Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"The totalitarian mash leaders based their propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, under such conditions, one could make people believe the most fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had lied to them, they would protest if they had known all along that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for their superior tactical cleverness."
– Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951

“Political language is designed to make lies, sound, truthful and murder, respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” 
– George Orwell 

"The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country." 
– Abraham Lincoln


1. Decade After the UN COI Report: Michael Kirby on North Korea's Human Rights Landscape. (please note my comments)

2. Russia Is Waging War Against the West, but Most People Are in Denial

3. House Republicans and Democrats to issue dueling documents casting blame for mistakes made in US withdrawal from Afghanistan

4. Collapse of $15 Billion Sale of U.S. Steel to Nippon Steel Could Cool the ‘Spirit of Camp David’

5. China "debt traps" loom on US partner's doorstep

6. Commentary: You could power America with China’s wasted energy

7. Mingus: Army Transformation ‘Never Stops’

8.  China’s ‘disappeared’ foreign minister demoted to low-level publishing job, say former U.S. officials

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024

10. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 8, 2024

11. CIA boss says west should not be intimidated by Russia’s nuclear threats

12. Iraqi Banks Used U.S.-Created System to Funnel Funds to Iran

13. Israeli strikes in Syria leave 14 dead and more than 40 wounded, Syrian state media says

14. Welcome to the Resistance: Call for Papers—SOF in Competition

15. The US is dismantling nuclear warheads to power next-gen reactors

16. Phase Zero of the Coming War

17. Army struggles to win over recruits with slew of failed marketing campaigns

18. The Deep Roots of Trump’s Isolationism



1. Decade After the UN COI Report: Michael Kirby on North Korea's Human Rights Landscape



This video is very much worth 30 minutes of your time to understand the human rights situation in north Korea. Justice Kirby and HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu have an important discussion about the current human rights situation. At the end of the discussion in passing Greg mentions funding challenges for HRNK so I want to expand on that so people can understand the situation.


Please note that the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) made significant contributions to the Commission of Inquiry and every year has provided detailed input to the State Department or the UN Universal Periodic Review as well as other US State Department Human RIghts reports. I mention this because funding for HRNK comes from private donations and grants and continues to face funding challenges since the Department of State (DOS) of the Biden administration has disapproved every grant request from HRNK.  


I state this because DOS funded HRNK's satellite imagery project investigation of North Korea's political prison camps, its research of North Korean workers officially dispatched overseas, and its scrutiny of North Korea's information environment for nine years, from 2014 until 2023. HRNK received about $800,000 in DOS support under the Obama administration, and about $1.2 million in DOS support under the Trump administration. The Biden administration has completely defunded HRNK, while providing no debriefings or just pro forma debriefings on the rejected proposals or rather flimsy reasons for those rejections.. DOS is currently funding groups from Canada and South Korea, but not HRNK, America's premier NGO focused on North Korean human rights. Yet DOS has continued to use HRNK research and data to inform its annual human rights reports.


For full transparency, I am a member of the Board of Directors of HRNK. I feel that it is important to raise this issue and ask why DOS refuses to fund HRNK during the Biden admiration.. It is difficult to understand how the United States cna have a human rights upfront approach to north Korea and yet deny modest funding requests from HRNK.






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndfRMOls-S8


Decade After the UN COI Report: Michael Kirby on North Korea's Human Rights Landscape


In this profound interview with HRNK's Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu, Justice Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia and lead investigator of the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights in North Korea, reflects on the enduring challenges and scant progress in North Korea's human rights issues a decade after the landmark report. Kirby discusses the unchanged and deteriorating conditions in North Korea, the complexities of international intervention, and the intertwined nature of human rights and global security.




2. Russia Is Waging War Against the West, but Most People Are in Denial


Do we sufficiently understand our adversaries?


An important excerpt that I wish all those who are opposed to the use of political warfare to describe one of the domains of warfare would read and consider.  


We need to pay attention to Dr. Agnieszka Bryc.


Excerpt:

So, what kind of war are we engaged in with Russia?
War has many domains. In Ukraine, there is, among other things, kinetic warfare, whereas against us, Russia is waging cognitive warfare. Its front is the mind, that is, cognitive aspects. The Russians are very skilled at this because they calibrate their campaigns. Having a good cultural understanding of each target, they tailor their tools. They run different campaigns against Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and Western European countries. They do not target the right or the left specifically but touch on the sensitive points of each community. Generally, we are on the defensive, and that is very problematic. The one who wins is the one who first imposes the narrative. If we do not move to proactive operations, we will defeat ourselves. This means that Russia won’t have to fire a single bullet because the West will capitulate on its own. To defeat the aggressor, we need to dare to take the initiative, impose the narrative, and engage more actively in the Russian infosphere. Essentially, we need to reach a state where the Kremlin has to put out fires on its own political stage.
We cannot pretend that Russia is not waging war against us… Nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that through negotiations, the Kremlin will cease to be a threat.





Russia Is Waging War Against the West, but Most People Are in Denial

kyivpost.com · by Michał Kujawski · September 8, 202

Even though Russia admits it is fighting a war against the “collective West,” leaders in the West prefer to dismiss such statements rather than muster up the political will to ensure Russia’s defeat.

by Michał Kujawski | September 8, 2024, 8:37 am


This photograph shows Kremlin's Spasskaya tower (L) and St. Basil's cathedral in downtown Moscow on July 23, 2024. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP)


Even though Russia admits it is fighting a war against the “collective West,” leaders in the West prefer to dismiss such statements rather than muster up the political will to ensure Russia’s defeat.

This is Part 2 of the interview with Dr. Agnieszka Bryc, PhD, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland. Part 1 can be viewed here.

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Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.


Agnieszka Bryc

Michał Kujawski: We would probably agree that this is not a war over territory, but a war to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity. The topic of peace talks is increasingly appearing in the media, and some commentators argue that Ukraine will have to come to terms with the loss of some territories, which contradicts the actual goal of Russia. Do Western societies understand that this war is not about disputed territories?


Agnieszka Bryc: Poles and other countries on the eastern flank understand this perfectly. This is not a war over territory, nor is it an internal family conflict. Russia is a revisionist state that wants to replace the Western-centric liberal order with a new “concert of powers,” where a tyranny axis would dictate the rules of the game. The Kremlin doesn’t hide it – Putin and his foreign minister have repeatedly announced that the “American century” is ending and a new era of “global majority,” meaning the so-called rest of the world, is beginning. The aggression against Ukraine is therefore not an isolated issue but part of a larger puzzle. Interestingly, the West – except perhaps for the countries on the eastern flank – has systematically ignored a series of warning signals. Putin’s first war, the Second Chechen War. The poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko. The open renunciation of cooperation with the West during the Munich conference. A year later, the war in Georgia. Then the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbas. And the final round in 2022. The comforting aspect is that it is increasingly accepted that there is no return to the pre-2014 status quo. Russia will not be a partner, not even a difficult partner, but will be a challenge and a threat. It remains to ensure that a secure Europe is a Europe without Russia.



Other Topics of Interest

Russian Misinfo Pushers and US Useful Idiots

Unsealed Indictment Reveals $10 Million in Funding from RT to MAGA Personalities

The word “war” for many people is associated with front lines and kinetic actions, but for many years we have also been experiencing what is known as hybrid warfare. Are we, as Western countries, at war with Russia?

Yes. For many years, Russia has been waging an aggressive war against the West, but most people deny this fact.

Peace requires the will of both sides; conflict only requires one.

Exactly. We cannot pretend that Russia is not waging war against us, our values and the liberal order. Nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that through negotiations, the Kremlin will cease to be a threat and will refrain from neo-imperial aggression.

So, what kind of war are we engaged in with Russia?

War has many domains. In Ukraine, there is, among other things, kinetic warfare, whereas against us, Russia is waging cognitive warfare. Its front is the mind, that is, cognitive aspects. The Russians are very skilled at this because they calibrate their campaigns. Having a good cultural understanding of each target, they tailor their tools. They run different campaigns against Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and Western European countries. They do not target the right or the left specifically but touch on the sensitive points of each community. Generally, we are on the defensive, and that is very problematic. The one who wins is the one who first imposes the narrative. If we do not move to proactive operations, we will defeat ourselves. This means that Russia won’t have to fire a single bullet because the West will capitulate on its own. To defeat the aggressor, we need to dare to take the initiative, impose the narrative, and engage more actively in the Russian infosphere. Essentially, we need to reach a state where the Kremlin has to put out fires on its own political stage.


We cannot pretend that Russia is not waging war against us… Nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that through negotiations, the Kremlin will cease to be a threat.

What messages does Russia send to societies, the left and the right in its cognitive operations?

The tools used in cognitive operations are somewhat like subliminal advertising – hidden, sneaky and precisely targeted. They generate chaos and disorientation within the country to ultimately destroy citizens’ trust in state institutions and democracy as a system of values. In Poland, for example, three emotions are constantly stoked: anti-government, anti-European, and anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Every Russian diversion, whether it’s a burnt shopping center or a Shahed drone that lands on Polish territory, is immediately reinforced with accusations of total helplessness and calls of “this is not our war!” Adding to this is the fact that the current administration is strongly pro-European and Donald Tusk was one of the EU leaders, which leads to a Polish internal conflict – the same PO-PIS (Civic Platform-Law and Justice) feud, so entrenched and tribal that even Russian trolls don’t have to exert much effort here. After 2022, the Ukrainian sentiment is also being manipulated, with the enemy of both Poland and Ukraine trying to color it with hostility and animosity. This results in a flood of false stories on social media, such as “Ukrainians receive more state aid than Poles,” “Ukrainians are taking jobs from Poles,” or “because of them, it’s impossible to see a doctor.” One of the most ridiculous was: “Ukrainian women are stealing Polish men.”



Russia exploits social moods, political situations and real problems to cause destabilization. Are states countering this effectively enough?

There are campaigns to debunk fake news and expose disinformation.


However, fake news often reaches a larger audience than the campaigns that correct it.

That’s right. Verifying content and conducting informational campaigns are important, but it’s not enough. To effectively defend against Russian cognitive operations, we need to move from defense to offense.

But we are not doing it.

We are not doing that, and it is backfiring. We’re afraid of being accused of interfering in Russia’s internal affairs. That is a mistake. It is the Kremlin that shamelessly meddles in the politics of other countries, organizes political coups (like in Montenegro), conducts aggressive subversion, not to mention its habit of armed attacks on its neighbors. Meanwhile, we – the West – fear offending Putin and pushing him out of his comfort zone. This is not how you hold an aggressive despot to account.

Is the lack of such campaigns due to political decisions or legal restrictions?

It seems to be more about political will. To defeat the Russian aggressor, we don’t need to lower ourselves to Russia’s level. I believe it’s enough to avoid making mistakes. We should abandon the mistake of an incremental approach in military support for Ukraine. We should provide it with every type of weapon needed to take the initiative on the front. And we should grant it full freedom in the right to self-defense, just as Israel deals with Hamas – on the enemy’s territory. Meanwhile, we should send a message to the Kremlin that Putin is no longer a partner, meaning we withdraw recognition of his authority. There are strong legal arguments for this. And finally, if we cannot adopt new sanctions packages, we can at least tighten the enforcement of existing ones and ensure that shadow fleets do not evade sanctions.


In the cognitive dimension, the sky is the limit. We can become active in the infosphere, which not only shapes the worldview of Russians but also reflects their emotions. We have social media and messaging apps at our disposal. However, I don’t see much activity from the West on these platforms. Ukrainian activity is evident, though. Meanwhile, let’s consider how panic-stricken Kremlin propagandists were over the arrest of Pavel Durov. There seem to be more weak points in the seemingly monolithic Russian structure; we just need to not be afraid to exploit them.

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Michał Kujawski

Michał Kujawski, a Warsaw-based journalist focusing on the CEE region, and former Head of Current Affairs at TVP World, is a Special Correspondent for Kyiv Post.



3. House Republicans and Democrats to issue dueling documents casting blame for mistakes made in US withdrawal from Afghanistan


Instead of pointing a partisan finger we need to understand that it us, the US, that is at fault for Afghanistan. We, collectively, our political leaders, policy makers, and military officials, have made so many mistakes that we need to own up to them as opposed to trying to shift the blame from one political party to another or from the military to civilian leadership and vice versa. And we should ask the key question: can we learn from the mistakes of the past two decades?



House Republicans and Democrats to issue dueling documents casting blame for mistakes made in US withdrawal from Afghanistan | CNN Politics

CNN · by Jennifer Hansler, Kylie Atwood · September 8, 2024


The last US military planes left Kabul's airport just ahead of an August 31 deadline, marking the full withdrawal of American forces.

Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images

CNN —

Republicans and Democrats will release dueling documents on the deadly August 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan on Monday, as former President Donald Trump’s campaign seeks to make the decisions surrounding the exit a key issue in the final weeks before the presidential election.

The release — after years of investigation by the Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee — of the report by Republican Chairman Rep Michael McCaul and a minority memorandum by Democratic Ranking Member Rep. Gregory Meeks underscore how partisan the debate over the frenzied US exit from Afghanistan has become. The reports also thrust the evacuation back into the spotlight during the lead-up to the election as the GOP has used the evacuation to attack Vice President Kamala Harris.

The documents are the latest in a series of examinations of the withdrawal, which saw the deaths of 13 US service members and left behind thousands of Afghans who had worked with the United States.

Accusations of culpability have fallen largely along party lines, with Republicans pointing fingers at the Biden administration for hastily pulling the US out of the country and Democrats, including the White House, casting blame on the Trump administration for striking a deal with the Taliban that set the US withdrawal into motion.

The conclusions of both documents, obtained by CNN ahead of their release Monday, continue that pattern. Although there were some new details revealed, the overarching findings largely align with what was already known.

The Republican report is highly critical of the Biden administration and pins the blame for the chaotic exit exclusively on its decisions. It also aims to implicate Harris, now the Democratic nominee for president, in its accusations by referring to the current government as “the Biden-Harris administration.”

