Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Knowledge is power. Information is power. The secreting or hoarding of knowledge or information may be an act of tyranny camouflaged as humility."

– Robin Morgan

“There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance—that principle is contempt prior to investigation.”

– Herbert Spencer

(Spencer warns that prejudice blocks knowledge. Rejecting ideas without inquiry ensures ignorance. True wisdom requires openness—examining before dismissing. Contempt for new truths closes the mind, preventing growth and enlightenment.)

“We have come out of the time when obedience, the acceptance of discipline, intelligent courage and resolution were most important, into that more difficult time when it is a man's duty to understand his world rather than simply fight for it.”

–Ernest Hemingway

1. Trump Renames DOD to Department of War

2. USSOCOM hosts a Change of Responsibility

3. General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025 (New JSOC and EUSA Commanders among others)

4. Can Trump’s ‘War Department’ Win a War?

5. In defense of the War Department

6. SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong

7. US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says

8. Putin Wagers Ukraine’s Army Will Break Before His Economy Does

9. Putin Sends Trump Two More Bad Signals

10. Beijing’s New Playbook for Trade Talks: Keep Talking but Give No Ground

11. U.N. Accuses Rwanda-Backed Rebels of Slaughtering Children, Other Civilians in Congo

12. Concepts Are Not Doctrine

13. The US Military’s Missile Gap Isn’t Going Away

14. In calling Taiwan ‘Nazis’, Beijing weaponises history

15. Hot mic catches Putin and Xi discussing organ transplants and immortality

16. AI False Information Rate Nearly Doubles in One Year

17. What if we could vaccinate against mis- and disinformation?

18. How Disinformation About the Minnesota Shooting Spread Like Wildfire on X

19. Why This Administration Can’t Fill Its Jobs

20. A Sobering Prophecy About the Rise of China

21. Ex Libris, Libertas: America’s Library vs. Anti-liberalism

1. Trump Renames DOD to Department of War

That was fast. The former DOD website has already been changed to the DOW website.

See the new website here: https://www.war.gov/

I would also note that Congress never once declared war while we have had a Department of Defense.

Regardless of the name DOD or DOW wars are only won when the political object is achieved.

Excerpts:

He added that, under the original War Department, the U.S. achieved military victories in both world wars; however, victories turned into more prolonged conflicts that often resulted in a "sort of tie" once the War Department rebranded as the Defense Department.

Hegseth concurred with Trump's contention.

"We changed the name after World War II from the Department of War to the Department of Defense and … we haven't won a major war since," Hegseth said.

And a colleague asked these formatting issues (I can see a lot of memes being generated by changes to the names below):

And on a lighter, and not entirely serious note, will the term “Defense” be replaced by “War” in many other titles of offices and agencies? Will DFAS become WFAS, and DIA be titled WIA (no pun intended concerning its survival)? Will Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) be referred to as WARPA? That might have a curious twist.

Consider the lists:

Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)

Department of Defense Education Activity (DOD EA)

Department of Defense Test Resource Management Center (DOD TRMC)

Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation (OLDCC), formerly Office of Economic

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA)

Defense Contract Audit Agency(DCAA)

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA)

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)

Defense Health Agency (DHA)

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA)

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

Defense Acquisition University (DAU)

Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) (component of DOD Office of Inspector General)

Trump Renames DOD to Department of War

https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4295826/trump-renames-dod-to-department-of-war/

Sept. 5, 2025 | By Matthew Olay, Department of War |

President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order today changing the Defense Department's name to the Department of War as a secondary title.

The order — the 200th signed by the president since taking office — authorizes Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and DOD subordinate officials to use secondary titles like "Department of War," "Secretary of War" and "Deputy Secretary of War" in public communications, official correspondence, ceremonial contexts and non-statutory documents within the executive branch, according to a fact sheet released by the White House.

Additionally, the order directs all executive agencies and departments to "recognize and accommodate these secondary titles in internal and external communications," as well as instructing Hegseth to recommend actions — including executive and legislative actions — that would be required to permanently rename the department.

"The name 'Department of War' conveys a stronger message of readiness and resolve compared to 'Department of Defense,' which emphasizes only defensive capabilities," the fact sheet reads.

"Restoring the name 'Department of War' will sharpen the focus of this department on our national interests and signal to adversaries America's readiness to wage war to secure its interests," it continues.

Prior to signing the executive order, Trump said, "This is something [we've] thought long and hard about; we've been talking about it for months."

He added that, under the original War Department, the U.S. achieved military victories in both world wars; however, victories turned into more prolonged conflicts that often resulted in a "sort of tie" once the War Department rebranded as the Defense Department.

Hegseth concurred with Trump's contention.

"We changed the name after World War II from the Department of War to the Department of Defense and … we haven't won a major war since," Hegseth said.

"And that's not to disparage our warfighters … That's to recognize that this name change is not just about renaming, it's about restoring; words matter," he continued.

The secretary went on to say that the War Department would fight decisively to win and not get mired down in endless conflicts.

"Maximum lethality, not tepid legality; violent effect, not politically correct," he said.

The War Department was originally established by Congress on Aug. 7, 1789, the same year the Constitution took effect. It replaced the Board of War and Ordnance, which was created in 1776 during the Revolutionary War.

The War Department had oversight over the Army and Navy until 1798, when the Navy Department was formed.

The first secretary of war, a civilian position, was retired Army Gen. Henry Knox, who was appointed by President George Washington. Fort Knox, Kentucky, is named after him.

On Nov. 8, 1800, the War Department building in Washington burned down and with it, all of the department's records.

During the Civil War, the department was responsible for recruiting, training, supply, medical care, transportation and the pay of two million soldiers.

The War Department's name remained the same for over 150 years, until it merged with the Department of the Navy and the newly established Department of the Air Force to become the National Military Establishment with the passage of the 1947 National Security Act.

Famous War Department secretaries include James Monroe, who became president; John Calhoun, who became vice president; Jefferson Davis, who became president of the Confederate States; Ulysses S. Grant, a former Union general who became president; Robert Todd Lincoln, son of President Abraham Lincoln; and William Howard Taft, who became president and then chief justice of the Supreme Court.

David Vergun, DOW News, contributed to this article.

2. USSOCOM hosts a Change of Responsibility

BZ to Shane Shorter. His legacy is that now almost all major headquarters show up to every engagement with a complete command team with a Commander and senior enlisted leader (SEL). General FEenton and CSM consistently did everything together and that set an example.

USSOCOM hosts a Change of Responsibility

Photo By Tech. Sgt. Marleah Miller | U.S. Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM),... read more

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA, UNITED STATES

09.05.2025

Story by Michael Bottoms

U.S. Special Operations Command

Subscribe44

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, Florida — U.S. Special Operations Command held a change of responsibility ceremony, Sept. 5, 2025, at the Davis Conference Center.

U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Andrew J. “AJ” Krogman assumed responsibility as the U.S. SOCOM command senior enlisted leader from U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Shane W. Shorter, who held the position for more than three years.

U.S. Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. SOCOM, hosted the event and reflected on the importance of noncommissioned officer leadership.

“SOF [Special Operations Forces] NCOs are the manifestation of our first SOF Truth, humans are more important than hardware – and truly – they are SOF’s credentials,” said Fenton. “And as our credentials, they lead the largest part of the SOF enterprise, our enlisted force, and set the example through their decades of service, of competence, confidence and character.”

Shorter thanked senior leaders from across the joint force and international SOF allies who attended the ceremony.

“Special Operations Forces are known as pathfinders and trailblazers, but it takes courageous leaders like all of you to clear those paths,” said Shorter. “The way every senior officer in this enterprise empowers NCOs sets a gold standard not only for SOCOM but for the entire military and our partners across the globe.”

As he passed the colors, Shorter said he was confident about the future of the command.

“I can think of no one better suited to assume the responsibilities at the pinnacle of Special Operations NCO leadership, advising at the helm of a 70,000-person global enterprise, than Command Sgt. Maj. Krogman,” he said. “You exemplify the best of special operations leadership. SOCOM is incredibly fortunate to have you stepping into this vital role.”

Fenton echoed that confidence, noting Krogman’s extensive special operations experience, including his role as the Joint Special Operations Command senior enlisted leader.

“Command Sgt. Maj. Krogman, you are known as a creator, innovator, out-of-the-box thinker, atypical and non-traditional,” said Fenton. “You are exactly what SOF needs.”

Krogman thanked Fenton for his support and described the transition as seamless and the mission ahead as urgent.

“The significance of U.S. SOCOM’s role today cannot be overstated. In an ever-changing global landscape, the need for special operations is more critical than ever – these are America’s elite warriors at the tip of the spear, ready to respond to any challenge with precision, agility and unwavering resolve,” said Krogman. “As we look to the future, the importance of special operations will only grow, and I am honored to be part of this vital mission. I am eager to work alongside each of you, to listen, to learn, and to lead with compassion and determination.”

3. General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025 (New JSOC and EUSA Commanders among others)

Release

Immediate Release

General and Flag Officers Announcement for Sept. 5, 2025

https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4294758/general-and-flag-officers-announcement-for-sept-5-2025/

Sept. 5, 2025 |

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced today that the President has made the following nominations:

Navy Vice Adm. Richard A. Correll for appointment to the grade of admiral, with assignment as commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Correll is currently serving as deputy commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

Navy Vice Adm. George M. Wikoff for appointment to the grade of admiral, with assignment as commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, Naples, Italy. Wikoff is currently serving as commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet and Commander, Combined Maritime Forces, Manama, Bahrain.

Navy Rear Adm. Heidi K. Berg for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, with assignment as commander, Fleet Cyber Command/commander, Tenth Fleet/commander, Navy Space Command, Fort Meade, Maryland. Berg is currently serving as deputy commander, Fleet Cyber Command/deputy commander, Tenth Fleet/deputy commander, Navy Space Command, Fort Meade, Maryland.

Navy Rear Adm. (lower half) Brad J. Collins for appointment to the grade of rear admiral. Collins is currently serving as commander, Navy Region Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bradford J. Gering for appointment to the grade of general, with assignment as assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Gering is currently serving as deputy commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Army Lt. Gen. Jonathan P. Braga for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Braga is currently serving as commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Army Lt. Gen. Michele H. Bredenkamp for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Bredenkamp is currently serving as director's advisor for Military Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

Space Force Lt. Gen. David N. Miller, Jr. for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general with assignment as deputy chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Requirements, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Miller is currently serving as commander, Space Operations Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado.

Space Force Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Schiess for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy chief of Space Operations for Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Schiess is currently serving as commander, U.S. Space Forces – Space/Combined Joint Force Space Component Commander, U.S. Space Force, Vandenberg Space Force Base, California.

Army Maj. Gen. Winston P. Brooks for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy chairman, NATO Military Committee, Belgium. Brooks served as commanding general, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Joseph R. Clearfield for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Tampa, Florida. Clearfield is currently serving as the deputy commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, Tampa, Florida.

Space Force Maj. Gen. Gregory J. Gagnon for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commander, U.S. Space Force Combat Forces Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. Gagnon is currently serving as deputy chief of Space Operations for Intelligence, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Army Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Hilbert for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commanding general, Eighth Army/chief of staff, Combined Forces Command, Republic of Korea. Hilbert is currently serving as commanding general, 11th Airborne Division and U.S. Army Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

Army Maj. Gen. James M. Smith for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as commanding general, Installation Management Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas. Smith is currently serving as deputy commanding general, Installation Management Command, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

Marine Corps Maj. Gen. William H. Swan for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, with assignment as deputy commandant, Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Swan is currently serving as the inspector general, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Space Force Maj. Gen. Steven P. Whitney for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general with assignment as director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Whitney is currently serving as director of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Space Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Air Force Col. Roderick T. Grunwald for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. Grunwald is currently serving as mobilization assistant to Commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

4. Can Trump’s ‘War Department’ Win a War?

The WSJ Editorial board questions the new (old?) name and winning and the soon to be released new National Defense Strategy (or National War Strategy or National MIlitary Strategy).

Regardless of Congressional action or inaction on remaining, I will bet that we will go on using the “secondary titles” or nicknames (DOW and SOW) in perpetuity (or as long as this administration remains in office).

The question is what is this distracting us from? Or is this the best path to improved warfighting?

What will the new "National War Strategy" tell us about warfighting in the future? This is the real issue, not the name of the organization that sits in the Pentagon.

Excerpts:

The commission said the U.S. needs a military that’s capable of fighting in more than one theater at once. Coordination among sophisticated adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—means a future war might not be quick or confined to a single continent.

But leaks to the press suggest Mr. Trump’s not so new War Department is about to roll out a strategy that won’t come close to that standard. It might put controlling the southern border ahead of deterring China. Whether Mr. Trump truly believes in a broad American retreat from the world isn’t clear, but his Pentagon is presiding over one.

Can Trump’s ‘War Department’ Win a War?

What matters isn’t the name but the erosion of U.S. hard power.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/department-of-war-donald-trump-pete-hegseth-military-eaaef539?st=CyR5D6&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By The Editorial Board

Sept. 5, 2025 6:15 pm ET

President Donald Trump shows a signed executive order as the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth looks on in the Oval Office of the White House on Friday. Photo: mandel ngan/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

President Trump signed an order on Friday to restyle the Pentagon as the Department of War, and the press has been preoccupied with the nomenclature. What should really worry Americans is whether Mr. Trump’s military can win the next major war, no matter what the sign outside the door says.

Mr. Trump loves nothing better than a rebrand. The decision in 1949 to change the name to the Department of Defense was because “we decided to go woke,” he said during Friday’s signing in the Oval Office, before he introduced Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth as his Secretary of War. Mr. Trump then added that the War Department is “a much more appropriate name, especially in light of where the world is right now. We have the strongest military in the world. We have the greatest equipment in the world.”

