Three years after the full invasion of Ukraine, on the surface there seems to be continuity of Russian influence in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but this belies significant shifts under the surface in a rapidly evolving geopolitical context. Drawing on insights from critical geopolitics, as well as our previous work in the region, we show how and why we should look beyond an elite-centric view of geopolitics to the geopolitical imaginaries of ordinary people. We argue that this is not just an ethical concern but can help us better understand empirical processes currently underway. The full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sent shock waves through the region, with public demonstrations in support of Ukraine in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Analysts at the time predicted that Central Asian countries would move away from Russia. Three years later however, the relationship of these countries with Russia is as close as ever, in spite of a renewed interest in the region by the West.
Does this demonstrate that elite geopolitics is all that matters? We argue that this isn’t the case, and that there are reasons why popular support for a close relationship with Russia has remained high – but also that this is in light of important reconfigurations affecting different strata of society (differently in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). Reconfiguration of labour migration, the emergence of a younger generation of well-educated urban middle class beginning to question historical legacies of Soviet rule, but also the emergence of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as hubs of Russian sanction evasion are part of how entanglements with and imaginaries of Russia are changing among populations and businesses.
Kazakh and Kyrgyz elites are navigating the issue of association with Russia more carefully than before, but regime legitimacy remains an important element of how the relationship with Russia is conducted. We conclude that popular imaginaries and practices co-produce a strong association with Russia, but the parameters are shifting.
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