“The Biden-Harris administration misled and, in some instances, directly lied to the American people at every stage of the withdrawal, from before the go-to-zero order until today,” the more than 350-page long Republican report alleges.

It lays out 23 recommendations, including the passage of resolutions condemning President Joe Biden, Harris, and other key members of the national security team.

The recommendations also focus on making future non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) successful, calling for Congress to put into place standard operating procedures for such a drawdown and requirements for the State Department and DOD to brief congress on NEO plans when an embassy has been designated as a high threat post.

The long list also calls for the declassification of information related to the deadly Abbey Gate terrorist attack that killed 13 service members and dozens of Afghans and the establishment of eyewitness portals for after-action reviews.

Meeks, the Democratic ranking member on the committee, accused McCaul of pursuing a “predetermined, partisan narrative about the Afghanistan withdrawal” and asserted that “Republicans’ partisan attempts to garner headlines rather than acknowledge the full facts and substance of their investigation have only increased with the heat of an election season.”

“Anyone who reads this report will be able to see that we conducted this investigation with integrity, not drawing conclusion ahead of time but rather looking at the facts and evidence we collected. The report is simply a recitation of those facts and evidence,” McCaul said in response to accusations from his Democratic colleagues and the administration that the report was politicized.

“This is not about politics to me — it never has been. It’s about getting to the bottom of what happened so we can make sure it never happens again,” he said in a statement. “And it’s about finding who was responsible for this catastrophe so they can finally, after three long years, be held accountable.”

Republicans accuse Biden admin of pursuing withdrawal ‘no matter the cost’

McCaul formally launched his investigation after assuming the chairmanship of the committee in January 2023, vowing to scrutinize the State Department’s planning, decision-making, and execution of the withdrawal.

The Republican probe included multiple hearings, transcribed interviews with 18 former and current officials, and the review of thousands of pages of documents from the US government.

The resulting report comes away with five conclusions.

It claims the Biden administration was “determined to withdraw from Afghanistan, with or without the Doha Agreement” – an agreement brokered under the Trump administration for a phased but eventual full withdrawal from Afghanistan – “and no matter the cost.” It accuses the administration of ignoring “the conditions in the Doha Agreement, pleas of the Afghan government, and the objections by our NATO allies, deciding to unilaterally withdraw from the country.”

It also accuses the administration of prioritizing “the optics of the withdrawal over the security of U.S. personnel on the ground.” It takes aim at the administration’s delay in ordering a NEO – a fact that has been well-scrutinized and documented. The report said that “Afghanistan once again became a haven for terrorists, including al Qaeda and ISIS-K” following the US withdrawal.

Among the other findings of the report, it said that Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad – who was appointed under the Trump administration – was negotiating a succession plan for the Afghan government that included the Taliban, and the committee claims he was “wedded to the idea.”

While the negotiations led by Khalilzad had been widely covered in news reports – and never resulted in an agreement due to the Taliban moving to military take Kabul – the details of what was being pursued remained unclear at times.

Khalilzad, who participated in a transcribed interview with the committee, said that “the power-sharing demand increased from 50-50, to 60-40 in favor of the Taliban, to 70-30 in favor of the Taliban,” the report writes. Khalilzad noted in his interview: “As the balance shifted on the ground … the negotiations on the government continued, but the dollar demand with it increased.”

The report also cites comments that Biden administration officials made to the public around the time of the withdrawal which contradicted the information that the US government had about the situation on the ground.

For example, in October 2021, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki claimed it would have taken 5,000 troops to protect the Bagram Air Force Base, which the US handed over to the Afghans in July of 2021. Yet General McKenzie testified to the committee that “at 2,500 U.S. forces, if you also assume that will allow the Afghans to stay in the fight, you can maintain a viable base at Bagram.” He added that he had believed maintaining Bagram was critical to stability in the country. Psaki also made public comments stating that no one could have assessed that the Afghan military would fall as quickly as it did, despite existing US government assessments at the time predicting that a fall could happen swiftly.

The Democratic memorandum outlines its separate takeaways from the hearings, documents, and transcribed interviews. It argues that the Trump administration set the withdrawal in motion and “failed to plan for executing it.” It also claims that the Biden administration initiated a “robust” process to review the evacuation. The memorandum argues that the fall of Kabul to the Taliban “precipitously changed the situation in Kabul and prompted a dynamic and unprecedented U.S. government response that protected Americans, our allies, and our interests.”

Moreover, Meeks’ memorandum argues that the findings are not new —”it comports with what Administration officials, the State Department’s own After-Action Review on Afghanistan (AAR), and extensive press reporting have already said repeatedly over years about the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

“This narrative is also not without points of debate – such as over whether to retain a small force in Afghanistan, whether U.S. analysts should have better anticipated the fall of the Afghan government and rapid speed of the Taliban’s takeover, or the precise timing of shifting from civilian-led evacuation flights to a NEO – but no thorough policy process would be, nor do any Commander-in-Chief’s decisions satisfy everyone,” it says.

Democrats’ memorandum on the report

Meeks said he released his own memorandum because “American taxpayers have funded this Committee’s oversight, and the American people deserve the truth.”

The New York Democrat also accused his Republican colleagues of further politicizing the matter ahead of the election.

“With the ascendance of Vice President Kamala Harris to the top of the Democratic presidential ticket, the GOP performance has reached a crescendo — Republicans now claim she was the architect of the U.S. withdrawal though she is referenced only three times in 3,288 pages of the Committee’s interview transcripts,” Meeks charged.

Even with the release of the report, McCaul has made clear that he continues to pursue his probe as Election Day nears and even after.

“We have a lot of unanswered questions regarding the” Department of Defense, McCaul told CBS’ Face the Nation on Sunday, ahead of the report’s publication. He said “didn’t reach any conclusions” regarding the Abbey Gate attack at the Kabul airport. That deadly attack, which was claimed by ISIS-K has been the subject of multiple investigations.

The Republican Chairman has subpoenaed Secretary of State Antony Blinken to testify on the report. Some of the recommendations of the report call for the testimony of officials like national security adviser Jake Sullivan.

“Congress has a responsibility to ensure those at fault during the Afghanistan withdraw are finally held accountable,” the report says.

On the eve of the report’s release McCaul said that the conduct of the withdrawal amounted to “moral negligence of the administration.”

“This was one of the deadliest days in Afghanistan. It could have been prevented if the State Department did its job by law and executed the plan of evacuation. They did not do that until, until the day that the Taliban invaded and overran Kabul. By that time, it was too late,” McCaul said on CBS.

McCaul also claimed that the release of the report at this time was not an effort to play politics, pointing to the many roadblocks that the committee faced as they tried to gather information and conduct interviews.

But State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a statement to CNN that “it remains deeply disappointing that House Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans used this process to politicize Afghanistan policy instead of working on legislative solutions to strengthen our country.”

“They have done a disservice by relying on false information and presenting inaccurate narratives meant only to harm the Administration, instead of seeking to actually inform Americans on how our longest war came to an end,” Miller said. “The State Department remains immensely proud of its workforce who put themselves forward in the waning days of our presence in Afghanistan to evacuate both Americans and the brave Afghans who stood by over sides for more than two decades.”

In June 2023 the State Department released its long-awaited Afghanistan After Action Review report, which found that both the Trump and Biden administrations’ decisions to pull all US troops from Afghanistan had detrimental consequences, and detailed damning shortcomings by the current administration that led to the deadly and chaotic US withdrawal from that country after nearly two decades on the ground.

The report made recommendations for the future, mostly related to the Department’s crisis response and preparedness. Both the State Department report and the Republicans’ report recommended putting a single point person in charge at the department when there is a complex crisis unfolding.

This story has been updated with additional reporting.

CNN · by Jennifer Hansler, Kylie Atwood · September 8, 2024


4. Collapse of $15 Billion Sale of U.S. Steel to Nippon Steel Could Cool the ‘Spirit of Camp David’


Again, I fear the impact on our alliances. And again, what happens when US Steel fails if it is not bought out nad saved? Is the US government going to bail it out?


Excerpts:


Simultaneously, in an exercise in formal understatement betraying Japanese concerns about the potential impact of failure of the steel deal, the powerful Japan Business Federation, Keidanren, said simply that it hoped “the review procedure will be conducted with the utmost integrity and fairness in accordance with the law,” according to Japan’s Jiji Press. The deal should be “conducted objectively based on fair rules and processes.”
Jiji quoted the influential Japan-U.S. Business Council as decrying “attempts to politicize the review process.”
The brouhaha has erupted as a political issue that Mr. Biden might prefer to avoid so close to the election, but he is reported likely to block the deal in line with the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, headed by the treasury secretary, Janet Yellen.
The presidential candidates, Vice President Harris and President Trump, despite their differences on almost everything else, also oppose the deal, which the United Steel Workers and Pennsylvania’s two senators, Bob Casey and John Fetterman, both Democrats, agree would cost jobs and compromise national security.



Collapse of $15 Billion Sale of U.S. Steel to Nippon Steel Could Cool the ‘Spirit of Camp David’

At issue is the question of how much Washington can trust Tokyo eight decades after the end of Japanese rule over Korea.



DONALD KIRK

Sunday, September 8, 2024

09:34:37 am

https://www.nysun.com/article/collapse-of-15-billion-sale-of-u-s-steel-to-nippon-steel-could-cool-the-spirit-of-camp-david


SEOUL — “The Spirit of Camp David” is at stake in a controversial decision that President Biden could make soon on the sale of one of the greatest names in American industrial history, U.S. Steel, to Japan’s largest steel maker, Nippon Steel.

To appearances, the $15 billion deal has nothing to do with the pledges made at Camp David more than a year ago by Mr. Biden, Prime Minister Kishida of Japan, and President Yoon of South Korea for mutual defense against North Korea and its regional allies, China and Russia.

The looming steel deal, however, has everything to do with American security, raising the hypersensitive question: how much can Washington trust Tokyo nearly eight decades after the end of Japanese rule over the Korean peninsula, much of China and Southeast Asia?.

Distrust between Washington and Tokyo pervades debate on what happens if U.S. Steel falls into Japanese hands as it teeters toward insolvency. In the aftermath of Camp David, the sale of U.S. Steel is almost a test case of the depth of friendship..

The danger of the deal compromising the American-Japan alliance contrasts with the show of friendship displayed by Messrs. Kishida and Yoon at their farewell summit at Seoul — their final meeting before Mr. Kishida steps down this month.

Casting aside numerous differences over unsolved issues like “comfort women” and slave labor during World War II, Mr. Yoon said they at least resolved “to maintain the positive momentum” they had built in 12 meetings, including Camp David, and adopt a “forward-looking attitude” despite the legacy of history.

Simultaneously, in an exercise in formal understatement betraying Japanese concerns about the potential impact of failure of the steel deal, the powerful Japan Business Federation, Keidanren, said simply that it hoped “the review procedure will be conducted with the utmost integrity and fairness in accordance with the law,” according to Japan’s Jiji Press. The deal should be “conducted objectively based on fair rules and processes.”

Jiji quoted the influential Japan-U.S. Business Council as decrying “attempts to politicize the review process.”

The brouhaha has erupted as a political issue that Mr. Biden might prefer to avoid so close to the election, but he is reported likely to block the deal in line with the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, headed by the treasury secretary, Janet Yellen.

The presidential candidates, Vice President Harris and President Trump, despite their differences on almost everything else, also oppose the deal, which the United Steel Workers and Pennsylvania’s two senators, Bob Casey and John Fetterman, both Democrats, agree would cost jobs and compromise national security.

The chief executive of U.S. Steel, David Burritt, has warned, however, that U.S. Steel would still have to close plants and does not have funds for the massive upgrading promised by Nippon Steel.

“Skeptics of the threat posed by the deal,” said an analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations, “argue that the acquisition of a U.S. firm by a close ally does not raise obvious security risks.” The lawmakers “leading the anti-deal charge,” said the report, “benefit from union support and face tough reelection contests.”

nysun.com



5. China "debt traps" loom on US partner's doorstep





China "debt traps" loom on US partner's doorstep

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · September 7, 2024

ByChina News Reporter

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The Maldives is the latest of India's neighbors to grapple with mounting international debts, much of it owed to China.

Chinese firms have constructed key facilities—such as bridges, ports and airports—across South Asia. Neighboring countries—including Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh—have also faced difficulties repaying their Chinese loans on large-scale infrastructure projects, such as a bridge linking the Maldives' capital of Male to its international airport.

This phenomenon has led to accusations of "debt-trap diplomacy," a term that became widely used during Donald Trump's administration. According to this notion, China lends money to vulnerable countries, knowing they may struggle to repay, which ultimately gives Beijing control over strategic assets. However, China has consistently denied such claims.


Commuters making their way through the Chinese-funded and built Sinamale Bridge in the Maldives capital of Male on November 16, 2023. The bridge has been cited by some as an example of "debt-trap diplomacy." Commuters making their way through the Chinese-funded and built Sinamale Bridge in the Maldives capital of Male on November 16, 2023. The bridge has been cited by some as an example of "debt-trap diplomacy." Ishara Kodikara/AFP via Getty Images

In Sri Lanka's case, the country defaulted on its external debt and effectively went bankrupt in 2022, exacerbated by high debt, the effects of COVID-19 and rising inflation. This year, Sri Lanka struck a deal with China's Export-Import Bank to restructure $4.2 billion of its debt. Notably, more than half of Sri Lanka's bilateral debt is owed to China.

China remains the largest creditor to the Maldives, holding $1.37 billion of the island nation's debt, according to World Bank statistics. The Maldives' public debt in 2023 reached 122.9 percent of its GDP, totaling about $8 billion. Saudi Arabia and India, while distant second and third creditors, are far behind China in terms of financial influence over the country.

The Maldives has even appealed to Bangladesh, securing a $200 million loan from the regional neighbor to support its economy.

Newly elected Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, who took office in November, has faced mounting criticism over his economic policies. Political opponents argue that his administration has failed to steer the country toward economic recovery. Muizzu's trip to Beijing earlier this year marked a shift toward China, as he sought to renegotiate the terms of existing loans.

