Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Mr. Bullen, when I serve my country as a soldier, I’m not going to serve her as a Democrat or as a Republican. I’m going to serve her as an American. To my last breath.”

– Sam Damon in Once an Eagle

"We are not enemies, but friends, We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely as they will be by the better angels of our nature. "

– Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 1861

"That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lessons of history."

– Aldous Huxley

1. China’s Xi proposes GGI to reshape global governance: Will the world follow?

2. Commentary: What China’s weapons parade says about its military might

3. A U.S.-India Repair Attempt

4. U.S.-China Rivalry Sparks a Submarine Arms Race

5. Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change

6. Hyundai Raid Exposes Shortage of Visas for Asian Companies Trying to Move Staff

7. Kenya Uses U.S.-Funded Antiterrorism Courts for Political Crackdown

8. If only Trump’s ‘Department of War’ were focused on actual war-fighting By Max Boot

9. On a day of rebranding at the Pentagon, this name change slipped under the radar

10. ICE’s Raid on Korean Workers and Trump’s Clashing Priorities

11. Why the World Turned on NGOs

12. How this couple secretly spied for China from inside Germany — the bizarre true story

13. For head of INDOPACOM, homeland defense extends across the Pacific

14. The Wrong Way to Do Diplomacy With Russia

15. Hegseth visits Puerto Rico as US boosts Caribbean military operations

16. US Air Force's first official autonomous combat drone takes to the air

17. Xi running 'The Art of War' circles around Trump

18. China's grand global plan on full display at SCO Summit

19. PRC Conceptions of Comprehensive National Power

20. The China-Russia-North Korea alliance that needs no name

21. American Security Systems are Compromised by China

22. The Future of Criminal Drone Use in Latin America

23. Can America's trust in its military survive the present moment? [Book excerpt]

24. Countering Digital Authoritarianism: How Malaysia Can Secure Digital Sovereignty by Tokenizing Trade Finance

25. Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet

26. 'It’s not weird’: The people who love to stare at airplane flight maps

1. China’s Xi proposes GGI to reshape global governance: Will the world follow?

Beware China's calls for global governance.

I. hate to sound like a broken record or beat a dead moresmore dead but this seems to validate my view of China's intent: My assessment is that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

China’s Xi proposes GGI to reshape global governance: Will the world follow?

While Chinese President Xi Jinping’s sweeping vision for global governance reform may resonate with states seeking alternatives to a Western-dominated order, questions remain over how far Beijing can go in turning rhetoric into reality.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-xi-jinping-global-governance-initiative-reform-un-sco-5334516

Chinese President Xi Jinping (centre) and foreign leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin (centre left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (centre right), walk to the Tiananmen rostrum ahead of a military parade to commemorate…see more

Listen14 min

Lee Gim Siong

08 Sep 2025 06:00AM

(Updated: 08 Sep 2025 09:58AM)

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BEIJING: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s newly unveiled vision for global governance reform signals Beijing’s clearest intent yet to lead in shaping a new world order, analysts say, as the geopolitical landscape reels from intensifying great-power rivalry and fracturing alliances.

The Global Governance Initiative (GGI) calls on countries to work together for a more just and equitable global governance system.

It builds on a string of sweeping international proposals the Chinese supremo has rolled out in recent years, and reflects China’s effort to consolidate them under a cohesive banner, say observers.

Xi has anchored the initiative in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - the regional bloc where Beijing exerts considerable sway - unveiling it at a recent summit in Tianjin, where he likened today’s geopolitical turbulence to the postwar upheaval that gave rise to the United Nations 80 years ago.

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But despite the rhetoric, analysts say questions remain over what China will do in practice under the GGI, and how far it can go in turning its bold vision into reality amid internal challenges and external scepticism over Beijing’s credibility and intent.

“China wants a reordering of the international system and the establishment of a multilateral system where the United States is simply one of many poles,” said Zachary Abuza, an academic focused on Asian geopolitics and security.

“But its drive is fueled as much by domestic weaknesses - from economic slowdown to demographic challenges - as by strength.”

REFERENCING THE PAST TO SHAPE THE PRESENT

Xi formally laid out the GGI at the SCO summit on Sep 1 in a keynote speech to member states, dialogue partners and observers.

He drew a historical parallel to 1945, reminding fellow leaders how the devastation of two world wars had spurred the founding of the UN and opened “a new page in global governance”.

Xi warned that while peace, development and cooperation remain fundamental trends 80 years on, Cold War thinking, hegemonism and protectionism still cast a “lingering shadow” over global affairs.

New threats and challenges are on the rise, he added, pushing the world into what he called “a new period of turbulence and transformation”.

“History tells us that the more difficult the times, the more we must hold fast to the aspiration of peaceful coexistence (and) strengthen our confidence in cooperation and win-win outcomes,” Xi said, framing global governance today as at a crossroads.

“For this reason, I am putting forward a Global Governance Initiative to work with all countries in building a fairer and more reasonable system of global governance, and to jointly advance the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) gives a speech during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, Sep 1, 2025. (Photo: Pool Photo via AP/Suo Takekuma)

By invoking 1945, Xi was not simply recalling history but framing the present as another moment of systemic change, with China leading the charge as the architect of a new global order, analysts note.

“China is positioning itself as the defender of peace and as the key shaper of the new order it is proposing,” Dylan Loh, assistant professor of public policy and global affairs at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University (NTU), told CNA.

Jonathan Ping, an associate professor at Bond University, stressed the ambition behind Xi’s words.

“This juxtaposition is significant - it frames today’s turbulence not as chaos, but as an opportunity for systemic transformation led by China,” he told CNA.

Abuza said Beijing views the present moment as one where shifting global conditions may work in its favour, especially as the US under President Donald Trump roils the international order.

Since reassuming office in January, Trump has steered the US towards a markedly unilateralist agenda - slapping sweeping tariffs on both allies and rivals and withdrawing from key multilateral agreements.

Notably, the US has again withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement and moved to exit the World Health Organization, while suspending most foreign aid, including programmes run through USAID, its overseas development agency.

Washington has also announced plans to end funding for European security initiatives such as the Baltic Security Initiative - steps that have deepened concern among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and reinforced doubts about America’s long-term reliability in multilateral leadership.

President Donald Trump signs an executive order withdrawing the US from the World Health Organization in the Oval Office of the White House, Jan 20, 2025. (Photo: AP/Evan Vucci)

“Xi is trying to equate the post-WWII disorder with the current disorder that he is implicitly blaming on the United States,” Abuza said.

Xi struck a similar note at a grand World War II military parade in Beijing on Sep 3, warning that humanity once again faced a choice between peace and war, dialogue and confrontation, mutual benefit and zero-sum rivalry.

The Chinese leader declared that China remains committed to the path of peaceful development.

“(We) will work hand in hand with people of all countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” Xi said.

At the same time, Abuza said that Beijing’s goal is not global hegemony but a system in which Washington is “one pole among many”, as the costs of global leadership and providing collective goods are more than what China wants to pay.

Instead, he said, China is pushing for a multilateral system in which China and rising partners from the developing world check US hegemony.

“From a Chinese point of view, the post-WWII era was established by states like France and the United Kingdom that did not have the power that they claimed to have,” Abuza said.

China has long portrayed itself as a beneficiary of the postwar order, often pointing to its status as a founding member of the UN and a permanent member of its Security Council.

Beijing has repeatedly stressed that it supports the UN’s central role in global governance, even as it calls for reforms to make the system more representative of developing countries.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (middle), in the presence of his wife Peng Liyuan, welcomes United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (left) during a reception at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in the Great Hall of the People…see more

BUILDING ON PAST MESSAGING

Rather than breaking new ground, analysts say the GGI is a consolidation and refinement of China’s earlier proposals.

Ping from Bond University views it as a strategic rebranding, reinforcing China’s long-term push for a multipolar order rooted in non-Western values.

Since 2021, Xi has introduced the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative, followed most recently by the GGI.

Broadly, the development initiative champions narrowing global inequality through development, the security initiative stresses fostering security through dialogue rather than military blocs, and the civilisation initiative calls for cultural diversity as an alternative to Western universalism.

Beijing claims that more than 100 countries and international organisations have expressed support for the Global Development Initiative, with varying levels of backing also voiced for the other two.

At the same time, observers say the GGI’s five guiding principles offer a clearer blueprint of what China envisions.

The principles - sovereign equality, respect for international law, multilateralism, putting people first and an action-oriented approach - were laid out by Xi in his Sep 1 speech.

The GGI “offers something akin to a small roadmap” of what a new order might look like, said NTU’s Loh, who added that its value lies in bringing disparate strands of Chinese foreign policy into a more coherent package.

China’s official concept paper on the GGI, released shortly after Xi's Sep 1 speech, makes clear that Beijing is not calling for a wholesale replacement of the current world order, but for reforms that address what it sees as deep imbalances.

Xi urges SCO members to pursue joint development, offers billions in loans and grants

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit produced fruitful results: China's Wang Yi

It highlights three deficiencies in existing institutions: the underrepresentation of the Global South, erosion of the authority of the UN Charter and its principles, and the lack of effectiveness in tackling global challenges such as climate change, digital divides and new frontiers like artificial intelligence, cyberspace and outer space.

In China’s telling, the GGI is meant to strengthen rather than supplant the UN system, but in a way that tilts representation and rule-making power toward developing countries, noted Abuza.

He believes the initiative could prove more consequential than its predecessors, which “have really gone nowhere” and were often targeted at a domestic audience.

This time, the emphasis on global governance reform may resonate internationally as many in the developing world share calls for change, Abuza added.

“The establishment of a multilateral system and leadership positions for key states in the Global South are a shared priority,” he said, pointing to India’s long-standing demand for UN Security Council reform as an example of overlapping interests.

Taken together, analysts suggest that the GGI is less about novelty than about timing and positioning. By packaging earlier ideas into a clearer framework, Beijing is trying to present itself as a reformer of the international system and a voice for the Global South, they say.

That message found public backing at the SCO summit, with the leaders of Belarus, Pakistan and Iran voicing support for the GGI, according to news reports.

Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith also endorsed the initiative in a bilateral meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the Sep 3 World War II parade, while Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signalled support too during his own talks with the Chinese president, according to a Chinese foreign ministry readout.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Chinese President Xi Jinping and their respective delegations hold bilateral talks at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, Sep 2, 2025. (Photo: CNA/Hu Chushi)

TURNING RHETORIC INTO REALITY?

What the initiative does not provide, however, is a clear sense of how China intends to move from principle to practice.

While Xi has laid out broad themes such as sovereign equality and multilateralism, he has offered few details on the mechanisms or resources Beijing is prepared to commit, analysts note.

They add that the gap between rhetoric and reality is most evident in how Beijing’s message is received across the Global South - the very audience it is trying hardest to court.

The term broadly refers to developing countries that are poorer, more unequal and have lower life expectancy than their developed counterparts.

Analysts say much of Xi’s language in launching the GGI was directed at developing countries, with repeated emphasis on sovereign equality, adherence to international law and opposition to “double standards”.

They note that the Chinese leader has cast Beijing as a defender of fairness for states that see themselves sidelined in a Western-dominated system.

Ping from Bond University said that while China’s messaging would resonate with countries seeking alternatives to Western-dominated systems, some could also view it as self-serving amid wariness over Beijing’s growing influence.

NTU’s Loh noted the diversity of Global South states, highlighting their varying histories and interests.

“This term is itself contested and open to contestation, (and) the leadership role of China that Xi is projecting will also be met unevenly by countries, even as I think a majority of the Global South are comfortable with China's leadership,” he said.

Perceived contradictions in China’s conduct also risk undermining the credibility of its global governance appeal.

Abuza, the academic focused on Asian geopolitics and security, said it was “rather rich” for the Chinese to call for adherence to international law, pointing to Beijing’s close alignment with Moscow and its defiance of an international tribunal ruling on the South China Sea.

At the Sep 3 military parade in Beijing, Xi shared the stage with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who remains shunned by much of the West over his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, likewise isolated internationally for his nuclear weapons programme, was also in attendance.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (front left), Chinese President Xi Jinping (front middle) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (front right) arrive at a military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender…see more

Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China rejects the 2016 ruling under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that invalidated much of its expansive claims.

This places Beijing at odds with some Southeast Asian states - particularly the Philippines, which has repeatedly accused Chinese vessels of harassment and incursions into its waters. China denies the allegations.

China’s domestic circumstances further complicate its push for a global order it seeks to lead, Abuza added.

“Although Beijing is always trying to project strength, Xi has to cope with enormous economic weaknesses, a decline in domestic consumption, rising capital flight, an enormous demographic challenge, and opaque politics without a clear transition mechanism,” Abuza said.

In his view, these internal strains weigh heavily on Beijing’s approach to the world.

“I think that Chinese foreign policy is driven more by China’s weaknesses than its strengths,” Abuza said.

A PLATFORM OF PROMISE AND LIMITS

Xi’s decision to anchor the GGI in the SCO underscores how Beijing views the bloc as a vehicle for amplifying its message, note analysts.

In his Sep 1 speech unveiling the GGI, the Chinese supremo said the regional bloc had already put forward many new ideas on global governance and should “play a leading role and set an example” in implementing the initiative.

Leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, attend a photo ceremony at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, Aug 31, 2025. (Photo: Pool via Reuters/Sergei Bobylyov)…see more

Since its founding in 2001 as a security grouping between China, Russia and Central Asian states, the SCO has expanded to 10 members, including India, Pakistan, Iran and most recently Belarus, along with a wide circle of observers and dialogue partners.

But observers have noted that its growing size has made it more heterogeneous, with overlapping rivalries and diverging interests.

“Beijing is positioning the SCO as a platform to export its governance vision beyond Eurasia … while symbolically powerful, the SCO’s ability to lead global governance reform remains constrained by internal fragmentation and external scepticism,” said Ping from Bond University.

Practical limitations include the SCO’s diverse membership, varying political systems, and limited institutional capacity, he added.

“Some members may resist deeper alignment with China’s model, preferring neutrality or balancing ties with other powers.”

Ultimately, the SCO’s reach is still limited, Abuza said, as it is a Eurasian organisation comprising just 10 members.

Abuza noted that Beijing has long sought to build institutions outside the post-World War II order. As an example, he highlighted the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that is run in parallel with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

“Others like BRICS were established and expanded to challenge the international order that’s led by the US and its Western allies, to reflect the economic power of the Global South,” Abuza said.

He said the SCO has followed a similar trajectory, growing from a focus on security to cover economic and cultural cooperation.

“Today, Xi sees it along with the BRICs as a vehicle to lead for a global reordering and the establishment of a multilateral system."

Source: CNA/lg(ws)

2. Commentary: What China’s weapons parade says about its military might

And of course what did they not show us that they do not want us to see?

Excerpts:

Several new systems were displayed for the first time in public, including new nuclear missiles for its nuclear triad, hypersonic missiles, naval lasers and counter-drone systems.

It also showcased a plethora of unmanned systems, including new stealth drones for air combat, “loyal wingmen” (networked operations alongside manned aircraft), and two different unmanned submarines for a variety of missions including mine clearance.

While there were scant details about the performance and other capabilities of the new weapons, there are conclusions that could be drawn from what we have seen about China’s intentions and capabilities.

Commentary: What China’s weapons parade says about its military might

From new nuclear missiles to counter-drone systems, China flexed its technological muscle to the world, says defence writer Mike Yeo.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/china-military-parade-nuclear-hypersonic-drone-tech-5337886

The JL-1 first generation nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile is seen during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on Sep 3, 2025. (Photo:…see more

Listen7 min

Mike Yeo

09 Sep 2025 06:00AM

(Updated: 09 Sep 2025 07:11AM)

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MELBOURNE: A military parade is always a carefully orchestrated show of might, and China’s parade on Sep 3 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II offered the world a good look at some of its latest weapons.

The message it sent was clear: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a high-tech force capable of shaping and prevailing on a modern battlefield, to defend China’s interests and ambitions for a new world order.

Several new systems were displayed for the first time in public, including new nuclear missiles for its nuclear triad, hypersonic missiles, naval lasers and counter-drone systems.

It also showcased a plethora of unmanned systems, including new stealth drones for air combat, “loyal wingmen” (networked operations alongside manned aircraft), and two different unmanned submarines for a variety of missions including mine clearance.

While there were scant details about the performance and other capabilities of the new weapons, there are conclusions that could be drawn from what we have seen about China’s intentions and capabilities.

A SURVIVABLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

This was the first time China publicly displayed and confirmed its full nuclear triad – with land-based, air-launched and seaborne nuclear weapons.

A triad ensures parts of a nation’s nuclear deterrent could survive a surprise first strike and remain viable for a counterattack. Having a credible “second strike capability” would deter adversaries from trying a disabling first strike to begin with.

China paraded five different types of nuclear missiles: the land-based DF-5C, DF-31BJ and DF-61 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the JL-1 Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM) and JL-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). Of these, only the JL-3 has previously been shown at a Chinese military parade, as well as earlier versions of the DF-5 and DF-31.

However, a survivable nuclear deterrent goes beyond having a counterstrike capability.

It also requires an early warning system to provide sufficient heads-up of an incoming attack. China is continuing its investments in this area, having built a network of ground-based early warning radars and put satellites into orbit, although the number of early warning satellites is still relatively small.

Commentary: Look beyond the spectacle of China’s WWII parade for the political messages

Commentary: North Korea will never denuclearise, after Israel strikes on Iran

Survivability also means the ability to always have at least one ballistic missile submarine out at sea to ensure not all can be targeted in port.

And China has ticked this box since 2023, according to the annual China Military Power report published by the US Department of Defense. It is also building a new class of ballistic missile submarine to replace its current fleet of Type 094 boats, which are reportedly not quiet enough by modern standards.

China has also fortified the base of the H-6N bombers that can carry the JL-1 by carving out a large facility inside a mountain to park the bombers at their base in Neixiang-Ma’ao in Henan Province, although it still lacks sufficient tanker aircraft to keep the bombers in the air for prolonged periods.

AN ARRAY OF HYPERSONIC MISSILES

It was also notable that there were hardly any conventionally-armed ballistic missiles at this year’s parade, when they used to figure prominently. Instead, China showcased a variety of land- and ship-based missiles that utilised hypersonic boost-glide warheads.

A YJ-17 anti-ship missile passes during a military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, Sep 3, 2025. (Photo: AP/Andy Wong)

Unlike ballistic missiles that fly in a fairly predictable arc in a fixed direction from launch, boost-glide weapons are much more manoeuvrable. They can make adjustments mid-flight and can approach an assigned target from any point of the compass, making it harder to detect, track and intercept.

Boost glide weapons can reach hypersonic speeds (approximately five times the speed of sound) of ballistic missiles but retain the flexibility of cruise missiles, which fly at high subsonic speeds (just below the speed of sound).

According to the 2024 report on China’s military power released annually by the US Department of Defense, the PLA Rocket Force has an arsenal of 3,500 longer-ranged boost-glide weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, in addition to many more similar, shorter-ranged missiles operated by the PLA Air Force and Navy.

Hypersonic missiles will be key to striking targets such as enemy bases, logistics and support hubs in the event of a conflict.

Any future conflict will be a war of attrition between stockpiles of attacking missiles and defending interceptors. This was demonstrated earlier this year, with Israel depleting its stocks of Arrow ballistic missile interceptors and the US going through its own stocks of missile interceptors at an “alarming rate” against drones and missiles fired by Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Commentary: Ukraine drone attack was ingenious – and a nightmare scenario come true

Commentary: Iran's tactics against Israel confirm a new trend in warfare

COUNTER-DRONE SYSTEMS

China also displayed something that militaries have been scrambling for: counter-drone systems.

Experts have been warning about a nightmare scenario of relatively cheap commercial-grade drones striking high-value military assets. On Jun 1, Ukraine demonstrated that this was now possible, when it launched hundreds of drones from deep inside Russia, attacking airbases far from the frontlines and destroying or damaging an estimated 30 Russian military aircraft.

Current air defence systems have been ineffective in detecting and destroying such drones, or are unsustainable given the use of expensive missiles to defeat cheap drones.

At the parade, the PLA rolled out its mobile gun, combined gun-missile, microwave energy and laser counter-drone systems. The threat of drone swarms was clearly on the minds of Chinese military planners – the gun and missile system and microwave energy systems look specifically designed to deal with such attacks.

The former carried an autocannon along with two banks of missile canisters fitted on a rotating weapons mount. One bank of missiles on the vehicle on display was packing a total of 48 small missile canisters. This means that it could potentially carry a whopping 96 missiles.

This set-up appears similar to the FK-3000 system that was displayed as far back as 2022, at the Zhuhai Airshow. This means that it was conceptualised by PLA planners or China’s defence industry even before Ukraine proved the concept on the battlefield.

Given that China is one of the world’s foremost manufacturers of small commercial drones, the early recognition of the potential battlefield challenge and delivering solutions even as others are starting to play catch-up is perhaps unsurprising.

The parade underscored how much China has modernised its military and is the world leader in areas like hypersonic weapons. What remains to be worked on is for the various branches of the PLA to work together as a cohesive, integrated force, and while most analysts agree that it is not there yet, it is certainly moving in this direction.

Mike Yeo is the Indo-Pacific Bureau Chief for defence media outlet Breaking Defense. He has more than a decade of experience as a defence journalist, specialising in regional defence and security matters.

3. A U.S.-India Repair Attempt

Two paragraphs worth pondering.

Excerpts:

For 25 years after the Cold War, Washington had a simple and elegant grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific. It was relatively cheap to keep the sea lanes open to trade and to provide American security guarantees to allies. Encouraging Indo-Pacific countries to follow the path of export-led economic development that brought unprecedented prosperity to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ultimately China would benefit the U.S. generally and American multinationals especially. At the same time the strategy promoted democratic governance and pro-Western politics across a vital region of the world.

The approach remains elegant and appealing but is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration’s shift toward protectionism in the Indo-Pacific may reflect Mr. Trump’s heterodox economic views, but it is enabled by a bipartisan shift away from trade policies grounded in promoting export-oriented growth models in less-developed economies. And the demand that allies and partners do more in defense cannot simply be reduced to isolationism. It also reflects the increasing costs and risks of American security guarantees amid the rising threat from China.

A U.S.-India Repair Attempt

The summer spat has eased, but Trump’s tariffs still stir anti-American sentiments.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-u-s-india-repair-attempt-9994ed50

By Walter Russell Mead

Sept. 8, 2025 5:02 pm ET

A member of a trades association protests against the U.S.’s tariff hikes on Indian goods in New Delhi, Aug. 30. Photo: arun sankar/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

What a summer. The Trump administration slapped punitive tariffs of 50% on India while administration officials and MAGA influencers vilified America’s most important potential long-term partner in the Indo-Pacific. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a highly publicized visit to a Chinese-sponsored anti-American political summit.

Fortunately, September seems to have brought a change in the weather.

President Trump came within hailing distance of an apology on Friday when he called Mr. Modi a great prime minister and praised the special relationship between the world’s two largest democracies. New Delhi was quick to respond, with Mr. Modi praising his good friend Donald Trump and pointedly skipping a virtual Brics trade summit called by Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

But if the atmospherics have improved, the underlying problems remain. Indian exports to the U.S. face higher tariffs than goods from Asian export powerhouses like South Korea, Vietnam and Japan. The Trump administration is penalizing friendly India for buying Russian oil while giving China a pass. That apparent unfairness has ignited waves of anti-American bitterness across the spectrum of Indian politics.

India isn’t the only Indo-Pacific partner where Trump administration policy shifts have roiled the waters. The ham-fisted Immigration and Customs Enforcement raid on South Korean workers at a Hyundai facility in Georgia ignited a political crisis in a perennially touchy and strongly nationalist treaty ally. Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigned from his post in part due to political fallout from American tariffs on a country whose help is crucial for achieving U.S. goals vis-à-vis China.

Many American foreign-policy observers and veteran officials see this administration’s every move through the lens of a deep loathing of Mr. Trump and his political base, and they aren’t shy about saying so. For these critics, the turmoil in relations with America’s most important Asian partners further demonstrates the toxic mixture of illiberal malignancy and destructive incompetence they believe characterizes Mr. Trump’s every act. But to stop there, as so many analysts do, is both to miss the true dimensions of the crisis in American foreign policy and to blind oneself to the strategic opportunities that exist.

For 25 years after the Cold War, Washington had a simple and elegant grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific. It was relatively cheap to keep the sea lanes open to trade and to provide American security guarantees to allies. Encouraging Indo-Pacific countries to follow the path of export-led economic development that brought unprecedented prosperity to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ultimately China would benefit the U.S. generally and American multinationals especially. At the same time the strategy promoted democratic governance and pro-Western politics across a vital region of the world.

The approach remains elegant and appealing but is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration’s shift toward protectionism in the Indo-Pacific may reflect Mr. Trump’s heterodox economic views, but it is enabled by a bipartisan shift away from trade policies grounded in promoting export-oriented growth models in less-developed economies. And the demand that allies and partners do more in defense cannot simply be reduced to isolationism. It also reflects the increasing costs and risks of American security guarantees amid the rising threat from China.

Viewed from this perspective, the summer spat between India and the U.S. looks more consequential. If Washington were to adhere to the pre-Trump strategy for the Indo-Pacific, our policy would be to encourage India to challenge China as an export-oriented manufacturing platform, using India’s cheap labor to drive industrial growth by producing for Western markets. This approach would be popular in India and would likely check Chinese ambitions by building up India as a rival power.

American public opinion, however, seems unlikely to support or even to tolerate policies of this kind in the long run. The U.S.-India partnership, like our alliances and relationships across the Indo-Pacific, will need to rest on a more sustainable basis. In India’s case, the way forward for both countries is to deepen cooperation in areas that matter to both. Building a technosphere that China doesn’t dominate, deterring Chinese aggression in and around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, countering jihadist terrorism and stabilizing the Middle East, fracturing the troubling Sino-Russian alliance, and reducing Chinese influence in India’s neighborhood are important to Washington and New Delhi.

India will continue to export goods and talented migrants to the U.S., and both countries will benefit from the exchange. But populism in India and America isn’t going away. Serious policymakers must listen to public opinion in both countries to keep worse storms than those that troubled the relationship this summer from recurring.

WSJ Opinion: Donald Trump’s 'Emergency' Tariffs Lose Again in Court

Play video: WSJ Opinion: Donald Trump’s 'Emergency' Tariffs Lose Again in Court

President Trump has imposed global tariffs by citing a 1977 emergency law known as IEEPA, but a federal appeals court says 7-4 that this is outside of his legal authority. Otherwise, what would stop the next Democrat in the office from declaring a climate "emergency" to declare a carbon tariff?

Appeared in the September 9, 2025, print edition as 'A U.S.-India Repair Attempt'.

