Quotes of the Day:
"Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent, or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war."
- Winston Churchill
"I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping exhausted men come out of line-the survivors of a regiment of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25 (Putin's War)
2. Special Operations News Update - April 26, 2022 | SOF News
3. US Looks to Shift Ukraine from Soviet to NATO Weapons
4. Two months of horror and resilience: 7 takeaways from the war in Ukraine
5. NGA Will Take Over Pentagon’s Flagship AI Program
6. At defence talks in Germany, US says world galvanized against Russia's invasion
7. U.S. State Dept backs ammunition sale for Ukraine -statement
8. PLANNING TO READ—READING TO PLAN: A PRIMER FOR SOF JOINT PLANNING DEVELOPMENT
9. For Peace, Let There Be Nukes
10. Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Toll Holdings Limited
11. FDD | Canada must designate Iran’s revolutionary guard as a terrorist group
12. Send Ukraine Cyber Help, Not Bureaucratic Gridlock
13. Projectile Launched From Lebanon Targets Northern Israel
14. Commercial Drones/Robotics and the Modern Combat Zone: A look at Ukraine
15. Where a Russian ‘fantasy’ meets brutal reality: A Ukrainian writer’s reflections on war
16. Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine
17. The War in Ukraine Has Unleashed a New Word
18. Shabaab targets Somali police chief in Mogadishu suicide bombing
19. Vietnam War Insiders: Putin Making Same Dumb Mistakes We Did
20. Plan Now for a No-Fly Zone Over Taiwan
21. Sri Lanka’s Economic Crisis: The Myth Of Debt Trap Vs The Reality Of Identity – OpEd
22. Vladimir Putin has to appear victorious 14 Days from today. Can he?
23. Finland, Sweden to begin NATO application in May, say local media reports
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25 (Putin's War)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird
April 25, 5:00 pm ET
Russian forces conducted precision missile strikes against five Ukrainian railway stations in central and western Ukraine on April 25 in a likely effort to disrupt Ukrainian reinforcements to eastern Ukraine and Western aid shipments. A series of likely coordinated Russian missile strikes conducted within an hour of one another early on April 25 hit critical transportation infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[1] Russian forces seek to disrupt Ukrainian reinforcements and logistics. The Kremlin may have additionally conducted this series of strikes—an abnormal number of precision missile strikes for one day—to demonstrate Russia’s ability to hit targets in Western Ukraine and to disrupt western aid shipments after US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s surprise visit to Kyiv over the weekend. However, Russian precision strike capabilities will remain limited and unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war; open-source research organization Bellingcat reported on April 24 that Russia has likely used 70% of its total stockpile of precision missiles to date.[2]
Local Ukrainian counterattacks retook territory north of Kherson and west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continue to make little progress in scattered, small-scale attacks in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are successfully halting Russian efforts to bypass Ukrainian defensive positions around Izyum, and Russian forces are struggling to complete even tactical encirclements. Local Ukrainian counterattacks in Kherson Oblast are unlikely to develop into a larger counteroffensive in the near term but are disrupting Russian efforts to completely capture Kherson Oblast and are likely acting as a drain on Russian combat power that could otherwise support Russia’s main effort in eastern Ukraine.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces resumed ground attacks against Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant in the last 24 hours. Russian officers may assess they will be unable to starve out the remaining defenders by May 9 (a possible self-imposed deadline to complete the capture of Mariupol). Russian forces will likely take high casualties if they resume major ground assaults to clear the facility.
- Russian forces are accelerating efforts to secure occupied Mariupol but will likely face widespread Ukrainian resistance.
- Continued Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine took little to no additional territory in the past 24 hours.
- Prudent tactical Ukrainian counterattacks around Izyum are likely impeding Russian efforts to complete even tactical encirclements of Ukrainian forces.
- Russian forces are preparing for renewed attacks to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in southern Ukraine after minor losses in the past 48 hours.
- Russian forces likely conducted a false flag attack in Transnistria (Russia’s illegally occupied territory in Moldova) to amplify Russian claims of anti-Russian sentiment in Moldova, but Transnistrian forces remain unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces resumed ground assaults against Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant and continued heavy bombardment on April 25 but did not secure any discernable advances.[3] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych and advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko separately reported that Russian forces are carrying out ground attacks against Azovstal despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s April 21 statement that Russia would cease its assaults on the plant to prevent further Russian casualties.[4] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed that Russia may employ chemical weapons against Ukrainian positions to ”smoke out” defenders and civilians, though ISW cannot independently confirm the possibility of these threats.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm the scale of these reported Russian assaults, but Russian commanders may assess that they will be unable to starve out remaining Ukrainian defenders in the coming weeks, necessitating hasty and likely costly Russian attacks to clear the facility by the Kremlin’s possible self-imposed deadline of May 9. It is otherwise unclear why Russian forces would resume ground attacks on the facility after previously stating their intent to starve out the remaining defenders, who are highly unlikely to be able to break out and are almost certainly low on supplies.
Russian forces continue to consolidate control over occupied Mariupol. Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Verushchuk said that Russia continues to refuse to engage with evacuation efforts, denying Russian claims that Russian forces opened humanitarian corridors to facilitate evacuations from Azovstal.[6] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian troops are using former police officers who were mobilized into the militia of the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) to patrol the streets.[7] Russian artillery continues to inflict massive damage on civilian infrastructure in areas of Mariupol that are already under Russian control.[8] Russian naval infantry units are reportedly redeploying away from Mariupol in the direction of Volnovakha, but ISW cannot independently confirm the status of such redeployments at this time.[9]
Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued shelling along the entire frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk and did not secure any confirmed advances in continuing ground attacks on April 25.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults against Koroviy Yar and Rubizhne and that fighting is ongoing in Popasna.[11] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on April 25 that Russian forces have completely captured Rubizhne (after making a similar claim on April 20), though this claim is likely false.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 30th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army suffered heavy losses around Severodonetsk, confirming that Central Military District units previously active on the Chernihiv axis are fighting in eastern Ukraine.[13]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)
Russian forces continued to mount unsuccessful ground offensives southward from Izyum toward Barvinkove and Slovyansk on April 25.[14] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a limited counterattack and expelled Russian troops from Zavody, about 20 km directly west of Izyum.[15] Russian forces are likely trying to advance through Zavody to bypass deeper-entrenched Ukrainian defenses along the direct highway route to Barvinkove. Effective Ukrainian counterattacks are likely impeding the ability of Russian forces to conduct even tactical encirclements, let alone the operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine that Russian forces likely intend to achieve. Russian forces maintained their positions around Kharkiv city and continued artillery and aviation strikes on Kharkiv city and the surrounding settlements.[16]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are consolidating in the southern direction to conduct limited attacks west toward Mykolaiv and north toward Kryvyi Rih after conducting limited withdrawals from several forward positions in the past two days.[17] ISW could not verify Ukrainian claims to have recaptured five settlements in Mykolaiv Oblast on April 24 and eight in Kherson Oblast on April 23, though Ukrainian forces are likely conducting successful local attacks.[18] Limited Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 48 hours northwest of Kherson city likely disrupted Russian offensive preparations and forced some Russian forces to retreat to Chornobaivka on April 23.[19] Ukraine’s Operational Command “South” reported that two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units attempted to advance toward Mykolaiv but lost half their personnel and retreated on April 24.[20] Ukrainian counterattacks continue to disrupt Russian efforts to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces likely conducted a false flag attack in Transnistria (Russia’s illegally occupied territory in Moldova), but Transnistrian forces remain unlikely to enter unsupported actions in Ukraine. The Transnistrian Internal Affairs Ministry reported that unknown forces targeted the Ministry of State Security with two grenade launchers on April 25; Transnistrian officials stated the attack was “an attempt to sow panic and fear in Transnistria.”[21] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed the attack was organized by Russia’s FSB ”to instill panic and anti-Ukrainian sentiment” and that the FSB will carry out further provocations in Transnistria, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim. The Kremlin (or local Transnistrian actors) may seek to depict threats to Russian speakers in Moldova to echo a common Russian talking point. The Moldovan government has not commented on the claimed attack as of publication.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka or another axis.
- Russian officers may assess they will be unable to starve out remaining defenders by May 9 (a possible self-imposed deadline to complete the capture of Mariupol) but will likely take high casualties if they resume major ground assaults to clear the facility.
- Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.
[2] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3466423-russia-has-used-up-about-70-of-its-highprecision-missiles-since-warstart-bellingcat.html; https://inforesist dot org/bellingcat-v-pervoj-faze-vojny-rf-poteryala-90-svoih-luchshih-desantnikov/.
[6] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/25/po-azovstali-okupanty-ne-hochut-jty-na-bud-yaki-peremovyny-cze-vijskovyj-zlochyn-iryna-vereshhuk/; https://www.rferl dot org/a/russia-mariupol-humanitarian-corridor-azovstal/31819961.html; https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/827024.html
[7] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/470; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/471
[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/04/25/kadurovrubezhnoe/; https://russian dot rt.com/ussr/news/995103-lnr-kadyrov-osvobozhdenie?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS.
2. Special Operations News Update - April 26, 2022 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - April 26, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world. USSOCOM cdr interview, JSOF profession, strategic competition and SOF, and more.
Image: Sailors perform a high-altitude low-opening jump during Arctic Edge, a biennial homeland defense exercise, over Alaska, March 10, 2022. Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Trey Hutcheson.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
SOF News
Interview – USSOCOM Commander. General Richard Clarke, USA, is the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. He is interviewed by William T. Eliason of Joint Force Quarterly. He outlines the priorities of USSOCOM, global security challenges, how USSOCOM is leveraging the diverse talents of special operators, leveraging what SOF brings to the joint force, experiences with the U.S. Congress, the terminology in use to describe the contemporary security environment, impact of technology on SOF, and more. “An Interview with Richard D. Clarke”, National Defense University Press, April 14, 2022.
Emerald Warrior 22. An exercise hosted by the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is currently ongoing at multiple locations across the Southeast United States. Staged out of Hurlburt Field, Florida and lasting one month, the combined exercise has participants from all components of the U.S. military. “Emerald Warrior 22 prepares Air Commandos for strategic competition”, AFSOC, April 25, 2022.
Golden Knights – Scaring Congressmen. The U.S. Capitol was evacuated this past Wednesday (Apr 20) after the U.S. Army’s Golden Knights demonstration team conducted a parachute jump into a baseball stadium before a game between the Washington Nationals and the Arizona Diamondbacks. Some believe that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to alert Capitol Police to the pre-planned performance over the stadium. The incident took place about a mile away from the U.S. Capitol. “U.S. Capitol security scare sparked by plane, parachutists at game”, Reuters, April 21, 2022.
SOCOM’s Little Bird. The A/MH-6 Little Bird has been serving the special operations community for several decades. Known as the “Killer Egg”, it has seen service around the world. The helicopter’s small size, agility, and speed make it an ideal aircraft for getting in and out of tight spaces. The two missions sets of the aircraft employed by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment are light attack and light assault. Read more in “The Future of SOCOM’s ‘Killer Egg'”, National Defense Magazine, April 22, 2022.
Pirate Flags, SOF, and Africa. On a small airfield in the Horn of Africa flies a flag sometimes associated with ‘Blackbeard the Pirate’. A recent mass casualty exercise conducted by Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) took place on Chabelley Airfield in Djibouti. The TF released pictures of the exercise events – some of which depicted the display of an unusual ‘unofficial’ flag. (The War Zone, Apr 25, 2022).
Joint SOF Profession. The move to rebalance special operations forces to be able to support operations in the new ‘strategic competition’ environment has called for many new innovative reforms of SOF. One of these is the proposal for a ‘Joint Special Operations Force’ or JSOF profession. “Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession”, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2022.
International SOF
Jordanian – U.S. SOF Parachute Jump. Soldiers from U.S. Special Forces joined up with the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces to conduct a combined parachute jump in Jordan in April 2022. (DVIDS, Apr 11, 2022).
Greece’s ETA. A Greek commando unit has achieved a “Combat Ready” rating from evaluators of the NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ). This means the Greek commandos are now certified to deploy as part of a NATO Special Operations Land Task Group. “Greece’s Special Forces Among NATO’s Best”, Greek Reporter, April 21, 2022.
Black Swan Exercise. An annual exercise involving NATO special operations forces is scheduled to take place in Hungary between April 25 and May 13. This exercise is conducted to improve the coordination and interoperability of NATO SOF units. The 2021 Black Swan exercise included SOF units from Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States. “Black Swan Military Exercise Starts in Hungary“, Hungary Today, April 25, 2022.
SOF History
SAS’s ‘Pink Panthers’. In the 1960s and 1970s the British Special Air Service conducted a lot of training and operations in the deserts of the Middle East. One of their principal vehicles was the Land Rover Series II. The vehicles were adapted to the SAS’s needs . . . to include a new paint job. (Coffee or Die Magazine, Apr 22, 2022).
2012 – SEALs Rescue Aid Workers. Two aid workers who were held captive by Somali pirates were rescued by personnel of SEAL Team Six. The aid workers were providing awareness training on how to avoid land mines. The captors demanded $45 million for their release. During the rescue mission in 2012, nine pirates were killed and three others captured. “When SEAL Team Six Rescued Two Aid Workers from Somali Pirates”, SOFREP, April 23, 2022.
Aussie Soldier and His Vietnam Exploits. Rayene Simpson was awarded the Victoria Cross and the U.S. Silver Star for his heroism in Vietnam. He served with the Australian Special Air Service in Vietnam and also as an attachment to U.S. Special Forces units. “How This Aussie Soldier Received Top Military Honors From 2 Countries”, History Net, April 25, 2022.
National Security
New U.S. Hostage Policy Needed? Bruce Hoffman argues that the ‘no dealing with terrorist groups on hostages’ stance by the United States has proven to be not very effective. In addition, he states that U.S. actions have often not conformed to this policy. “US hostage policy doesn’t deter terrorists”, The Hill, April 19, 2022.
USMC’s CH-53K. The Marine Corps has achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the CH-53K King Stallion. The heavy lift helicopter will significantly upgrade the Corps lift capability for the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). “Marine Corps declares IOC for CH-53K King Stallion”, DVIDS, April 25, 2022.
IC’s Controlled Access Programs. The intelligence community has compartmentalized intelligence on the basis of the sensitivity of the activity, sources, or methods involved. The Controlled Access Program (CAP) outlines the procedures for controlling intelligence – using ‘controls’ such as Special Intelligence (SI), Talent Keyhole (TK), and Human Intelligence Control System (HCS). These control systems have compartments and sub-compartments. There are also unacknowledged CAPs – known only to those who are authorized for access to the information. Learn more in a Congressional Research Service fact sheet entitled “Controlled Access Programs of the Intelligence Community”, CRS, April 20, 2022, PDF, 3 pages.
Strategic Competition
SOF’s Value in Today’s Competitive Environment. The character of global geopolitical competition is influencing the future roles, missions, and force structure of U.S. special operations forces. The future SOF of the United States has to strike a balance between its past two-decade focus on CT and COIN and coping with the competitive threats posed by China, Russia, and other regional powers. “Rediscovering the Value of Special Operations”, Joint Force Quarterly, April 14, 2022.
CSINT – Commercially Sourced Intelligence. Hostile foreign powers support the commercial activities of their national commercial firms who are engaged in intelligence gathering activities. U.S. CSINT firms are handicapped – with a lack of support from U.S. intelligence agencies and with the legalities of the foreign corrupt practices act (FCPA). “CSINT is actually a combination of many traditional intelligence disciplines, which have been privatized and are available on the open market.” Former intelligence officers now working in the private sector believe that the U.S. is not competing effectively in the ‘commercial’ gray zone. Read more in “Commercial Intelligence in the Gray Zone”, The Cipher Brief, April 25, 2022.
Mines and the Baltic Sea. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has heightened the tension between Russia and the West. This includes the nations that border the Baltic Sea. Russia will likely increase its efforts to expand its influence over the former Soviet republics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) in the Baltic region through the use of gray-zone power. Russia maintains a ‘robust and highly capable stockpile of mines’ and can use this mine threat asymmetrically to complement its other gray-zone activities in the Baltic region. NATO must take into account the severe implications of the use of Russian mines and pursue effective means of rapidly minimizing their impacts in the Baltic region. “Baltic Sea Mining as an Extension of the Russian Gray Zone”, by Victor Duenow, Foreign Policy Research Intiative, April 18, 2022.
Russians Test New Missile. A test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile took place amidst threats by Putin against the West. The event on Wednesday (Apr 20) was a seen as a message that should “give thought to those who are trying to threaten Russia.” The Sarmat ICBM is capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads (as many as ten) as far as the United States. Analysts believe the recent launch was an incremental step in Russia’s ICMB program. The Sarmat will replace the SS-18 Satan on a one-for-one basis. “Putin rattles his ‘Satan II’ nuclear saber to hide Russian failures in Ukraine war: analysts”, CNN.com, April 21, 2022.
A Nuclear Battlefield? The current conflict in Ukraine has highlighted once again the threat posed by the use of nukes – especially as an escalatory factor that could bring about a larger war between Russia and the West. Putin has threatened the West with nuclear weapons if it continues to provide Ukraine with even greater support or if it decides to intervene in the conflict. Is that an empty threat or would Putin really resort to launching a few tactical nukes to make the West back off? In any case, NATO commanders need to prepare their forces for a battlefield that could include tactical nuclear weapons. Jonathan D. Moreno, a former staff member of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, provides his thoughts and five recommendations on this important topic. “NATO Should Start Preparing Troops for a Nuclear Battlefield”, Defense One, April 20, 2022.
NATO Membership for Sweden and Finland? The Russian aggression in Ukraine has drastically changed the strategic landscape on the European continent. NATO is more united than ever and military spending will be increasing across Europe. The Russian invasion has created incentives for two neutral countries to join the security alliance. “NATO membership an existential imperative for Sweden and Finland”, The Strategist, April 26, 2022.
