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FEBRUARY 2025
UnderTheLens
Macro Analytics - 03/10/25
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GERMANY'S "WHATEVER IT TAKES" MOMENT
OBSERVATIONS: THE BIDEN "EXCESS DEBT" RECESSION IS NEAR!
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow model projection for real GDP growth in the first quarter of 2025 (Q1 2025) is now showing a slump to -1.5%. This marks a significant downward revision from the previous estimate of 2.3% on February 19, 2025. How did we go from +2.3% to -1.5% in less than a month?
The immediate and expected reaction from the media will be to call this the beginning of a “Trump recession” and blame it on President Trump’s policies. It is almost hilarious (if not alarming) to read the hundreds of comments arguing that the Atlanta Fed NowCast means that the new administration’s policies are causing a recession.
First of all let us appreciate that the United States has been in a private sector recession for months. However, an abnormal increase in government spending during a period of growth and a risky borrowing policy led to a bloated Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The United States had a $7.59 trillion nominal GDP increase between 2021 and 2024 compared to a rise of $8.47 trillion in government debt. This marks the worst GDP growth adjusted for government debt accumulation since the 1930s.
The US government spending financed by increasing federal debt accounted for about 22% to 25% of the total US GDP growth over 2021–2024. This extraordinary increase in government spending in the middle of a recovery led to record-high government debt and was the leading cause of money supply growth and, with it, the inflation burst that Americans are suffering today.
WHAT IS GOING ON?
The short answer is Keynesian Stimulus Spending no longer works and Biden knew it! The math is simple:
- In the US it now takes as much as $2.50 of New Debt to produce the $1 of economic growth.
- In the US it now takes as much as $1.50 of Deficit Growth to produce $1 of economic growth.
- In Q4 2024 it took $5.8 Debt = $1 GDP; In Biden's last year of 2014 it took $3.9 Debt for $1 GDP.
The Biden Administration's spending was out of control and they knew it! The leading money supply growth soared and the cumulative inflation suffered by Americans in the past four years was over 20.9%, with groceries and gas prices rising by more than 40%. Excessive government spending was not only the cause of the rise in money supply growth and the burst of inflation, but also led to an $8.47 trillion increase in debt and an unsustainable path to financial ruin if policies remained the same. The Biden's expectations were that the Regulatory State would shift in his second term to even more control (Price Controls, YCC, QE) as the government took full control of a more centralized liberally planned economy.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, with no policy changes, the United States would have accumulated deficits of $12.6 trillion between 2025 and 2030. ===>
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VIDEO PREVIEW (click image)
Pay-Per-View Page Link
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THIS WEEK WE SAW
Exp=Expectations, Rev=Revision, Prev=Previous
US
US Challenger Layoffs (Feb) 172k (Prev. 49.795k)
US ISM Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 50.3 vs. Exp. 50.8 (Prev. 50.9)
US ISM Manuf Employment Idx (Feb) 47.6 (Prev. 50.3)
US ISM Manuf New Orders Idx (Feb) 48.6 (Prev. 55.1)
GERMANY
German HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 46.5 vs. Exp. 46.1 (Prev. 46.1)
German HCOB Construction PMI (Feb) 41.2 (Prev. 42.5)
German Industrial Orders MM (Jan) -7.0% vs. Exp. -2.8% (Prev. 6.9%)
===> Net interest outlays were expected to grow from $881 billion in 2024 to $1.2 trillion by 2030, even assuming no recessions or unemployment increases.
Cutting government spending is essential to reduce prices, bring inflation under control and stop the looming public finance disaster. By 2024, it became evident that revenue measures would not reduce the United States federal deficit. Deficits are always a spending problem.
We must remember that 2024’s 2.8% GDP growth reflected almost $2 trillion in borrowing, a roughly one-to-one spending-to-growth ratio and a dangerous path to a debt crisis.
Private GDP should measure the economy, as government spending and debt do not drive productive growth. Stripping government spending can give us a more accurate picture of the reality of the productive sector in America. The latest Atlanta Fed estimates show a massive decline in net exports (-3.7%) due to a large increase in imports, a small decline in consumption of goods (-0.09%), but strong services (+0.62%), rises in government expenditure (+0.34%) and a healthy increase in investment (+0.62%).
Thus, the surprising factor is an abnormal slump in exports and a rise in imports that may be revised, because the trade deficit in December 2024 rose to a record $98.4 billion and GDP did not reflect such a massive slump in net exports. The concerning thing is that government spending continues to be excessive, and the United States is running an annualised $2.5 trillion deficit.
