LinkedIn Share This Email

Steven Richard Sheffey's

Chicagoland Pro-Israel Political Update

Calling balls and strikes for the pro-Israel community since 2006

Follow me on Twitter

Join our mailing list

August 28, 2022


If you remember nothing else, remember this:


  • What were hypotheticals in 2015 are history in 2022. The JCPOA worked, Iran complied, and sanctions relief did not result in an uptick in terrorism. 
  • After Trump withdrew while Iran was still in compliance, Iran ramped up its nuclear program and increased its non-nuclear deleterious activity by 400%.
  • In the seven years since 2015, opponents of the JCPOA have not come up with an alternative more likely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
  • The choice is not between the JCPOA and a hypothetical perfect deal. The choice is between the JCPOA and the status quo, military action, or sanctions. The JCPOA is the best option.
  • The choice is not between a deal with some provisions that sunset and a deal with no sunsets. The choice is between a deal with sunsets in ten or more years or no deal and no restrictions right now.
  • The deal does not require us to trust Iran. The IAEA would again be able to implement the most comprehensive inspections regime ever imposed on any country under any arms control agreement. The JCPOA is not a trust but verify agreement. It is a distrust and verify agreement.
  • Russia's ancillary role in the deal is a small price to pay to ensure Iran does not get a nuclear weapon.
  • Read to the end for upcoming events and fun stuff, including Heart of a Nation's teen essay contest.


You're welcome to read for free, but if you want to chip in to defray the cost of the newsletter, click here and fill in the amount of your choice. You don't need a PayPal account; the link lets you use a credit card. If you have trouble, let me know. Or you can Venmo @Steven-Sheffey (if it asks, last four phone digits are 9479).

Hi Steve,


If we can agree on anything, it's that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal, is complicated. Individuals and organizations genuinely concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and sincerely concerned about the safety and security of Israel have different views. 


But we know this: What were hypotheticals in 2015 are history in 2022. We've seen the world with and without the JCPOA. Critics of the JCPOA have yet to present an alternative more likely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) asked last week "how can anyone come to the conclusion that America is safer without the Iran nuclear deal? Since Trump blew it up, Iran’s breakout time to a bomb has gone from a year to weeks. WEEKS. Restarting the deal is the only way to change this catastrophic reality."


Iran has been dragging its feet on returning to the JCPOA since Biden was elected. If the JCPOA was a giveaway to Iran, Iran would have jumped at the opportunity to get back in. The Biden administration has held firm on its conditions and Iran has dropped some key demandsincluding its insistence that international inspectors close some probes of its atomic program and its demand that the U.S. remove the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corp from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. And according to Israeli officials, the U.S. has toughened its positions on unresolved Iranian demands.


The Biden administration has not accepted and is not considering new concessions to Iran as part of reentering the 2015 nuclear deal. A senior administration official deemed reports to the contrary as "categorically false."


Any return to the JCPOA would prohibit Iran from enriching and stockpiling uranium above very limited levels, denying it the material required for a bomb. Iran would not be permitted to have any of the highly enriched uranium that it is stockpiling today. Thousands of advanced centrifuges Iran is operating today would be stopped and removed, including all of the centrifuges enriching at the fortified underground facility at Fordow. Strict limits on Iranian enrichment would mean that even if Iran left the deal to pursue a nuclear weapon, Iran’s breakout time (the amount of time needed to create enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb) would increase from one or two weeks today to at least six months.


Any Iranian pathway to a plutonium-based nuclear weapon would also be blocked as a result of a prohibition on reprocessing and the redesign of a reactor that could otherwise be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. In addition to the nuclear constraints Iran would have to implement, the IAEA would again be able to conduct the most comprehensive inspections ever negotiated, allowing it to detect any Iranian effort to pursue a nuclear weapon covertly. Much of that international monitoring would remain in place for an unlimited amount of time.


If there is an alternative to reentering the JCPOA that is more likely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, opponents of the JCPOA have yet to tell us--and they've had seven years to come up with one. In the interim, we've seen the world with and without the JCPOA. With the JCPOA, Iran was not a nuclear threat. Following Trump's withdrawal (while Iran was still in compliance), Iran ramped up its nuclear program and increased its non-nuclear malign activities, all under what Trump deemed "maximum pressure" sanctions.