4. U.S.-China Rivalry Sparks a Submarine Arms Race

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https://www.wsj.com/world/china/us-china-submarine-fleets-nuclear-2ef36d54?st=XkGYtF&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

U.S.-China Rivalry Sparks a Submarine Arms Race

Beijing’s fleet gets quieter and more lethal; Washington leads in tech, lags in production

By Mike Cherney

, Austin Ramzy

and Alistair MacDonald

| Graphics by Daniel Kiss

and Roque Ruiz

Sept. 8, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Quick Summary

China’s submarine fleet is rapidly improving in technology and size, challenging the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific.View more

China is on the verge of becoming a world-class submarine power, with new technology and a bigger, better fleet that is gaining on the U.S. and its allies—spurring a new undersea arms race in the Pacific.

Rapid improvements are making Beijing’s underwater navy quieter and faster, capable of carrying more advanced weapons and better sensors and able to remain submerged for longer.

At the same time, Beijing’s military has extended its reach deeper into the Pacific, confronting rivals in the South China Sea and performing blockade and invasion drills around Taiwan, where a conflict could demand a greater role for submarines than at any time since World War II.

That is pushing the U.S.—which stations about 60% of its worldwide submarine force in the Indo-Pacific—and its allies to bulk up their own underwater fleets.

China’s military has submarine bases from Liaoning in the north to Hainan island in the South China Sea, part of a naval buildup that has enabled Beijing to patrol nearby waters and project power far from its shores.

As the U.S. adapts to meet what it sees as China’s growing threat, bases as far west as Guam and regional rotations give America’s submarines deeper reach into the Pacific. The Navy has moved several of its most advanced fast-attack submarines—the Virginia class—to the region since April last year.

In a military conflict, Pacific nations would seek to preserve—or obstruct—maritime trade and other shipping traffic through strategic waterways, drawing submarines into the vital role of the stealthy, sustained defense of chokepoints.

Sources: U.S. Defense Department (China naval bases); Congressional Research Service (U.S. defense sites); U.S. Navy (location and numbers of submarines); Hague Center for Strategic Studies (maritime chokepoints); Global Maritime Traffic (shipping traffic)

“Pretty much every country that aspires to have a half-decent navy in the Indo-Pacific is building submarines, or acquiring submarines,” said Peter Jennings, a director at Strategic Analysis Australia and a former deputy secretary in Australia’s defense department. “There’s no doubt they are very useful.”

But the U.S. and its allies are facing stiff challenges in keeping up with China.

A Chinese nuclear-powered submarine near the port city of Qingdao in 2019. Photo: jason lee/Reuters

The U.S. is struggling to build new submarines. Facing production concerns, the Trump administration is reviewing the 2021 “Aukus” defense pact, an agreement intended to help deter Chinese aggression. Under the pact, Australia is meant to buy nuclear-powered submarines from the U.S. and work with the U.K. to build a new sub incorporating U.S. technology.

China until recently didn’t present such a challenge. For years, Beijing focused on building a fleet of diesel-electric submarines that were sufficient for patrolling its backyard in the Western Pacific. China’s first nuclear-powered submarine, which entered service in 1974, was a loud, slow vessel whose biggest threat was in exposing its crew to radiation.

After a half-century of slow progress, everything has changed.

“They could be on the cusp, for submarine operations, of a technological leap where they are able to quiet the submarines significantly and it becomes very hard to track them,” said Brent Sadler, a Navy veteran and senior research fellow with the Heritage Foundation.

China has made particular strides in the development of nuclear-powered submarines, whose greater speed, range and endurance give Beijing’s navy greater reach.

New models in development include the Type 095, which analysts expect to have vertical launch tubes that can accommodate cruise missiles. “The 095 is going to be a very quiet sub,” said Christopher Carlson, a retired captain in the Navy Reserve and former Defense Department naval systems engineer who researches China’s submarine program. “That’s going to complicate matters greatly.”

China’s nuclear-powered submarines

091

(1974)

093 (baseline)

(2006)

093A (versions 1 and 2)

(2015 and ‘16)

092

(commissioned: 1983)

093A (version 3)

(2017)

093B

(2025 estimated)

094 (baseline)

(2007)

Relative detectability

094 (version 1)

(2011)

095

(under development)

094 (version 2)

(2020)

LESS

096

(under development)

Noise levels

LOUDER

QUIETER

Sources: Christopher Carlson, Seaforces.org, U.S. Defense Department (years); Office of Naval Intelligence

China has also improved its newer conventionally powered submarines, the Yuan class, with “air-independent propulsion” technology that makes them quieter and allows them to wait longer to come up for air. And China showed off new underwater drones in a military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, including one that could function as a submarine and another that could be an autonomous torpedo.

However, the development of a relatively small Chinese attack sub that analysts say could combine elements of nuclear and conventional power appeared to have been slowed when a prototype sank at a shipyard last year.

Overall, the U.S. still has a technological edge over China, with subs that are quieter and more advanced, and more upgrades to its all-nuclear fleet in the works.

Newly built Virginia-class attack submarines will be outfitted with acoustic improvements that make them stealthier. They also will have a larger payload capacity that will make them more lethal.

“We are making historic investments in our undersea warfare capabilities,” said Cmdr. Rick Moore, a Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman. The fleet operates underwater drones, has fixed and deployable underwater sensors and is incorporating artificial-intelligence capabilities in its submarines and unmanned platforms, he said.

Nuclear-powered submarine upgrades

U.S.

Virginia-class (Version 5)

Type 095

China

Pump-jet

propulsion

system

Entered service: 2004

Top Speed: +29 mph*

Crew: 132

Length: 377 feet

In development

Top Speed: 35–38 mph†

Length: 377 feet

Pump-jet

propulsion

system

Virginia Payload Module (each able to launch seven Tomahawk missiles)

Four

torpedo

tubes

Vertical

launch

system

Eight

torpedo

tubes

Virginia Payload Tubes (each able to launch six Tomahawk missiles)

*Over 25 knots (28.8 mph). Exact speed not available.

†Top speed dependent on hull design.

Note: The Virginia Payload Module is a planned component for future submarines. Design of the Type 095 submarine is estimated.

Sources: U.S. Navy (U.S.); "China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines," U.S. Naval War College, Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang, 2023 (China)

Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

With technological developments comes new strategic thinking.

If Beijing chooses to invade Taiwan, the self-ruled island that China claims as its own, the Chinese navy would likely use its conventional submarines to defend coastal territory. China’s newer nuclear attack subs, which are faster and equipped for longer journeys, would likely attempt to block U.S. forces from coming to Taiwan’s aid.

If the U.S. chooses to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, the Navy could use its submarines to try to destroy China’s ships and hunt its subs.

The U.S. could also try to keep Chinese ships bottled up in the Taiwan Strait to stop China from encircling Taiwan. U.S. submarines could launch missile attacks against Chinese land targets and try to cut off Chinese supplies by blocking shipping lanes to the south.

“Submarines are very valuable because they are a relatively light-footprint way to project significant power,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow and director of military analysis at the Defense Priorities think tank who believes the U.S. should reduce its forces in Asia but supports deploying submarines to Australia. “They don’t require large numbers of U.S. personnel. They don’t leave aircraft and surface ships vulnerable to Chinese missiles.”

A war at sea in Asia could draw in submarines from a host of countries, a prospect that supports the wish for U.S. partners to build up their fleets.

Select submarine fleets in the Pacific

Nuclear-powered

Diesel-electric

China

U.S.

Ballistic missile

Attack

Guided missile

Japan

South Korea

Ballistic missile

Attack

Vietnam

Australia

Attack

Midget

Taiwan

Singapore

Attack

Sources: U.S. Navy (U.S.); International Institute for Strategic Studies (all others)

Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia, even France and the U.K., could be drawn into a wartime alliance against China, their submarines taking on roles ranging from direct combat to defending shipping lanes and preventing Chinese access to resources.

Singapore recently ordered two more German-built submarines. The Philippines, on the front line of a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea, has said it hopes to buy submarines as part of a multibillion-dollar military buildup.

When it comes to building submarines, Beijing has an industrial edge. China has the world’s largest commercial shipbuilding capacity, and already has the biggest surface fleet by number of ships.

It is also bulking up on conventional submarines, which are less costly and quicker to build than nuclear submarines. Despite their speed and endurance limitations, China knows “they need numbers, so they keep building a lot of them,” said Sadler.

President Trump has made building ships a priority, but limited capacity is a concern. The first of the ballistic-missile Columbia class U.S. submarines is expected to be delivered in 2029—approximately two years late. The U.S. plans a new class of ultra-advanced attack subs, called the SSN(X) for now, but it isn’t expected to start building them until the early 2040s.

Maintenance backlogs can keep U.S. subs out of action for years. In the 2023 fiscal year, 16 U.S. attack submarines were at a depot or idle, meaning only 67% of the attack-sub fleet was operationally ready, according to a report from the Congressional Research Service.

The U.S. has been building 1.2 attack submarines a year, when 2.33 a year are needed to increase the force and replace submarines sold to Australia under the Aukus agreement, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Such challenges make it harder for the U.S. and its partners to push back against China.

“If we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed, then great,” Elbridge Colby, Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, told a Senate committee in March when asked about Aukus. “But if we can’t, that becomes a very difficult problem.”

Write to Mike Cherney at mike.cherney@wsj.com, Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com, Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com, Daniel Kiss at daniel.kiss@wsj.com and Roque Ruiz at roque.ruizgonzalez@wsj.com

5. Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change

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https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-tanks-military.html?unlocked_article_code=1.kk8.jXXZ.D2nFkuYBOKLO&smid=url-share

Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change

They’ve been a mainstay in battle since the early 20th century. But in just three years of war in Ukraine, tanks have evolved.

By Marco Hernandez and Thomas Gibbons-Neff Sept. 8, 2025

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When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the two sides’ tank divisions looked much as they did during the Cold War.

Now, Russia’s and Ukraine’s Soviet-era tanks rumble across the battlefield covered in anti-drone nets and spikes, dangling chains and unwieldy cages.

The exterior transformations of these hulking vehicles are a testament to how quickly drones have changed the war in Ukraine in just over three years. Lethal drones have pushed traditional missiles and artillery to the sidelines.

Russian vehicles

Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via EPA-EFE and AP (first three photos); @milinfolive via VKontakte

Ukrainian vehicles

Roman Pilipey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images (first three photos); Florent Vergnes/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The armor changes began early in the war after Ukrainian forces used U.S.-supplied anti-tank missiles to strike Russian tanks directly from above, piercing weaker points in vehicles’ armor.

To counter the explosive projectiles, Russian tank crews began mounting homemade cages above their turrets to cushion the tanks from blasts. Other Russian units already had cages on their tanks, anticipating strikes from above.

Since then, the battlefield has completely changed. It is now driven by small, cheap first-person-view (F.P.V.) drones that can be used like homing missiles.

In response, both Ukrainian and Russian tanks have undergone transformations to address their vulnerabilities. Here’s how it happened:

Earlier in the war, anti-tank missiles and drones that dropped grenades primarily threatened tanks from above

To protect the tanks from above, mechanics built structures on the tops. Then, soldiers began using F.P.V. drones to maneuver like homing projectiles into other vulnerable areas of the vehicles

DRONE

GRENADE

REINFORCED

CAGE

F.P.V. DRONE

BOMB

RUBBER

When signal jammers began disabling wireless drones, a new type of drone emerged, guided by fiber-optic cable. Soldiers then added spikes to tanks to catch the cables

In response, tank crews learned to build their own defenses on the fly, like anti-drone netting, to protect themselves from other angles

DRONE

ANTI-DRONE NET

ENTANGLED

DRONE

SPIKES

TO CATCH

FIBER-OPTIC

CABLE

FIBER-OPTIC

CABLE

The New York Times

Since tanks were first widely introduced to cross the shell raked battlefield in World War I, their hulls and armor have stayed largely the same: Most protection was mounted on the front of the vehicle, where the crews believed the threat would materialize.

With the small, guided drones on the battlefield in Ukraine, the threat can come from any direction with a level of accuracy capable of hitting weak spots in the armor.

Configurations are rarely uniform, and it is difficult to pinpoint when these armor changes became widespread. But the outgrowth of these new types of protection has aligned with the proliferation of different types of drones, especially in 2023, when the F.P.V. drones became widespread on the battlefield.

Now, tanks are used in battle far less than in 2022. To maintain tanks’ relevance, Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have covered them in different configurations of armor as ad hoc solutions to rapidly shifting tactics.

This Russian ”turtle” tank was equipped with metal grids against drone attacks and a mine roller in front to clear the way. @milinfolive via Telegram

Some of the first tank modifications came early in the war, when the main threats to military vehicles were Ukraine’s anti-tank missiles, supplied by the United States, and drones that dropped grenades.

Videos from early in the war show Russian troops modifying the T-72, one of Russia’s most widely used tanks in the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. This is what they added:

T-72 tank

Metal frame

Guns removed

Wood logs

Rubber layers

Metal panels

Armored transport

vehicle

Five illustrations showing the process to transform a T-72 tank into a troop-transport vehicle

An illustration of a Russian T-72 tank

First, soldiers removed the guns from the tank and welded a metal frame onto the vehicle.

An illustration of the tank with no guns and a new metal frame weld on top

They then added logs to the frame and rubber layers to protect the treads.

An illustration of the modified tank with rubber mats to prevent drone attacks and wooden logs sandwiched into the new metal frame

Metal panels then covered the entire structure, giving the tanks another shroud of protection in drone-heavy areas.

An illustration of the modified tank fully enclosed by a metal cage on top

Wide-open sections of the tanks were often covered with chains to prevent drones from entering.

An illustration of the modified tank enclosed by a metal cage on top and chains in the front to prevent drone attacks

The Ukrainians also upgraded their tank armor as Russian drone numbers surged to match Ukraine’s homegrown fleet of lethal drones.

Much of the development, whether in bomb-dropping drones or F.P.V.s, came from Ukraine as Kyiv met Moscow’s much larger military by improvising with cheaper but equally deadly weapons.

The United States sent M1 Abrams battle tanks, long seen as the top of their class, to Ukraine in the fall of 2023. But the tanks were thrust into battle lacking the appropriate armor to defend against drones.

Once the Ukrainian troops realized that the American tank was susceptible to the same threats as their older Soviet models, they began to adapt the Abrams for the modern battlefield.

These are some of the modifications the Ukrainians have used:

M1 Abrams tank

Reactive armor

M1 Abrams tank

Rubber

M1 Abrams tank

Chains

M1 Abrams tank

Anti-drone net

M1 Abrams tank

Five illustrations showing the protective additions to the Abrams tanks in response to drone attacks

The first M1 Abrams tanks were sent to Ukraine in 2023 equipped with standard armor. Many were lost, primarily because of drone attacks.

An illustration of an Ukrainian Abrams tank as provided by the U.S.

To turn the tide, M1 Abrams are being equipped with reactive armor that can explode and destroy drones on impact, minimizing the damage to the tank.

An illustration of an Ukrainian Abrams tank with additional reactive armor layers

Moving parts like treads and wheels are covered with rubber panels to prevent F.P.V. drones from hitting them.

An illustration of an Ukrainian Abrams tank with additional reactive armor layers and rubber mats

Drones can sneak into narrow sections and disable a tank even from underneath, so chains and cables sometimes are used to entangle them and prevent direct impacts.

An illustration of an Ukrainian Abrams tank with additional reactive armor layers, rubber mats and chains

Foldable nets are also added to the turrets to protect the access to the hatch or gunners exposed at the top.

An illustration of an Ukrainian Abrams tank with additional reactive armor layers, rubber mats, chains and an anti-drone net on top.

An illustration of the fully modified Abrams tank

The added protection can come with a cost: Cages, coverings and more armor mean it can be even harder for crews to see from their small hatches and windows.

So Ukrainian and Russian mechanics keep tinkering with their contraptions to keep the tanks in the fight.

A view beneath a Russian tank’s anti-drone net. Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, via EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

As it stands, Ukraine’s 750-mile front line looks much different from three years ago. Fiber-optic cables line abandoned fields, and drones hunt individual soldiers at all hours of the day.

It is extremely dangerous to move large vehicles, especially tanks. A drone that cost several hundred dollars can quickly take out a multimillion-dollar tank.

At greater threat than three years ago, tanks are used far less in battle now, facing a combination of the proliferation of drones and legacy threats, such as landmines. But they remain important, especially for trying to take and hold territory. With their heavy firepower, they will continue to have a role in attacking, defending and supporting the foot soldiers of the infantry.

6. Hyundai Raid Exposes Shortage of Visas for Asian Companies Trying to Move Staff

Apparently according to a business official from Korea, Korea asked for 30,000 B1 visas to train American workers in advanced technology but US immigration policy makers denied the request. Is anti-immigration the dominant overriding US policy and is foreign direct investment, return of manufacturing jobs to the US, and US national security/alliance considerations only of secondary consideration?

Also, after spending the day yesterday with some Korean colleagues (and after hearing their personal tales of being interrogated by US immigration officials) they told me what has impacted Korea the most about this entire incident is the video of Korean people released by ICE that shows their citizens shackled at the wrist, waist, and ankles. It is the treatment that was inflicted on these citizens that will have a lasting impact on the alliance and Korean views on America.

It is really a shame because traveling through Korean customs and immigration is so simple and efficient and we are always treated with respect.

Hyundai Raid Exposes Shortage of Visas for Asian Companies Trying to Move Staff

Immigration raid at a plant in Georgia points to difficulty getting permits for workers with specialized skills

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/hyundai-raid-exposes-shortage-of-visas-for-asian-companies-trying-to-move-staff-be88433c

By Jiyoung Sohn

in Seoul and Yang Jie

in Tokyo

Updated Sept. 9, 2025 3:52 am ET

A Hyundai site in Georgia where U.S. authorities carried out an immigration raid last week. Photo: Parker Puls/Bloomberg News

Quick Summary

Asian companies face work visa challenges for specialists needed to run U.S. factories, hindering investment.View more

The Trump administration wants tougher immigration enforcement. It also wants Asian manufacturing powerhouses to pour investment into U.S. factories.

Those goals are now clashing because Asian companies are having trouble getting enough work visas for personnel needed to get the U.S. plants running, say immigration specialists.

Last week, the contradiction was highlighted when the U.S. carried out an immigration raid in Georgia and arrested some 300 South Koreans helping to build a Hyundai Motor 005380 0.23%increase; green up pointing triangle joint-venture battery plant.

Now the South Koreans are expected to head home soon under a diplomatic deal, and experts say it might take longer and cost more for Asian companies to build their U.S. factories without the specialists they need.

President Trump hinted at such concerns when he wrote on social media that his administration “will make it quickly and legally possible” for foreign investors “to LEGALLY bring your very smart people, with great technical talent to build World Class products.”

One cause of the issue is America’s shortage of skilled technical workers, which stems from a long-term decline in manufacturing employment and the offshoring of production. The U.S. lacks the workforce needed to support advanced industries such as semiconductors and biotechnology, according to a July report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

In semiconductors alone, an estimated 67,000 technical jobs are at risk of remaining unfilled by 2030 unless the workforce pipeline is expanded, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association.

Asian companies—mostly from South Korea, Japan and Taiwan—are investing hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. manufacturing at the urging of both the Biden and Trump administrations.

The detention of South Korean workers at the Hyundai “Metaplant” site in Georgia unfolded as Seoul and Washington were finalizing a trade deal in which South Korea agreed to $350 billion in U.S. investments. In exchange, the U.S. said most South Korean exports to the U.S., including cars, would be subject to a 15% tariff instead of an earlier proposed rate of 25%.

A production line at the Hyundai facility. Photo: Anna Ottum for WSJ

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said Tuesday he would work closely with the U.S. to prevent cases like the one in Georgia from recurring. “I hope that there will never again be any unjust infringement on the activities of our people and companies,” he said.

Companies say they are willing to hire and train an American workforce but can’t meet tight deadlines to get their plants running with Americans alone.

That is why it is common for hundreds of employees from the home country to descend on big project sites. Companies such as Hyundai and its battery-making partner, LG Energy Solution, often bring along the same contractors they work with at home. Around 250 of the roughly 300 South Koreans arrested worked for contractors, LG Energy said. Japan said Tuesday that three of its citizens working at the site were also detained.

The detainees largely held temporary visas suitable for short-term training and supervising purposes, such as the B-1 visa, and many were working at the site as instructors, according to South Korean officials. Some had arrived in the U.S. through a visa-waiver program that allows entry for up to 60 days for travel and certain limited business activities, they said.

Don Southerton, a consultant who has advised South Korean companies including Hyundai on operating in the U.S., said some Korean firms and their contractors in the past used visa-waiver programs for short-term travel or business visits without triggering scrutiny.

“I don’t think they ever had to worry about it,” he said. “And there has been so much encouragement for these plants to be” in the U.S., he said.

U.S. authorities said those arrested illegally crossed the border, entered through a visa waiver program that prohibited them from working or overstayed their visas.

Hyundai said it was reviewing its processes to ensure that its partners “maintain the high standards of legal compliance that we demand of ourselves.”

Other nonimmigrant employment visa types allow companies to bring in workers for longer periods, but they aren’t easy to get.

The H-1B visa lets companies operating in the U.S. hire foreign workers in specialty jobs such as tech and engineering. The annual cap recently has been under 100,000 visas.

The E-2 visa is designed for specialized workers at U.S. units of companies from regions with commerce treaties with the U.S., a category that includes Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. Approval standards have been getting tougher as applications surge in South Korea, whose firms are overseeing many large projects in the U.S., said Hong Chang-hwan, a lawyer at Seoul-based firm Kookmin Emigration who specializes in U.S. immigration matters.

“The U.S. might say such workers can be hired locally, but Korean firms say such talent is difficult to find and deploy quickly in a plant that you’re trying to get going on schedule,” he said.

In 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing sought to bring in some 500 experienced workers to accelerate construction, igniting a protest by Arizona’s construction unions. TSMC said the workers were there only for short-term support, with no impact on local hiring.

South Korea’s trade and industry minister said last year that visa challenges have made it hard for many South Korean conglomerates to dispatch workers to the U.S. and increase investments there.

In July, Rep. Young Kim (R., Calif.) and others introduced a bill that would allot 15,000 visas for South Koreans with specialized education or expertise. The bill, proposed in varying versions over the past decade, hasn’t moved forward.

Similar visa categories have been created for countries such as Australia and Singapore through free-trade agreements. The U.S. grants more than 10,000 E-3 visas annually to Australian nationals in specialized fields, enabling them to work for up to two years in the U.S., renewable indefinitely.

Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade negotiator who is now at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said South Korea pushed hard for special visas like those granted to Australia and Singapore when it negotiated its own free-trade deal with the U.S., which took effect in 2012. Seoul ultimately didn’t get them, although it did get included in the visa-waiver program.

With investment a U.S. priority, “a longer-term solution is urgently needed,” Cutler said.

Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Yang Jie at jie.yang@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 9, 2025, print edition as 'Hyundai Raid Bares Shortage Of Technical Skills in the U.S.'.

7. Kenya Uses U.S.-Funded Antiterrorism Courts for Political Crackdown

Unintended consequences and 2d and 3d order effects.

Kenya Uses U.S.-Funded Antiterrorism Courts for Political Crackdown

Young people who took to the streets to protest corruption and poor job prospects could face decades in maximum-security prison under a set of laws set up to combat al Qaeda

https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/terrorism-court-kenya-protesters-7349e793

By Caroline Kimeu

Sept. 8, 2025 9:00 pm ET

NAIROBI, Kenya—The Kenyan government is using special antiterrorism courts—established with U.S. money to combat al Qaeda—to threaten political dissidents with decades in prison.

Prosecutors have charged 75 Kenyans with terrorism in recent weeks, the majority for allegedly destroying government property during street demonstrations against President William Ruto.

The charges raise the possibility that dissidents, most in their early 20s, could find themselves in maximum-security prisons for decades after allegedly participating in protests against high taxes, poor job prospects and rampant public corruption. Defense lawyers say none of the accused has a known criminal record or connections to designated terrorist groups.

“Applying terrorism charges even where you believe individuals have burned down buildings or committed robbery is excessive,” said Irungu Houghton, head of Amnesty International’s Kenya office.

Kenya is one of the closest U.S. allies in Africa, winning favor from Washington for deploying troops to neighboring Somalia to fight al-Shabaab, one of the world’s most-virulent al Qaeda affiliates, and sending police across the world to battle gangs in Haiti.

An image of the 2013 terrorist attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, taken from closed-circuit television. Photo: WESTGATE MALL/AFP/Getty ImageS

Multinational soldiers participate in a training exercise held by the U.S. Africa Command in Kenya earlier this year. Photo: thomas mukoya/Reuters

The U.S. helped Kenya establish the antiterrorism courts five years ago, after a series of al Qaeda-linked attacks shook the East African country, from the truck-bombing of the U.S. Embassy in 1998 to the massacres of shoppers at the Westgate Mall in 2013 and of students at Garissa University two years later.

The U.S. provided training for judges, prosecutors and investigators to better identify and convict terrorists. That same year, the U.S. funded a Kenyan counterterrorism force, training officers in techniques similar to those used by U.S. agencies, including how to uncover terror networks, monitor and question suspects, secure crime-scene evidence and track terror financing.

In recent weeks, U.S. diplomats have raised concerns with Kenyan authorities that Ruto is misusing the courts to crush his critics, according to an American official. U.S., British, European and United Nations officials met privately with human-rights advocates in Nairobi in July to discuss the government crackdown.

The director of public prosecutions said in a recent statement that destroying government and private property constitutes a terrorist act when it disrupts essential services and aims to cause fear among the public or the government. The prosecutor’s office added that early investigations indicated the attacks on government property were premeditated.

A Ruto spokesperson didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The terrorism charges are the latest in a series of ever-sharper government responses to more than a year of youth-led demonstrations.

The Gen Z protests, as they’re known here, began in opposition to tax hikes, but have come to reflect anger about youth unemployment and the theft of public monies by government officials.

Antigovernment protesters in Nairobi’s central business district last year. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

Police corner participants in last year’s protest. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

Just 10% of Kenyan workers have formal jobs, meaning millions, especially young people, are scratching out a living on the edges of the economy, according to the World Bank. Roughly one in three Kenyans lives below the poverty line.

Kenya ranks in the bottom third among 180 countries in the corruption perceptions index assembled by Transparency International, the nonprofit watchdog. Kenyans are faced with graft at all levels of government, from traffic police demanding a roadside payoff to the hard-to-explain wealth of top officials.

The heavy-handed reaction of security forces to the protests—jail-cell beatings, drive-by abductions and outright killings—has intensified the protesters’ fury.

More than 120 people were killed during demonstrations over the past year. In one recent incident filmed by a bystander and widely circulated among Kenyans, police shot a Nairobi street vendor in the head at point-blank range, apparently unprovoked.

Kenyans gather for a vigil at the spot where police gunned down a Nairobi street vendor. Photo: daniel irungu/epa/shutterstock

Human-right groups accuse the government of hiring provocateurs—known locally as goons—to infiltrate protests and discredit demonstrators to justify the violent reaction. Goons, the activists say, looted, set fires and assaulted passersby while police stood aside.

Defense lawyers predict prosecutors will struggle to prove terrorism in protest-related cases, but say the charges could be damaging even if eventually dropped. “Within that time, they will have terrorized young people and sent a message to those at home that if you have a different opinion, we will come for you,” said Njeri Maina, a parliamentarian and lawyer representing the protesters. Maina says many defendants have been traumatized during detention in maximum-security prisons.