The strategic location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, a key passage for 80 percent of global trade, makes it a pivotal player in regional geopolitics. Muizzu has expressed hope for further collaborations with China under the Belt and Road Initiative, potentially increasing Chinese involvement in the island nation's infrastructure.

However, the Maldives' economic situation remains precarious. In June, Fitch Ratings downgraded the country's foreign-currency issuer default rating to CCC+, citing rising external debt and challenges in maintaining its currency peg to the U.S. dollar.

The International Monetary Fund has also issued warnings, calling for urgent policy adjustments to address the country's fiscal deficits and high debt burden.

Mohamed Maleeh Jamal, a former Maldivian minister and central bank board member, criticized the Muizzu administration for delaying necessary reforms. "The government must follow, without further delay and foot-dragging, the advice of the IMF and World Bank, which is to take immediate steps to minimize recurrent financial costs and manage external debt risk by implementing reforms," Jamal told Newsweek.

He added that if China is not willing to commit to a debt restructuring plan, the Maldives should obtain one through the aid of other nations.

He also criticized Muizzu's leadership, saying the president had "failed to maintain an intelligent foreign policy" and had not "shown the ability to stop recruiting unqualified activists to government posts and SOE [state-owned enterprises], many of whom lack proper qualifications and, more importantly, a mandate to carry out" key responsibilities.

Newsweek contacted the Maldives Foreign Ministry for comment via email. The Bangladeshi and Chinese foreign ministries did not immediately respond to written requests for comment.

Despite widespread concerns over China's role in global lending, some experts dispute the notion of "debt-trap diplomacy."

In a 2021 article for The Atlantic, Deborah Brautigam, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Harvard Business School's Meg Rithmire argued that the theory oversimplified the complex nature of international finance. They said their research had found no evidence of China seizing assets from any debtor nation and added that Beijing often agreed to restructure loans, as seen in Sri Lanka's case.

In Sri Lanka, for example, China offered extensions and a grace period. The situation suggests that China is evolving its approach to managing the financial risks involved in international infrastructure projects.

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About the writer

Micah McCartney

Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan.

You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.


6. Commentary: You could power America with China’s wasted energy




Commentary: You could power America with China’s wasted energy

A vast mountain of coal suggests we’re turning the corner on rising global emissions, says Bloomberg Opinion’s David Fickling.

08 Sep 2024 06:00AM

(Updated: 08 Sep 2024 06:09AM)

channelnewsasia.com · by David Fickling


SYDNEY: By any stretch of the imagination, the United States is one of the world’s biggest coal producers. Even after declining by about half since 2008, output last year was still about 527 million metric tonnes, the fourth-biggest total globally.

And yet you could keep all of America’s coal boilers and blast furnaces going until Thanksgiving in 2025 with the reserves of solid fuel that Chinese industries have built up in the last couple of years.

The reasons for the emergence of this vast mountain – 636 million metric tonnes at the end of June, sufficient to cover Singapore in a layer of soot nearly a metre deep – aren’t a great mystery. When stocks ran perilously low in late 2021 and prompted widespread power cuts, Beijing ordered mines and power stations to boost their output and stockpiles so that something similar wouldn’t happen again.

The campaign has been wildly effective: China has accounted for about 97 per cent of the world’s increase in coal production since 2018. Now, however, it has been left with a vast and slowly deteriorating pile of solid fuel.


That’s yet another example of grotesque waste in a country whose slowing growth is increasingly weighing on the world economy.

It’s also evidence that we’re turning the corner on the years when China was the biggest culprit for rising global emissions. America’s diminishing appetite for coal has helped hold back greenhouse pollution over the past 15 years. China’s may do the same, on a far greater scale, over the next 15.

CHINESE COAL STOCKPILE IS SLOWLY DEGRADING

It’s easy to imagine a stockpile of solid fuel as a battery ready to discharge, a vault of gold bullion, or a strategic crude reserve waiting to be pumped out. Coal doesn’t work that way, however.

Instead, it’s more like a silo of corn that degrades and loses value the longer it’s left. Over time, it reacts with oxygen in the air and gradually loses potency. In extreme cases, this can cause stockpiles to heat up and ignite spontaneously. Even in less dramatic cases, a pile can lose about a quarter of its energy content each year.

Thinking about China’s reserves that way helps explain several factors in the market that otherwise seem baffling. For instance, the price of soot at Qinhuangdao used to be the mirror image of the national coal inventory: When inventories were high, prices at the port east of Beijing slipped because supplies were ample, and vice versa.

That relationship fell apart in early 2022. The last time China’s coal stockpile ballooned in the middle of the 2010s, prices were less than half their current level because sellers in an oversupplied market were struggling to offload their carbon at any price.

The best explanation for current elevated costs north of 800 yuan per metric tonne (US$112 per tonne) at Qinhuangdao is that the port’s benchmark is based on relatively high-grade coal, which is not so easy to get your hands on in the China of 2024. Most of that 636 million tonnes in the national inventory appears to have been either low-quality material when it was dug up, or have become so in the months it’s been sitting around waiting for the furnace.

That’s affecting trade, too. Low-grade import coal with 3,800 kilocalories per kilogramme, compared to the 5,500kcal Qinhuangdao product, is currently trading at its lowest levels in three and a half years – a strong indicator that a domestic market awash in poor quality coal doesn’t need to bring any more of it from overseas.

Indonesia, which produces a lot of that lower-kilocalorie product and often accounted for as much as half of China’s coal imports in 2021, fell below a 15 per cent market share in June as consumers focused on higher grades that could be blended with their own supplies to produce a more acceptable furnace feed.

CLOSER LOOK AT CHINA’S COAL USAGE

There’s little reason for climate advocates to celebrate the fact that this inventory isn’t being burned. Coal that’s oxidised in a stockpile will produce carbon dioxide just as surely as the stuff that’s incinerated in a power plant – it just won’t produce any useful energy, a worst-of-both-worlds situation.

At the same time, it gives the lie to some of the arguments about the resilience of China’s coal sector. Mine production has indeed remained pretty strong in 2024 - up more than 3 per cent in June and July, a sweltering period when air conditioning has boosted electricity demand in recent years.

With such an enormous pile of fuel sitting around unused, however, it’s consumption by end users that really matters.

Have a look at the three sectors that account for about 95 per cent of China’s coal usage, and the picture looks weak. Output of cement in the seven months through July fell 11 per cent from a year earlier, and steel was down 2 per cent. Thermal power, the vast majority driven by coal, climbed a scant 0.5 per cent, even before the tidal wave of hydroelectricity now pumping through the grid entered full flood.

You need to make some truly heroic assumptions about demand growth in the tiny remainder of the market to build a bullish picture on those numbers.

To mark the moment before they commence their long descent, climbers often leave a pile of stones at the summit. China’s vast coal mountain looks like just such a cairn, to mark a peak our planet’s climate will be glad to see the back of.

Source: Bloomberg/ch


7. Mingus: Army Transformation ‘Never Stops’





Mingus: Army Transformation ‘Never Stops’

ausa.org · September 5, 2024




Photo by: AUSA/Luc Dunn

Thu, 09/05/2024 - 07:22

As the Army moves to quickly adopt new technology, it must make sure its formations know how to fight on an ever-changing battlefield, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James Mingus said.

“Think about the infusion of tech and technology that’s coming—not tomorrow, but that is here today,” Mingus said Sept. 4 during a Hot Topic on Army Aviation, hosted by the Association of the U.S. Army. “Have we, as a United States Army and our partners, have we taken all that stuff, put it together in a meaningful way that changes how we fight? … I would challenge ourselves that we still haven’t figured it out.”

The Army’s “transforming in contact” initiative, which puts new and emerging capabilities in soldiers’ hands, is an important part of that process, Mingus said, particularly as the Army seeks to transform and modernize the force and its equipment. “It’s not just about the kit,” Mingus said. “It’s about how you take it, put it together and how you fight that’s just as important as the stuff that’s out there.”

Transforming in contact, an initiative led by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, emphasizes the importance of continuous change, Mingus said. “It never stops,” he said. “Every day, the Army should get up and be a little bit better than what it was yesterday.”

Technology is changing so rapidly, and threats around the world are evolving so quickly, that the Army can’t do things in a normal way, Mingus said. “We have to constantly and continuously transform,” he said, “and kind of break the paradigm of how we normally modernize.”

That transformation extends to the aviation community, Mingus said, citing as an example a mass long-range air assault mission by the 101st Airborne Division that spanned more than 500 miles as its 2nd Brigade Combat Team moved from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Johnson, Louisiana.

As Army aviation continues to transform, it must focus on the fundamentals, Mingus said, particularly as the community has grappled with several helicopter crashes in the past year.

“We had a pretty rough year on the aviation side,” he said. “As I’ve gone around the Army and talked to folks, [we] spent a lot of time trying to figure out, what are we doing right? What are we doing wrong?”

In addition to making sure there’s enough time to train, the Army should look at how it trains its pilots. “From the very beginning, we have developed a system of systems where we train system integrators before we develop and train pilots,” Mingus said. “We need to think through … how we flip that because, overwhelmingly, as I talked to the senior warrants, the senior aviation community, first and foremost, we must build the best pilots in the world first before you turn them into systems integrators.”

Leaders also must ensure their soldiers are masters of their craft, Mingus said. “No matter what type of formation you’re in, the mastery of those fundamentals underpins all of this,” he said.



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8. China’s ‘disappeared’ foreign minister demoted to low-level publishing job, say former U.S. officials



In the game of thrones a fallen official does not usually end up as a bookseller.



China’s ‘disappeared’ foreign minister demoted to low-level publishing job, say former U.S. officials

Qin Gang, an aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomat, had a meteoric rise and an even faster fall from grace. He’s now said to be taking a salary at a Beijing state-run bookseller.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/08/qin-gang-whereabouts-foreign-minister/

8 min

201


Qin Gang takes his oath as Chinese foreign minister in Beijing in 2023. (Andy Wong/AP)

By Ellen Nakashima and Christian Shepherd

September 8, 2024 at 9:59 a.m. EDT


His rise was meteoric, his fall equally abrupt. Ever since the summer of 2023, when then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang mysteriously disappeared from public view, his fate has been the subject of intense speculation.


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Wild rumors abounded: He’d been imprisoned. Killed himself. None was true.


In fact, Qin is alive but, according to two former U.S. officials, in a position very diminished from his once-lofty perch close to Chinese President Xi Jinping.


Qin has been nominally assigned to a low-level job at a publishing house affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, according to the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.


The former officials say that Qin, 58, has been placed — at least on paper — at a job with World Affairs Press, a state-owned publishing house affiliated with the Foreign Ministry.


The demotion, which the former officials said took place sometime in the spring, is a “fall from grace” but also means “he’s off the hook,” one of them said. “He’s not going to jail, but his career is over.”



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It probably serves not just as a punishment but also as a cautionary tale, the official said. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly declined to comment on its former boss’s fate and did not respond to faxed questions about Qin’s new role.


As a Xi loyalist, Qin was promoted to foreign minister at record speed. At 56, he was not only tapped as minister but also elevated to state councilor, a senior position that Wang Yi, Qin’s predecessor, did not achieve until his 60s, after five years as foreign minister.


His rapid rise irked colleagues, who saw him as leapfrogging others, said Christopher K. Johnson, a former senior CIA China analyst and now the head of China Strategies Group, a consultancy.


Qin earned Xi’s trust as head of protocol for the Foreign Ministry from 2014 to 2017. In that role, he was responsible for the minutiae of burnishing Xi’s image on the world stage. Before the Chinese president’s visit to Belarus in 2015, Qin demanded a 2 a.m. visit to a museum on the itinerary where he counted steps, according to a former Belarusian diplomat. His wife, Lin Yan, befriended Xi’s wife and made mooncakes for her, one U.S. official said.


Qin was promoted to vice minister of foreign affairs in 2018, then ambassador to United States in 2021, a position he held for only about 18 months before returning to Beijing to become China’s youngest foreign minister since the 1950s.


Qin’s rapid ascension was perhaps the most prominent among a younger generation of aggressive diplomats often known as “wolf warriors,” after proudly nationalist Chinese action films from the 2010s. He was “an early adopter” of the aggressive style of diplomacy, earning favor with Xi, Johnson said. “This guy was a wolf warrior before it was cool to be a wolf warrior.”


From Day 1 as foreign minister, Qin positioned himself as lead enforcer of Xi’s diplomatic agenda, not as lieutenant to Wang, who had been promoted to director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and technically outranked him.


During his first major news conference, in March 2023, Qin channeled Xi, who warned days earlier of “containment” by Washington, with blunt remarks about a coming confrontation with the United States.


Current and former U.S. officials who have dealt with Qin describe an individual who lacked the diplomatic finesse of more experienced colleagues and who found it difficult to switch out of “wolf warrior” mode.


One tense moment came in August 2022, when Qin was Beijing’s ambassador in Washington. Then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had just left Taiwan, completing a two-day trip despite Beijing’s vociferous objections to a high-ranking U.S. official visiting the island, a self-governed democracy that China claims as its own. Senior Biden administration officials were meeting with Qin in that period, sometimes twice daily, to try to prevent the crisis from spiraling into conflict. It was the only senior-level channel between Beijing and Washington at the time, making it particularly crucial.


The officials made clear that the United States was not seeking confrontation but would respond if the Chinese took aggressive measures. After Pelosi left, China reacted by firing missiles into the waters around Taiwan, and the White House summoned the ambassador. In one fraught exchange, one official recalled, Qin made what appeared to be a threat about China “erasing the median line,” referring to an unofficial boundary down the middle of the strait separating China from Taiwan that both sides had long observed to maintain stability.


His statement alarmed the officials, who saw it as escalatory, and pressed to know whether this was an official position. Qin responded with a “performative” tirade on the affront Pelosi’s mission represented to China, a second official said.


