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Perek 5 opens with more discussion about animals causing damage (mostly via goring). It then moves to the category of "the pit", i.e. when damage occurs through something or someone falling into a pit or ditch that you've dug in the public domain.
Mishna 1 deals with two cases that sound very similar, but are actually very distinct. The first is one in which a ox gored and caused the death of a cow, and possibly also caused the death of the cow's offspring as well - or possibly not. The second case is one in which a cow gored and killed an ox, and was possibly still pregnant when it did so, and possibly wasn't any longer pregnant at that point. What's at stake in the latter case is the liability limit for the cow's owner. This is so because the cap on liability is tied to the value of the "aggressor" animal, which is higher when it is pregnant and lower when it is not.
Also of note is that the entire Mishna follows an opinion which is not, in the end, the accepted halacha. The Mishna follows the opinion which holds that our guiding legal principle is that "in a case of doubt, we split the difference between the two parties". As we've mentioned earlier in Bava Kamma though, the Halacha follows the principle that in a case of doubt, the burden of proof always lies with the claimant.
Mishnayot 2 and 3 seem pretty intuitive.... until you get to Rebbi's opinion at the end of 3. The assumption before we get to Rebbi is that the law here breaks down into a binary: Either the owner of the courtyard (or field) allowed the other person to enter and deposit things there, or he didn't. If he did, then he has implicitly accepted all liabilities that may arise. And if not, the intruder bears full liability.
But Rebbi says that the situation is not a binary. There are actually three possibilities: (1) The owner of the courtyard permits entry and formally accepts liability for whatever may ensue, (2) the owner of the courtyard permits entry but says nothing about accepting liability, (3) the owner of the courtyard does not permit entry. And the halacha is different, according to Rebbi, in each of the three cases.
The opening of Mishna 4 again highlights an important principle that we've seen a few times already. Human beings are in an entirely different category than animals when it comes to being liable for damage we have caused. We possess both higher intelligence regarding the potential consequences of our actions, and a greater moral understanding of why we must always exercise caution.
Mishnayot 5 and 6 move to damages caused by a pit that you have dug, whose opening is either literally in the public domain, or is technically on your private property but in a place where it is universally understood the public will be walking. There are two important things to know about the laws of the pit:
(1) In Mishnaic times it was perfectly normal, common, and expected that people would use the public domain for underground storage, i.e. through digging a pit there. As a member of the public, you were entitled to use the public domain in this way (not dissimilar from our use of public streets when we park our cars in front of our homes despite that fact that the cars are "obstacles" in the public domain.)
(2) Anyone who walked in the public domain in Mishnaic times was therefore expected to keep his eyes open for the openings to pits.
This explains the mic-drop line toward the end of Mishna 6 which severely limits the entire discussion of liability in this case to instances in which the animal (and never a human!) that fell into the pit was unable to navigate in a typical way (e.g. it was visually impaired or it was walking around at night)
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