A National Police Service spokesperson declined requests for comment.

Officials have said harsh measures are necessary to prevent chaos and economic sabotage. Protests in 2023 cost Kenya some $23 million a day in infrastructure damage and lost sales, according to the Kenya Private Sector Alliance.

Meanwhile, Kenya and its U.S.-funded antiterrorism courts continue to face the threat from Islamist extremist groups. Some 60 civilians and security officers were killed last year in al-Shabaab attacks along Kenya’s borders with Somalia, according to the Nairobi-based Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies, a nonprofit research group.

U.S. commandos are stationed at a base at Manda Bay, Kenya, where they work with local counterparts fighting al-Shabaab.

Mohamed Abdi Ali was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment after he was found guilty of aiding a 2019 attack by al Qaeda-linked militants on a Kenyan hotel. Photo: monicah mwangi/Reuters

Kenya’s repression of dissent has raised concerns in Washington. Sen. Jim Risch (R., Idaho), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has proposed a review of Kenya’s designation as a major non-NATO U.S. ally, the only sub-Saharan Africa country to receive the status, which offers security benefits.

“Kenya’s security forces are accused of abduction, torture and even cross-border kidnappings,” Risch said in a statement. “We must be sure our assistance isn’t enabling these activities and assess whether these abuses mark a breakdown of institutions we rely on as partners.”

The U.S.-funded antiterrorism courts, located near a maximum-security prison to reduce the risks of transporting suspects, handle Kenya’s most high-profile terrorism prosecutions. In June a judge there sentenced two men to 30 years each for aiding a lethal 2019 al-Shabaab attack on a Nairobi hotel-office complex. One American, Jason Spindler, was among the 22 killed in the attack, and Washington saw the convictions as validation of its long-term strategy of reinforcing Kenya’s judicial system.

Now, to the dismay of rights groups, the courts are prosecuting young protesters.

Among them is 25-year old Sharon Nyairo, a junior chef at a Nairobi hotel, who says she lives paycheck-to-paycheck supporting herself and her mother.

Sharon Nyairo, a chef at a Nairobi hotel, faces terrorism charges which she denies. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

When demonstrations spread around the country on June 25, Nyairo says she found herself unable to get to work, due to roadblocks and a public-transport shutdown.

So, angry about corruption and police excesses, she says she joined friends protesting in Kikuyu, a lush town on the outskirts of the capital. They chanted and dodged tear gas.

That evening, after leaving the protests, she went out for food and found herself confronted by a police officer patrolling the area. He gave her a pointed look, she says, and addressed her brusquely in Swahili: “You’re a Gen Z—come here.”

He ordered her into one of the two police trucks behind him, both packed with young people.

A man flees tear gas unleashed by Kenyan police during a protest against a new finance bill last year. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

Authorities accused Nyairo and two-dozen others in Kikuyu of raiding and torching government offices in the area, according to court documents. Within weeks, she found herself in a maximum-security prison, battling terrorism charges.

“It was mental torture,” Nyairo told The Wall Street Journal. She recalled spending the first nights sleeping on cold floors of police holding cells. Officers then moved her to a high-security facility, where she was unnerved by the routine strip searches, and stunned to be placed in the same block as convicted murderers.

Prison guards hinted she should get used to life there, given the charges she was facing, she says. At court appearances she would dissolve into tears.

Nyairo’s mother says her daughter had no prior run-ins with police or even her teachers. “We fear for her, not knowing how this case will end,” her mother said.

Nyairo, 24 years old, is shown with her brother at a relative’s home in Nairobi. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

A spokesperson for the prosecutor’s office said it couldn’t comment on cases currently before the courts.

An investigator with the terrorism unit revealed a widespread reluctance among his colleagues to proceed with the charges. “You definitely want to associate terrorism charges with serious terrorists,” said the investigator, adding that he believes the charges, while legal, are disproportionate.

Lawyers say many of the accused come from poor families, who often travel long distances for their children’s cases and cannot afford legal assistance or bail. Kenya’s antiterrorism law allows the government to detain people for up to a year before even being charged.

“The fact that the courts are entertaining these cases is a failure of justice,” said lawyer Andrew Muge, who represents dozens of the defendants.

Initially, courts set protest-related bail at between $1,500 and $2,300, a colossal sum for most Kenyan families. Lawyers and relatives appealed, however, and the courts dropped the demand to less than $400.

A public crowdfunding campaign raised bail money, but the kitty quickly ran dry, leaving many defendants stuck in high-security prisons awaiting trial.

Those convicted would generally face 30-year sentences.

U.S. agencies declined to comment on the recent events. However, a State Department spokesperson said the U.S. had documented human-rights concerns related to protests last year, including reports of unjust arrests and detentions. The spokesperson added that these issues “will remain a part of our diplomatic discussions.” The U.S. Embassy in Kenya declined to comment.

The most-recent round of protests hit after a teacher and blogger, 31-year-old Albert Ojwang, died in police custody.

Mourners carry the casket with the body of a blogger and teacher Albert Ojwang, who died in police custody earlier this year. Photo: epa/Shutterstock

A high-ranking police officer had accused Ojwang of publishing a critical post about him, and, on June 7, police seized Ojwang from his home in Homa Bay, a town in western Kenya. Officers took him to a local precinct before transferring him to a police station more than 200 miles away in Nairobi. His father followed behind, boarding an overnight bus to the capital, and carrying the family’s land title deed to post bond. By the time he had reached Nairobi in the wee hours of the morning, Albert was dead.

At first, police said Ojwang died after hitting his own head against the cell wall.

After an autopsy revealed head and body injuries consistent with an assault, and signs of a struggle, authorities admitted he had died at the hands of police. The police station commander, two junior officers and three civilian detainees face murder charges.

Maina, the lawmaker and defense lawyer, says she plans to introduce legislation amending antiterror laws to prevent their misuse. The laws, she said, are “so wide and vague that you can charge for someone breathing in a manner that you do not like.”

Mwau Katungwa, a 28-year-old student and part-time construction worker, says he attended a June protest in Matuu, a town in eastern Kenya, but left when it began to turn violent. He was arrested after helping two friends who had been wounded by gunfire.

Mwau Katungwa, a student and part-time construction worker, was arrested after helping two friends who had been wounded by gunfire.. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

“Should I have left them to die?” he asked in an interview.

“I’m not a terrorist,” he said.

Last month, Ruto ordered unspecified compensation for civilians and security forces killed or injured during protests.

But the president shows no sign of giving into protesters’ demands, especially from those calling for his resignation. He accuses such critics of illegally plotting his ouster.

Ruto publicly ordered police to aim for the legs of any protester vandalizing businesses. One of his top aides openly encouraged police officers to “shoot to kill” during demonstrations, later backtracking in the face of public outrage.

A police officer who publicly challenged the shoot-to-kill directives was transferred to a remote station. The officer, Hiram Kimathi, says he hasn’t been paid for two months and suspects he has been suspended, but hasn’t received formal communication.

“If you come out and say that what the government is doing is totally unconstitutional, you will find yourself in hot soup,” said Kimathi, who recently joined a movement against unlawful police conduct, alongside two former security officers.

An injured protester is assisted after being shot with a rubber bullet by antiriot police in July. Photo: daniel irungu/epa/shutterstock

Kenyan activist and protest mobilizer Boniface Mwangi, 42, was arrested at his home to face charges of facilitating terrorism. He says officers searched his home without a warrant, as is sometimes allowed under the antiterror laws, before taking him to a police station.

Amid condemnation from the public and human-rights groups, authorities dropped the terror charges and instead charged him with unlawful possession of ammunition. Officials said they had seized three tear-gas canisters and a blank rifle round during their searches of his home and office.

“This is a fear offensive,” Mwangi said. “The government is ruining the lives of young Kenyans.”

Prominent human rights activist Boniface Mwangi, photographed at his office in Maguezi hub, which was raided by police. Photo: KC Cheng for WSJ

Write to Caroline Kimeu at caroline.kimeu@wsj.com

8. If only Trump’s ‘Department of War’ were focused on actual war-fighting by Max Boot

If you think this is a brutal critique you should read yesterday's Duffel Blog.

Opinion

Max Boot

If only Trump’s ‘Department of War’ were focused on actual war-fighting

Deploying troops domestically, blowing up alleged drug smugglers: The “Department of War” at work.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/09/08/trump-hegseth-defense-department-war/

September 8, 2025 at 6:45 a.m. EDTYesterday at 6:45 a.m. EDT

6 min

666

President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a Cabinet meeting on Aug. 26. (Tom Brenner/For the Washington Post )

President Donald Trump’s executive order renaming the Department of Defense as the Department of War is a perfect encapsulation of how he employs the military. It’s gimmicky and newsworthy, it prioritizes style over substance — and pushes the legal limits of presidential power.

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The “Department of Defense” was named by Congress in 1949, so it can’t be changed by executive order. Trump’s directive portrayed the change as a “secondary title” for the Department of Defense and urged Congress to make the change official, but Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth isn’t waiting for legislative authorization to rebrand himself as the “Secretary of War.” The switch in 1949 wasn’t made because the armed forces went “wokey” and stopped winning wars, as Trump alleged. The old Department of War had been solely in charge of the Army. The new name was for an expanded agency that also included the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

But while renaming the Defense Department is pointless and wasteful — new signage could cost millions of dollars — it is not nearly as troubling as the uses to which Trump puts the military. The president is employing the armed forces ostensibly to fight crime at home and drug smuggling abroad. In the process, however, he is pushing military personnel into dangerous and uncharted legal waters — and, ironically, moving them further away from fighting actual wars.

Last week, the administration announced that the U.S. military had blown up a speedboat in the Caribbean allegedly full of Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang members smuggling drugs. All 11 people on board died. Interdictions of suspected drug smugglers are nothing new. But simply blowing up a boat is unprecedented. Normally, the Navy or Coast Guard seize the vessel and arrest the crew.

Follow Trump’s second term

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that kinetic strike was done on Trump’s orders, because “the president has a right to eliminate immediate threats to the United States.” But it isn’t clear how a speedboat in the Caribbean, even one full of drugs, constituted “an immediate threat,” especially when Rubio initially said that its destination was Trinidad.

The strike is a troubling new chapter in a trend that began in 2001, and continued through Republican and Democratic administrations, with the United States employing missile and drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists without benefit of trial. The administration is piggybacking on that history by designating Tren de Aragua as a foreign terrorist organization. But calling it a terrorist group doesn’t automatically give the president the power to kill its purported members.

Past administrations justified lethal strikes by citing the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against al-Qaeda and its supporters and a similar 2002 authorization against Iraq, along with the military’s inherent right of self-defense when attacked. But Tren de Aragua has nothing to do with al-Qaeda, and comparing its criminality to a terrorist attack on the U.S. is a stretch. Trump has argued that Tren de Aragua is engaged in hostilities against America at the behest of the Venezuelan regime, but the U.S. intelligence community has undercut that claim.

Even while assembling a formidable armada in the waters near Venezuela, Trump has not asked Congress for an authorization for the use of force against Tren de Aragua or any other drug cartel. The president, who has long advocated the death penalty for drug dealers, simply told the military to go out and act.

Experts in the laws of armed conflict raise serious concerns about the legality of the U.S. strike. Ryan Goodman, who was a special counsel at the Defense Department during the Obama administration, wrote on Bluesky: “I literally cannot imagine lawyers coming up with a legal basis for lethal strike of suspected Venezuelan drug boat.”

Matthew Waxman, who served in senior national security positions in the George W. Bush administration, told me: “The president can label this like the war against al-Qaeda, but that doesn’t make it legally so. This is yet another astonishing theory of Trump’s powers, this one being used to justify murky operations that likely violate international law and perhaps domestic law, too.”

This would hardly be the first use of military force in which the administration has been found in violation of the law. U.S. District Judge Charles R. Breyer ruled last week that, by dispatching National Guard troops to Los Angeles this summer, Trump violated the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the use of the military in domestic law enforcement. (The judge’s order has been stayed pending appeal.) The justification for the deployment was the claim that the troops were needed, the judge wrote, “to quell a rebellion and ensure that federal immigration law was enforced,” but, he concluded, “There was no rebellion, nor was civilian law enforcement unable to respond to the protests and enforce the law.”

Aside from issues of legality, there is the issue of strategy: It’s far from clear how presumably temporary troop deployments will make a significant dent either in crime across the country or in the multibillion-dollar industry of smuggling drugs into America. U.S. troops are highly unlikely to be able to significantly reduce smuggling operations, to say nothing of most domestic crime, and the cost of attempting to do so will be high. (The National Guard deployment to Washington is estimated to cost $1 million a day.) If the administration has a coherent strategy, it isn’t being shared with the public or Congress.

Trump’s deployments are showy gestures that detract from the armed forces’ primary, war-fighting mission and put them on a perilous path of engaging in potentially illegal actions. No wonder Hegseth began his tenure by firing senior judge advocates general, i.e., the military’s lawyers. Legality in the use of force appears of little interest to the administration.

Senior officials, indeed, seem to revel in their contempt for the rule of the law. Hegseth said on Friday that the “War Department” would be concerned with “maximum lethality, not tepid legality.” On Saturday, Vice President JD Vance, posting on X, called the strike on the alleged drug-smuggling boat “the highest and best use of our military.” When an online critic argued that “killing the citizens of another nation who are civilians without any due process is called a war crime,” Vance replied: “I don’t give a s--- what you call it.”

What readers are saying

The conversation explores President Trump's decision to rename the Department of Defense as the "Department of War," with many participants expressing strong opposition and concern. Several comments highlight the potential implications of this rebranding, suggesting it signals a... Show more

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By Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend," which was named one of the 10 best books of 2024 by the New York Times.

9. On a day of rebranding at the Pentagon, this name change slipped under the radar

Note the helpful infographic at the link. I gained some understanding of Space capabilities.

On a day of rebranding at the Pentagon, this name change slipped under the radar

We'll see how long the Department of War lasts. Space Force Combat Forces Command might stick around.

https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/09/the-pentagons-department-of-war-rebrand-extends-to-space/

Stephen Clark – Sep 8, 2025 2:45 PM | 119

US Space Force Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, deputy chief of space operations for intelligence, speaks during a discussion panel at the Air and Space Forces Association Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado, March 4, 2025. Credit: US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Emmeline James

President Donald Trump signed an executive order Friday authorizing the Department of Defense to refer to itself as the Department of War, reverting to a more bellicose title used until a 1940s-era military shakeup in the aftermath of World War II.

The order approves the Pentagon's use of the Department of War name as an "additional secondary title" for the Department of Defense while the Trump administration seeks congressional approval to officially change the name. Until Congress votes on the issue, the name change is effectively a rebrand of the DoD that could be reversed with the signature of a future president.

But there was another potential name change revealed by the Pentagon on Friday, just hours before Trump signed the War Department order. This one may have more staying power.

The news first appeared in a standard announcement of promotions and new assignments for 17 general and flag officers. One of the reassignments was for Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, who was nominated for promotion to become a three-star lieutenant-general as head of "US Space Force Combat Forces Command" at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado.

There's no such command within the military's byzantine organizational structure, so Ars asked the Space Force about the name. It turns out the Space Force is considering renaming one of its existing field commands as Combat Forces Command. This existing post is currently known as Space Operations Command, and it works with US Space Command to provide personnel (on the ground) and assets (on the ground and in orbit), and intelligence to support ongoing military space operations.

Names don't win wars, but a Space Force spokesperson said the proposed new name "better reflects the field command’s critical responsibility as the Space Force’s proponent for combat space power, including generating and improving combat-ready forces to execute" missions assigned by the Space Force and Space Command.

Increasingly, the focus of US military space operations is shifting from an approach of controlling satellites and tracking other objects in space toward a more adversarial posture. Today, the US military is monitoring the maneuvers of more than 1,000 Chinese satellites in orbit, including missions capable of disabling US satellites, refueling critical Chinese military spacecraft, and guiding terrestrial weapons toward their targets.

In recent years, Space Force officials have talked more openly about not just defending US satellites in orbit, but developing offensive capabilities to disable or destroy spacecraft operated by an adversary. The proposed Golden Dome missile defense shield would include space-based interceptors, bringing yet another element of combat into orbit.

A Space Force spokesperson said Space Operations Command would be designated Combat Forces Command "upon the establishment of a new commander, which is currently pending formal approval and confirmation" by the Senate.

An infographic explaining the capabilities of Space Operations Command. Credit: US Space Force/Robert Buckingham and Dave Grim

The incoming commander, Lt. Gen. Gagnon, has served as the Space Force's chief intelligence officer at the Pentagon since 2022. If confirmed, Gagnon would replace Lt. Gen. David "Rock" Miller, who took command of Space Operations Command nearly two years ago. Miller's next assignment will be at the Pentagon, where he will serve as the Space Force's chief of strategy.

Space Operations Command was established in 2020 as part of a military reorganization following the creation of the Space Force as the military's newest armed service branch. From the start, the cornerstone of the new command's mission was to "prepare for war that either begins or extends into space," the first chief of the Space Force, retired Gen. John "Jay" Raymond, said at the time.

When he took the top job at Space Operations Command early last year, Miller said his task was to "build on but also build out [America's] combat space power."

A Space Force spokesperson echoed these sentiments in a statement Friday.

The spokesperson said the command's mission "is to generate, present, sustain, and improve combat-ready intelligence, cyber, and space forces, while partnering across the US government, allies, and commercial agencies to project combat power in, from, and to space."

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Trump's decision to bring back the Department of War name signaled a "vibe shift" to "restore a warrior ethos" among US military forces, repeating a familiar talking point since he took the top job at the Pentagon in January.

While it's unclear how long the Department of War rebrand will last, the Space Force's Combat Forces Command might stick around.

Officials in the first Trump administration were among the first in government to describe space as a "war-fighting domain" akin to land, air, sea, and cyberspace. However, the language only escalated during the Biden administration, which also continued to boost the Space Force's budget.

Frank Kendall, who served as secretary of the Air Force under Biden, said in January that space will be a "decisive theater" in modern warfare.

And last year, several Space Force generals began talking openly about deploying offensive weapons in space, something that was anathema just a few years ago, at least for discussion in public forums. Gen. Chance Saltzman, the Space Force's top general, said last December the service's job was to provide the president with "offensive and defense options" for combat in space.

"In 2014, we had senior leaders start to talk about space and war in the same sentence," Saltzman said. "They got kind of berated by the senior leadership. So this is still a relatively new condition when we’re talking about war-fighting in space."

Stephen Clark Space Reporter

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

10. ICE’s Raid on Korean Workers and Trump’s Clashing Priorities

Clashing priorities. We cannot "make America great again" without a well functioning legal immigration process. We need good sound legal immigration policies and not anti-immigration policies.

ICE’s Raid on Korean Workers and Trump’s Clashing Priorities

TIME · Miranda Jeyaretnam

The Trump Administration’s aggressive immigration crackdown could be bad for business, experts tell TIME.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested 475 people on Thursday in Ellabell, Ga., in what U.S. officials said is the largest single-site immigration raid. More than 300 of those detained were South Korean nationals working at the factory, which is co-owned by South Korean battery maker LG Energy Solution and auto company Hyundai. South Korean Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon-sik said on Sunday that the Trump Administration has agreed to release the Korean nationals who could return home on a chartered flight as soon as Wednesday.

Responding to the incident, President Donald Trump seemed eager to strike a balance between the seemingly competing interests of attracting foreign investors while driving out undocumented immigrants.

“I am hereby calling on all Foreign Companies investing in the United States to please respect our Nation’s Immigration Laws. Your Investments are welcome, and we encourage you to LEGALLY bring your very smart people, with great technical talent, to build World Class products, and we will make it quickly and legally possible for you to do so,” Trump posted on Truth Social on Sunday evening. “What we ask in return is that you hire and train American Workers. Together, we will all work hard to make our Nation not only productive, but closer in unity than ever before.”

But experts say that the raid could already be costing the U.S. foreign investment.

“It certainly has dampened the investment sentiments and raised concerns among Korean firms on how to approach direct investment in the USA,” Ryu Yongwook, an assistant professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore specializing in East Asian international relations, tells TIME.

The detentions have inflamed tensions between the American and Korean governments, especially as the raid came less than two weeks after South Korean firms pledged to invest billions of dollars in the U.S. as part of a U.S.-South Korea trade deal. South Korean lawmaker Oh Gi-hyoung said at a news conference on Sunday that if the U.S. expects to attract investment from South Korean companies, it should treat South Korean nationals with respect.

The U.S. accounts for the largest share of South Korea’s investments abroad, according to the country’s Finance Ministry.

“The Trump Administration is asking South Korea to do more for the USA, especially in inculcating U.S. manufacturing, and it simultaneously cracks down on Korean firms that are making major investments in the USA,” Ryu says. “It makes little sense and hurts U.S. interests.”

Georgia plant construction delayed

The battery plant where the ICE raid took place last week is part of a gigafactory complex spread out across nearly 3,000 acres that is expected to produce thousands of jobs once completed. Georgia has been at the core of the U.S.’s green energy boom in recent years, as overseas firms have rushed to take advantage of Biden-era government subsidies. Last week, Gov. Brian Kemp, a Republican who has pushed for foreign green energy investments, announced that another Korean firm, biotechnology company JS Link, would build a magnet manufacturing facility in the state, creating over 500 new jobs.

An American flag flies above a piece of heavy machinery at Hyundai Motor Group’s electric vehicle plant in Ellabell, Ga., on Sept. 5, 2025. Russ Bynum—AP

Across the country, some of Korea’s biggest companies have invested in huge projects propped up by federal subsidies as part of former President Joe Biden’s 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which has largely benefited red states even as Republican lawmakers and the Trump Administration have sought to repeal or undermine parts of it. Last month, Hyundai committed to increase its direct investment in the U.S. from $21 billion to $26 billion by 2028, while South Korea announced a $150 billion project to aid the U.S.’s shipbuilding industry as part of a broader $350 billion investment package.

The raid, though, will likely slow down the timeline for the plant to be completed—and for Hyundai to ramp up U.S. manufacturing more broadly. Construction has been temporarily suspended and will likely be delayed further in order to hire new staff. LG Energy said it was halting business travel for its employees to the U.S. and advised its employees in the U.S. to return to South Korea. The company said that 47 of its employees had been detained, 46 of whom are South Korean, while Hyundai said none of its employees were among those detained but that it is vetting the employment practices of its suppliers and subcontractors.

The delay “will have a detrimental effect to the local economy in Georgia,” Ryu says.

Barry Zeigler, the business manager of UA Local Union 188, which represents plumbers, pipe-fitters, welders, and air-conditioning technicians, told the New York Times that the plant was meant to create jobs for locals, but dozens of union members had been let go earlier this month. Trump has, as recently as Sunday, called on foreign companies to employ more Americans.

But some say there aren’t enough Americans who can fulfill those jobs, at least without adding to operational costs or requiring more time. “The reality is right now that there’s a work force shortage for construction labor pretty much nationally,” Didi Caldwell, the chief executive of Global Location Strategies, told the Times.

“The U.S. is demanding investments from South Korea but is asking us to use Americans only to construct factories there. In reality, that is just impossible,” Chang Sang-sik, head of the Korea International Trade Association’s International Trade and Commerce Research Center, told Bloomberg. “They need local technicians during the construction period.”

Aggressive immigration policies clash with goal for foreign investment

The demand for construction workers has clashed with the Trump Administration’s crackdown on both legal and illegal immigration. Georgia state officials have embraced the Trump Administration’s aggressive immigration priorities. The U.S. Attorney’s office in the Southern District of Georgia said the raid was part of “Operation Take Back America,” a nationwide campaign to “repel the invasion of illegal immigration.”

“In Georgia, we will always enforce the law, including all state and federal immigration laws,” Kemp’s office said in a statement. “All companies operating within the state must follow the laws of Georgia and our nation.”

But the detentions have already spooked foreign investors.

“Talking to my friends last night, I had one guy say, ‘We’re getting mixed messages from the Administration: You want our money, but you don’t want us,’” Tami Overby, an international business consultant who formerly led the U.S.-Korea Business Council at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, told the Times. “It had a chilling impact all across board rooms in Asia.”

The Trump Administration has also tightened legal avenues to work in the U.S., including introducing stricter rules for H-1B visas.

“In principle, Korean companies have violated the U.S. immigration law, so they don’t have reason to complain,” Ryu says, but he notes that the application process for H-1B is almost prohibitively time-consuming and costly.

“South Korean companies are reluctant to go that route because it takes at least 8 months of lead time before you can begin working on an H-1B, and there is no guarantee you will get it,” Chun Jong-joon, a Korean American immigration lawyer, told the Los Angeles Times. There are also quotas set per country for H-1B visas, and the visa is awarded by an annual lottery.

What some Korean companies end up doing instead is using 90-day tourist visa waivers, which do not allow for work, to bring Korean nationals into the U.S. for up to three months and rotate them until construction is completed, Ryu says. It was a “known practice,” he adds, claiming that the U.S. generally “didn’t pay much attention,” since American workers and the U.S. economy ultimately benefitted from the speedy construction of these projects.

Since Korean firms have committed to increase their direct investments in the U.S., the U.S. government should in turn raise the H-1B quota for South Koreans and improve the process to legally work in the U.S., Ryu says.

Unless the U.S. fixes its persistent visa issues, Ryu says the Trump Administration’s immigration policies will make the country unfriendly for business. It’s a clash in interests he’s seen happen elsewhere—with Trump’s tariffs.

“The U.S. is now losing competitiveness in chip fabrication, especially in the foundry,” Ryu says. “Given how strategic and critical chips are, especially in the context of the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, the U.S. needs its allies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, to assist the U.S. in this regard. And yet, Trump has threatened these allies with chip tariffs and even contemplated taking a partial ownership of foreign fabrication firms.”

The plant “benefited the local economy in Georgia, as the speedy construction of the Hyundai factory would expedite the hiring of locals once the factory is constructed,” Ryu says. The reaction in South Korea has been that the “heavy-handed arrest … was unnecessary and unreasonable,” he adds.

“Trump’s immigration policies and push for bigger foreign investment do not have to be incompatible,” says Ryu. “But for them not to be incompatible, the U.S. government must produce and apply a fine-tuned immigration policy that eases the process of foreign direct investment.”

TIME · Miranda Jeyaretnam

11. Why the World Turned on NGOs

Not all NGOs. Note the great work of Spirit of America which is arguably one of the most unique (and patriotic) NGOs in existence. See the SOA model (and philosophy) here: https://spiritofamerica.org/ (note my bias: I am a member of the Board of Advisors: https://spiritofamerica.org/about/board-and-advisors).

Excerpts:

By the early 2000s, though, major NGOs began to struggle to operate at a larger scale while maintaining the grassroots contacts and input that contributed to their early successes. The growth of international NGOs raised concerns about how accountable these groups were to the communities they served, as locals felt excluded from agenda setting, implementation, and evaluation of NGO programs.