Indo-Pacific
India Under Cyber Attack. The Chinese are continuing and expanding their attacks against certain sectors of India’s infrastructure. The latest attacks appear to be against India’s power grids. This is all part of the broader pattern of China’s systematic pursuit of offensive cyber operations against India for more than a decade. China has been using cyber attacks to steal trade and other sensitive data from several countries, to include the U.K., Australia, India, and the United States. Read more in “Expanding Chinese Cyber-espionage threat against India”, Observer Research Foundation, April 18, 2022.
Australia’s Tanks and Javelins. Many military observers are taking note of the massive failure of Russian tanks to achieve battlefield success during the first six weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some point to the extremely effective use of anti-armor weapons such as the Javelin by Ukrainian defenders as a sign that the tank has seen its best days. Australia has recently decided on a $3.5 billion program to procure 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and there is criticism mounting on this decision in light of events in Ukraine. Jim Molan, a retired major general of the Australian Army, explains why these critics are wrong in “Has the Javelin heralded a post-tank world?”, Defence Connect, April 20, 2022.
Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/
Wagner Group in Africa
Russian Recruitment – Ethiopia. Hundreds of Ethiopians have lined up for several days at the Russian embassy in Addis Abba. Apparently they are looking to sign up to participate in the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Many of the would-be recruits are former members of the Ethiopian army who now are unemployed. Some Ethiopians view Russia as a ‘friendly country’ although many of the applicants are likely there for economic reasons. The Russians are denying recruitment of Ethiopians and say they are in front of the embassy to show their support for Russian in the war with Ukraine. “Ethiopians Line Up at Russian Embassy as Officials Deny Recruitment Effort”, Voice of America, April 20, 2022.
Russian Mercenaries in Africa. The Wagner Group has been busy in several African nations over the past few years. They have been key to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s global ambitions. Wagner has acquired a significant foothold in Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali. “Russian mercenaries are Putin’s ‘coercive tool’ in Africa”, AP News, April 23, 2022.
Russian Advisor Dies in Mali. A Malian army unit struck an improvised explosive device alongside a road in Sahel state (Mali) on this past Tuesday (Apr 19). One of the victims was a Russian ‘advisor’ who died after being airlifted to a hospital in the central Malian town of Sevare. The Russian paramilitary firm – the Wagner Group – is in Maili providing in training and ‘other assistance’. “First Russian ‘advisor’ confirmed killed in Mali blast, report”, Aljazeera, April 20, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.
Books, Pubs, and Reports
Special Warfare. The January – March 2022 issue of Special Warfare has been posted. This issue’s theme is ethics and special operations. Article titles include “Developing SOF Moral Reasoning”, “Ethics is Leader Business”, “All Training is Ethics Training”, “Is There an Ethical Crisis in Army Special Operations?”, and more. There are also sections entitled “From the Commandant” and “Exercise Routines in the New Year”. Posted on DIVIDS, PDF, 24 pages.
Report on F-35. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has published a 64 page report (PDF) entitled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Cost Growth and Schedule Delays Continue, April 2022.
Podcasts, Movies, Videos, and Future Events
Podcast – Russian and China in the Arctic and High North. Listen to some international security pundits as they consider the implications of Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign and defense policies for peace and security in the Arctic . . . and how China’s growing interest in the polar territories is further shaping regional relations. RUSI, April 6, 2022, 48 minutes.
Podcast – Digital Terrorists: Policy and Practice in the Online Counterterrorism Fight. Listen to a discussion on how extremists and terrorists operate in the online environment. Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, April 22, 2022, 45 minutes.
Movie Info – Top Gun: Maverick. Those people into exciting flicks about the combat jets may enjoy this article about the latest version of Top Gun to be released in May 2022. (People, Apr 18, 2022).
Must See Russian Spy Films. Seventeen movies about spies are described in this article. If you want to brush up on your Russian language skills then here is one way to start! “17 Must-Stream Russian Spy Movies and Series”, SpyScape, April 2022. (Editor’s note: I watched The Optimists series on Amazon Prime – excellent!)
Video – 38 RQS Trains in Jungle Warfare and Tracking for CSAR. The 38th Rescue Squadron Blue Team attended a Tactical Tracking Operations School course to learn how to track personnel through the jungle environment at the Lightning Academy in Wahiawa, Hawaii, March 26 – April 10, 2022. DVIDS, April 10, 2022, 3 minutes.
Video – Former Green Beret Live From Ukraine. Ryan Hendrickson is a former U.S. Army Special Forces Engineer. Ryan transferred over to the Army in 2008 after completing enlistments in both the Navy and Air Force. Ryan has many military deployments including Iraq, Afghanistan, and several South and Central American countries. He is the author of Tip of the Spear, a book about his time in the Army and Afghanistan. He is now in Ukraine helping to provide humanitarian aid with a missionary organization. The Team House, YouTube, April 8, 2022.
Event – The Wagner Group’s Playbook in Africa. A panel discussion will take place examining the Russian paramilitary corporation’s role in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, CAR, and Sudan. Tuesday, April 26, 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm, presented by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Event – Seapower and US Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region. The increasing Chinese pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas is a concern of the United States. Does the United States have sufficient seapower and defense capabilities to deter China? Two senior members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) provide their insight on this topic. Hudson Institute, Friday, April 29, 2022, 10:00 am.
SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.
3. US Looks to Shift Ukraine from Soviet to NATO Weapons
Can the airplane be rebuilt while in flight? But this is probably necessary and certainly for the long term.
US Looks to Shift Ukraine from Soviet to NATO Weapons
“It would just be easier if we were using similar systems,” said one expert, as U.S. officials mull long–term efforts to resupply Ukraine’s arsenal.
The latest tranche of U.S. military support for Ukraine not only speeds long-range weapons to defend the Donbas region, but also opens the door for a future Ukrainian army that fights with the same small arms, artillery, and aircraft as the West.
Since the invasion began, Ukraine has largely defended itself using Soviet-era arms, because Ukrainian forces were familiar with those weapons—such as the AK-74, their standard-issue rifle. Many of Ukraine’s weapons fire different round sizes than U.S. versions and are not compatible.
“It's what they inherited after the end of the Cold War,” said German Marshall Fund fellow Steven Keil. “It makes up a bulk of their own military capacity.”
In recent weeks, as the United States has worked to get weapons to Ukraine, it looked to Eastern European and former Soviet Bloc countries that had the Russian-specific munitions on hand. If those Eastern European countries agreed to give weapons to Ukraine, the United States pledged to backfill them with western replacements: guns, artillery, air defenses, and aircraft that meet NATO standards.
“From NATO’s point of view, this has been a win-win-win,” said Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It makes the logistics easier. And you know, [it makes] the supplying of weapons easier because you have a broader sort of set of suppliers.”
It could also accelerate Kyiv’s modernization to NATO-standard weapons, regardless of whether Ukraine joins the alliance.
For example, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics inherited the Soviet-designed self-propelled 152 howitzer as heavy artillery. It’s a different gun and uses a different projectile than the U.S.-made 155 howitzer.
With the 152s, “I'm not sure where they can get them. I don't know if anyone produces them,” Cancian said. “Whereas when you're talking 155, there are a half-a-dozen countries that will produce a self-propelled 155. So when it comes time to rebuild the Ukrainian military, that's going to become an issue.”
Monday’s latest announcement of $322 million in foreign military financing—part of a massive $3.4 billion in security assistance from the United States to Ukraine since the war began—supports the continued purchase of Soviet-era munitions, for now. But “as these items become more difficult to procure, FMF could be used to assist with the [Armed Forces of Ukraine] transition to U.S./NATO caliber systems for long-range firing, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and artillery,” according to a summary of the aid obtained by Defense One.
Furthermore, the money can be used for “modernizing Ukraine's weapons inventory through the provision of more precise and capable weapons, including sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and other small arms,” said a U.S. official who spoke to Defense One on background. That means those systems could also transition to NATO/U.S.-standard weaponry, if that is what Ukraine chooses.
“Up until now, we've been working at helping them meet their immediate needs,” the U.S. official said. “Now we're getting to the place where we need to start looking ahead to additional future possibilities.”
That has a strategic impact, Keil said.
“Using systems that are newer, newer generation aircraft or, more widely used caliber of artillery, is definitely in NATO's interest,” Keil said. “Particularly in the event of conflict … it would just be easier if we were using similar systems.”
Early in the fighting, the lack of interoperability was one of the reasons the U.S. did not send Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces would have needed U.S. training and support in Ukraine, which President Joe Biden was unwilling to do.
Each of the more advanced systems now under consideration would also require training—not only on how to operate them, but also on how to maintain them. The U.S. official said the extent of the longer-term support is still being worked through.
“We’re not there yet. We're just taking the initial first step,” the official said.
But the groundwork is already being laid. Earlier this month, Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks met with the CEOs of America’s largest defense companies to look for ways to speed up weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Global defense stocks have largely risen in the weeks following Russia’s invasion, especially after NATO allies increased plans to boost military spending.
But last week, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet refused to speculate about how the conflict might affect weapon sales for the world’s largest defense contractor.
“The environment is more challenging from a national security and global security perspective than it was before,” Taiclet told investment analysts on the company’s quarterly earnings call. “That suggests that deterrence is a more valuable product than it's ever been, at least in the last 80 to 100 years. We feel we're really positioned well with our strategy to meet that need for national security and global security. But we can't quantify yet exactly how that's going to touch our revenue … until we get actual contracts that have order schedules.”
Marcus Weisgerber contributed to this report.
4.Two months of horror and resilience: 7 takeaways from the war in Ukraine
An interesting run down.
Two months of horror and resilience: 7 takeaways from the war in Ukraine
Grid’s global team looks at the major surprises in Vladimir Putin’s war.
Global Editor
April 25, 2022
The war in Ukraine is two months old. There were many who didn’t think it would last two weeks. The day after the Russian invasion, Grid wrote that “tectonic shifts” were likely. It wasn’t that bold a prediction; from the beginning, it was clear that NATO would be tested severely, a new refugee crisis was possible and geopolitical alliances might be scrambled as well.
In truth, none of us guessed the extent of it, nor in some cases did we imagine where those tectonic shifts would occur. At the two-month mark, Grid’s global team looked at the surprises and key takeaways from the war to date.
1. The Russian military: “Everything wrong”
That may seem like a harsh heading. But consider the evidence.
Two months later, perhaps no forecast has been punctured more forcefully than this one.
And while Ukraine’s military and civilian resistance deserve credit and the country has received significant international support, the performance of the Russian military is perhaps the war’s great surprise to date.
“From what we understand or what we thought we understood about Russian doctrine, they’re doing everything wrong,” David Shlapak, a senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, told Grid in March. “They came in without employing artillery and firepower the way we would have expected them to. They undertook some fairly risky operations. Their doctrine is actually pretty clear on how they intend to fight. And they just didn’t do that,” said Shlapak.
As Joshua Keating reported, early signs of trouble came on the war’s first day when Russian paratroopers attempted to seize Hostomel Airport northwest of Kyiv, which would have allowed them to airlift troops to take the capital. The paratroopers landed well ahead of the invading force with limited air cover and wound up in a violent struggle with the Ukrainian military that left the airport unusable. The Russians were forced to transport their troops over land.
A Ukrainian serviceman walks past destroyed Russian tanks not far from the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv on April 3. (SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images)
It would prove a harbinger of other missteps. Russian units moved on their own with poor or nonexistent logistics support, air cover or communication. Multiple reports suggest the Ukrainians successfully intercepted Russian communications — a result of poorly encrypted devices and other security failings on the part of the Russians. There have been reports of Russian soldiers using mobile phones and analog radios — both easy to intercept and more likely to betray a unit’s location.
The generals
Meanwhile, roughly once a week, a Russian general had been killed in Ukraine. When Russia announced the death of Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of Russia’s 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, on April 16, it brought the total to eight, according to Western and Ukrainian officials.
In two decades in Vietnam, the U.S. lost nine generals — most of whom were killed when their helicopters were shot down. During the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, one American general died; he was shot by an Afghan soldier. Not since World War II, when the Soviets lost roughly six or seven generals each month, has there been anything like this rate of loss.
“It is inconceivable to lose so many general officers,” David Petraeus, a four-star general and former CIA director, told Grid. “The loss in experience and expertise are enormous and the disruption has to be equally so.”
Petraeus and other former military leaders blamed both the communications issues and traditional Russian command and control structures. The latter leaves almost all decision-making power at the higher level, leaving no latitude for decision-making for lower-ranking officers. Hence, setbacks on the battlefield have forced Russian senior officers to the front lines.
“When your planning begins to fall apart because of the nature of war, fog and friction and uncertainty, and because of stronger than anticipated resistance, then you have to have a very senior person who comes forward,” Lt. Gen. Frederick “Ben” Hodges, a former U.S. commander in Europe, told Grid. “And so you’ve got a lot of senior officers out there exposed or having to move up close to what’s going on to try and unravel the various problems that normally should have been sorted out by a much more junior, lower-level commander.”
Low morale
We may never know whether Russia’s poor performance has hurt morale or poor morale has led to poor performance; both may be true. As Keating reported, it was clear from the start that many Russian officers were unaware they were to be part of an invasion until just before it began. Rank-and-file troops may not have known their “training mission” was to involve something entirely different.
There have been desertions and unconfirmed reports of mass surrender, but the singular symbol of Russian woes involved the 37th Motor Rifle Brigade, which fought outside Kyiv in mid-March. Troops attacked and injured their commanding officer after the brigade suffered heavy losses, according to a Western official and Ukrainian journalists. Furious troops ran a tank into Col. Yuri Medvedev, injuring both his legs; Ukrainian correspondent Roman Tsymbaliuk reported that the colonel had been hospitalized, and a senior Western official said later that Medvedev had died of his wounds. The attack by his own forces was, the official said, “a consequence of the scale of the losses taken by his own brigade.”
2. NATO’s comeback
“NATO” is almost a dirty word (or acronym) for Russian President Vladimir Putin. In his worldview, the institution represents an encroachment of the West on the territory of the former Soviet bloc and a threat to Russian security and values.
If Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was meant to push the alliance back, it has failed already.
“Putin will end up with the exact opposite of what he sought,” John McLaughlin, a former acting director of the CIA, told Grid. “Not a weaker, more fractured NATO, but an alliance that is better armed, more united and hugging more of Russia’s borders than before his attack on Ukraine.”
Two months into the war, the once unwieldy alliance has built a multibillion-dollar arms pipeline into Ukraine and prodded members to boost defense spending (more on the German “tectonic shift” below). Longtime holdouts Finland and Sweden are now interested in NATO membership, and recently added member states Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic — countries Putin prefers to imagine as in Moscow’s sphere of influence, as they were in the Soviet era — are now crucial players in the resistance against Russia.
This is particularly true in Poland, a nation for which Putin harbors a profound enmity. Poland has welcomed nearly 3 million refugees from Ukraine — far more than any other country — and sent tens of thousands of artillery shells, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars and other arms to Ukraine. Polish President Andrzej Duda tweeted that the “heroism of the Ukrainian nation … is becoming part of the history of the free world. It is the commitment of us, those already free, to make sure they win.”
In short, an alliance founded 73 years ago and until recently dismissed by many as outdated and adrift now appears more central and relevant to global affairs than it has in decades.
“I think you see an alliance that sort of woke up out of a slumber and decided that the mission for which it was created is back,” Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO and now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, told Grid. “It’s found a clear purpose.”
3. Germany — two steps forward, one step back
Then came the invasion and Germany’s “zeitenwende” — German for “turning point.”
“The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point,” Germany’s new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, said in late February. “It is our duty to do our best to support Ukraine in defending itself against Putin’s invading army.”
In short order, the government canceled the $11 billion Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which would have doubled exports of Russian gas to Germany; boosted defense spending to 2 percent of GDP; and added 100 billion euros in new spending on military investments — more than double its entire defense budget for 2021. Then came the truest zeitenwende: Germany began supplying anti-tank and air defense missiles to Ukraine, overturning a longstanding policy of not sending weapons into conflict zones.
“It would have been hard to imagine Germany doing these things and saying these things even two months prior,” Steven Keil, a fellow for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, told Grid.
But Germany’s zeitenwende has its limits — one big one in particular: The government is still buying Russian oil and gas. Other nations are, too, but none relies so heavily on Moscow for its energy needs, and therefore none is pouring as much money into Kremlin coffers. For all its rhetorical outrage about the war, Germany is still sending $220 million a day to Moscow in the form of payments for Russian oil and gas. German Finance Minister Christian Lindner said the alternative would “inflict more damage on ourselves than on [Russia.]”
“Germany takes two steps forward and then at least one step back,” Liana Fix, program director for international affairs at the Körber-Stiftung, a German think tank, told Grid.
The financial newspaper Handelsblatt — normally a friend to German business — put it more bluntly in an editorial: “The country that proudly proclaims that Europe will ‘never again’ see the likes of Auschwitz is pumping 200 million euros each day into Putin’s war chest.”
4. China’s gamble
The conventional wisdom was that if it came to war, China would walk a tightrope. As Grid’s Lili Pike reported when the war began, China was navigating a geopolitical balancing act when it came to Ukraine, thanks primarily to its recently burgeoning relationship with Russia.
Two months later, it looks less like a tightrope and more like strong support — at least in terms of rhetoric and propaganda — for Putin and his war.
China has refused to criticize Putin, amplified Russian falsehoods and placed blame for the war at the feet of the U.S. and its NATO allies. Chinese universities have gone so far as to organize seminars on a “correct interpretation” of what they call a “crisis,” not a war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose for a photograph during their meeting in Beijing on Feb. 4. (ALEXEI DRUZHININ/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)
Diplomats and analysts have pondered exactly what was said when Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the opening day of the Beijing Winter Olympics — just three weeks before the invasion. Beyond the economic deals — including $117.5 billion for Russia in new energy contracts — and a Putin-Xi joint statement that included an agreement to “oppose further enlargement of NATO,” did Putin tell Xi what he had planned? And the extent of it? China scholars note that the violation of internationally accepted borders is a longstanding red line for China, and the barbarity of Putin’s war has likely surprised Beijing, much as it has surprised the rest of the world.
But to date, China’s propaganda and misinformation about the war have mirrored the Kremlin’s own mythmaking.
