What Does Biden’s Executive Order Restricting Chinese Investment Really Mean?
Marriage therapists say that when couples argue in a relationship, the topic they think they’re arguing about is usually just a surface-level trigger for the deeper, ongoing tensions couples tend to have.
It’s not a perfect parallel for the US and China, but it’s not a bad one either.
President Biden’s recent executive order – the same legal power that Abraham Lincoln used to end US slavery via the Emancipation Proclamation – only intends to limit US PE and VC investment into the AI, quantum computing, and semiconductor industries in China.
Officials repeatedly used the word “narrow” in their talking points, and between the 45-day comment period and when the order takes effect (likely in 2024), what’s actually restricted within those industries will likely be narrowed further.
“No Biotech”
I spoke several times with the BBC and also with Caijing about this executive order, and was delighted to share my thoughts in this newsletter when Leon asked. While the order doesn’t restrict biotech or pharmaceutical investment, the fact that everyone’s immediately saying that it has “no biotech restrictions” is itself telling of what restrictions may come next.
The intention of this order is likely to fill the gap between export restrictions and company-specific blacklists. More simply, the US wants to avoid investment situations like 4Paradigm – a Chinese AI company that received investment from Sequoia as well as Goldman Sachs, and whose technology is now being used by the Chinese military.
Think of it this way: If you’re the US government, and if you have a budding adversary that you say is stealing hundreds of billions of dollars in IP from your country every year, and whose military has been threatening to attack an island you’ve implicitly, if not explicitly, committed to defending militarily, having your nation’s businesses supply capital and know-how to startups there – startups that must help their government if asked to – is a bad look.
And although the Chinese Embassy called Biden’s order “blatant economic coercion and technological bullying,” given China’s own requirements that outbound investments get cleared by both the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) – in addition to the requirement that the outbound money transfer to be approved by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) – it seems unlikely that the Chinese government would allow Chinese investors to directly support American military or surveillance technology.
The US and China are feuding, and this is what feuding nations do. And it’s not really about the money – it’s more about the know-how that tends to accompany it.
I don’t see this particular executive order as as big a blow to the Chinese startup industry as what may come next. Nobody in Congress seems to be saying it went too far, and many are saying it was too appeasing to China – in fact, Janet Yelled alerted Chinese offices to this order during her visit last month, and the White House is likely intending to signal restraint to their Chinese counterparts.
At the same time, Biden seems equally likely to use what he believes to be a muted, anodyne step to rally international allies around. But that could take a year or more.
Biotech: How Long Until More Restrictions?
The untold and unfortunate story, well-known to readers of this newsletter, is that there are a lot of Chinese biotech entrepreneurs who truly want to help patients and make the world better, and there are a lot of US investors who want to fund them. The cross-border medical industry was the last to be affected by the trade war for this reason.
Nothing about that is restricted by this order. Furthermore, cross-border university collaborations and IP licensing are specifically not set to be restricted, too.
In the last half-decade, the US has added teeth to both biotechnology export restrictions and the CFIUS process (which regulates US inbound foreign investment); those remain the bottom line for now. And while stories like CFIUS’ September 2022 blocking of China-based Asymchem’s attempt to buy 82% of Massachusetts-based MIT spinoff Snapdragon Chemistry, or F-Star Therapeutics struggle (ultimately successful) to get acquired by the UK subsidiary of Sino Biopharmaceutical make the headlines, the majority of CFIUS requests are approved, even by Chinese applicants (who tend to make up 15%-20% of CFIUS applications, making them the largest group).
That reflects a self-selection bias, though. Many Chinese PE firms once active in the US have stepped aside due to CFIUS headaches. And some others will be affected by this executive order, to the extent that it limits US investment firms investing in Chinese investment firms that in turn invest Chinese biotechs. And with global foreign direct investment (FDI) into China down 89% in the second quarter these Chinese investment firms have other headaches, too.
Bottom line? Biden’s executive order may be a welcome nothingburger for Chinese biotech startups as it’s written, but I see cross-border capital and IP collaboration getting harder, and not easier, over the next three to five years – if not more.
I hope I’m wrong. — James Early
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