The United States will not enter a recession due to the change of administration, but because of the excess spending policies of the Biden years. Reducing federal spending, deficit and debt accumulation is essential to recover the health of the economy.
Bloating GDP with public spending and debt is not growing; it is the recipe for disaster.
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WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW!
FED'S US GDPNow REAL GDP FORECAST
PLUNGES DRAMATICALLY!
The GDPNow model estimate for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the first quarter of 2025 projections plummeted to a -1.5% annualized increase. This was largely seen to be due to plummeting net exports.
We believe it was due to surging Imports "front running" US Tariffs.
This leaves many wondering what happened to the so-called “Golden Age of America.”
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RESEARCH - MARKET DRIVERS
1- GERMANY'S "WHATEVER IT TAKES" MOMENT
- A Massive Reflation Bazooka of €900B is now being placed in the German Legislative Plan.
- The leaderships of Germany’s traditional two dominant parties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, announced their intention to borrow €900 billion to be spent on two funds covering defense and infrastructure.
- To do this, Germany plans to amend the German constitution in the two weeks before the next legislature is convened.
- The most consequential was in the 10-year bund yield, which rose 30 basis points for its biggest one-day rise since Germany reunified in 1990.
- The euro has surged against the dollar, and appeared to break conclusively out of what many thought would be a protracted downward trend.
2- POTENTIAL MACRO TRADING SCENARIOS
- With the macro landscape continuing to price in a US growth slowdown, Goldman Sachs goes through Five potential macro scenario moving into 2025 and how best to play it via an equity theme across the US, Europe and ROW.
- Three factors to consider when deciding upon the equity theme:
- Growth slowing or accelerating?
- Inflation rising or falling?
- Central Banks easing or tightening?
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DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH - POLICY DRIVERS
1- THE NEW STRATEGIC RESERVE - Bitcoin
- President Trump just signed an executive order on Thursday creating a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, marking a major shift in U.S. digital asset policy.
- Instead of acquiring crypto assets, White House Crypto and AI Czar David Sacks, a Silicon Valley venture capitalist, indicated that the reserve will be funded exclusively with bitcoin seized in criminal and civil forfeiture cases, ensuring that taxpayers bear no financial burden.
2- RESCISSION v IMPOUNDMENT - Key To DOGE Budget Results Not Stopped By Courts
- Rescission is an alternative to "impoundment,
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RESCISSION: Ensures DOGE cuts stick via this relatively expeditious budget-slashing technique.
- The approach could guide DOGE cuts around federal judges who consider executive-branch-initiated spending cuts as exceeding constitutional authority.
-
Rescission offers a means by which presidents can collaborate with Congress to cancel previously-appropriated spending. Enabled by Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the rarely-used process starts with the president sending a special message to Congress, providing specific details about which budgetary authorities he wants to rescind.
- IMPOUNDMENT
- Rescission is an alternative to "impoundment," by which presidents unilaterally delay Congressionally-directed spending.
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC REPORTING -
ECONOMIC DRIVERS
LABOR REPORT (NFP)
- Most notably in the February Labor Report was the Underemployment rate, which jumped to 8%, its highest level since October 2021, as household employment dropped by 588K (See chart below right).
- The jump in broad unemployment is pretty noteworthy.
- Underemployment jumped from 7.5% to 8% even as the labor participation rate fell. That is the highest it has been since when we were still in the aftermath of COVID).
ECB RATE CUTS
- The ECB's rate cut was not in doubt by anyone, and the ECB did not disappoint, cutting rates for the 6th time in a row by 25bps across the board.
- Deposit rate to 2.5% from 2.75%
- Refinancing Rate to 2.65% from 2.90%
- Marginal lending to 2.60% from 2.85%).
- What everyone was focusing on was whether the ECB would use the word "restrictive" in the statement. And while it did use it, here is what it said: "Monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive, as the interest rate cuts are making new borrowing less expensive for firms and households, and loan growth is picking up."
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RESEARCH - MARKET DRIVERS | |
1- GERMANY'S "WHATEVER IT TAKES" MOMENT
BLOOMBERG - JOHN AUTHERS - 02-06-25
A €900B MASSIVE REFLATION BAZOOKA
Sometimes you can feel the global economy’s tectonic plates move under your feet. This is one of those times.
