The question presented on appeal in this case concerned the proper method for presenting and evaluating a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. As discussed by the Cal. Supreme Court in this decision, since 2003, the Labor Code has prescribed a framework: Once an employee-whistleblower establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that retaliation was a contributing factor in the employee’s termination, demotion, or other adverse action, the employer then bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action “for legitimate, independent reasons.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.6) But in the years since section 1102.6 became law, some courts persisted in instead applying the burden shifting framework borrowed from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Noting the lack of uniformity, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the Cal. Supreme court to decide which of these frameworks governs section 1102.5 retaliation claims. The Court concluded that courts should apply the framework prescribed by statute in Labor Code section 1102.6. Under that statute, employees need not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test to make out a case of unlawful retaliation.

Vines sued his former employer O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging race and age-based discrimination, harassment and retaliation-related claims. After a jury found in his favor and awarded damages on his claims for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation, Vines moved for an award of $809,681.25 in attorney fees. The trial court awarded only $129,540.44 in fees, based in part on its determination the unsuccessful discrimination and harassment claims were not sufficiently related or factually intertwined with the successful retaliation claims. On appeal Vines contended that the trial court's determination was based on a legal error and it thus abused its discretion in reducing the fee award. Agreeing with Vines, the court of appeal reversed the postjudgment fee order and remanded for the court to recalculate Vines’s fee award

Cirrincione filed a class action complaint against American Scissor Lift, alleging multiple wage and hour claims. The relevant claims alleged in the operative complaint were predicated on ASL’s

policy and/or practice of rounding the work time of its employees, which allegedly resulted in the systematic underpayment of wages, as well as its failure to: 1) provide meal breaks or pay premium wages in lieu thereof; 2) authorize or permit employees to take rest breaks or pay premium wages in lieu thereof; 3) timely pay its employees all unpaid wages due at termination or resignation; and 4) reimburse employees for using their personal cell phones, vehicles, and tools for work purposes. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification, concluding that class certification was not warranted because plaintiff had failed to establish that common questions of fact or law would predominate over individual questions, or that plaintiff’s claims were typical of those of the proposed subclasses. As for the proposed rounding subclass, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s contention that an employer’s practice of rounding work time in the absence of a uniform, written rounding policy is a violation of California law, finding that plaintiff had failed to support his position with any case law. The court also rejected plaintiff’s contention that any underpayment of wages resulting from ASL’s rounding practice could be accomplished by simply reviewing payroll records, explaining that his claim was belied by his own evidence. Finding no error, the court of appeal affirmed.

"Lawyers argue for a living. Some do more than argue. They lace their settlement demands with threats. When does such activity cross the line and become professional misconduct?" So began the court of appeal's decision in this appeal where Falcon Brands, Inc. and Coastal Harvest II, LLC (Falcon) appealed from an order granting respondent’s anti-SLAPP motion. The cross-complaint alleged extortion and intentional interference with a contract against attorney Amy Mousavi and her law firm, Mousavi & Lee, LLP (Mousavi). Falcon argued Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands which were the focus of Falcon’s cross-complaint, were not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP law because they constituted illegal attempts to force Falcon into settling the underlying matter. The trial court rejected this argument and granted Mousavi’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court of appeal reversed as to the first cause of action for extortion because it concluded Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, when considered in context, were not protected speech per the Cal. Supreme Court’s ruling in Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299). Instead, the appellate court concluded Mousavi’s escalating series of threats ultimately transformed what had been legitimate demands into extortion. It therefore concluded Falcon’s first cause of action was not protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The court of appeal affirmed as to the intentional interference with a contract cause of action. That claim arose out of Mousavi’s actual revelation of damaging information about Falcon to Falcon’s merger partner, and Falcon did not contend the revelations were illegal as a matter of law. Additionally, the revelations were made in furtherance of Mousavi’s contemplated litigation. Consequently, it determined the trial court had correctly concluded the revelations were protected by the litigation privilege, and thereby protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Espinoza sued his former employer, Hepta Run, Inc., and its owner, Ed Tseng, asserting causes of action for Labor Code wage and hour violations, unfair business practices in violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and representative claims for penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). Following a bench trial the court entered judgment in favor of Espinoza for $84,117.73. Hepta Run and Tseng appealed the judgment, as well as the trial court’s earlier order denying their motion for summary adjudication based on federal preemption of Espinoza’s meal and rest period claims. The court of appeal agreed the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary adjudication and reversed the judgment to that extent. However, it also concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the owner personally liable under section 558.1, noting that substantial evidence supported the finding that the owner caused the Labor Code violations; and that defendants had forfeited their challenges as to the sufficiency of the evidence and damages by failing to identify the elements of the subject causes of action, and failing to explain how the evidence at trial failed to support them.

Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. - In this case, three individuals who worked for Lyft each filed separate PAGA actions against the company, alleging the company misclassified its California drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. One of those individuals, Tina Turrieta, settled her case against Lyft. The other two individuals then sought to intervene in Turrieta's case, arguing that her settlement with Lyft was the result of a reverse auction. The trial court denied their motion to intervene, finding that they lacked standing. Agreeing that the status of the other drivers as PAGA plaintiffs in separate actions did not confer standing, the court of appeal affirmed. The CA Supreme Court has granted review of the court of appeal decision, limiting review to the following issue: Does a plaintiff in a representative action filed under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698, et seq.) (PAGA) have the right to intervene, or object to, or move to vacate, a judgment in a related action that purports to settle the claims that plaintiff has brought on behalf of the state?