The name change is supposed to echo the era when America was victorious. “We won World War I, and we won World War II, not with the Department of Defense, but with a War Department,” Mr. Hegseth said recently. “We’re not just defense, we’re offense.” In other words, no more Vietnams, Iraqs or Afghanistans. But the obvious point is that the U.S. won the terrible conflicts of the 20th century because it built the most fearsome military power and had the political will to use it.

Neither are in abundant supply today, despite Mr. Trump’s assertions and his B-2 bomber fly-bys at diplomatic summits. The U.S. spent 16.9% of its economy on defense in 1952 during the Korean War and north of 8% during Vietnam. But after the explosion of government domestic spending on healthcare, retirement, education, and much more, the Pentagon now gets a mere 3% of GDP. Mr. Trump’s one-time cash infusion in his reconciliation bill this year can’t bend this downward trajectory.

“The United States last fought a global conflict during World War II, which ended nearly 80 years ago,” the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy said last year. “The nation was last prepared for such a fight during the Cold War, which ended 35 years ago. It is not prepared today.”

The commission said the U.S. needs a military that’s capable of fighting in more than one theater at once. Coordination among sophisticated adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—means a future war might not be quick or confined to a single continent.

But leaks to the press suggest Mr. Trump’s not so new War Department is about to roll out a strategy that won’t come close to that standard. It might put controlling the southern border ahead of deterring China. Whether Mr. Trump truly believes in a broad American retreat from the world isn’t clear, but his Pentagon is presiding over one.

Listen to what retired Air Force four-star Gen. Mark Kelly said during a Friday event at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “We’re facing an apex adversary now, today,” he said of China. But the Air Force is “doing so with half the combat power that we had 35 to 40 years ago.” The fleet, Gen. Kelly added, is “twice as old and operating at twice the op [operational] tempo, flown by aviators getting half the training sorties, at half the platform readiness rates.”

This erosion of hard military power is the central problem at the Pentagon. Rename the place, or don’t. But talking up a War Department, without making sure it’s ready to win a war, is what one of Mr. Trump’s predecessors would have called speaking loudly and carrying a small stick. And that’s how wars are lost.

In defense of the War Department

Euphemisms such as “defense” and “security” have a tendency for bureaucratic mission-creep.

https://wapo.st/4nhF6KO

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/09/05/war-department-defense-trump-rebrand/

September 5, 2025 at 5:32 p.m. EDTYesterday at 5:32 p.m. EDT

3 min

1,794

(Illustration by Washington Post and iStock)

Euphemisms distort thought, and no entities are more adept at producing euphemisms than governments. President Donald Trump’s rebranding on Friday of the Department of Defense as the Department of War is a worthy blow against government euphemism. Perhaps it can be followed by clearer thinking about the military’s role at home and abroad.

Get first-person illustrated stories about how work is changing

President George Washington created the War Department as a Cabinet-level agency in 1789 to oversee the Army. It was joined by a Cabinet-level Navy Department in 1798. In 1947, the service branches were merged under the National Military Establishment, headed by a defense secretary. Two years later, Congress created the Defense Department, headquartered in the Pentagon.

Trump’s executive order cannot undo the legislation enacted in 1949, but it authorizes “Department of War” for use in labels and communications. Trump also proposes that Congress make the change official, and the National Defense Authorization Act (which normally passes in December) would be a natural vehicle.

It is more delicate to say that the Pentagon’s mission is defense than war. But the former depends on the latter. The extent to which the Pentagon can defend U.S. interests around the world is tied to the expectation that the United States can fight and win wars. That expectation is what shapes the calculations of rival states. As Trump said Friday afternoon in the Oval Office: “I’m going to let these people go back to the Department of War and figure out how to maintain peace.”

Follow Trump’s second term

Concepts such as “defense” and “security” have a tendency for bureaucratic mission creep. The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy mentioned “climate” 19 times. Climate change is a problem, but fighting it is not the military’s job. Nor is nation-building.

Clarifying that the Pentagon is in the business of war-fighting could have other salutary effects. Congress has not declared war as the Constitution contemplated since World War II, even as U.S. troops have fought and died in wars large and small around the world. Renaming the Pentagon won’t cause Congress to suddenly change its ways, but at least it is a reminder that the powers the Pentagon exercises are subject to legislative oversight.

The change won’t necessarily have the political effects Trump desires. He is making a point of using National Guard troops for domestic purposes — in D.C. and perhaps other cities soon. If those troops are commanded by the War Department, rather than the Defense Department, might it prompt more opposition to their deployment? By stripping away the euphemism, the name change bluntly highlights for the citizenry the power that these troops represent: They are not police officers but soldiers.

Trump’s opponents complain about the aggressive connotations of the new name. But the United States is protected by the most lethal and vigilant fighting force ever assembled, no matter what it’s called. The new name could prompt more focused debate about how to use it.

6. SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong

Setting taside the FAS test (feasibility, acceptability, and suitability) or the SOF mission planning criteria, What amazes me is that this ALLEGED activity was kept secret for so long. (if it happened at all). It seems like there were many who were aware of this. This could have easily been leaked in the previous administration. It could have been leaked by congress.

Historical or Traditional SOF Mission Planning Criteria

1. Must be an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) mission or activity.

2. Mission or tasks should support the joint force commander’s campaign or operation plan, or special activities.

3. Missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and fully coordinated.

4. Required resources must be available to execute and support the SOF mission.

5. The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.

There are so many unknowns about this (alleged mission). But do we really think that emplacing a listening device on a north Korean communications system would provide the intelligence we desire and need regarding KJU's intentions?

And note that a similar mission was allegedly conducted in 2005.

The New York Times reporting also revealed another infiltration by SEALs two decades prior. Per the paper, a team of Navy SEALs crossed into North Korea in 2005 under orders from then-President George W. Bush.

Note how many people supposedly know about this mission in the previous administration and congress. There were probably dozens. involved in the investigation. Why did this not leak before now? Who is talking out of school and why? Who are the "two dozen?"

The New York Times said it spoke with two dozen people familiar with the classified operation, and held back several details that its reporters felt would harm security or future operations if disclosed.

When Joe Biden took office in 2021 he and his defense secretary Lloyd Austin ordered an investigation into the 2019 mission. Key members of Congress were then informed of the findings.

Again why is this being revealed now? What is someone trying to accomplish with the release of this information? Discredit the administration? Discredit hardline efforts and support "engagement" and negotiation with the regime? Does someone think this is a "trust building" action? Or Discredit engagement by giving Kim an out on any agreement by calling attention to US "hostile action" and calling into question US veracity in any negotiation and agreement?

I am sure KJU and his inner circle and the Propaganda and Agitation Department are figuring out how to best exploit this. We may learn a lot from their response to this.

SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong

A report by the New York Times details a complex and risky operation in 2019 to spy on North Korea's leader that ended when the SEALs aborted the mission, killing three fishermen who had stumbled across them.

Nicholas Slayton

Published Sep 5, 2025 3:06 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · Nicholas Slayton

Navy SEALs infiltrated North Korea in 2019 in a mission that fell apart, according to a story published in the New York Times Friday. The investigation outlined extensive and massive planning that went into a secret move to plant a listening device inside North Korea and how the operation fell apart when SEALs came across a boat of civilians.

The New York Times said it spoke with two dozen people familiar with the classified operation, and held back several details that its reporters felt would harm security or future operations if disclosed. Task & Purpose reached out to the Department of Defense to confirm or comment on the New York Times’ revelations. A spokesperson for the department declined to comment.

The mission involved SEALs from Red Squadron of Seal Team 6, or DEVGRU, the same unit that killed Osama Bin Laden. The SEALs were tasked with sneaking onto a remote shore in North Korea to install an electronic listening device that would be able to intercept messages from Kim Jong-Un. At the time, tensions between the United States and North Korea were elevated with both Kim Jong-Un and President Donald Trump warning of conflict over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Trump had repeatedly taken to Twitter to issue threats to Kim. A summit in 2018 saw a pause in nuclear and missile testing and the two leaders were setting up a second summit, this time in Hanoi in February 2019. The military was tasked with installing the listening device so the U.S. could have better intelligence going into that meeting.

Trump authorized the mission, ordering U.S. military personnel to infiltrate a sovereign nation that had for decades prepared for a resumption of war on the peninsula against South Korean and American troops. Joint Special Operations Command prepared a massive operation that involved a submarine, SEAL Team 6, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 and several other military assets including Navy ships and aircraft carrying additional special operations forces held in reserve.

There were immediate problems. Due to North Korean security, the SEALs had to go in nearly blind, with no drones or aircraft overhead relaying pictures or intelligence. Once deployed, the SEALs would be mostly on their own.

In early 2019, the SEALs deployed on two mini subs from a Navy submarine. They parked about 100 yards from shore underwater — one having to make a U-turn after overshooting the landing spot — and swam closer, occasionally peeking above the water.

But a small boat carrying three people in diving suits was already in the otherwise empty landing spot. The boat moved towards the submarines and a man in a diving suit jumped into the sea. According to the Times’ reporting, the senior enlisted SEAL of the raid team opened fire, with the other SEALs following his lead.

All three men on the boat were killed and the mission aborted. The SEALs sank the dead bodies to the sea floor and returned to the submarine. It was later determined the three people killed were civilian fishermen.

Neither Pyongyang or Washington acknowledged the botched operation (it remained unclear if Pyongyang had caught on to the operation). Kim and Trump met for two days at the end of February in Hanoi and again in the summer at the Korean demilitarized zone.

When Joe Biden took office in 2021 he and his defense secretary Lloyd Austin ordered an investigation into the 2019 mission. Key members of Congress were then informed of the findings.

The New York Times reporting also revealed another infiltration by SEALs two decades prior. Per the paper, a team of Navy SEALs crossed into North Korea in 2005 under orders from then-President George W. Bush.

North Korea continues to maintain its nuclear program. It is believed to possess several dozen nuclear weapons.

Nicholas Slayton

Contributing Editor

Nicholas Slayton is a Contributing Editor for Task & Purpose. In addition to covering breaking news, he writes about history, shipwrecks, and the military’s hunt for unidentified anomalous phenomenon (formerly known as UFOs).

taskandpurpose.com · Nicholas Slayton

7. US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says

Ah yes, the "catastrophic retaliation." This is what has long provided strategic planning paralysis: our fear of the north's catastrophic retaliation?

Note in 2014 I wrote about our strategic planning paralysis (of course my conclusion then was we need to seek bottom up change in the north that results in a free and unified Korea, but I digress):

Korea: Strategic Patience = Strategic Paralysis

https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/korea-strategic-patience-strategic-paralysis/

We have to think about what are Kim Jong Un's red lines for going to war. The most important one is whether his personal safety is threatened - either by internal or external forces. Second is if his "treasured sword" (nuclear weapons) is threatened. DId this threaten his personal safety or the loss of his nuclear arsenal?

Also did the regime even detect this operation? What intelligence did we collect to determine if this mission was in fact compromised? Did the regime assess this was a smuggling operation gone wrong? Or an escape operation gone wrong? Also, this action could have been South Korea or even China - (I assume this took place in the West Sea and on the West Coast? China would have the easiest access. Recall relations at the time were frosty but then again China would not likely have to conduct such an operation to plant a listening device (so let's not mirror-image our operation with a potential Chinese one). But it could have been Chinese smugglers.

Excerpt:

Neither the US nor the North Korean government has made the botched operation public. Before approving the plan, the White House had been concerned that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke a “catastrophic retaliation”.

Let's consider some KJU Red Lines- would the compromise of this operation provoke a catastrophic retaliation? I think not. I think the regime will try to exploit the revelation of this operation as part of its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

I. Red Lines That May Trigger a Conventional Attack on South Korea

1. Perceived Imminent Regime Change or Decapitation

2. Internal Instability Combined with External Pressure

3. Unification by Absorption Perception

II. Red Lines That May Trigger Use of WMD (Including Nuclear Weapons) During Major Combat Operations

1. Collapse of Conventional Forces

2. Perceived Loss of Regime Survival

3. Severing of Escape or Survival Routes

4. Perceived Use-It-or-Lose-It Nuclear Posture

III. Red Lines That May Trigger a Preemptive Nuclear Strike (First Use)

1. Imminent Decapitation Perception

2. Deployment of Strategic Assets

3. Political or Diplomatic Signals of Imminent Regime Change

4. Trigger by Miscalculation

US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says

New York Times says Trump authorized mission to plant listening device; team killed fishers they encountered

The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025

US Navy Seals shot and killed a number of North Korean civilians during a botched covert mission to plant a listening device in the nuclear-armed country during high-stakes diplomatic negotiations in 2019, the New York Times reported on Friday.

Citing unidentified sources, including current and former military officials with knowledge of the still-classified details, the newspaper said Donald Trump approved the operation during his first administration, as he was involved in historic talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The plan was designed to fix a “blind spot” in US intelligence that would allow the US to intercept the North Korean leader’s communications, potentially giving Trump an advantage ahead of the summit between the two leaders in 2019.

But it unraveled when the detachment of Navy Seals came across North Korean civilians who appeared to be diving for shellfish, the Times reported. The American forces opened fire, killing all those on the small fishing vessel, the report said, without specifying the number of casualties.

Neither the US nor the North Korean government has made the botched operation public. Before approving the plan, the White House had been concerned that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke a “catastrophic retaliation”.

A classified Pentagon review later concluded the killings were justified under the rules of engagement, the report said.

In 2019, the Seals were dispatched to North Korean waters in a nuclear-powered submarine, and then deployed in two mini-subs in frigid waters to reach the shore. A group of eight Seals were then supposed to sneak past North Korean border forces, install the device, and then escape undetected. However, the operation was disrupted by the attack on the civilians, and the Seals left without installing the device.

The newspaper also revealed that the plan was based on a similar 2005 operation approved by George W Bush.

