By Steve Tharp
The North Korean leadership has historically thrived on crisis and increased tensions with the outside and uses that tension to achieve both internal and external goals. When I was serving as a U.N. Command negotiator meeting with the North Koreans at Panmunjom in the late 1990s, we had a simple "8-Step" do-loop process which described North Korean negotiating tactics with this dependence on tension and crises: 1) Cause the "appearance" of tension; 2) Blame South Korea and the U.S. for the tense situation; 3) Quickly agree "in principle" to a major improvement in relations. Steps4-7 described phases in the negotiations process and were intermediate steps: 4) Set artificial deadlines to pressure the other side; 5) Politicize and draw out negotiations front-loading the agenda and demanding preconditions (the preconditions are often the true objectives); 6) Blame South Korea and the U.S. for the protracted talks; 7) Demand compensation or major concession, before returning to the talks. Step 8 "Go back to Step 1" created the do-loop quality in the process and was inserted whenever North Korea felt it necessary to restart. Over the years, it has been easier for me to understand North Korean behavior when I put it in the context of these steps. The essential point is that without a crisis, there cannot be a breakthrough.
Here is an example of this tactic from 2000 starting with a March 1st Nodong Shinmun article (Steps 1 and 2):
"Peace is mankind's common desire. The most dangerous reactionary force challenging the mankind's aspiration and desire to live in a peaceful world free of aggression and war is the imperialist force. The situation observed in the month of February once again clearly proved that it is impossible to think about the world peace and security without frustrating and breaking down the imperialists' aggression moves. Due to the imperialists' dominationist policy, tensions developed in many regions and countries around the world in February. The imperialists have also strengthened their interference in other countries. This is because it was in this region that the imperialists' aggression and war maneuvers are most persistently carried out and the tense situation in this region had the world worried. The United States, Japan, and the South Korean puppets were the main culprits."
After creating the necessary tension, the North had set the stage to reach a "dramatic" breakthrough. After several talks between South and North Korean leaders (the Southern team crossed secretly back and forth at Panmunjeom), the two sides agreed in April to a June 15 South-North summit. This "historic" June 15 Summit was held within 3 ½ months of the saber rattling and on the 1-year anniversary of the defeat of the north Korean People's Army navy at the first battle of Yeonpyeong. At the summit, many agreements were made in principle and there was a feeling that peace was finally at hand on the Korean Peninsula. Without going through the steps in detail, the bottom line is that this had all broken down by Oct. 30, 2001 when North Korea's media announced Step 8/Step 1:
"North Korea is fully prepared for any military challenges at a time when tension is mounting on the Korean Peninsula due to the United States' hostile polices against it..."
"The United States looks not to ease tension but to escalate it, increasing the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula."
The problem with this type of crisis diplomacy is that you must keep raising the level of the rhetoric in Steps 1 and 2 to get the appropriate reaction from the other side. In the five years since taking power Kim Jong-un has ratcheted up the rhetoric to higher and higher levels but still can't seem to get past Step 2 as the South Korean and the American governments are not taking the bait as in the past. On the contrary, the current ROK and U.S. leadership are responding with their own provocative responses while in close consultation with China and Japan.
The recent crisis created by North Korea have led some in the media to speculate that this is the most extreme tension since the end of the Korean War fighting. When the rhetoric gets extreme, as is currently the case, hyping it is a common media reaction, especially for the foreign media because of their lack of experience in Korea. This media hype can also encourage each side to continue raising the rhetoric levels, and hence raising the stakes in the game.
With neither side being willing to yield, the current situation seems analogous to "chicken," a game which involves a degree of danger and forces one side to flinch before the other. One version of this game involves 2 cars driving straight at each other on a road with the first one swerving (or flinching) being the "chicken" or coward. Flinching too late, however, brings injury or death and so the reasonable person will swerve to avoid catastrophe. If both opponents are unreasonable, the situation becomes dangerous.
Classic movie fans will remember when James Dean is forced to play a form of chicken in the 1955 movie "Rebel Without a Cause. He and another boy drive stolen cars toward the edge of a cliff with the rules being the first one to jump out of the car is the "chicken." In that instance, James Dean was the loser, the chicken, as he jumped first but he was also the survivor as the other boy's jacket caught on the door handle before he could jump and he perished as he rode the car over the cliff. With tensions remaining high, everyone hopes that the two sides will quickly find an exit ramp and avoid hostilities. A quote from the American submarine commander in the 1990 movie "The Hunt for Red October" sums up the problem very well. "The hard part about playing chicken is knowing when to flinch."
Steve Tharp is a retired U.S. Army officer who served 26 years with the U.S. military in Korea, to include six years as a U.N. Command negotiator at Panmunjeom. He is currently writing a series of DMZ tourism books. Write to daraemm@gmail.com
