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CGG Files SEB Complaint for Emergency Relief for

Ballot Secrecy Issues

September 24, 2026 


Georgia County Election Officials:



Coalition for Good Governance has filed an emergency complaint with the State Election Board seeking prompt action to prevent Georgia’s voting system from creating traceable electronic ballot records in the November election. You may read the complaint and proposed compliance order here. 


We chose Cobb County and Gwinnett County as respondents, not because their practices are particularly different than other counties, but because we have had extensive communications with those two counties in the past about these issues. Both counties maintain well organized records and have excellent legal counsel, and are therefore in a position to help promptly resolve the issues to everyone’s benefit.


We would have preferred that the SEB take rulemaking action months ago, even at the August board meeting, to give the counties and voters the guidance needed. However, to date, they have declined to give the matter the rulemaking attention it requires, leaving the decision-making up to each county on how to comply with the mandatory multiple ballot secrecy laws in the face of a flawed software program in the scanners.  


We recognize that voting begins soon and that election officials are already managing demanding schedules, fixed budgets, poll-worker training, equipment preparation, and many other responsibilities. Last-minute procedural changes are never welcome. It is deeply unfortunate that this longstanding problem remains unresolved by state officials so close to the start of voting.


But in short, it is never “too late” or “too burdensome”  to protect voters’ constitutional rights, which is a core responsibility of county officials.


CGG has worked for many years to protect voters’ right to a secret ballot. From our many prior emails, you are aware that we have been warning state and county officials about this vulnerability and urging action for months, particularly since we discovered the ability of AI to rapidly exploit this long standing vulnerability.  We sincerely hope counties have been developing contingency plans over the last few months to prevent anonymous paper ballots from being de-anonymized when they are scanned.


The problem simply must be solved. Creating electronic records capable of connecting voters to their choices threatens to depress November’s turnout, facilitate voter intimidation and coercion, enable the quiet use of voting information to discriminate against people because of their political views, and invite serious post-election challenges. This data must never be created in the first place. When an election system creates a reliable, systemic means of tracing ballots to voters, the resulting election does not satisfy Georgia’s constitutional requirement of a secret ballot, and invites post-election challenge.


We are sympathetic to the additional administrative burden that corrective procedures may impose on counties. Unfortunately, county election administrators are now experiencing the consequences of state officials’ failure to resolve a long-known problem in a timely manner. Our proposed interim remedy—thoroughly shuffling ballots before they are scanned—is not technologically complex, although we recognize that it will require planning, training, careful security and ballot accounting controls, and additional work.


Several misconceptions have complicated discussion of this issue. We address some of the common ones we’ve heard below.


Misconception 1: This is primarily a small-county problem and does not significantly affect large counties.


The facts: This is not merely a small-county problem. In fact, large counties using multiple advance-voting locations are often especially vulnerable because each location serves voters from many precincts and hundreds of possible ballot styles.


That diversity can make a voter’s ballot easier—not harder—to identify. At a particular time and location, relatively few voters may be casting exactly the same ballot style. If someone has an approximate voting time and knows the voter’s ballot style, those facts can substantially narrow the possible ballot records. Generally, the majority of voters’ records can be connected with the voter in large county vote centers. 


Princeton researcher Max Springer used the Ball Ground Vote Center in Cherokee County as a proof-of-concept location for a large-county vote center. For the May 2026 primary, he reported obtaining high-confidence voter-to-ballot matches for 1,618 of the location’s 1,860 advance-voting ballots—approximately 87 percent. (But note Misconception 2 below. A contemporaneous list of voters or security video of the polling place would have boosted the match to 100%.)


Every county, regardless of size, has a material issue of unlawfully creating traceable ballots. 


Misconception 2: Matching voters to their ballots still requires substantial “guesswork.”


The facts: That is misinformation spread by the SOS office. The fact is that when the order in which voters used a scanner is accurately recorded, matching voters to electronic ballot records does not require any guesswork. A 100% match can be done.