The White House, the Pentagon and the US embassy in Seoul did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the report.

Since Trump’s last summit with Kim in 2019, talks have fallen apart and North Korea has forged ahead with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program.

Trump this week said that US forces had killed 11 people in a strike on a boat in international waters that he claimed was carrying drugs to the United States. The White House has released few details about the operation, which it claimed targeted members of Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang.

The Guardian · / · September 5, 2025

8. Putin Wagers Ukraine’s Army Will Break Before His Economy Does

Which is the conventional force and which is the "guerilla army?"

As Kissinger said: "The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose."

Putin Wagers Ukraine’s Army Will Break Before His Economy Does

The Russian leader’s bet explains why he is evading President Trump’s push for a deal

https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-wagers-ukraines-army-will-break-before-his-economy-does-d3ab22fb

Ukrainian soldiers and an armored vehicle in the Sumy region.

By Marcus Walker

\ Photographs by Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

Sept. 6, 2025 9:22 am ET

The war in Ukraine has become a contest between two hourglasses: one measuring how long Ukraine’s thinly stretched army can keep up the fight, and the other how long Russia’s economy can sustain the invasion without hurting the stability of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

The problem for President Trump’s push for peace is that Putin is betting Ukraine’s hourglass will run out first, allowing him to impose a victor’s terms and win a place in Russian history alongside conquering czars.

That is why the Russian president has for months sidestepped Trump’s proposals to freeze the fighting with a territorial compromise that the U.S. thought would be attractive for Moscow. Instead, the Kremlin is sticking to its maximalist demands, which would effectively make Ukraine its vassal and change the balance of power in Europe.

Trump’s latest deadline for Putin to show he is serious about peace talks with Kyiv has lapsed. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European allies continue to discuss sending peacekeepers to maintain a peace that is nowhere in sight.

What’s missing, say many policymakers and analysts who are critical of Trump’s approach to peacemaking, is a concerted U.S.-European strategy to shorten Russia’s countdown clock and change Putin’s calculation, because, on current trajectories, he could win his bet.

Russian endurance

Russia’s economy grew strongly in 2023 and 2024, despite Western sanctions, thanks to energy exports and the fiscal stimulus from heavy military spending. But strains and shortages have been building up, growth is faltering, oil and gas revenues are down sharply, and the government’s deficit is rising.

That doesn’t mean it is approaching a crisis that would force Putin to shrink his war aims.

“Problems are visibly mounting, but the Russian economy is not going to run into the wall any time soon,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

Antidrone netting shrouds roads in a town near the front line in Ukraine’s south.

A Ukrainian military vehicle drives through a town near the front line.

Even with its worsening outlook, the economy can support Russia’s war effort for at least another 18 to 24 months before problems become severe, he said.

A determined Western effort to tighten sanctions, and better enforce existing ones, could shorten that time frame, Gabuev said, as would lower oil prices. But it is hard to cut off Russia’s oil revenues altogether, he said.

China and India now buy the bulk of Russian oil. India says it will continue to do so despite U.S. secondary tariffs imposed in August. The U.S. and Europe have so far shown little appetite to punish China, which has the power to fight back in any trade war, over its extensive economic support for Russia.

Even if Russia’s finances deteriorate sharply, that doesn’t mean Putin will give economics priority over his political goals—including his historical fixation with restoring what he sees as Russia’s rightful status and sphere of influence.

With borrowing constrained by international sanctions, budget cuts could fall on civilian spending to protect military outlays. Army recruitment could shift toward more coercive mobilization if the funds for lavish signing bonuses run dry.

Russian President Vladimir Putin Photo: Vladimir Smirnov/ZUMA Press

Putin isn’t totally insensitive to economic fallout—such as inflation—that could cause widespread discontent, said Maria Snegovaya, a Russia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. The proof, she says, is that Putin has tried hard to insulate much of Russian society from the war, in both his economic and mobilization policies.

Ukraine’s intensifying campaign of drone attacks against Russian oil refineries and pipelines aims both to reduce Russia’s export revenues and to spread domestic disruption. It is already leading to fuel rationing in some regions.

“It is getting harder to maintain the appearance of normalcy,” said Snegovaya. “Russians become unhappy if the war interferes with their lives.”

But in an increasingly authoritarian country, there are ever-fewer ways for Russian society or elites to express discontent or take action, she noted. She estimated Russia could sustain its war on Ukraine for another three years, unless sanctions tighten considerably.

A member of a Russian youth movement at a ceremony marking the end of World War II in Moscow. Photo: angelos tzortzinis/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Ukrainian tenacity

On current battlefield trends, another two or three years of war could stretch Ukraine’s defenders to breaking point.

Although Russia’s big offensive in eastern Ukraine this spring and summer has achieved only marginal territorial gains, the relentless attrition of men is weighing on Ukraine’s army, which can’t replace its losses as easily as Russia with its much larger population.

Moscow’s military goal isn’t so much to capture land as to exhaust Ukraine’s forces, until Kyiv is forced to capitulate. Putin is likely to reduce his aims and accept a deal that Ukraine and the West can live with only if he believes Ukraine won’t buckle on the battlefield, while his internal political risks from continuing the war are rising.

The continued supply of Western arms and ammunition will be essential for extending Ukraine’s ability to resist, alongside the buildup of Ukraine’s own military industries.

Stabilizing Ukraine’s manpower shortage is also crucial. In the eastern Donetsk region, the main crucible of the fighting, the infantry has become so sparse that small groups of Russian soldiers are often able to infiltrate the wide gaps between their dugouts. Ukraine relies on mines, artillery and above all on drones to pick off the Russians.

Kyiv is continually improving its drone capabilities to compensate for its infantry shortage, but it can’t defend the country with a robot army alone.

A bombed school in a Ukrainian town.

Ukrainian defenses near the front line in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Ukraine is paying a price for skewed military draft practices that have put much of the burden of mobilization on middle-aged men from poorer rural and provincial areas, sheltering the urban middle class and the young. Russia’s war recruitment is even more socially and regionally lopsided, but its greater size and authoritarian regime means it can get away with it. In Ukraine’s more democratic society, it grates.

“Social inequality is the main problem behind the infantry crisis. The draft offices take the farmer out of his tractor but not the attorney out of his office,” said Serhiy Ignatukha, leader of the Bulava drone unit in Ukraine’s Presidential Brigade.

Like many tired front-line veterans, he is frustrated about the large number of able-bodied men who frequent the bars and nightclubs of cities such as Kyiv, Dnipro and Odesa. “We should be like Israel, where everybody fights,” he said.

In addition, rigid Soviet-style habits of Ukraine’s military command, which many soldiers say have caused unnecessary losses, have also eroded trust in the army leadership as well as citizens’ willingness to sign up. Many front-line officers and military analysts have said for the past two years that Ukraine needs to overhaul how it generates and manages its forces.

“Maybe we still didn’t reach that critical point yet where the need for change forces action,” said Capt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn, a battalion commander in Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade, who has been highly critical of the army high command.

Ukraine has repeatedly defied the odds since Russia launched its full scale invasion in February 2022. Despite shortages of men and munitions, it has kept finding ways to stay in the fight.

Ukraine’s deepest resource is “our will to survive, which helps us to act in nonstandard ways,” said Shyrshyn. “To find the way, where there is no way.”

Write to Marcus Walker at Marcus.Walker@wsj.com

9. Putin Sends Trump Two More Bad Signals

Excerpts:

“Let him come to Moscow,” Mr. Putin said. What an idea: Come in, Mr. Zelensky, welcome to the Kremlin, please sit down. How do you take your tea, one lump or two of polonium? Remember that Russia has made multiple attempts to assassinate the elected Ukrainian president throughout the war, and no doubt will continue to try.

...

“Everything is still safe, but it’s more complicated,” Ivar Värk, the CEO of Estonian Air Navigation Services, recently told us. An EU memo from May documented increased signal interference in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, too. As a means of causing disruption, this Russian activity is “simple and cheap,” the memo said, and it’s “likely to continue unless proportional counter measures are taken.”

How much more evidence of Mr. Putin’s intentions does Mr. Trump need?

Putin Sends Trump Two More Bad Signals

He says Zelensky should ‘come to Moscow,’ as a top EU plane is jammed.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/russia-vladimir-putin-plane-gps-jamming-ursula-von-der-leyen-donald-trump-ukraine-05a2595d

By The Editorial Board

Sept. 5, 2025 6:14 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin Photo: Stepan Pugachev/Associated Press

President Trump keeps hoping Vladimir Putin will negotiate in good faith to end his Ukraine war, and Mr. Putin keeps giving signs that he’s a menace not to be trusted. This week the Russian said he might be willing to meet Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, if the parley is held in his preferred setting.

“Let him come to Moscow,” Mr. Putin said. What an idea: Come in, Mr. Zelensky, welcome to the Kremlin, please sit down. How do you take your tea, one lump or two of polonium? Remember that Russia has made multiple attempts to assassinate the elected Ukrainian president throughout the war, and no doubt will continue to try.

Or consider that Russia is suspected of jamming a plane last weekend that was carrying a senior European Union official on a tour of the continent’s eastern flank. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was flying to visit an ammunition factory in Bulgaria, which is a member of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, when the plane’s GPS navigation was jammed.

An EU spokesman said officials believed it was “blatant interference” by Russia. Last year a plane with British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps aboard was jammed near the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Pilots have other tools for navigation, but they can get disoriented, and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said such signal interference can have “potentially disastrous effects,” and it’s “taken very seriously.”

GPS jamming and spoofing in Eastern Europe has become “more or less constant,” says John Wiseman, who founded a website that uses transponder data to track suspected incidents. The city of Tartu in Estonia, another EU and NATO member, previously relied on GPS for approaching planes. Amid signal interference last year, some planes had to divert, and Finnair suspended flights to Tartu while the airport adopted an alternative.

“Everything is still safe, but it’s more complicated,” Ivar Värk, the CEO of Estonian Air Navigation Services, recently told us. An EU memo from May documented increased signal interference in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, too. As a means of causing disruption, this Russian activity is “simple and cheap,” the memo said, and it’s “likely to continue unless proportional counter measures are taken.”

How much more evidence of Mr. Putin’s intentions does Mr. Trump need?

Beijing’s New Playbook for Trade Talks: Keep Talking but Give No Ground

China sent a trade envoy to Washington with a clear message: We’re willing to talk, but we’re not ready to make a deal

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-new-trade-talk-strategy-49fb1f1a

Lingling Wei

Sept. 5, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Li Chenggang, pictured in Sweden, is said to have offered little to the U.S. on a subsequent visit to Washington. Photo: Peng Ziyang/Xinhua/ZUMA

Quick Summary

Trade negotiations between China and the U.S. show little progress as Beijing takes a new stance: Keep talking, but yield little.View more

With trade negotiations between China and the U.S. showing little progress, Beijing is taking a new stance: Keep talking, but yield little.

That position was illustrated by the recent visit to Washington by Li Chenggang, a key member of Beijing’s negotiating team led by Vice Premier He Lifeng.

According to people familiar with the situation, his visit didn’t come at the request of the U.S. government. Li didn’t meet with administration officials such as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who are directly involved in top-level negotiations with China. He instead met with deputy-level officials at the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department and the USTR, where he largely repeated Beijing’s long-held positions.

The trip signaled a new mandate from Chinese leader Xi Jinping: By seeking to engage with the Trump administration while making few concessions, Beijing is trying to hold itself up as a responsible party at a time of intensifying great-power competition.

The result is a delicate detente—but one that isn’t likely to produce a trade deal soon.

Just in the past couple of weeks, Xi rolled out the red carpet for leaders from Russia, India, North Korea and other developing nations, touting China as the leader of a new, multilateral world order that is a contrast with President Trump’s America-first foreign policy.

China’s leader Xi Jinping in Beijing recently with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, in an image released by North Korean state media. Photo: Korean Central News Agency/AFP/Getty Images

During his meetings in Washington in late August, Li repeated Beijing’s demands that the U.S. remove tariffs on Chinese goods and ease U.S. restrictions on the export of American tech products, but he offered little of substance in return, the people said.

“The meetings were not productive,” said one person familiar with Li’s visit.

Li’s visit came on the heels of remarks by the Chinese ambassador to the U.S. that were critical of Washington. Speaking to a U.S. soybean-industry event on Aug. 22, Xie Feng, the Chinese envoy, said U.S. protectionism was “casting a shadow over China-U.S. agricultural cooperation.”

Last month, Washington and Beijing extended their pause on higher tariffs through early November. The truce was secured after the two agreed to roll back tit-for-tat tariffs and ease export restrictions on key goods, including rare-earth magnets from China, which are critical for many industrial products, and certain technology products from the U.S.

Now, the two sides are at an impasse over the U.S. request for China to crack down on the flow of the chemicals used to make fentanyl. Beijing won’t take action until the administration removes the 20% tariffs it has placed on Chinese imports as punishment for China’s role in the fentanyl trade, according to the people.

Moreover, Trump’s call for China to significantly increase its purchases of American soybeans has so far gone unanswered. U.S. officials say that China has, over the past 18 months, been deliberately slashing imports of U.S. agricultural products, including by revoking certificates for meat-processing facilities, sourcing grains from other countries and building up inventories in advance of U.S. harvest seasons. Just weeks before the harvest, American farmers are worried that China will buy little, if any, of their soy.

Imported soybeans from Brazil arrive at the Chinese port of Yantai. Photo: Cfoto/DDP/ZUMA

In a statement, White House spokesman Kush Desai said, “the administration continues to press our trading partners using the power of the American economy, the world’s best and biggest consumer market, to level the playing field for American industries and workers.”

China’s Commerce Ministry said Li called on both sides to “make good use” of regular dialogue to manage differences and expand cooperation. People close to Chinese officials say a main purpose for Li’s trip was to understand the full spectrum of U.S. demands.