Late last Tuesday, the leaderships of Germany’s traditional two dominant parties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, announced their intention to borrow €900 billion, to be spent on two funds covering defense and infrastructure.
PLAN CALLS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION
To do this, they will amend the German constitution in the two weeks before the next legislature is convened.
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After decades of defiantly running a tightly conservative fiscal ship, this is a sudden “whatever it takes” moment. For European economics, the change is almost as radical as the US shift to support Russia rather than Ukraine. It’s also, of course, linked to that shift. Faced with a crisis imposed on them by the US, Germany’s governing elite has made a move that it had been resisting for decades.
Quantitatively, we can gauge what an asteroid collision this is from the market reaction.
The most consequential was in the 10-year bund yield, which rose 30 basis points for its biggest one-day rise since Germany reunified in 1990.
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Yes, this is a really big deal. But context is important. Even after its seismic selloff, the 10-year bund yield remains lower than equivalents in the US, the UK, or any other country in the EU. The market had been telling German politicians that they had room to do this.
Meanwhile, the euro has surged against the dollar, and appeared to break conclusively out of what many thought would be a protracted downward trend after Donald Trump won the US election.
| Stock markets, also trying to process developments on US tariffs, are staging a remarkable move out of the US and into Europe, particularly Germany. The market response to the twin crises of the US defense withdrawal and likely tariffs on the EU has so far been emphatic; traders think the US will come out of this worse than Germany. |
This is most dramatic in the mid-cap segment, where companies tend to be most directly exposed to their domestic economy rather than to global growth. The turnaround in favor of the German MDAX index, and against the S&P 400 mid-cap index in the US, has been breathtaking. It’s taken only two months.
With the European Central Bank scheduled to meet Thursday, and virtually certain to announce a rate cut, there’s concern that it will feel the need to address the sudden spurt of generous fiscal policy with somewhat tighter monetary policy. Projections for rate cuts over the rest of this year have been trimmed back in the overnight index swaps market.
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HIGHLIGHTS
- Nobody doubts that this is the biggest turning point for German economic policy at least since reunification, and possibly much longer. The country’s frugal monetary and fiscal policies are born of folk memories of the Weimar Republic’s hyperinflation a century ago, and this is a decisive turn away from that.
- Plenty of people predicted that Germany would have to start spending more; nobody I spoke to pretended to have had any idea of the scale of what is underway. Only a week ago, the talk was of €200 billion, which seemed extraordinary. Now we’re talking about €900 billion, closing in on the psychological threshold of $1 trillion.
- Everybody in the Frankfurt financial center seems elated. You would think that Germany had just won the World Cup.
- There is deep disquiet over the way this is being done. The lame duck parliament elected in 2021 is rushing this through in two weeks, led by a combination of parties that will no longer have the necessary two-thirds support to make this change once the newly elected legislature is seated in two weeks. It’s being orchestrated by the Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz, who spent the recent campaign arguing against doing any such thing. This isn’t a great advertisement for democracy, and there will be real trouble if it goes wrong.
- In the short run, there’s a slight risk that the Greens decline their support; the leaders of the CDU and SDP appear to have taken them for granted. There is also a need to find an extra four votes in Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat. This is likely, but not a total certainty.
- Longer term, the biggest risk might lie in the reaction function of the ECB. Its predecessor, the Bundesbank, responded to the massive fiscal expansion of reunification by hiking its deposit rate from 5% when the Berlin Wall came down 1989 to 8.75% by the summer of 1992, a move that broke the EU’s exchange rate mechanism and dampened the German economy. The ECB is a different institution, but gets a lot of its genes from the Bundesbank.
- Spending the money on something is not going to be difficult. Germany’s armed forces are inadequate. It has a well-established procurement system, and any money the Defense Ministry is allocated, it will spend. Investment in infrastructure will be more contentious, but again, there’s little doubt that the money can be spent.
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US Vice President JD Vance appears to be by a wide margin Frankfurt’s most despised living human. His name keeps coming up. Germans see his attempt to interfere in their election, tell them how to deal with their Nazi legacy and then humiliate Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, as despicable and unforgivable. It’s the extent of the shock caused by Vance (and Trump) that has shaken the German establishment into action. Or, put differently, if this was all a Machiavellian strategy by Vance to get Germany to take up its share of the burden of Europe’s defense, wow did it succeed.
- There’s hope, expressed by several people, that Germany’s ability to repurpose manufacturing facilities could help it swiftly turn around arms production as auto plants take up the burden. The US is so unpopular that it will be politically difficult to buy American arms.