“This is not the time for polemics,” then-White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell said, according to the official. “It’s a moment for precision.”


Qin’s time in the spotlight was brief. He disappeared from public view five months after becoming foreign minister, setting off a cascade of rumors about his downfall.


He was formally dismissed in July last year after only 207 days in the job. Wang, 70, returned to replace his successor as foreign minister.

It has been unclear what led to Qin’s ouster. A leading theory among political analysts of China is that he had an extramarital affair with a well-known Chinese television journalist, Fu Xiaotian, and the couple had a child out of wedlock born in the United States.


Because censors closely guard the private lives of top officials, personal indiscretion is rarely seen as a serious offense in the male-dominated world of Chinese politics.


But Fu’s celebrity lifestyle, including social media posts about meeting world leaders and traveling on private jets with her infant son, made the affair a potential security vulnerability for China, analysts said. Rumors circulated that Beijing suspected that she had been passing secrets to a foreign intelligence service, but they have never been substantiated. Fu, like Qin, has been absent from public life for more than a year.


In July, the ruling Communist Party summarily dismissed several officials from the 205-member Central Committee, including the former defense minister, who had been investigated for corruption. But Qin, the readout stated, had merely “resigned” from the committee. He remained a “comrade” — a member of the Communist Party — hinting at a milder punishment.


It was the first sign that Qin was indeed alive.


“The Politburo crediting Qin with the title of ‘comrade’ indicates that he has not been expelled from the party and could be reassigned to a new, lower-ranking role,” said Neil Thomas, an expert on Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, a think tank.


“In the Xi era, similar demotions have been meted out to leading cadres found guilty of relatively minor political infractions,” Thomas said.


Qin’s apparent demotion follows a precedent set by Shen Guofang, a former assistant foreign minister who was abruptly reassigned in 2005 to a job as editor in chief at World Affairs Press. No reason was given for his move, but it was rumored that he was being punished for an affair. Shen nonetheless kept a public profile in his new job, giving regular speeches and interviews, in which he has claimed to have no idea why he was reassigned.


Questioned about Shen’s transfer at the time, Qin, who was then the Foreign Ministry spokesman, called it “routine.”


World Affairs Press is located in an alley in central Beijing and has a bookstore that is open to the public. It consists of a small room stocked with Chinese diplomat memoirs and books by Xi. When a reporter visited the bookshop this week, employees said they had not heard of Qin working at the publishing house. A receptionist who answered the phone also said she did not know whether it was true.


A former translator for top Chinese leaders, Victor Gao, was recently pressed on Qin’s whereabouts in an interview with Al Jazeera.


“He is somewhere in China,” said Gao, who is now vice president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank. “You will never see him.”


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By Ellen Nakashima

Ellen Nakashima is a national security reporter with The Washington Post. She was a member of three Pulitzer Prize-winning teams, in 2022 for an investigation of the Jan. 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol, in 2018 for coverage of Russia's interference in the 2016 election, and in 2014 for reporting on the hidden scope of government surveillance. follow on X @nakashimae


By Christian Shepherd

Christian Shepherd is China correspondent for The Washington Post. He previously covered the country for the Financial Times and Reuters from Beijing.follow on X @cdcshepherd


9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024




Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024


Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine. Burns stated during a panel with United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief Richard Moore on September 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to issue periodic threats of direct confrontation against the West but that these threats should not intimidate the West. Burns stated that the CIA had assessed that Russian forces may have considered using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and that he was in contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin on the matter. The CIA's assessment of possible Russian readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 corresponded with intensified Russian rhetoric about nuclear confrontation amid the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts. This rhetoric was likely more a part of a routine information operation designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine than an indicator of Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons, however. The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked thinly veiled threats of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine, such as in the fall of 2022, to induce fear among decision makers. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.


Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed presidential decrees on September 8 appointing Iryna Vereshchuk and Viktor Mykyta to the positions of Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office and appointing Oleksandr Kamyshin and Dmytro Lytvyn as his advisors. Kamyshin will advise Zelensky on strategic issues, and Lytvyn will advise him on communications. Zelensky reassigned Mykyta from his previous position as the Head of the Zakarpattia Oblast Military Administration on September 8 and Vereshchuk resigned from her previous post as Ukrainian Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT) on September 3.


Key Takeaways:


  • Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine.


  • Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia.


  • The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however.


  • The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship.


  • The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia.


  • Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8.


  • Russian forces conducted counterattacks in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 8.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and marginally advanced near Chasiv Yar.


  • A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor claimed on September 8 that the Russian military needs to improve the training of drone unit commanders.




10. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 8, 2024


Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, September 8, 2024



https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-8-2024


A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.[1] The driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[2] Israeli forces at the border crossing killed the shooter.[3] The gunman killed three Israeli civilians working at the border crossing.[4] The Israel Airports Authority—the Israeli government entity responsible for airports and land-to-land border crossings—closed Allenby Bridge, the Rabin crossing, and Jordan River crossing with Jordan until further notice following the shooting attack.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Jordan on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[6] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[7] Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Jordanian Interior Minister Mazin Abdullah Hillal al Farrayeh said that the driver acted alone.[8] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify Kataib Hezbollah’s September 8 claim.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi claimed on September 7 that Iran will “certainly” conduct a “second True Promise Operation,” in reference to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[9] Naghdi claimed that Iran will retaliate “at the right time” to ensure that its retaliation generates “more effects.”[10] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran fired toward Israel in April 2024, and the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage on Israel than Tehran intended.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[12]

Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Richard Moore stated on September 7 that he still expects Iran to retaliate against Israel the killing of Haniyeh.[13] Moore stated that “we won’t be able to let our guard down for the type of activity that the Iranians might try and prosecute in that direction.”

Key Takeaways:

  • West Bank: A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.
  • Iranian Retaliation: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
  • Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hamas’ eastern Khan Younis Battalion rocket commander on September 3. The IDF said on September 8 that the commander launched rockets at towns near the Gaza Strip and central Israel throughout the war.




11. CIA boss says west should not be intimidated by Russia’s nuclear threats



CIA boss says west should not be intimidated by Russia’s nuclear threats

Bill Burns calls Vladimir Putin a ‘bully’ whose ‘sabre-rattling’ should not always be taken literally

The Guardian · by Dan Sabbagh · September 7, 2024

Western leaders should not be intimidated by Kremlin threats of nuclear escalation, the head of the CIA said on Saturday, amid a debate over whether Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles should be used inside Russia.

Bill Burns, on a visit to London alongside the head of MI6, said the US had brushed off a previous Russian nuclear scare in autumn 2022, demonstrating that threats from Moscow should not always be taken literally.

“Putin’s a bully. He’s going to continue to sabre rattle from time to time,” Burns said. “We cannot afford to be intimidated by that sabre rattling … we got to be mindful of it. The US has provided enormous support for Ukraine, and I’m sure the president will consider other ways in which we can support them.”

The CIA director also said the US was working very hard on fresh proposals for a ceasefire in Gaza with new “texts and creative formulas”. A new plan, being devised with the help of mediators from Qatar and Egypt, would emerge, he hoped, “in the next several days”.

However, it was unclear, Burns added, whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and the Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar were willing to strike a deal. It was a question of political will, he said: “Whether or not leaders on both sides recognise that enough is enough and that the time has come to finally make some hard choices.”

Benjamin Netanyahu putting his own interests before Israel’s, says Gantz

Read more

Israel had succeeded in “severely degrading” Hamas’s military capabilities over the past 11 months, Burns said, but had not eliminated the movement in a war that had created a severe humanitarian crisis. “It is also a movement and an idea,” the spy chief said, and you could only “kill an idea with a better idea”, meaning there needed to be some long-term hope for Palestinians.

On Ukraine, the veteran spy chief was asked whether there was too much nervousness in Washington and other western capitals about the risk of escalating the war by giving permission for Storm Shadow, a missile with a range of at least 190 miles, to be used inside Russia.

“None of us should take lightly the risks of escalation,” Burns told an audience at a Financial Times event in London – and said there had actually been a belief within the CIA that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine in the first year of the war.

“There was a moment in the fall [autumn] of 2022 when I think there was a genuine risk of potential use of tactical nuclear weapons,” by Russia in Ukraine, Burns said, but he believed such concerns should not be taken too seriously. “I never thought … we should be unnecessarily intimidated by that,” he added.

At the time, Russian troops had been pushed back in northern Ukraine and had abandoned Kherson in the south, prompting a belief that Russia might seek to use a nuclear weapon if a rout developed. In any event, the frontline stabilised shortly afterwards.

Burns said that Joe Biden, the US president, had sent him to pass on a direct warning to Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Russian foreign intelligence service, at a meeting in Turkey in November 2022 “to make very clear what the consequences of that kind of escalation would be” – and that a similar approach was in place today.

So far, the White House has been notably hesitant about allowing the use of Storm Shadow and other long-range missiles inside Russia, such as the US-made Atacms, despite repeated pleas from Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, including one made on Friday.

Burns voiced concern that Iran was considering whether to supply ballistic missiles to Russia, but would not confirm whether the CIA believed it had done so. It would be a “dramatic escalation” of the relationship between the two countries; Tehran so far has supplied only less effective drones for Russia to use in Ukraine.

Burns and his British counterpart, the MI6 chief, Sir Richard Moore, had never appeared in public together before the surprise appearance at the event at London’s Kenwood House in Hampstead. Tight security meant that audience members were told only 15 minutes in advance who would be appearing.

Moore said there were concerns that Russian spies were becoming increasingly reckless in the UK, Europe and elsewhere as the war in Ukraine continues. “I think Russian intelligence services have gone a bit feral, frankly,” the British spy chief said, as shown by a spate of arson attacks in the UK and elsewhere in Europe.


The Guardian · by Dan Sabbagh · September 7, 2024


12. Iraqi Banks Used U.S.-Created System to Funnel Funds to Iran


Iraqi Banks Used U.S.-Created System to Funnel Funds to Iran

New York Fed’s process to move Baghdad’s oil earnings lacked key money-laundering safeguards, resulting in illicit transfers that financed terrorist groups for years

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/iraq-banks-u-s-fed-iran-financing-0c3e740c?st=qwdtcx5nsgoli0l&utm


By David S. CloudFollow

Sept. 8, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Ali Ghulam was the undisputed dollar king of Iraq for almost a decade.

His three Baghdad banks wired tens of billions of dollars in that time outside the country, ostensibly for car parts, furniture and other imports. He was one of the biggest operators in an ad hoc banking system set up around two decades ago under the U.S. occupation that gave the Federal Reserve Bank of New York a key role in processing Iraq’s international transactions. 

Years later, when the Fed finally began looking closely at where the money was going, it shut him down almost overnight.

U.S. officials suspect his banks were among more than two dozen Iraqi banks involved in funneling dollars to Iran and its militia allies, using front companies and falsified invoices to circumvent sanctions that block Iran from the global financial system. Audits of Ghulam’s banks completed in May, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, reveal extraordinary details of overseas dollar transactions that auditors said raised money-laundering concerns. Ghulam, in interviews, denied the allegations.

Among Iraqi banks overall, as much as 80% of the more than $250 million in dollar wire transfers flowing through them on some days were untraceable and some portion of that amount went secretly to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the anti-U.S. militias it supports, according to U.S. officials. 

A top U.S. Treasury official told Iraqi officials at a Baghdad meeting in January that Iraqi banks “deliberately exploited” their access to U.S. dollars to support the Quds Force, a paramilitary arm of the IRGC, and also the militia groups operating in Iraq that the Iranian government backs, according to U.S. officials familiar with the discussions.

The militias were involved in “ongoing attacks” on U.S. forces, including some that have caused casualties, Brian Nelson, under secretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, told Central Bank of Iraq officials at the meeting, the officials familiar with the discussions said.


A member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shouted anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli slogans in April. Photo: Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto/Getty Images

The U.S. has taken action to block the suspected Iraqi banks from using the Fed system to transfer dollars, Nelson told the Journal in an interview. “It’s been important for Treasury to ensure those funds are not diverted in support of the Iranian regime.” Nelson, who left Treasury in August, declined through a spokeswoman to discuss his talks with Iraqi officials.

The crackdown on Iraqi banks started in late 2022 after more than a decade of U.S. inaction, even after warnings by the Pentagon inspector general as long ago as 2012 of potential fraud on the order of $800 million a week. Current and former U.S. officials said that over the years the U.S. implemented temporary restrictions on cash flows to Iraq, but feared that tight or permanent controls would plunge Iraq into economic chaos and set back its fight against Islamic State.

For Iran, which has been sanctioned for illicit nuclear activity and for supporting terrorism, access to dollars is critical for buying weapons and parts for drones and missiles, and financing armed groups it supports around the Middle East, U.S. officials said. 

Those include Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, U.S.-designated terrorist groups that have battled Israel since last October, raising tensions in the Middle East to the highest level since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq two decades ago.

Ad hoc system

After the invasion of 2003, Washington agreed to hold Iraq’s earnings from oil sales—tens of billions a year—at the New York Fed. To circulate the proceeds back into Iraq, the Fed began shipping dollars in cash to Baghdad and processing commercial wire transfers from Iraq’s private banks for international trade, hoping to revive its shattered economy after years of war and sanctions.

The ad hoc system lacked a key check that is standard in international banking: It didn’t require the banks to divulge specifically who was getting the funds they were wiring out of Iraq. 


The Central Bank of Iraq headquarters in Baghdad. Photo: ahmad al-rubaye/AFP/Getty Images

In the U.S. and most other countries, banks seeking to move money internationally typically use a secure messaging system, known as Swift. The Belgium-based service routes messages between banks, specifying the amount and the intended recipient. It handles millions of daily payment instructions across more than 200 countries and territories and 11,000 financial institutions. Each bank in a message chain approves or disapproves the transfer after a review aimed at curbing money laundering, terrorist financing or other fraudulent activity.

After decades under sanctions, Iraqi private banks didn’t have the necessary agreements with major foreign banks to make international wire transfers using the standard Swift system for commercial transactions.