Another reason for Beijing’s outreach is economic. With a collapse of its property market and sluggish consumption at home, Chinese negotiators are aiming to prevent the administration from raising tariffs and tightening export controls on China, which could exacerbate the economic pressure.

Xi wants to avoid a one-sided deal like the one Beijing struck with the first Trump administration in early 2020, The Wall Street Journal has reported. That deal required China to significantly increase purchases of American goods and services while requiring the U.S. to do very little in return.

With domestic consumption proving stubbornly slow, China is eager to avoid a further economic hit from tariffs. Photo: Mahesh Kumar A./Associated Press

While the Trump administration also has de-escalated tensions with Beijing, it is simultaneously pursuing trade agreements with other nations that concern China. Specifically, Beijing is troubled by provisions designed to counter transshipment—the practice of Chinese companies using countries like Vietnam to circumvent U.S. tariffs. This targeted pressure has, in turn, provided another incentive for Chinese negotiators to engage.

In a Fox News interview last month, Bessent said that “we’re very happy” with the situation with China. “I think right now the status quo is working pretty well,” the Treasury secretary said, referring to the current tariff levels on China.

Bessent’s remarks suggest a continued detente between the two sides, potentially creating an opening for a summit between Trump and Xi. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said a leaders’ meeting is likely, though no date has been set.

“Both sides think they still have some time to work this out,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, referring to a potential trade deal. “Both sides see the need and high possibility for a summit this year.”

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

11. U.N. Accuses Rwanda-Backed Rebels of Slaughtering Children, Other Civilians in Congo

To the UN (a sarcastic question): How about the "responsibility to protect?"

Of course that question should go to the member states. But few of us are even aware of what is happening in Africa.

U.N. Accuses Rwanda-Backed Rebels of Slaughtering Children, Other Civilians in Congo

Here’s what you need to know about the war in eastern Congo

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-n-accuses-rwanda-backed-rebels-of-slaughtering-children-other-civilians-in-congo-0d073edb

By Nicholas Bariyo

Updated Sept. 6, 2025 1:05 am ET

M23 soldiers are seen in the Congolese city of Goma in February. The Rwanda-backed group signed a preliminary truce with Congo in July. Photo: AFP/Getty Image

Quick Summary

The U.N. reported that M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo might have committed war crimes, including rape and executions.View more

Rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo committed what might have been war crimes and crimes against humanity, raping women and executing children and other civilians, the United Nations said Friday. M23 rebels, reinforced by Rwandan troops, stormed through eastern Congo at the start of this year, seizing two major cities and battering the Congolese army and its allied militias.

What is happening in eastern Congo?

The governments of Congo and Rwanda signed a U.S.-brokered peace deal in Washington in June to end the latest round of a conflict that has plagued eastern Congo for decades. A month later, Congo signed a preliminary truce with the M23 rebels in Qatar, in which the parties committed to reaching a comprehensive peace deal.

But on the ground, tensions continued to simmer as both sides reinforced their positions, the U.N. said in its new report.

M23 fighters—whose ranks are dominated by Congolese ethnic Tutsis backed by Rwandan troops—have conducted targeted attacks on civilians in areas predominantly inhabited by Hutus. Hutu extremists slaughtered Tutsis by the hundreds of thousands during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and ethnic tensions remain heated. In July, M23 rebels attacked villages about 40 miles north of the regional city of Goma, where they allegedly executed hundreds of Hutu men and women, as well as dozens of children, with machetes and axes, according to the U.N.

“The atrocities described in this report are horrific,” said U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. “It is heart-breaking and deeply frustrating to witness, once again, the dehumanization of the civilian population by those in power who are failing in their responsibilities.”

An M23 spokesman didn’t respond to requests for comment on the U.N. report. In the past, the rebels have said that they intervened to prevent atrocities against ethnic Tutsis at the hands of Hutu extremists.

The new report cited human-rights abuses by Congolese government troops, as well.

Congo’s foreign minister, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, said the government would work to ensure that victims of the abuses get justice. She described alleged crimes committed by M23 as “hallmarks of Rwanda’s repeated aggression” against Congo.

“The Democratic Republic of the Congo will not allow such acts to be normalized or forgotten,” she said in a statement.

M23 rebels captured the Congolese city of Goma in late January. Photo: AFP/Getty Image

Is this just about ethnic grievances?

While lingering Tutsi-Hutu hatreds are an underlying cause of the conflict, you don’t have to dig too deep in Congo to uncover monetary motives for the combatants. Eastern Congo is rich in minerals, including gold, diamonds and coltan, a key ingredient for smartphones and laptops.

By controlling land, the rebels and their backers control minerals. M23 quickly captured the coltan-mining town of Rubaya, where the rebels raise around $800,000 each month by taxing traders, according to the U.N. Thousands of tons of illegally mined Congolese gold have passed through Rwanda, according to the U.N. Rwandan officials have said they would like the country to serve as a processing center for legally mined Congolese minerals, once peace is in place. Uganda, which has 4,000 or so troops in Congo fighting a separate Islamic State-aligned rebel group, is also a main transit route for smuggled Congolese minerals headed to international markets.

What has been the civilian toll?

The exact number of dead is unknown, but certainly thousands upon thousands have died in the fighting, many of them innocent bystanders to the war. More than two million people have been displaced by the M23 insurgency over the past three years, according to the U.S. CARE International reported that at least 67,000 women and girls experienced sexual assaults during the first four months of the year, the most intense period of fighting.

An M23 rebel walked alongside residents in Goma in January. Photo: AFP/Getty Images

What’s Rwanda’s role in the war?

The U.N. says Rwanda sent some 4,000 troops to help M23’s advances, and that at times there were more Rwandan troops on the front lines than rebel fighters, firing antiaircraft missiles at Congolese government forces and guided mortars into heavily populated areas. Three U.N. peacekeepers—blue-helmeted troops were stationed around Goma to assist the government and protect civilians—were killed during the rebel attack. The U.N. was blunt, charging that M23 has been operating “with training, material, intelligence, and operational support from the Rwanda Defense Forces.”

A Rwandan government spokesperson didn’t respond to requests for comment. Rwandan officials have previously denied sending forces to assist M23, but they do acknowledge employing what they obliquely call “defensive measures.”

Congolese officials have accused Rwanda of intervening in the conflict largely to gain access to stolen Congolese minerals, a charge Rwanda has denied.

The Congo-Rwanda peace agreement requires both sides to stop supporting armed groups in the region, which, in principle, would require Rwanda to abandon M23 and the Congolese government to break from a Hutu-based militia.

How bad could this get?

The Congo-Rwanda peace agreement is a solid step forward. And perhaps fighting will ease between M23 and its enemies, although so far the rebels seem reluctant to surrender their territorial gains. But when tensions have boiled over in Congo, the results have been devastating. Congo’s previous war in the late 1990s and early 2000s metastasized. Zimbabwe and Angola sent troops to support the regime of former strongman Mobutu Sese Seko against rebels backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. That conflict led to the deaths of more than five million Congolese, many from disease and hunger.

Write to Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 6, 2025, print edition as 'U.N. Accuses Congo Rebels of Atrocities'.

12. Concepts Are Not Doctrine

Conclusion:

Doctrine and concepts serve different purposes. Doctrine serves as a guide to inform commanders and their staff of ways to plan and conduct current operations; it is not an advertising tool for other things, such as concepts. Concepts are a vision for the future and reflect needed modernization efforts. Including conceptual ideas in doctrine about nonextant capabilities or force structure, or possible future operating environments, is not useful for military commanders and their staffs. Despite this being common knowledge among doctrine writers and concept developers, we routinely see efforts to incorporate unvalidated conceptual ideas into service, joint, and multinational doctrine. Therefore, when promoting new ideas about how to solve an operational problem we see in the future, the military forces of the United States and NATO need to clearly delineate concepts and doctrine and enforce a rigorous validation process to examine concept ideas and ensure they are currently viable before incorporating them into doctrine.

I have always been partial to LTG Cushman's views on joint doctrine.

“A 1950 definition called doctrine ‘the compilation of principles and theories applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice.’”

“Doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason.”

“Doctrine cannot replace clear thinking…under the circumstances prevailing.”

LTG (RET) John H. Cushman, “Thoughts for Joint Commanders,” (1993 Copyright John H. Cushman)

Concepts Are Not Doctrine - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Kaine Meshkin · September 5, 2025

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As a doctrine author I often see misconceptions of doctrine and concepts, especially the purpose of each. The distinction between the two, however, is far from a trivial one. For members of the profession of arms, understanding how they differ is important. But for military institutions and those of us responsible for crafting concepts and writing doctrine, it is imperative. Failing to properly distinguish between them has real-world implications, leading to situations like unvalidated concepts entering doctrine, which causes confusion and renders doctrine unhelpful to the military professionals who need it the most. This misapplication of purpose happens, and it spans from service doctrine through US joint and multinational doctrine. It is a problem that must be addressed, and that begins with clarifying the differences between doctrine and concepts.

What is Doctrine?

US Army doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and as a guide for actions of operating forces, and elements of the institutional force that directly support operations in support of national objectives.” US joint and NATO doctrine have similar definitions.

Doctrine has a hierarchy of ideas that help shape how a commander can think about the planning and conduct of operations. These ideas reflect how the force can currently operate. In other words, doctrine must reflect existing capabilities, force structure, and operational approaches. Doctrine constantly evolves as various operational conditions change over time.

Doctrine, for the most part, is not the way, but rather a way. As the Army definition states, it can serve as a guide. It is an authoritative product, but commanders have the discretion to use their judgment in its application. The only doctrine that is prescriptive are procedures. There are some things commanders and soldiers should not exercise their own judgment on, like how to call in a medevac or the steps to employ a weapon system.

Doctrine embodies the professional language of the military. Terms and symbols are also doctrine and another aspect of our professional language. Doctrine needs to be clear and easily understood. Buzzwords, jargon, colloquialisms, and slang are not doctrine and should be avoided when discussing the planning and conduct of operations. When buzzwords or slang terms are used in lieu of approved doctrinal terms, it causes confusion about what, exactly, is being discussed. In this regard, doctrinal terminology provides the language baseline to increase shared understanding and interoperability, something especially important for multinational operations.

Doctrine takes time to write if it is going to be useful. For doctrine writing there is a clear tradeoff between speed, quality, and quantity. You can usually have two of those elements, but never all three. Quality is arguably the most important. Doctrine is usually at its best when it is the product of many minds and pens. In the US Army we have doctrine authors who do the bulk of the work, but we also send drafts out to various experts throughout the Army for their insights. It takes time to staff a publication across the Army so that the best minds and most experienced leaders have time to read it, reflect on it, and provide feedback on how to improve it. US joint and NATO doctrine both follow a similar process.

Doctrine drives changes to training and to the planning and conduct of operations, but it is not the medium to provide solutions to enterprise-wide problems for the military. In the Army, we often see a desire from leaders pushing modernization efforts to want to change doctrine first, when in reality we may need to enact changes to other parts of the Army before we change the doctrine. The concept-to-doctrine pipeline helps illustrate this further.

What are Concepts?

Concepts are the intellectual starting point for solving an operational problem and they help drive modernization. They are a vision of a future state for military forces and should provide a clear difference from current doctrine. They can outline needed changes to the composition and disposition of forces, new operational approaches (sometimes referred to as operational concepts), and necessary capabilities to combat threats and adapt to changes in the operational environment. Since concepts are unconstrained by current technical or operational limitations, they should never be rushed into doctrine; they need to be validated first.

Validation is a process that takes time and often involves various forms of experimentation, simulations, wargames, and exercises to assess a concept’s efficacy. Once a concept is validated and the necessary capabilities and force structure are fielded to support it, it is no longer conceptual, but rather it is reality and should be reflected in doctrine. However, what we put in doctrine often evolves from how it was originally conceptualized. That is because we learn things through the validation process about what is or is not viable or useful in a concept. Parts of a concept may be valid, others may not. Funding constraints may prevent some capabilities, for example, from being produced. Because of this, doctrine will likely never perfectly reflect a concept and this is precisely why we should never rush a concept into doctrine. We must know what is feasible first.

Confusing Doctrine with Concepts

Recent developments in NATO and US joint doctrine help illustrate some of the problems with forgetting the purpose of doctrine.

Starting in 2024, US joint doctrine started including “futures” chapters in doctrinal publications, a curious development since doctrine is supposed to reflect the current operational environment and capabilities of the joint force. The information in these “futures” chapters comes from the Joint Warfighting Concept—no doubt interesting information but not appropriate for a doctrinal publication. If commanders are interested in predictions on the future of joint warfare, all they need to do is read the concept. It’s why it exists. By putting it in doctrine we are implying that these future possibilities are currently relevant to operations, something that simply is not true. When the conditions are in place for the concept to become reality, then joint force doctrine writers can and should incorporate the validated components of the concept into doctrine.

Something similar occurred in NATO with the alliance’s version of the multidomain operations concept. NATO’s new concept did not undergo any validation activities before it was rushed into doctrine at the direction of senior leaders in NATO, ostensibly to promote or advertise the concept. As a result, dutiful NATO doctrine authors were copying, in many cases word for word, from the concept paper because they had no idea how to incorporate the conceptual ideas as operationally relevant doctrine. It resulted in significant confusion about what multidomain operations were and how NATO was going to approach operations in the future.

For some context, when published in 2023, the NATO concept was a highly aspirational blueprint for modernizing the alliance that had little utility for the conduct of current operations by NATO forces. The NATO concept embodied a whole-of-government(s) approach that sought to have, among other things, NATO military commanders influencing private sector entities to aid in operations. The concept did not grapple with the wisdom or feasibility of such activities, nor did it explain how NATO intends to influence the sovereign member nations of NATO to change their national policies or legal restrictions in this regard. NATO multidomain operations represented a fundamental paradigm shift in how an alliance of nations conducts operations.