There will be far more to write about this. For now, the optimism for a sustained stock market rally and for the German economy to jolt back into life is overwhelming. German financiers aren’t known for their over-excitability. They’re really excited now.
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2- POTENTIAL MACRO TRADING SCENARIOS
GOLDMAN SACHS - LINDSAY MATCHAM 02-07-25
With the macro landscape continuing to price in a US growth slowdown, Goldman Sachs goes through five potential macro scenario moving into 2025 and how best to play it via an equity theme across the US, Europe and ROW.
3 factors to consider when deciding upon the equity theme:
- Growth slowing or accelerating?
- Inflation rising or falling?
- Central Banks easing or tightening?
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Macro Scenario 1: Growth Slowing + Inflation Moving Lower + Central Banks Easing + Yield Curve Bull Flattens (Lower Yields + Lower Long End) or Bull Steepens (Lower Yields + Lower Short End)
Short Cyclicals + Long Defensives + Long ROW
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This is what is getting priced as I type; a growth slowdown in the US as Trump/Musk implement DOGE (austerity) and tariffs/reciprocal tariffs come into play, growth slowdown pricing overdone resulting in a broader risk-off move. Growth slowdown is not surprising given the large amounts of fiscal spending done previously. Real yields are rallying reflecting the weaker growth and disappointing EPS. This is different to a Goldilocks' disinflationary narrative where lower yields allow for easing which pushes equity valuations higher. In this scenario, curves either bull steepen as they are today: lower yields and lower in the short end to reflect a more aggressive FED cutting cycle or bull flatten as they have been in the past few weeks: lower yields and lower in the long end to reflect lower expectations of growth + inflation into the future.
Equity Thematic Implementations:
- US: Short Cyclicals vs Defensives ex Commodities {GSPUCYDE Index}. Short High Beta Cyclicals {GSXUHBCY Index}, Short Middle Income Consumer { GSXUMIDC Index}, Short Liquid Regional Banks { GSCBRGBK Index}.
- Europe: play for SX7E downside via futures, puts or puts spreads.
- Europe: Long EU Bond Proxies Basket { GSXEBOND Index} which is outperforming on today’s risk off move, Long Defensives { GSXEDEFS Index} which include food & bev, telecoms, media and utilities. Long EU Granolas { GSXEGRAN Index} which is also outperforming.
- ROW plays include long China heading into 2 sessions as money flows out of the US: AI: long GS China Tech AI-Benefi {GSXACAIT Index} and long GS China Humanoid Robots {GSXACHRO Index}. Consumption: long GS China Trade Ins {GSXACTRA Index}. Geopolitical Risk Off + Small Cap Upside + AI Exposure: long GS China Resilient Tech {GSCBCRTE Index}.
SX7E vs Cyclicals vs Defensives ex Commodities basket. .SX7E is selling off as I type, as growth/tariff concerns filter from the US through to Europe.
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Macro Scenario 2: Growth Slowing But Remaining Positive + Inflation Moving Lower+ Central Banks Easing + Yield Curve Bull Steepens (Lower Yields + Lower In The Short End)
Long Cyclicals + Long Small Caps + Long Commodities
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Growth slows but not that concerning, given it’s still positive (used to 3% growth post Covid) Yields and the USD move lower reflecting the growth slowdown. But FED cuts get priced in the front of the curve resulting in bull steepening FED & the ECB are able to cut into disinflation whilst growth remains OK; a positive risk asset environment. Disinflation allows Trump to enact his tax cuts resulting in small cap outperformance Growth positive + bull steepening: Cyclicals, small caps and commodities outperform as the cost of capital moves lower.
Equity Thematic Implementations:
- US: RTY upside is the play as small caps outperform as the cost of capital moves lower and growth remains positive.
- Europe: Long MDAX & EU Cyclicals Upside {GSXECYCL Index,} which include autos, chemicals, machineries, mining, oil and gas and semis.
In this scenario buy the dip in Russell and MDAX as curves bull steepen and growth remains positive.
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Macro Scenario 3: Growth Remaining Positive + Inflation Sticky + Central Banks On Hold/Hiking + Yield Curve Bear Steepens (Higher Yields + Higher In The Long End)
Long Cyclicals + Long Value + Long Commodities
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Inflation remains stickier than anticipated causing central banks to remain higher for longer in a growth environment Trump’s tariffs are inflationary, but trade continues to boom in a new higher for longer regime
In Europe. Fiscal deficits (and higher yields as a result) drive growth in the face of higher TTF prices. Yield curve bear steepens: higher yields and higher in the long end to reflect positive growth and future expectations of inflation and term premium In the environment of positive growth and higher yields. Cyclicals + Value + Commodities outperform during a healthy tightening.