Instead, the U.S. and the Central Bank of Iraq began using a different type of Swift message normally used for moving funds between banks. Since bank-to-bank transfers are considered far less risky than those between commercial customers, the messages don’t require disclosure of the final recipient of wire transfers. 

In Iraq, that gap was used to divert dollars on a massive scale, U.S. officials said.

The 42-year-old Ghulam, now a London resident, ran an empire that handled the biggest share of the dollars transferred out of Iraq—on some days as much as 20% of the wire transfers, he and Iraqi banking officials said.

His banks—Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank, Al Ansari Islamic Bank and Al Qabidh Islamic Bank—were the first to be blocked from dollar transactions by the Fed and Treasury in late 2022. U.S. officials haven’t explained the decision publicly. They said privately the banks were cut off because of their large volume of suspicious transactions. No action has been taken against Ghulam personally. 

Ghulam denied his banks knowingly sent funds to the Quds Force or the Iranian government. “The Americans have nothing on me,” he said in an interview. “I have nothing to do with money laundering or Iran.” 


Ghulam’s home in London. The U.S. blocked his three Iraqi banks from dollar transactions. Photo: Gabriella Demczuk for WSJ

He said his life in London, where he and his family live after relocating from Baghdad in 2018, has been turned upside down since the U.S. dollar cutoff. His $40 million house, recently renovated with gleaming marble floors, a basement lap pool and a parrot aviary, is just a few blocks from the U.S. ambassador’s residence. After a fitness walk, he often heads to favorite London restaurants in his Rolls-Royce SUV. 

“The system is bad, but every bank in Iraq was operating under the same system,” he said. “Why did the Americans bring this system?”

Since banning Ghulam’s banks, Treasury and the Fed have pressed for more sweeping changes in Iraq. Two dozen other Iraqi banks have been banned by the U.S. from conducting dollar transactions. Strict new rules imposed since late 2022 by the Central Bank of Iraq under U.S. pressure require banks to disclose final recipients of wire transfers. The New York Fed around that time began carefully monitoring wire transfers out of Iraq’s official accounts, rejecting any that didn’t comply with standard procedures for international money transfers, officials said. 

The Iraqi central bank also announced plans to do away with its current system for wiring dollars overseas by the end of this year. The bank didn’t respond to requests for comment. 


Iraqi central bank governor Ali Mohsen Al-Alaq, shown in 2018, said Iraq is implementing changes to its banking system. Photo: noufal ibrahim/epa/Shutterstock

“The previous system allowed some misuse of these channels, such as transactions involving fictitious exporters,” Ali Mohsen Al-Alaq, the Iraqi central bank governor, said in August to the country’s official news agency.

Iraq is “establishing direct relationships between Iraqi banks and correspondent banks, bypassing the need for execution through the Central Bank or the Federal Reserve,” he said.

A spokeswoman for the New York Fed said in a statement: “We maintain robust compliance regimes that evolve over time in response to new information and in communication with other U.S. government agencies. Working in collaboration with [the Central Bank of Iraq] and the U.S. Treasury Department, we will continue updating and refining our compliance controls to best prevent abuse of our payment channels, while CBI reshapes Iraq’s banking landscape in support of legitimate commercial trade and curtailing illicit finance.”

The U.S. maintained its role in processing wire transfers so Iraq could “continue to conduct international trade in a high-risk environment, including during the war with ISIS,” said a Treasury official, adding that the system was “valuable to U.S. national security.”

Militias move into banking

Even though the U.S. occupation of Iraq ended in 2011, the dollar remains popular with ordinary Iraqis and businesses, functioning almost as a second official currency. 

Cargo planes still deliver pallets of U.S. currency—Iraq’s oil sale proceeds—to the Iraqi central bank, totaling as much as $10 billion a year, and as much as $35 billion or more a year flows electronically.

As part of the process of moving those dollars into the economy, the Iraqi central bank conducts a daily cash sale of dollars for dinars at a fixed rate. Banks can then resell the dollars at the higher unofficial rate offered by private exchange houses and dollar traders, legally generating instant profits. In a separate procedure for overseas wire transfers, Iraqi banks deposit dinars at the central bank, which messages the Fed to send an equivalent amount of dollars to foreign accounts specified by the banks, a system unique to Iraq.

When Iraq’s powerful militias saw the dollars to be made from the system, they started taking over private banks. They then entered the business of wiring money abroad, abusing the system by using fraudulent or inflated invoices for nonexistent imports, according to Iraqi officials and bankers.

Once the funds arrived abroad, usually in the United Arab Emirates, the dollars were withdrawn as cash or moved through informal channels known as hawala, which have few controls, officials said. The central bank of the U.A.E. didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Some of the funds ended up with Iran’s IRGC, which used its close ties to Iraqi power brokers to skim off unknown amounts, according to the U.S. Treasury. Some of the money ended up back in Iraq in the hands of militias and other powerful entities, including bankers.


An employee at Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank in 2003. The bank was eventually taken over by Ghulam. Photo: Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images

Ghulam’s rise through the Iraqi banking sector began after the 2003 U.S. invasion. The power vacuum “allowed many impoverished Iraqis to amass wealth amid the social unrest,” according to K2 Integrity, a Manhattan financial-crimes advisory firm, which conducted the audits of Ghulam’s banks for the Central Bank of Iraq after they were banned by the U.S.

Ghulam opened a Baghdad clothing business that was a front “for selling U.S. dollars on the black market,” according to the audits, which included multiple interviews with unnamed Iraqis described as well-acquainted with Ghulam’s family and career. He also joined the Mahdi Army, a Shia militia group led by a cleric with close ties to Iran that battled U.S. troops in the early years of the U.S. occupation, the audits said.

Ghulam, in the interviews with the Journal, said those accounts of his background are false, spread by his rivals. He said he has no ties to militias but that most other bankers did. “Working in Iraq, if you don’t have your own militia, it’s very, very hard,” he said.

In 2008, he said, he established a currency-exchange company and started buying up shares of Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank. He was married to a woman who had been a teller there, and who had told him back in 2002—when his father’s Baghdad bakery had an account at the bank—that there was good money to be made in currency trading.

Also in 2008, he was kidnapped at his Baghdad home by armed men in police uniforms, who he said injected him with a sleeping drug. He was released 19 days later after his wife’s father paid a $900,000 ransom, he said.

In 2014, he took control of Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank after buying out the second-largest shareholder, he said. When the bank’s founder—formerly the largest shareholder—balked at his choices for the board of directors, Ghulam showed up at a board meeting with armed men to install his relatives and associates, including a cousin who became the board’s chairman, according to several Iraqi officials and bankers.

Ghulam said the men accompanying him were bodyguards he had employed since his kidnapping. He denied that he had used intimidation to take over the bank, saying that as the new majority shareholder he had the right to name board members. Ghulam also said he lived for a time on the top floor of the bank to be secure from kidnappers.

The bank gave Ghulam access to the system that drew on dollars held in the New York Fed. Working through the Iraqi central bank, he soon turned the business of transferring payments abroad into a bonanza. He acquired two more banks and became the biggest player in the business.

Audit red flags

The K2 audits showed that Ghulam’s banks sent a total of $3.5 billion outside Iraq in the six months before the 2022 ban, all in huge round-dollar amounts to just a handful of obscure companies in the U.A.E.

The smallest transfer was for exactly $2,970,000, and the largest was for exactly $17,000,000. In the six months audited, one Iraqi company sent precisely $243,000,000 in 17 payments through Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank. The audit called the round numbers a red flag for money laundering because such amounts are almost never seen in legitimate business transactions.

Documents reviewed by the auditors showed Ghulam’s banks sent the funds on behalf of a tiny group of clients, many of whom had opened their accounts at the banks on the same day in 2016.

Invoices said the payments were for “general goods” or “carpets” or “vehicles” or other broad categories, including in some cases “all types of goods.” The audits said the invoices had limited identifying information and “appeared unsuitably simple given the complexity of payments,” and lacked supporting export documents such as bills of lading and certificates of origin.

Ghulam’s banks transferred the funds to only five little-known companies. All of the recipients had accounts at a single Dubai bank but almost no online presence and little indication they were capable of exporting goods to Iraq at the scale of the payments they received.

“The exact business activities and precise locations for the customers remain unclear,” one of the audits concluded, and payments lacked “apparent economic/business purpose.”

One of the biggest recipients was Silicon Valley FZE, a U.A.E. company whose registration said it specialized in trading electrical equipment, building materials, electronics and spare parts. Its business license was suspended by U.A.E. authorities days after Ghulam’s banks were banned by the U.S., according to the audits. The owner, Omar Awad Zahmak, declined to comment, saying through an intermediary “all of his business in U.A.E. had stopped.”

The audits said that once the funds were transferred to Dubai companies, they were then distributed to 163 other recipients in the U.A.E., most of whom were “wholly unidentifiable” from the bank’s records. One payment for “car parts” was traced to 14 other recipients identified only “as wholesalers of mobile phones and accessories.” 

All the parties in the transactions appeared to be part of a network, the audits concluded.

“The customers of [Ghulam’s banks] appear to be operating as part of a network, and originated funds to a group of beneficiaries which also appear to be operating as part of a network and as trade intermediaries, having facilitated the movement of funds on behalf of the same group of ultimate beneficiaries,” the audits said.


Ghulam’s banks handled the biggest share of the dollars transferred out of Iraq. Photo: Gabriella Demczuk for WSJ

Iraqi customs forms, invoices and other paperwork filed by Ghulam’s banks with the Iraqi central bank indicated that some of the products paid for by the wire transfers were arriving from Iran through a border crossing in northern Iraq, a senior Iraqi banking official said. But after an investigation, the official said, it appeared that most of the imports financed by Ghulam’s banks never arrived in Iraq.

Ghulam, in the interviews, said his clients were Iraqi merchants, not Iranians, and the round-dollar amounts moved to the U.A.E. were due to the system established by the U.S. and the Iraqi central bank, which he said preferred to bundle dollar transactions into round amounts to keep the number of daily wire transactions limited.

“It’s very possible,” he added, that a portion of the dollars he moved might have ended up in Iran, but only after the funds were no longer under his banks’ control.

Pilot program

The K2 audits didn’t trace the funds to Iran, but unnamed individuals “knowledgeable about the Iraqi financial sector” told the auditors that Ghulam has ties to “Iran and Iranian-backed militia groups.” One said that Ghulam sent Iran over $1 billion in 2021. Another told auditors he smuggled cash and gold bullion to Lebanon, Syria and Iran on behalf of a former Iraqi prime minister. The audits said it wasn’t possible to corroborate Ghulam’s reported relationships with Iranian and Iran-allied individuals and entities.

People interviewed told the auditors that Ghulam had a connection to Hamad Al-Moussawi, who helped him forge connections to Iran-aligned militias and with the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. Al-Moussawi, an Iraqi banker, has been sanctioned by the U.S. for money laundering and support of terrorist-designated groups. 

Al-Moussawi owned Baghdad’s Al-Huda Bank, one of the banks banned and also sanctioned by the U.S. A Treasury statement in January said the bank “exploited its access to U.S. dollars” to send funds to the IRGC and to Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi militia group with ties to Tehran that has been designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. Al-Moussawi “received guidance” from the Quds Force, the IRGC paramilitary wing, to establish the bank in 2008 and “used forged documents to execute at least $6 billion in wire transfers out of Iraq,” the statement said.

Ghulam said he has known Al-Moussawi for years but hasn’t had much contact with him since 2018. Al-Moussawi didn’t respond to requests for comment. Ghulam said he is still hopeful the Fed will restore his access to dollars, which U.S. officials said is unlikely. 

The U.S. clampdown has substantially reduced the illicit dollar transactions by Iraqi banks, U.S. officials and Iraqi bankers said.

The Fed still handles some transfers from Iraqi banks but only after the recipients of the dollars are verified by K2, U.S. officials said. The Iraqi central bank plans to eventually route all Iraqi wire transactions through international banks, instead of the Fed. 

Al-Alaq, the Iraq central bank governor, told the country’s state-run news service: “We plan to reach 100% by the end of the year for external transfers between Iraqi banks and correspondent banks without going through the U.S. Federal Reserve.”

At the urging of the Fed, the Iraqi central bank has established a pilot program in which four Iraqi banks process dollar transfers through Citigroup, which checks where the money is going before approving the transfer. As much as $800 million a week now flows through the program, following standard international regulations. Karen Kearns, a spokeswoman for Citi, declined to comment on the program.

But the U.S. moves haven’t halted Tehran’s attempts to use Iraq as a source of dollars, Nelson, the now-former Treasury undersecretary, told the Journal: “Iran continues to seek to abuse the international financial system not only in Iraq, but throughout the region, and frankly wherever they have the opportunity to do so.”

Write to David S. Cloud at david.cloud@wsj.com


13. Israeli strikes in Syria leave 14 dead and more than 40 wounded, Syrian state media says



Israel must continue to handle multiple threats.



Israeli strikes in Syria leave 14 dead and more than 40 wounded, Syrian state media says

AP · September 9, 2024

This is a locator map for Syria with its capital, Damascus. (AP Photo)

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DAMASCUS (AP) — The number of people killed in overnight Israeli strikes in Syria has risen to 14 with more than 40 wounded, Syrian state media said Monday morning.

Israeli strikes hit several areas in central Syria late Sunday, damaging a highway in Hama province and sparking fires, Syrian state news agency SANA said. The initial death count reported by the Masyaf National Hospital in western Hamas province was four.

SANA, citing hospital head Faysal Haydar, said 14 were killed and 43 wounded. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a U.K.-based war monitor, said at least four of those killed were civilians.

One of the strikes targeted a scientific research center in Maysaf and others struck sites where “Iranian militias and experts are stationed to develop weapons in Syria,” the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. Local media also reported strikes around the coastal city of Tartous.

There was no immediate comment from the Israeli military. Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes on targets inside government-controlled parts of war-torn Syria in recent years, but it rarely acknowledges or discusses the operations. The strikes often target Syrian forces or Iranian-backed groups.