Analysts told Grid that China is gambling on the war winding down and a subsequent return to that “limitless friendship” with Russia, which the two leaders heralded in early February. Above all, as former Australian prime minister and Asia Society President Kevin Rudd told Grid, Beijing’s current stance is a reflection of its own core interests.
“They want a benign relationship with the Russians because of the length and history of the Russian-Chinese border,” Rudd explained. “They want to be able to dedicate all their strategic energies to their principal global and regional strategic adversary, the U.S., rather than having to divert some of those resources — military or otherwise — to handling the Russian question.”
5. Putin still has lots of friends — and money.
“We will make sure that Putin will be a pariah on the international stage.”
So said President Joe Biden in late February, as the Russians marched into Ukraine. It’s a message that has been echoed regularly by leaders across Western capitals and backed by unprecedented sanctions on the Russian economy, its central bank and Russian oligarchs.
In some ways, “pariah” sounds right — especially if one looks at the U.S. and Europe. Zoom out to the rest of the world, and you get a very different picture.
As Nikhil Kumar has reported, Russia still has plenty of friends around the world. Dozens of countries have rejected or abstained from U.N. votes criticizing the Kremlin. Beyond China’s support and Germany’s oil and gas payments, Putin can still count several nations willing to trade with Russia, or least keep quiet about his war.
To name just a powerful few:
India, the world’s largest democracy, has a strong relationship with the U.S. but has also had ties with Moscow for decades. Some 60 percent of India’s military hardware comes from Russia, and since the war began, Russia has reportedly been offering New Delhi oil at discounts of as much as 20 percent below global prices.
To date, there has been no strong condemnation of the invasion from Delhi. India was one of three countries — China and the United Arab Emirates were the others — to abstain from the U.N. Security Council resolution that condemned the Russian invasion.
“Like other countries, we have important interests of our own that we have to factor in to all our decisions,” a senior Indian diplomat told Grid, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
Persian Gulf powers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — two countries with historically close ties to Washington — have resisted calls to isolate Russia. They have also been reluctant to help reduce the world’s reliance on Russian oil by boosting their own production. Among the reasons is a rift over Washington’s pursuit of a new nuclear pact with Iran. “The Biden administration’s determination to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal … has convinced the Saudis that America is determined to dismantle the regional order that it created, no matter what demons it may unleash,” Mohammed Alyahya, the former editor of the English edition of Al Arabiya, wrote in a recent Jerusalem Post op-ed.
Even NATO ally Turkey — which has sent weapons to Ukraine — hasn’t sanctioned Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. For Turkey, tourism revenues, purchases of Russian weapons and a heavy reliance on Russian energy and grain supplies (in 2021, Russia accounted for 45 percent of Turkish gas purchases and 56 percent of its grain imports) have made it difficult to cut the cord with Moscow.
The reluctance to criticize Russia was on vivid display at the U.N. on April 7, in a vote to remove Russia from the U.N.’s top human rights body. The U.S. led the charge and succeeded, garnering 93 votes to suspend Russia. But nearly as many did not support the measure; 24 countries voted against — including China — and another 58 abstained — among them India, Brazil, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Money for Moscow
While sanctions have no doubt dealt a body blow to the Russian economy, a Bloomberg Economics report found that Russia could actually earn one-third more from energy sales this year than last — netting around $321 billion to help line its wartime coffers.
The EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, put it starkly: “We’ve given Ukraine nearly 1 billion euros [around $1.1 billion],” he said. “That might seem like a lot, but 1 billion euros is what we are paying Putin every day for the energy he provides us with.”
The money matters — hugely. To put this in perspective: Russia spends around $62 billion a year on its armed forces, according to one recent estimate — meaning that, since the beginning of the war, Europe has already covered about two-thirds of Moscow’s annual military budget.
In early April, Lithuania became the first country to actually turn off the Russian spigots. “From this month on — no more Russian gas,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said. “If we can do it, the rest of Europe can do it too.”
They can. But to date, only Estonia and Latvia have followed suit.
Friends at home
Meanwhile, inside Russia, for every pocket of dissent, there are indications that Putin still has significant support.
Roughly 60 percent of Russians in recent surveys said they backed the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine, according to a summary compiled by researchers at the London School of Economics. Some of those polls show support strengthening since the war began. The figures come with important caveats: As Grid has reported, Russia is in the grip of a brutal Kremlin crackdown on dissent that has squashed independent media and led to thousands of arrests.
But Putin is hardly a pariah inside his own country. In a March piece, the independent Russian journalist Farida Rustamova highlighted how, “over the past month, Putin’s dream of a consolidation among the Russian elite has come true.” She added that “these people understand that their lives are now tied only to Russia, and that that’s where they’ll need to build them.”
None of which is to suggest that Putin is in an enviable position at home or on the global stage. But given the money still pouring in, the countries lining up with the Kremlin — or at least refusing to join in the criticism — and internal polling numbers that would be the envy of leaders anywhere, the term “pariah” doesn’t apply to Putin. At least not yet.
6. No cyberwar (yet)
All indications were that Russia would use its cyberweapon. It had great and demonstrated skill in this area, and just before the war, Russia was blamed for what Ukrainian officials said was the largest cyberattack of its kind in the country’s history, a strike that took offline the websites of the country’s army, defense and foreign ministries, along with major banks. There were other precedents.
Dmitri Alperovitch, founder of the Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies at Johns Hopkins University and chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, a D.C. think tank, told Grid that a Russian cyberattack was almost inevitable, especially if Putin’s war didn’t go well in the conventional sphere.
Two months in, it hasn’t happened — or it hasn’t worked. Ukraine has assembled its own “IT Army” — a cyberdefense team, and the U.S., EU and other allies have said they are aiding Ukraine in hardening its cyberdefenses.
But the question remains: What happened? Why no major attack?
Alperovitch believes Putin may be holding this particular weapon at bay until he feels an absolute need to use it.
“He thinks a victory that he can pull out is still achievable and that he can make a deal with the Europeans at least, and possibly the Americans to take the sanctions off,” Alperovitch told 60 Minutes last week. “I think he’s mistaken on that, but I think at least until he tries that, he’s unlikely to launch a cyberattack.”
And if it becomes clear that he’s mistaken? “They’ll hit when they realize that,” he said.
7. Tale of two leaders
Lastly, when one surveys the landscape today, against how it looked two months ago, it’s worth noting a stunning turnaround in the fortunes and global image of two individuals.
Before the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was a relatively new and unpopular leader. Three years ago, he was an actor and comedian. Most Americans would have heard of him only because his phone call with President Donald Trump had been a key piece of the prosecution to impeach the president.
Before the war, a conventional view of Putin was that he was a cunning strategist, a kind of grandmaster at the chess game of geopolitics. He was an autocrat and strongman, to be sure, but he was welcomed at the G-20 and various other gatherings of global leaders.
Today? Zelenskyy is among the most popular figures on the planet — an icon of democracy and courage.
Putin stands accused of war crimes, and in terms of strategy, he may have committed the sin that dooms any master at the chess board: He failed to see clearly the ramification of his moves.
A lot can happen in two months.
Thanks to Alicia Benjamin for copy editing this article.
Tom Nagorski is the global editor at Grid, where he oversees our coverage of global security, U.S.-China relations, migration trends, global economics and U.S. foreign policy.
5. NGA Will Take Over Pentagon’s Flagship AI Program
Excerpts:
That transition will occur over the next fiscal year, said Mark Munsell, NGA’s chief technology officer. “Right now we're doing a lot of activities, getting people on the program, leadership in place, setting up a program office structure and all those kinds of things to receive it. As far as the technology goes…Our agency is very enthusiastic about capitalizing on the department's investment over the last five years.”
That could also mean that more of Project Maven’s products could make their way into the public domain faster. In his remarks, Sharp repeatedly emphasized the importance of more imagery being made public to influence the global conversation around things like Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In the same way that Project Maven has cut down on the amount of time it takes analysts to find things in intelligence data, it could also cut down on the amount of time it takes to make those insights public.
NGA Will Take Over Pentagon’s Flagship AI Program
Agency also sending new special spy drones to Eastern Europe.
DENVER—The National Geospatial Agency will take over Project Maven, the Pentagon’s key artificial intelligence program designed to identify individual objects out of a massive amount of surveillance data, NGA’s outgoing commander, Vice Adm. Robert Sharp, said Monday.
Referring to the Pentagon’s most recent budget request, Sharp pointed out that “NGA gains operational control of Project Maven’s [geographical intelligence] AI services and capabilities from the office of undersecretary of defense for intelligence that includes responsibility for labeled data, AI algorithms, testing, [and] evaluation capabilities.”
The Defense Department launched Project Maven in 2017 to help analysts make better use of the huge amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance footage that drones were collecting over the Middle East. Maven has since become a sort of blueprint for other Defense Department AI initiatives.
“We already have ongoing efforts to leverage AI machine learning algorithms to enable genomic analysis at scale. And this [memorandum of understanding] brings together two major DOD AI and ML efforts,” Sharp said.
That transition will occur over the next fiscal year, said Mark Munsell, NGA’s chief technology officer. “Right now we're doing a lot of activities, getting people on the program, leadership in place, setting up a program office structure and all those kinds of things to receive it. As far as the technology goes…Our agency is very enthusiastic about capitalizing on the department's investment over the last five years.”
That could also mean that more of Project Maven’s products could make their way into the public domain faster. In his remarks, Sharp repeatedly emphasized the importance of more imagery being made public to influence the global conversation around things like Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In the same way that Project Maven has cut down on the amount of time it takes analysts to find things in intelligence data, it could also cut down on the amount of time it takes to make those insights public.
Geographical intelligence or GEOINT products, “in the form of commercial imagery and services have been instrumental to those fighting in Ukraine…It's been used very effectively to provide transparency and to counter Russian disinformation,” he said.
The agency is also undertaking a new program to help bring more onthe-ground mapping information to Eastern Europe, where it could affect the fight against Russia in Ukraine. In March, he said, NGA “teammates” visited with allies in Eastern Europe to “train some military partners” on the use of a small tactical mapping drone for the battlefield, called Aerial Reconnaissance Tactical Edge Mapping Imagery System, or Artemis.
“It's a small unmanned aircraft system that's ideal when you have atmospheric conditions that aren't the best for satellite collection, [such as] extensive cloud coverage,” he said. “Due to this initiative, we now have military forces in Europe who can use Artemis for high resolution imagery, creating their own [geographical intelligence] at the tactical edge that can be easily shared at the unclassified level with international partners and with no restrictions.”
He declined requests to name which military partners were using the drone now.
6. At defence talks in Germany, US says world galvanized against Russia's invasion
Good words from the SECDEF. He is on a roll this week.
Excerpts:
"As we see this morning, nations from around the world stand united in our resolve to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia's imperial aggression," Austin said at the start of talks.
"Ukraine clearly believes that it can win, and so does everyone here."
At defence talks in Germany, US says world galvanized against Russia's invasion
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany, April 26 (Reuters) - The United States said the world was galvanized against Russia's two-month-old invasion of Ukraine as it hosted defence talks in Germany involving over 40 countries that sought to speed and synchronize the delivery of arms to Kyiv.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin hosted the event at Ramstein Air Base following a trip to Kyiv where he pledged additional military support to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's war effort, which is at a crossroads.
"As we see this morning, nations from around the world stand united in our resolve to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia's imperial aggression," Austin said at the start of talks.
"Ukraine clearly believes that it can win, and so does everyone here."
U.S. Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cautioned that Ukraine needed more security assistance - now - to help it defend against an unfolding and potentially decisive Russian onslaught in the east. He said the coming weeks were "critical."
"Time is not on Ukraine's side," Milley said during closed-door remarks provided to reporters traveling with him. "The outcome of this battle, right here, today, is dependent on the people in this room."
Milley added: "The Ukrainians will fight. We need to make sure they have the means to fight"
Driven back by Ukrainian forces from a failed assault on Kyiv in the north, Moscow has redeployed troops into the east for a ground offensive in two provinces known as the Donbas.
U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, assess that Russia will rely heavily on artillery strikes, trying to pound Ukrainian positions as Moscow moves in ground forces from several directions to try to envelop and wipe out a significant chunk of Ukraine's military.
But the United States also estimates many Russian units are depleted, with some operating with personnel losses as high as 30% -- a level considered by the U.S. military to be too high to keep fighting, officials say.
U.S. officials cite anecdotes like Russian tanks with sole drivers and no crew and substandard equipment that is either prone to breakdowns or out of date.
British assessments showed that about 15,000 Russian personnel had been killed in the conflict while 2,000 armored vehicles including some 530 tanks had been destroyed, along with 60 helicopters and fighter jets, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said on Monday.
Russia has so far acknowledged only 1,351 troops killed and 3,825 wounded.
Russia still has advanced capabilities and superior force numbers, and has shown a willingness to keep pouring soldiers and units into the fight, U.S. officials said.
Moscow can also economically afford to wage a long war in Ukraine despite being hammered by Western sanctions, defence experts and economists said. read more
For its part, Ukraine boasts high morale, creative and adaptive battlefield tactics and local knowledge of the terrain, along with arms and intelligence from the United States and its allies.
"They definitely stand a fighting chance," a U.S. military official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The meeting is taking place at Ramstein, a sprawling air base southwest of Frankfurt which only months ago was grappling with an influx of Afghan evacuees after the Taliban takeover of that country last summer.
Organizers said over 40 countries were attending and a scan of the meeting room showed countries mainly from Europe but also from the Middle East including Israel and even Africa. On a screen, representatives from South Korea and Japan attended virtually.
"This gathering reflects the galvanized world," Austin said.
Germany, for the first time, announced the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine. "We decided yesterday that Germany will facilitate the delivery of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine," German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht said at Ramstein, according to the script of her speech.
Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine has killed thousands of people, displaced millions more and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States - by far the world's two biggest nuclear powers.
Putin says the "special military operation" in Ukraine is necessary because the United States was using Ukraine to threaten Russia and Ukraine was guilty of the genocide of Russian-speaking people.
Ukraine says it is fighting a land grab by Russia and that Putin's accusations of genocide are nonsense.
Reporting by Phil Stewart; additional reporting by Sabine Seibold in Berlin; Editing by Cynthia Osterman, William Maclean
7. U.S. State Dept backs ammunition sale for Ukraine -statement
$165 million.
U.S. State Dept backs ammunition sale for Ukraine -statement
WASHINGTON, April 25 (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department on Monday used an emergency declaration for the first time during the Biden administration to approve the potential sale of $165 million worth of ammunition to Ukraine to help the country defend itself against Russia's ongoing invasion, the Pentagon said.
The Ukrainian government had asked to buy various rounds of so-called nonstandard ammunition, the department said in a statement, referring to ammunition that does not adhere to NATO standards.
The Pentagon said the package could include artillery ammunition for howitzers, tanks and grenade launchers such as 152mm rounds for 2A36 Giatsint; 152mm rounds for D-20 cannons; VOG-17 for automatic grenade launcher AGS-17; 125mm HE ammunition for T-72 and 152mm rounds for 2A65 Msta.
"As Ukrainian forces expend ammunition to defend their country, their daily replenishment requirements continue to increase," a State Department official said.
"Critically low stores of ammunition for their fielded systems" were among the reasons the State Department official said that "an emergency exists."
An emergency declaration has not been used since 2019 when the Trump administration informed congressional committees that it would go ahead with 22 military sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Jordan, infuriating lawmakers by circumventing a long-standing precedent for congressional review of major weapons sales.
The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible sale to Ukraine on Sunday.
"The Biden administration appears to argue that countering Russian aggression is in U.S. national security interest, which is not that different than what Trump did with regard to Iran" and the 2019 sales to Middle East allies, Jeff Abramson, a senior fellow at Arms Control Association, told Reuters.
But thus far Ukraine has had very broad bipartisan support. "If this were being provided to a country with less general agreement as being in need, you would expect to see members of Congress raise the question of whether this truly is an emergency from a U.S. security perspective," Abramson said.
The Pentagon did not identify the prime contractor for the weapons but did say that Foreign Military Financing would be used to pay for the munitions.
Reporting by Susan Heavey and Mike Stone in Washington Editing by Matthew Lewis
8. PLANNING TO READ—READING TO PLAN: A PRIMER FOR SOF JOINT PLANNING DEVELOPMENT
Plans are nothing, planning is everything, Ike.
I spent a week at JSOU last month supporting its Strategic Influence through Information Advantage course and I can attest that JSOU puts a priority on effective planning.
PLANNING TO READ—READING TO PLAN: A PRIMER FOR SOF JOINT PLANNING DEVELOPMENT | Small Wars Journal
PLANNING TO READ—READING TO PLAN: A PRIMER FOR SOF JOINT PLANNING DEVELOPMENT
By Professor Greg E. Metzgar
Center for Adaptive & Innovative Statecraft
Joint Special Operations University
The past two decades of persistent conflict have brought about an unprecedented need for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Force (CF) personnel at all levels to learn quickly and constantly enhance their ability to conduct operational design and planning functions not only at the component level but increasingly at the operational level. This “punching above your weight” is due to continued manning requirements that dictate a sustained need to fulfill operational demands, along with a diminishing pool of personnel resources. As the Joint Force enters the mid-point of the 21st century, the demands placed upon the joint force will continue, and professionals at all levels will require a renewed focus on being prepared to address the multidomain threats posed by a host of strategic challenges.
The requirements for Special Operations Forces (SOF) planners will require a renewed interest in ensuring that the joint operational planning skills acquired over the past two decades do not atrophy, as they will continue to play a crucial role as SOF, and Conventional Forces focus to address irregular warfare (IW) threats and conflict below the threshold of war with strategic challengers. In a 2003 article, the author addressed the following challenge, still applicable today:
“Given SOF truths (people are more important than hardware, competent SOF cannot be created or mass-produced in an emergency, and quality over quantity), the expanded requirement for operators and planners presents a dilemma. How does SOCOM educate enough SOF planners for its expanded mission without compromising its capabilities or disregarding SOF truths? SOCOM cannot simply strip tactical SOF units, already critically short of experienced manpower, to meet the demand for educated strategic planners who can function effectively on a combatant commander’s staff or on a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).”