Others criticized the power dynamics inherent in their work, raising concerns that these groups might be replicating global hierarchies. Most international NGOs were headquartered in the global north, with influential development NGOs such as BRAC—headquartered in Bangladesh—being more of an exception rather than the norm. As a result, large NGOs could attract substantial funding, but this would draw funds away from local civic actors and needs. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the oversaturation of international NGOs in the country and the absence of any coordinating mechanism led these groups to duplicate one another’s activities. Similar concerns were present in other natural disasters, where NGOs and the aid sector were seen as overwhelming the local response.

In response to these criticisms, NGOs undertook actions to establish and enhance their financial transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. Some reorganized with localization initiatives that gave decision-making powers to local communities. But governments around the world continued challenging NGOs’ legitimacy. They argued that these groups were elitist and advanced foreign agendas and partisan political objections. Claims such as those made by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell—who declared in 2001 that “NGOs are such a force multiplier for us”—did little to allay some foreign leaders’ concerns about these groups as partisan.

...

As a result, discourse around NGOs has dramatically shifted from the optimism of the 1990s. This July, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio referred to the “globe-spanning NGO industrial complex” that, in his estimation, had little to show since the end of the Cold War. And following the change in the foreign-policy priorities of major Western powers, development NGOs face even greater challenges. Overseas development assistance by top donor countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development fell by more than 7 percent in 2024. Some governments retreated due to strategic realignments that prioritized national interests such as defense spending over foreign aid. Others did so due to fiscal pressures and budget deficits. In response to dramatic cuts to development aid, private funders have stepped up. But will these new actors be able to ensure that NGOs’ programming continues without further cuts? And what does it mean for the development sector if NGOs are simultaneously losing access to state funds and support and becoming increasingly reliant on nonstate actors?

Why the World Turned on NGOs

From powerbrokers in the ’90s to pariahs today.

September 8, 2025, 12:07 AM

By Suparna Chaudhry, an associate professor of international affairs at Lewis & Clark and the author of the forthcoming book Civil Societies, Uncivil States: State Repression of NGOs.

Foreign Policy · Suparna Chaudhry

Middle East and North Africa
Africa

The Fall 2025 cover of Foreign Policy magazine with an illustration of a tattered flag with a globe waving from a makeshift stick flagpole/

This article appears in the Fall 2025 print issue: The End of Development. Read more from the issue.

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In just nine months, the Trump administration has laid waste to the development landscape, dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and slashing nearly the entire U.S. foreign aid budget. This has posed a problem for nongovernmental organizations working on development the world over, derailing decades of work to increase access to health, food, education, and better governance. The impact is disproportionately felt across the global south, where these cuts will inevitably erode institutional knowledge and disrupt development trajectories.

But while the U.S. government’s actions have posed the biggest and most unexpected challenge for these groups, the reality is that the heyday of NGO influence was already long over. NGO revenue streams have dried up—and not just from the United States. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had already begun their aid retreat before U.S. President Donald Trump took office a second time. In 2020, the U.K. effectively closed its equivalent of USAID, the Department for International Development, by merging it with the Foreign Office. Foreign aid dropped by about $6 billion after the merger, a decline expected to hit $11 billion by 2027.

Similar trends are visible across Western Europe. Sweden, which previously was one of the top countries that provided the most development aid as a percentage of gross national income, more than halved its overseas aid budget in 2023. In Germany, overseas development assistance fell by over 10 percent from 2023 to 2024, with more cuts projected as the country prioritizes defense spending. Similarly, in 2025, France reduced its development aid budget by almost 40 percent, representing a reduction of nearly 2.3 billion euros (about $2.6 billion). The Dutch government will cut 2.4 billion euros ($2.8 billion) from its development aid budget by 2027, while Belgium has announced a 25 percent reduction in aid funding over the next five years.

In the face of fewer democratic constraints, governments are also eroding the norms that supported NGOs for much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Concurrently, global democratic recession and authoritarian resurgence have created a troubling environment for NGOs. In the face of fewer democratic constraints, these governments are also eroding the norms that supported these groups for much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

As a result of these trends in tandem, many development NGOs have had to abruptly close programs and lay off staff. In Ethiopia, South Africa, and Uganda, many NGOs working on providing HIV/AIDS treatment, vaccinations, and maternal and child health care have laid off staff or closed entirely. In Somalia, Save the Children closed nutrition centers. In Honduras and other countries, cuts to food programs administered by Catholic Relief Services left children without daily meals. U.S. and U.K. aid cuts have especially decimated sexual and reproductive health programs for women and girls. What does the global war on NGOs mean for development? And with their decline, can private aid to NGOs fill the gaps for the world’s poor?

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratic transitions across Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, Western aid agencies channeled significant resources to NGOs in the 1980s and ’90s. NGOs increased in number, size, and funds received and emerged as key actors in development, democratization, and humanitarianism. A coalition of NGOs, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, played a key role in the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997. Their efforts won them the Nobel Peace Prize that same year. Médecins Sans Frontières won the prize shortly after, in 1999, in recognition of its pioneering humanitarian work. In 1997, Jessica Mathews, who that year would become president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described a “power shift,” in which NGOs became power brokers alongside governments in global politics.

These organizations in the development sector were seen as more competent and less prone to misuse and bureaucratic inefficiency than governments. In 1996, the United Nations started its Oil-for-Food program to allow Iraq to sell enough oil on the world market in exchange for food and medicine to soften the blow of sanctions after the first Gulf War. But Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein earned billions of dollars through corruption and illegal oil smuggling, furthering the notion that direct aid transfers to governments ran the risk of officials pocketing aid for themselves. Incidents such as this soured governments on direct transfers, and instead an increasing amount of foreign aid was channeled to development NGOs in an effort to alleviate global poverty, disease, and hunger. International NGOs also became important providers of humanitarian aid in the wake of ethnic conflict and genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda.

By the early 2000s, though, major NGOs began to struggle to operate at a larger scale while maintaining the grassroots contacts and input that contributed to their early successes. The growth of international NGOs raised concerns about how accountable these groups were to the communities they served, as locals felt excluded from agenda setting, implementation, and evaluation of NGO programs.

Others criticized the power dynamics inherent in their work, raising concerns that these groups might be replicating global hierarchies. Most international NGOs were headquartered in the global north, with influential development NGOs such as BRAC—headquartered in Bangladesh—being more of an exception rather than the norm. As a result, large NGOs could attract substantial funding, but this would draw funds away from local civic actors and needs. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the oversaturation of international NGOs in the country and the absence of any coordinating mechanism led these groups to duplicate one another’s activities. Similar concerns were present in other natural disasters, where NGOs and the aid sector were seen as overwhelming the local response.

In response to these criticisms, NGOs undertook actions to establish and enhance their financial transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. Some reorganized with localization initiatives that gave decision-making powers to local communities. But governments around the world continued challenging NGOs’ legitimacy. They argued that these groups were elitist and advanced foreign agendas and partisan political objections. Claims such as those made by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell—who declared in 2001 that “NGOs are such a force multiplier for us”—did little to allay some foreign leaders’ concerns about these groups as partisan.

More from the Fall 2025 print issue

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The subsequent color revolutions increased these leaders’ hostility toward NGOs. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, insists the West orchestrated protests and regime change in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine through its support of local NGOs and activists. While scholarly work debates whether U.S. democracy assistance and support by U.S. NGOs played a prominent role in regime change in these countries, leaders in the region wasted no time in jumping to the conclusion that the West was using NGOs as political weapons. Claims such as these paved the way for the global crackdown on NGOs—and a perception of their overreach was embraced by leaders around the world. In 2016, then-Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, for instance, argued that foreign governments were using NGOs to subvert democracy.

Today, more than 130 countries have cracked down on NGOs, many through administrative means. An administrative crackdown uses the law to create barriers to entry, funding, and advocacy. In 2012, the Russian government forced organizations receiving foreign funding and engaging in “political activities” to register as “foreign agents.” The designation subjected groups to onerous financial requirements and placed them under government monitoring. Similarly, in 2010, Indian lawmakers amended the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), enabling the government to target nonprofits of a “political nature.” Neither Russia nor India clearly defined “political.”

More recently, in 2024, despite public backlash, Georgia passed a law requiring NGOs to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power” if they received more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources. This April, the Georgian government introduced criminal penalties, including prison sentences, for individuals who refuse to register as foreign agents.

These laws’ chilling effect is not limited to groups supporting human rights, media freedom, political advocacy, or promoting democracy. In India, the FCRA hampered many development NGOs’ responses during the deadly delta variant wave of the COVID-19 pandemic because it prohibited subgranting funds from larger donors or international NGOs to grassroots organizations. It also imposed a 20 percent cap on administrative expenses drawn from foreign funds, inhibiting organizations’ capacity to hire more staff during the emergency. When India’s government did not renew Oxfam’s license and registration in 2022, it impeded the supply of oxygen cylinders, ventilators, and food to vulnerable communities.

International actors, meanwhile, have struggled to mount a coherent campaign to stymie such repression. This was partly because even during the first Trump administration, the U.S. government had already started positioning NGOs as a cultural enemy. In June 2018, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. at the time, blamed the U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council on NGOs. Meanwhile, Western democracies such as Australia and Italy started criminalizing and restricting NGOs working with migrants. In New Zealand, Greenpeace lost its charitable status due to its political activities, which was reinstated only after a High Court decision in its favor. In Canada, environmental NGOs, particularly those opposing proposed oil pipelines, faced increased prosecution. Authoritarian governments were no longer the only ones restricting NGOs. Democracies, fearful of these groups challenging their economic interests and questioning their development and industrialization policies, also began pushing back.

As a result, discourse around NGOs has dramatically shifted from the optimism of the 1990s. This July, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio referred to the “globe-spanning NGO industrial complex” that, in his estimation, had little to show since the end of the Cold War. And following the change in the foreign-policy priorities of major Western powers, development NGOs face even greater challenges. Overseas development assistance by top donor countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development fell by more than 7 percent in 2024. Some governments retreated due to strategic realignments that prioritized national interests such as defense spending over foreign aid. Others did so due to fiscal pressures and budget deficits. In response to dramatic cuts to development aid, private funders have stepped up. But will these new actors be able to ensure that NGOs’ programming continues without further cuts? And what does it mean for the development sector if NGOs are simultaneously losing access to state funds and support and becoming increasingly reliant on nonstate actors?

In the United States, several groups, including the Mellon, Skoll, and MacArthur foundations, pledged to fill the gap created by the loss of foreign aid in March and April. Others shored up emergency support and bridge funds to prevent disruption to the work of front-line organizations. However, the funds pledged by these foundations were a fraction of the U.S. foreign aid budget—to the tune of millions, vastly below the typical annual budget of USAID of some $40 billion.

Foundations and elite philanthropy are not the only sources of funds for these NGOs. Individual charitable giving may also have the potential to keep these organizations afloat. My research indicates that for individuals who already donate to nonprofits, learning about repressive NGO environments increases their generosity. In addition, individuals who frequently volunteer and trust institutions are more likely to maintain their support for international NGOs that face criticism or crackdown abroad. Further, my experimental study with Marc Dotson and Andrew Heiss shows that in the face of legal crackdowns and government efforts to malign NGOs, specific actions by these groups can prevent reductions in support from individual donors, with NGOs perceived as being financially transparent and accountable receiving continued support from individuals abroad.

The current foreign aid retreat leaves the door open for China, which already provides development assistance through its Belt and Road Initiative.

Though the short-term response by foundations and the research findings on individual charitable giving may be promising, development aid previously given by multiple major global economies may not be easily replaceable by other sources. Official development assistance provided by the United States usually amounted to more than $60 billion annually. The Foreign Aid Bridge Fund has already concluded, with doubts about raising significant amounts of additional capital. And according to the latest Global Philanthropy Tracker report, 32 high-income countries contributed to more than $70 billion in cross-border philanthropy in 2020. While this rivals the amount of U.S. aid, coordinating these funds from so many countries would be a herculean task, and it’s unclear what organization would assume that role. Private aid will also be unable to replace the expertise, scale, or agenda-setting capacity that came with government aid.

In response to previous disruptions in aid (especially through the U.S. global gag rule, which prevents foreign NGOs that provide legal abortion services or referrals from receiving aid), NGOs have reached out to geopolitical rivals to avoid disruptions to their operations. The current foreign aid retreat leaves the door open for China, which already provides development assistance through its Belt and Road Initiative. However, China usually sidesteps NGOs, instead cultivating close relationships with foreign governments as a way to promote China’s own governance norms, including emphasizing state sovereignty.

If the era of NGOs is indeed coming to an end, the effects will be devastating for vulnerable communities, particularly in the global south. Many countries, especially non-democracies, had often tolerated development NGOs because of the services they provided. Increasing anti-NGO rhetoric on both the left and right, and Western donor governments scaling back on aid, means that development NGOs may face an even narrower civic space. Repressive governments may become even more emboldened to enact restrictive laws—ones that undermine advocacy and development NGOs alike.

This article appears in the Fall 2025 print issue of FP. Read more from the issue.

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Foreign Policy · Suparna Chaudhry

12. How this couple secretly spied for China from inside Germany — the bizarre true story

Another form espionage similar to the FBI's "game of pawns" video:

https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-game-of-pawns/view

How this couple secretly spied for China from inside Germany — the bizarre true story

glassalmanac.com · Brian Foster · September 7, 2025

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It started like a scene from a spy novel: early July in Bavaria, police waiting at the front door for a well-known political scientist returning from a long stay in Italy. The man, 75-year-old Klaus Lange, wasn’t just married to a retired professor — prosecutors say he was also passing information to Chinese intelligence while moving in elite academic and policy circles in Berlin.

An academic couple under suspicion

According to the Karlsruhe Federal Prosecutor (Germany’s office responsible for terrorism and state-security cases), Lange is accused of “intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power” — specifically, China. His wife faces the same charge. Investigators say Lange’s standing as an expert in international relations gave him access to high-level networks that could “open doors” and help Beijing seed influence operations in Europe.

The portrait that emerges is not of trench coats and dead drops, but of an urbane scholar leveraging conferences, briefings, and carefully nurtured contacts. Reporting at the time even indicated he also worked with Germany’s own intelligence services, a detail that underscores how porous the boundary can be between analysis, liaison work, and clandestine tasking when geopolitics gets involved.

The airport stop that blew the case open

The couple’s legal saga didn’t begin this summer. Back in November 2019, Munich criminal police intercepted their taxi on the highway to the airport as they prepared to fly to Macau — allegedly to meet their Chinese case officer. That roadside stop triggered a search of their home which, investigators say, proved “fruitful.” While the specifics remain sealed, what followed was a years-long probe, a brief incarceration for Lange at Landshut prison, and then release pending further proceedings.

What investigators say the mission was

Prosecutors allege the pair’s remit aligned with classic espionage tradecraft in the age of soft power: recruit, influence, and transmit. The idea, they say, was not necessarily to steal blueprints but to channel talking points, cultivate decision-makers, and quietly shape debate — the kind of gray-zone activity that can tilt policy over time without a single classified document ever changing hands.

This, officials argue, is precisely why academic and think-tank ecosystems are attractive: they offer reach, credibility, and proximity to decision-makers, all while draped in the legitimacy of research and public discourse.

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A legal case with geopolitical stakes

Germany has taken a harder line on foreign interference in recent years, with federal prosecutors repeatedly warning that “non-traditional” intelligence activity — from academic partnerships to business delegations — can mask covert influence. The Lange case fits that pattern: an outwardly respectable platform allegedly used to launder narratives and report back to handlers abroad.

The couple has not been convicted, and under German law they’re entitled to a presumption of innocence. But the charges alone are a reminder that modern intelligence work often looks less like cloak-and-dagger and more like calendar invites, panel discussions, and well-timed “background briefings.”

For head of INDOPACOM, homeland defense extends across the Pacific

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · September 9, 2025

Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, speaks at the International Military Law and Operations Conference on Waikiki Beach, Hawaii, Sept. 8, 2025. (Wyatt Olson/Stars and Stripes)

WAIKIKI BEACH, Hawaii — The commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said Monday that he was unfazed by media reports that the Pentagon’s draft National Defense Strategy will prioritize defense of the American homeland over challenging Beijing and Moscow globally.

“[T]he homeland is in the Pacific,” Adm. Samuel Paparo told reporters on the sidelines of INDOPACOM’s four-day International Military Law and Operations Conference on Waikiki Beach.

The American territories of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are in the Western Pacific, while the state of Hawaii is in the Central Pacific, he said.

Meanwhile, the United States is joined in compacts of free association with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Marshall Islands, which means the U.S. is responsible for their national defense, he said.

“Defense-in-depth means that the Pacific is a priority theater because four of the five priority threats to the United States of America — to the security, freedom and well-being of the United States — traverses the Indo-Pacific geography,” Paparo said.

The Pentagon has up to now regarded those primary threats as China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and terrorism.

Incoming administrations typically issue a defense strategy that reflects its priorities, but China’s emerging military has been a concern for more than a decade. Donald Trump’s first administration in 2018 regarded China a priority challenge in its defense strategy.

Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief who supports a more isolationist American policy, is heading the revamped strategy, Politico reported Friday.

The annual MILOPS conference, now in its 36th year, is INDOPACOM’S effort to bring together military and legal officials from partner nations to collaborate on and advance legal diplomacy in the security realm. It is particularly beneficial for small nations lacking deep legal benches.

In keynote speeches opening the conference Monday morning, Paparo and Surangel Samuel Whipps Jr., the president of Palau, described how China seeks to impose its will on the region using “lawfare.”

“China has made the law a weapon,” Paparo told the attendees from 30 nations. “We must make the law a shield — a shield and a signal. They declare laws unilaterally and then apply them retroactively. They pressure nations to concede sovereign rights that nations lawfully possess. They use false claims of legitimacy to justify coercion. This is not the rule of law. This is the rule by law, and that distinction between law as a tool of order versus a tool of power is the fault line of our time.”

Palau, which lies about 500 miles southeast of the Philippines, has been the recipient of both China’s largesse and chicanery, Whipps told the audience.

China is Palau’s top investor and top source of tourists, he said.

But Palau remains one of only a handful of nations that maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province that properly belongs to China.

Palauan officials have determined that businesses and criminal organizations linked to the Communist Party of China make “sham investments” in the nation, in which land is leased and then left undeveloped, he said.

“They’ll get a lease for 99 years and then do nothing with us and say, ‘Well, if you switch to China and dump Taiwan…,’” he said.

The Palauan government is reviewing options to change the law so that “we can kick them out” in such cases, he said.

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · September 9, 2025

14. The Wrong Way to Do Diplomacy With Russia

Conclusion:

For Putin, the summit was never about pursuing peace in Ukraine. His aim all along has been to bend the international system to his will and to preserve his monopoly on power at home. Since his first incursions into Ukraine in 2014, Putin has played the long game. He has always believed that time is on his side. The Alaska summit bought him even more time—and gave him a stronger hand for achieving military victory.

The Wrong Way to Do Diplomacy With Russia

Foreign Affairs · More by Celeste A. Wallander · September 9, 2025

What Trump Could Learn From Reagan

Celeste A. Wallander

September 9, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, Russia, September 2025 Alexander Kazakov / Sputnik / Reuters

CELESTE A. WALLANDER is Executive Director of Penn Washington and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. She was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and oversaw U.S. military assistance to Ukraine during the Biden administration.

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Summits between heads of state are high-stakes gambles to achieve breakthrough solutions. Typically, they are judged on whether they help resolve an intractable international issue. But sometimes, their most consequential impact is on the domestic political standing of one or both of the summit’s participants. And U.S. President Donald Trump’s summit last month in Alaska with Russian President Vladimir Putin is of this mold: it strengthened Putin, and in doing so has prolonged both the war in Ukraine and his hold on power.

The meeting in Anchorage has parallels to the 1986 summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. Then, as now, an American leader and a Russian one met to resolve a major foreign policy challenge—in 1986, ending an arms race, and last month, ending the war in Ukraine. In both cases, they failed. The talks in Iceland collapsed when Reagan refused to scuttle his Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposed program that would neutralize Soviet nuclear missiles before they struck their targets. Alaska ended without a deal to end Russia’s invasion.

But there the parallels diverge. Both summits may have had profound consequences for the Kremlin, yet those consequences could not be more different. For Gorbachev, the Iceland summit hastened the end of his country. He returned to the Kremlin weakened from his failure to stop Reagan’s program, and his subsequent decisions paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later. Putin, by contrast, has emerged triumphant. Trump rolled out the red carpet for the Russian leader in Anchorage and spoke gushingly of their “fantastic relationship.” Putin made no concessions, and Trump shifted the responsibility for ending the fighting to Ukraine: “Now it is really up to President Zelensky to get it done,” he said in an interview with Fox News.

Although Putin did not face any strong opposition before Alaska, he now enjoys a glow of success for, by all appearances, having won over the American president. According to a late August survey by the independent Russian polling firm Levada, 79 percent of Russians view the summit as a success for Putin, and 51 percent are more optimistic for an improvement in relations with the United States. After the summit, Russian media did not have to put out false pronouncements to highlight Putin’s diplomatic triumph: it broadcast the real event, along with Western commentary on Putin’s victory. Stronger than ever, Putin can continue his war against Ukraine for as long as it takes to win on his terms.

DEATH KNELL FOR AN EMPIRE

When the Politburo elected Gorbachev general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, the country was in desperate need of reform. The Soviet military was bogged down in Afghanistan, a conflict that Gorbachev called “a bleeding wound,” and incompetent central planning was dragging down the Soviet Union’s economic growth rate. Détente with the United States, which lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, had failed to ease competition between the superpowers. And inequality, corruption, and scarcity were rampant.

Gorbachev promised hard-liners and reformists alike that he would fix these grave issues. Yet he promised to do so not by fundamentally changing the Soviet system. Instead, he said he would succeed by increasing productivity and eliminating wasteful spending. He reassured the Soviet elite that the Communist Party would remain strong and in control. Rather than upend the party’s central control, he would secure new resources by improving relations with the West, which would allow Moscow to curtail defense spending and ramp up economic modernization. To that end, Gorbachev asked the Politburo to support negotiations with Washington on limiting each side’s stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet security elite agreed to back an agreement, but only if the Americans disavowed defenses against strategic nuclear weapons as part of it. The offense-defense balance, they warned, could not tip in Washington’s favor.

That is why Gorbachev went to Iceland: he would show the world and wary party colleagues at home that he could stop the arms race and rejuvenate the Soviet economy by unlocking the conditions for growth. But he failed spectacularly and publicly. The world watched on television in real time as Reagan refused to cancel his Strategic Defense Initiative and Gorbachev left empty-handed. When he returned to Moscow, he had to defend himself before a fractious Politburo, with conservatives continuing to demand that Washington disavow strategic defenses as part of a deal. Gorbachev faced a divided leadership with competing demands on him.

Ultimately, he chose to rely upon his core reformist supporters in order to save his power. In 1987, Gorbachev agreed to sign an Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Reagan even though it did not constrain Washington’s missile defenses. He pushed aside the Politburo’s conservatives and began leaning more on moderate leaders and advisers, especially Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Over the next several years, Gorbachev pursued a sweeping series of economic and political changes that allowed for quasi-private businesses and greater autonomy for the 15 constituent Soviet republics, Russia included. But instead of unleashing an economic dynamism that would silence his opponents, Gorbachev’s changes broke the Soviet system without creating a functional new one. Food lines grew longer, Soviet cities were shaken by hunger riots, and wage payments began to fall behind.

In trying to preserve his power, Gorbachev destroyed the structure that gave it to him. And by weakening the tools of Soviet political control, he opened up space for nationalist movements and leaders, including Boris Yeltsin in Russia, to gain strength. Eventually, these movements overwhelmed what was left of a decaying state. In December 1991, the Soviet Union passed into history.

WITH TIME ON HIS SIDE

Putin’s Russia is not Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. There is no collective leadership constraining the Kremlin. Putin does not answer to a Politburo or any powerful committee: he presides over a personalist authoritarian system in which he is the sole source of power. The public officials and business leaders in Putin’s orbit owe their positions, their influence, and their wealth to their loyalty and service to him alone. But that does not mean he is invulnerable. Russian state propaganda is formidable, but sufficient economic hardship could disturb the quiescence of Russian society. And it’s unclear how the Russian elite might respond if circumstances forced Putin to cut off their economic benefits.

So far, the president has managed these risks well. After more than three years of war, the Russian economy has not crashed under the pressure of sanctions. Instead, the country’s skilled economic leaders managed to keep growth above four percent last year, buoyed by high defense spending. Employment, consumption, and access to credit remain high. It is hard to gauge accurate public opinion in an authoritarian police state, but there are no outward signs that discontent within the elite or society at large threatens Putin’s rule.

Still, extensive government spending to strengthen the economy has led to high inflation—nearly ten percent in 2024 and over eight percent this year. And Putin’s war carries significant opportunity costs for Russia. International sanctions limiting the country’s trade, investment, and access to technology hamper productivity and growth. Russia can sell oil to China and India, but its limited access to global markets means it does so at a discount. The Russian army can recruit new contract soldiers, but it must offer substantial sign-on bonuses and ever higher payments to entice them, and those contracts are driving labor shortages and inflation.

In Alaska, Trump did nothing to push back against Putin’s narrative.

Putin’s performance in Alaska helps obviate these pressures. True, he did not secure agreement to some long-standing demands or the business deals that the Trump administration had hinted at. But in the eyes of Russia’s elite and ordinary citizens, he succeeded nonetheless. He broke out of the isolation that the West had imposed upon him, defiantly landing in the United States despite sanctions and international arrest warrants for war crimes. He delayed and has possibly entirely avoided new crushing sanctions on Russian oil. And he reminded the world that Moscow stands resolute in its demands that Ukraine cede not just territory but its autonomy and sovereignty as well.

In fact, the summit helped Putin legitimize Moscow’s grievances, giving Russians who might doubt the wisdom of the invasion reason believe that it was, as Putin promised, just. Addressing reporters in Anchorage against a backdrop that read “Pursuing Peace,” Putin spoke of Russia’s “legitimate concerns,” of his desire to see a “just balance of security in Europe and in the world,” and of “the need to eliminate all the primary roots, the primary causes” of the fighting in Ukraine. Trump did nothing to push back against this narrative. Indeed, the American president appears to have accepted Putin’s contention that Moscow should have a say over Ukrainian territorial integrity and Western security guarantees. Putin flew home having demonstrated to his subjects that he was right all along, that they must not waiver, and that he will win for them.

For Putin, the summit was never about pursuing peace in Ukraine. His aim all along has been to bend the international system to his will and to preserve his monopoly on power at home. Since his first incursions into Ukraine in 2014, Putin has played the long game. He has always believed that time is on his side. The Alaska summit bought him even more time—and gave him a stronger hand for achieving military victory.

Foreign Affairs · More by Celeste A. Wallander · September 9, 2025

15. Hegseth visits Puerto Rico as US boosts Caribbean military operations

Puerto Rico as the staging base for SOUTHCOM operations?

Hegseth visits Puerto Rico as US boosts Caribbean military operations

militarytimes.com

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico — U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Puerto Rico on Monday as the U.S. steps up its military operations against drug cartels in the Caribbean.