I get it. Entering into a deal with Iran does not feel good. The appeal of military action and sanctions is that neither requires Iran's cooperation. We crave certainty. We'd love to bring Iran to its knees with sanctions or drop so many bombs that they'd have no ability to ever acquire nuclear weapons. But that's not reality. 


Military action can set back Iran's program, but only for one to three years at most, and the result will all but ensure that Iran races toward a bomb for its own protection. If your concern is that the JCPOA will not last forever, why would you support military action instead, which will delay Iran's program for fewer years than the JCPOA? Even provisions of the JCPOA that sunset sooner rather than later will remain in force longer.


If your concern is that some provisions of the JCPOA sunset too soon (a false assumption), why would you prefer losing all of the protections of the JCPOA right now instead of in the future? Many of the restrictions are scheduled to last until 2031 and some for 25 years or longer.


By withdrawing from the JCPOA while Iran was in compliance and one year from breakout, Trump proved that sanctions will not deter Iran from malign nuclear or non-nuclear activities. During Trump's "maximum pressure" sanctions build-up, Iran moved from one year to days or weeks from breakout.


Iran also increased its non-nuclear activities under Trump's sanctions.  Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that "Iranian attacks on U.S. forces in the Middle East increased 400% after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and Iranian military forces and proxies in the region have seen 'sustained support' even when economic pressure on the regime was highest. 'It’s an unfortunate fact of life that Iran is willing to dedicate what resources it has to supporting its military, to supporting its various tools – the destabilization and terror, including the IRGC Quds Force – irrespective of what its revenues are from other sources,' he said.


Prior to Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran used the preponderance of sanctions relief for economic development and infrastructure


Iran's breakout time if we reenter the JCPOA will move from days or weeks to six months. Iran has gained knowledge and experience it could not have gained had both Iran and the U.S. remained in compliance with the deal. Consequently, instead of pushing back Iran’s breakout time from a few weeks to a year, the same deal will push it back from a few weeks to roughly six months. It’s less than the 12 months we had before Trump broke the deal, but the choice is not between six months and 12 months, but between six months with a deal or two weeks — approaching zero as time goes on — without a deal.


Arms control expert Robert Einhorn said on February 3 that “a six-month breakout period would be enough time to respond — militarily if necessary — to an overt Iranian nuclear breakout. The sweeping monitoring and inspection powers included in the 2015 deal, which in some cases extend for another two decades, will also help restrain Iran’s ability to make a covert dash for a nuclear weapon, long considered by U.S. officials to be a more likely scenario.”


The JCPOA will not address Iran's malign non-nuclear activities. The sole objective of the deal is to halt Iran's nuclear program. The State Department points out that Iran would be able to engage in these dangerous activities, "and potentially more, with far greater impunity if it were not verifiably and permanently constrained from obtaining a nuclear weapon."


President Biden's airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria last week--in the midst of negotiations with Iran--signaled that the U.S. will continue to address Iran's non-nuclear malign activities. House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) said that "Biden has made clear that our resolve to prevent Iranian threats against American interests and those of our partners will remain steadfast even as we seek to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions through diplomacy." But imagine if those Iranian forces were protected by an Iranian nuclear umbrella.


But how can we trust Iran? We can't. That's the point. The JCPOA is not premised on trust but verify. It is premised on distrust and verify. The deal does not rely on trust to confirm compliance. It relies on the most intrusive inspections ever imposed on any country under any arms control agreement. The former head of the Iran branch in Israel’s Military Intelligence’s Research and Analysis Division said in a lengthy interview that is worth your time, ‘’We can say a lot of bad things about Iran, but they kept their part of the agreement. Everything started going haywire when Trump left the agreement.”


