From Iran’s current perspective it would seem that
not renegotiating with the U.S. is their best alternative, particularly if they can come to terms with the remaining signatories.
For President Trump to be successful, he will need to change Iran’s calculus and balance sheet of rewards and penalties so that renegotiating will be better for them than resisting. This will require several tactical steps:
Implementation of a broader strategy: When Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser under Richard Nixon, was negotiating the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970’s, he was confronted with an intransigent Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator. Understanding the strong axis of influence between the Soviet Union and China over North Vietnam, he opened negotiations with them first, to obtain their support and willingness to pressure North Vietnam in exchange for concessions. After successful negotiations on those fronts, he was then able to engage a subdued and pressured Tho in the Paris Talks and reach an eventual satisfactory agreement.
Perhaps a place to begin an Iranian strategy is to map out an axis of influence that could pressure and influence Iran. This might involve opening negotiations with Russia, perhaps even linking the relief of sanctions imposed upon them in return for support on the Iranian deal. It may be further necessary to look at an axis of influence that could pressure Europe to assert pressure on Iran. This may require some creative thinking, as often these axes of influence are not obvious and require some rigorous thought and exploration. Unfortunately, instead of a broader strategy of coalitions and influence, the U.S. has chosen to confront Iran directly and alone.
Changing their balance sheet of incentives and penalties: Iran views their current balance sheet as leaning strongly in favor of not renegotiating with the U.S. They can keep the current agreement and relationships with the other countries, which in turn could make the threat of renewed U.S. sanctions less effective.
For Iran's calculus to change, the U.S. needs to change their balance sheet in favor of renegotiation by increasing incentives and rewards and intensifying penalties. In tandem with the broader strategic implementation outlined above, a target balance sheet for Iran that we should aim for, might look like this:
If we (putting ourselves in Iran's shoes) say “NO” to renegotiation with the U.S.
- We suffer increased isolation from the western world.
- We continue to be seen as a rogue and pariah state.
- We have limited options with other avenues blocked (assuming a broad strategic implementation).
- We will have severe economic pressure.
- We will have internal unrest, protests and riots.
- We may be vulnerable to possible preemptive military strikes from countries such as the U.S and Israel.
- We will always be fearful of a coup attempt generated by internal and/or external forces.
If we (putting ourselves in Iran's shoes) say “YES” to renegotiation with the U.S.
- We develop a collaborative relationship and trade partnerships with the West.
- We become an economic player on the world stage.
- We can become a recognized power in the Middle East to be reckoned with.
- We are assured sovereignty and security.
- We develop a robust nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes.
- Our economic conditions are improved drastically.
- We forge strong diplomatic, scientific, agricultural, trade and culture relations with the West.
- We become recognized as a legitimate state in the world community.
By us re-balancing the deal/no deal calculus that Iran faces, we may just have a greater chance of achieving our objectives.
Conducting secret back-channel negotiations. Even with these tactical steps, negotiations will fail unless they are conducted in secret. This will keep bureaucratic, political and media influences on both sides at bay, and allow for a more open and honest exploration of ideas. The more public bluster there is, the less likely the parties will back down from entrenched positions. This is true of both the proactive axis-of-influence negotiations discussed above as well as the primary negotiations with Iran.
This balance of entente with the axis-of-influence countries and détente with Iran, supported by a balance sheet from Iran's perspective that favors renegotiation, may be a more constructive approach to allowing Iran to have our way!