Their arrival in the U.S. territory comes more than a week after ships carrying hundreds of U.S. Marines deployed to Puerto Rico for a training exercise, a move that some on the island have criticized.

Puerto Rico’s Gov. Jenniffer González said Hegseth and Caine visited on behalf of President Donald Trump’s administration to support those participating in the training.

“We thank President Trump and his administration for recognizing the strategic importance of Puerto Rico to U.S. national security and for their fight against drug cartels and the narco-dictator Nicolás Maduro,” González said.

Hegseth and Caine met with officials at the 156th Wing Muñiz Air National Guard Base in Carolina, a city just east of the capital of San Juan.

González said Hegseth spoke to nearly 300 soldiers at the base and thanked those he described as “American warriors” for their work.

The visit comes as the U.S. prepares to deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico for operations targeting drug cartels, a person familiar with the planning said Saturday. The person spoke on condition of anonymity because information about the deployments has not been made public.

Tensions escalating

On Sept. 2, Trump announced that the U.S. carried out a strike in the southern Caribbean against a vessel that had left Venezuela and was suspected of carrying drugs. Eleven people were killed in the rare U.S. military operation in the Caribbean, with the president saying the vessel was operated by the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua.

While the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago praised the strike and said the U.S. should kill all drug traffickers “violently,” reaction from other Caribbean leaders has been more subdued.

Barbadian Foreign Minister Kerrie Symmonds recently told The Associated Press that members of Caricom, a regional trade bloc, sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio asking for an open line of communication on developments. He said they want to avoid being surprised by any U.S. moves against Venezuela.

Meanwhile, Venezuela’s government on Monday insisted that the U.S. is falsely accusing it of playing a crucial role in the global drug trade. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez told reporters the U.S. government should redirect its recently deployed maritime force to the Pacific, where fast boats and container ships have long carried Colombian cocaine.

“Those ships that are trying to intimidate Venezuela today should be there in the Pacific if they truly wanted to fight and prevent cocaine from reaching the United States of America,” she said. “They have a GPS location problem. They’re where they shouldn’t be. They need to calibrate their GPS.”

Rodríguez, citing reports from the United Nations and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, added that Venezuela “has absolutely nothing to do with the deaths of (U.S.) citizens from drug overdoses” as the country “is not relevant” in global drug production.

She suggested the U.S. should focus on fighting consumption within its borders.

“There’s a lot of hypocrisy, a lot of double standards, a lot of political manipulation of this issue to attack, to intervene, to aim for regime change in countries that aren’t sympathetic,” she said, referring to drug trafficking.

‘No to War’

The ongoing training of the Marines in Puerto Rico and the upcoming deployment of fighter jets have rankled some in the U.S. territory, where the memories of the U.S. Navy using nearby islands as training ranges for decades remains fresh, with the cleanup still ongoing.

The April 1999 death of civilian security guard David Sanes Rodríguez sparked large protests at the time, eventually leading to the U.S. military leaving the island. Rodríguez was killed after two 500-pound bombs were dropped near him as part of a training mission in Vieques.

On Sunday, dozens of people gathered at the National Guard base in Carolina to decry the heightened U.S. military presence on the island.

They held signs that said, “No to War” and “No to military bases in P.R.”

Organizers also warned against the use of Puerto Rico as a staging ground for potential U.S. military actions in the region.

“We denounce the existence of military bases in Puerto Rico,” said Sonia Santiago Hernández, founder of Mothers Against War.

González has dismissed those concerns, saying that Puerto Rico is playing an important role in Trump’s ongoing fight against drug trafficking since it represents a U.S. border in the Caribbean.

She also has noted that the ongoing training of Marines involves logistics exercises and no ammunition.

Marines in Puerto Rico

Siul López, a spokesman for Puerto Rico’s National Guard, told The AP that a group of Marines currently training on the island are not tied to the U.S. maritime force recently deployed to Caribbean waters.

“One thing has nothing to do with another,” he said, adding that the training in Puerto Rico was pre-planned.

López said he did not know when exactly the training exercise in Puerto Rico was first planned but noted that such exercises are usually planned about a year in advance.

He said the training began on Aug. 31 but that he does not know when it will end, nor how many Marines are involved.

He said they are practicing amphibious maneuvers with a variety of vehicles.

Meanwhile, González said last week that she estimates more than 1,000 Marines were on the island.

The U.S. Marine Corps issued a statement on Aug. 31 noting that Marines and sailors from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit would be conducting amphibious training and flight operations in southern Puerto Rico.

“The challenging terrain and tropical climate of Puerto Rico provides an ideal environment for the 22nd MEU to conduct realistic amphibious training and hone specialized skills such as patrolling, reconnaissance and survival techniques, ensuring a high level of readiness while forward deployed,” the Marine Corps said in a statement.

It wasn’t immediately clear how long Hegseth and Caine planned to stay in Puerto Rico, or if they planned to visit other sites while on the island.

López, the National Guard’s spokesman, declined to comment on specifics of the visit.

Associated Press reporter Will Weissert in Washington D.C., Regina García Cano in Caracas and AP videographer Alejandro Granadillo in San Juan, Puerto Rico, contributed.

In Other News

militarytimes.com

16. US Air Force's first official autonomous combat drone takes to the air

US Air Force's first official autonomous combat drone takes to the air

New Atlas · September 8, 2025

One of the US Air Force's first official combat drones has taken to the air after only a year of building and development. General Atomics's YFQ-42A is currently undergoing flight testing in anticipation of a future fleet of 1,000 autonomous planes

The YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) isn't the only autonomous combat drone in the world under development, but it is the first of two, along with the Anduril YFQ-44A, to be officially accepted as combat aircraft by a major air force. In this case, the designations stand for Y – Prototype, F – Fighter, Q – Unmanned Aircraft, design number 42 and 44, and A – series.

The idea is to create a fleet of autonomous jet-powered Loyal Wingman combat craft with the performance to operate alongside fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, including the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. These aircraft would act as force multipliers that would cost less than crewed fighters, yet would have advanced machine learning for human-machine teaming. With this, the human pilot can concentrate on the mission while the drones fly themselves, even in combat scenarios.

Derived from the General Atomics "Gambit" family of uncrewed aerial vehicles, its development was sped up by means of model-based digital engineering as well as an autonomous avionics suite tested over five years using a jet-powered MQ-20 Avenger drone, formerly known as the Predator C, and the XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station (OBSS).

Because the YFQ-42A is still in the prototype stage, its specifications are still a bit fluid as well as largely under wraps, but it's estimated to have a range of over 700 nautical miles (805 miles, 1,300 km) and be capable of carrying two air-to-air missiles in its payload bay. In addition, the fuselage is designed for a low radar and infrared profile for better stealth. It may also be capable of aerial refueling.

"What a great moment for the U.S. Air Force and for GA-ASI," said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. "It’s been our collaboration that enabled us to build and fly the YFQ-42A in just over a year. It’s an incredible achievement and I salute the Air Force for its vision and I salute our development team for delivering yet another historic first for our company."

A decision is expected in 2026 as to which of the two prototypes will proceed to full production.

Source: General Atomics

New Atlas · September 8, 2025

17. Xi running 'The Art of War' circles around Trump

And we have to learn how to play Go more proficiently.

Excerpts:

In today’s US–China rivalry, Trump has squandered America’s systemic and alliance advantages, ceding ground to Beijing in areas where it excels. China’s grip on the strategic tempo—and its ability to keep the bigger picture in view—is increasingly clear.

As The Art of War notes, “One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.” Victory can be foreseen but not manufactured at will. It demands long-term planning and disciplined execution.

Trump’s China policy has been transactional and short-sighted, treating foreign affairs as a string of quick political deals rather than a coherent grand strategy.

His unpredictability may occasionally catch Beijing off guard, but without a plan grounded in the principle of “know yourself and know your enemy,” it only reinforces the image of a blustering paper tiger—tough on the weak, timid toward the strong.

Xi running 'The Art of War' circles around Trump - Asia Times

Trump should have consulted Sun Tzu’s ancient tome on strategy, leadership and conflict before picking a fight with China

asiatimes.com · Linggong Kong · September 8, 2025

Donald Trump and the Republican Party like to cast themselves as hawks on China.

Yet in his second term, Trump’s approach has been more bluster than bite—often retreating after tough talk and increasingly looking like a paper tiger. Beijing, by contrast, has kept its cool and, time and again, seized the initiative on major issues.

“The Art of War“, Sun Tzu’s ancient Chinese manual on strategy and leadership, has shaped thinking on conflict and power for more than two millennia. Its lessons are as relevant in today’s geopolitical rivalry as they were on the battlefield.

Seen through this lens, Trump’s China strategy reveals a series of costly missteps.

Sun Tzu’s most enduring lesson is simple: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Strategy starts with a clear-eyed view of both sides’ strengths and weaknesses.

Trump ignored that advice. On the campaign trail, he boasted that steep tariffs would bring Beijing to its knees. But China had already learned from the first trade war and was ready for a rematch.

He misjudged Beijing’s resolve to strike back, overlooked how deeply US businesses and consumers depended on Chinese manufacturing, and failed to see rare earths coming as a pressure point.

The gamble quickly turned against Washington. The tariffs hurt the US economy, forcing Trump to call Xi Jinping to seek a truce—a move that burnished Xi’s global image and fueled nationalism at home, giving Beijing more leverage at the table.

China’s response followed another of Sun Tzu’s maxims: “Strike where they are unprepared.” Beijing targeted US farm exports and manufacturing hubs, hitting Trump’s political base directly.

It tightened controls on rare earth exports, putting the squeeze on America’s tech and defense sectors. The pressure worked. Trump slowed his tariff plans, softened technology export restrictions and even blocked Taiwan’s president from passing through the United States to avoid a clash with Beijing.

Losing the moral high ground and alienating allies

Another major misstep has been Trump’s dismantling of America’s global alliance network—Washington’s greatest long-term asset.

Sun Tzu’s warning that “He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks” applies as much to geopolitics as to the battlefield. Unity means not just coherence at home, but trust and cooperation abroad. Trump has eroded both.

Domestically, his second-term agenda has fueled accusations of democratic backsliding, sparked nationwide protests, and deepened political polarization—undermining the values that once gave the United States moral authority.

Abroad, “America First” has often meant pulling America out: quitting the Paris Climate Accord, walking away from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization, threatening NATO partners, cutting foreign aid, and slapping tariffs on allies as if they were adversaries.

Each move chipped away at US soft power and left friends questioning whether Washington could still be counted on.

Beijing has wasted no time exploiting the opening. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, China has positioned itself as a “responsible major power” on trade, climate, and development. Since Trump’s return to office, global surveys show China’s image improving while America’s has slid.

Worse, Trump’s rhetoric and moves on flashpoint issues—from the Russia–Ukraine war to the Panama Canal to Greenland—have openly defied the postwar norms of territorial sovereignty.

The backlash has been swift, feeding China’s propaganda machine and reinforcing its narratives about “US hegemony” and “unjust alliances.” In the battle over global perception, Beijing has seized the high ground.

Regaining lost ground

Against a disciplined and calculating rival, Washington cannot afford to govern by impulse or chase short-term political wins.

It needs to return to a basic rule of strategy: knowing yourself and knowing your enemy. That means taking an honest measure of both sides’ strengths and weaknesses, playing to America’s advantages and targeting China’s vulnerabilities.

The trade war is a case study in getting that balance wrong. America’s economy is acutely sensitive to election cycles, corporate lobbying, and consumer price fears—pressures Beijing’s political system doesn’t face. Tariffs that ignore this dynamic only give China the edge in resilience and staying power.

In technology competition, however, America still holds decisive advantages: world-class universities, a deep bench of innovative talent, and a wide network of allies.

The smarter play is to harness those strengths—building coordinated tech controls with partners rather than relying on go-it-alone tariffs. The Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” approach to semiconductors is a step in that direction.

Both systems have inherent strengths and flaws. China’s authoritarian model delivers consistent long-term strategy and can absorb economic shocks, but it lags in innovation, struggles to keep top talent, and lacks anything close to America’s global alliance network.

The US, by contrast, thrives on the creativity and self-correction that democracy enables—yet too often sacrifices long-term strategic goals for short-term political wins. Prevailing in this rivalry will require discipline: doubling down on America’s advantages while applying steady, targeted pressure on China’s weaknesses.

Striking the unprepared: Trump’s strategic edge

As Sun Tzu observed, “Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.” Donald Trump’s unpredictable style in office once gave him a genuine advantage of this kind. His first term offered vivid proof.

In November 2017, Trump visited Beijing to a reception of extraordinary warmth and ceremony. Both Chinese officials and outside observers assumed the visit would help stabilize US

–China relations. Yet less than six months later, in March 2018, Trump launched an unprecedented trade war against China, catching Beijing off guard. The following month, his administration imposed sanctions and restrictions on Chinese technology giants Huawei and ZTE. This sequence of moves—swift, forceful, and unforeseen—left Beijing reeling and amounted to a strategic win for Washington at the time.

But this approach only works when the strike delivers both real damage and genuine surprise—something that requires a thorough prior understanding of each side’s strengths and weaknesses. By the time Trump moved to revive the trade war in his second term, Beijing had long since fortified its defenses. The element of surprise was gone.

Instead, it was China that wielded its own “unprepared strike”—deploying the rare-earths card as leverage, a move that blindsided Trump and marked a clear instance of Beijing turning Sun Tzu’s dictum to its own advantage.

Transactional and short-sighted

In today’s US–China rivalry, Trump has squandered America’s systemic and alliance advantages, ceding ground to Beijing in areas where it excels. China’s grip on the strategic tempo—and its ability to keep the bigger picture in view—is increasingly clear.

As The Art of War notes, “One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.” Victory can be foreseen but not manufactured at will. It demands long-term planning and disciplined execution.

Trump’s China policy has been transactional and short-sighted, treating foreign affairs as a string of quick political deals rather than a coherent grand strategy.

His unpredictability may occasionally catch Beijing off guard, but without a plan grounded in the principle of “know yourself and know your enemy,” it only reinforces the image of a blustering paper tiger—tough on the weak, timid toward the strong.

Linggong Kong is a PhD candidate in political science at Auburn University, where his research focuses on international relations, China’s grand strategy and Northeast Asian security. His commentaries have been published or republished in The Conversation, The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Factor, and Newsweek Japan, among others.

asiatimes.com · Linggong Kong · September 8, 2025

18. China's grand global plan on full display at SCO Summit

Again, beware of the Chinese concept of global leadership and global governance.

Excerpts:

If the SCO is to succeed, it must develop at least a veneer of independence and openness to court and persuade those who are more open to engaging and working with the US, EU and its partners, and to reassure them that membership does not amount to a declaration of estrangement from the West.

The SCO’s open question will need to be answered carefully in the years ahead. Its true significance may lie not in the agreements signed, but in its extensive and blatant display of contradictions – a common stage where rivals coexist, tensions are choreographed and China experiments with a new grammar of influence that is beginning to contest systematically existing claims about legitimacy in the global order.

Could this SCO summit redefine what multilateralism means in Eurasia? The jury is still out.

China's grand global plan on full display at SCO Summit - Asia Times

China experimenting with new grammar of influence that is openly testing the US-led global order’s legitimacy

asiatimes.com · Brian YS Wong, Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa · September 9, 2025

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin was by no means a game-changer, but it was a useful bellwether for close observers of China’s shifting foreign policy strategy.

Over the past decade, Beijing’s understanding and interaction with the so-called “global order” has undergone a significant transformation — from a historically deferential approach rooted in compliance with Western-led institutions, to now tentatively attempting to convene a coalition of the “aggrieved.”

For many SCO members, abstention costs more than participation. Central Asian states treat it as insurance against great power rivalry, while India stays engaged to prevent China from monopolizing regional leadership.

Belarus joined in 2024 less for benefits than to avoid isolation. Iran uses membership to counter diplomatic marginalization despite crippling sanctions. Whatever their motives, most members conclude that exclusion means forfeiting influence over conversations that will happen with or without them.

The recent summit confirmed this pattern across multiple domains. On security, the new Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats will not reconcile India and Pakistan, but it will extend the SCO’s reach.

On economics, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted trade with SCO members that has surpassed US$500 billion and recast selective bilateral deals as signs of multilateral progress. Even the Belt and Road Initiative, still contested by India, folds easily into SCO bilateral discussions – giving Chinese projects Eurasian branding.

On governance, Beijing advanced its Global Governance Initiative, rejecting bloc politics and “Cold War mentality” while affirming loyalty to the UN and WTO – signaling opposition to US dominance without naming it. None of these commitments is enforceable, but their repetition may subtly shape, and eventually foster, new conceptions of legitimacy.

All the world’s a stage

Unlike Washington, which has long enjoyed a near-unrivalled position as the de facto convenor of the “coalition of values,” or as some cynical voices would put it, a “coalition of the empires”, Beijing has long been reticent about positioning itself as a hub or nexus for Global South leadership.

Much of this was epitomized by the late leader Deng Xiaoping’s adage: “Hide your strength and bide your time.” Today, the winds of change are blowing wildly – and perhaps freely, too.

From BRICS+ to SCO, from BRI to the slew of “Global Initiatives” unveiled in recent years, Beijing appears intent on projecting its ability to convene not just any partner, but some of its most prominent allies, despite their intertwined rivalries, under its banner.

Indeed, both India and Pakistan are SCO members, even as tensions abound among Central and West Asian members of the group. Notably, this model of modern statecraft relies on performance, rather than substantive norms and policy commitments, as the currency of influence.

When Indian leader Narendra Modi sat alongside Pakistani leaders despite their militarized borders, when Iran attended despite crushing Western sanctions, and when Turkey balanced NATO membership with SCO partnership, these performative acts validated something more valuable than any treaty signature — China’s role as a rising convener of Eurasian politics.

In truth, the SCO operates on principles that would make Western diplomats recoil: no enforcement, minimal obligations and irresolvable contradictions. Yet this apparent weakness conceals a useful strength that escapes conventional analysis, enabling Beijing to signal nominal and symbolic victories without committing to substantive policy breakthroughs.

Precisely because the SCO is so divided, the optimal strategy for asserting authority is to avoid specific policy debates that could deepen fragmentation and instead play up the discursive and emotive commonalities among its members – notably, a shared skepticism toward the incumbent US leadership and its proclaimed vision of the world order.

This inversion of Western institutional logic explains why what looks hollow from Brussels or Washington endures in Eurasia. Western observers see failure in the lack of enforcement, but the absence of obligations is precisely what sustains the forum. By design, the SCO absorbs contradictions and hosts adversaries without requiring consensus.

Its communications are filled with amicable yet non-contentious statements that offer representatives plausible deniability – which partly explains why Pakistan found it conducive and politically possible to sign onto a declaration that implicitly criticizes the role played by radical Islamist terrorists in regional geopolitics, an olive branch of sorts to India over the recent Indo-Pakistani clashes.

The implications reach well beyond South and Central Asia. If China can convene adversaries, absorb contradictions and project authority through institutional design rather than military coercion or economic conditionality, it may well be devising a template that other multilateral institutions could replicate.

The SCO thus demonstrates a certain constructivist streak in China’s approach: through ritual, repetition and the circulation of its diplomatic language, Beijing normalizes its symbolic leadership across multilateral frameworks.

The ascending power is slowly coming to terms with the imperative and case for soft power, to be acquired via the dexterous leveraging of existing and new multilateral institutions.

Where the SCO falls short

Yet this is also where the SCO falls short. Where the G7 demands coordination and NATO insists on collective defense, the SCO is rooted in avowed ambiguities and the accommodation of inconsistencies and conflicts. Indeed, its path forward is defined by several clear challenges.

The first is the danger of mission creep. What began as a loose security dialogue now includes coordination centers, development banks and governance initiatives. Beijing rejects “bloc politics” even as it builds bloc-like structures.

Some may praise the expansion in scope as artful maneuvering, yet aligning and harmonizing the interests of its diverse member states remains far easier said than done.

Can the SCO get India and Pakistan on the same page on which projects should be externally financed? How will Central and West Asian states seek to compete with one another for governance-related funding? To what extent will Russia seek to subtly co-opt SCO coordination centers to maintain its waning influence in Central Asia? These are questions no single power can answer unilaterally.

The second concerns long-standing mistrust and skepticism. China, India and Russia appear to be drawing closer (as reflected by their leaders’ cordial interactions at Tianjin and a flurry of sherpa-led talks beforehand), yet their engagement begins from a low baseline.

Serious and deep-seated mistrust between the bureaucracies of New Delhi and Beijing remains unresolved. Russia courts both India and Pakistan, leveraging the divide as a strategic hedge. Pakistan remains central to both Beijing and Moscow but continues to sharpen, not soften, regional rivalries – particularly amid a recent thaw between its military leadership and Washington. The SCO’s optics masks more fractures than they mend.

The third revolves around whether the SCO can truly function as a multilateral mechanism rather than a Sino-Russian-led bloc. While that framing appeals to countries deeply inimical to the West, it could repel those who remain wary of alienating the US, the European Union and the Anglosphere at large.

Beijing’s diplomatic vocabulary — terms like “indivisible security,” “common development,” “civilizational dialogue” — recurs in declaration after declaration, providing ammunition to those who seek to paint the SCO as yet another China-driven and Beijing-propped initiative.

If the SCO is to succeed, it must develop at least a veneer of independence and openness to court and persuade those who are more open to engaging and working with the US, EU and its partners, and to reassure them that membership does not amount to a declaration of estrangement from the West.

The SCO’s open question will need to be answered carefully in the years ahead. Its true significance may lie not in the agreements signed, but in its extensive and blatant display of contradictions – a common stage where rivals coexist, tensions are choreographed and China experiments with a new grammar of influence that is beginning to contest systematically existing claims about legitimacy in the global order.

Could this SCO summit redefine what multilateralism means in Eurasia? The jury is still out.

Dr Brian Wong is an HKU-100 assistant professor in philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. His research examines the ethics and dynamics of authoritarian regimes and their foreign policies, historical and colonial injustices, and the intersection of geopolitics, political and moral philosophy, and technology. Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a Hong Kong-based geopolitics strategist with a focus on Europe-Asia relations.

asiatimes.com · Brian YS Wong, Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa · September 9, 2025

19. PRC Conceptions of Comprehensive National Power

Please go to the China Brief link here to read the article in the proper format (p. 6-17). https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CB-V-25-Issue-16-September-6.pdf

Excerpts:

Conclusion

Considerable attention and resources were devoted to developing CNP theory from 1990–2015. As subsequent articles in this series discuss, this theoretical framework has been influential in shaping Party ideology and government policy, including informing significant shifts in the Xi era. As early as 1996, scholars were noting that the study of CNP had “entered a stage of extensive practical application” (Wang Songfen ,Comparative Study of the Comprehensive National Power of Major Countries in the World, 1996). Writing in 2015, Jinan University Professor Jia Haitao (贾海淘) explained that the concept and theory of CNP had become an important guiding ideology for socialist construction and national development in the new era, and that it had become the governing philosophy and theory of the Party and the country in the new era (Jia Haitao, Comprehensive National Power and Cultural Soft Power Systems Reseach, 2015). [9].

The relative decline in public discussions on how to calculate CNP after 2010 suggests that the system settled on a solution, but that solution was never made public. Continued reporting on the PRC’s expanding CNP by government agencies like the NBS and in statements by Xi Jinping indicate that work on CNP continues to this day.

The Party-state’s long-term and consistent framing of CNP has implications for interpreting future CCP behavior. CNP scholars such as Huang and Wu anticipated long ago that global competition in the 21st century would include “economic warfare, technological warfare, and military warfare” (Huang Shuofeng, Comprehensive National Power Theory, 1992). And in a 2002 work, Wu added that “victory without war does not mean that there is not any war at all. The wars one must fight are political war, economic war, and technological war … a war of comprehensive national power” (Wu Chunqiu, Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy, 2002).

PRC Conceptions of Comprehensive National Power

By Erik R. Quam

Creative COmmons

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/09/09/prc_conceptions_of_comprehensive_national_power_1133564.html?mc_cid=345dc69165

Executive Summary:

Comprehensive national power (CNP) is a central framework through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) measures its progress toward key strategic objectives. The ends the CCP is pursuing through building its CNP is a dominant position in a reshaped international order in which it has prevailed in an ideological competition with the West.
The effort to establish a theoretical framework to understand CNP began in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, Considerable attention and resources were devoted to developing CNP theory from 1990–2015, especially under leading scholars such as Huang Shuofeng and Wu Chunqiu. This work initially took place outside of government, at the National Defense University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, but today official measurements are likely conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics.
Influenced by cybernetics and systems-of-systems engineering, PRC CNP theory frames CNP as a complex system with a large number of measurable indices. To this day, the Party-state appears to make precise calculations of CNP, including ranking the CNP of different countries.

Over two days in late August 2025, the National Committee of the 14th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held a meeting to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan that is currently under development. Politburo standing committee member and state vice premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) delivered a report to an audience that included a number of top-level officials. [1] Praising the country’s development over the last four and a half years, he declared that the economic power, science and technology power, and comprehensive national power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “have all leapt to a new stage” (跃上了新台阶) (People’s Daily, August 26).

“Comprehensive national power” (综合国力; CNP) [2] is a central framework through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) measures its progress toward key strategic objectives. The framework also guides Beijing’s approach to, and understanding of, competition with the West. The Party has assessed since at least 1992—when the term was first enshrined in the Party Charter—that CNP competition defines global systems competition, and that competition with the United States will determine the future of the international order (Party Members Net, October 22, 2022). While some Western scholarship references CNP as an aspect of competition, or as part of Chinese-style modernization, very little has dealt with it as the primary subject of study. [3] This article is the first in a series of five that will analyze how the Party-state system has characterized the importance of CNP to both national rejuvenation and international competition, how the CCP has resourced national development strategies in pursuit of these objectives, and what the implications of this framing are for interpreting future CCP and PRC behavior. This first instalment provides an overview of what the Party means by CNP, the theoretical underpinnings that lie behind it, and a brief history of ongoing attempts by scholars and government agencies to calculate comparative CNP globally.

Beijing’s Central Framework for Rejuvenation and Global Competition

Chinese scholars have defined CNP as the resources possessed by a state to ensure both its survival and its development; as well as the capability of that state to use its resources to achieve strategic objectives (Hu Angang, China Study, 2010). Jiang Zemin outlined this in 1993 when unveiling new strategic military guidelines, noting that “if we can sustain rapid economic development for a decade or several decades in a secure and stable environment, our economic, military, and comprehensive national power will increase greatly. Our security will be better assured, our international standing will be higher and firmer, and our cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics will have greater vitality” (只要我国能够在相对安全稳定的环境中加速发展十年，几十年，我们的经济实力，国防实力，在综合国力就会大大增强，我国的安全就更有保证，我国的国际地位就会更有巩固和提高，有中国特色社会主义事业就会更加充满升级和活动) (Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin: Volume 1, 1993).