Given the nature of the rapidly expanding challenges in the current near-term security environment, planners at all levels are challenged having timely access to traditional educational opportunities such as Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for individual or other collective joint training events. This requires a greater degree of continual individual initiated professional development. This article addresses two main issues for future and current joint SOF planners: 1) A “Quick Reference” list of immediate joint educational resources that can be employed to fill knowledge gaps before deploying; and 2) A “Professional Development Resource” for those journeyman SOF (and Conventional) planners who want to sharpen their joint planning knowledge. We will start with the foundational references and doctrine, and then transition to recommended initial set of articles and books that provide operational context and examples to build joint operational acumen.
START WITH THE BASICS
Over the course of our lives, teachers and coaches have encouraged us to master the basics. This is true of joint operational planning and joint operations as well. Doctrine is the cornerstone upon which our Service and Joint forces operate, and therefore this is the logical place to start. The advantages of the information age we live in, is that we are not bound to find a printed copy to review. Online resources abound within the Services and Joint arena. Therefore, the initial way to start building your base is by studying the joint doctrine—and the best place to start is the Joint Doctrine Library (https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/). Tabs on this page will direct you to the Joint Electronic Library + (JEL+), albeit CAC enabled, this provides the student with the most current approved joint doctrine and other valuable resources. Menus and dropdown tabs on this page will allow the reviewer to find not only Joint Publications, but Insights Reports of “best practices” in the joint community, along with concepts and lessons learned.
Figure 1: Screen shot of the JCS “Joint Doctrine Home” webpage.
Once you sign into the JEL+, you can access the “Training” tab found at the top of the page, and in the drop-down menu the “Joint Force Headquarters Training” link is another helpful resource for the joint staff officer or non-commissioned officer. The Joint Force Headquarters Training webpage (JFHQT) has “descriptive, performance-oriented joint training tasks and resources in searchable and functional formats” along with other information “based on observed best practices, effective products, joint doctrine publications, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), and applicable policies.”
20 MINUTE PRIMERS FOR PLANNING
For the time constrained practitioner, there are several articles found in various professional journals that can add to the knowledge of the joint planner. While this is not an exhaustive list, it provides a good place to start with current topics for educating the developing and novice and even experienced joint planning professional.
-
National Defense University Joint Forces Quarterly (NDU JFQ): Each quarter, the NDU Press produces a new issue of the JFQ, filled with informative and timely articles related to strategy, joint planning and operations, and intergovernmental and homeland security topics that provide the joint planning practitioner with source of scholarly insights and knowledge when time is compressed. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/
-
Joint Staff J-7 “Insights and Best Practices”: The Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 conducts annual joint / combined exercises with the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC) each year. The oversight and interactions they have with the GCCs and other joint headquarters allows them to collect “notably lessons learned, doctrine, education, and future joint force development” insights by observing operational practices of the GCC and Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF HQs). The DTD publishes and updates regular “Insights and Best Practices” related to Joint Force Functions and practices that are available in .pdf formats available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers/
-
YouTube: The YouTube channel has become a source that is used every day for gaining some knowledge on just about any subject. The ability to YouTube a particular subject and gain knowledge is legendary—from changing a spark plug on a mower to even joint planning. Using the term “joint planning process” a student can find several videos that explain the joint planning process (JPP) and related topics such as the Center of Gravity (COG), Joint Functions, and Operational Design. However, it must be noted that while some videos are provided by notable agencies such as the U.S. Army War College, or the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in Leavenworth, others are commercially generated and might not reflect current doctrinal process and procedures. https://youtube.com
BOOKS FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
There is an ever-expanding list of books that are written about joint force employment and analysis of recent joint operations. Everyone has their favorites they would recommend, however the intent here is to list six of the author’s recommended books related to this subject to get the intellectual energy flowing. This is not all inclusive, but rather recommendations to build your professional planning library and take the first steps toward a greater context of joint planning and operational analysis. A good practice is to examine the notes which an author uses in their chapters composing the book, along with reviewing the bibliography, where a consolidated list of references is found.
-
B.A. Friedman. ON OPERATIONS: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021).
-
David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks. Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, July 2020). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/crafting-strategy-for-iw.pdf?ver=2020-07-02-111410-093
-
Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak. U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014 (California: RAND Publications, 2016). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html
-
Linda Robinson, Daniel Egel, and Ryan Andrew Brown. Measuring the Effectiveness of Special Operations (California: RAND Publications, 2019). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2504.html
-
Dan Madden, Dick Hoffman, Michael Johnson, Fred T. Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll. Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare (California: RAND Publications, 2016). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR779.html
-
Col. Keith Burkepile, COL Matthew D. Morton, and COL VeRonica Oswald-Hrutkay, eds. CAMPAIGN PLANNING HANDBOOK Academic Year 2021 (Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College, 2021). https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3738.pdf
CONCLUSION
Students attending the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Special Operations Planning Course (SOPC) frequently ask the professors, “What do you recommend we read for joint planning?” This article is a short primer that directly answers that question and provides a list of “Quick Reference” and “Professional Development Resources” for those who are looking to develop their knowledge and sharpen their joint planning knowledge. Lukas Milevski argues that the strategic and operational planner “requires a particular way of thinking” and key to this is logic, sharpening the ability to “match available means to desired political goals as well as the adversarial logic of trying to impose one’s preferred instrumental logic on an active, intelligent enemy seeking to do the exact same thing in return.” The competitive nature of the 21st century is demanding a greater degree of joint operational design and planning is understood at an increasing span from tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This Primer is just one way of ensuring the current and integrating SOF and Conventional journeyman are prepared to accept the challenges of their generation.
Steven P. Schreiber, Greg E. Metzgar, and Stephen R. Menhir, “Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer,” Military Review, (May-June 2004): 2-8.
Lukas Milevski, “Strategic Sense in the Writing and Reading of History” Military Strategic Magazine, Vol. 7, Issue 3 (November 2021): 2.
Greg Metzgar
Professor Greg Metzgar is a retired Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel with 23 years of tactical, operational, and strategic planning and analysis experience. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), School of Advance Air and Space Power Studies (SAASS) and the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and two tours with the 7th Special Forces Group as battalion operations officer and company commander. Joint experience includes tours with the Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), Joint Concepts Directorate USJFCOM J9, Joint Staff Joint Training Team (J-7), and with the Joint Staff Joint Center for Operational Analysis. He has been a professor teaching operational planning and research at the Joint Special Operations University since 2019. He is a published author and has articles in Military Review, Special Warfare, and other professional periodicals.
9. For Peace, Let There Be Nukes
Excerpt:
However, the U.S. government fears that if South Korea built nuclear weapons, any hope of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula would evaporate. In addition, the United States is apprehensive that a nuclear South Korea could start a nuclear arms race in the East Asian region.
For Peace, Let There Be Nukes - The American Conservative
For Peace, Let There Be Nukes
The U.S. fantasy of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula has long been a mirage.
April 26, 2022
The blatantly aggressive invasion of Ukraine by Russia, complete with apparent war crimes, has shaken up world politics—especially in faraway East Asia. Russia, in an attempt to recover from an initially bungled invasion of Ukraine, is making nuclear threats to try to attenuate U.S. and Western assistance to that nation. Thus, the thinking is that China or North Korea might also rely on such weapons to try to similarly shield an aggressive invasion of a non-nuclear country in East Asia.
A recent poll in South Korea showed more than 70 percent of South Koreans support their government getting nuclear weapons. Although South Korea has a very good conventional military by world standards, much better than its arch-rival North Korea, the North Koreans have nuclear weapons. Pressure is building in South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons because of fears that the United States’ “extended deterrence” (using its nuclear weapons to protect its ally South Korea) might be unreliable if North Korea invaded South Korea.
As it gets longer range missiles to deliver nuclear weapons, North Korea could invade South Korea and threaten the United States’ cities and military bases in the Pacific with nuclear holocaust if it came to the South’s assistance. Stupidly, during the debate in South Korea about whether to make a drive for nuclear weapons, North Korea warned that it would use its nuclear arsenal “at the outset of war” with the South. Also in South Korea’s neighborhood, China and Russia also have nuclear weapons and could possibly turn unfriendly.
However, the U.S. government fears that if South Korea built nuclear weapons, any hope of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula would evaporate. In addition, the United States is apprehensive that a nuclear South Korea could start a nuclear arms race in the East Asian region.
Taiwan, nervous about an attack from an increasingly nationalist China and without the mutual defense treaty South Korea has with the United States, likely is thinking similar thoughts as the South Koreans. And maybe even the more pacifist Japan—which has a mutual defense treaty with the United States, but also has difficult relations with China, Russia, North Korea, and even South Korea—might be having nuclear daydreams.
Instead of obtaining nuclear weapons, at least one senior South Korean official has proposed enhancing extended deterrence by the United States reaching a nuclear-sharing agreement with South Korea similar to the one enjoyed by NATO nations. Under such an arrangement, if a war broke out, South Korean aircraft would be allowed to carry U.S. nuclear weapons.
This proposal is the wrong way to go. The United States should learn the right lesson from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not the wrong one. It is true that Ukraine was invaded because it was not a member of NATO. However, despite the awful nature of the aggressive and heinous Russian invasion, at the end of the day, Ukraine is not strategically vital to the United States, and President Joe Biden, despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s valiant and understandable effort to shame America into doing more to help him, has no obligation to do so.
The United States, now $30 trillion in debt, foolishly has assumed the burden of defending relatively wealthy far-forward states near Russia—for example, Poland, Romania, and the Baltics—and in East Asia, especially South Korea, Japan, and informally Taiwan. Whenever a severe security crisis occurs, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all such states make it known they are nervous that U.S. extended deterrence will not hold. These states, and others in Pax Americana, should be apprehensive, because when war with any nuclear power is afoot, would the United States sacrifice Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago to save Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei?
In a time when the financially strapped United States should be thinking about a more modest security posture in the world, it should allow South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. The arms race did not start with them, it started with the pariah state North Korea getting nuclear weapons. The U.S. fantasy of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula has long been a mirage because North Korea will never give up its growing nuclear arsenal.
South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have been responsible players in the international system for some time now and would likely be good stewards of nuclear weapons. However, the price for the United States allowing them to obtain such arms would be to abrogate all U.S. security guarantees. In the longer term, after the Ukraine crisis has passed, the United States should even rethink defending NATO countries. The Russian military has already proven it is a hollow shell; Europe already has Britain and France, two countries with a nuclear deterrent to counter the Russian one; and the wealthy European Union had five times the GDP of Russia, even before recent Western economic sanctions have devastated it, thus allowing Europe to amply defend itself without a U.S. nuclear and conventional umbrella.
Ivan Eland is a senior fellow with the Independent Institute and author of War and the Rogue Presidency, about why and how NATO bears some responsibility for the impending crisis in Ukraine.
Latest Articles
10. Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Toll Holdings Limited
Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Toll Holdings Limited
Release date
04/25/2022
Body
The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced a settlement with Toll Holdings Limited (“Toll”), an international freight forwarding and logistics company headquartered in Melbourne, Australia. Toll agreed to remit $6,131,855 to settle its potential civil liability for 2,958 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations. The apparent violations occurred when Toll originated or received payments through the U.S. financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons. These payments were in connection with sea, air, and rail shipments conducted by Toll, its affiliates, or suppliers to, from, or through the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, or Syria, or the property or interests in property of an entity on OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Toll’s apparent violations were non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.
For more information, please visit the following web notice.
11. FDD | Canada must designate Iran’s revolutionary guard as a terrorist group
Excerpts:
The Trudeau government should set an example by designating the IRGC in its entirety as a terrorist organization. And Trudeau should publicly urge the United States to resist Iran’s demands. Even if Washington fails to heed him, Trudeau’s position would help further delegitimize an organization that has claimed the lives of innocent Canadians.
Perhaps more notably, Canada’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group would serve as an act of justice that the families of the IRGC’s Canadian victims have long demanded. For their sake if no one else’s, Ottawa should finally call the IRGC what it really is.
FDD | Canada must designate Iran’s revolutionary guard as a terrorist group
Designating the IRGC as a terrorist group would serve as an act of justice that the families of the IRGC’s Canadian victims have long demanded.
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · April 25, 2022
The United States remains on the verge of making a dangerous concession to Iran. And Canada seems prepared to double down on a policy that echoes it.
Washington may soon delist Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the paramilitary force responsible for advancing Tehran’s radical Islamist ideology, as a foreign terrorist organization. This capitulation – part of a US bid to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – would fuel the IRGC’s domestic repression and regional aggression for years to come.
But Ottawa has yet to sanction the IRGC. In 2012, Canada did sanction the Quds Force, the IRGC’s foreign operations arm, which provides military and economic support to Iran’s proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere in the region. Since then, however, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has steadfastly ignored repeated calls by Canadian parliamentarians – including a 2018 resolution that passed the House of Commons overwhelmingly – to designate the IRGC in its entirety.
Even after the IRGC’s Aerospace Force downed a Ukrainian airliner in early 2020, killing all 176 people on board, including dozens of Canadians, Trudeau failed to impose meaningful consequences on Tehran. Though Iran described the incident as an accident, an Ontario judge ruled last year that the shootdown was “intentional” and an “act of terrorism.”
Ottawa’s position may reflect a perceived bifurcation of the IRGC’s foreign and domestic policies. According to this line of thinking, the Quds Force constitutes an entity distinct from the broader IRGC’s operational command, thereby obliging Ottawa to regard them as independent political actors. In this view, Canadian policy-makers can address the IRGC’s two missions separately.
But this approach is an illusion. In fact, the IRGC as a whole operates under the control of one man: Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And for him, the IRGC – as the Islamic Republic’s 1979 constitution stipulates – has one overarching objective: “fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God’s way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.”
In other words, the IRGC seeks to export the same Islamist creed that it enforces at home. The IRGC’s various branches facilitate this goal. For example, as Jason M. Brodsky of United Against Nuclear Iran, a US advocacy group, notes in a recent op-ed, the IRGC’s Basij militia and Ground Force have assisted the Quds Force in Syria, where Tehran seeks to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Meanwhile, the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization monitors and represses domestic dissent.
Ultimately, Tehran’s worldview conflates politics and religion, regarding the state as the key instrument for discharging the divine will. As Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founding father and first supreme leader, put it in his 1970 treatise Islamic Government, “Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.”
Ottawa and Washington seem unable to grasp this fundamental reality, clinging to the hope that they can reason with the regime or intimidate it with tough rhetoric. But the Islamic Republic will not renounce its raison d’être. Only a US-led maximum pressure campaign — drawing on all instruments of Western power, be they military, economic, or diplomatic — stands a chance of changing the regime’s behaviour.
The Trudeau government should set an example by designating the IRGC in its entirety as a terrorist organization. And Trudeau should publicly urge the United States to resist Iran’s demands. Even if Washington fails to heed him, Trudeau’s position would help further delegitimize an organization that has claimed the lives of innocent Canadians.
Perhaps more notably, Canada’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group would serve as an act of justice that the families of the IRGC’s Canadian victims have long demanded. For their sake if no one else’s, Ottawa should finally call the IRGC what it really is.
Tzvi Kahn is a Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter @TzviKahn.
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · April 25, 2022
12. Send Ukraine Cyber Help, Not Bureaucratic Gridlock
Send Ukraine Cyber Help, Not Bureaucratic Gridlock
The United States has sent Ukraine a variety of military equipment, including killer drones, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, small arms, and ammunition. We should do more.
If ordered, U.S. Cyber Command could develop the ability to temporarily disable key Russian military, intelligence, or logistics networks. This would be a tremendous boon to Ukrainian forces. Moreover, such cyber operations would not be clearly traceable back to the U.S.—reducing the possibility of escalating tensions with Russia.
Unfortunately, it appears that National Security Council staff will force the Pentagon to navigate a time-consuming bureaucratic maze before it can include offensive cyber operations in the package of military assistance to Ukraine. The NSC staff stance echoes that of the Obama administration.
Washington has long invested billions of dollars annually to build immense capabilities for offensive cyber operations. Yet, for years, those capabilities went unused. Policy directives from President Obama created a multi-level bureaucratic review process that was too slow and cumbersome to enable timely or meaningful cyber operations.
The result was inaction in the face of growing cyber and conventional threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The commander of U.S. Cyber Command recently testified that he was unaware of any cyber operations that took place under the Obama Administration’s policy process.
That changed in 2018, when President Trump, supported by the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, created a new process that delegated the authority to conduct time-sensitive offensive cyber operations to certain operating agencies, including the Department of Defense.
This new process struck a careful balance to enable timely offensive cyber operations within carefully defined parameters. For example, approval of actions above a certain threshold—including any cyber operation that would have a kinetic effect similar to that of a conventional operation—were reserved to the President, while the military could carry out smaller-scale operations following a streamlined interagency coordination process.
U.S. Cyber Command successfully deployed these newly delegated authorities to defend the 2018 and 2020 elections against Russian influence operations. In the key period ahead of the 2018 midterm elections, it temporarily shut down the Internet Research Agency, a Kremlin-associated troll farm involved in 2016 election influence. During the 2020 cycle, Cyber Command conducted more than two dozen operations to combat foreign threats to the election.
Combined with “hunt forward” operations, which position U.S. cyber operators alongside foreign partners to engage and defend against malicious cyber threats, offensive cyber operations are effective tools for the United States and our allies to counter an accelerating and dangerous cyber landscape.
The commander of Cyber Command disclosed “nine different hunt forward operations” that have helped our allies engage with persistent adversary threats, including most recently, assistance to Ukraine against Russia.
Other federal agencies can complement the military’s efforts with their own offensive cyber operations. Just this week, for instance, the Department of Justice and FBI announced that an offensive cyber operation had successfully removed Russian malware that was designed to create “botnets” from around the globe.
In spite of these successes, Biden’s NSC staff has reportedly launched an “interagency review” that aims to undo the Trump administration’s work streamlining reforms. Proponents of the review argue that the White House must control all decisions related to cyber operations, no matter how trivial the operation, to manage the diplomatic and strategic consequences of military action.