Israel has vowed to stop Iranian entrenchment in Syria, particularly since Syria is a key route for Iran to send weapons to the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has been clashing with Israeli forces for the past 11 months against the backdrop of Israel’s war against Hamas — an ally of Hezbollah — in Gaza.

AP · September 9, 2024


14. Welcome to the Resistance: Call for Papers—SOF in Competition


I wonder what is the coordination between IWI and JSOU and the Irregular warfare center and CISA at NDU all claiming ownership of the province of irregular warfare.


Some good topics but one of the most important aspects of resistance (and all special operations) is assessment. This is where SOF (SF, PSYOP, and CA) has to get back to its roots and be able to conduct effective assessment to inform campaign planning (and resistance needs to be in support of a campaign plan. We need skilled operators conducting area studies, areas assessments, target audience analysis, civil reconnaissance and civil information management.  Why are assessments critical?


4. Assessment - must conduct continuous assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic.  Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable, durable, political arrangement  is required. Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it.   Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.
https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html



I would also offer that one of the topics for resistance study is the resistance potential in north Korea where one of the largest resistance movements could be unleashed and it will have huge implications because what happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects. But most of SOF and those who study resistance neglect what is happening (or has the potential to happen) in north korea.


Welcome to the Resistance: Call for Papers—SOF in Competition

https://irregularwarfare.org/uncategorized/welcome-to-the-resistance-call-for-papers-sof-in-competition/?utm

September 9, 2024 by Adam Darnley-Stuart, Nicholas Krohley Leave a Comment

Team Resistance – SOF in Competition

To launch the Project the Resistance Team will take center stage! Welcome to the Resistance strand within the SOF in Competition project, we are setting out an initial agenda for the global IW community of practice. We want to drive debate around issues that range from how we integrate resistance activity into geopolitical strategy, to how resistance happens in different contexts (and SOF’s role as a catalyst or enabler of different types of resistance), to how resistance campaigns are executed and evaluated on the ground and online.

As a first step, we want to frame our engagement with the community of IW practitioners, policymakers, and academics on SOF’s approach to resistance. The following inter-connected topics are offered to provoke thought and debate, and we encourage you to take them as inspiration to build out whatever arguments you think are most compelling for your peers.

  • Resistance as a Strategic Lever: Strategic competition plays out on a global scale, wherein we seek advantage against our rivals in multiple theaters using multiple levers. What is the role of SOF-enabled resistance activity as we compete with the Russians in the Caucuses, for example, or the Chinese in Sub-Saharan Africa, or the Iranians in the Levant? How might we integrate the actions of resistance movements—violent and nonviolent alike—as lines of effort within strategic campaigns to disrupt our rivals’ roots in the human terrain?
  • Building on the ROC: NATO SOF’s Resistance Operating Concept (aka “the ROC”) sets out a strategic framework for the role of resistance activity in national defense strategy. Since its publication in 2020, it has become a foundational document for scholars and practitioners of resistance around the world. What comes next? What tools, authorities, and programs currently exist, or need to be created, to better implement and scale resistance activities? Are they adequately resourced and synced across the SOF and security cooperation/security force assistance (as well as interagency) communities? How should national (government-led) resistance approaches differ from non-state-led efforts? How does support to national resistance activities happen, and under what conditions—not only in the defensive European-centric context of NATO’s ROC but worldwide for both offensive and defensive purposes across the competition continuum?
  • Ethics & Effects: How do SOF manage our obligations to the resistance networks that we want to support? What are the pros and cons of direct engagement between SOF elements and local resistance movements, concerning the balance between enhancing capability while preserving authenticity—especially when dealing with nonviolent civil resistance networks? Concurrently, academic literature on nonviolent resistance argues for strict boundaries vis-à-vis armed guerrilla activity. What is the strategic, legal, and ethical view of the SOF enterprise on the operational realities of merging or coordinating violent and nonviolent resistance? How do we compensate and calibrate for our perception of moral, ethical, and legal boundaries in contrast to our adversaries’ employment of concepts like Unrestricted Warfare?
  • Engaging the Private Sector: What is the role of the private sector in enabling resistance activity? From logistical and financial support to the provision of equipment and innovative technology, how can SOF build bridges between the private sector (in the West, in the AO in question, or elsewhere) and a given resistance movement? For the SOF enterprise, how does the CIV-MIL interface function in support of different types of resistance activity at varying levels of risk and conflict, and what does/should this look like in practice?
  • Resistance in Total Defense: Within Europe, there is growing enthusiasm around the “Total Defense” concept, which combines whole-of-government action with whole-of-society support to achieve an integrated, comprehensive defense posture. This concept, which is embedded in the ROC, places civic mobilization and civil resistance (and guerilla or asymmetric/partisan warfare as well) as subordinate lines of effort within an overarching government-led campaign. To what extent is this model transferrable outside of Europe to the AUKUS alliance and beyond? What is the optimal way to align top-down government-led action with bottom-up civic initiative and resilience? How can governments best harness the potential of civic action and operationalize societal resilience without subsuming or degrading civil society itself?
  • Transformative Technologies: How might emerging technologies transform or enhance the practice of resistance? What is the potential of digital resistance movements, and what are the limitations? How can online engagement be synchronized with real-world action? To what extent is the SOF community trained, equipped, organized, and empowered to leverage technology within resistance activity?

Take all of this as inspiration—and send your papers to nkrohley@frontlineadvisory.com with “Resistance Article Submission” in the subject line.

Editorial guidelines can be found here.

Nicholas Krohley, Ph.D.                                            Adam ‘Monster’ Darnley-Stuart

Resistance Team Lead                                             Director

SOF in Competition                                                   SOF in Competition

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Military training of Ukrainian border guards from “Stalevyi kordon” (Steel border) brigade in the Dnipropetrovsk region. April 2023. (Petro Zadorozhnyy, the Collection of war.ukraine.ua)

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.



15. The US is dismantling nuclear warheads to power next-gen reactors



The modern swords into plowshares?


And finally a nuclear analogy I can understand. 


Excerpt:

The uranium for conventional reactors is enriched up to 5% and HALEU is uranium enriched between 5-20%. Highly enriched uranium is anything more than 20% and is used in weapons or naval submarines.
In other words, if conventional reactor uranium is Miller Lite, and highly enriched uranium is Everclear grain alcohol, HALEU is the nice cool glass of Belgian beer that strikes the balance between two extremes, said Dan Leistikow, vice president of corporate communications at US-based uranium enrichment company Centrus Energy.



The US is dismantling nuclear warheads to power next-gen reactors | CNN

CNN · by Ella Nilsen · September 9, 2024


This cast is filled with molten-hot enriched uranium called HALEU. It was made in part from America's old nuclear warheads.

National Nuclear Security Administration

CNN —

Inside a highly classified facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee — the same facility that enriched uranium for the first atomic bomb in the era of the Manhattan Project — workers are turning old, unexploded warheads into fuel that will power cities.

The recipe to create advanced reactor fuel involves melting weapons-grade uranium with low-enriched uranium in a crucible — a massive, metal cauldron heated to around 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit to turn its contents into molten soup.

Emerging from its furnace, a glowing orange cast filled with the hot liquid uranium is slowly lowered into a cooling chamber. The hardened finished product, which looks like black charcoal, can be safely held in-hand.

This fuel is set to power the next generation of America’s nuclear reactors — small, modular power stations that are easier and cheaper to build. They require far less upkeep and physical space than the aging fleet of large nuclear power plants.


HALEU is canned at a secure federal facility in Oak Ridge, Tenneseee.

National Nuclear Security Administration

One downside? They also require a more-enriched and energy-dense uranium.

Until last year, the United States got the vast majority of its enriched uranium from Russia. A bipartisan law passed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put a stop to that. Now, scientists and companies are racing to produce it at home.

Why does Russia have so much enriched uranium?

  • After the Cold War, Russia possessed loads of highly enriched uranium — the kind used for weapons. In negotiations after the war, the US and other countries encouraged Russia to dilute that uranium below the weapon-making threshold, and sell it to the world as nuclear fuel. It was a beneficial deal for all parties. The US had a supply of fuel, and Russia — which was struggling economically after the Cold War — had a willing market to sell to.

Downblending old weapons from the nuclear arsenal is not the only way to make this fuel, known as high assay low-enriched uranium — or HALEU for short. A couple of facilities around the country are also making it, and they are expected to produce most of the fuel in the long run. The federal government is expected to award over $2 billion in the coming months to uranium enrichment companies to help kickstart the supply chain.

In the meantime, the feds are doing a “couch cushion exercise,” scouring high and low for suitable nuclear fuel that might have slipped through the cracks, said Michael Goff, principal deputy assistant secretary for the Energy Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy. In addition to the US nuclear stockpile, the Idaho National Laboratory is also downblending part of its collection of fuel from research reactors.

That the US is looking to its own arsenal for nuclear fuel speaks to how much of a scramble there is to get new-age reactors off the ground — like TerraPower, the Bill Gates-backed project in Wyoming that recently broke ground.

Projects like TerraPower are awaiting the fuel shipments, anxious they may run out of time. The company was set to get its first fuel shipments from Russia – the world’s only commercial HALEU supplier.

That changed after the war in Ukraine.

“We are getting to the point where we need to see more urgency from the government,” said Jeff Navin, TerraPower’s director of external affairs. “There’s a huge national interest to move quickly. We don’t fully understand why that same sense of urgency hasn’t gotten to the Department of Energy in getting this material out.”


Bill Gates at the groundbreaking for TerraPower's nuclear power plant near Kemmerer, Wyoming, in June.

Benjamin Rasmussen/The New York Times/Redux

Bottom line, the amount of HALEU the US can get from its nuclear weapon stockpile is relatively small. It’s going to need a bigger production line.

“The long-term solution is we have to have enrichment,” said Jeff Chamberlin, the acting principal assistant deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation. “Even if we down-blended all that material tomorrow, we couldn’t supply the demonstration needs of all the advanced reactor companies the US has stated right now.”

Why the US needs special nuclear fuel

The United States currently gets about 20% of its power from nuclear. Inside the US Energy Department, there’s high interest to increase that percentage in the coming years because nuclear energy is reliable and doesn’t produce climate pollution.

“We need some firm, clean baseload electricity — nuclear provides that,” said Goff. “In order to meet our energy security needs and our climate goals, we do need significantly more nuclear energy deployed.”

The nuclear power industry is increasingly looking to smaller reactors, which run on HALEU. These reactors can last longer than conventional ones and fit into smaller spaces — making them more versatile and easier to set up.

The uranium for conventional reactors is enriched up to 5% and HALEU is uranium enriched between 5-20%. Highly enriched uranium is anything more than 20% and is used in weapons or naval submarines.

In other words, if conventional reactor uranium is Miller Lite, and highly enriched uranium is Everclear grain alcohol, HALEU is the nice cool glass of Belgian beer that strikes the balance between two extremes, said Dan Leistikow, vice president of corporate communications at US-based uranium enrichment company Centrus Energy.

“You can get more energy in smaller spaces,” said Josh Jarrell, director of the Idaho National Laboratories fuel cycle science and technology division. “You can be more energy dense, you can make more effective fuel, theoretically, we could generate electricity more economically.”

Centrus is one of two enrichment companies in the US working to break America of its dependence on Russia, which supplies the vast amount of the world’s enriched uranium. Congress recently passed an import ban on Russian uranium, leading to a supply squeeze both for HALEU and fuel for conventional reactors.


Idaho National Labs is also working to convert warhead uranium into reactor fuel.

Idaho National Labs

After a “lack of investment over decades,” Centrus is aiming to “restore a domestic enrichment capability with US technology” to meet the demand for the country’s electricity and for its national security, Leistikow told CNN.

It will take years to get there.

The Energy Department estimates the advanced nuclear industry will need 40 tons of HALEU by 2030. When it is running at full capacity, Centrus will enrich a little less than 1 ton per year.

What will the country’s leftover nuclear arsenal contribute? Six tons by 2027.

TerraPower’s Navin said six tons is a “great start,” but far from enough for his company’s first core load, let alone other advanced nuclear projects in the US.

Exactly how much highly enriched uranium the US has is a classified secret, and there are a lot of interests competing for it, from national security to research nuclear reactors.

But Congress recently directed the NNSA and Energy Department to prioritize converting America’s old nuclear arsenal for advanced reactor fuel.

“Within their possession, they have more than enough (highly enriched uranium) to make many, many, many tons of HALEU,” Navin said.

CNN · by Ella Nilsen · September 9, 2024


​16. Phase Zero of the Coming War


I am glad that Joint Pub 5.0 eliminated the standard phasing template and allowed intellectual rigor to return to the campaign planning process where phases do not have to follow that standard template and instead can be tailored to the campaign activities and outcomes.


Phase Zero was the worst idea of all.  We should be able to conduct entire campaigns in the so-called "Phase Zero" and not have every military action lead to decisive eropations in war.


But this article is useful for discussion.


Conclusion:


The United States needs a generational investment in defense, an effort that will require the next administration to articulate a clear vision of victory – not in normative terms and values, but one that speaks directly to geopolitics, our economic welfare, and the security of our homeland. We need a strategy that returns national security priorities to our economic policy-making, speaks directly to the imperative of re-shoring our critical manufacturing and supply chains, and most all is grounded in the clear articulation of the hierarchy of our national interests. Those critical of increased defense spending argue that the American public will not support more military spending, but the truth is that as of today nobody has made a clear case to the public about how dangerous the international system has become, and what is at stake. We need our leaders to address plainly the reality that Russia constitutes a chronic threat to transatlantic security, and that China poses an existential threat to the United States and its allies, in Europe and Asia alike, for it seeks to build a system of global governance resting on its economic and military power. Until we have these issues put front and center before the American public, no “pivot to Asia” or “China first” or any other similar strategic sleight of hand will give us a path forward that can preserve and defend the United States’ vital national security interests, keep our homeland safe and maintain our access to resources worldwide. 