Since then, CNP competition has shaped the CCP’s approach to modernization strategies domestically and international competition globally. As Jiang explained in 1991, international competition is, in the final analysis, “a competition of comprehensive national power” (综合国力的竞争) (Selected Important Documents Since the 13th National Congress, May 23, 1991). [4] This assessment was repeated in a 1993 speech at an economic work symposium, where Jiang described competition among various countries as “a comprehensive national power competition based on economic, scientific, and technical strength” (以经济和科技实力为基础的综合国力的竞争) (Qiushi, July 31, 2019). In 1992, Jiang’s report to the 14th Party Congress argued that the essence of socialism was in developing productive forces, something that can be assessed in terms of the extent to which it strengthens the socialist state’s CNP (是否有利于增强社会主义国家的综合国力) (CCP News, October 12, 1992). In the intervening decades, CCP assessments have displayed a remarkable consistency. Nearly 30 years later, Xi Jinping explained that “winning advantage in the competition for comprehensive national power is the key to national rejuvenation” (在综合国力的竞争中赢得先机是民族复兴的关键) (People’s Daily, September 27, 2021).

The end state the CCP is pursuing through building its CNP is a dominant position in a reshaped international order in which it has prevailed in an ideological competition with the West. For decades, the CCP has rejected the current international order as biased against the developing world, designed to protect Western hegemony over the international system and, ultimately, an existential threat to Marxist-Leninist regimes like the CCP. This is visible in the Party’s long-held opposition to “hegemonism” (霸权) and “power politics” (强权)—rhetoric that took on new meaning at the end of the Cold War as a new, unipolar order began to emerge and the PRC’s capacity to challenge it grew. According to many PRC analysts at the time, this unipolar order would inevitably evolve into a multipolar one, despite efforts by the United States to preserve its hegemonic status, a perspective that has since become a central theme of academic and Party literature on CNP. In this context, calls from PRC leaders for “multilateralism” and for a democratized international system are designed to challenge U.S. hegemony by using the United Nations to constrain U.S. options globally. This was most clearly articulated by then-Senior Colonel at National Defense University (NDU) Liu Mingfu (刘明福), who explained in 2009 that “building democratic nations is the weapon with which America attacks China, and building a democratic world is the weapon with which China attacks America” (Liu Mingfu, The China Dream [中国梦], 2015). [5]

Systems Theory and the Foundations of Chinese CNP Research

The effort to establish a theoretical framework to understand CNP began in earnest in the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping called for understanding the PRC’s national power through comprehensive study. Responding to Deng’s call, Huang Shuofeng (黄朔风), a scholar at NDU, published the first major study on the country’s CNP in 1984, titled “Studying of the Chinese National Defense Strategy Systems for the Year 2000” (2000年中国国防战略系统研究). Two years later, Wu Chunqiu (吴春秋), a scholar at the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), published an article in National Defense University Journal (国防大学学报) titled “National Defense Strategy and Comprehensive National Power” (国防战略与综合国力). The writings of these two early proponents of CNP research were part of a growing body of literature that emerged as teams at NDU and elsewhere conducted research on CNP, grand strategy, military-civil fusion, and cybernetics. [6] This work was unified by a desire to determine “scientific measures” (科学的对策) to ensure the survival and development of the PRC to “continuously enhance [its] comprehensive national power” (不断增强我国的综合国力) (Huang Shuofeng, Comprehensive National Power Theory [综合国力论], 1992).

The theoretical outline of how scholars have framed CNP relies on a systems-of-systems engineering approach. Wu explained in 1998 that the value of studying CNP lies “in its comprehensiveness, which requires considering the factors of national strength as a large system” (Wu Chunqiu, Chinese Grand Strategy, 1998). This focus reflects a preoccupation with cybernetics within Chinese academia over the past four decades. PRC scholars view the overarching system as a “non-linear, dynamic, open, and complex system” (Huang Shuofeng, Rivalries Between Major Powers, 2006). According to Huang, “the non-linearity of the system means that inputs and outputs will be disproportionate, and small changes in the initial balance will cause huge changes in the results” (Huang Shuofeng, Rivalries Between Major Powers: A Comparison of World Power’s Comprehensive National Power [大国转量：世界主要国家综合国力国际比较], 2006). This makes CNP, in the words of one CASS researcher, “not a simple sum of multiple forces but system made up by a variety of forces … and whether the structure is balanced is also extremely important” (综合国力不是多种力量的简单加总，而是多种力量有机组合的一个系统 … 结构是否均衡也非常重要) (World Economics and Politics, August 23, 2006). As such, it is impossible to fully and accurately reflect a country’s CNP by emphasizing any one factor in isolation.

Balancing this system-of-systems is the role of the state. As a former director of the Research Office of the CCP Central Committee explains in the introduction to Huang’s 2006 book Rivalries Between Major Powers, studying CNP enables the government to allocate resources across the national systems to drive development. This focus on maintaining an even balance across the system and on the importance of government coordination of development aligns with CCP assessments of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, in Huang’s view, the collapse was a failure to coordinate relations between essential elements in the development of Soviet CNP: military competition led to an economic crisis, while scientific and technological innovation stalled and political turmoil ensued. This approach holds lessons for how scholars, and perhaps also the CCP, consider the ramifications of the PRC’s slowing economic growth. On the one hand, slowing growth could have disproportionate impact on the country’s CNP, given the “nonlinearity” of the system. Conversely, Huang’s work suggests that it would be an error to over-weight the importance of slowing economic growth on the country’s overall CNP.

Different authors describe the particular subsystems that make up CNP in different ways. Despite not knowing with certainty precisely how the CCP measures CNP, consistency across a wide-body of sources offers valuable insights. Most include similar core elements. These elements also fit with a list of critical areas of focus for the Party that Jiang highlighted at the 14th Party Congress: economics, politics, science and technology, education, culture, military affairs, and foreign affairs (CCP News, October 12, 1992).

Huang explains that in designing a CNP system, the first requirement is to develop the goal that the function of the system is designed to achieve, and to identify the criteria used to judge progress towards that goal. He breaks down this system-of-systems into a four-tier hierarchy. (See Figure 1.) At the bottom is a base layer (基本层) of more than 30 variables. These all feed into seven critical elements of CNP in a “sub-criteria” (子准则层) layer. Four of these seven elements—economic strength, science and technology strength, national defense strength, and resource strength—support the hard power branch of a “criterion layer” (准则层), while a further three, political strength, cultural and education strength, and foreign policy strength, support a soft power branch. These two sources of power then feed into a “target/goal layer” (目标层)—CNP. Once this basic framework had been created, researchers could then start to apply metrics for calculating CNP.

Figure 1: Illustrative Excerpt From Huang Shuofeng’s CNP Framework

(Source: Huang Shuofeng, Rivalries Between Major Powers, 2006, p.88)

Quantitative Methods Used to Calculate CNP

One of the most important aspects of Chinese approach to CNP is the understanding that it can be objectively measured and compared through mathematical equations and that resources can be adjusted to bolster it. The intent behind such calculations is to help CCP leaders understand the PRC’s position vis-à-vis other international actors and identify elements within domestic modernization efforts that may need support or adjustment. Even if the specifics of the mathematical formulas the Chinese system uses remain elusive, assessments in key leadership speeches and reports of “leaps” and “taking big steps” in CNP has remained a consistent theme over the past 30 years. [7] For instance, Xi’s declaration in 2017 that Socialism with Chinese Characteristics had entered a “new era” reflected assessments at the time that the PRC was making measurable progress in building its CNP.

Chinese scholars have worked for decades to formulate ways of calculating CNP. In Comprehensive National Power Theory, Huang explained the need to “use systems theory, synergy, and dynamic methods” (运用系统论，协调学和动力学的原理) to establish a set of equations designed to measure CNP. In his 2006 book, he wrote that he had adopted a method that combined qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, building on models developed by the engineer and cybernetics expert Qian Xuesen (钱学森) to create a model consisting of a main equation and 30 sub-equations, including more than 150 indices. Huang’s equation is just one of many that emerged in the literature between 1992 and 2014. A decisive model does not appear to have been made public, though NDU, CASS, CICIR, and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) all have published global CNP rankings based on mathematical formulations. Tables 1a and 1b depict weighted values and rankings from the work of PRC scholars on CNP.

Table 1a: Weighted Values for CNP Indices

Natural Resources (0.08)Economic Activity Capacity (0.28)

Overseas Economic

Activity Capacity (0.13)

S&T Capabilities: (0.15)

Human Resources: 0.25

Land Resources: 0.25

Mining Resources: 0.25

Energy Resources: 0.25

Economic Strength (total): 0.70

Econ. Strength (per capita): 0.10

Productivity: 0.07

Material consumption level: 0.06

Structure: 0.07

Import/Export

Trade Volume: 0.50

International

Reserves: 0.50

R&D as a share

of GDP: 0.30

S&T Talent: 0.30

Proportion of mechanical

transportation

in exports: 0.20

Share of technology-intensive products

in exports: 0.20

Degree of Social Development: (0.10)Military Capabilities: (0.10)

Government Regulatory

Capabilities: (0.08)

Diplomacy (0.08)Education Level: 0.20

Cultural Level: 0.20

Health Care Level: 0.20

Communication: 0.20

Urbanization: 0.20

Number of military personnel: 0.25

Military Spending: 0.25

Weapons Exports: 0.25

Nuclear Weapons: 0.25

Government Consumption

as % of GDP: 0.20

Central Gov. expenditure as % of GDP: 0.20

Expert

Questionnaire: 0.60

Diplomacy (Fuzzy evaluation results): 1.0

Table 1b: Country Rankings Based on Those CNP Indices

Country197019801990U.S.83.6 Rank 178.4 Rank 179.1 Rank 1Japan39.6 Rank 948.8 Rank 452.9 Rank 3Germany45.6 Rank 350.0 Rank 350.3 Rank 4France37.6 Rank 644.9 Rank 543.8 Rank 5China27.5 Rank 1030.2 Rank 1032.3 Rank 9

(Source: Wang Tongfeng, Chen Sha, Shi Xiaoyu, eds., Comparative Study of the Comprehensive National Power of Major Countries in the World [世界主要国家综合国力比较研究], Institute of World Economics and Politics, China Academy of Social Sciences, Hunan, PRC: Hunan Publishing House, 1996, p. 169–71.)

Differences have persisted over how to calculate CNP. A 1996 book edited by CASS’s Institute of World Economics and Politics explained that, while there is no singular definition of what constitutes CNP, there are consistent themes across all studies of CNP. The publication of its annual “Yellow Book” (黄皮书) indicated that CASS was working on calculating and comparing CNP globally. The Yellow Book series continues to address CNP to this day. [8] Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of CASS’s “Yellow Book” admitted in 2006 that disagreement led to them turning to an outside team for help with their calculations. (For a breakdown of different Chinese scholars’ CNP comparisons, see Table 2 below.)

In 2013, the NBS undertook a project called “Research on the Comprehensive National Power Evaluation of Major Countries in the world” (世界主要国家综合国力评价研究), using a computational model that listed CNP elements similar to those previously outlined by Huang. The deputy director of the bureau at the time emphasized the importance of correctly understanding a country’s “comprehensive national strength” (综合实力) and its status and role in the international community (NBS, November 17, 2014). He said that the PRC’s “status and influence in the international community are growing” (越来越高), and so the NBS should “objectively evaluate” its CNP. He directed his team to build the comprehensive national power calculation into a leading product of the statistical research department (NBS, November 17, 2014). Subsequent NBS annual reports suggest that they have assumed responsibility for calculating comparative CNP ever since. A Xinhua article reviewing annual government statistical yearbook for 2018 framed the work under the headline “comprehensive national strength achieves historic leap” (Xinhua, July 1, 2019). In January 2023, the NBS’s director explained that CNP had “reached a new level” (综合国力再上新台阶), citing per capita GDP growth in support of their claim to argue that the country’s “comprehensive national power, social productivity, international influence, and people’s living standards have further improved” (NBS, January 17, 2023).

Despite these differences in examination of how to calculate CNP, including how measures are weighted, a clear picture of CCP priorities in pursuit of CNP has emerged over time, centered on the seven core elements that were originally laid out by Huang Shuofeng and Jiang Zemin.

Table 2: Comparative CNP Rankings of Major Countries by Various Scholars

Scholar/

InstituteChina’s RankingAmerica’s RankingJapan’s RankingCountries ComparedRanking YearRanking ResultsWang Songfen10181719701. The United States, 2. The Soviet Union,

3. Canada, 4. Australia, 5. Germany,

6. France, 7. England, 8. Japan, 9. Italy,

10. PRC, 11. Brazil, 12. Mexico, 13. India,

14. South Africa, 15. South Korea, 16. Egypt,

17. IndonesiaWang Songfen10151719801. The United States, 2. The Soviet Union, 3. Canada,

4. Germany, 5. Japan, 6. France,

7. Australia, 8. England, 9. Italy, 10. PRC,

11. Brazil, 12. South Korea, 13. Mexico, 14. South Africa, 15. India, 16. Indonesia, 17. EgyptWang Songfen10141719901. The United States, 2. Russia, 3. Canada,

4. Japan, 5. Germany, 6. France, 7. Australia,

8. England, 9. Italy, 10. PRC, 11. South Korea,

12. Brazil, 13. Mexico, 14. India, 15. South Africa,

16. Indonesia, 17. EgyptHuang Shuofeng712719981. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. Germany,

4. Russia, 5. France, 6. England, 7. PRC,

8. Canada, 9. Italy, 10. Australia, 11. Brazil,

12. IndiaCICIR712719981. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. France,

4. England, 5. Germany, 6. Russia, 7. PRCCAS8121319901. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. Germany,

4. Canada, 5. France, 6. UK, 7. Russia, 8. PRC, 9. Italy, 10. Australia, 11. India, 12. Brazil,

13. South AfricaCAS7121319951. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. Germany,

4. Canada, 5. France, 6. UK, 7. PRC,

|8. Russia, 9. Australia, 10. Italy, 11. India,

12. Brazil, 13. South AfricaCAS7121320001. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. Canada,

4. Germany, 5. France, 6. UK, 7. PRC,

8. Russia, 9. Australia, 10. Italy, 11. India,

12. Brazil, 13. South AfricaLi Shenming and Wang Yizhou6171020061. The United States, 2. England, 3. Russia,

4. France, 5. Germany, 6. PRC, 7. Japan,

8. Canada, 9. South Korea, 10. IndiaLi Shenming and Wang Yizhou7121020101. The United States, 2. Japan, 3. Germany,

4. Canada, 5. France, 6. Russia, 7. PRC,

8. England, 9. India, 10. Italy

(Source: Qi Haixia, “From Comprehensive National Power to Soft Power: A Study of the Chinese Scholar’s Perception of Power,” How China Sees the World Working Paper Series, No.7 (2017), Griffith Asia Institute, Queensland, Australia; Institute of international Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, p. 4–5)

Conclusion

Considerable attention and resources were devoted to developing CNP theory from 1990–2015. As subsequent articles in this series discuss, this theoretical framework has been influential in shaping Party ideology and government policy, including informing significant shifts in the Xi era. As early as 1996, scholars were noting that the study of CNP had “entered a stage of extensive practical application” (Wang Songfen ,Comparative Study of the Comprehensive National Power of Major Countries in the World, 1996). Writing in 2015, Jinan University Professor Jia Haitao (贾海淘) explained that the concept and theory of CNP had become an important guiding ideology for socialist construction and national development in the new era, and that it had become the governing philosophy and theory of the Party and the country in the new era (Jia Haitao, Comprehensive National Power and Cultural Soft Power Systems Reseach, 2015). [9].

The relative decline in public discussions on how to calculate CNP after 2010 suggests that the system settled on a solution, but that solution was never made public. Continued reporting on the PRC’s expanding CNP by government agencies like the NBS and in statements by Xi Jinping indicate that work on CNP continues to this day.

The Party-state’s long-term and consistent framing of CNP has implications for interpreting future CCP behavior. CNP scholars such as Huang and Wu anticipated long ago that global competition in the 21st century would include “economic warfare, technological warfare, and military warfare” (Huang Shuofeng, Comprehensive National Power Theory, 1992). And in a 2002 work, Wu added that “victory without war does not mean that there is not any war at all. The wars one must fight are political war, economic war, and technological war … a war of comprehensive national power” (Wu Chunqiu, Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy, 2002).

Erik R. Quam is the Director of the China Strategic Focus Group at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

This article reflects the sole views of the author. They do not reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Navy.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

Notes

[1] The opening of the meeting was chaired by politburo standing committee member and CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning (王沪宁), and among 20 other listed senior officials were current and former politburo members Shi Taifeng (石泰峰) and Hu Chunhua (胡春华).

[2] This paper translates “综合国力” as “comprehensive national power.” Some official English translations use “comprehensive national strength,” though to avoid confusion this article translates “实力” as “strength.” (“实力” is used to discuss the elements that constitute CNP, such as economic strength (经济实力)). At times, inconsistent language is used to discuss CNP within the Chinese language discussion. Most Party documents use “综合国力.” Some scholars instead use the term “comprehensive national strength” (综合实力); though, in almost all cases, those who are writing about CNP as the main topic use “综合国力.” Conceptually, the two appear to mean the same thing.

Official English translations have translated “综合国力” in several ways over the years. These include: “overall strength” in the 14th and 19th Party Congress reports; “overall national strength” in the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Party Congress reports; and “composite national strength” in the 20th Party Congress Report. “Composite national strength” is also used to translate “综合国力” in the 2021 Party Resolution on History. At times, however, even official translations use different terminology within the same document. For example, the 14th Party Congress Report issued by Jiang Zemin in 1992 translated “综合国力” as “overall strength of the country,” “overall capacity of the country,” and “overall national strength.” It is easy in reading only the English translations to not recognize that these three translations are all of the same term. Of course, terms can translate differently upon different uses as well, though that does not seem the case in the 14th Party Congress Report.

[3] One exception is an insightful 2000 study by Michael Pillsbury. Which laid a strong foundational framing of the discussion of CNP in the 1990s (Pillsbury, Michael, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, 2000). This paper seeks to not only step off from that strong framework but to develop how the PRC has resourced the pursuit of, and focus on, CNP over the ensuing 25 years.

[4] This came in a speech delivered at the Fourth National Congress of the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) in 1991.

[5] Liu, Mingfu, The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era, CN Times Books, Inc., New York, NY, 2015, p. 80–81. (The original Chinese version was published in 2009.) Liu, and this book in particular, are somewhat controversial, with many arguing that Western academics and scholars give Liu more credit than he deserves for influence within the Chinese system. However, it does seem consistent with two continuing lines of attack the PRC government uses in the information space against the United States. The first is the “weaponization” of democracy, which is clearly articulated across government documents. For example, see the 2021 and 2022 Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports titled “The State of Democracy in the United States,” which criticizes the U.S. system, and in particular U.S. democracy. The 2021 report, for example, warned “Any attempt to push for a single or absolute model of democracy, use democracy as an instrument or a weapon in international relations, or advocate bloc politics and bloc confrontation will be a breach of the spirit of solidarity and cooperation which is critical in troubled times.” The foreign minister’s statement, meanwhile, said that democracy “has become a ‘weapon of mass destruction’ used by the United States to interfere in other countries’ affairs” (MFA, December 7, 2021, December 11, 2021). The second line of argument advanced by the PRC government that is consistent with Liu’s framing is the notion of a “democratic international order” that it has pressed for over the past several decades (MFA, June 19, 2022; Xinhua, April 25, 2023).

[6] The following is a list of key individuals and organizations involved in CNP-related research since the 1980s:

Huang Shuofeng, who led a team at NDU from the 1980s until his death in 2006. That work produced at least three books examining CNP.
Wu Chunqiu, at AMS, published a book in 1998 on Chinese grand strategy that examined CNP and systems analysis in great detail. Wu remains actively engaged on these issues today.
Jiang Luming (姜鲁鸣), also at NDU, continues to shape the discussion on CNP through his work developing the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy, one of seven CCP national development strategies underpinning Chinese pursuit of CNP.
Hu Angang, who served as chief editor of China Study (国情报告), an annual journal published by Tsinghua University that tracked and measured CNP from 1991–2012, when its publication appears to have stopped.
Men Honghua (们红花), President of the Institute for China and the World at Tongji University and formerly of the Center for China Studies at Tsinghua University.
Yan Xuetong (阎学通), a prominent Chinese scholar at Tsinghua University and Dean of the Institute of International Relations.
Teams at CASS, CICIR, and other places across the Chinese system have devoted significant efforts to building CCP understanding of CNP.
The National Bureau of Statistics and the National Development and Reform Commission, among others, also have devoted significant time to measuring CNP.

[7] For example, in 2002, Jiang Zemin called for ensuring CNP “reached a new level” (再上一个大台阶). In the 18th Party Congress Report, Hu Jintao reported that CNP had “stepped up to a new level” (迈上一个大台阶).

[8] At some point the focus on CNP shifted away from the “World Economic Yellow Book” (世界经济黄皮书) to the “Yellow Book of International Politics: Annual Report on International Politics and Security” (国际形势黄皮书：全球政治与安全报告).

[9] Jia Haitao, Comprehensive National Power and Cultural Soft Power Systems Research, Beijing, China: China Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 2015, p. 33.

Appendix: A Note on Methodology

The theory and methodology of this series of articles is based on an assumption that comprehensively analyzing three key bodies of literature produced in the PRC over the past 40 years sheds light on the theoretical, ideological, and policy intent of the Party’s approach to strategic competition with the West.

The first is a deep body of literature by traditional academics and researchers at Chinese universities, PRC academic institutions with direct government affiliation at places like National Defense University in Beijing, and pseudo-government academics at think tanks like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) or the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), both of which are directly affiliated with the PRC government. In particular, this study focuses on the work produced by such researchers over nearly four decades in the fields of CNP, grand strategy, great power relations, and Chinese development strategies, among others. These authors, and their work, scoped understanding of CNP and international competition across Chinese academia, the PRC government and the CCP, developing the theoretical framework for CNP and international competition. Much of this research and writing was done at the behest of the PRC government and the CCP, largely funded by government programs. Their work does not represent official government positions, necessarily, but much of it was done at the behest of state and Party organs.

The second body of literature consists of key CCP and PRC government documents produced from 1978 to the present. This includes speeches by senior CCP officials, Party Congress reports, government work reports, Five Year Plans, the evolution of the CCP Party Charter, national development strategies, Party guidance, and “outline” (纲要) and “decision” (决定) documents, among others. The Party documents serve as the cornerstone to understanding the CCP’s ideological framing of strategic competition, including strategies and implementation instructions disseminated to the Party’s 100 million members around the world. They serve as a blueprint of CCP intent. While these documents outline CCP ideology and strategic intent, they do not reflect pursuit of that intent. For that reason, the third body of literature critical to this series includes policy and strategy implementation documents developed by the PRC and CCP since the early 1990s, which shed light on resources being devoted to the pursuit of outlined intent, and offer measurable data to gauge success in pursuit of outlined strategies.

20. The China-Russia-North Korea alliance that needs no name

A sober warning from Dr. Lee:

Excerpts:

The lack of a formal summit was not a bug; it was a feature. It aligns perfectly with Beijing’s foundational foreign policy principle of “non-alliance” since the early 1980s, to preserve strategic autonomy and avoid entrapment in the conflicts of others. This allows China to maintain maximum flexibility while signalling alignment.

The true strength of this triumvirate lies not in a public treaty, but in its functional, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing gains.

Observers who fixate on the absence of an official trilateral ceremony are missing the substance of a deeply functional partnership.

The China-Russia-North Korea alliance that needs no name | Lowy Institute

The West should not be blinded by what is plain to see.

lowyinstitute.org · Seong-Hyon Lee

The image of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un standing together at Tiananmen Square was a masterclass in political theatre, a chilling and unambiguous declaration for many in the West of a new anti-Western axis. Yet, some observers have pointed to the conspicuous absence of a formal trilateral summit as evidence of the bloc’s limits, suggesting Beijing remains reluctant to be locked into a rigid alliance with Moscow and Pyongyang.

This view, however, misdiagnoses the nature of the challenge. The truth is not that China is a reluctant partner, but that it is methodically building an alliance without a name. Beijing’s entire strategy is to avoid the formal trappings of an “alliance” with its rigid obligations, while reaping all the benefits of one through deniable, “grey zone” cooperation.

The lack of a formal summit was not a bug; it was a feature. It aligns perfectly with Beijing’s foundational foreign policy principle of “non-alliance” since the early 1980s, to preserve strategic autonomy and avoid entrapment in the conflicts of others. This allows China to maintain maximum flexibility while signalling alignment.

The true strength of this triumvirate lies not in a public treaty, but in its functional, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing gains.

Observers who fixate on the absence of an official trilateral ceremony are missing the substance of a deeply functional partnership.

The “reluctant dragon” narrative is seductive because it plays into the West’s hope that China remains a pragmatic actor that can be peeled away from its more volatile partners. But the evidence points to the contrary. Xi was not a passive host; he was the director of this entire production. A similar photo-op did not arise in Moscow in May when Kim did not attend the May parade, instead allowing Xi to stage the triumvirate’s formal debut in Beijing rather than on Putin’s home ground. Xi cemented his role as the undisputed architect of this new axis. His actions reveal a leader who is confident and in control, not one being taken advantage of.

The true strength of this triumvirate lies not in a public treaty, but in its functional, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing gains. It is a system designed for maximum effect with minimum accountability.

For Putin, the summit provided an immediate, existential victory. Standing beside Xi was a powerful antidote to Western narratives of his diplomatic isolation, conferring invaluable political legitimacy on the global stage. More concretely, the event solidified a critical military supply chain from North Korea, ensuring a continued flow of artillery shells and ballistic missiles for his war in Ukraine. Finally, by pulling North Korea deeper into the conflict, Putin successfully opens a second front of pressure on the United States in Northeast Asia, forcing Washington to divide its strategic attention and resources.

For Kim, the visit marked his triumphant graduation from isolated pariah to valued junior partner. This was the successful realisation of his “security from Russia, economy from China” strategy. By providing Russia with critical military assets, the shift from aid recipient to arms provider grants him unprecedented agency. In his bilateral meeting with Xi, he explicitly requested deeper economic cooperation, securing the lifeline that only Beijing can provide through the “livelihood” loophole in UN sanctions.

This new alignment renders his nuclear arsenal non-negotiable, turning the US policy of “denuclearisation” into an obsolete illusion. This reality was underscored by a subtle yet seismic shift during the visit: for the first time in years, Beijing’s official readouts conspicuously avoided any reference to the “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”. The deliberate omission of long-standing diplomatic language amounts to a quiet but profound concession to Pyongyang.

While Putin secured a lifeline and Kim gained new status, the ultimate strategic gains belong to Xi’s China. The summit and parade were the public manifestation of a profound shift in China’s strategic posture: a deep “psychological decoupling” from the West. Beijing has concluded that strategic reconciliation with Washington is no longer a viable goal and is now actively pursuing a new world order. The triumvirate forms the hard-power nucleus of this new posture, a long-term strategy to expand influence by exploiting perceived American missteps. By endorsing Pyongyang’s closer ties with Moscow, Beijing shares the burden of managing the Kim regime, ensuring it remains a permanent security dilemma for the United States and its key Asian allies while providing political cover to accelerate its own “grey zone” cooperation.

