By Gerard Virga

I lost a hearing early in my career that I had no business losing. The law was on my side. My preparation was the problem.

My client had a sympathetic story to tell, and more to the point, a truly compelling and touching one. So, I did what any committed young lawyer does and went over her direct with her again and again until she could recite it in her sleep. We ran her direct over and over until every answer came out clean and polished. I thought that was the job.

We sat through a long morning docket to be heard, and by the time she took the stand, the polish worked against us. Her answers came a half-second too fast and a little too smooth, and I watched the judge quit taking notes. What I had built as credibility was landing on the bench as coaching. My honest witness sounded rehearsed because I had rehearsed the honesty right out of her.

We did not lose the case, but we lost that afternoon. What I remember most came after that hearing. As I packed up, the judge stopped me and said, “Gerard, everybody who walks through that door has a few dents in them. It’s the ones who come in looking perfect that I stop believing.”

That one sentence did more to level up my trial work than any seminar I have sat through. A family court judge spends all day sorting out who is telling the truth, and real testimony has some grit to it. The pause. The correction. The answer that wanders before it lands. Sand all of that off and you have not helped your witness. You have taken away the one thing the judge was listening for: AUTHENTICITY.

If you want to level up your practice, start there. I still prep witnesses hard. I just prep them to tell their truth now, which means staying true to their own story, in the way only they can tell it, in their own voice. Authenticity cannot be coached, and it is often the single most important element in winning your case.

Case Law Update

By Cameron Carlyle and Shannon McLin, B.C.S.


In Stewart v. Vindel, No. SC2024-0428 (Fla. July 9, 2026), the Florida Supreme Court resolved a district conflict and held that trial courts have discretion under section 61.075, Florida Statutes to award prejudgment interest when necessary to achieve an equitable distribution of marital property. The Court emphasized, however, that prejudgment interest is not automatic. Whether prejudgment interest should be awarded depends on the particular facts and equitable considerations presented in each case.

The case arose from a dissolution of marriage proceeding filed by the former husband in 2018. An uncontested judgment dissolved the marriage approximately nine months later, but the trial court reserved jurisdiction over equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. The equitable distribution issues were not resolved until 2022. The trial court valued the marital property as of the date the petition was filed. The former wife requested prejudgment interest on her share of the marital assets from the date of filing through the eventual distribution. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that it would be inequitable to charge the former husband interest for delays largely caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Third District reversed, concluding that the trial court’s reason for denying prejudgment interest lacked evidentiary support. The Court’s decision conflicted with Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), which held that prejudgment interest was unavailable in equitable distribution proceedings because section 61.075, Florida Statutes did not expressly authorize it. The Supreme Court approved the Third District’s decision and disapproved Iarussi. The Court focused on section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes, which provides that the statute’s equitable distribution provisions are “in addition to all other remedies available to a court to do equity between the parties.” The Court concluded that this broad language encompasses prejudgment interest as an equitable remedy. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute’s express authorization of interest on postjudgment installment payments implied that prejudgment interest was prohibited.

The Court explained that prejudgment interest may be appropriate when one spouse has been deprived of meaningful access to significant marital property during the dissolution of marriage proceeding. Joint ownership does not necessarily mean that both spouses had equal possession, use, control, or economic benefit from the property. When sufficient facts exist, the trial court retains discretion to determine whether prejudgment interest is an appropriate means of achieving equity.


The Dissent

Justice Labarga dissented, reasoning that section 61.075, Florida Statutes expressly authorizes a trial court to consider the time value of money when an equitable distribution award is paid in installments after judgment, but it does not expressly authorize prejudgment interest. Therefore, in his view, the Legislature’s inclusion of postjudgment interest and omission of prejudgment interest demonstrated that the prejudgment interest was not available. He cautioned that courts may not add relief to a statute that the Legislature did not provide. The majority rejected that negative-implication analysis, concluding that the statute’s broader authorization of other remedies necessary to do equity was sufficient.

Practice-Pointer

Family law practitioners should now evaluate prejudgment interest as a potential component of equitable distribution, particularly in cases involving lengthy proceedings, an early valuation date, exclusive control of income-producing or appreciating assets, or one spouse’s prolonged inability to access marital funds. A party seeking prejudgment interest should expressly request it in the pleadings, pretrial filings, or at trial, and present evidence establishing the period of deprivation, the assets involved, who controlled or benefited from them, and why interest is necessary to achieve equity. Counsel should also request specific findings supporting the ruling. Conversely, a party opposing prejudgment interest should present evidence identifying delays not attributable to that party and explaining why an award would be inequitable. A generalized request or argument, unsupported by evidence and a clear trial court ruling, may be insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Tech Tip: The Invisible Witness - Metadata Fabrication of Evidence in Family Law

By Fritznie Jarbath

Your client hands you a screenshot — timestamped, seemingly authentic — showing the other party sending a threatening message at 2:47 a.m. It looks real. It may not be.

Every digital file carries metadata: an invisible layer of embedded data encoding when a file was created, modified, and on what device. For a photograph, it includes GPS coordinates, camera settings, and timestamp. For a Word document, it includes the author’s name, creation date, and full revision history. Most practitioners never look. Most opposing parties know that.

Free tools available online allow anyone to alter timestamps, strip GPS data, and rewrite document properties in minutes — without leaving traces visible to the naked eye. Add AI-generated images and deepfake technology into the mix, and the digital evidence your client is up against may be entirely fabricated while appearing entirely legitimate. Florida courts are already confronting this. In early 2026, a Miami-Dade virtual hearing was terminated when the presiding judge raised concerns that a witness may have been AI-generated.

Family law cases run on digital evidence: texts, emails, financial records, photographs. The digital evidence makes our clients uniquely vulnerable. The first line of defense is simple: stop treating digital exhibits as self-authenticating. Demand native file production in discovery — not screenshots, not PDFs — so forensic metadata analysis remains possible. Sometimes, the matter is a bit more complex, and you should know when a certified digital forensics expert belongs on your team.