To further add to the confusion, NATO envisioned that its new concept would eventually replace joint operations with no clear explanation of what that meant or how it would be achieved. In fact, the full realization of the NATO concept required conditions and capabilities that did not exist when published, do not exist now, and may never exist. It had, therefore, no doctrinal utility to the militaries of the alliance in its published form. A rigorous validation process would have identified these problems, and appropriate adjustments could have been made before trying to incorporate the concept, wholesale, into doctrine. That said, the US Army offered to help describe elements of the concept in doctrine in a way that was relevant for current operations. That process is currently ongoing, and it has, so far, yielded a much clearer picture of what parts of the NATO concept are doctrinally valid for the militaries in NATO. It is an attempt to validate after the fact, which is a suboptimal solution but better than letting the confusion continue.

Doctrine and concepts serve different purposes. Doctrine serves as a guide to inform commanders and their staff of ways to plan and conduct current operations; it is not an advertising tool for other things, such as concepts. Concepts are a vision for the future and reflect needed modernization efforts. Including conceptual ideas in doctrine about nonextant capabilities or force structure, or possible future operating environments, is not useful for military commanders and their staffs. Despite this being common knowledge among doctrine writers and concept developers, we routinely see efforts to incorporate unvalidated conceptual ideas into service, joint, and multinational doctrine. Therefore, when promoting new ideas about how to solve an operational problem we see in the future, the military forces of the United States and NATO need to clearly delineate concepts and doctrine and enforce a rigorous validation process to examine concept ideas and ensure they are currently viable before incorporating them into doctrine.

Kaine Meshkin is a retired US Army officer and a former assistant professor at the United States Military Academy. He is a doctrine developer at the US Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Kaine Meshkin · September 5, 2025

13. The US Military’s Missile Gap Isn’t Going Away

Conclusion:

The American defense industrial base revitalization is underway. The managed decline that took place over decades, however, will take more funds and more time to reverse entirely. The US commercial industry is ready and able to join the fight. The only thing we lack is time.

The US Military’s Missile Gap Isn’t Going Away

The National Interest · Mackenzie Eaglen, Todd Harrison

Topic: Security

Region: Americas

September 5, 2025

By: Mackenzie Eaglen, and Todd Harrison

The military used one fourth of its THAAD interceptors to defend Israel. Imagine how many it would need to defend Taiwan.

This summer’s “12-Day War” between Israel and Iran exposed what Washington should have long known: the US military’s air and missile defense architecture is not ready for a long fight against a capable enemy. Israel severely degraded Iran’s ability to fire missiles by systematically eliminating many of their launchers. However, the United States still expended nearly 25 percent of the total number of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile interceptors during the short conflict. Not a quarter of all our THAAD interceptors bought last year, but a full one-fourth of all of these systems ever procured. The military is falling behind and must reverse course soon.

In the twelve days of fighting between Israel and Iran, over 150 THAAD interceptors were launched at Iran’s more advanced ballistic missiles. This is over three times the average annual procurement of around 40 interceptors since 2010. At $15.5 million per interceptor, this puts the armed forces on an unsustainable trajectory. Even if the Pentagon increases current orders beyond the meager 12 funded in the 2025 budget, it still takes 3 years between the date a contract is awarded and when the interceptors are delivered.

The shortage of THAAD interceptors is not unique. American ships in the region also launched over 80 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors to help defeat Iranian missiles during the 12-day conflict. The only version of this missile in production is the SM-3 Block IIA, and the Defense Department is still waiting on the first delivery of these upgraded missiles from a contract awarded in 2019.

The United States used a significant portion of its interceptor stockpiles to defend Israel, which has its own multi-layered air and missile defense systems, from Iran. This rogue state had already lost half its missile launchers from Israeli strikes, according to the Israeli government. Now, imagine a fight with China.

Much has been written about how a shortage of offensive munitions will make it difficult for the United States to outlast a sophisticated military in any prolonged conflict. Not only are American munitions stockpiles limited, but also the means of delivery are decreasing as our fleets of surface warships, fighter jets, and bombers continue to shrink in size.

The US Air Force used nearly half of its stealth B-2 fleet just to strike the Iranian nuclear site at Fordow in Operation Midnight Hammer. Our offensive platforms are limited, and defending them against attacks by missiles and drones would be crucial to successfully defeating any Chinese aggression. While it may seem odd to fire a million-dollar interceptor to defeat a thousand-dollar drone, it makes sense to fire as many interceptors as necessary to defend a multi-billion-dollar ship against that drone.

Security

Why Germany Can’t Avoid European Leadership

If it does not recognize and institutionalize Germany’s political centrality, Europe is doomed to indecision and irrelevance.

Leon Hadar

September 5, 2025

Economic Development

The Dawn of American State Capitalism

President Trump’s massive trade and investment deals risk creating a fiat economy.

Aaron Bartnick

September 5, 2025

Security

A Power-Driven Foreign Policy

The question is no longer whether we should have a “power-based foreign policy,” but rather how we most effectively assert our power.

September 5, 2025

If the Iranians can deplete 25 percent of America’s THAAD stocks and a significant portion of our SM-3 magazines in a few days, the Chinese can and will exhaust them in a few hours. Multi-million-dollar missiles, only produced in the dozens per year, are no match for far cheaper and more plentiful threats. America cannot stay on the losing side of the production curve when it comes to missile defense. At a time when the risks of a protracted conflict with a peer rival are growing, the military must regain its ability to compete at scale.

The most promising solution for the fastest return is to leverage commercial innovation. Our free market system, access to capital, and entrepreneurial culture make the United States the envy of the world for technological innovation. Washington must do more to leverage this advantage to develop novel interceptors and non-kinetic defenses that are designed from the outset for production at a scale of thousands per year.

But the transition to more mass-produced missile defense systems will not happen overnight, and policymakers should not view it as an either-or choice. The US military can bridge this transition by adopting a hybrid approach, following the example of the Space Force. Services must continue to build next-generation, exquisite systems while initiating multiple efforts to develop lower-cost, highly proliferated systems with new companies. A mix of capabilities will, over time, bolster stockpiles while strengthening and broadening the defense industrial base.

With the influx of money just appropriated for the Golden Dome, the Pentagon finally has the resources it needs to pursue a hybrid approach to missile defense. The initial Golden Dome architecture, due any moment, should make mass-produced systems a key element of the overall design.

Look no further than artillery to find this blended production model already underway and showing early success. Congress has been pouring money into the armed forces’ organic and defense industrial bases for munitions, and those investments are starting to pay off. The Army has been busy investing billions in new munitions production lines and adding new capacity and resiliency to its supply chains across the country. In parallel, the Army is “expanding and modernizing existing facilities to increase speed, flexibility and capacity.”

As the US Army succeeded in quadrupling the monthly production rate of 155mm shells this summer, it also expanded surge capacity by “moving shell production from a single facility to four separate facilities this year.”

This milestone came on the heels of another new load, assembly, and pack munitions facility that opened in Arkansas in April. A late May ribbon-cutting at Crane Army Ammunition Activity in Indiana for a new explosive railcar holding yard also followed.

The American defense industrial base revitalization is underway. The managed decline that took place over decades, however, will take more funds and more time to reverse entirely. The US commercial industry is ready and able to join the fight. The only thing we lack is time.

About the Authors: Todd Harrison and Mackenzie Eaglen

Todd Harrison is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and among the nation’s most preeminent air and space experts, appearing regularly in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Bloomberg.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute whose writing has been recently published in The New York Times and National Review.

Image: Mehmet Ali Poyraz / Shutterstock.com.

14. In calling Taiwan ‘Nazis’, Beijing weaponises history

True colors of Xi and the CCP revealed?

Excertrps:

On 3 September, Beijing staged its largest military parade in a decade. President Xi Jinping has cloaked the spectacle in anti-fascist rhetoric. Its real purpose, however, was to deter rivals, shape global perceptions and mask the most aggressive military buildup since 1945, including a 7.2 percent increase in defence spending, a massive shipbuilding capacity and a growing nuclear arsenal.

Works such as British historian Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally highlight the real sacrifices of the Chinese people in World War II (both Communist and Nationalist) in resisting Japanese imperialism. But in 2025, the Chinese leadership’s commemorations of ‘anti-fascist’ solidarity will be attended not by Western allies, but by despots including Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Burmese dictator Min Aung Hlaing.

We may honour the Chinese people’s past sacrifice and heroism, but the party-state’s rhetoric and actions should give us pause about its future trajectory.

In calling Taiwan ‘Nazis’, Beijing weaponises history | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Tuvia Gering · September 3, 2025

In a rhetorical escalation, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper compared Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the Nazis, echoing Russia’s justification for its invasion of Ukraine. This is part of China’s broader pattern of weaponising and rewriting history to suit its needs.

On 28 August, the party’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily, featured an article by Wang Yingjin, head of the Center for Cross-Strait Relations at Renmin University in Beijing. In it, he argued that the DPP’s recent drive to unseat dozens of opposition legislators through mass recall votes was doomed to fail.

Wang attributed the failure to a litany of problems with the party, including dissatisfaction with Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s governance, partisan misuse of democratic mechanisms and harmful policies. Moreover, he feigned concern for Taiwan’s democracy, branding the DPP guilty of ‘green terror’ and ‘dictatorship’.

Specifically, he argued that two civil society groups, the Kuma Academy and Bluebird Movement, ‘expose the dangerous tendency of “Taiwan independence” forces becoming increasingly Nazi-like.’

In reality, the Kuma Academy is a non-profit aiming to train and empower citizens in emergency response, civil defence and media literacy. The Bluebird Movement is a grassroots pro-democracy civic movement, advocating for greater legislative transparency and government accountability.

China’s cognitive warfare against Taiwanese democratic institutions is part of a long-running campaign. For instance, during large-scale Chinese army drills around Taiwan in April, party-state propaganda arms depicted Lai as a literal ‘parasite’.

However, referencing the Nazis is the ultimate political slur, a global fallacy that dehumanises opponents and silences debate. Wang’s charge is more consistent with Moscow’s playbook in Ukraine, where ‘Nazification’ has been used as a pretext for Russia’s illegal invasion.

Is this a precursor to a Chinese ‘de-Nazification’ campaign? Beijing’s immediate aim is likely more tactical: to sow division, weaken the DPP and erode Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

It would have been far harder for the party to weaponise the term had it not first been normalised at home. Taiwan’s opposition leader, Kuomintang chairman Eric Chu, used it this year by likening the DPP to Nazi Germany and Lai to Hitler.

This comparison drew sharp rebukes from Germany’s and Israel’s de facto embassies in Taipei, both condemning the trivialisation of Nazi atrocities and Holocaust memory. Yet Chu only doubled down.

Incidentally, as Wang’s article was in the printing press, the Chinese embassy in Israel marked the 80th anniversary of the ‘War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War’.

Over the years, Beijing has reframed the plight of Jewish refugees in Shanghai as a story of Chinese exceptionalist national benevolence. Shanghai was one of the few places where Jews fleeing Nazi persecution could enter without a visa, providing a haven for more than 20,000 refugees.

In Beijing’s revisionist telling, however, China is framed as an eastern ‘Noah’s Ark’, a saviour that welcomed Jews ‘with open arms’. Scholars such as Mary Ainslie argue this form of historical statecraft erases Jewish voices and casts China as global moral protector of a ‘rightful’ civilisational centre.

This stands in stark contrast to Beijing’s open hostility toward Israel since 7 October 2023. China refused to condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks and hostage-taking, even lending legitimacy to Hamas’s actions at the International Court of Justice.

Party-state propaganda outlets and state-led disinformation campaigns such as Spamouflage have amplified anti-Israel disinformation and antisemitic tropes; posts across Chinese social networks compare Israel’s campaign against Hamas and other Iran-backed proxies to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

On 14 June, Xue Jian, China’s consul in Osaka, explicitly compared Israel to Nazi Germany. In previous posts, the diplomat likened Israelis to Japan’s Imperial Army and circulated AI-generated images portraying them as ‘baby-devouring demons’.

Yet Israel is often not so much the primary target as it is a proxy in the great-power battle of narratives.

On 17 August, the United States and China released annual reports condemning each other’s human rights records. The US State Department’s report opened with the word ‘genocide’, describing China’s actions against Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. In response, China’s State Council Information Office, a front of the CCP’s Propaganda Department, accused the US of aiding ‘genocide’ in Gaza.

On 3 September, Beijing staged its largest military parade in a decade. President Xi Jinping has cloaked the spectacle in anti-fascist rhetoric. Its real purpose, however, was to deter rivals, shape global perceptions and mask the most aggressive military buildup since 1945, including a 7.2 percent increase in defence spending, a massive shipbuilding capacity and a growing nuclear arsenal.

Works such as British historian Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally highlight the real sacrifices of the Chinese people in World War II (both Communist and Nationalist) in resisting Japanese imperialism. But in 2025, the Chinese leadership’s commemorations of ‘anti-fascist’ solidarity will be attended not by Western allies, but by despots including Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Burmese dictator Min Aung Hlaing.

We may honour the Chinese people’s past sacrifice and heroism, but the party-state’s rhetoric and actions should give us pause about its future trajectory.

aspistrategist.org.au · Tuvia Gering · September 3, 2025

15. Hot mic catches Putin and Xi discussing organ transplants and immortality

Plotting how they both can live forever? Exchanging life sustaining TTPs?

Hot mic catches Putin and Xi discussing organ transplants and immortality

Live footage of private conversation between Russian president and Chinese leader aired at Beijing military parade

Oliver Holmes and Pjotr Sauer

Wed 3 Sep 2025 12.21 ED

The Guardian · Oliver Holmes · September 3, 2025

The authoritarian strongmen Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have mused on how organ transplants might lead to immortality, during a brief exchange of small talk caught on a hot mic at a military parade.