Phase Zero of the Coming War

By Andrew A. Michta

September 06, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/06/phase_zero_of_the_coming_war_1056517.html


The world today is more fractured and unstable than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and by all indications we are heading for a period of protracted systemic instability, with Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific increasingly at risk of descending into a wider general war. The war in Ukraine is in its third year since Russia’s second invasion, and the war in the Middle East threatens to escalate into a major regional conflict between Israel and Iran. China and Russia are arming at speed and scale, while the United States and its European allies continue to lag when it comes to defense spending and defense production. Russia and China are de facto allies, having openly declared a “no-limits” partnerships that forms the core of the new “Axis of Dictatorships,” aided and supported by Iran and North Korea. China, which has surpassed the United States as the manufacturing powerhouse, continues to bid for regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific as it works to unravel the power balance in Asia. For its part, Russia continues to pursue its revisionist course in an attempt to re-litigate the post-Cold War settlement and re-establish its empire in Eastern Europe.  At the same time, the United States is politically split, threatened both from within and without. And while NATO maintains its political support for Ukraine, Europe remains divided when it comes to appetite for risk-taking, with countries further away from the eastern flank reluctant to spend the money to rearm. 

Over the past two decades America expended vast resources to fight scheduled wars that, at a strategic level, resulted in failure. The grand “nation-building” and “state-building” projects pursued by successive administrations, Democrat and Republican, depleted our national resources, shrank the nation’s military to the point where we are able to fight only in one major theater, reduced and consolidated our defense industrial base such that we no longer have the capacity to produce weapons and munitions at speed and scale, and most of all, sapped public confidence that our leaders are able to provide effectively for our security and defense, and to do so at an acceptable cost. During the two decades of the Global War on Terror and “overseas contingency operations” we seem to have forgotten the basic verities of great power politics, i.e., that there is no substitute for hard power, and that in a state-on-state near-peer conflict a country’s military capabilities ultimately rest on its manufacturing capacity, its manpower reserves, and its human capital, for without them no nation will have the requisite resilience to deter and, if need be, defeat its enemies.  

For over a decade the policy community in Washington has spoken of a new era of “strategic competition” between great powers. This narrative has been replete with normative assertions about defending the “rules-based international order,” as though a values-based rhetoric could overshadow our growing hard power deficit. Perhaps that is one reason why our policy elites and our key national security documents have studiously avoided using the “w” word, as in “war.” However, the reality is that the United States and its allies are not engaged in strategic competition; rather we are already in Phase Zero of a protracted conflict with Russia and China, with the adversaries shaping the terrain in real time and space, as well as through cyber and influence operations. We face this challenge amid significant resource constraints and with a diminished defense industrial base. Today the United States has a military too small for the task of fighting a two-theater war, and our defense spending is about half of what we spent on average during the Cold War. 

We are deficient when it comes to national resilience, and are vulnerable to malicious actors exploiting our critical infrastructure through cyber. Russia has made significant strides in some aspects of military technology, especially in hypersonics and nuclear submarine propulsion.  About a decade ago China overtook the United States with the largest navy in the world; it is currently building the equivalent of the entire British Royal Navy every two years.[i]  For its part, Russia has put its entire economy on a war footing, reconstituting its armor at rates that allow it to field over a thousand tanks a year, both refurbished and new production.  At the same time, China and Russia produce their weapon systems and munitions at a fraction of the cost of that of the U.S. defense industry. The U.S. approach to weapons procurement, which has prioritized ever-more exquisite and capable systems that the Services can buy only in limited numbers, has left us with no choice but – as was the case when we helped defend Israel from its recent attack by Iran – to shoot millions of dollars in ordnance at drones that cost a few thousand dollars to produce.

The United States needs a generational investment in defense, an effort that will require the next administration to articulate a clear vision of victory – not in normative terms and values, but one that speaks directly to geopolitics, our economic welfare, and the security of our homeland. We need a strategy that returns national security priorities to our economic policy-making, speaks directly to the imperative of re-shoring our critical manufacturing and supply chains, and most all is grounded in the clear articulation of the hierarchy of our national interests. Those critical of increased defense spending argue that the American public will not support more military spending, but the truth is that as of today nobody has made a clear case to the public about how dangerous the international system has become, and what is at stake. We need our leaders to address plainly the reality that Russia constitutes a chronic threat to transatlantic security, and that China poses an existential threat to the United States and its allies, in Europe and Asia alike, for it seeks to build a system of global governance resting on its economic and military power. Until we have these issues put front and center before the American public, no “pivot to Asia” or “China first” or any other similar strategic sleight of hand will give us a path forward that can preserve and defend the United States’ vital national security interests, keep our homeland safe and maintain our access to resources worldwide. 

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow and Director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own. 

Notes:

[i] China's navy is now growing at terrifying speed (telegraph.co.uk)



17. Army struggles to win over recruits with slew of failed marketing campaigns



Army struggles to win over recruits with slew of failed marketing campaigns - Washington Examiner​'

While militaries continue to utilize drones on the battlefield, they won’t be replacing boots on the ground anytime soon — posing a challenge to the Pentagon as it struggles to meet its military recruitment quotas. 

By

Elaine Mallon September 8, 2024 9:33 am


Washington Examiner · September 8, 2024

For 2023, the Army, Navy and Air Force all missed their recruiting targets; only the Marine Corps achieved its targeted goal. However, this comes after the Corps faced structure cuts leaving recruiters having to fill 19,000 fewer active duty and reserve positions than it needed in 2020.

For the past two years, the Army has failed to meet its recruitment goals by 10,000 soldiers each year. The current size of the active duty Army is the smallest it has been since the 1940s — standing at 445,000 soldiers.

It’s not just the active-duty Army struggling to recruit — so is the National Guard and Reserves. Last year, the Army reserves had just 9,319 enlistees — falling short of its 14,650 new soldiers target.

As war wages in Gaza and Ukraine, U.S. military officials are aware of how vital it is for the United States military to be reliant on people just as much as they are on weapons and new technology.

However, only 23% of young Americans qualified to enlist without a waiver, and less than 10% of young Americans said they would consider enlisting, according to a 2022 poll from the Pentagon’s Office of People Analytics. In addition, the number of American 18-year-olds is expected to drop from 9.4 million in 2025 to 8 million by 2029. With all of these factors at play, military recruiters have their work cut out for them.

“The all-volunteer force faces one of its greatest challenges since inception,” Ashish S. Vazirani, acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, told the House of Representatives late last year.

Currently, Congress has two measures set forth that they hope to provide the military manpower in the case of the United States going to war. One of the provisions would call for all young men to be automatically registered for the Selective Service, and the other would make women eligible for the draft.

To combat a growing apathy toward the military and a hot job market, the U.S. Army continues to seek recruits by offering large signing bonuses and launching expensive advertising campaigns.

However, many modern-day advertisements have failed to elicit the results that the Army has hoped for and have even garnered the branch heavy criticism and backlash.

This year, the U.S. Army signed an $11 million deal with the United Football League that included having the Army insignia on players’ uniforms and on banners throughout the stadium. The deal also entailed for UFL owner Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to make five social media posts promoting the Army, but he did not uphold his end of the bargain.

Internal review by the United States Army found that the deal not only failed to bring in any new recruits, but actually led to the loss of 38 enlistments.

There was concern about partnering with UFL, an unofficial minor league version of the National Football League, given the recently created franchise’s low viewerships. A merger between the XFL and the United States Football League, the UFL boasted higher views than seen in the other two franchises, but it still failed to garner the high viewership found in the NCAA, which generates ten times the number of viewers.

Internal documents reveal the UFL staffing was “inexperienced” and caused many communication breakdowns between the Army in terms of rendering out marketing plans.

In another failed campaign from three years ago, the Army released five animated videos following the backstory of real-life soldiers as they navigated their journey into joining the military. Unlike previous advertising campaigns, the videos did not highlight on activities that will be completed in the military but instead gave each soldier a chance to share their personal story of why they joined.

“Research tells us that young people today see the Army as a “distant star” — a place requiring a nearly superhuman level of discipline with little relevance to their daily lives,” said Maj. Gen. Alex Fink, Chief of Army Enterprise Marketing. “Similarly, youth don’t necessarily connect with those who serve or see common ground in terms of interests, abilities, and goals. ‘The Calling’ shatters these misperceptions by showing that Soldiers are all of us: real people with hopes, dreams, fears, aspirations, families, friends, and obstacles to overcome.”

One of the videos which shared the story of Cpl. Emma Malonelord, in which she shared how she has been fighting for freedom at a young age, showed an animated video of her with her two mothers at a gay rights rally.

This video, along with the other four videos, garnered mass criticism, including from Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) in which he tweeted a side-by-side video of The Calling video of Emma with a military ad of Russian soldiers.

“Holy crap. Perhaps a woke, emasculated military is not the best idea….,” Cruz tweeted.

The comments from this video, along with the other four, were eventually disabled.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

“The comments violated our social media policy and were not aligned with Army values. Out of respect for the safety and wellbeing of our soldiers and their families, we have disabled the comments,” Laura DeFrancisco, public affairs chief for the Army Enterprise Marketing Office, told Army Times.

In January, The Calling was delisted from the Army’s YouTube platform.


Washington Examiner · September 8, 2024


18. The Deep Roots of Trump’s Isolationism



This is not meant as partisanship but I offer it because it assesses an issue of concern, American isolationism. Of course the author offers a prescription for the Democrats (so this is partisan) but much of the prescription should actually be bipartisan.


Excerpts:

The United States cannot afford to run away from the world, as it did during the long era of isolationism. But it can no longer seek to run the world, which it has neither the power nor the domestic consensus to do. Instead, Americans need to learn to live in a world of ideological diversity and multiple conceptions of order, working alongside other centers of power, democracies and non-democracies alike. Pragmatic realism should guide U.S. statecraft.
Democrats need to find the middle ground between expansive liberal internationalism and dangerous isolationist excesses.
The Democrats must also focus on fixing a broken immigration system. The uncontrolled influx of migrants across the nation’s southern border will further polarize U.S. society and strengthen right-wing forces calling for the United States to pull up the drawbridge; as in the past, anti-immigrant and isolationist sentiment go hand in hand. Democrats need to preempt Trump’s anti-immigrant excesses, including mass deportations, by setting out credible plans for securing the border, creating an orderly system to process legal immigration, and laying out a pathway to resolving the status of millions of undocumented migrants.
Democrats must also prioritize getting working Americans back on their feet. Rebuilding the middle class is the starting point for rebuilding the political center, which is necessary to restore the political foundation of a purposeful and steady brand of internationalism. Tariffs need to be part of that effort, but only a small part. The 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods envisaged by Trump would hit American consumers hard and risk fragmenting the global economy, just as the Smoot-Hawley Act did. Moreover, even though protectionism and industrial policy will bring back some manufacturing jobs, this approach will not redress the problems facing the nation’s deindustrialized heartland.
Rebuilding the middle class requires generating well-paying jobs in the service sector, where most Americans work. This challenge will necessitate place-based investment, workforce development and training, and the fashioning of an education and employment ecosystem that prepares Americans for the jobs of the digital era. Democrats should also showcase plans for containing the cost of housing, food, fuel, childcare, and higher education.
This course correction would simultaneously achieve two urgent objectives. It would help defeat Trump and avert the dangers of his reelection by appropriating key elements of his electoral appeal. It would also help shore up the domestic foundations of U.S. internationalism, thereby steadying U.S. leadership in a world sorely in need of American power and purpose.



The Deep Roots of Trump’s Isolationism

Democrats Need Their Own “America First” Agenda

By Charles Kupchan

September 9, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Charles Kupchan · September 9, 2024

The mainstream U.S. foreign policy establishment views former President Donald Trump as a dangerous neo-isolationist, completely out of step with American ideals and interests. Internationalists at home and abroad shudder at the prospect of Trump’s potential reelection in November, fearing that he would dismantle the liberal order that the United States and its allies have built and defended since World War II.

Such fears are justified; Trump may indeed seek to do away with at least some core elements of the U.S.-led liberal order. But to portray his “America first” approach as a dark deviation from the American experience is to misunderstand its deep historical and ideological roots, as well as its considerable political appeal. Trump’s statecraft is a response to a changing world and to demand signals from the U.S. electorate, not a capricious effort to take apart the world that the United States made.

None of this is to deny that Trump’s return to office could be disastrous. At home, he may well imperil American democracy. Abroad, Trump’s mere reelection would set the world on edge. U.S. allies would have to face the reality that their security guarantor—the globe’s premier power—has been beset by intractable political dysfunction; they would have no choice but to question Washington’s long-term reliability and make other plans. Meanwhile, autocrats would be emboldened and the cause of democracy everywhere debilitated.

Yet the best way to avoid that highly unattractive outcome is not to recoil at Trump’s “America first” movement or to see it merely as the work of a know-nothing felon. Rather, the way forward requires unpacking that movement, understanding its considerable political appeal, and appropriating its worthy elements. If the Democrats are to defeat Trump and his neo-isolationist agenda, they should cull central elements of his “America first” program and pivot toward a more modest, restrained, and pragmatic brand of U.S. statecraft.

STEAL HIS THUNDER

From 1789 to 1941 (with brief exceptions during the Spanish-American War and World War I), the United States embraced an isolationist grand strategy to which Trump’s basic impulses bear a strong resemblance. In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington called for “as little political connection as possible” with foreign nations, declaring, “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” Isolationism endured well into the twentieth century, in no small part because its multiple ideological strains broadened its political appeal.

Isolationism offered something for everyone, enabling it to long have a lock on U.S. politics. For realists, isolationism properly reflected and reinforced geographic insulation and strategic detachment. For idealists and progressives, isolationism meant escaping realpolitik and enabling investment in the country’s economic well-being rather than in instruments of war. Conservative nationalists looked to isolationism to defend sovereignty and strengthen the unilateral exercise of U.S. power. Libertarians saw the strategy as a means of securing small government and domestic freedom. For anti-immigrant groups, isolationism meant preserving social homogeneity by keeping the nonwhite world at bay. Industrialists saw isolationism as an extension of protectionism—keeping imports, rather than migrants, at bay.