Equity Thematic Implementations:
- US: long High Beta Cyclicals Basket {GSXUHBCY Index}, Long Liquid Regional Banks {GSCBRGBK Index}
- Europe: long SXPP for a cyclical and commodities rally, Long EU Nat Gas Exposed {GSXENGAS Index}, Long China Exposed Cyclicals {GSXECRSK Index}
- Long our Copper Basket {GSXGCOPP Index}
Buy the dip in our Global Copper Basket & SXPP if macro scenario 3 plays out.
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Macro Scenario 4: Growth Reacceleration + Inflation Moving Lower + Central Banks Easing + Yield Curve Bull Steepens (Lower Yields + Lower In The Short End)
The Everything Rally + Animal Spirits Reignite
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Trump breaks the back of inflation, reduces the deficit with DOGE & 30 year yields continue move lower. Trump’s tax cuts and de-regulation propel US GDP to higher levels. Lower shelter inflation brings inflation down to circa 2% allowing the FED and ECB to cut accordingly. The perfect risk asset environment resulting in the everything rally & animal spirits reignite.
Equity Thematic Implementations:
- US:: Long Memes {GSXUMEME Index}, Long HY Debt Sensitivity {GSXUDEBT Index}, Long US De-Reg {GSXUDREG Index}
- Europe: Long EU Weak Balance Sheet {GSXEWBAL Index}, EU Made In The USA {GSXEMADE Index}, Long EU Semis {GSSBSEMI Index}, Long Power Up {GSXEPOWR Index}, Long EU HY Debt {GSXEDEBT Index}
Buy the dip in US De-Reg and our EU Weak Balance Sheet in this scenario.
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Macro Scenario 5: Growth Slowing and Becoming Worrisome + Inflation Sticky + Central Banks On Hold/Hiking + Curves Bear Flattening (Higher Yields + Higher In The Short End)
Risk Off
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Growth continues to slow and moves into worrisome levels as Trump’s tariffs continue to drive risk off. Trump's tariffs end up being inflationary, resulting in central banks on hold with curves bear flattening; higher yields + higher in the short end. The higher cost of capital in a slowing growth environment is problematic for small caps/cyclicals, growth and non-profitable tech particularly.
Equity Thematic Implementations:
- US: Short Non Profitable Tech {GSXUNPTC Index} and short our Low Profit R2K Basket {GSCBNPR2 Index}
- Europe: short Cyclicals vs Defensives basket { GSPECYDE Index}, short Weak Balance Sheet {GSXEWBAL Index}, short HY Debt {GSXEDEBT Index}
Non Profitable Tech & EU Cyclicals would struggle in this scenario.
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DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH - Policy Drivers | |
1- THE NEW STRATEGIC RESERVE - Bitcoin
President Trump just signed an executive order on Thursday creating a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, marking a major shift in U.S. digital asset policy.
Instead of acquiring crypto assets, White House Crypto and AI Czar David Sacks, a Silicon Valley venture capitalist, indicated that the reserve will be funded exclusively with bitcoin seized in criminal and civil forfeiture cases, ensuring that taxpayers bear no financial burden.
- It is estimated that the U.S. government owns about 200,000 bitcoin; however, there has never been a complete audit. The E.O. directs a full accounting of the federal government’s digital asset holdings.
- The U.S. will not sell any bitcoin deposited into the Reserve. It will be kept as a store of value.
- The Reserve is like a digital Fort Knox for the cryptocurrency often called “digital gold.”
- Premature sales of bitcoin have already cost U.S. taxpayers over $17 billion in lost value.
- Now the federal government will have a strategy to maximize the value of its holdings.
- The Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce are authorized to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin, provided that those strategies have no incremental costs on American taxpayers.
US DIGITAL ASSET STOCKPILE
- The Executive Order establishes a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile, consisting of digital assets other than bitcoin forfeited in criminal or civil proceedings.
- The government will not acquire additional assets for the Stockpile beyond those obtained through forfeiture proceedings.
- The purpose of the Stockpile is responsible stewardship of the government’s digital assets under the Treasury Department.
PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT
- President Trump promised to create a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and Digital Asset Stockpile. Those promises have been kept.