The Russian president was in Beijing on Wednesday with the Chinese leader, who hosted allies for a ceremony to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war.

As Putin and Xi walked at the head of a delegation of foreign leaders, state media aired live footage that captured parts of what appeared to be a private conversation. While they made their way towards a raised platform in Tiananmen Square, Putin’s interpreter could be heard saying in Chinese: “Biotechnology is continuously developing.”

After a brief inaudible passage, the interpreter added: “Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and [you can] even achieve immortality.”

Xi, who was off camera, could be heard responding in Chinese: “Some predict that in this century humans may live to 150 years old.”

Putin confirmed later to reporters he had discussed prospects for significantly increasing human life expectancy with Xi.

Both leaders have shown little intention of relinquishing power in their lifetimes. In 2018, Xi abolished presidential term limits, paving the way for him to rule indefinitely. Putin has also changed Russian law to allow him to remain in high office.

Military reveals and bold messaging: five key takeaways from China’s big parade

During their conversation, the two men walked alongside the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un, who was smiling and looking in the direction of Putin and Xi. It was not clear if their chat was being translated for him.

Later footage showed the three leaders walking up the steps towards the viewing platform for the parade.

The moment was carried on the livestream provided by the state broadcaster CCTV to other media, including the international newswires AP and Reuters.

China’s largest-ever military parade included 50,000 spectators and a big display of military hardware, from tanks and drones to nuclear-capable missiles, fighter jets and stealth aircraft.

The performance was seen as a show of defiance to the west. Other attenders included the president of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Myanmar’s junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing.

In his formal address, Xi told the crowd that the Chinese people stood firmly “on the right side of history”. He said China was a great nation that was “never intimidated by any bullies” – in an apparent veiled reference to the US and its allies – and added that China was “unstoppable”.

Reuters contributed to this report

The Guardian · Oliver Holmes · September 3, 2025

16. AI False Information Rate Nearly Doubles in One Year

To download the 17 page report you will have to provide some information . :-)

https://www.newsguardtech.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/August-2025-One-Year-Progress-Report-3.pdf

AI False Information Rate Nearly Doubles in One Year

NewsGuard’s audit of the 10 leading generative AI tools and their propensity to repeat false claims on topics in the news reveals the rate of publishing false information nearly doubled — now providing false claims to news prompts more than one third of the time.

https://www.newsguardtech.com/ai-monitor/august-2025-ai-false-claim-monitor/

Published Sept. 4, 2025

Despite a year of technical advancements in the AI industry, generative AI tools fail at a nearly doubled rate when it comes to one of the most basic tasks: distinguishing facts from falsehoods. The 10 leading AI tools repeated false information on topics in the news more than one third of the time — 35 percent — in August 2025, up from 18 percent in August 2024. When it comes to providing reliable information about current affairs, the industry’s promises of safer, more reliable systems have not translated into real-world progress.

The increase reflects a structural tradeoff. As chatbots adopted real-time web searches, they moved away from declining to answer questions. Their non-response rates fell from 31 percent in August 2024 to 0 percent in August 2025. But at 35 percent, their likelihood of repeating false information almost doubled. Instead of citing data cutoffs or refusing to weigh in on sensitive topics, the LLMs now pull from a polluted online information ecosystem — sometimes deliberately seeded by vast networks of malign actors, including Russian disinformation operations — and treat unreliable sources as credible.

Malign actors are exploiting this new eagerness to answer news queries to launder falsehoods via low-engagement websites, social media posts, and AI-generated content farms that the models fail to distinguish from credible outlets. In short, the push to make chatbots more responsive and timely has inadvertently made them more likely to spread propaganda.

17. What if we could vaccinate against mis- and disinformation?

See the graphics at the link: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/insight-and-impact/insightblog/vaccinate-against-disinformation

I think President Trump's NSS in 2017 had the best way to vaccinate against mis and disinformation.

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

I had some thoughts on this in 2017.

The Cyber Underground – Resistance to Active Measures and Propaganda: “The Disruptors” - Motto: “Think For Yourself”

https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/the-cyber-underground-%E2%80%93-resistance-to-active-measures-and-propaganda-%E2%80%9Cthe-disruptors%E2%80%9D-mot-0

What if we could vaccinate against mis- and disinformation?

BBC

In the hours after the recent earthquake in Myanmar, dramatic videos flooded social media – crumbling buildings, desperate survivors, scenes of chaos. But many of these were not real. They were AI-generated fakes.

While these videos may have been shared with good intentions, as the presenter notes, they also diluted the visibility of credible information, blurred the line between fact and fiction, and added noise to an already fragile situation. This is the evolving face of mis- and disinformation – more visual, emotionally charged, and difficult to verify in real time.

But what if we could prepare people to resist fake news before it spreads?

Inoculating against mis- and disinformation in North Africa

As part of BBC Media Action’s broader effort to understand what works in tackling information disorder, we’re testing proactive responses to mis- and disinformation in places where such interventions are rarely studied.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted research to understand social media users’ experiences of, and reactions to, mis- and disinformation in North Africa, with a focus on Libya, Algeria and Tunisia. Based on our findings, we have been testing several approaches, including some rooted in ‘inoculation theory’: a psychological framework proposed by social psychologist William McGuire in the 1960s and developed to address mis- and disinformation by Professor Sander van der Linden and colleagues at the University of Cambridge.

Much like a medical vaccine builds resistance to disease, this theory suggests that exposing people to a weakened version of a manipulative technique and showing them how to refute it can build resilience against future exposure. This is the basis of the prebunking approach: helping audiences understand common manipulation techniques, like emotional language, false dichotomies, personal attack, and scapegoating, before they encounter them in the wild.

This approach is especially needed in contexts where people are experiencing high levels of mis- and disinformation and often have limited tools to respond. While there is strong evidence that prebunking is generally effective at countering mis- and disinformation, most research on the approach still comes from high-income contexts, with limited efforts to apply it at scale.

In 2022, we first piloted the adaptation of prebunking techniques for a Tunisian social media audience. Based on the pervasive challenges highlighted by local media experts, we produced two versions of a prebunking video on emotional manipulation: a locally made animation and a re-voiced edit of the original video created by the University of Cambridge team. However, we found that neither led to significant shifts in people’s ability to recognise manipulation, or in their trust and sharing behaviour. This lack of measurable impact offered valuable insights into what works – and what doesn’t. Through a qualitative follow-up, we found:

Emotional manipulation was so common in Tunisia’s media that many didn’t see it as problematic.
Some participants mistrusted animations entirely due to their association with propaganda in Tunisia.
Others got caught up in the realism of the test posts and missed the manipulative cues altogether.

34% of respondents in a survey conducted in Tunisia believe it is more important to share information quickly than to check for accuracy

A breakthrough in Libya

Building on the learnings from Tunisia, we’ve been adapting prebunking for Libyan audiences and context over the past year. We took a more layered approach to address potential barriers while maximising quality. Using in-depth media monitoring to help us map local disinformation trends and identify the most pervasive manipulation techniques,we found emotional language and scapegoating emerging as top concerns. In partnership with the UNDP, we produced two videos and carried out two randomised control trials via our local El Kul (For Everyone) current affairs platform – a trusted source of information with over a million weekly users.

This time, the results were encouraging. We found:

Improved sharing discernment for scapegoating content: Viewers were significantly less likely to say they would share scapegoating content. While they didn’t always spot the technique, they were more cautious in practice, an improvement relative to the Tunisian trial.
Improved technique recognition for emotionally manipulative language: Viewers were more likely to distinguish between posts with emotional language and those that did not use this manipulation technique. As inoculation theory hinges upon technique recognition in order to increase resilience, this is a first essential first step in the journey to more cautious sharing and responsible online behaviours.

We shared these insights at the 2025 Cambridge Disinformation Summit contributing to a wider conversation on what it takes to tackle information disorder in lower-trust, lower-resource contexts. Our experience in Libya shows that with sustained investment in local research, design, and delivery, these approaches can successfully help prepare audiences to recognise and slow the spread of mis- and disinformation.

Building resilience where it’s needed most

Much of the global research into mis- and disinformation focuses on high-income countries. But in places where digital connectivity is growing faster than digital literacy, the risks are different and often more acute. BBC Media Action’s work is helping fill this gap, combining digital research, qualitative insights, survey data, and audience testing to understand how mis- and disinformation is experienced, and how responses can be adapted for local contexts.

Mis- and disinformation is a structural, behavioural, and emotional challenge – and it demands equally nuanced responses. Pre-bunking is one way to tackle this. As we look ahead, we’re exploring how to build on our initial work with short-form prebunking content and deepen its impact. A promising direction is long-form drama, which offers opportunities for repeated, narrative-driven prebunking content that can help build resilience to common manipulation techniques, especially among audiences less likely to engage with social media interventions.

As false narratives continue to spread faster than we can debunk them, it is time we stop playing catch-up and proactively give people the tools to navigate their information environment more safely and responsibly.

Our study in Tunisia was funded by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, through GiZ. Our work in Libya was funded by UNDP.

This article first appeared on our LinkedIn newsletter, Insight and Impact. Subscribe on LinkedIn.

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BBC

18. How Disinformation About the Minnesota Shooting Spread Like Wildfire on X

How Disinformation About the Minnesota Shooting Spread Like Wildfire on X

Under Elon Musk’s leadership, X has become the perfect platform to supercharge the spread of dangerous disinformation during breaking news events.

Wired · David Gilbert · September 3, 2025

Minutes after the perpetrator of the shooting at Annunciation Catholic Church in Minneapolis last week was identified, YouTube appeared to delete several videos they had shared that morning.

But not before the videos were downloaded and reshared in full on X.

Within hours, the platform was flooded with wild claims about the shooter and her motivation, with everyone from Elon Musk, the site’s owner, to the head of the FBI and left-wing activists posting half-baked allegations blaming anti-Christian hate, transgender genocide, and white supremacy. Many of the posts racked up millions of views per X’s public metrics.

While other social media platforms were also used to share unfounded claims about the shooter’s motivations, X, under Musk, has become the perfect platform to supercharge the spread of dangerous disinformation during breaking news events. The entire team tasked with tackling disinformation on the platform was first culled years ago, and now X's biggest users claim they are incentivized by the platform to share out-of-context clickbait content over verified facts.

“X’s feed algorithm is fully designed to maximize engagement, even negative engagement,” says Laura Edelson, an assistant professor in the computer sciences college at Northeastern University who specializes in tracking disinformation online. “In these conditions, conspiratorial, extreme content tends to perform very well. And when you couple that with the fact that with X’s significantly weakened content rules, this is exactly what we would expect to result.”

X did not respond to WIRED‘s request for comment.

An 11-minute video from the shooter, which was shared by dozens of X accounts in the minutes after her identity was revealed, includes a wide array of guns and ammunition. The weapons were adorned with over 120 symbols, words, and phrases that reference dozens of hateful ideologies, mass shooters, memes, and coded language used by the nihilistic online communities the shooter was a member of.

As extremism researchers warned people against jumping to quick conclusions given the huge swath of digital, written, and video content that needed to be analyzed, X users took very little notice.

The same day, screenshots from the video were used by everyone from elected lawmakers and senior government officials to law enforcement personnel, activists, podcasters, and conspiracy theorists on X to push particular narratives about what was to blame for the latest mass shooting.

In one of the primary narratives erroneously pushed immediately after the shooting, conservative influencers and politicians claimed that the perpetrator’s gender identity was at fault. Information about the shooter, who identified as transgender and changed her name to Robin Westman when she was 17 years old, spread like wildfire on X, pushed by a huge list of right-wing figures, including Georgia representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, right-wing podcaster Benny Johnson, and Musk himself. X’s own AI-powered chatbot Grok refuted the idea that transgender people disproportionately carry out mass shootings.

Many X users, like right-wing commentator Nick Sortor, claimed the attack was motivated by hatred of God, citing “all the anti-Christian and and anti-God writings” on the shooter’s guns. FBI director Kash Patel seemed to boost these claims by posting that the shooting was being investigated as a “hate crime targeting Catholics.” Conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer alleged that the shooter was “radicalized by leftism and Islam.” Others cited anti-Israel phrases written on the weapons as proof the shooting was antisemitic.

On the left, most focused on the fact the shooter praised other mass shooters and used racist language. Left-wing podcaster Benjamin Dixon, who describes himself as “Pastor of Antifa,” described the shooter on X as “a right wing incel aggrieved white boy.”

The platform itself even helped boost some of these claims in the summaries it presented to users about the shooting, which highlighted the "anti-Trump messages" written on some of the shooter's weapons without mentioning all the other words and phrases.

The reality, according to extremism experts who are still trawling through the shooter's writings and digital footprint, is that there simply appears to have been no overarching ideology motivating the shooter. Instead, some have determined that the shooter was likely part of a growing group of nihilistic violent extremists whose sole motivation is the violence itself.

“They clearly state several times they are not doing this for any ideology or cause, they are simply doing this for the sake of violence, for their desire for notoriety, to know what it feels like to be one of their idols, to cause chaos and see the fear in the eyes of their victims,” Marc-André Argentino, an extremism researcher, wrote on Bluesky in reference to the diaries the shooter posted to YouTube hours before the attack.

Argentino also warned that nihilistic violent extremists can be performative, their messages and writings designed in part to trick people into boosting specific phrases out of context.

“These kind of attackers put on a performance, there is a script they follow and part of that script is trolling journalists or leaving ironic items in the hope someone in the media will bring on the Streisand effect to further spread their attack and be immortalized,” says Argentino.

But on X, where posting first and often is rewarded more than posting accurate and verified information, such warnings repeatedly fall on deaf ears.