The most dangerous mistake Washington and its allies could make is to misdiagnose the nature of this challenge. To fixate on the lack of a formal alliance is to prepare for the last war. The threat is not a new NATO versus Warsaw Pact, but a fluid, adaptable network that operates in the seams of international law, leveraging ambiguity and plausible deniability.

The Korean War serves as a powerful historical lesson, demonstrating how this same alignment of powers, when faced with a US-led bloc, coalesced into a devastating military coalition. The image from Beijing, therefore, should not be seen as a mere photograph, but as a sober reminder that a functional alliance does not require a formal name to be real, coherent, and profoundly dangerous.

lowyinstitute.org · Seong-Hyon Lee

21. American Security Systems are Compromised by China

Conclusion:

We’ve already seen what happens when we delay action. The same companies that helped build China’s surveillance state are now embedded in our neighborhoods. If we don't draw a clear line between privacy and foreign intrusion, we will pay the price in lost freedoms, compromised infrastructure, and weakened national security.

For America to be secure, we must end foreign surveillance on our soil.

American Security Systems are Compromised by China

By Russ Walker & Chet Love

September 09, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/09/09/american_security_systems_are_compromised_by_china_1133586.html

Home and business security systems are supposed to keep Americans safe. Yet very often our cameras, routers, drones, smart locks, and more are compromised, opening the door to surveillance and security risks—often without consumers being any the wiser.

The biggest security threat comes from China. Millions of U.S. homes and businesses rely on electronics and security systems manufactured by companies with direct ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many of these products are cheap, widely available, and deeply integrated into our daily lives. But the cost we save at checkout comes due later when our personal information and national infrastructure are at risk.

Take Hikvision and Dahua, two Chinese surveillance giants blacklisted by the U.S. government. Their products—used in schools, homes, and even municipal buildings—are capable of sending video data to foreign servers. DJI drones, popular with hobbyists and law enforcement alike, have been flagged by the Department of Defense for transmitting user data back to China. Meanwhile, Wi-Fi routers from Huawei and TP-Link have documented firmware vulnerabilities that make it easy for hackers to steal data, monitor activity, or disable connected security systems.

These vulnerabilities risk more than privacy —they’re a threat to national security. China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy explicitly encourages companies to aid the state in acquiring foreign technology and intelligence. Meanwhile, security systems installed in government offices, power grids, and defense facilities could be exploited to surveil sensitive operations or disrupt vital systems. As 5G and Internet of Things (IoT) devices proliferate, the scope of this threat only grows. Firms like Huawei, ZTE, and DJI don’t just make gadgets—they serve the geopolitical interests of an adversarial regime.

Compounding these risks is the inadequacy of domestic American data storage. You wouldn’t keep your car unlocked on a busy street. Nor would you leave your wallet on a counter in an airport. But Americans regularly—and often unknowingly—have their data housed in less secure overseas facilities unprotected by U.S. oversight.

Like the proliferation of Chinese drones, security systems, and internet products, the rise in overseas data storage is largely driven by cost. Data centers consume a massive amount of energy, and U.S. electricity isn’t cheap. This forces companies to move their data centers to locations with lower energy costs.

To protect Americans from this silent invasion of insecure goods and the risks of overreliance on overseas data centers, the U.S. needs to act—now. First, we must establish a Privacy Gold Star Certification, a national standard that helps consumers and institutions identify products that meet strict security guidelines. Only systems that use U.S.-developed software, store data on American servers, and are free from foreign ownership or control would be certified. End-to-end encryption and explicit opt-in requirements for data sharing would be mandatory.

Second, we should ban foreign-controlled security systems from critical infrastructure altogether. American businesses, schools, and families deserve confidence that the tools they use to protect themselves aren’t secretly compromised.

Third, we should require all surveillance footage and related data to be stored within U.S. borders and governed by U.S. privacy laws. It's unacceptable that personal and institutional data could end up in the hands of foreign adversaries simply because a cheaper device was more convenient at the time of purchase.

Fourth and finally, we should unlock the power of every available electron by optimizing energy efficiency and embracing energy generation from every power source available—whether it’s natural gas, nuclear, wind, solar, or something else. Government shouldn’t pick winners and losers but rather put every energy source on the table in order to drive down costs and incentivize building data centers in America instead of abroad.

We’ve already seen what happens when we delay action. The same companies that helped build China’s surveillance state are now embedded in our neighborhoods. If we don't draw a clear line between privacy and foreign intrusion, we will pay the price in lost freedoms, compromised infrastructure, and weakened national security.

For America to be secure, we must end foreign surveillance on our soil.

Russ Walker is the Executive Director of the Rainey Freedom Project and Senior Strategist at the September Group

Chet Love is the Managing Partner of Cornerstone Group International and Chairman of the Board of the Joseph Rainey Center for Public Policy. He also served as Director of Policy and Legal Counsel for SolarCity (now Tesla).

22. The Future of Criminal Drone Use in Latin America

Excerpts:

The United States neglects the evolving threat of nonstate drone use in Latin America at its own risk. A more aggressive strategy to fight back against this challenge could not only benefit U.S. partners in the region, but might also boost America’s own readiness for future conflict. With the Trump administration urging a greater focus on utilizing military tools against transnational criminals, disrupting illicit drone networks should be a top priority. While Ukraine remains at the bleeding edge in terms of drone tactics, Latin America offers a unique opportunity for U.S. personnel to embed with partner militaries and gain hands-on expertise in counter-drone operations. Such a partnership would also be a valuable step to defuse tensions with countries like Mexico, who are fearful that U.S. counter-crime operations could encroach on their national sovereignty.

One of the other key benefits the United States may offer is in tracking criminal drone operators. As in Ukraine, it is vastly more efficient to eliminate the individuals trained to pilot drones than it is trying to destroy individual drones, which can themselves be cheaper than the munitions expended to take them down. The United States has an array of intelligence assets (including its own advanced reconnaissance drones) which could enable more precise operations by partner forces. Unarmed MQ-9 drones operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have already ranged hundreds of miles into Mexico to conduct reconnaissance of cartel activities, offering a template to build upon.

Finally, the United States and Latin American governments should always be prepared for adaptation. Striking drone operators could increase the demand for autonomous systems that need only be launched to go about their mission without a pilot. These are currently beyond the capabilities of Latin American groups, but as advances in both drones and artificial intelligence continue, the next evolution may be just around the corner.

The Future of Criminal Drone Use in Latin America

Henry Ziemer

September 9, 2025

warontherocks.com · September 9, 2025

Two shocking stories signal that the use of drones by Latin American criminal groups is entering new and dangerous territory. Most recently, Intelligence Online reported that a joint investigation by Ukraine and Mexico uncovered several cases of individuals linked to Mexican cartels enlisting in the Ukrainian International Legion to gain experience using weaponized aerial drones. Reportedly, the investigation also found signs that members of Colombian insurgent groups may have done the same with the intention of bringing these skills back to the Western Hemisphere. Russia has also allegedly provided training to Colombian nonstate groups.

On July 2 the Colombian navy interdicted for the first time a semi-submersible “narco-submarine” designed to be piloted remotely via a Starlink terminal. Whereas the Mexican cartels learning from the battlefields of Ukraine underscores how global conflicts are feeding into criminal drone tactics, the Colombian underwater drones represent an innovation with deep roots in Latin America’s own criminal dynamics.

Latin America’s criminal networks are not merely copying the rest of the world when it comes to drones. They are important players in the development and refinement of tactics. Governments in the region need to adapt — and fast — or risk having their sovereignty further eroded by heavily armed nonstate groups. The United States, which has signaled a more muscular approach to organized crime in recent months, can play a key role tracking criminal drone operators to cut off the knowledge base for these groups. Furthermore, by partnering with countries like Mexico and Colombia in their fight against illicit drones, the United States can itself gain valuable firsthand data on how these systems are evolving in the hands of adversaries.

BECOME A MEMBER

First-Person View, Fiber-optics, and New Domains

Criminal organizations are constantly modifying, experimenting, and testing drone tactics in real time. The pace of such innovation is on the order of weeks, if not days.

Most notable is the rapid adoption of first-person view one-way attack drones by both Colombian and Mexican nonstate groups. Unlike drone-dropped munitions, which usually require a drone to fly directly above a target before releasing an unguided explosive like a hand grenade to fall onto the target, one-way attack drones typically carry an explosive that detonates on contact with the target, destroying the drone in the process. This allows operators to fly directly into their targets, navigating vegetation, buildings, and other forms of cover for a high degree of precision.

In Mexico, the first documented one-way attack drone identified by open source analysts was recorded in April 2025. In the months that followed, several more cases cropped up, with these drones now featuring alongside more traditional quadcopter bombers on cartel social media and in equipment seizures by Mexican security forces. One recent video involved alleged Jalisco New Generation Cartel members discussing how to configure drones for one-way attacks.

In Colombia, one of the first documented attacks by an explosive-armed drone was posted to X (formerly Twitter) by the open source intelligence account War Noir on June 12, 2025. On July 20, the National Liberation Army reportedly used a similar drone to attack Colombian forces in the fiercely contested Catatumbo region, killing three and injuring another eight. That same month a different rebel group attacked a Colombian navy riverine patrol boat using an one-way attack drone. While this resulted in minimal damage, it demonstrates the expanding target set for Colombian armed groups. This is further evidenced by yet unconfirmed reports of rebels using a drone to cause a police helicopter to crash in Antioquia — a move which, if corroborated, would mirror tactics employed by insurgents in Myanmar.

While open source reporting does not necessarily reveal the full picture, it is most likely these types of drones are more widespread, not less, among criminal groups than the above analysis would indicate.

One battlefield innovation not yet observed in Latin America is the use of fiber-optic cable to connect the drone to its control system. These thin tethers provide an operator with an unjammable connection to their drone, vital for when the electromagnetic spectrum is contested. Fiber-optic drones, however, sacrifice mobility and flexibility, needing to navigate carefully so that their cables are not tangled or severed — meaning it is usually preferable to use a traditional remote link when jamming is not a serious concern. Latin American militaries currently have limited jamming capacity, so it seems unlikely fiber-optic drones will emerge as a significant force. Nevertheless, this capability is proof that jamming alone is no silver bullet. Even if Latin American militaries and police succeed in denying the electromagnetic spectrum to criminal drones, there is a readily available playbook for these groups to follow in response.

Another key development to watch for will be how these drones continue integrating with cartel armor tactics in Mexico. Improvised armored fighting vehicles, known colloquially as “narco-tanks” or “Monsters,” have gone from tools of propaganda and intimidation to cartel mainstays as fighting in the country’s hinterlands has intensified. While individual narco-tanks differ considerably in their level of sophistication and protection, as early as 2023 one of these vehicles was captured sporting an anti-drone “cope cage” resembling those found on Russian and Ukrainian armor. More advanced models reportedly incorporate their own jammers for further protection. Meanwhile, increasing photographic and video evidence of cartel foot soldiers bearing anti-drone jammers and GPS spoofing systems suggests that drone and counter-drone tactics are a reality these groups are already incorporating into their daily operations.

Reports from the front lines of cartel warfare lend credence to this assessment. In an interview with InSight Crime, a former member of the United Cartels described scenes from a battle with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel that could have been ripped from the trenches of the Donbas:

They’d shot down the drone, and the grenade had not exploded. A few gave a celebratory yell and ran to retrieve it…As they approached the drone, they heard the rumble of the Monsters. There were at least three, Carlos said, each coming from a different angle. The sound of gunfire followed.

In skirmishes across Mexico, cartels have learned to use a combination of improvised explosive devices, trenches and earthworks, armored vehicles, and drones to shape opposing forces and attack from multiple vectors simultaneously. As these groups continue to experiment with this form of crude combined arms, there is a serious risk this may allow them to more effectively challenge the Mexican state itself. Vehicles like the AMX-VCI or Humvee used as transports by the Mexican army are vulnerable to attack against their relatively light top armor, a weakness that drones are particularly well-suited to exploit.

Finally, the seizure of an unmanned narco-sub demonstrates that the air is far from the only environment ripe for illicit drones. As detailed by in a report from Small Wars Journal, drone narco-subs offer many advantages over crewed platforms: a lower profile increasing stealth, more space for cargo due to the elimination of crew, and the ability to loiter at sea for potentially weeks at a time before moving in to deliver their payloads. Especially in wake of the recent U.S. strike on an alleged narcotrafficking boat from Venezuela, interest in unmanned alternatives for drug running is likely to increase significantly among criminal organizations in the region.

Also worth analysis are ground drones which have yet to see notable use by criminal groups in the region. Battery life and mobility limitations, as well as the more limited commercial availability of such equipment, suggest that aerial drones will remain the platform of choice. Nevertheless, it seems realistic that groups may experiment with more limited applications of autonomy, such as remotely operated turrets on narco-tanks. In the Colombian context, improvised ground drones might complement existing car bombs to deliver larger explosive payloads than can be carried by small aerial drones.

Fighting Fire with Fire

Eager to keep up in the drone arms race, Latin American armed forces have ramped up their efforts to acquire and field drones. To date, most of the systems acquired have been unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms like the Airbus SIRTAP purchased by Colombia from Spain in 2024 or the U.S. RQ-1 ScanEagle operated by Brazil. However, as clashes between state forces and criminal groups intensify throughout the region, some governments are seeking to acquire armed optionality as well.

Colombia most recently made headlines for its efforts to build a domestically produced drone bomber. Known as the “Dragom,” the platform is a conventional quadcopter capable of dropping explosives and carrying supplies over challenging terrain, making it a versatile addition to the country’s armed forces. Smaller drones designed to drop grenades are also being experimented with, in part out of necessity, by local security forces in Mexico. These initiatives are laudable, and certainly there is little time to waste in familiarizing armed forces throughout the region with the basics of drone and counter-drone tactics. However, procurement of armed drones by Latin American militaries also opens serious legal and ethical questions.

The emergence of new drone manufacturers and technological innovations has drastically lowered costs, allowing many militaries to procure these systems. But America’s own experience with drone warfare underscores that precision does not always mean discrimination between legitimate targets and noncombatants.

On the African continent in particular, governments facing insurgency have embraced medium altitude long endurance drones like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. These platforms can loiter with several munitions over a target for extended periods of time, a capability previously the provenance of advanced Western militaries. While a powerful asset, without strict rules of engagement and procedures for assessing collateral damage, these systems have major humanitarian consequences. According to a report from Drone Wars UK, between 2021 and 2024, aerial drones have been responsible for at least 943 civilian deaths in African countries, almost equaling the highest civilian casualty estimates given for the entire U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan.

In the hands of an unscrupulous government like Venezuela, medium altitude long endurance drones could become yet another potent tool for intimidating and victimizing their populace. Without updated training and regulations, the proliferation of weaponized drones could merely intensify the crossfire between criminals and the state, with lethal consequences for civilians caught between the two.

The Shape of Things to Come

Despite the rapid pace of adaptation underway in Latin America’s criminal underworld, the sophistication of these groups’ tactics should not be overstated. They have made rapid leaps in innovation, but their organizational structure, discipline, and doctrine remain haphazard. Expertise is concentrated in a relatively narrow slice of their membership, which can be targeted effectively to have a disproportionate impact on overall capabilities.

The United States neglects the evolving threat of nonstate drone use in Latin America at its own risk. A more aggressive strategy to fight back against this challenge could not only benefit U.S. partners in the region, but might also boost America’s own readiness for future conflict. With the Trump administration urging a greater focus on utilizing military tools against transnational criminals, disrupting illicit drone networks should be a top priority. While Ukraine remains at the bleeding edge in terms of drone tactics, Latin America offers a unique opportunity for U.S. personnel to embed with partner militaries and gain hands-on expertise in counter-drone operations. Such a partnership would also be a valuable step to defuse tensions with countries like Mexico, who are fearful that U.S. counter-crime operations could encroach on their national sovereignty.

One of the other key benefits the United States may offer is in tracking criminal drone operators. As in Ukraine, it is vastly more efficient to eliminate the individuals trained to pilot drones than it is trying to destroy individual drones, which can themselves be cheaper than the munitions expended to take them down. The United States has an array of intelligence assets (including its own advanced reconnaissance drones) which could enable more precise operations by partner forces. Unarmed MQ-9 drones operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have already ranged hundreds of miles into Mexico to conduct reconnaissance of cartel activities, offering a template to build upon.

Finally, the United States and Latin American governments should always be prepared for adaptation. Striking drone operators could increase the demand for autonomous systems that need only be launched to go about their mission without a pilot. These are currently beyond the capabilities of Latin American groups, but as advances in both drones and artificial intelligence continue, the next evolution may be just around the corner.

BECOME A MEMBER

Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies Americas Program.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · September 9, 2025

23. Can America's trust in its military survive the present moment? [Book excerpt]

Another book for my "to read pile."

Excerpt:

It is requiring heroic discipline on the part of military leaders to navigate these political developments. At the time of this writing, they appear to be lowering their profile, interpreting their roles more narrowly, emphasizing regulations for behavior, and trying to discourage veteran political activism. However, it is both unfair and likely to be insufficient to rely solely on the military to police the civil–military relationship. Civilians have responsibilities they are shirking to respect the apolitical space our system is designed to provide the military.

Can America's trust in its military survive the present moment? [Book excerpt] - Breaking Defense

An excerpt from The State And The Soldier: A History Of Civil-military Relations In The United States written by Kori Schake of AEI.

breakingdefense.com · Kori Schake · September 8, 2025

The following is an adapted excerpt from The State And The Soldier: A History Of Civil-military Relations In The United States, a new book from Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. You can purchase the book, which is out now in Europe and October 26th in the US, by clicking here.

How is it that a country founded in fear of a standing army would come to think of its military as a bulwark of democracy?

There is no other country in which the military is so proficient, so respected, so influential in policymaking without becoming a threat to civilian governance. Standard models of civil–military relations would predict a military so constituted to be tempted by coups or state capture. Yet, for over 250 years, there has never been an organized attempt to overthrow the US government by its military. It is a precious, anomalous history.

Why that is the case isn’t simple. It’s partly the political culture of the colonies that would become the United States devising a government of distributed and counterbalancing power. It’s partly the restraining example of an extraordinary individual during state formation, giving time for civilian institutions and military norms to form and strengthen. It’s partly structural factors such as geographic expanse, rival and dispersed urban and commercial centers, and a benign international security environment coupled with urgent domestic insecurity (the “insider threat” of conflict with Native Americans) resulting in a weak federal army and strong militia. It’s partly adroit politicians demonstrating the skills that make them successful and simply outplaying ambitious military aspirants.

Which is to say that the American experience has proven beneficial and durable — but difficult for other states to emulate.

The main tenets of civil–military relations as established in the United States are that the military:

owe their loyalty to the Constitution;
are subordinate to both the president as commander in chief and to the Congress;
can only either faithfully carry out civilian orders or resign their commission.

There are almost no incidents of military insubordination during the nation’s actual wars. Whether the US is winning or losing, it is deeply engrained in the American military tradition that civilians determine the strategy and resourcing of wars, for better and for worse. The only example of wartime insubordination is that of Gen. Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War, and President Harry Truman’s firing of him rings down through the decades uncontested.

The US experiences more friction in the aftermath of wars, as civilians and the military argue over reduced forces and budgets. Those instances are hyperbolized as dangerous rebellions — the Admirals’ Revolt! — but are mostly the earnest actions of both civilian and military leaders, struggling to understand changing technologies and geopolitical developments, acting within the bounds of a political system designed for Congress to contest executive control by the president.

The creation of a volunteer force and the military becoming small relative to the population created another turn of the kaleidoscope. In those circumstances, the military has become a main source of public understanding about warfare in ways with which civilian leaders are often uncomfortable and which veterans capitalize on politically. As public confidence plummeted in most institutions of government and civic life in America, it held roughly constant for the military, leading the public to blame elected leaders and praise the military in ways that encourage broader military involvement in politics.

But contemporary concerns about the military becoming a partisan political force are largely unfounded. Despite norm-shattering behavior by a small but influential coterie of politicians, military leaders, and veterans, the constitutional, legal, and normative boundaries of civil–military relations in America remain robust.

And the central reason the US military abjures political involvement is that the leaders understand organically what survey research on civil–military has revealed: while partisan civilians encourage the military wading into our political and cultural disputes, it respects the military less when they do.

Needing to recruit a volunteer military, and reveling in the approbation of the public, the military consider it in their self-interest to restrain their own involvement. Such discipline doesn’t extend to veterans, whom the public do not separate from the military, and who have every right as citizens not in active military service to engage in politics.

There are basically only two essential tests of the health of civil–military relations in the US:

can the president fire military leaders with impunity? and
will the military carry out policies they don’t agree with?

The American military easily meets both of those standards. For all of the discomfort of our febrile political moment, the American military remains dedicated to not being a threat to democracy.

That professionalism has lasted 250 years, but may be facing its most strident test in the coming months. With what Pauline Shanks-Kaurin terms an “unprincipled principal” as president, Congress ceding even more of its constitutional authorities to the executive for partisan purposes, and governors eager to advance partisan policies by offering National Guard units to other states or the federal government, we appear headed to unprecedented times.

A Throughline Of History

What emerges from litigating the historical cases is a deep and abiding gratitude that this country had George Washington at its inception to establish the standard to which our military continues to aspire. Even other Founders lacked his starchy and often weary integrity on civil–military issues. In a system of government designed to distribute power and check abuse by building in contending forces, generations of American military leaders have navigated the inherent frictions by Washington’s example. Washington wasn’t always right, but he was exemplary often enough to validate Bismarck’s observation that God has a special providence for drunks, babies, and the United States of America.

The US ended conscription in 1973, and the American military rebuilt itself into a professionalized force, a transformation that consumed a decade but of which it is justifiably proud. The military it produced triumphed in the 1991 Gulf War and catapulted a legislatively empowered chairman of the joint chiefs of staff into the limelight. The assertiveness with which Gen. Colin Powell worked civilian leaders and sought to affect public attitudes was novel and uncomfortable for a civilian leadership in whom the public ceased to repose confidence.

America’s twenty-first-century wars saw the rise of veteran activism accusatory of civilian misjudgments but, given the wars’ extended duration and inconclusive outcomes, surprisingly little antagonism between civilian and military leaders. The arguments seldom had a clear civil versus military dynamic, the mistakes were predominantly civilian in nature, and the military accepted firings and made do with strategies and resources poorly aligned to political objectives.

What does come through clearly is that the disparity in public standing between politicians and the military incentivizes suits to hide behind uniforms when talking to Congress or the public, leading to suspicion by many politicians that military judgments are designed not solely as professional expertise but also for political effect. After all, a rare throughline of Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden is that all believed the military was trying to limit their ability to enact preferred policies.

There are three domestic challenges to the American military remaining outside of politics: politicization in the broader body politic, mistakes by military leaders widening the aperture of vulnerability to political manipulation, and ambition by a political demagogue to break the good order and discipline of the military to recruit insurrectionists. The combination has produced a dramatic decline in public trust in the military — it is now at the lowest level in more than twenty years, roughly equivalent to attitudes in 1975.

Fortunes of war do not appear to negatively affect attitudes about the military: confidence dives only in 2018. Research by Peter Feaver demonstrates that the American public begins to view our military comparable to the Supreme Court: brimming with integrity when agreeing with respondents’ political views and disgracefully politicized when not. The public is actively pulling the military into the fray, and the only impediment to politicization is the professional restraint of the military itself.

Gen. Mark Milley isn’t the only military leader who stumbled into political thickets, but his choices exacerbated public perceptions of a military leadership actively engaging in political and cultural fractures. A main driver of perceptions about military politicization has resulted from veterans endorsing political candidates, speaking at political conventions, and claiming to speak for the active-duty force. And norms are eroding across the political spectrum of excluding military images from political advertisements and appearances.

But the arsonist of politicization is Donald Trump and the political movement he represents. In striking contrast to the deference generally shown the American military, Trump denigrated war hero John McCain, insulted a Gold Star family, reportedly referred to the military as “suckers and losers,” accused “the generals” of corruption, uses meetings with troops as campaign events, and pardoned servicemen convicted of war crimes at courts martial. He is now ordering troops into cities over the objections of governors and mayors on the false premise of civic emergency. These actions are putting political pressure on military leaders not seen since at least Thomas Jefferson was president, and probably not ever in American history.

It is requiring heroic discipline on the part of military leaders to navigate these political developments. At the time of this writing, they appear to be lowering their profile, interpreting their roles more narrowly, emphasizing regulations for behavior, and trying to discourage veteran political activism. However, it is both unfair and likely to be insufficient to rely solely on the military to police the civil–military relationship. Civilians have responsibilities they are shirking to respect the apolitical space our system is designed to provide the military.

Kori Schake leads the foreign and defense policy team at the American Enterprise Institute and is the author of The State and the Soldier: A History of American Civil-Military Relations.

breakingdefense.com · Kori Schake · September 8, 2025

24. Countering Digital Authoritarianism: How Malaysia Can Secure Digital Sovereignty by Tokenizing Trade Finance

Excertps:

Conclusion

As digital ecosystems become tools of geopolitical influence, Malaysia has a chance to lead in not only ensuring its own digital infrastructure sovereignty but also in securing its economic future. Tokenized trade finance is one key way that Malaysia can continue to grow economically while still engaging with China and other ASEAN nations. Additionally, securing digital sovereignty is a pillar of Malaysia’s broader national security strategy, with the ability to safeguard economic flows and assert control over digital infrastructure being key in this respect.

All in all, Malaysia could become a model for other mid-sized economies pursuing increased economic growth while maintaining digital infrastructure sovereignty, with trade finance tokenization providing Malaysia the unique opportunity to benefit from strategic competition without being consumed by it.

Countering Digital Authoritarianism: How Malaysia Can Secure Digital Sovereignty by Tokenizing Trade Finance

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/09/malaysia-digital-infrastructure-sovereignty/

by Hugh Harsono

09.09.2025 at 06:00am

In an era of intensifying strategic competition and hybrid threats, digital infrastructure has become a new battlespace domain. Trade finance, typically seen as a bureaucratic and purely economic function, is now a potential vector for influence, coercion, and strategic dependencies. This challenge is particularly critical for growing mid-sized economies like Malaysia, whose location and industrial base place it at the center of Indo-Pacific supply chains, making digital infrastructure sovereignty a necessity in this context.

As China increasingly exports key building blocks for digital infrastructure, including semiconductors, 5G, and data center capacity under the guise of economic development, Malaysia faces a critical inflection point on whether it should integrate these technologies into its current trade ecosystems, especially considering China’s long-standing status as Malaysia’s largest trading partner.

This is also critical given today’s contested digital landscape, with economic platforms being a crucial emerging component of national defense. In this case, critical financial infrastructure would form a key part of a country’s national resilience framework. In this case, tokenizing trade finance on its own offers a path for Malaysia to secure its own digital autonomy and insulate itself against coercive influence in the ever-prevalent digital world.