Fearful that the expansionist ambitions of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan would entangle the United States in great-power rivalry, the isolationist camp in September 1940 founded the America First Committee, which did its best to keep the nation far away from World War II. But the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in 1941, shattered the isolationist consensus. The United States’ entry into World War II marked a historical inflection point, clearing the way for the nation’s embrace of an expansive internationalism. Soon thereafter, the onset of the Cold War accelerated the country’s appetite for global engagement. By the early 1950s, it was liberal internationalism, not isolationism, that had captured U.S. politics. The projection of American power and the creation and defense of an open, multilateral order among like-minded democracies had come to pay dividends across the political spectrum. The result was a centrist and bipartisan compact behind liberal internationalism. That compact long served as the political foundation of Pax Americana.

If the Democrats are to defeat Trump and his neo-isolationist agenda, they should cull central elements of his “America first” program.

Today, however, that internationalist consensus has shattered—just as the isolationist consensus did in 1941. Washington’s purposes abroad are no longer in equilibrium with its domestic means. Deindustrialization and the hollowing out of the middle class, decades of strategic overreach and hyperglobalization, and the influx of immigrants and rapid shifts in the country’s demographic makeup are combining to bring back into political vogue the multiple ideological strains of isolationism that previously shaped U.S. grand strategy.

Enter Trump. “The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer,” he pledged in his inaugural address, in 2017. “From this moment on, it’s going to be America first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families.” Rather than resisting the public’s call for an inward turn, Trump amplified it, promising to free the U.S. government from its foreign burdens and focus its attention and resources on the home front. That promise won the support of many millions of Americans that felt—and still feel—left behind by liberal internationalism. Trump fell far short of his pledge to get working Americans back on their feet—an electoral liability, but also one of the reasons that his politics of grievance and neo-isolationist impulses still have considerable public appeal.

The country is now in the midst of a tug of war over its role in the world. If the Democrats want to defeat the new “America first” movement, they need to better understand it, and then steal Trump’s thunder by borrowing its most appealing components.

NON-ENTANGLEMENT, THEN AND NOW

After the errant attempt of the original America First movement to keep the United States out of World War II, “isolationism” became a dirty word. Ever since, internationalists have deployed the term to tar and feather the likes of the conservative commentator Patrick Buchanan, the former Republican member of Congress Ron Paul, and now Trump, charging that they are naively deluded about the desirability and viability of strategic detachment. Internationalists contend that even if isolationism may have made sense in an earlier era, when expansive oceans to the east and west afforded the United States natural security, today’s world provides no such luxury. Due to numerous developments—including ballistic missiles, economic interdependence, the connectedness of cyberspace, and climate change—strategic detachment and going it alone are no longer viable options.

This critique of isolationism is valid; the United States can never again enjoy the natural security that it once did. However, the original conception of isolationism rested on the advantages not just of geographic separation but also of non-entanglement. Were Donald Trump to fail to honor NATO’s commitment to collective defense, he would have a solid precedent. In 1793, George Washington unilaterally reneged on the alliance that the United States had concluded with France in 1778 to secure French help during the Revolutionary War. The main reason for this act of “ignominious perfidy,” as the Virginia representative James Madison called the move, was that Washington deemed it to be contrary to the national interest for the country to be dragged into another war with the United Kingdom.

The United States did not conclude another military alliance for more than 150 years, when it did so through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and NATO after World War II. This preference for non-entanglement was also the principal source of opposition to the commitment to collective security contained in the League of Nations covenant. Senator William Borah, an Idaho Republican and a leading opponent of ratifying the treaty that created the league, argued that U.S. membership would mean that “we have forfeited and surrendered, once and for all, the great policy of ‘no entangling alliances’ upon which the strength of this Republic has been founded.”

Trump’s skepticism toward nation-building and the promotion of democracy abroad resonates with the isolationist posture of early America.

In similar fashion, Trump’s brand of isolationism is motivated more by unilateralism than by a search for strategic detachment. “I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down,” Trump has declared, insisting that “we will never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs.” He has informed the United Nations General Assembly that “we will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable global bureaucracy.” For Trump, alliances qualify as “unions that tie us up,” especially when allies do not shoulder their fair share of the defense burden.

Trump’s stiff-necked unilateralism is self-defeating, alienating the allies that the United States needs in order to defend common interests and secure collective action. But his cautionary stance toward entanglement does help inoculate the United States against chronic overreach. Trump initiated the process of ending Washington’s disastrous war in Afghanistan. He has reportedly questioned the wisdom of granting Ukraine membership in NATO—with good reason. NATO’s declaration of an “irreversible” commitment to Ukraine’s membership, which would obligate NATO to defend the country if attacked, is fundamentally at odds with the alliance’s current unwillingness to go to war in Ukraine’s defense. JD Vance, Trump’s running mate, is wrong to oppose further U.S. aid to Ukraine, but he is right on some things. “The Biden administration has no viable plan for the Ukrainians to win this war,” he correctly noted in an essay for The New York Times in April. “The sooner Americans confront this truth, the sooner we can fix this mess and broker for peace.”

The American public deserves a sober and realistic debate about the nature and salience of the U.S. interests at stake in Ukraine. The American electorate also deserves to be told the truth: that Ukraine is highly unlikely to succeed in expelling Russian forces from its territory, even with the continuation of strong support from the West. Trump’s readiness to seek a negotiated settlement is not capitulation: it is pragmatism.

THE WORLD AS IT IS

Trump’s skepticism toward nation-building and the promotion of democracy abroad also resonates with the isolationist posture of early America. To be sure, Americans from the founding era onward believed that they were embarking on a unique experiment in building republican government, an experiment that they were ultimately destined to share with the rest of the world. Yet the founders and their successors were appropriately doubtful of the United States’ ability to engineer political change abroad and therefore understood that they needed to spread democracy primarily by example. As then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams famously stated in 1821, the United States “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”

So, too, did successive U.S. presidents appreciate the need to operate in the world as it is, working with democracies and non-democracies alike in the pursuit of U.S. interests. Even as President James Monroe warned Europe’s great powers in 1823 against any “future colonization” in the Western Hemisphere, he acknowledged and accepted Europe’s political preferences. It was the policy of the United States, he asserted, “not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it.”

Trump took this ideological variant of isolationism too far during his presidency, exhibiting a fondness for autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jung Un while giving a cold shoulder to the leaders of allied democracies. But Trump’s approach to grand strategy does exhibit due caution to the promotion of democracy abroad. He correctly traced the United States’ overreach in the Middle East to the “dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interests in becoming a Western democracy.” He told the UN General Assembly that “we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone” and that “I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions.” In an interdependent and globalized world, Trump’s pragmatic readiness to work across ideological dividing lines may produce better results than positing the twenty-first century as “a battle between democracy and autocracy,” as President Joe Biden has done.

The United States’ early embrace of isolationism also emerged from the firm belief of the founders that ambition abroad would come at the expense of freedom and prosperity at home. Entanglement in great-power rivalries would require a large federal government and military establishment, which would in turn threaten tyranny at home and divert resources that would be better spent on productive domestic investment.

When it comes to the defense of liberty at home, Trump unquestionably breaks with American traditions, having attempted to overturn the outcome of the 2020 election and expressed interest in imposing exactly the kind of tyranny that the founders feared. Yet Trump’s attacks against what he deems the “deep state” resonate with libertarian skepticism of the federal government. And even though he supports the sizable military establishment that the founders opposed, Trump has effectively portrayed nation-building and foreign aid as a wasteful distraction, arguing that Washington should be spending taxpayer money solving problems at home rather than abroad. Many Americans agree.

BORDERS AND BARRIERS

On immigration, Trump’s program is in line with the anti-immigrant sentiment that accompanied the nation’s long embrace of isolationism. In the nineteenth century, U.S. expansion into the Caribbean and Latin America was blocked by widespread public and elite opposition to bringing more Black, Hispanic, and Catholic people into the U.S. body politic. The United States did annex over half of Mexico at the end of the Mexican-American War (1846–8), but the U.S. government wanted not Mexico’s people but its land, which was soon settled by whites. The intensification of isolationism during the interwar era coincided with a surge in anti-immigrant fervor. In 1924, Congress passed legislation that reduced the number of Jews and Catholics coming into the country by 90 percent and barred immigration from Asia entirely. During the 1930s, the United States deported about a million immigrants from Mexico, many of whom were U.S. citizens.

Trump’s brand of neo-isolationism is tinged by a similar embrace of anti-immigrant sentiment. As president, he cut back on immigrant quotas, made insulting references to minorities, and strove to build a wall on the border with Mexico. Trump is now campaigning on an anti-immigrant platform, pledging to deport millions of undocumented migrants, who, he insists, are “poisoning the blood of our country.” Many Americans see immigration as the top challenge facing the country, which is why most Democrats also see an urgent need to fix the system. Biden worked hard to secure a bipartisan overhaul of immigration policy, but Republicans, at Trump’s prompting, sank that effort earlier this year. Thereafter, Biden took the extraordinary step of issuing an executive order providing for temporary closure of the southern border when the seven-day average of daily illegal crossings exceeds 2,500.

Trump has also resuscitated the protectionism that long guided the nation’s economic statecraft. Even though the United States from its earliest days relied heavily on commerce with other nations, it sought fair rather than free trade and relied on tariffs for revenue and to protect domestic industries. The United States’ geopolitical retreat of the 1930s coincided with a sharp pullback on the trade front; the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 triggered the fragmentation of the global economy and the collapse of international trade.

During his presidency, Trump relied heavily on the protectionist component of the isolationist playbook. He renegotiated the North American Free Trade Area, ended efforts to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and announced a wide range of tariffs. Trump has pledged to impose a raft of new tariffs if reelected, including 60 percent on all Chinese goods and ten percent on products from the rest of the world. Trump has even floated the idea of turning back time to the nineteenth century by eliminating the personal income tax and relying on tariffs for all federal revenue. (A federal income tax was introduced temporarily during the Civil War, but not regularized until the twentieth century.) Once again, Trump is responding to demand signals from the electorate, seeking to appeal to the many Americans who have suffered economic dislocation as a result of automation and free trade. It is no surprise that Biden has not only continued to rely on tariffs (particularly on Chinese goods) to promote manufacturing and has also turned to industrial policy to create jobs, advance economic security, and fight climate change.

PREEMPTING “AMERICA FIRST”

Trump’s brand of U.S. statecraft has deep roots in the American experience and, like the original version of isolationism, has something for almost everyone, giving it broad appeal across the American electorate. Democrats dismiss his “America first” agenda as strategic delusion at their own peril. Instead, they should preempt it by embracing its best elements.

Democrats need to find the middle ground between an expansive liberal internationalism that is no longer sustainable at home or abroad and the dangerous isolationist excesses that would likely accompany Trump’s return to the presidency. That middle ground entails standing by Biden’s multilateralism and his investment in old alliances and new partnerships, moves that have resuscitated U.S.-led collective action and restored the nation’s image as a team player. At the same time, the United States must avoid the bouts of strategic overreach, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that encourage the electorate to gravitate toward isolationist alternatives.

In Ukraine, that middle ground requires working to broker a cease-fire and focusing on ensuring that the 80 percent of the country still under Kyiv’s control is secure, prosperous, and stable. With Ukraine up against relentless aggression from a much larger neighbor, that outcome would qualify as a success by any reasonable measure. In the Middle East, Washington should seek to end the violence in Gaza and then lay out a pathway to Palestinian self-determination and normalization of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors. The United States should stand up to Chinese ambition, but also avoid unnecessary provocations that could lead to an irreversible geopolitical rupture. Washington should work intently to cooperate with Beijing to tame rivalry and advance joint efforts to tackle global challenges.

The United States cannot afford to run away from the world, as it did during the long era of isolationism. But it can no longer seek to run the world, which it has neither the power nor the domestic consensus to do. Instead, Americans need to learn to live in a world of ideological diversity and multiple conceptions of order, working alongside other centers of power, democracies and non-democracies alike. Pragmatic realism should guide U.S. statecraft.

Democrats need to find the middle ground between expansive liberal internationalism and dangerous isolationist excesses.

The Democrats must also focus on fixing a broken immigration system. The uncontrolled influx of migrants across the nation’s southern border will further polarize U.S. society and strengthen right-wing forces calling for the United States to pull up the drawbridge; as in the past, anti-immigrant and isolationist sentiment go hand in hand. Democrats need to preempt Trump’s anti-immigrant excesses, including mass deportations, by setting out credible plans for securing the border, creating an orderly system to process legal immigration, and laying out a pathway to resolving the status of millions of undocumented migrants.

Democrats must also prioritize getting working Americans back on their feet. Rebuilding the middle class is the starting point for rebuilding the political center, which is necessary to restore the political foundation of a purposeful and steady brand of internationalism. Tariffs need to be part of that effort, but only a small part. The 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods envisaged by Trump would hit American consumers hard and risk fragmenting the global economy, just as the Smoot-Hawley Act did. Moreover, even though protectionism and industrial policy will bring back some manufacturing jobs, this approach will not redress the problems facing the nation’s deindustrialized heartland.

Rebuilding the middle class requires generating well-paying jobs in the service sector, where most Americans work. This challenge will necessitate place-based investment, workforce development and training, and the fashioning of an education and employment ecosystem that prepares Americans for the jobs of the digital era. Democrats should also showcase plans for containing the cost of housing, food, fuel, childcare, and higher education.

This course correction would simultaneously achieve two urgent objectives. It would help defeat Trump and avert the dangers of his reelection by appropriating key elements of his electoral appeal. It would also help shore up the domestic foundations of U.S. internationalism, thereby steadying U.S. leadership in a world sorely in need of American power and purpose.

Foreign Affairs · by Charles Kupchan · September 9, 2024






De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

 
 
V/R
David Maxwell


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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