- This Executive Order underscores President Trump’s commitment to making the U.S. the “crypto capital of the world.”
- I want to thank the President for his leadership and vision in supporting this cutting-edge technology and for his rapid execution in supporting the digital asset industry. His administration is truly moving at “tech speed.”
- I also want to thank the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets — especially Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick — for their help and support in getting this done. Finally Bo Hines played a critical role as Executive Director of our Working Group.
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2- RESCISSION v IMPOUNDMENT - Key To DOGE Budget Results Not Stopped By Courts
RESCISSION ensures DOGE cuts stick via this relatively expeditious budget-slashing technique.
- The approach could guide DOGE cuts around federal judges who consider executive-branch-initiated spending cuts as exceeding constitutional authority.
-
Rescission offers a means by which presidents can collaborate with Congress to cancel previously-appropriated spending. Enabled by Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the rarely-used process starts with the president sending a special message to Congress, providing specific details about which budgetary authorities he wants to rescind.
With Republicans holding a narrow 53-47 Senate majority, one of the most attractive aspects of rescission is that it doesn't require 60 votes -- a simple majority suffices to grant the president's wish. Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley told reporters that Musk was "elated" with Paul's proposal: "I think he didn't realize it could be done at 51." According to South Carolina Sen. Lindsay Graham, it was the first time Musk had heard of the rescission process. He said Musk reacted by triumphantly lifting his arms into the air.
The approach promises to immunize DOGE spending cuts from federal judges who are skeptical about the executive branch's power to cut spending that was duly authorized by Congress. This week has seen two major developments that demonstrate the strength of that judicial headwind:
IMPOUNDMENT
Rescission is an alternative to "impoundment," by which presidents unilaterally delay Congressionally-directed spending. First used by Thomas Jefferson, the method was restricted by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) after Democrats felt President Nixon was abusing it. Trump has called ICA "a disaster of a law" and vowed to “do everything I can to challenge [it] in court, and if necessary, get Congress to overturn it.” However, as noted above, the same law provides the opportunity for rescission, which means Trump can use ICA to his advantage.
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS - Economic Drivers | |
LABOR REPORT (NFP)
UNDEREMPLOYMENT (CHART RIGHT)
Most notably in the February Labor Report was the Underemployment rate which jumped to 8%, its highest level since October 2021, as household employment dropped by 588K (See chart below right).
The jump in broad unemployment is pretty noteworthy.
Underemployment jumped from 7.5% to 8%, even as the labor participation rate fell. That is the highest it has been since when we were still in the aftermath of COVID.
Pre COVID, the data doesn’t look as bad, though you need to go back to 2017 to find worse prints (8.1% was the high print in 2018 and 2019). While anything based on the Household part of the survey has a margin of error that can make it almost as useful as a random number, this still strikes me as a Canary In The Coal Mine!.
Expect the JOLTs Quit rate next week to confirm that the labor market was already shaky BEFORE the start of the tariff wars and shift in behavior towards the EU.
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HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (CHART RIGHT)
Looking at the household survey, the number of employed workers dropped by 588K after soaring in January; the number of unemployed workers rose by 203K from 6.849MM to 7.052MM.
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ECB RATE CUT ANNOUNCEMENT
The ECB's rate cut was not in doubt by anyone, and the ECB did not disappoint, cutting rates for the 6th time in a row by 25bps across the board.
- Deposit rate to 2.5% from 2.75%
- Refinancing Rate to 2.65% from 2.90%
- Marginal lending to 2.60% from 2.85%)
What everyone was focusing on was whether the ECB would use the word "restrictive" in the statement. And while it did use it, here is what it said: "Monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive, as the interest rate cuts are making new borrowing less expensive for firms and households and loan growth is picking up."
True, but one wonders just how restrictive fiscal policy is becoming now that European interest rates are exploding higher at the fastest pace since covid. We'll find out soon enough.
The ECB also said that "a headwind to the easing of financing conditions comes from past interest rate hikes still transmitting to the stock of credit, and lending remains subdued overall." As a result, the economy faces continued challenges "and staff have again marked down their growth projections – to 0.9% for 2025, 1.2% for 2026 and 1.3% for 2027".
The downward revisions for 2025 and 2026 reflect lower exports and ongoing weakness in investment, in part originating from high trade policy uncertainty as well as broader policy uncertainty." Meanwhile, rising real incomes and the gradually fading effects of past rate hikes remain the key drivers underpinning the expected pick-up in demand over time.
