British defense exhibition DSEI, which is scheduled to begin in Sept. 9 in London and is slated to feature major Israeli defense companies.
The Israeli Ministry of Defense announced last week that it had withdrawn its participation in the exhibition after DSEI organizers banned government representatives in response to Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza.
The Trophy active protection system can be integrated in a variety of military vehicles, with the manufacturer claiming it’s “the only fully integrated APS fielded by NATO.”
Battle tank models slated to carry it include the U.S. Abrams, Israel’s Merkava and Namer armored personnel carrier, the UK’s Challenger tanks and Germany’s Leopard 2.
About Tzally Greenberg
Tzally Greenberg is the Israel correspondent for Defense News. He has experience reporting on economic affairs as well as defense and cyber companies.
15. U.S., Japan, S. Korea officials meet for quantum computing summit
Trilateral cooperation on another level. (the quantum level - apologies for the attempt at humor).
World News Sept. 5, 2025 / 3:53 PM
U.S., Japan, S. Korea officials meet for quantum computing summit
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/09/05/tokyo-us-south-korea-japan-meet-quantum-computing-summit/9481757100890/
By Lisa Hornung
Deputy Secretary of CommercePaul Dabbar spoke at his confirmation hearing in Washington in May. Before his confirmation, he was the CEO of Bohr Quantum Technology. File Photo by Annabelle Gordon/UPI. | License Photo
Sept. 5 (UPI) -- The United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea came together in Seoul this week, then in Tokyo Friday, for two Trilateral Quantum Cooperation meetings, the State Department said.
The meetings were to recognize the value of trilateral cooperation to strengthen and secure emerging technologies, a press release said. Experts from government and industry met to share best practices and discuss how to protect quantum ecosystems from physical, cyber, and intellectual property threats.
"Our trilateral partnership helps ensure Americans can benefit from the breakthroughs in quantum computing that have the potential to reshape the global balance of power, spark entirely new industries, and revolutionize the way we live and work. These workshops highlighted the growing importance of trilateral cooperation in safeguarding innovation and strengthening the quantum ecosystem, which has the promise of increasing human flourishing and the economic prosperity of Americans and our partners," said a press release from the State Department's spokesperson.
In August, South Korea's President Lee Jae Myung reflected on the partnership after having met President Donald Trump.
Related
"The golden era is yet to come, not because we lack something, but [because] possibilities are endless," Lee said, describing future cooperation.
He said Japan can't be left out of this equation, as trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will be essential to address North Korea and drive technological innovation.
Likely to help in quantum computing is new deputy secretary of the Department of Commerce Paul Dabbar. He was the president and CEO of Bohr Quantum Technology before his Senate confirmation. He led the development and deployment of emerging quantum network technologies while at Bohr.
North Korea announced in 2019 that it intends to adopt quantum computing for economic development. NK Economy reported quantum computers are being highlighted in the Korean Workers' Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun.
Quantum computing and its lower toll on the power grid -- relative to supercomputers -- could hold appeal for North Korea.
Rolling blackouts and power outages are common in the country, according to defectors and former residents of the country.
16. FM Cho says to consider U.S. visit to discuss immigration crackdown on S. Koreans with Trump administration
(6th LD) FM Cho says to consider U.S. visit to discuss immigration crackdown on S. Koreans with Trump administration | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 6, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in para 9-10)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Sept. 6 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Saturday he may visit the United States to discuss with Washington the arrests of hundreds of South Koreans by U.S. immigration authorities at a South Korean battery plant site in Georgia.
Cho made the remarks as he presided over an emergency meeting on the immigration crackdown, confirming that more than 300 out of 457 people who were taken into custody are South Korean nationals.
"We are deeply concerned and feel a heavy sense of responsibility over the arrests of our nationals," Cho said at the start of the meeting, attended by two vice ministers, officials from the ministry and overseas missions.
"We will discuss sending a senior foreign ministry official to the site without delay, and, if necessary, I will personally travel to Washington to hold consultations with the U.S. administration," he said.
Cho said President Lee Jae Myung has instructed officials to make all-out efforts to swiftly resolve the matter, stressing that the rights and interests of South Korean nationals and the business operations of South Korean companies investing in the United States must not be infringed upon.
Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na expressed regret and concern over the crackdown during a meeting with acting U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Joseph Yun on Thursday, Cho said.
Later in the day, First Vice Minister Park Yoon-joo held a phone call with Allison Hooker, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, to discuss bilateral and international issues.
During the call, Park requested the State Department's cooperation regarding the matter and expressed regret over the crackdown and the public disclosure of the scene where South Korean nationals were being arrested.
Park said the crackdown occurred at a critical time when the two countries need to maintain momentum for trust and cooperation following their leaders' recent summit.
He emphasized that the economic activities of Korean firms investing in the U.S. and the rights of South Koreans should not be subject to unjust infringement during U.S. law enforcement operations, and called for the State Department to intervene for a speedy resolution of the matter.
Hooker responded that her department is closely monitoring the situation and maintaining communications with other relevant U.S. agencies.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks during an emergency meeting on the arrests of South Korean nationals at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Sept. 6, 2025. (Yonhap)
U.S. authorities carried out a search warrant at an electric vehicle battery plant construction site operated by HL-GA Battery Co., the joint venture between Hyundai Motor Co. and LG Energy Solution Ltd. in Bryan County near Savannah on Thursday.
They described the raid as a criminal probe into alleged unlawful employment practices.
U.S. President Donald Trump said Friday the arrested people are "illegal aliens" and the immigration officials were "just doing their job."
Steven Schrank, a special agent with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) for Georgia, said the individuals in custody include those who came in through a visa waiver program that bans them from working, or had overstayed their visas.
Most of them are being held at a detention center in Folkston, Georgia.
HL-GA Battery Co. said it is fully cooperating with the authorities and has paused construction to assist their work.
U.S. authorities have called the raid "the largest single site enforcement operation in the history" of the HSI.
In a statement Saturday, LG Energy Solution said it has suspended all business trips to the U.S. and has instructed employees currently visiting the U.S. to stay in their accommodations or return home immediately.
The company's chief human resources officer will depart for the U.S. the following day to address the issues on site, the firm said.
"We will make every effort to promptly resolve the situation, including ensuring the speedy and safe return of all employees," the firm noted.
Of those in custody, 47 have been confirmed as LG Energy Solution employees, while the others are related to HL-GA Battery.
Most were reportedly dispatched to carry out final construction work, such as electrical installations, ahead the plant's planned completion next year.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unveiled a short video clip of Thursday's raid into the plant site, showing Korean and other workers being screened, shackled with handcuffs and metal chains, and loaded onto an "inmate transport" vehicle.
The video started with a scene in which a convoy of immigration authorities' vehicles is heading toward the site. It then showed armed police officers in full gear waiting outside the site, while people inside were moving out in a line apparently for screening procedures.
In another scene, people were raising their hands while officials were placing metal chains around their feet and handcuffing them before being loaded onto a bus. It also showed several people captured from what appeared to be a pond near the plant site.
In a press release, ICE welcomed companies seeking to invest in the U.S., but stressed they have to "adhere to the law."
This photo, captured from the social media X account of the Atlanta bureau of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, shows agents carrying out a raid at the Hyundai Motor-LG Energy Solution venture's electric vehicle battery plant construction site in Ellabell, located in Bryan County, west of Savannah, in Georgia on Sept. 4, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · September 6, 2025
17.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