The scanner software assigns Record IDs using a predictable number rather than a random one. Applying a simple mathematical formula to the electronic ballot records reveals the order in which the ballots were scanned. If that reconstructed ballot order is paired with an accurate record of voter order—such as security video, a poll watcher’s contemporaneous list, or scanner public-counter observations—the corresponding voter and ballot record can be matched directly with complete accuracy. This is all described in the 2024 peer reviewed and award winning academic paper.  But the 10 minute video presentation gives a clear user-friendly overview of the problem.


Some uncertainty can arise when no contemporaneous record of voter order exists and check-in timestamps are used as an approximation of scanning order. For example, several voters with the same ballot style may check in close together and then scan their ballots in a different sequence. That limitation does not eliminate the vulnerability. It means only that particular ballots may be harder to match using only that particular source of information.


The constitutional standard is not whether every voter’s ballot can be identified. A system that provides a reliable means of tracing a meaningful number of ballots to voters is unacceptable. Georgia law requires “absolute ballot secrecy” for every voter.


Misconception 3: Deleting the Record ID column from a cast-vote-record file, as the SOS instructed, solves the problem.


The facts: This is more misinformation promoted by the SOS office. Deleting the Record ID column alone does not prevent traceable ballot records from being created, retained, or potentially reconstructed.


The DVSorder researchers explained this problem in Section 5.2 of their 2024 peer-reviewed paper, available here. Depending on the structure and ordering of the released data, removing the Record ID field may not prevent reconstruction of the ballot sequence.


I tested this theory using redacted cast-vote-record data from three counties, with my own rudimentary layman-level skills. A basic Chat GPT-driven brute-force exercise successfully reconstructed ballot order in approximately 15 minutes of computer time per county.


More fundamentally, public-record redaction occurs only after the scanner has already created the unlawful traceable electronic record. The voter-to-ballot connection must be avoided before scanning, to comply with law. With the current software, the paper ballot is anonymous before scanning, but the scanner’s creation of an electronic ballot record unlawfully de-anonymizes it by placing that record in a recoverable sequence.


Misconception 4: Ballots are naturally shuffled when they fall into the scanner’s ballot container.


The facts: What happens to the physical ballot after scanning does not correct the traceable electronic record already created when the ballot enters the scanner.

The constitutional injury occurs when the ballot is scanned and the system generates an electronic ballot image and cast-vote record in a recoverable sequence. Even if the paper ballots become disordered after falling into the scanner container, the electronic records remain traceable.


That is why any physical shuffling used as an interim safeguard must occur before the ballots are scanned.



Misconception 5: Withholding or redacting public records will adequately protect the upcoming election.


The facts: Once the current software scans a ballot and unlawfully creates a traceable electronic record, later withholding or redaction cannot undo that event.

Ballot secrecy does not mean merely limiting traceable voting information to government officials, contractors, or vendors. Georgia law requires an anonymous ballot—not a traceable ballot treated as confidential.


Hundreds of individuals may have direct or indirect access to counties’ election data. The Secretary of State’s office obtains election databases from counties, and traceable data are also provided to Enhanced Voting, a commercial vendor. Records may be copied, transferred, retained, breached, inadvertently disclosed, or intentionally misused.


As we have noted before, the documented abuses involving Flock camera data demonstrate why merely limiting sensitive information to insiders is not an adequate safeguard. Data capable of revealing voters’ choices are extraordinarily valuable and tempting. The responsible course is not to create those data in the first place.


Misconception 6: The use of hand marked ballots rather than BMDs would resolve the issue.


The facts: No, the problem is in the scanner software, which assigns the same flawed pseudo-random number series whether the ballot is hand marked or machine marked.  While it is true that hand counting ballots would avoid the problem, we do not recommend that approach. Hand counting should be reserved for recounts and audits or very small local elections. 


Misconception 7: The legislature refused to fund the software update that would have solved this.