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GLOBAL
WHAT DOES YOUR SCAN OF THE DATA BELOW TELL YOU? - THE MEDIA AVOIDS BAD NEWS!
We present the data in a way you can quickly see what is happening.
THIS WEEK WE SAW
Exp. =Expectations, Prev. =Previous
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UNITED STATES
- US ISM Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 50.3 vs. Exp. 50.8 (Prev. 50.9)
- US ISM Manuf Employment Idx (Feb) 47.6 (Prev. 50.3)
- US ISM Manuf New Orders Idx (Feb) 48.6 (Prev. 55.1)
- US ISM Mfg Prices Paid (Feb) 62.4 vs. Exp. 55.8 (Prev. 54.9)
- US S&P Global Manufacturing PMI Final (Feb) 52.7 (Prev. 51.6)
- US Construction Spending MM (Jan) -0.2% (Prev. 0.5%)
- US IBD/TIPP Economic Optimism (Mar): 49.8 (Exp. 53.1, Prev. 52.0)
- US Redbook YY 6.6% (Prev. 6.2%)
- US ISM N-Mfg PMI (Feb) 53.5 vs. Exp. 52.6 (Prev. 52.8)
- US Factory Orders MM (Jan) 1.7% vs. Exp. 1.6% (Prev. -0.9%, Rev. -0.6%)
- US ADP National Employment (Feb) 77k vs. Exp. 140k (Prev. 183k, Rev. 186k)
- US S&P Global Services PMI Final (Feb) 51.0 (Prev. 49.7)
- US S&P Global Composite PMI Final (Feb) 51.6 (Prev. 50.4)
- US Wholesale Sales MM (Jan) -1.3% (Prev. 1.0%, Rev. 1.4%)
- US Wholesale Inventory R MM (Jan) 0.8% vs. Exp. 0.7% (Prev. 0.7%)
- US Initial Jobless Claims 221.0k vs. Exp. 235.0k (Prev. 242.0k)
- US Continued Jobless Claims 1.897M vs. Exp. 1.88M (Prev. 1.862M, Rev. 1.855M)
- US Challenger Layoffs (Feb) 172.017k (Prev. 49.795k)
CHINA
- Chinese Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 50.2 vs Exp. 49.9 (Prev. 49.1)
- Chinese Non-Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 50.4 vs Exp. 50.3 (Prev. 50.2)
- Chinese Composite PMI (Feb) 51.1 (Prev. 50.1)
- Chinese Caixin Manufacturing PMI Final (Feb) 50.8 vs. Exp. 50.3 (Prev. 50.1)
- Chinese Caixin Services PMI (Feb) 51.4 vs. Exp. 50.8 (Prev. 51.0); Composite PMI (Feb) 51.5 (Prev. 51.1)
- Chinese Trade Balance (USD)(Feb) 170.52B vs. Exp. 142.35B (Prev. 104.84B)
- Chinese Exports YY (USD)(Feb) 2.3% vs. Exp. 5.0% (Prev. 10.7%); Imports YY -8.4% vs. Exp. 1.0% (Prev. 1.0%)
- Chinese Trade Balance (CNY))(Feb) 1226.1B (Prev. 752.9B)
- Chinese Yuan-Denominated Exports (Feb) 3.0% (Prev. 10.9%); Imports (Feb) -7.3% (Prev. 1.30%)
JAPAN
- Japanese Unemployment Rate (Jan) 2.5% vs. Exp. 2.4% (Prev. 2.4%)
- Japanese Jobs/Applicants Ratio (Jan) 1.26 vs. Exp. 1.25 (Prev. 1.25)
AUSTRALIA
- Australian Current Account Balance SA (Q4) -12.5B AU vs. Exp. -11.9B AU (Prev. -14.1B AU)
- Australian Net Exports Contribution (Q4) 0.2% vs. Exp. -0.1% (Prev. 0.1%)
- Australian Retail Sales MM Final * (Jan) 0.3% vs. Exp. 0.3% (Prev. -0.1%)
- Australian Real GDP QQ SA (Q4) 0.6% vs. Exp. 0.5% (Prev. 0.3%); YY SA (Q4) 1.3% vs. Exp. 1.2% (Prev. 0.8%)
- Australian Building Approvals (Jan) 6.3% vs. Exp. 0.5% (Prev. 0.7%, Rev. 1.7%)
- Australian Balance on Goods (Jan) 5,620M vs. Exp. 5,500M (Prev. 5,085M)
- Australian Goods/Services Exports (Jan) 1.3% (Prev. 1.1%)
- Australian Goods/Services Imports (Jan) -0.3% (Prev. 5.9%)
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EU
- EU HICP Flash YY (Feb) 2.4% vs. Exp. 2.3% (Prev. 2.5%); services inflation 3.7% (prev. 3.9%); HICP Excluding Food, Energy, Alcohol & Tobacco Flash MM (Feb) 0.60% (Prev. -0.90%); HICP-X F&E Flash YY (Feb) 2.6% vs. Exp. 2.6% (Prev. 2.7%); HICP Excluding Food, Energy, Alcohol & Tobacco Flash YY (Feb) 2.6% vs. Exp. 2.5% (Prev. 2.7%).