These short-sighted views capture the essence of the Obama and Biden administration’s inaction through bureaucratic malaise. As Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) recently noted, rescinding the Trump framework would be “a grave mistake [that] would undermine deterrence at the worst possible moment.”
If the review is to recommend positive policy changes, it should aim to improve interagency communication and speed the coordination and approval process for offensive cyber operations, not recreate a failed multi-tiered review process. President Biden should continue to delegate authority to operating agencies, and Congress should continue to provide the authorities and resources necessary to establish deterrence below the threshold of armed conflict.
Even as Russian forces retreat from the suburbs of Kyiv, the risk of cyberattacks against U.S. and allied critical infrastructure remains high. Vladimir Putin continues to wield powerful cyber tools, and he may use them to lash out at the United States and its allies. In the face of that threat, now is not the time to build bureaucratic obstacles to operations that could help stop Russian attacks before they begin.
A former General Counsel of NSA and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the NSC, Michael Ellis is a visiting fellow in law and technology in The Heritage Foundation’s Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies. Formerly Chief of Staff to the Director of National Intelligence, Dustin Carmack is a research fellow in Heritage’s Center for Technology Policy.
13. Projectile Launched From Lebanon Targets Northern Israel
Projectile Launched From Lebanon Targets Northern Israel | FDD's Long War Journal
A rocket launch was identified from Lebanon that exploded in an open area near northern Israel near Kibbutz Metzuva Monday morning, according to an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Twitter statement.
The IDF said it responded with artillery fire “near the area from which the shooting was carried out” and against “open spaces” using “dozens of artillery shells.”
The attack comes against the backdrop of the resumption of rocket fire from Gaza by Palestinian militants towards southern Israel, which has been blamed on clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police at Al-Aqsa Mosque. [See FDD’s Long War Journal: Gaza-Based Militants Fire Rockets for Second Night in a Row.]
While there has not been official blame placed on a particular militant group, it is likely Palestinian factions were behind the strike with the tacit approval of Hezbollah. This is a strategy that has been employed before by suspected Palestinian factions, notably during last year’s Gaza war.
Suspected Palestinian militant rocket assaults from Lebanon are not treated by the IDF in the same manner as those from Gaza due to the possible involvement of Hezbollah. This may be a reason for the Israeli military’s limited response to the offensive. Generally, the IDF targets terrorist military infrastructure it has previously identified based on intelligence following an attack.
This also brings up the absence of blame by the IDF in its public statements following the strike from Lebanon. The IDF omitted placing blame on the Lebanese government, Hezbollah or Palestinian militants for the rocket fire. This suggests either the IDF did not have exact intelligence on the actor(s) behind the attack or preferred not to publicly blame a specific group in an effort to contain its response.
Adding to previous attacks from Lebanon by suspected Palestinian militants, it appears the Resistance Axis, led by Iran, is becoming more unified in its response to Israeli military efforts against Palestinian militant factions and unrest at Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
Are you a dedicated reader of FDD's Long War Journal? Has our research benefitted you or your team over the years? Support our independent reporting and analysis today by considering a one-time or monthly donation. Thanks for reading! You can make a tax-deductible donation here.
14. Commercial Drones/Robotics and the Modern Combat Zone: A look at Ukraine
Learn, adapt, anticipate.
Commercial Drones/Robotics and the Modern Combat Zone: A look at Ukraine | Small Wars Journal
Commercial Drones/Robotics and the Modern Combat Zone:
A look at Ukraine
By COL (R) Bill Edwards
If you are paying close attention to the war in Ukraine you would have noticed a significant change in how war is prosecuted in the modern age specifically regarding commercial and military drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and robotics. Additionally, Ukraine is winning the information war starting at the top of their government in the form of President Zelenskyy’s constant and upfront reporting daily. Why is this important? What this specific conflict is showing us from a military and possibly more important from a private sector perspective is the demonstration of what strategists and historians would classify as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). "The best-known definition of RMA is the one provided by Dr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, U.S. DoD, who defined it as '…a major change like warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations” (Revolution in military affairs - SourceWatch).
In the case of Ukraine, the drone in all forms is a fast-evolving technology that is being employed using innovative tactics to create an environment where a real sense of parity can be found between Ukrainian and Russian ground forces. This is something no one would have predicted before the invasion. Couple that with an aggressive information campaign that floods the market hourly with updates from the front and you will find a successful recipe for gaining and winning the world’s attention and favor. This is evident by all the ammunition, equipment, and supplies coming from the west to keep Ukraine in the fight. The overwhelming power of the Russian military has quickly found out that their adversary not only has the “will” to fight but is also “agile” and “creative” in how they fight. Drones are one very important aspect of how this modern-day David is matching up with Goliath in real-time for all of us to witness. Now, some will argue that drones in all forms have been used for decades which is true but what we haven’t seen is this level of coordinated employment at a tremendous scale in a major combat operation (MCO) while simultaneously operating in a multi-domain operational environment (MDO).
Early on, the Ukrainian government using a myriad of social media platforms including Facebook mobilized the private sector to get into the fight early by putting commercial drones normally used for recreation purposes to act like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and weapons delivery platforms. “The ministry posted the appeal on Facebook last Friday…do you have a drone? Then give it to an experienced pilot! Or do you know how to fly a drone? Join the joint patrol with Unit 112 of the Kyiv City Special Brigade…! Kyiv needs you and your drone…” the defense minister wrote (How Military And Civilian DJI Drones Are Used In Ukraine - Special (dronexl. co). More recently, we’ve seen private-sector drones, mostly DJI platforms giving us a frontline view of the Ukrainian targeting process. More specifically, these drones are flying from locations close to Russian forces, identifying targets and then giving that information for coordinated infantry or artillery strikes. The best example of this comes with the widely watched stalled 40-mile Russian convoy into Kyiv. As the world watched and wondered what was happening it recently came to fruition that behind-the-scenes Ukrainian special forces including the Ukrainian drone unit Aerorozvidka thwarted and destroyed the convoy using nighttime ground and drone raids. Additionally, the idea of robotics is taking shape in this conflict.
Drone systems that utilize artificial intelligence (AI) and have autonomous capabilities raise a whole different problem to understand. Systems like the Israeli Harpo are only one of many possible options that could be used in a manner that doesn’t require a “human in the loop” as the system looks for Russian electronic warfare systems and “decides” to take them out autonomously. Additionally, the United States has entered this space with shipments of the “Phoenix Ghost” a drone that has an extended flight time capability and searches for its target on a “one-way” mission profile. All of this makes the technology and its employment unique to modern warfare and we shouldn’t be naïve to think that the Russians are not watching and learning. Russia and its military-industrial complex came into the conflict with limited use of UAV and UAS systems; however, we’ve seen an uptick in their use of drones outside of their expected military-grade arsenal which is a direct reaction to the Ukrainian effort and success. The use of the Orlan-10 and DJI drones by the Russians has expanded exponentially over the last several weeks as they try to match the Ukrainian effort but sadly reports of technology issues and captured Orlan-10 platforms have shown that the Russians are well behind when it comes to being capable of replicating what Ukrainian forces have produced. The best example comes from a downed Orlan-10 that was kept flying with duct tape, a bottle cap, and a payload consisting of a low-end Canon DSLR camera. In the modern age of easily accessible drone technology, this is laughable. Additionally, it should be noted that Ukrainians have sharpened their skills since the beginning of this conflict in 2014.
The use of drones over entrenched soldiers has proven to be very effective. The use of 3-D printed drones as a “fire and forget” weapon in this conflict emerged in 2015 and the tactics and techniques have only grown more sophisticated over time. As the conflict continues, we’ve also seen some interesting reports concerning the use of private-sector drone detection and monitoring systems. In the last few weeks, the Ukrainian government attacked and condemned the Chinese drone maker DJI for helping the Russian war effort with its manipulation of proprietary drone detection and monitoring capability known as Aeroscope. More specifically, the Ukrainians are accusing DJI of helping Russian forces identify Ukrainian targets including drone operators with this technology while limiting their use of the same system. Additionally, counter-drone technology continues to lag far behind the platform’s evolution. This is a noted problem that spans military and commercial/private sector use. As we’ve seen sophisticated Russian detection systems have failed to counter the extensive and successful use of commercial drones by Ukrainian forces. A good example is the sinking of the Russian warship Moskva. It was noted that Ukraine used the Turkish TB-2 platform as a decoy or distraction to lure the ship’s air defenses away from the real threat of ship killing missiles; however, this reporting is thought to be sensationalized to support the overall information campaign and bolster the idea of Ukraine’s drone might. In the end, Russia underestimated Ukraine and its military “will.” Russian forces have discovered that Ukrainians have created a semblance of airspace parity and as noted in the previous article “are rewriting the rules of war “ with Russia in the case of drone use.
Lastly, as the conflict continues more and more western technologies will enter the conflict zone to test their capabilities. Currently, reports of lasers and non-kinetic takedowns of drones have made their way to open news sources. Evidence of this inevitable reality comes in the way of a U.S. warship testing a laser on a drone in an exercise. Additionally, the Israelis have tested a similar system in the summer of 2021, proving we can expect to see far more in this heavily saturated drone environment.
The Ukraine war is providing the world with an extraordinary view of modern conflict in real-time. Drones and information together are winning the “hearts and minds” of the world community. It’s time to declare we are witnessing an RMA as it pertains to drones and robotics. Government and military leaders should take this seriously, but more importantly, recognize how the evolution of the commercial drone market has progressed in the 12 years since its inception. Frankly, this is quite amazing.
Bill Edwards
Bill Edwards is a retired United States Army Colonel and veteran of the Iraq war. He is currently the President of Calibre Engineering. He speaks and writes extensively on commercial drones/robotics and their impact on society.
15. Where a Russian ‘fantasy’ meets brutal reality: A Ukrainian writer’s reflections on war
Think about the long term effects on so many levels.
Excerpts:
How many will return? I do not know, but I fear that many won’t be able to come back.
In other words, in addition to all the other tragedies of this “special operation,” both countries are losing their most precious commodities: their youth. This is a reality. And it will impact everything — the economy and culture and health of both nations — for years and years to come.
This will be one of the longest-lasting effects of Russia’s campaign: a brutal and bloody remaking of two great countries, all because a group of men in the Kremlin refuse to snap out of their weird and destructive fantasies.
I must go now — to check tomorrow’s weather.
Where a Russian ‘fantasy’ meets brutal reality: A Ukrainian writer’s reflections on war
The novelist Andrey Kurkov prays for rain and worries about long-term damage to Ukraine and Russia both.
Special Contributor
April 26, 2022
Editor’s note: We first “met” Andrey Kurkov in February. The acclaimed Ukrainian novelist wrote a piece for us on the eve of war from his native Kyiv. His observations then were from a capital on edge — learning about self-defense and the locations of bomb shelters — but a population living life and spending its days as if war were a remote possibility. One month into the war, Kurkov shared profound reflections on the invasion, the Ukrainian resistance and his own personal odyssey.
Now, two months after the war began, Kurkov has written again for Grid. His reflections are — like his well-known novels — a mix of pathos and dark humor.
We hope that at the three-month mark, there will be better news to share.
Over the past two months, I’ve developed a new habit: First thing in the morning, I check the weather forecast. Why? Because when I see that it is raining or snowing in the war zone — in my homeland — I know that the Russian army cannot move quickly and that the mercenaries from Syria and Lebanon, brought to Ukraine on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s orders, are feeling cold and uncomfortable.
It is, I admit, a strange habit — looking up the weather and hoping for rain and snow. But it is hardly the strangest thing to have happened over the past two months, since Russia invaded my country.
Perhaps the strangest thing has been the Russian campaign itself — confused and compromised by the weirdness of the Russian military leadership. For them, this is not a war. It is — weirdly — a “special operation.” They continue to cling to this alternate reality, even as we hear of Russian soldiers doing whatever they can to get out of going to the front lines. No doubt they are aware that this is in fact a war, one in which, over the past two months, their chances of losing have only increased.
And yet Russia refuses to come to its senses. In fact, as it struggles, Putin and his commanders are resorting to all kinds of weirdness. Take for example the case of the Donetsk Philharmonic Orchestra. These are musicians in the area where Russian separatists have been fighting for years and where Putin is now concentrating his “special operation.” Local reports say that they were summoned to hold a concert for the Russian military, but when they arrived at the venue, their instruments were taken away. Instead, the musicians were handed assault rifles and asked to put on military fatigues. No, they weren’t being asked to stage a play. They were being conscripted and deployed to Mariupol, the southern port city that has been under siege for a month now. And where, among thousands of others, the Donetsk orchestra’s pianist Nikolai Zvyagintsev was killed earlier this month. He was 38 years old.
The fate of his fellow musicians is unclear, as are the circumstances of Zvyagintsev’s death. Was he also forced into fighting in Mariupol? We don’t know for sure. What we do know is that his piano will never sing again.
It is one of the countless tragedies of this war — sorry, “special operation” for my readers in the Russian establishment, who continue to behave in other weird ways. They are for instance going slow on prisoner exchanges. Both sides claim to have detained hundreds of enemy soldiers. The Ukrainians have been calling for prisoner swaps. Some have taken place. But the Russians do not seem to be in a hurry to reclaim their men.
I put this down to their generally odd — or rather, destructively odd — behavior. But perhaps this is one of those areas where fantasy — the Russian fiction that this isn’t really a full-scale conflict, with mass death and prisoners of war — is colliding with a cold and hard and horrific reality. Only the other day, a Russian politician called for a law that would forcibly take the blood of captured Ukrainian prisoners to treat wounded Russian soldiers. This is a practice that was used by Adolf Hitler during World War II. Blood for German soldiers and officers was taken from concentration camp prisoners. Why would such a brutal proposal be needed if the reality was a simple and well-organized “special operation”?
What Putin and his generals cannot mask is how their war has already changed the reality not just for Ukraine but also for Russia.
For years now, Russia has been facing a population crisis. It simply does not have enough people. Russia’s population has shrunk from more than 148 million in the early ’90s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to around 145 million — and projections suggest it could drop below 140 million by the end of this decade. Fewer people marry, fewer women want to have children, and now this war will make Russia’s demographic problems that much worse. People will be less likely to have children when the nation’s economy has been battered by sanctions, and thousands — perhaps tens of thousands — of young men will never come home from the war. And young men were already in short supply in what is a rapidly aging country.
On the other side, a different population crisis. Millions of Ukrainians have been forced to flee their country. More than 10 million people — myself included — have left their homes; more than half that group has crossed a border to another country. Will all these millions ever return? Can they, as Russia destroys their homes? The war has fortified Ukraine’s spirit and its determination to maintain its freedom and its pro-European course. People are standing shoulder to shoulder to resist the aggressor. But too many have had no choice but to leave. This includes an entire generation of Ukrainian children. As their fathers and uncles and aunts fight, they have been driven out with their mothers and grandparents.
How many will return? I do not know, but I fear that many won’t be able to come back.
In other words, in addition to all the other tragedies of this “special operation,” both countries are losing their most precious commodities: their youth. This is a reality. And it will impact everything — the economy and culture and health of both nations — for years and years to come.
This will be one of the longest-lasting effects of Russia’s campaign: a brutal and bloody remaking of two great countries, all because a group of men in the Kremlin refuse to snap out of their weird and destructive fantasies.
I must go now — to check tomorrow’s weather.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
Andrey Kurkov is one of Ukraine’s best-known writers and the author of the critically acclaimed novels “Death and the Penguin” and “Grey Bees.”
16. Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine
Powerful statement from the SECDEF.
There can be no more illusion of neutrality.
Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine
Defense secretary Lloyd Austin said he ‘wants to see Russia weakened’ – a sign Washington now defines its goals differently
The US defense secretary’s declaration that Washington wanted to see Russia weakened militarily and unable to recover quickly, marks a shift in Washington’s declared aims underlying its military support for Ukraine.
At a press conference in Poland after a surprise visit to Kyiv, Lloyd Austin was asked if he would now define US goals differently from those set out soon after the Russian invasion. In response, he started out with the established administration line about helping Ukraine retain its sovereignty and defend its territory.
Then Austin added a second goal: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” That meant Russia should “not have the capability to very quickly reproduce” the forces and equipment that had been lost in Ukraine.
The UK defence secretary, Ben Wallace, estimated those losses on Monday as a quarter of Russia’s pre-invasion strength, with more than 2,000 armoured vehicles knocked out, including at least 530 tanks, as well as 60 aircraft.
The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, who travelled with Austin to see Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv, agreed with his formulation of US objectives, saying: “I think the secretary said it very well”.
The two officials were talking as the first howitzers from the latest tranche of US military supplies began arriving in Ukraine, and $165m in supplies of “non-standard” ex-Soviet compatible ammunition was announced.
‘Russia is failing’ in its war aims, says US secretary of state Antony Blinken – video
The remarks suggested that even if Russian forces withdrew or were expelled from the Ukrainian territory they have occupied since 24 February, the US and its allies would seek to maintain sanctions with the aim of stopping Russia reconstituting its forces.
It also indicated Washington is taking a position in an internal debate within Nato on whether to use the opportunity of Vladimir Putin’s strategic blunder in Ukraine to try to hobble his ability to threaten other countries in the future.
“The balance in Nato itself has shifted,” Rajan Menon, the director of the grand strategy programme at the Defense Priorities thinktank, said. “The argument now seems to be this is not just about Ukraine; it’s about a larger problem, that is the threat that Russia poses to Europe as a whole. And if you look at it that way, then these comments begin to make sense.”
“The Russians are on the retreat, so you have this flush of optimism which has moved the goalposts,” Menon, professor emeritus in international relations at Columbia University, said. “Once Washington says it, those in Nato who want the war to be about that are empowered, because what the US says matters.”
A European diplomat said it was unclear whether the remarks reflected a new decision or “a clearer articulation” of an existing position.
“I think it’s fundamentally about trying to get on the front foot in this crisis. There’s a lot of domestic criticism of the administration for being passive,” the diplomat said. “All of this is swirling around at the moment in the administration, as they work out exactly how forward they want to be.”