The facts: Secretary Raffensperger did not request funding for the software update in either of the two sessions this year. We believe that very few lawmakers were aware of the ballot secrecy software flaw or the urgent need to update the software, and therefore did not ask Raffensperger about it.  Also, Secretary Raffensperger had wildly overstated the cost and time necessary for a software update in years past.  


There’s no doubt that the legislature would have funded the rather modest, but essential, cost of the software update had it been clearly requested and the ballot secrecy issue explained. The SOS office testified at the 2024 Curling trial that updating the software would take approximately 20 minutes per touchscreen. Of course, multiple touchscreens can be updated simultaneously. The process would have been similar to the process the counties undertook in October 2020 to update the software for the candidate display issue which was accomplished in 11 days statewide during Covid. The update could have easily been done during August had the SOS office wished to do so. 


What we believe counties should do now


First, ensure that your county attorney is fully informed and engaged in this topic. 


We understand that new procedures may strain county resources and require additional training shortly before voting begins. Election officials did not create the software flaw, and county personnel should not have been left to address it at this late date without clear and lawful statewide guidance.


Nevertheless, even without state agency guidance, every county superintendent has an independent duty to conduct elections in a lawful manner that guarantees ballot secrecy. We urge you to review the list of applicable ballot secrecy laws on [page 4] of the complaint which counties must comply with, regardless of SOS practices, supplied software, or improper state directives. 


Counties should act now to establish a documented plan that prevents ballots from being de-anonymized when scanned, regardless of whether the Secretary of State provides different administrative instructions, or the State Election Board issues emergency rules.


Counties should make plans for: 

·       Securely collecting ballots without scanning them in voter order, using traditional non-electronic ballot boxes;

·       maintaining bipartisan chain of custody and complete ballot accounting;

·       thoroughly shuffling ballots in sufficiently large groups before scanning;

·       preserving meaningful observation by poll watchers and the public;

·       protecting accessible voting; and

·       reconciling ballots, voter check-ins, and scanner totals.


The precise procedure may vary with county size, voting volume, facility configuration, and ballot-style distribution. We suggest that counties involve their boards, election staff, attorneys, and technical advisers immediately, if contingency plans have not already been made.


Our complaint also explains our objections to the Secretary of State’s instructions concerning the withholding of election records. CGG does not support releasing cast-vote records or ballot images from prior elections in a form that exposes voters, as explained in the complaint. At the same time, destroying the audit trail or withholding entire categories of records is not an acceptable or lawful solution.


For prior elections, counties should use a technically validated sanitization process that replaces traceable original identifiers with genuinely randomized substitute identifiers applied consistently to cast-vote records and corresponding ballot images. This preserves the ability to compare each cast-vote record with its ballot image without exposing the original scanning sequence.


Please join us in requesting prompt State Election Board action. We ask county election officials to join us in urging the State Election Board to convene an emergency hearing, consider emergency rules, and provide counties with lawful, practical, and uniform guidance before voting begins. County officials and their counsel should have a central role in that proceeding so the Board can understand the operational realities and identify workable procedures.


We are available to answer questions about our complaint and discuss the technical, legal, and operational issues. Please submit questions privately [here] or contact me at Marilyn@uscgg.org We will use that input to prepare additional proposed guidance and, where appropriate, a public FAQ without identifying the person or county submitting the question.


We recognize the difficult position in which counties have been placed, and we appreciate the work election officials are doing under intense time pressure. Our objective is to work collaboratively toward a solution that protects voters, preserves election transparency, and reduces the risk of disruption before, during, and after the election.


The need is urgent, but workable solutions remain available. We respectfully ask every county to act promptly, and to contact the SEB to urge their immediate action. 


Marilyn Marks

Executive Director

Marilyn@uscgg.org


About Coalition for Good Governance

Coalition for Good Governance is a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to protecting voters’ rights to secure, fair, and transparent elections with verifiable outcomes. The Coalition works to ensure that every voter can cast a completely secret ballot and have confidence in the accuracy and integrity of election results.