“Context collapse is a rhetorical device that we see a lot in breaking news events—twisting real quotes or events to mislead or presenting it without the context in which it was said,” Nina Jankowicz, the former Biden administration disinformation czar who is now CEO of the American Sunlight Project, tells WIRED. “This is particularly prevalent on microblogging platforms like X, where users are disincentivized to read more than 280 characters or past the headline of a news item.”

Since Musk’s takeover of Twitter in late 2022, almost every move he’s taken with regards to content moderation has made it more difficult to find accurate and timely information on X.

Shortly after he bought the company, Musk removed the team responsible for tackling disinformation and replaced it with the crowdsourced Community Notes system, which made the misinformation situation worse, not better. More recently, users have relied on Grok to fact-check posts, which also hasn’t helped. This lack of oversight, combined with a new verification system that rewards posts with the highest engagement over verified sources, has resulted in a toxic stew of disinformation flooding the platform during major global breaking news events. This was clearly seen at the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war and more recently during the protests in LA.

“There are no guardrails on X anymore, and it's become overrun by disinformation accounts and grifters,” says Mike Rothschild, an author who writes about conspiracy theories and extremists. “There are certain narratives about mass shootings that will instantly find homes on X, and nothing holds them back from spreading.”

Wired · David Gilbert · September 3, 2025

19. Why This Administration Can’t Fill Its Jobs

The Washington Post provides a nice service here for tracking all administration nominations. There are a lot of empty positions.

President Donald Trump has the ability to fill roughly 4,000 politically appointed positions in the executive branch and independent agencies, including more than 1,300 that require Senate confirmation. The Washington Post and the Partnership for Public Service are tracking nominees for roughly 800 of those positions.

Latest updates

As of September 5, 2025 at 5:05 p.m.

Thursday, Sept. 4

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2025/trump-appointee-tracker/

Why This Administration Can’t Fill Its Jobs

Making many officials work multiple roles is bad for governance.

The Atlantic · David A. Graham · September 5, 2025

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

The best line of Donald Trump’s three-hour-plus Cabinet meeting last week came not from the president but from Marco Rubio.

“Personally, this is the most meaningful Labor Day of my life, as someone who has four jobs,” said Rubio, who was serving as secretary of state, acting national security adviser, acting archivist of the United States, and acting administrator of USAID. (He’s since handed the latter to Russell Vought, who now also has three titles.) Three of these roles are subject to Senate confirmation; Rubio has been confirmed, and for that matter nominated, only as secretary of state. Trump has not put any nominee forward for the other two positions.

From top roles on down, the Trump administration continues to struggle to find people who can and will fill jobs, leaving the president to rely on a small circle of advisers, each playing multiple roles. The result is short-staffing and conflicts of interest that help explain why the executive branch has been bad at accomplishing not only its statutory responsibilities but also some of its political goals.

Consider Stephen Miran, the chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. Trump has nominated him to fill a recently vacated seat on the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. Miran told senators during a hearing yesterday that if he is confirmed, he will not resign from the CEA.

“I have received advice from counsel that what is required is an unpaid leave of absence from the Council of Economic Advisers,” Miran said. “And so, considering the term for which I’m being nominated is a little bit more than four months, that is what I will be taking.” (Miran said that if confirmed to a full term, he would resign.)

In other words, Miran would be simultaneously serving (albeit without pay) a president who has demanded that the Fed lower interest rates and sitting on the ostensibly independent board that sets interest rates. Conflicts of interest aren’t usually quite so obvious. The claim that an attorney advised Miran that his approach is fine is not encouraging: This administration seems to be able to get a lawyer to sign off on practically any arrangement. That doesn’t mean the public should accept it. But don’t worry—Miran demurred when a senator asked if he was Trump’s “puppet.”

Somehow, this is not the most disturbing case. Emil Bove, Trump’s former personal lawyer and a top Justice Department official, was narrowly confirmed as a federal appeals judge in July. But between that vote and taking his spot on the bench, Bove continued to work at the Justice Department, reportedly attending both internal meetings and a public event—a highly unusual arrangement. Once again, this didn’t appear to be an explicit violation of the judiciary’s rules, because he hadn’t yet been sworn in; nevertheless, he risked working on issues that could come before him in court. It doesn’t take a law degree to see why this arrangement looks bad, especially at a moment when faith in the courts as a check on the executive branch is in question.

“Socializing with Trump is fine. Advising Trump is not fine. Putting himself physically in a place where it looks like he is identifying with the president’s political agenda is not fine,” the legal ethicist Stephen Gillers told The New York Times. Then again, Bove has never seemed all that concerned about appearing to be anything other than a Trump sycophant. During his confirmation process, he refused to say whether a third presidential term was permitted, despite the clear language of the Constitution, and accounts from several whistleblowers contradict statements he made in his confirmation hearing, which suggests that he may have lied to senators. (He denies this.)

I first wrote about Trump’s use of dual-hatting, which is the term for one person filling multiple jobs, back in May. At the time, the possibility existed that this was a temporary state of affairs. Now it’s starting to look more permanent. Despite a focus on identifying qualified nominees, a key point in Project 2025, Trump’s pace of confirmations for top jobs is roughly the same as it was in his first, shambolic term. This comes even though Republicans control the Senate and have not voted down any nominees. Democrats have tried to slow down various appointments, and the GOP is considering the “nuclear option” to circumvent Democrats’ efforts, but they can’t confirm someone who hasn’t even been nominated, as is the case for nearly 300 roles.

Jobs that don’t have a person devoted to the work full-time are bad for effective governing. For example, the Department of Homeland Security recently told the nonprofit watchdog American Oversight that since early April, it has not been saving text messages exchanged by top officials, as required by law. (DHS later told the Times that it does preserve texts but did not explain why it had previously denied American Oversight’s requests for them.) Responsibility for collecting public records and enforcing laws falls on the National Archives, which Rubio now runs, but he seems unlikely to crack down on DHS, even if he had the time to concentrate on the matter.

An ideological case for failing to appoint individuals for each opening is more plausible: Traditional conservatives who prefer that government do less might cheer this. But as I wrote last week, Trump is attempting to establish an extremely intrusive government that flexes its muscles in nearly every area of American life. That’s hard to do with a skeleton crew, and it sometimes means staffers trying to do things that they don’t really have the authority to do.

Or, in other cases, the expertise. This week, the Department of, uh, War reportedly approved plans to detail as many as 600 military lawyers to serve as temporary immigration judges. A shortage of immigration judges is a real problem that has dogged the U.S. government for years. A person who comes to the United States and requests asylum may wait for years before they receive a hearing or an interview. Some of those people will be accepted, but some will not, and the prospect of spending years in the U.S. while waiting is understandably attractive for migrants.

That doesn’t mean military lawyers are a good solution, and not simply because the Pentagon seems to have its hands full of tricky legal situations, including the soft launch of martial law in American cities and what look like extrajudicial murders of suspected drug smugglers (the administration has said that it acted lawfully, but it hasn’t offered a detailed explanation). Immigration law is notoriously complex. Bringing in military lawyers “makes as much sense as having a cardiologist do a hip replacement,” Ben Johnson, the head of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, told the Associated Press.

This is the latest instance of Trump turning to the armed forces to do things for which they aren’t trained or prepared. A militarized society isn’t merely a threat to the Constitution and freedom; it’s also unlikely to work very well. Nor is a Federal Reserve that’s a subsidiary of the White House, or a federal bench that is a wing of the Department of Justice, which itself appears to be an appendage of Trump’s personal legal team. These moves have the same ultimate effect as Trump’s efforts to steamroll the judiciary and seize powers from Congress: They create a president who is worse-informed, worse-advised, and ever more powerful.

20. A Sobering Prophecy About the Rise of China

Excerpts:

The term “Indo-Pacific” has its origins in the geopolitical writings of Karl Haushofer, who between the First and Second World Wars wrote a series of books and articles that identified the Indo-Pacific region as the center of gravity for future geopolitical struggles.

...

“A giant space is expanding before our eyes,” Haushofer wrote, “with forces pouring into it which, in cool matter-of-factness, await the dawn of the Pacific age, the successor to the aging Atlantic, the over-age Mediterranean and the European era.” The huge populations of the Indo-Pacific, he continued, are creating “the arsenal of a Pacific geopolitics.” India and China, he added, were struggling to become liberated from “foreign domination and capitalistic pressure.” He urged Germany’s leaders to align with these “Indo-Pacific forces” and referred to the Indo-Pacific region as a “geopolitical giant.”

A Sobering Prophecy About the Rise of China

Karl Haushofer called it a growing “geopolitical giant.”

Francis P. Sempa

∙

September 4, 2025

modernagejournal.com · September 4, 2025

Robert Kaplan has written many important books, but the two that are more relevant to current international relations are Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power and Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. Together, those books present a study and analysis of the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, which is the twenty-first century’s “heartland” in the global struggle for power and preeminence. The term “Indo-Pacific” has its origins in the geopolitical writings of Karl Haushofer, who between the First and Second World Wars wrote a series of books and articles that identified the Indo-Pacific region as the center of gravity for future geopolitical struggles.

Karl Haushofer was born in Munich in 1869, during Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s efforts to consolidate most of the “German states” under Prussian rule in a German empire. Two years later, after Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War, Germany was unified. Haushofer joined the military after high school and later taught at the Bavarian War Academy. In 1908, Haushofer traveled to India and Southeast Asia on his way to Japan, where he served as a military attaché. The next year, he spent time in Korea and Manchuria, and in 1910 he visited Russia on his way back to Germany. During the First World War, he served as a brigade commander, attaining the rank of major general. After the war, Haushofer taught political geography in Munich and founded Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, a monthly journal in which he and other German writers discussed geopolitical questions and theories. Haushofer befriended Rudolf Hess, who introduced him to Adolf Hitler.

Haushofer and his colleagues at Zeitschrift für Geopolitik studied and debated the works of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. They believed, with the Prussian philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder, that “history is geography in motion,” and they contended that “geographic and spatial factors, properly understood, explained Germany’s past triumphs and failures and held the key to national renewal” in the wake of Germany’s defeat in World War I, as David Murphy writes in The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933. The war, Murphy explains, “was the crucial experience in preparing the ground for the explosion of geopolitical thought between 1924 and 1933” in Germany.

There was also a Darwinian aspect to Haushofer’s writings—the notion, acquired from Ratzel and Oswald Spengler, that the state was an organism that went through the stages of birth, expansion, decline, and in some instances, death—and that international relations was, as Robert Strausz-Hupé later wrote, a “struggle for space and power.” Strausz-Hupé noted that there is no direct evidence that Haushofer’s ideas influenced Hitler, though it is likely that at least some members of the Nazi elite and army officers were familiar with the writings of the German geopoliticians.

Haushofer believed in spheres of influence, or what the geopoliticians called “Pan Regions,” and in the mid-1920s he identified what he believed was the world’s most important region—the Indo-Pacific. His most important book was The Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship Between Geography and History (1925). There, he foresaw that global power would shift from the Atlantic basin to the Indo-Pacific based on the relative size and population of China and India, which he called the “Monsoon countries.” Haushofer wanted Germany to ally herself to Russia, Japan, China, and India, thus forming a Eurasian bloc that would be able to geopolitically outflank Great Britain and the United States. In his mind, Mackinder’s “heartland” would shift from Eastern Europe and Central Asia to the Indo-Pacific.

“A giant space is expanding before our eyes,” Haushofer wrote, “with forces pouring into it which, in cool matter-of-factness, await the dawn of the Pacific age, the successor to the aging Atlantic, the over-age Mediterranean and the European era.” The huge populations of the Indo-Pacific, he continued, are creating “the arsenal of a Pacific geopolitics.” India and China, he added, were struggling to become liberated from “foreign domination and capitalistic pressure.” He urged Germany’s leaders to align with these “Indo-Pacific forces” and referred to the Indo-Pacific region as a “geopolitical giant.”

Haushofer’s dreams came crashing down when Germany attacked Soviet Russia in June 1941 and Japan continued its war of conquest in China. His Indo-Pacific bloc never materialized during his lifetime. (Haushofer committed suicide with his wife in 1946.) It did reemerge to some extent with the formation of the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1950 (which included the eastern half of Germany), but that alliance proved short-lived as Sino-Soviet relations soured and the split was deftly exploited by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy.

Mackinder, whose work Haushofer admired and often quoted, suggested in 1904 that China, with its large oceanic frontage, could someday bid for Eurasian hegemony. In World Politics of Today, Haushofer predicted that someday China would “return” to the sea. China today has the world’s largest navy and a shipbuilding capacity exponentially greater than the United States. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has both land power and sea power components, and China also sees itself as a “near-Arctic power.” Robert Kaplan noted in Monsoon that the Greater Indian Ocean region stretching from the Horn of Africa to India and Indonesia “was never far from China’s gaze,” and today manifests “the quiet, seemingly inexorable rise of India and China over land and sea.” And in Asia’s Cauldron, Kaplan identified the South China Sea as the “maritime heart” of the Indo-Pacific. Recent headlines have noted not only the continued “strategic partnership” between China and Russia but also the warming of relations between China, Russia, and India. Haushofer’s great Eurasian bloc is again in view.

The latest essay every day.

modernagejournal.com · September 4, 2025

21. Ex Libris, Libertas: America’s Library vs. Anti-liberalism

To satisfy your weekend intellectual fix, a book review essay from Dr. Pilon about our great Library of Congress (and more) which to me should be the Church or Temple of America (separation of church and state notwithstanding).

Conclusion:

The founders had been right to insist on the primacy of education in a people’s genuine, as opposed to a pseudo, republic. All that wisdom lodging inside books and manuscripts, a treasure of the ages, contained right next to the nation’s congressional buildings and the Supreme Court, should serve as a reminder of our responsibility to inform ourselves. This is not only as citizens of the still freest country in the world, but for our own sake and that of our children.