If the remarks do indeed represent the Biden administration’s aims, there is a separate question of whether it was sensible to declare them so bluntly. It arguably weakens Russia’s incentive to withdraw, reinforces Moscow’s narrative that Nato is waging a proxy war in Ukraine aimed at weakening Russia and even regime change, deepening Putin’s paranoia.
“If I was writing the secretary’s talking points, I would prefer he said: our goal is that Ukraine wins, rather than our goal is to weaken Russia because they are two sides of the same coin, but one would have been much more aligned with what the administration has been saying,” said Alina Polyakova, the president of the Center for European Policy Analysis, said.
“Certainly this will be used by the Russian state media to double down on the narrative that we’ve already seen from the Russian government, that the US is ‘out to get us’, that they want to destroy Russia,” she said, but added: “Frankly, I don’t think we should worry too much about how this will be spun by the Russian media, because they can spin anything.”
Ultimately, Polyakova said, Austin was voicing a widespread feeling about the long-term threat posed by Putin that is increasingly difficult to ignore.
“I think the secretary’s comments were truthful in that it will be in the greater interest of global stability and European security not to have a military aggressive state, bordering Nato or bordering Europe,” she said. “I think that’s very obvious.”
17. The War in Ukraine Has Unleashed a New Word
"ruscism"
The War in Ukraine Has Unleashed a New Word
Credit...Photo illustration by Pablo Delcan
In a creative play on three different languages, Ukrainians identify an enemy: ‘ruscism.’
Credit...Photo illustration by Pablo Delcan
The City Council of Mariupol, Ukraine, was trying to make a point about mass death. Their city had been hit hardest by the Russian invasion, and thousands of corpses lay amid the rubble after weeks of urban warfare. After the revelation of Russian atrocities in Bucha and other cities in northern Ukraine, the elected representatives of the port city wished to remind the world that the scale of killing in the south was still higher. In dry and sober language, they described the fates of Mariupol residents. Occasionally, though, emotion slipped through: In passing, the council members referred to the Russian perpetrators by a term of condemnation that every Ukrainian knows, though it is not yet in the dictionaries and cannot (yet) be said in English: “рашизм.”
As Russian troops withdrew from the Kyiv region, and photographs of the corpses of murdered civilians appeared in media, Ukrainians expressed their horror and condemnation with this same word. As I read about Irpin, about Bucha, about Trostyanets, of the bodies crushed by tanks, of the bicyclists shot on the street, of the desecrated corpses, there it was, “рашизм,” again and again, in comments sections, in social media, even in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian state. As Russia renews its attempt to destroy the Ukrainian state with its Easter offensive in the Donbas, Ukrainians will keep using this new word.
Grasping its meaning requires crossing differences in alphabet and pronunciation, thinking our way into the experience of a bilingual society at war with a fascist empire. “Pашизм” sounds like “fascism,” but with an “r” sound instead of an “f” at the beginning; it means, roughly, “Russian fascism.” The aggressor in this war keeps trying to push back toward a past as it never happened, toward nonsensical and necrophiliac accounts of history. Russia must conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin says, because of a baptism a thousand years ago, or because of bloodshed during World War II. But Russian myths of empire cannot contain the imagination of the Ukrainian victims of a new war. National identity is about living people, and the values and the futures they imagine and choose. A nation exists insofar as it makes new things, and a national language lives by making new words.
The new word “рашизм” is a useful conceptualization of Putin’s worldview. Far more than Western analysts, Ukrainians have noticed the Russian tilt toward fascism in the last decade. Undistracted by Putin’s operational deployment of genocide talk, they have seen fascist practices in Russia: the cults of the leader and of the dead, the corporatist state, the mythical past, the censorship, the conspiracy theories, the centralized propaganda and now the war of destruction. Even as we rightly debate how applicable the term is to Western figures and parties, we have tended to overlook the central example of fascism’s revival, which is the Putin regime in the Russian Federation.
The origins of the word “pашизм” give us a sense of how Ukrainians differ from both Russians and Americans. A bilingual nation like Ukraine is not just a collection of bilingual individuals; it is an unending set of encounters in which people habitually adjust the language they use to other people and new settings, manipulating language in ways that are foreign to monolingual nations. I have gone on Ukrainian television and radio, taken questions in Russian and answered them in Ukrainian, without anyone for a moment finding that switch worthy of mention. Once, while speaking Ukrainian on television, I stopped for a moment to quote a few words of poetry in Russian, a switch that was an effort for me. But Ukrainians change languages effortlessly — not just as situations change, but also to make situations change, sometimes in the middle of a sentence, or even in the middle of a word.
“Pашизм” is a word built up from the inside, from several languages, as a complex of puns and references that reveal a bilingual society thinking out its predicament and communicating to itself. Its emergence demonstrates how a code-switching people can enrich language while making a horrific war more intelligible to themselves. Putin’s ethnic imperialism insists that Ukrainians must be Russians because they speak Russian. They do — and they speak Ukrainian. But Ukrainian identity has as much to do with an ability to live between languages than it does with the use of any one of them.
A billboard in Kyiv in March calling for Russian soldiers not to become murderers.
Ukrainian is written in Cyrillic, and so pausing upon “рашизм” in this, its original form, will help with the mental calisthenics required to apprehend things the way the Ukrainians do. Seeing those six characters, you might be tempted to begin by making them Latin ones. But languages work together in a complex way, especially in the minds of people who speak more than one of them natively. As Rimbaud and the Hasidim (who came from Ukraine) knew, each letter has magic. We have to go slowly.
Those six Cyrillic letters contain references to Italian, Russian and English, all of which a mechanical, letter-by-letter transliteration would block. The best (if imperfect) way I have found to render “рашизм” from Ukrainian into English is “ruscism” — though not what the standard protocol of transliteration would suggest, this gestures at both the word’s origins and its meaning. When we see “ruscism” we might guess this word has to do with Russia (“rus”), with politics (“ism”) and with the extreme right (“ascism”) — as, indeed, it does. A simple way to think about it is as a conglomerate of the “r” from “Russia” and the “ascism” from “fascism”: Russian fascism. This is barely the beginning of the story, but it starts us down the path toward the linguistic playfulness that makes the word possible, and toward the accumulation of meaning drawn from each sound.
I have had to spell “рашизм” as “ruscism” in English because we need “rus,” with a “u,” to see the reference to Russia. In losing the original Ukrainian “a,” though, we weaken a multilayered reference — because the “a” in “рашизм,” conveniently, allows the Ukrainian word to associate Russia and fascism in a way English cannot.
But wait: How can the “ra” (written “pa” in Cyrillic) suggest Russia in Ukrainian? You might guess that “Russia” in Ukrainian also has an “a” in the first syllable, but it does not. It’s spelled with an “o”: Росія. You might remember that Ukrainians also know Russian, and guess that perhaps the word for “Russia” in Russian is spelled with an “a.” It’s not: In Russian, too, the word has an “o” as its first vowel. But the guess puts us on the right track. We are about to see that Ukrainians can play with Russian in ways that Russians cannot — that a Ukrainian word can contain within it a reference to Russia that Russians themselves would never catch.
If you don’t know either language, you might think that Russian and Ukrainian are very similar. They are pretty close — much as, say, Spanish and Italian are. If you know one, you have a tremendous advantage in learning the other. But you do still have to learn it. Russian grammar is similar to Ukrainian — perhaps a tad closer than, say, Ukrainian and Polish — but the semantics are not that close. From a Russian perspective, the false friends are legion. There is an elegant four-syllable Ukrainian word that simply means “soon” or “without delay,” but to a Russian it sounds like “not behind the bar.” The Ukrainian word for “cat” sounds like the Russian for “whale,” while the Ukrainian for “female cats” sounds like Russian for “intestines.”
Russians do not understand Ukrainian, because they have not learned it. Ukrainians do understand Russian, because they have learned it. This fact has battlefield implications. Ukrainian soldiers often speak Russian, though they are instructed to use Ukrainian to spot infiltrators and spies. This is a drastic example of a general practice of code-switching. President Volodymyr Zelensky generally used Russian as a comedian and almost always uses Ukrainian as a politician — except for when he might switch, midspeech, to using Russian to address Russians, in the full knowledge that Ukrainians will follow along.
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine addressing the United Nations Security Council via video link on April 5.
To switch back and forth between kindred languages requires a lively knowledge of the differences between them. One difference between Ukrainian and Russian has to do with that “ah” sound, which appears more often in Russian. In both languages, the vowel “a” consistently generates this sound. In Russian, though, a written “o” can do it, too. A salient example is the Russian word for “liberation” — “освобождение.” This is transliterated the way it looks, as “osvobozhdenie,” but sounds more like “asvobazhdenie,” with each “a” pronounced as an “ah.” To a Ukrainian ear, this is a very Russian word. The Ukrainian counterpart — визволення, vyzvolennia — sounds completely different (though it is almost identical to the Polish wyzwolenie).
The Russian освобождение is also laden with decades of Soviet usage, since it was applied relentlessly to describe every action of the Red Army, including ones where the people in question did not believe that they were being “liberated,” as in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. This is the word now used by Russians to describe their invasion of Ukraine, and it carries with it decades of mendacious use. To Ukrainians it can sound both absurd and sinister; when Russians use it earnestly, Ukrainians might consider it a sign of “zombification,” зомбування, a word they use rather a lot. One Ukrainian explanation for the use of the letter Z by official Russia as the symbol of the invasion is that “the other half of the swastika was stolen in the warehouse,” a joke about the logistics of the Russian Army — but personally, the Z makes me think of “zombie.”
Windows in Moscow forming the letter Z — the symbol of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine — in March.
At present, Ukrainian media often features a special kind of mockery in quotations of Russians speaking Russian — a kind of humor that is only possible from inside a linguistic community. Ukrainians are perfectly capable of writing Russian correctly, but during the war some internet commentators have spelled the occasional Russian word using the Ukrainian writing system, leaving it looking unmoored and pitiable. Writing in Ukrainian, you might spell “oсвобождение” as “aсвобaждениe,” the way it is pronounced — a bit of lexicographic alchemy that makes it (and, by extension, Russians) look silly, and mocks the political concepts being used to justify a war. In a larger sense, such efforts are a means of displacing Russia from its central position in regional culture.
Indeed, one relevant case of this o/a shift is the name of Russia itself. The Russian word for “Russia” is “Россия,” but that “o” is pronounced as an “a,” something like “Rahssiya.” You can now see where this is going. The “rah” sound at the beginning of our new Ukrainian word, “рашизм,” doesn’t just signal “Russian” — it suggests the word “Russia” as it is pronounced by people speaking Russian. It is the peculiar way Russian speakers name their own country that seals a link between “Russia” and “fascism.”
In Russian you need to know when an “o” becomes an “a,” but once you know, the sound is consistent. Ukrainians play with English as well, which in this respect is trickier. In English it is all but impossible to predict how a given vowel will be pronounced; the letter on the page has almost nothing to do with the sound you are supposed to make. (If you don’t believe me, go back and sound out the vowels in any sentence of this essay.) English vowel sounds are also different — broader, lazier and more numerous — than those in Ukrainian and Russian. English speakers have about as many ways of pronouncing “a” as there are vowels in those entire languages.
When Americans say “Russia,” the first and second syllable rhyme. This is baffling, since the first vowel is a “u” and the second is an “ia.” Neither is pronounced in a way that corresponds to how speakers of Slavic languages — and indeed most other languages — would understand the pronunciation of “ia” or “u,” or for that matter any vowel. For both, Americans tend to make an “uh” sound, known as a schwa; we say “Ruhshuh.” This “uh” sound does not exist in Ukrainian or Russian, whose speakers sometimes have a difficult time knowing where it belongs and how to pronounce it.
It matters how we spell and say “Russia” in English because the Ukrainian word “рашизм” strips the English for parts. Ukrainians hear us say “Russia” a good deal. Now, they tend not to take too seriously what we say about Russia, and generally they are right — and so when they take “Russia” and make it “Pаша,” borrowing the way we might say it, they mean a Russia that is not to be taken so seriously, not to be accepted on its own terms, an object of contempt. This and the more dismissive “Pашkа” (the “k” makes it diminutive) are in the spoken language rather than written. And the way the word is spoken matters, too: the Ukrainians can’t quite do the schwa “uh” sound, so their “Pаша,” although it is meant to mimic English, actually sounds like “Rahsha.”
Here we begin to feel the density of the parts and references packed into “рашизм.” It is not just the “r” sound at the beginning that can stand for Russia. Nor is it even just the “ra,” as a reference to how Russian speakers pronounce the Russian word for “Russia.” The first three letters, “раш,” also make reference to how English speakers pronounce Russia. Although the reference to English is inexact, the “rahsh” sound that comes from it turns out to be very productive, because it makes the combination with “fascism” work smoothly. Three-quarters of the letters in a Ukrainian neologism from English (“Pаша”) are brought together with five-sixths of the letters from an adopted Italian word (“фашизм,” fascism) to generate the new word “рашизм” — a dense and effective conglomerate.
When we say “Russia,” the double “s” is pronounced “sh.” In the middle of “fascism” we find the same sound, “sh” — though this time it is generated by “sc,” which English borrows from the original Italian “fascismo.” We can render that sound with “sh” or, in these two words, “ss” and “sc,” but the clarifyingly simple Ukrainian orthography picks up that sound, however it is spelled in whatever language, and renders it as “ш.” So “раша” + “фашизм” = “рашизм,” also thanks to that middle sound. The “sh” sound in the middle, the “ш,” refers to both Russia and to fascism, but only because Ukrainians are playing with English. In neither Russian nor Ukrainian does the word for “Russian” have a “sh” sound.
“Pашизм” relies on English to work, but it is not easy for English to reclaim. When “Russia” becomes “Pаша,” the vowels firm up and become more honest; they no longer quite conform to English. The same is even true for the “ism,” which in Ukrainian requires a more clipped and disciplined sound. These honest vowels make it hard for English speakers to pronounce “pашизм” as it is supposed to be pronounced — and even if we were to pronounce it correctly in Ukrainian, it would not sound like much of anything in English.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
Card 1 of 4
U.S. wants to see Russia weakened. The United States toughened its messaging on the Ukraine war, saying the American aim was not just to thwart the Russian invasion but also to weaken Russia so it could no longer carry out such military aggression anywhere.
Fears of a new front. Explosions shook Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova aligned with Russia that occupies a strategically important spot on Ukraine’s western flank. Ukrainian officials accused Russia of causing the explosions as a pretext to invade Ukraine from that direction.
This is why, to claim “pашизм” for English, I have to transliterate it — as Ukrainians also generally do — as “ruscism.” The mechanically correct transcription would be “rashysm,” which is hardly clear. We have to go back and get the “u” to indicate Russia, and we take the “ism” because we know this is about ideology. And while the Ukrainian consonant “ш” demands a “sh,” the resulting “rushism” would suggest a weakness for American talk radio or Canadian classic rock. We know that “ш” did not actually come from an “sh” in the first place; it came from both the “ss” of Russia and the “sc” of fascism. We choose “sc,” and get “ruscism.” As in Ukrainian, a “sh” sound joins the two parts. But now, in English, the visible “sc” recalls the unusual spelling of fascism, as it should.
In English, if you believe in racism, you are a racist; if you believe in fascism, you are a fascist. This lexical progression is similar in Ukrainian. “Расизм,” racism, has the associated personal form “расист,” racist. “Фашизм,” fascism, yields “фашист,” fascist. Likewise, the new word “рашизм” has “рашист,” or ruscist. (Unlike English, Ukrainian also generates female forms of these words.) Ukrainians sometimes refer to individual Russians as “ruscists,” making lists, for example, of prominent Russian supporters of the war. But there is also the tendency to refer to all Russian soldiers in Ukraine as “ruscists.” This runs into certain difficulties: Given the imperial character of the Russian state, a very high proportion of the Russian soldiers in Ukraine belong to national minorities. This suggests a deeper problem, which is that even soldiers dying for a fascist cause need not be fascists themselves.
Whereas Russian leaders have intensified the Soviet tradition of referring to contemporary enemies as “fascists,” in Ukraine, the word refers more simply to the horrors of World War II, which were even deeper there than in Russia. When Ukrainians speak of “ruscism,” they are accusing Russians of a deep betrayal of what should have been a common inheritance and a common memory. They are accusing Russians of becoming what should have been defeated long ago.
Few beyond Ukraine seem to know that millions of Ukrainians, exercising freedom of speech in a country that allows it, have invented and are deploying a new word. “Ruscism” will sound strange at first. So did “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing,” other words that emerged from (Eastern) European wars. The concepts that clarify our world today were once strange and new. But when they point to something, they can take hold.
Russian fascism is certainly a phenomenon that requires a concept. The Russian Federation promotes the extreme right everywhere. Putin is the idol of white supremacists around the world. Prominent Russian fascists are given access to mass media during wars, including this one. Members of the Russian elite, above all Putin himself, rely increasingly on fascist concepts. Putin’s very justification of the war in Ukraine, as an act of cleansing violence that will return Russia to itself, represents a Christian form of fascism. The recent publication, in an official Russian news service, of what I consider an openly genocidal handbook, providing a plan for the elimination of the Ukrainian nation as such, confirms all this. Moscow is the center of fascism in our world.
The greatest risk of such an effectively compact word is that it will carry the sense that all Russians are fascists, simply by virtue of being Russian. Given that half the Ukrainian population is either displaced or trapped by war, with thousands of civilians killed and hundreds of thousands deported, a tendency toward general condemnation is not surprising; the fact that Ukrainians have had a very hard time convincing Russians that a war is actually taking place doesn’t help. But a usage that identifies all Russians as fascists would repeat the error it is meant to rectify. Thus far, the word is generally used as a response to particular actions, like kidnapping children or executing civilians.
The word is not only a condemnation of Russian actions; it is also an offering to the Russian language. The words “ruscist” and “ruscism” already flourish in Russian, or at least in Ukrainian Russian. I actually heard them for the first time in Russian, not in Ukrainian. It will be interesting to see if they catch on inside the Russian Federation. If they did, they would most likely be criminalized by the Russian state. Russia today is a country where it is illegal to call this war a “war,” and where reading a poem or showing a blank poster is deemed a slander of the army. Given Putin’s felt need to define the enemy of the moment as fascist, a word that points to Russian fascism is unlikely to be tolerated.