Trade Finance as a Geopolitical Vulnerability

Tokenization in trade finance refers to converting traditional trade documents and financial instruments, such as invoices, letters of credit, or bills of lading, into digital tokens on a secure blockchain, which is a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger maintained by a distributed network of computers. This allows for instant, verifiable, and programmable value transfer.

While this technology is often framed as a fintech solution, it holds critical strategic value as it reduces exposure to digital choke points, limits undue data transfer risks, and decentralizes liquidity flows in times of economic stress or sanctions. In this respect, tokenized trade finance better enables equal footing for parties participating in a transaction, bypassing the traditional cumbersome systems that place significant emphasis on intermediaries and trust. Crucially, by leveraging a distributed ledger, tokenizing trade finance resists single points of failure, making it more resilient to external pressures than traditionally centralized systems.

Malaysian micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), the key drivers of trade finance in Malaysia, are currently extremely reliant on manual, paper-based processes. Despite the country’s relatively robust digital retail payments industry, enabled by platforms such as Touch ‘n Go and Maybank’s MAE, its trade finance sector remains fragmented and split between analog and digital implementation. A prime example of this can be seen in the rollout of mandatory e-invoicing and digital tax reporting tools in mid-2024. While a positive step toward modernization, this effort has seen uneven adoption, with many businesses struggling to align these new systems with legacy workflows, resulting in errors and delays in settlements.

Therefore, this mismatch between domestic digital innovation and enterprise-level infrastructure creates an exploitable vulnerability for Malaysia. In the event of a geopolitical dispute, threat actors could exploit these digital gaps through transactional blockades, data theft, or even ransomware attacks, disrupting cross-border trade flows. Therefore, ensuring digital infrastructure sovereignty is extremely important for Malaysia, particularly as supply chains become key battlegrounds for influence and coercion.

BRICS and the Challenge of Digital Infrastructure Sovereignty

The proposed BRICS Pay infrastructure, alongside digital infrastructure initiatives such as the Blockchain Service Network (BSN) and the possibility of Belt and Road Initiative-linked stablecoins, represent China’s increasing utilization of infrastructure tools as instruments of influence. This is particularly concerning for Malaysia, since, by default, these tools would come with governance models that reflect an authoritarian digital economy, a system where the government would exercise ultimate control over all data and digital platforms to the detriment of user privacy and innovation. As a result, countries that adopt them risk becoming locked into asymmetric dependencies with China, potentially affecting national data sovereignty and even economic continuity.

However, the launch of the national Malaysian Blockchain Infrastructure (MBI) in April 2025, a live digital asset sandbox, alongside its efforts to work with regional partners like Singapore through SGTraDex, showcases Malaysia’s desire for digital sovereignty, with its decentralized homegrown platforms serving as a key countermeasure to reliance on centralized foreign systems.

Economic Statecraft Through Tokenization

Tokenizing trade finance will enable Malaysia to maintain strategic ambiguity in its partnerships while avoiding digital dependencies. Additionally, this move could enable businesses to access new liquidity pools, including alternative and decentralized finance (DeFi) providers, within financing systems that are not overly dependent on any single external financial architecture. This fulfills a significant gap for Malaysian MSMEs today, with the MSME funding gap standing at $21.5b, which is equivalent to around 5% of Malaysia’s GDP.

To this end, Malaysia’s Securities Commission unveiled a proposal for tokenizing capital market products in mid-2025 and has since announced a digital asset regulatory sandbox. When combined with Malaysia’s existing global leadership in Islamic finance, tokenized instruments such as a proposed cross-border smart sukuk could enable greater financial inclusion on a global basis, with smart sukuks being Shariah-compliant bond-like financial instruments projected to be worth over $1t in 2025. In this case, smart contracts would automate and enforce Shariah concepts, enabling Malaysian-based financial innovation with both religious and strategic legitimacy.

Securing Malaysia’s Digital Infrastructure

In late 2024, Malaysia gained “partner country” status in BRICS, with cross-border yuan transactions growing 27% in Q1 2025. With China continuing to be Malaysia’s largest economic partner, Malaysia’s participation in BRICS does introduce the threat of subtle entanglement through digital platforms. A tokenized domestically-governed digital finance architecture gives Malaysia a hedge against these possibilities, enabling continuous cross-border trade despite the threat of sanctions, payment blockades, or the withdrawal of digital services by foreign entities.

Ensuring digital infrastructure sovereignty will help Malaysia secure its economic future. This is especially critical due to the increasing prevalence of supply chains, data, and economics in today’s definition of conflict, highlighting a distinct need for economic participation, continuity, and simultaneous national resiliency in light of gray zone conflict.

Malaysia’s 2020 blockchain pilot in palm oil supply chain traceability shows its early interest in applying blockchain to its national growth priorities. These capabilities could be drawn upon for expansion if tokenized trade finance becomes widespread, with use-cases including commodities, halal trade, and green finance, making Malaysia a credible standard-setter for secure, transparent, and Shariah-compliant trade systems.

Conclusion

As digital ecosystems become tools of geopolitical influence, Malaysia has a chance to lead in not only ensuring its own digital infrastructure sovereignty but also in securing its economic future. Tokenized trade finance is one key way that Malaysia can continue to grow economically while still engaging with China and other ASEAN nations. Additionally, securing digital sovereignty is a pillar of Malaysia’s broader national security strategy, with the ability to safeguard economic flows and assert control over digital infrastructure being key in this respect.

All in all, Malaysia could become a model for other mid-sized economies pursuing increased economic growth while maintaining digital infrastructure sovereignty, with trade finance tokenization providing Malaysia the unique opportunity to benefit from strategic competition without being consumed by it.

Tags: blockchain, BRICS, Digital sovereignty, INDO-PACIFIC, Tokenization, Trade finance

About The Author

Hugh Harsono
Hugh Harsono's research interests focus on emerging technologies’ impact on international security, technology policy, and strategic competition. Hugh received his graduate and undergraduate degrees from the University of California, Berkeley.

25. Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet

Excerpts:

Conclusion

For decades, the geographic remoteness of the bases that the American bomber fleet calls home protected the most valuable air assets that the U.S. possessed from enemy attack. In the age of cheap drones that can be smuggled close to a target and released nearby, however, the fundamental ideas behind airbase defense need to change. Ukraine has created a new paradigm in offensive operations behind enemy lines. Kyiv demonstrated the ability of a well-planned attack, bypassing geographic distance, technical challenges, and the alertness of a police state, to simultaneously strike multiple airbases and destroy billions of dollars in irreplaceable assets.

To defend our bomber fleet from such an attack, the United States needs to apply a layered defense model using dispersion, early detection, passive defenses, and a variety of methods of active defense to safeguard the bombers that form a core part of our military strategy. While the post-Cold War model of cost cutting and defense by geography has been sufficient to defend the American bomber fleet in a world where threats mainly came from a small number of highly effective and expensive systems like cruise missiles, the introduction of cheap weapons, deployable by small sabotage teams working deep within enemy territory and accurate enough to target specific points on an aircraft, has obviated the old model. Adaptation to current conditions is a necessity to secure the future of the U.S. bomber fleet.

Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/09/cheap-drones-priceless-targets-fortifying-americas-bomber-fleet/

by Daniel Allen, by Marco Volpitta

09.09.2025 at 06:00am

Photo Credit: Viacheslav Ratynskyi

Abstract

In June of 2025, Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb proved that 117 cheap drones were sufficient to cripple a third of Russia’s bomber fleet overnight. Ukraine’s massive operational success underlined a simple fact: the logic of previous aircraft basing no longer holds. Remoteness is no longer as effective a shield as once thought, and threats towards high-value assets can come in the form of small drones and large, expensive missiles. What was once efficiency is now complacency, and the U.S. Air Force needs to learn from the mistakes of our adversary to minimize the risk of a strike that could cause irreparable damage to the U.S. bomber fleet. Solutions to this problem exist, and if implemented by the United States, can provide increased resiliency to our strategic assets in the 21st century.

Irreplaceable and Concentrated

Much like Russia’s far interior, the United States bomber fleet has benefited from its relative isolation from the rest of the world. Two oceans separate the continental United States (CONUS) from its major adversaries, and the north and southern borders present no significant threats to some of the U.S.’s most valuable strategic air assets. As a result, the U.S. bomber fleet’s footprint since 1988 has been consolidated to bring all U.S. bombers to just five home bases across three time zones: Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri; Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas. There are a few bombers stationed at any given time at Edwards Air Force Base, California, for flight testing, and others are deployed abroad. However, the overall picture is clear: a successful attack on just a handful of American airbases using small, cheap drones could cripple the U.S. ability to use bomber assets for the foreseeable future.

Long life cycles of modern bomber aircraft mean that the United States has no immediate capacity to produce legacy aircraft beyond maintenance and upgrades. Much like the Russians, our current crop of bombers went out of production long ago. With the exception of the B-21 Raider — itself still early in its production cycle — any bombers destroyed or significantly damaged could not be replaced on the shortened timescale an attack on the U.S. homeland would require.

While sources occasionally allude to the use of multirole fighters like the F-35 to replace certain missions of strategic bombers (such as nuclear payload delivery), clear operational limitations make their use as “complete replacements” untenable. Long-range bombers such as the B-52H can fly 8,800 miles unrefueled while hauling 70,000 lb. of ordnance, and the forthcoming B-21 Raider, which the Air Force calls “the backbone of our bomber fleet,” gives Washington the option to strike or visibly hold at risk any target on earth from domestic bases. By contrast, the F-15E’s ferry range is 2,400 mi even with three external fuel tanks, and the F-35A’s internal-fuel range is just over 1,350 mi, so both fighters must rely on tankers and forward hubs to reach intercontinental distances. Bombers also carry a broad nuclear load-out, such as air-launched cruise missiles, whereas the F-35A was only certified in 2024 to deliver a single B61-12 gravity bomb. Fighters augment regional operations, but they cannot replace the bombers’ unique blend of global reach, heavy payload, and strategic-signaling power that anchors U.S. deterrence strategy. These weapons are irreplaceable and more vulnerable than ever.

Latent Threats

Chinese purchase of farmland across the U.S. further elevates the dangers to the U.S.’s strategic bomber fleet. In 2010, Chinese ownership of American farmland was valued at roughly $81 million; by 2022, it had surged to approximately $1.9 billion, a more than twentyfold increase. Morgan Lerette, a former contractor for the private military contractor Blackwater, writes, “The Chinese are, or will, use this farmland to learn more about U.S. military capabilities, movements, and technology.” Indeed, the strategic purchase of land immediately adjacent to (or nearby) American bases – including Grand Forks Air Force Base and Warren Air Force Base (which has since been divested)- raises the danger of offering a launch point for sabotage missions or deep-strike operations similar to what was witnessed in Operation Spiderweb. Chinese nationals have already used drones to enhance their surveillance efforts; Key West, Florida, has seen repeated incidents at an intelligence center, where Chinese ‘tourists’ were found swimming near the military facility and snapping photos. While government reforms to land ownership have attempted to counter these emerging threats, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) backed companies have grown increasingly creative, using judicial loopholes to circumvent restrictions. The innocuous cornfields surrounding the U.S.’s newly vulnerable strategic bombers have thus become a possible forward operating post in a future crisis.

Solutions

To defend our bomber fleet, we can think in terms of James Reason’s Swiss cheese model. Any single line of defense will have holes that can be exploited, but by layering different defenses on top of each other, the system can cover for the weaknesses of any individual defense. The goal is to create a system where individual layers of defense complement each other and where responding to one layer makes another more effective. Options for short- and long-term solutions that are both passive and active are highlighted below.

Short Term

Long Term

Passive

Anti-drone netting
Training soldiers in drone spotting
Investing in EW capabilities
Investing in radar capabilities
Land purchase restrictions

Active

Training soldiers in drone defense
Investment and development in anti-drone systems
Building hardened shelters
Reoccupying deactivated or downsized bases from the Cold War

Short Term & Passive

The current conflict in Ukraine has seen the widespread use of anti-drone netting, including for the protection of entire logistics routes in the hottest sectors of the conflict. Both Russian and Ukrainian combat engineers have set up these tunnels, though they have only been effective when constantly maintained and well-built to ensure drones can’t slip through holes in the netting. These nets have the benefit of being easy and quick to set up, on a timescale of hours or days instead of the months or years required to fund, plan, and build more permanent infrastructure. They also have the benefit of being more flexible: drone netting could protect American bombers at home airbases as well as at forward operating bases like Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with a minimum of lead time and effort to set up, lending them to snap deployments in response to regional events. For U.S. home airbases, these would be best as a temporary solution. Anti-drone netting simply does not provide the same amount of protection as a true aircraft shelter, and the bases where strategic bombers can be expected to spend most of their time are worth the investment of proper protection.

Short Term & Active

Electronic warfare is, as the war in Ukraine has shown, the focal point of drone defense. In the U.S., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) already has a contract with a company called Dedrone to protect civilian airports and civilian airliners from small drones. The U.S. military should look to emulate and expand this model, extending the use of electronic warfare from operations abroad to peacetime defense of critical infrastructure like the airbases holding strategic aircraft. Electronic jamming will be crucial: with the exception of fiber optic drones, small drones tend to be susceptible to signal jamming, and the drones involved in Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb were flown using a combination of signal transceivers and autonomous piloting. While autonomous targeting systems can’t be jammed, the presence of those systems only as a backup suggests that human piloting is still preferable to AI-driven systems.

The ability to jam both commonly used and novel radio frequencies used to communicate with drones will be important: with the speed of adaptation in the war in Ukraine, jammers and drones not developed in that crucible are outdated as soon as they arrive. Using the experience of our allies in Ukraine will allow for American jamming capabilities to stay ahead of the game, leveraging American expertise in technologies like digital signals to give ourselves and our allies an edge in the constant battle of adaptation. American airbases should also have the ability to turn off cell signals within a radius of at least several miles with no lead time or external clearance. During the Spiderweb attacks in June, Ukrainian pilots used Russia’s LTE cell coverage to pilot the drones remotely from within Ukrainian territory itself. GPS signals carry different (though similar) risks, allowing both drone pilots and autonomous drones to better pinpoint their location and therefore the way to the target.

Long Term & Passive

While a potentially costly solution, simply reoccupying some of the bases deactivated or downsized during the Cold War or in its immediate aftermath could reduce the potential damage any single attack could cause the fleet, complicate the logistics of a mass strike, and make such a strike more detectable. Especially for active fighter bases, the amount of additional logistics required could be minimized.

Defense companies, both established and new, have developed radars specifically suited to picking small drones out from ground clutter. The use of these radars in Ukraine under combat conditions has allowed for adaptation to real-world conditions. The U.S. should take advantage of these existing systems as well as its deep pool of capital and defense engineering expertise to continue developing new methods of radar detection to maximize the window of detection that radars can afford an airbase under attack.

As a more permanent passive defense, hardened aircraft shelters are a cost-effective and shovel-ready solution for the protection of the U.S. bomber fleet. Satellite imagery of Whiteman Air Force Base shows that these structures have already been built to permanently house the American B-2 fleet; given the novel threats facing the bomber fleet today, it would be a cost-effective solution to extend this protection to other aircraft types. While the cost of a hardened shelter is difficult to ascertain from public documents, recent contracts as well as recent publications suggest a cost per shelter on the order of $8-9 million each. However, this may be a low estimate given the larger size of bomber aircraft compared to fighters. Interest in these shelters has been growing for some time. Most recently, Congress published an open letter in 2024 to the Air Force and Navy asking for clarification on the feasibility of better protecting U.S. aircraft on the ground with such shelters, with the signatories including Secretary of Defense (then Senator) Marco Rubio.

China has certainly made a decision regarding the value of these structures: over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has built over 400, while the U.S. has built only 22. While the sheer number of upgrades the B-52 has gone through in its nearly 70 year service life makes it difficult to estimate the cost of a single bomber, the eye-popping price tags on more recent bombers make the additional cost of aircraft shelters well worth it if they protect even a handful of B-1s or B-52s, or a single B-2 or B-21. Shelters also have the benefit of being a well-understood, mature technology that could be constructed in a matter of a few years. The contracts linked above were closed in two to three years; if tenders had been released to build shelters when Congress asked about their feasibility in May of 2024, they would be approximately halfway done by now.

Long Term & Active

To engage in active defense against a swarm of cheap drones, those drones must be detected first. Though solutions are being proposed and developed, radar systems have, since their inception, been focused on large, fast targets like fighter and bomber aircraft or missiles. Drones flip these assumptions on their head: by being small, flying low, and being constructed of materials like carbon fiber and plastic, they become extremely difficult to distinguish from radar “clutter,” and reaction times suffer as a result. In many cases, even with a radar pointed at an incoming small drone, the first warning will be visual or auditory. Defense companies, both established and new, have developed radars specifically suited to picking small drones out from ground clutter. The use of these radars in Ukraine under combat conditions has allowed for adaptation to real-world conditions. The U.S. should take advantage of these existing systems as well as its deep pool of capital and defense engineering expertise to continue developing new methods of radar detection in order to maximize the window of detection that radars can afford an airbase under attack.

In addition to radar, the U.S. should utilize its airmen to give more consistent surveillance of the outskirts of crucial airbases. Where a radar might miss a drone in ground clutter, a human tasked with guarding a sector is much less likely to miss the distinctive and loud sound of a small drone passing close by on its way towards the assets within an airbase and able to report such an incursion or even respond. While a screen of airmen with shotguns trained in skeet shooting is far from an ironclad guarantee of keeping drones out of an airbase, it’s one more layer of defense that can be deployed to collectively make it harder to attack valuable air assets. Furthermore, training and equipping ground troops in the use of fragmenting rifle rounds that increase the chance to hit a moving aerial target, or introducing newer kinetic options such as Saab’s new Loke anti-drone cannon system, will be crucial in preparing airbases for novel attacks. The speed of deployment of these systems- the Loke system was developed and tested in just 84 days– is indicative of the opportunity that exists in kinetic drone defense. As rapidly evolving technology, the infusion of American defense technology expertise and capital would allow for these systems to be brought online faster and with better results. The U.S. should partner with its allies, such as Sweden, to ensure that defense technology is developed as quickly and effectively as possible and to leverage experience gained by allies’ development programs. Ukraine in particular provides an excellent testing ground for new systems, and has recently begun a program aimed at providing live combat test data for Western military systems in exchange for the military edge those systems provide.

Conclusion

For decades, the geographic remoteness of the bases that the American bomber fleet calls home protected the most valuable air assets that the U.S. possessed from enemy attack. In the age of cheap drones that can be smuggled close to a target and released nearby, however, the fundamental ideas behind airbase defense need to change. Ukraine has created a new paradigm in offensive operations behind enemy lines. Kyiv demonstrated the ability of a well-planned attack, bypassing geographic distance, technical challenges, and the alertness of a police state, to simultaneously strike multiple airbases and destroy billions of dollars in irreplaceable assets.

To defend our bomber fleet from such an attack, the United States needs to apply a layered defense model using dispersion, early detection, passive defenses, and a variety of methods of active defense to safeguard the bombers that form a core part of our military strategy. While the post-Cold War model of cost cutting and defense by geography has been sufficient to defend the American bomber fleet in a world where threats mainly came from a small number of highly effective and expensive systems like cruise missiles, the introduction of cheap weapons, deployable by small sabotage teams working deep within enemy territory and accurate enough to target specific points on an aircraft, has obviated the old model. Adaptation to current conditions is a necessity to secure the future of the U.S. bomber fleet.

Tags: America’s Bomber Fleet, drone warfare, kinetic drone defense, Operation Spiderweb

About The Authors

Daniel Allen
Daniel Allen previously evaluated nuclear programs and military capabilities for the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. He has held research positions at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and the University of Chicago. He is an incoming research assistant at the RAND Corporation.
View all posts
Marco Volpitta
Marco Volpitta graduated from Middlebury College in February, where he studied biochemistry, international politics, and economics. He is currently a volunteer in Ukraine, where he works in a field kitchen and is in the process of joining the drone forces of the Ukrainian military.

26. 'It’s not weird’: The people who love to stare at airplane flight maps

Okay. I admit to doing this for a long time. I always have the map on and when I take a break from reading I stare at the map. I especially like it when I am flying trans-pacific flights as I like staring at the view of the map from the top of the world. It fascinates me when I see the proximity of North America and the EurAsian landmass (and greenland as well.). But I do not think I will be enjoying the map as much today on my short flight to Texas.

‘It’s not weird’: The people who love to stare at airplane flight maps

“Flight pathers” were picking maps over movies before it was trendy on TikTok.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2025/09/09/flight-map-airlines-trend/

September 9, 2025 at 5:00 a.m. EDTToday at 5:00 a.m. EDT

5 min

Summary

(Illustration by Richard A. Chance for The Washington Post)

By Hannah Sampson

Nicole Sunderland doesn’t have to ponder the in-flight entertainment options when she looks at the screen on the plane seat in front of her.

She’ll be watching the map, thank you very much.

Travel better with news, tips and guides that make you feel like a local wherever you go. In your inbox, Thursdays.

“I’ll fly to Qatar for 14 hours and that map will be on the entire time,” said Sunderland, 41, a content creator and consultant who splits time between the D.C. area and Phoenix. Flight attendants don’t always understand: “Sometimes they’ll reach in and be like, ‘Do you want us to turn it off?’ And I’m like, ‘No, no. Leave it on.’”

She’s part of a robust group of fliers who keep their eyes on the plane’s progress. The practice got a blast of publicity last year amid a social media trend that featured travelers — mostly men — staring straight ahead at maps or blank space during long trips to prove ... something.

“You just gonna sit there staring at the back of the seat?” Elaine Benes asks her on-again, off-again boyfriend David Puddy in an oft-referenced episode of “Seinfeld.” “Yeah,” he replies, staring blankly ahead with a satisfied look on his face.

The name of the trend is too crude to spell out in a family newspaper (think: uncooked canine). In some cases, according to news articles that questioned whether participants were “heroic or foolish,” travelers shunned drinking water or even bathroom visits. Some commenters hailed the “ultimate dopamine detox” while fliers bragged about reaching a new personal best.

Follow Travel

Whether it was a true endurance challenge or a merely a bit, the internet had a blast with it.

“The mind is capable of amazing things,” the text over one apparently tongue-in-cheek TikTok says. “My mind knows no limits. I am operating in a different spiritual realm.”

An in-flight map from FlightPath3D. (FlightPath3D)

‘Raving map fans’

Moving in-flight maps, which first appeared on passenger planes in the 1980s, boast broad appeal beyond the brief trend.

According to FlightPath3D, an in-flight map provider for more than 90 airlines, about 68 percent of passengers open the map on seat-back screens and 20 percent view only the map. Delta Air Lines has said the flight map is the top piece of content, with 45 percent of passengers engaging with it during flights.

Duncan Jackson, president of FlightPath3D, has a name for the fans: flight pathers. He said there are now options built in to explore animated previews of destinations, global route maps and animal-filled kids’ maps. Last year, he said, 400 million passengers used the product.

“There’s comfort in it. For some, it’s almost meditative,” he said. “They just love to see where they are, how long’s left, watch the progress of the aircraft across the flight plan. There are just raving map fans.”

Sunderland’s interest — obsession even — in pinpointing her location in the sky dates back to a turbulent flight between the Bahamas and Florida in 2017. Now, she keeps her eye on the elevation to see how much the plane has dropped in shaky air. She will try to sleep on an overnight, pick up a book and may occasionally watch her comfort movie, “Crazy Rich Asians.” But her eyes return to the map whenever there are bumps.

“All my travel companions make fun of me, every single one,” she said.

She once took a long flight with a friend who watched four or five Harry Potter movies in a row.

“My anxious self ... I was watching the speed, the elevation, the flight path,” said Sunderland.

Cheaper than buying WiFi

Manu Seminara said watching maps on a plane is “almost like a hobby.” The London resident works for a marketing agency and posts travel content on TikTok, where she shared a video of people around her watching movies and TV shows on a plane while she adjusted her view of the map.

“I try to put on a movie and I’m like, ‘This is more interesting,’” she said. She loves seeing the elevation and what city she’s flying over.

Seminara said she felt “seen, honestly” when flight map fixations went viral last year.

“I was doing this, and it’s not weird, because clearly people are doing it,” she said. “They’re just coming out now.”

Nick Kosir, who is known as the Dancing Weatherman on Fox Weather, was talking to his manager about a recent flight a couple years back.

“It was awesome: I just sat there, stared straight ahead and didn’t do anything for five hours,” said Kosir, who lives in New York City. “He goes, ‘Dude, that’s a serial killer trait.’”

When the trend started to go viral the following year, he sent an example to his manager and said “I found my people.”

Kosir made his own video showing himself watching the flight map. He said he spends so much time online every day that he welcomes an escape. Sometimes he just tries to focus on creative ideas or deep thinking before the plane lands. On the flight he put on TikTok, he wrote he counted to 1 million twice.

“On a plane, I’m too cheap to buy the WiFi so it actually is peaceful in my mind and I truly enjoy that,” he said. “If there’s nothing in front of me, I just stare blankly into the cosmos.”

But if the flight map is available, he’s a fan.

“I weirdly like watching the flight tracker just because it’s cool to me; it’s cool to see how fast the plane is going, it’s cool to see what state you’re over,” he said. “Something about it is oddly comforting.”

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

China’s Xi proposes GGI to reshape global governance: Will the world follow?

REFERENCING THE PAST TO SHAPE THE PRESENT

BUILDING ON PAST MESSAGING

TURNING RHETORIC INTO REALITY?

A PLATFORM OF PROMISE AND LIMITS

Commentary: What China’s weapons parade says about its military might

A SURVIVABLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

AN ARRAY OF HYPERSONIC MISSILES

COUNTER-DRONE SYSTEMS

A U.S.-India Repair Attempt

The summer spat has eased, but Trump’s tariffs still stir anti-American sentiments.

U.S.-China Rivalry Sparks a Submarine Arms Race

Beijing’s fleet gets quieter and more lethal; Washington leads in tech, lags in production

Quick Summary

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Hyundai Raid Exposes Shortage of Visas for Asian Companies Trying to Move Staff

Immigration raid at a plant in Georgia points to difficulty getting permits for workers with specialized skills

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Kenya Uses U.S.-Funded Antiterrorism Courts for Political Crackdown

Young people who took to the streets to protest corruption and poor job prospects could face decades in maximum-security prison under a set of laws set up to combat al Qaeda

If only Trump’s ‘Department of War’ were focused on actual war-fighting

On a day of rebranding at the Pentagon, this name change slipped under the radar

ICE’s Raid on Korean Workers and Trump’s Clashing Priorities

Georgia plant construction delayed

Aggressive immigration policies clash with goal for foreign investment

Why the World Turned on NGOs

More from the Fall 2025 print issue

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The Development Economist Who Wasn’t

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The airport stop that blew the case open

What investigators say the mission was

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Conclusion

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Conclusion

Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet

Abstract

Irreplaceable and Concentrated

Latent Threats

Solutions

Short Term & Passive

Short Term & Active

Long Term & Passive

Long Term & Active

Conclusion

About The Authors

‘It’s not weird’: The people who love to stare at airplane flight maps

‘Raving map fans’