- EU HCOB Manufacturing Final PMI (Feb) 47.6 vs. Exp. 47.3 (Prev. 47.3)
- EU Unemployment Rate (Jan) 6.2% vs. Exp. 6.3% (Prev. 6.3%, Rev. 6.2%)
- EU HCOB Services Final PMI (Feb) 50.6 vs. Exp. 50.7 (Prev. 50.7)
- EU HCOB Composite Final PMI (Feb) 50.2 vs. Exp. 50.2 (Prev. 50.2)
- EU HCOB Construction PMI (Feb) 42.7 (Prev. 45.4)
- EU Retail Sales MM (Jan) -0.3% vs. Exp. 0.1% (Prev. -0.2%)
- EU Retail Sales YY (Jan) 1.5% vs. Exp. 1.9% (Prev. 1.9%, Rev. 2.2%)
- EU Employment Final YY (Q4) 0.7% vs. Exp. 0.6% (Prev. 0.6%); GDP Revised YY (Q4) 1.2% vs. Exp. 0.9% (Prev. 0.9%); GDP Revised QQ (Q4) 0.2% vs. Exp. 0.1% (Prev. 0.1%); Employment Final QQ (Q4) 0.1% vs. Exp. 0.1% (Prev. 0.1%)
GERMANY
- German HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 46.5 vs. Exp. 46.1 (Prev. 46.1)
- German HCOB Services PMI (Feb) 51.1 vs. Exp. 52.2 (Prev. 52.2)
- German HCOB Composite Final PMI (Feb) 50.4 vs. Exp. 51 (Prev. 51)
- German HCOB Construction PMI (Feb) 41.2 (Prev. 42.5)
- German Industrial Orders MM (Jan) -7.0% vs. Exp. -2.8% (Prev. 6.9%)
FRANCE
- French HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 45.8 vs. Exp. 45.5 (Prev. 45.5)
- French Trade Balance, EUR, SA (Jan) -6.54B (Prev. -3.905B, Rev. -3.48B)
ITALY
- Italian HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 47.4 vs. Exp. 46.6 (Prev. 46.3)
SPAIN
- Spanish HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 49.7 vs. Exp. 51.5 (Prev. 50.9)
SWITZERLAND
- Swiss Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 49.6 vs. Exp. 48.0 (Prev. 47.5)
UK
- UK S&P Global Manufacturing PMI (Feb) 46.9 (Prev. 46.4)
- UK Mortgage Lending (Jan) 4.207B GB vs. Exp. 3.55B GB (Prev. 3.568B GB, Rev. 3.343B GB)UK Mortgage Approval (Jan) 66.189k vs. Exp. 65.65k (Prev. 66.526k, Rev. 66.505k); BOE Consumer Credit (Jan) 1.74B GB vs. Exp. 1.2B GB (Prev. 1.045B GB, Rev. 1.062B GB); M4 Money Supply (Jan) 1.3% (Prev. 0.1%)
- UK BRC Shop Price Index YY (Feb) -0.7% (Prev. -0.7%)
- UK grocery inflation 3.3% in the four weeks to February 23rd, via Kantar
- UK S&P Global Services PMI (Feb) 51.0 vs. Exp. 51.1 (Prev. 51.1)
- UK S&P Global Composite PMI (Feb) 50.5 vs. Exp. 50.5 (Prev. 50.5)
- UK S&P Global Construction PMI (Feb) 44.6 vs. Exp. 49.5 (Prev. 48.1)
- UK Halifax House Prices YY (Feb) 2.90% vs. Exp. 3.10% (Prev. 3.00%); MM (Feb) -0.1% vs. Exp. 0.3% (Prev. 0.7%)
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