What about Russia? Akshai Vikram and Sam M. Hickey explain that "Russia's ancillary role in the deal is a small price to pay to ensure Iran does not get a nuclear weapon." Our European allies, not Russia, are the intermediaries in negotiations. Rob Malley refuted the Republican talking point about Russia's role in the negotiations, saying that "There has been a lot written about Russia’s role in the JCPOA negotiations, and this is a fantasy: they have not played a central role in the negotiations. Our European allies are the ones in the driver’s seat here, they’re the ones who have been negotiating."


Russia would not benefit from its custodianship of what for Russia, relative to Russia's stockpile, is a relatively small amount of Iranian uranium. The bottom line: "A renewed nuclear deal will not help Russia at the expense of the US. It would simply help the US — by ensuring Iran never gets a nuclear weapon."


What about Israeli opposition? Depends on which Israelis. Barak Ravid explains that some Israeli opposition is "connected to the domestic political situation and the upcoming Israeli elections. [Lapid and Gantz] want to show they are taking a hard line and working against the nuclear deal, fearing attacks from their political rival and ardent Iran hawk Benjamin Netanyahu."


Israeli security officials are divided, and many senior Israeli security experts support returning to the JCPOA. If you are confused about Israel's Iran policy, it's because you are paying attention.

 

The bottom line, as Joel Rubin explains, is that the JCPOA "effectively stopped Iran’s nuclear program. Trump's withdrawal from the deal and "maximum pressure" unleashed it. These are verifiable facts." Let's hope the remaining issues can be resolved so that we can reenter the JCPOA, and then let's urge Congress to act responsibly and not block our best chance to verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.


Last week's newsletter.


ICYMI:



Tweets of the Week. Tamir Hayman and Steve Sheffey.


Twitter Thread of the Week. Bookmark it because I'll keep adding to it.


Video Clip of the Week. Senator Ed Markey: Return to the Iran Deal.


Teen Essay Competition. American, Israeli, and Palestinian teenagers, 13-19 years old, are invited to submit short essays, poems or songs in English, Hebrew or Arabic on the topic: What would you most like to improve about your own society and how would you do it? Authors of winning essays will receive $500 from Heart of a Nation. Click for details. (I'm on the Advisory Committee--it's a great organization.)


This is the newsletter even Republicans have to readAnd it's the original source of the viral Top Ten Signs You Might be at a Republican Seder.


So if someone forwarded this to you, why not subscribe? It's free! Just click here


Donations are welcome (because this costs money to send). If you'd like to chip in, click here and fill in the amount of your choice. You don't need a PayPal account; the link allows you to use a credit card. If you'd rather send a check, please reply and I'll send you mailing information (please do NOT send checks to the P.O. Box). Venmo to @Steven-Sheffey (last four 9479) is fine too.


You’re reading thisSo are other influentials. If you want the right people to know about your candidate, cause, or event, reply to this email to discuss your ad.

The Fine Print: This newsletter usually runs on Sunday mornings. If you receive it as an ICYMI on Wednesday it's because you didn't open the one sent on Sunday. Unless stated otherwise, my views do not necessarily reflect the views of any candidates or organizations that I support or am associated with reserve the right to change my mind as I learn more. I am willing to sacrifice intellectual consistency for intellectual honesty. I might be wrong: Read opposing views and decide for yourself. A link to an article doesn't mean that I agree with everything its author has ever said or that I even agree with everything in the article; it means that the article supports or elaborates on the point I was making. I take pride in accurately reporting the facts on which I base my opinions. Tell me if you spot inaccuracies, typos, or other mistakes so that I can correct them in the next newsletter (and give you credit if you want it). Advertisements reflect the views of the advertisers, not necessarily of me, and advertisers are solely responsible for the content of their advertisements. I read, value, and encourage replies to my newsletters, but I don't always have time to acknowledge replies or to engage in one-on-one discussion. I'm happy to read anything, but please don't expect me to watch videos of any length--send me a transcript if the content is that important. Don't expect a reply if your message is uncivil or if it's clear from your message that you haven't read the newsletter or clicked on the relevant links. Dedicated to Ariel Sheffey, Ayelet Sheffey, and Orli Sheffey z''l. ©2022 Steve Sheffey. All rights reserved.