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After the Supreme Court modified the deadly force standard in Tennessee v. Garner, I was asked by CPCA to draft a change to § 53a-22. Believing police should be held to a single standard, I merely proposed adding the Supreme Court’s language which was subsequently adopted by the legislature. In 1996, I tried a deadly force case where an emotionally disturbed man was shot when he approached the officer with a knife. Following a jury verdict in favor of the officer, the case was appealed on a negligence issue. I argued to the appellate court that officers should be held to a single consistent standard. It is hard enough being an officer without being subjected to liability when having to decide which standard applies when making a split-second decision in a life and death situation. The Court affirmed the judgement in favor of the officer but did not address the single standard issue.
The possibility of state prosecution for the use of deadly force which might be objectively reasonable in federal court arose when Hartford Officer Magnano was arrested under factual circumstances similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kisela v. Hughes, where the officer’s actions were found to be not constitutionally unreasonable. The case was summarized in an earlier article but for the purpose of this article it is sufficient to note that at the moment of the shooting the potential victim in Kisela was about 6 feet from the stationary person who had approached with a knife. In Magnano the subject was approaching with the knife from approximately 10 feet from the potential victim.
A more recent IG report published on July 2, 2026, found deadly force to be unreasonable in a State Police ramming incident. This incident was closely analogous to the Supreme Court case of Scott v. Harris, where the Court found the use of deadly force to be reasonable. Here is a comparison of the significant facts:
OFFENSES PRIOR TO USE OF FORCE:
State Police: Speeding (initially 80 to 90 then up to 120 mph), misuse of plates, failure to maintain lane, reckless driving, engaging in pursuit, suspicion of driving while intoxicated.
Scott: Speeding (initially 73 mph in a 55 zone, then up to 90 mph),
TRAFFIC:
Light in both cases and essentially no traffic at time of use of force.
NATURE OF SUSPECT OPERATION:
Videos appear to show more swerving in the State Police matter and more controlled driving in Scott who largely maintained lanes and used his blinker light when passing.
NATURE OF AREA:
Both were on limited access highways absent pedestrian or bicycle traffic. At one point the Scott pursuit entered a shopping center that appeared to be closed. He exited the mall, striking a cruiser, but the impact was not discernable on the video.
LIGHTING AND WEATHER:
Both were at night and weather was clear.
USE OF FORCE:
State Police: Stop sticks were deployed (speed continued at 75 mph +), 1st and 2nd rams at approximately 76 mph, 3rd ram (PIT) at 47 mph.
Scott: Rammed once at approximately 85 mph.
AUTHORIZATION:
Both pursuits and use of force were authorized. In Scott, only a PIT was authorized.
INSPECTOR GENERAL FINDINGS:
The IG found that “Trooper Blanchette’s actions were not objectively reasonable as a whole. It was also not objectively reasonable for Blanchette to believe, at the time that he used deadly physical force, that the Accord posed an imminent risk of death or serious physical injury to other motorists or the public.”
The IG noted, “Although federal law does not govern the assessment of whether a police officer’s use of deadly force is objectively reasonable under General Statutes §53a-22, the general observations about the realities of policing expressed in Graham are often helpful in evaluating a determination of justification made under state law.” The report applies the facts of the case in determining that, “It certainly is a significant factor in assessing whether it warranted engaging in conduct that could reasonably be expected to have killed or seriously injured both the driver and the passenger of the Accord.”
The IG noted that at the time of the first ram that a tire was off the vehicle and it slowed to 65-75 mph, and it was logical to believe the Honda would continue to lose more speed diminishing the risk. In Scott, the vehicle was traveling at over 85 mph.
The IG exercised discretion in declining to prosecute because, in the context of this case, the use of deadly force was not well-defined. “Indeed, I am unaware of any prior criminal prosecutions in Connecticut against an officer for the unjustified use of deadly physical force by way of a forced stop procedure. The lack of clearer guidance as to what prosecutors and judges will consider to be deadly physical force in this context militates against a prosecution in this case. This report, however, should help to provide police officers a clearer understanding of the conduct my office will, going forward, categorize as deadly physical force.” The IG also acknowledged that the Trooper’s supervisor authorized the use of force.
It is of course totally appropriate to consider prior precedent in determining the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force in a particular circumstance. It appears that the IG may in the next similar use of deadly force to sop a vehicle, consider this finding as sufficient notice of criminal behavior to initiate criminal proceedings.
U.S. SUPREME COURT FINDINGS IN SCOTT v. HARRIS, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
In Scott, the Court described the process for evaluating the reasonableness of deadly force in stopping a dangerous fleeing vehicle which was queried in the IG’s report. “We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”
The Court considered the option of ending the pursuit. The choice presented the option of ramming the suspect and eliminating the risks to others or allowing the suspect to continue with the uncertainty as to what would happen thereafter. “We think the police need not have taken that chance and hope for the best.” It appears that the Supreme Court would have little difficulty finding that the first two rams by the State Trooper at speeds of over 75 mph were reasonable, but when the suspect vehicle slowed to 47 mph the PIT maneuver may have been unreasonable. But the question at that point is whether the PIT would amount to deadly force. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the supervisor who authorized the PIT acted reasonably. A PIT, when performed properly, is a relatively safe tactic. The Court reasoned that “authorizing a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT) is a standard, safe driving technique designed to stop a motorist quickly by throwing the car into a spin at controlled, lower speeds.” Therefore, a PIT at 47 mph might not be likely to cause serious injury or death.
The Supreme Court’s primary concern was the safety of innocent people. In Scott, there were no travelers in the immediate location where the suspect was rammed. However, common sense informs us that when driving on public highways one never knows when innocent travelers will appear. “… We are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”
“The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable.”
Assuming a vehicle operated at 75 mph, with a blown tire, poses a risk to innocent travelers, the question becomes whether applying deadly force to stop the dangerous operation amounts to a felony under Connecticut law. The finding that the trooper’s use of force was unreasonable puts Connecticut officers on notice that they may face arrest.
Will it also be criminal if the vehicle is capable of being driven at 100 or 120 mph?
Will the officer who chooses to not use force be protected from state liability if the occupants of the suspect vehicle who may be considered identifiable persons subjected to imminent harm are injured or killed?
Will the officer who fails to perform their most essential public duty of protecting innocent people be sued or disciplined for neglect of duty if innocent travelers are killed or seriously injured?
Will officers trained on Supreme or Second Circuit precedent finding the use of deadly force, under similar circumstances, is reasonable when the Court emphasizes their duty to protect innocent people, be criminally charged if their acts, under state law, are found to pose a risk to criminals who create potential risks to others even if deadly force is justified under federal law?
In other words, can or should an officer be prosecuted under state law when the same act would be deemed reasonable under federal law? Or, as the IG determined in this case, maybe administrative remedies are a better remedy in questionable deadly force cases?
Written by Elliot B. Spector, Esquire
Spector Criminal Justice Training Network, Inc.
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