Police officers in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, arresting a demonstrator for protesting with a blank sign in March.Credit...Screen grab from Twitter
And so we see a difference between official Russia and unofficial Ukraine, one that is not about myths or ethnicity or even language preferences, exactly, but rather about how words matter in wartime, under pressure. In the tyranny, they threaten, because they might reveal truth; in the democracy, they conceptualize and suggest action. This difference is visible on the battlefield, where the Russian Army is conformist and cowering, and the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian Army adaptable and creative.
We also see a difference between Ukrainians and monolingual people generally. There is a liveliness inherent in Ukrainian code-switching that makes constructing the word “рашизм” possible — and once constructed, the word has a liveliness of its own. We can appreciate Ukrainian creativity, and perhaps borrow from it.
That “ruscism” is used to describe the enemy has implications for how Ukrainians define their own values. It stigmatizes Russia as an invader committing an injustice that can be linked to past injustices, and whose leaders abuse language to hide these basic facts. But it also takes as axiomatic (and thus affirms) that fascism is what is to be resisted. The language has supplied a new thing, and, as Hannah Arendt reminds us, new things are the best we can hope for in totalitarian times. The Ukrainian language has offered a neologism whose formation helps us to see deeper into the creativity of another culture, and whose meaning helps us to see why this war is fought — and why it must be won.
Timothy Snyder is the Levin professor of history at Yale University. His book “Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin” will be published in a new edition on April 26, and a new audiobook of his “On Tyranny” was recently released with 20 new lessons on Ukraine.
18. Shabaab targets Somali police chief in Mogadishu suicide bombing
Shabaab targets Somali police chief in Mogadishu suicide bombing | FDD's Long War Journal
On the evening of April 22, Shabaab, al Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, struck a popular restaurant in Lido Beach in Mogadishu in an attempt to assassinate the chief of the Somali Police Force, Abdi Hassan Mohamed Hijaar. The police commander was accompanied by 11 members of the Somali Parliament at the time of the attack.
Local reporters describe the attack as “complex” as the terrorist organization conducted a suicide bombing of the crowded restaurant, then followed the explosion with an assault by gunmen. Hijaar, along with several other Somali government officials, were breaking their Ramadan fast at the restaurant at the time of the attack.
Shabaab frequently employs the tactic of suicide assaults, especially upon popular hotels in Mogadishu, using the shock and chaos created by the suicide bombing to enable its gunmen to then enter the fray.
According to local sources, Hijaar and other Somali government officials were unharmed in the assault, indicating that Shabaab failed to accomplish its objective. However, at least 6 people, all civilians, were killed in the attack. Local officials stated at least another 7 people were also injured.
Shabaab was quick to claim the suicide bombing via its Shahada News Agency and local radio stations. According to the jihadist group, it was specifically targeting “the grouping of apostate government officials” at the restaurant.
According to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal, Friday’s blast marks the group’s 12th successful or attempted suicide bombing so far this year. The vast majority of these have occurred inside Mogodishu.
Shabaab further stated it “killed and wounded 44 people,” including an alleged government official, though the group routinely inflates the casualty numbers of its attacks. Local media has also denied that any government personnel were injured.
Targeting Somalia’s Election Process
Friday’s suicide assault once again demonstrates that Mogadishu is not safe from insurgent attacks. Shabaab continues to attempt to undermine the federal government by illustrating its inability to protect its population and secure its territory. In this regard, Friday’s suicide bombing was just the latest in a recent series of attacks.
On Monday, Shabaab claimed credit for a mortar attack on the Somali parliament building in Mogadishu. Though no one was killed in the attack, at least six were injured. The attack occurred while the newly elected parliamentarians were approving procedures for electing the speakers.
The mortar blasts, like the consecutive strikes at the end of March, represent yet another Shabaab attempt to undermine the Somali election process. Friday’s suicide assault can also be seen within the context of Shabaab’s attempts at disrupting the process.
As the election process continues, with various delays, Shabaab will continue to muster its forces to disrupt the elections across the country. Government officials, including local politicians, are likely to continue to be targets of Shabaab’s violence.
Despite some setbacks in recent years, Shabaab continues to be one of al Qaeda’s most effective branches. It maintains significant control over much of southern Somalia and retains the ability to strike in Mogadishu, Kenya, where it also controls territory, and against heavily fortified bases in both Somalia and Kenya.
Though its fortunes have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, it has weathered numerous offensives from an array of local, regional, and international actors, including the United States.
Are you a dedicated reader of FDD's Long War Journal? Has our research benefitted you or your team over the years? Support our independent reporting and analysis today by considering a one-time or monthly donation. Thanks for reading! You can make a tax-deductible donation here.
19. Vietnam War Insiders: Putin Making Same Dumb Mistakes We Did
Ambassadors Negreponte and Taylor share their views with Don Kirk.
Vietnam War Insiders: Putin Making Same Dumb Mistakes We Did
QUAGMIRE
Former top U.S. officials told The Daily Beast that the Russians will get run out of Ukraine just like the Americans got run out of Vietnam.
Published Apr. 26, 2022 3:31AM ET
Photo Illustration by Elizabeth Brockway/The Daily Beast/Getty
WASHINGTON, D.C.—A Vietnam veteran and two-time U.S. ambassador to Ukraine sees a powerful parallel between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the American defense of the Saigon regime in the Vietnam War. He believes the Russians today, like the Americans nearly 50 years ago, are doomed to fail.
“The Americans got run out of Vietnam, and the Russians are going to get run out of Ukraine,” William Taylor, ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009 and again, for seven months, from June 2019 to January 2020, told The Daily Beast. “The U.S. didn’t understand Vietnam, and the Russians didn’t understand Ukraine.”
Fresh out of West Point, Taylor was so gung-ho as a lieutenant leading a platoon in combat in Vietnam that he extended his one-year tour by six months, got promoted to captain and led a company. But he grew disillusioned after the North Vietnamese victory on April 30, 1975—aided by massive Russian as well as Chinese military and financial support—requested his discharge after the requisite six years for a U.S. Military Academy grad, and has worked for NATO, the Pentagon and the State Department.
With searing memories of firefights in the jungles below the old “demilitarized zone” between the two Vietnams and then the disastrous South Vietnamese foray into southern Laos in early 1971, Taylor became convinced “I could be of better use out of the army.” Reading books and papers to which he hadn’t been exposed while fighting “the enemy,” he said, “I started thinking the army wasn’t well used.”
That’s a lesson that Taylor predicts the Russians are going to learn the hard way as the war drags on. Although comparisons are inexact, he finds an eerie parallel between the American failure in Vietnam and Russia’s violent campaign in Ukraine. “We didn’t understand there’s a nationalism about the Vietnamese,” he said. “The Vietnamese pushed us out,” and “the Ukrainians will push out the Russians.”
The ghost of the American failure in Vietnam half a century ago haunts U.S. policy-making from Ukraine to the Middle East. John Negroponte, Vietnam director on the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger and a member of his negotiating team in the talks in Paris with the North Vietnamese, agrees that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin failed to understand Ukrainian nationalism when he famously expounded on “the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in an article nearly a year ago. “I don’t think,” said Negroponte, whom George W. Bush as president years later named as America’s first director of national intelligence, “the international community doubts Ukraine is a separate country.”
Like Taylor, Negroponte credits the Ukrainians with galvanizing the support to stand up against the Russians. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky “has captured the political will,” he told The Daily Beast. “The difference between Ukraine and Vietnam is whether the Ukrainians have the spirit to defend themselves.”
Negroponte points to “a loss of national will” on the part of the Americans to explain the disastrous exit from Vietnam. Richard Nixon as president “didn’t want the war to continue after the end of his first term” in 1972, he said. Considering the history, “we would be right to be concerned especially as the way we left Afghanistan.”
While the U.S. faced widespread international and finally bitter domestic opposition for its protracted war in Vietnam, this time around there’s near-universal condemnation of Putin’s actions, at least from the West.
If Putin believed he could get away with invading Ukraine after Biden ordered the precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, Negroponte noted, “Washington has been captivated by the response of Ukraine.”
“One of the big differences between Ukraine and Vietnam,” he said, is “We didn't have international support,” whereas, “In the case of Ukraine, you have all of NATO.” Moreover, “NATO has been issuing statements and doing stuff. Biden hasn’t gotten way out in front of NATO. We are working with NATO.”
Zelensky’s pleas for NATO nations to enforce a “no fly zone” over Ukraine against Russian planes evoke memories of the U.S. in Vietnam where the South Vietnamese relied on U.S. air power.
Still, neither Taylor nor Negroponte believes the U.S. and its NATO allies should risk a much wider war by challenging the Russians directly in aerial combat. Instead, they agree NATO should pump in the weaponry Ukraine needs to stave off the Russians, just as China and Russia did for the North Vietnamese.
Like Taylor, Negroponte speaks highly of the fighting spirit of the Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians were “putting up a spirited defense,” he said, while Biden “is doing a pretty good job” of supporting them. This time, while U.S. and other NATO forces stay away, they’re counting on the Ukrainians to ensure Russia cannot escape the quagmire into which Putin has foolishly sunk his forces—and his own reputation as a fearsome dictator.
20. Plan Now for a No-Fly Zone Over Taiwan
Plan Now for a No-Fly Zone Over Taiwan
Thwarting a Chinese invasion depends on air defense, and that starts with these four steps.
BY SETH CROPSEY
FORMER DEPUTY NAVY UNDERSECRETARY
Taiwan is not Ukraine. It is, rather, in a far more vulnerable position. No matter what other idea guides the defense of the island republic, air superiority will be critical. Washington and Taipei must prepare now to ensure this air superiority. And while discussion of a Ukrainian no-fly zone has given a wide berth to military reality, planning for Taiwan’s air defense must be grounded in hard truth.
Proportionally, Taiwanese airspace is much more difficult to defend than that of Ukraine. While Russia must deploy combat power across a 1,400-mile border, China could concentrate tactical air forces in a much smaller area in assaulting Taiwan.
One could not, by the way, defend just half of Taiwan from Chinese aerial attack. The country is too small, and the Taiwanese population lives on the island’s western side. There is no “humanitarian corridor” one could create over eastern Taiwan. A Taiwanese no-fly zone is, in effect, an air exclusion zone over Taiwan – that is, a combat action, whether or not the U.S. declares it as such.
One could not even defend only Taiwanese airspace. Taiwan is an island, separated by thousands of miles of open ocean from U.S. bases. Its most reasonable supply routes would run through the Philippine Sea, south along the Ryukyus, or north from Luzon. Each area is beyond its territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus, the supply and logistical aspect of a Taiwanese no-fly zone would mean defending territory beyond Taiwan.
Given these operational, strategic, and geographic realities, four steps are necessary to win the air war over Taiwan.
First, the U.S. must ensure its naval and aerial superiority in the Ryukyu archipelago, between Luzon and Taiwan, and in the Philippine Sea. China should be expected to bracket Taiwan from the east and west, likely with an aircraft carrier strike group on one side and a ground-based air surge on the other. (China’s violations of Taiwan’s airspace over the past 18 months can be taken as practice for the latter.) The Ryukyus are a reasonable defensive line in the north. The archipelago can be turned into an anti-air nest, packed with forward-deployed U.S. Marines and Air Defense Artillery.
The Luzon Strait is harder to defend and would likely require forward-deployed tactical aviation. Most important, however, is the Philippine Sea supply route, as China almost certainly will push submarines into the Philippine Sea and out into the western Pacific. The U.S. should create an anti-submarine dragnet with surface ships and other assets, defended by a constant fighter screen. Each service can play a clear role in this system: the Army in the Ryukyus, the Air Force in the Luzon Strait, and the Navy in the Philippines.
Second, an integrated air defense network is needed to protect Taiwan from Chinese missile bombardment. China’s missile arsenal is simply too large to blunt with a traditional air defense system. Integration would allow for better tracking and target prioritization and enable far more effective layering. If fighter and radar picket data can be fused with air defenses, Taiwan can extend the engagement range of its older ground-based systems like its Patriot surface-to-air missiles, or PAC-2s. American interceptors can help, but given the scale of the operational problem, bolstering Taiwan’s missile defenses to ensure they survive an opening bombardment makes more sense.
Third, the U.S. must obtain more tanker aircraft. A no-fly zone would require air combat over Taiwan and near the Taiwan Strait—that is, extremely close to Chinese territory. U.S. air bases are too far away and the current tanker fleet is too small to provide the refueling that will ensure consistent fighter coverage over Taiwan and in the Luzon and Miyako Straits
Fourth, the U.S. must begin the fight with a significant numerical advantage, or risk being out-concentrated over time. Once again, China can focus a greater volume of aircraft against Taiwan than Russia could against Ukraine, even in the latter’s eastern region. Air combat is a numerical exercise: between forces of equivalent training and comparable equipment, quantity provides a decisive advantage that improves with scale. Chinese aircraft can refuel and rearm at bases far closer to the combat zone than their American counterparts.
Unless the U.S. is willing to strike the Chinese mainland—an option that policymakers should consider despite their political aversion to it—the U.S. must expand its tactical air fleet. Maintaining superiority over Taiwan will require 30 or more fighter squadrons, considering the aircraft the PLA can deploy rapidly from the Eastern and Central Theater Commands to the Taiwan Strait. It may require more if the PLA executes a larger buildup. Taiwan has 17 squadrons. Assuming reasonably effective missile defenses, perhaps 12 will still fly after the first wave of Chinese missiles arrives. This creates an 18-squadron gap between Taiwan and China that the U.S. would need to fill. Two American carrier air wings would provide eight squadrons, while an Expeditionary Strike Group could provide another squadron.
The remaining nine would come from ground-based aviation. Available Japanese-based Air Force tactical aviation could provide four fighter squadrons, and ground-based USMC aviation two. Thus, the U.S. would need to deploy to Japan at least three additional fighter squadrons and likely more, depending upon the state of Taiwanese air defenses.
Winning the air war over Taiwan would be the central immediate concern during a cross-strait conflict. The U.S. must prepare to fight and win this conflict. It should be prepared to say publicly and in advance of any hostilities that winning a conflict over Taiwan is the U.S. objective and that as part of this the U.S. will enforce a no-fly-zone over Taiwan.
Had we taken more seriously Mr. Putin’s attacks on such other Black Sea targets as Georgia and Crimea and acted with greater resolve years ago to help Ukraine defend itself, war might have been averted. Xi Jinping and his predecessors’ declared intent to subdue Taiwan—if needed, by force—is clear as blue skies. Those skies must be defended over Taiwan if the U.S. is to remain the Pacific’s pre-eminent power and our friends and allies in the region are to continue casting their lot with us.
Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy and is the author of Mayday and Seablindness.
21. Sri Lanka’s Economic Crisis: The Myth Of Debt Trap Vs The Reality Of Identity – OpEd
Excerpt:
Finally, to determine what steps the nation should take to exit the situation. Sri Lanka’s debt must be restructured quickly and a debt management programme implemented. Both with the IMF’s financial and technical assistance and the austerity measures. Due to the IMF’s massive involvement, Sri Lanka has evaded the IMF’s intervention for a lengthy period, including the people and government. However, if the nation is to survive, this intervention is necessary, and it is the best course of action. Additionally, Sri Lanka needs professional engagement from the IMF to turn its debts and new investment into profitable and developmental assets. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has helped several countries, including India, get back on their feet after a similar predicament. Under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance and support, India launched the 1991 LPG reforms, which resulted in the country’s economic turnaround.
Sri Lanka’s Economic Crisis: The Myth Of Debt Trap Vs The Reality Of Identity – OpEd
Sri Lanka is undergoing a severe economic crisis and is at the risk of devolving into a failed state. The country’s foreign reserves are fast depleting, falling from $5 billion in 2019 to 1.8 billion in 2021, despite high inflation and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 110 per cent. From health to defence, the nation is attempting to reorganise its affairs. Meanwhile, other speculations about the origins of the crisis have evolved, ranging from Covid to debt-trap diplomacy. The debt trap of China and Covid is marketed as the source of the crisis. They are, however, only a catalyst; the debt trap sponsored the cause, and Covid was the spark that ignited the fire. The root cause of the crisis lies at the heart of the country. The country’s people were persuaded to offer legitimacy and authority to an aristocratic political system Using the identity crisis and insecurity. This mechanism triggered the Butterfly and Domino effect.
The root cause of Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and all of the other problems that the nation has been dealing with for decades is the country’s identity crisis and sense of insecurity. There are two dominating factions in the country: the Sinhala Buddhists and the Tamil Nationalists. Non-ethnic differences separate the two groups; they are also split along religious and linguistic grounds. The majority of Sinhala nationalists feel unhappy with sharing their territory with Tamil nationalists, who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically distinct from them. Similarly, the Tamil Nationalist minority feel insecure about sharing their territory with the majority. This sense of vulnerability ultimately resulted in the civil war that lasted for decades and ravaged the nation. The same uneasiness that led to the present economic catastrophe also convinced the nation’s people to provide legitimacy and authority to an aristocratic political system, as the insecurity of the majority had done before. The country’s populace was convinced to provide legitimacy and power to an aristocratic governmental structure to preserve their interests.
This autocratic political system is reflected via the Sri Lanka podujana peramuna and the New Democratic Front, both endorsed by the Sinhala majority in the country’s political institutions. As a result of this unavoidable support, the nation’s political structure was transformed from democracy to aristocracy. Sri Lanka was classified as a “flawed democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2019. In the aftermath, the nation was plagued by corruption, widespread exploitation, and repression of minorities, among other things.
Sri Lanka’s troubled political structure and its geographic location on the Indian Ocean exposed it to foreign threats. The most serious of these threats came from financial reserves, particularly from China. China has poured a large quantity of money into Sri Lanka to aid the country’s growth and development. However, the political system of Sri Lanka, which was plagued by corruption, was unable to translate the flood of riches into productive assets. Consequently, the nation found itself in a financial trap with a dual deficit. As is customary in the west, China is being held responsible for the present economic crisis to prevent the expansion of the Chinese financial arm.