Ex Libris, Libertas: America’s Library vs. Anti-liberalism

The Geopolitics of Culture: James Billington, the Library of Congress, and the Failed Quest for a New Russia, by John Van Oudenaren (Cornell University Press, 2024).

by Juliana Geran Pilon (September 2025)

Library of Congress Jefferson Building, Interior (Andrew Prokos)

Jerusalem has the Tower of David to recall that good governance is subject to a higher authority; Athens celebrates the Goddess of Reason, its namesake, in the iconic Pantheon; Rome cherishes its huge, erstwhile hugely (if dangerously) popular Colosseum; Paris worships in splendor inside a gargoyled Notre Dame. Embracing them all – divine law, rationality, people’s will, and faith—Washington’s Library of Congress (LOC) pays tribute to as many books as it can access: a shrine to ideas.

The concept preceded the building. In 1800, as part of the Congressional plan to relocate the national government from Philadelphia to Washington, $5,000 was expressly allocated for books to start a national library. It underscored the founders’ unprecedented commitment to education as essential to republican self-government. Not simply a convenient reference library, it reflected an appreciation of its potential strategic significance as an instrument of statecraft. Which is why after his election as president in 1802, Thomas Jefferson made the Librarian of Congress a presidential appointment. The author of America’s covenantal document then had another chance to demonstrate his commitment to the institution in 1814, after the British burned the embryonic library inside the U.S. Capitol, by selling his personal library of 6,487 books to “recommence” the project. It would take a few more decades for it to become the magnificent edifice it is today, a jewel in the heart of America’s capital that inspires the awe its biblical liberal ideals deserve.

Blessed with several fine directors, it fell to the twelfth, University of Chicago professor Daniel J. Boorstin, to name the monumental main building after the erudite founder in 1980. The chronicler of the country’s unique ethos in the bestselling trilogy The Americans, Boorstin understood its symbolism and the crucial role played by Jefferson in its reification, and was equally devoted to its mission. Having benefited from a huge budgetary increase during both the Ford and Reagan administrations, he used to enhance connections with scholars and influencers throughout America and the world. Upon his retirement in 1987, The New York Times assessed the American Jewish librarian “perhaps the leading intellectual public position in the nation.”

The paper of record showed far less acumen in its laconic mention of his successor’s appointment on April 17, 1987, when it described Billington, then Director of the Wilson Center for International Scholars who had taught at both Harvard and Princeton, merely as “an expert on the Soviet Union” who had “acted as a consultant to Mr. Reagan.” The editors seem unaware that his popularly acclaimed Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith was a masterpiece of comparative analysis, documenting in riveting detail the role of culture in violent upheavals. That he arrived on the scene at the very moment that the Iron Curtain was about to fall seemed almost providential.

For the next 28 years, serving as the nation’s de facto secretary of culture, Billington excelled beyond expectations. He was the right man in the right place, being called upon to advise policymakers on how to respond to rapid changes going on in the Soviet Union. But “[e]ven more important than this advisory role was the way he was to mobilize the human and material resources of the Library of Congress as part of the overall US and Western effort to assist in the positive transformation of Russia following the collapse of communism.” So writes Dr. John Van Oudenaren in his comprehensive account of the LOC’s role in the complex and unprecedented pivot from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship between the two rival powers.

A Russia expert, now Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Dr. Van Oudenaren is ideally suited for this project: he was part of it. As Director of the World Digital Library and LOC’s Chief of the European Division, he was privy to the delicate negotiations conducted by Billington with his Russian counterparts, and provides exquisitely detailed information regarding acquisitions, setbacks, and rationale. But the book is not meant for scholars alone. By placing the LOC’s activities in historical context, it opens a window onto the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in an illiberal world. The Geopolitics of Culture: James Billington, the Library of Congress, and the Failed Quest for a New Russia thus stands testimony to the extraordinary efforts by public and private actors to help Russia reawaken, only to see it fail at the hands of one man: a sociopathic former KGB officer.

That quest, prompted by the apparent liberalization implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev, inspired America’s policy of promoting positive change in Russia as early as 1987. It began with a considerable increase in the exchange of documents and materials traditionally undertaken by libraries, followed by an even more dramatic spike during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1999). But the most dramatic escalation came after Congress authorized the LOC’s Congressional Research Service to expand exchanges, in order to help newly democratic countries build effective parliamentary bodies. Far from seeking to impose an American model on others, this goal reflected America’s democratic values and national self-government.

The same attitude underlay the growing number of exhibitions featuring Russia’s history and arts and digitalization of archival Russian materials: designed to preserve the nation’s precious heritage for all the world. “Billington’s distinctive contribution to U.S.-Russian relations was his emphasis on the importance of national identity and self-respect,” writes Van Oudenaren. “Culture was for him not just an add-on… [but] the heart of the matter.” And since the same went for every other nation, “he sought to apply [the same] principle’ on a global scale with the World Digital Library (WDL), the purpose of which, he stressed, was to encourage each country to showcase what was greatest in its own culture on a high-tech platform developed and managed by the LOC.”

In January 2000, Billington explained his vision in a Congressional hearing: the library could become “the hub of an international [online] network to advance education and understanding.” There followed joint projects with Spain, Brazil, France, the Netherlands. In February 2001, he was approached by Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had just established his Open Russia Foundation, with the express intent to disseminate educational materials through the Internet. Then came September 11, and Billington saw a new need for “deeper cultural understanding of the three great rising regions on the Eurasian landmass—Confucian East Asia, Hindu South Asia, and the world of Islam.” Congress was busy appropriating gobbles of money to an understaffed USAID barely coordinating with a stale-thinking State and a bureaucratic Defense Department.

Fortunately, there was the private sector. Specifically, Khodorkovsky, who loved both the exchange programs and the WDL, became a donor to LOC’s rule of law programs, writing a personal check for $1 million payable to the LOC. The relationship ended abruptly in 2003 with his arrest; he would spend the next decade in jail on trumped-up charges. As fate would have it, another Soviet Jew, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, who took up the baton in 2003, approaching Billington about a particularly ambitious, still secret, plan to “digitize every book in the world.” After several more meetings, Brin convinced him to undertake a pilot project in early 2004 to digitize over five thousand books in the General Collection. In 2005, Google signed an agreement with the LOC to begin the WDL, donating $3 million to jump start it.

Another opportunity came after the George W. Bush administration decided to rejoin UNESCO in 2003, after a twenty-year absence, and appoint Billington as a member of the commission which interacted with the organization. Two years later, the commission decided to recommend a joint project of LOC, Google, and UNESCO to create a Global Gateway by digitizing the holdings of national libraries. It was formally launched by December. In 2007, the Russian State Library also agreed to cooperate, but ultimately nothing came of it. By then, the newly-appointed prime minister of Russia Vladimir Putin had finally revealed his sinister colors. They were displayed in a chillingly turgid sixty-eight-page Concept [Kontseptsiya]: Strengthening Traditions of Russian Statehood in the Public Consciousness and in the Activity of the National Government,” a copy of which was delivered to the LOC. The operative word, whose importance should have been immediately obvious but was not, even to Billington, was “statehood” —gosudartskvo.

The pivot from nation to state, focusing centrally on the head of the state, cemented the narrative departure from the nominal internationalism of communist ideology that Stalin had adopted after the Nazi invasion of World War II. In line with this reconfigured kontseptsiya, the Putin Presidential Library would be dedicated to spelling out and disseminating the notion of “stateness.” Finally dispensing with the risible Marxist myth of “the dissolution of the state,” it kept the Soviet-era anti-liberal, anti-American and anti-NATO demonology to justify the same expansionism, vividly demonstrated in the occupation of Georgia in 2008. But no longer communist, Putinist imperialism had become openly pan-Russian. Similarly ostentatious was the increasingly routine and brazen practice of killing the dictator’s enemies by barbaric means, imprisoning and torturing dissenters and their families, friends, however distantly related.

Not that Putin disregarded history – on the contrary, he had started rewriting it even before taking power, in 1999. Developing a “usable past” for post-Soviet Russia meant grounding its legitimacy neither in Russia’s pre-Soviet history nor in anything during communist times but squarely in the Soviet victory over the Nazis. Militarism is a sure staple of collectivist authoritarianism, especially of the fascist variety. So too is denigrating privatization, which Putin does by condemning the horrible nineties, given the unpopularity of the corruption that began during Yeltsin era. Never mind that it increased exponentially under Putin. Lying is the one common denominator of all tyrannies, no matter how they advertise themselves.

Billington was not caught unawares. For as early as the 1980s he had considered it possible for what he called a “crypto-fascist authoritarian nationalism” becoming the ruling ethos after the end of Soviet rule. Yet he couldn’t help giving in to what the dissident writer Nadezhda Mandelstam had called “Hope Against Hope.” Despite his own intimate conversations with Putin, whose content is unfortunately unrecorded, however, he was more sanguine about Russia than either his former mentor, the British Jewish Isaiah Berlin or the Soviet Jewish Nobel Prize-winning poet Joseph Brodsky. Both had been skeptical that an open, democratic future was possible in that vast Eurasian territory containing a multitude of fragmented, and politically inexperienced communities. In the end, he could not have failed to admit his two friends held a far more realistic view of Russian intelligentsia than he did, notwithstanding his encyclopedic knowledge of Russia.

After Billington’s retirement, the WDL’s work ended in 2016, as did most other exchange initiatives. By then, the WDL site contained content in 145 languages and its interface would be accessible in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish, in addition to Russian. Once again it would fall to the LOC and other Western libraries to save the world’s culture and memories. Its website, www.wdl.org, was finally shuttered in November 2021, after nearly 20,000 library items comprising over a million images had been contributed by 158 partners in sixty countries. The exchange program begun in 1987, later renamed Congressional Office for International Leadership, eventually brought more than 40,000 Russian young leaders to the United States before the program with Russia was terminated following Putin’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But, in what ranks as one of Billington’s most enduring achievements, exchanges with other post-Soviet states, above all Ukraine, continue and are aimed at helping to shore up these countries in the face of Russian aggression.

Billington certainly cannot be blamed for not trying to bring about a new Russia. Unfortunately, in abandoning his original suspicion of what he called “a ruthlessly effective self-perpetuating political machine, operated by apparatchiks taught not to think for themselves,” Billington succumbed to the classic liberal American penchant for optimism. Van Oudenaren called his hope that Russia could revive its pre-Bolshevik culture and traditions naïve; but he could have said the same of U.S. foreign policy for over a century.

Doubtless, Billington “did not have an answer to the question of how the United States can combine the promotion of democracy and universal human values with respect for civilization and cultural diversity.” But “at least he recognized,” argues Van Oudenaren, “that this was a key question for the United States – perhaps the key question for the future of foreign policy.” To do that, however, it is imperative that policymakers be clear-eyed about the facts and not engage either in wishful thinking or suicidal self-flagellation. It also helps to learn history and all the other arts fairly called liberal.

The founders had been right to insist on the primacy of education in a people’s genuine, as opposed to a pseudo, republic. All that wisdom lodging inside books and manuscripts, a treasure of the ages, contained right next to the nation’s congressional buildings and the Supreme Court, should serve as a reminder of our responsibility to inform ourselves. This is not only as citizens of the still freest country in the world, but for our own sake and that of our children.

Table of Contents

Juliana Geran Pilon is Senior Fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization. Her eight books include The Utopian Conceit and the War on Freedom and The Art of Peace: Engaging a Complex World; her latest book is An Idea Betrayed: Jews, Liberalism, and the American Left. The author of over two hundred fifty articles and reviews on international affairs, human rights, literature, and philosophy, she has made frequent appearances on radio and television, and is a lecturer for the Common Sense Society. Pilon has taught at the National Defense University, George Washington University, American University, and the Institute of World Politics. She served also in several nongovernmental organizations, notably the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), where as Vice President for Programs she designed, conducted, and managed programs related to democratization.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

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Can Trump’s ‘War Department’ Win a War?

What matters isn’t the name but the erosion of U.S. hard power.

In defense of the War Department

SEAL Team 6 infiltrated North Korea in a mission gone wrong

Nicholas Slayton

Contributing Editor

US Navy Seals killed North Korean civilians in botched 2019 mission, report says

Putin Wagers Ukraine’s Army Will Break Before His Economy Does

The Russian leader’s bet explains why he is evading President Trump’s push for a deal

Russian endurance

Ukrainian tenacity

Putin Sends Trump Two More Bad Signals

He says Zelensky should ‘come to Moscow,’ as a top EU plane is jammed.

Beijing’s New Playbook for Trade Talks: Keep Talking but Give No Ground

China sent a trade envoy to Washington with a clear message: We’re willing to talk, but we’re not ready to make a deal

Quick Summary

U.N. Accuses Rwanda-Backed Rebels of Slaughtering Children, Other Civilians in Congo

Here’s what you need to know about the war in eastern Congo

Quick Summary

What is happening in eastern Congo?

Is this just about ethnic grievances?

What has been the civilian toll?

What’s Rwanda’s role in the war?

How bad could this get?

Concepts Are Not Doctrine - Modern War Institute

The US Military’s Missile Gap Isn’t Going Away

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The military used one fourth of its THAAD interceptors to defend Israel. Imagine how many it would need to defend Taiwan.

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In calling Taiwan ‘Nazis’, Beijing weaponises history | The Strategist

Hot mic catches Putin and Xi discussing organ transplants and immortality

Live footage of private conversation between Russian president and Chinese leader aired at Beijing military parade

Oliver Holmes and Pjotr Sauer

Wed 3 Sep 2025 12.21 ED

AI False Information Rate Nearly Doubles in One Year

NewsGuard’s audit of the 10 leading generative AI tools and their propensity to repeat false claims on topics in the news reveals the rate of publishing false information nearly doubled — now providing false claims to news prompts more than one third of the time.

What if we could vaccinate against mis- and disinformation?

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A Sobering Prophecy About the Rise of China

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Ex Libris, Libertas: America’s Library vs. Anti-liberalism