A Hypothetical scenario to demystify the conspiracy of the Debt Trap diplomacy. The board of directors of an infrastructure development firm, a public limited company, successfully raised funds for a highway building project. Rather than constructing the highway, they diverted the funds to personal spending and investments. Initially, the firm paid the bank interest using funds from its shareholders-funded reserves. However, after the covid, the shareholders were handicapped making them impotent to replenish their reserves. Consequently, the reserves dwindled, and the firm was unable to pay the interest due to the corporation’s inability to generate income from the funds, interest and principal accumulated. Naturally, the bank will need the collateral that was pledged.
Who is to blame in this case: the bank, the company’s directors, or the shareholders who disregarded checks and balances to satisfy their personal interest . China is the bank in this scenario, the Sri Lankan government serves as the board of directors, and the Sri Lankan people serve as shareholders. Thus, the Sri Lankan people failed to establish checks and balances on their representatives due to their drugged condition of insecurity, forcing the country or firm into bankruptcy and forcing it to sell its assets to banks and other foreign investors. Furthermore, According to Reuters, China is responsible for just 10.8% of the country’s debt; 47% of the country’s debt is financed by market borrowing, particularly international sovereign bonds (ISB).This capital-market borrowing is unconditional, with interest rates that are quite high and payback periods that are much shorter.
The coronavirus served as the ignition source for the fire. Sri Lanka was heavily reliant on its tourist sector, which accounted for 10% of its GDP. Following the corona, international travel limitations wiped off the industry. To add fuel to this fire, the Sri Lankan government made efforts to promote organic farming by prohibiting the use of chemical fertilisers; this measure, implemented during a period of economic and social distress, had a detrimental effect on domestic food production and limited the export of cash crops, mainly tea. Sri Lanka was the second biggest exporter of tea, and Ceylon tea is often regarded as the most sought-after brand globally. Organic farming practices lowered tea and other cash crop yields, limiting export capacity and revenue. On the other hand, the decline in food output necessitates the importation of food crops, putting further strain on the country’s currency reserves, which are already reduced due to interest payments. Finally, massive tax cuts, a campaign commitment, and a failed effort to revive the economy brought the nation’s economy to a standstill.
Finally, to determine what steps the nation should take to exit the situation. Sri Lanka’s debt must be restructured quickly and a debt management programme implemented. Both with the IMF’s financial and technical assistance and the austerity measures. Due to the IMF’s massive involvement, Sri Lanka has evaded the IMF’s intervention for a lengthy period, including the people and government. However, if the nation is to survive, this intervention is necessary, and it is the best course of action. Additionally, Sri Lanka needs professional engagement from the IMF to turn its debts and new investment into profitable and developmental assets. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has helped several countries, including India, get back on their feet after a similar predicament. Under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance and support, India launched the 1991 LPG reforms, which resulted in the country’s economic turnaround.
*Haridass Sankar is a professional with M.A. in International Relations, established software engineer and an aspiring political analyst.
References:
-
Samrat Sharma,2022, Sri Lankan economic crisis explained in five charts, India Today (https://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/sri-lankan-economic-crisis-explained-five-gotabaya-rajapaksa-1933514-2022-04-04)
-
Neil DeVotta, 2017, Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: THE ROOTS OF PLURALISM BREAKDOWN, WakeForestUniversity (https://www.pluralism.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Sri_Lanka_Complete_Case.pdf)
-
Anonymous, Politcal Stablity of Sri lanka, Economic Intelligence Unit, (https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=171250800&Country=Sri+Lanka&topic=Summary&subtopic=Political+forces+at+a+glance&subsubtopic=Political+stability)
-
Uditha Jayasinghe,2022,Sri Lankan parties seek interim govt with new PM as IMF talks loom, Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/sri-lankas-ruling-coalition-members-propose-interim-govt-new-prime-minister-2022-04-11/)
-
Siri Gamage,2007,Democracy in Sri Lanka: past, present and future,Asian Studies Review (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03147539308712906)
- Uditha Jayasinghe, 2022,Sri Lanka on the edge as debt burden mounts, Reuters(https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lanka-edge-debt-burden-mounts-2022-01-17/)
22. Vladimir Putin has to appear victorious 14 Days from today. Can he?
This will take a lot of spin.
Vladimir Putin has to appear victorious 14 Days from today. Can he?
Newsweek · by William M. Arkin · April 25, 2022
Russia has stumbled again. Its southern offensive, the second phase of the Ukraine war, has failed to be the "biggest tank war since World War II," as some analysts were predicting. Instead, Russia's ground forces have shown the same lackluster performance on the ground, unable to break through anywhere.
The towns and villages of the south, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Friday, "are the places where the fate of this war and the future of our state is being decided, now."
Experts point to May 9th—Victory Day in Russia commemorating the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945—as the next decisive milestone for Vladimir Putin. By that date, they say, Russia will either find some way to declare some kind of victory and cease fighting, or May 9th will trigger a transition from Russia's "special military operation" to "war." Then Russia will undertake a mobilization on a national scale to defeat Ukraine, with the threat of Moscow escalating further.
On the ground, though, Putin's forces are now spread thin, exhausted, and show no real signs of renewal. U.S. military and intelligence observers tell Newsweek the big offensive expected in the south has already turned into a deadlock: neither side can fully defeat the other, they say.
Can Vladimir Putin claim victory on May 9th? The Russian president attends Orthodox Easter mass led by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill at the Christ The Saviour Cathedral on April 24, 2022 in Moscow, Russia. contributor/Getty Images
"Russia is again depending on long-range air strikes, artillery and rocket fire to pave the way for the ground forces to be able to advance," a senior U.S. Army officer, granted anonymity in order to discuss operational matters, told Newsweek via email. "But it can't support an offensive on the giant front it has now created. Super-motivated Ukrainian forces have not only held their own and even advanced in some places, but they are watching the enemy again stumble. Yes, Russia is fighting—but Ukraine is winning."
An hour before midnight last Monday, April 18, Russia launched what it is now calling the second phase of its invasion of Ukraine. The primary goal, the Kremlin said, was to capture Donbas (the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts) in the southeast, half of which they took control over in 2014.
One of Ukraine's top security officials, Oleksiy Danilov, says that in its new offensive Russian forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses "along almost the entire front line of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions." Kharkiv is the province north of Donbas, and home to Ukraine's second largest city, constituting a symbolic trophy and an important line of communication reaching from western Russia onto the eastern battlefield.
As heavy artillery and rocket strikes commenced, Russian troops started a "pincer movement" from Kharkiv in the north to occupied Donetsk in the south. Imagine this Russian offense as a horseshoe, with forces at two open ends attempting to join together to make a circle, enveloping all of the territory contained in the middle (the remainder of Donbas).
Success in such a pincer movement requires the complete defeat of remaining Ukrainian defenders in the beleaguered port city of Mariupol, analysts say. That would free up almost 20 percent of Russia's total force. The Russian army has about 10 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) deployed around the city.
On Thursday, Putin declared Mariupol "liberated" after 53 days of fighting, urging his army to move on. "There's no need to climb into these catacombs and crawl underground through these industrial facilities..." he said, referring to the Azovstal steel works in the north of the city, one of Europe's largest. There, some 2,000 Ukrainians are holding on, more than half of them civilians.
"Block off this industrial area so that not even a fly can get through," Putin said.
Putin was answered by Serhiy Volyna, commander of Ukraine's 36th Marine Brigade, one of the main units defending the city: "No matter what Russian propaganda tells you, we fight in fierce battles every day and hold back thousands of enemy troops, preventing them from advancing. This is at the cost of superhuman efforts and great losses."
The defenders in Mariupol held on.
By Sunday, Russia's pincer offensive in Donbas had also stalled. Russian air attacks intensified after Monday, and the army increased its rocket and artillery firings to some 1,000 projectiles daily, triple the average going into the new effort. But on the ground Russian forces moved mere kilometers, losing as much territory as they were gaining.
A Russian soldier in Mariupol on April 12, 2022. A Russian general has raised the prospect that the breakaway Russian region of Moldova, Transnistria, was part of Kremlin plans for its invasion of Ukraine. ALEXANDER NEMENOV//Getty Images
And Russia opened yet another front, beyond Donbas. On Friday, a senior Russian commander, Major General Rustam Minnekaev, told Russian news media that the task of the armed forces was to establish "complete control over Donbas and southern Ukraine." U.S. intelligence saw his statement as a fresh definition of Moscow's mission, adding the entire south in its territorial objective: a daunting task.
This second southern front to the west of Donbas extends roughly 250 miles from Donetsk in the east to Mykolaiv in the west (the distance from New York City to Niagara Falls on the Canadian border). Russian forces in this area are being resupplied more freely from occupied Crimea, and they seem stronger than those tired forces in the Donbas area. But they are also stymied in their new advance, meeting heavy Ukrainian resistance.
Closer to Russia border, in and around Kharkiv, Moscow lost the most during the week. Though Russia continued intense artillery attacks and air strikes into built-up urban areas, the perimeter of Ukrainian territorial control around the city widened. Ukraine also managed to liberate a number of towns and villages around the periphery of the city, according to governor Oleh Synehubov. In fact, U.S. intelligence observers say, Russia seems to have given up altogether on the goal of taking eastern Ukraine's largest city—just as it gave up on Kyiv, another major defeat.
South of Kharkiv, on the northern part of the pincer movement, Russian soldiers advanced a few kilometers, seizing Kreminna and threatening the urban conglomeration around the city of Severodonetsk, which sits upon an important obstacle, the north-south flowing Siverskyi Donets river. Before the war, some 250,000 Ukrainian lived in the area, including the towns of Rubizne and Lysychansk. Here the fighting has been intense since February 24th, Russia unable to make any major breakthrough.
Some 25,000 Russian troops are now deployed along these front lines. Their objective is to reach the towns of Sloyansk and Kramatorsk, some 35 miles away. Those two cities would be key to the ability on the part of Russia to join its forces north to south and complete the circle. Ukrainian headquarters for the entire Donbas defense is located in Kramatorsk and it is fully fortified.
Putin's Iskander Missiles Are Battle-Testedâand Can Carry Nuclear Warheads
Read more
On the southern side of the pincer, Russia has made even less progress that in the north. Three Ukrainian brigades have held this territory for weeks and are now being reinforced. The only major change during the week is a seeming Russian breakthrough further west, where Putin's forces managed to take the town of Zelene Pole, south of Kramatorsk but far outside Donbas. Some U.S. observers say the new move north might be a sign that some forces may have already been freed up from the fight in Mariupol.
On the southern front, further to the west, where Russia says it is seeking to take all of southern Ukraine, Putin's forces have also stalled. Russian forces there have not been able to move north out of Kherson to take Mykolaiv, a city of almost a half a million people.
As for occupied Kherson itself, the region north of Crimea, Zelensky adviser Mykhailo Podoliak pledged this week that Ukraine wouldn't give up—that it would not only hold off Russia but liberate all of the province. "You cannot even doubt that the state has a strategy to de-occupy all towns and villages in southern Ukraine," he said in a message to the people. "There will be no freezing of the conflict ... There will be only the Kherson region of Ukraine."
Since Russia's defeat in northern Ukraine and withdrawal from the Kyiv region, Putin's forces have been flowing into southern Ukraine to bolster this second phase. Mostly these forces have come from Russia itself (the forces from northern Ukraine are too battered to immediately join the fight). Before the offensive, Russia had some 65 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the south, which equals some 50,000 front line soldiers. An additional 20 or so BTGs have now joined those forces, for a total of some 82-85 battalion tactical groups now inside Ukraine. Russia has also collected 100,000 troops near Ukraine's borders.
But these reinforcing troops are neither fresh nor ready. Kyiv sources are now quipping that Ukraine has more tanks on the ground inside the country than Russia does. Russian forces are not only short on supplies, but they are poorly coordinated.
Putin's Bombers Could Devastate Ukraine But He's Holding Back. Here's Why
Read more
Experts say it's a matter of density of the battlefield: how many forces Russia can congregated and operate together. In nearly two months of fighting, Putin's army has shown little ability to coordinate between adjacent forces, or to successfully command large formations. Logistical troubles—the supply of ammunition, fuel and even food—have never been solved. Environmental factors—weather, terrain, the spring thaw—have also stymied Russia, impeding off-road movements. The Russian army also continues to be beset with severe morale problems, hampering operations and advances.
Nearly two months of failed offensives on the ground have given Western aid a chance to make a difference, first with anti-tank weapons and surface-to-air missiles, and now with heavy equipment. Soon, Western artillery will be in the hands of Ukrainian defenders—the first purely offensive weapons to be shipped into the country.
As the second week of Russia's second phase begins, Russian forces find themselves split between north, south and eastern formations around Donbas, still fighting in Mariupol, and thinly deployed along the 250 mile plus southern front. Putin may be able to make some progress in Donbas in the next two weeks in order to enable him to declare victory on May 9th, but overall, the prognosis on the ground is grim. That leaves declaring war and ordering a national mobilization as Putin's second option on May 9th: a decisive move to match the gravity of the Russian national day.
"Given the human cost of the war so far—as many as 20,000 soldier deaths [for Russia]—and the fragility of domestic support for continued fighting, there's little possibility of a successful national mobilization back home," says a second military officer working in the Pentagon, granted anonymity in order to speak candidly to Newsweek.
It is a reminder that the human cost of the stalemated war is high. This scale of soldier casualties—more in fewer than two months than Russia lost in its entire decade-long Afghanistan war in the 1980s—has an impact back home, even if Moscow has clamped down on internal debate and news.
"We have plenty of anecdotal evidence that the Russian people are unhappy about so many soldiers dying," says a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official. "At this point, it can no longer be covered up."
The DIA official points to the effect of sanctions on the ordinary population. "It's like Soviet days are returning, with constraints on everything and severe food shortages," the official says. "Mobilizing tens of thousands of draftees is a task that is in-and-of-itself complex. Add to that, that the Russian people might not support a larger-scale war and you really find Putin in the ultimate corner."
Shocking Lessons US Military Leaders Learned by Watching Putin's Invasion
Read more
Meanwhile, as the fighting continues, and as Russia continues long-range strikes, Ukrainian military casualties also accumulate. U.S. military and intelligence observers estimate that Ukrainian soldier deaths are about the same level as Russian (in the area of 20,000), with roughly equal forces facing off at the line of contact.
It is in the civilian cost of the war that the tragedy of continued fighting becomes most obvious. The United Nations now says that it can verify some 5,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths since the start of fighting; this number does not include the south or the zones where active fighting persists.
In Mariupol alone, Ukrainian local officials say that as many as 20,000 civilians have died (some 100,000 civilians are still trapped in the city). The rest of the south probably has suffered some 6,000-8,000 additional civilian deaths from the fighting. Overall, as many as 30,000 civilians have lost their lives. Since Russia's invasion on February 24, about 25 percent of Ukrainian civilians have also been forced to flee their homes.
In announcing the additional $800 million aid package to Ukraine last week, President Joe Biden declared that Putin "will never succeed in dominating and occupying all of Ukraine." All of. It was a tepid call to arms, one that not only doesn't reflect Russia's unsuccessful second phase but one that imagines the war will last months more.
"U.S. politicians might be talking months or years, but in the trenches, where the war is being closely followed, that analysis is ridiculous," the senior DIA official tells Newsweek. "Beyond Donbas, there is no second wind. And in the south, in Russia's newly declared combat zone, the Ukrainian defenses are the strongest."
Writing last week in a report of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, experts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds said it "appears increasingly likely that rather than use it [May 9th] to announce victory, the Russian government will instead use 9 May as the day on which the 'special military operation' is officially framed as a 'war'."
Michael Kofman, director of Russian studies at Washington's Center for Naval Analysis, tweeted this weekend that: "Without national mobilization, I think the Donbas is the last major offensive the Russian military can attempt given the current state & availability of forces. Whether it succeeds, or fails, the Russian military will be largely exhausted in terms of offensive potential."
Exclusive: Ukraine Crisis Could Lead to Nuclear War Under New Strategy
Read more
Still, negotiations continue. The two countries again held virtual talks on Thursday and Friday, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov complaining that the Ukrainian side has not yet responded to the latest version of Russia's "proposals."
UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres is due to arrive in Moscow for talks with Lavrov, and to meet with Putin. On Thursday, Guterres will travel to Kyiv meet with President Zelensky.
But in another pessimistic sign for Russia, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba predicted that the war will be resolved on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table.
Newsweek · by William M. Arkin · April 25, 2022
23. Finland, Sweden to begin NATO application in May, say local media reports
Have not seen anything official so far but I could have missed something.
Finland, Sweden to begin NATO application in May, say local media reports
HELSINKI, April 25 (Reuters) - Finland and Sweden will together express their wish to join NATO in May, tabloid newspapers Iltalehti in Finland and Expressen in Sweden reported on Monday, citing sources close to the matter.
Despite tightening cooperation with the military alliance since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Nordic countries had both opted to stay out. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which it calls a "special operation", has forced Sweden and Finland to examine whether their longstanding military neutrality is still the best means of ensuring national security.
According to Iltalehti, the leaders of Finland and Sweden plan to meet in the week of May 16 and after that publicly announce their plans to apply to join the alliance.
Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto declined to comment, but repeated his longstanding view that he would prefer Finland and Sweden made similar choices.
Swedish daily Aftonbladet reported separately, citing sources close to Swedish government offices, that the United States and Britain had promised Sweden increased military presence, more in-depth military exercises and 'strong political' support from NATO countries" during a possible NATO application process.
The Swedish foreign ministry declined to comment on Expressen's and Aftonbladet's reports.
Finland's Prime Minister Sanna Marin said two weeks ago, while visiting her Swedish counterpart Magdalena Andersson, that she expected Finland to make its decision whether to apply for NATO membership within weeks. read more
Stockholm is conducting a review of security policy, which includes a view on possible NATO membership, with the results due by mid-May. read more
Separately, Sweden's ruling Social Democrats are also reviewing their long-held objection to NATO membership. That is expected at the latest by May 24.
Reporting by Essi Lehto and Anna Ringstrom in Stockholm; Editing by Hugh Lawson and Alex Richardson
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
