Greetings!
In this issue we highlight China’s future nuclear plans and other recent nuclear geopolitical developments, new reports focused on nuclear developments, and new global advancements in nuclear security and technology. We also recommend a few opinion pieces that caught our attention.
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Last week, two articles highlighted the complex geopolitical and global security challenges posed by Saudi Arabia’s decision to build nuclear power plants.
One
argued that a Saudi rejection of the Westinghouse's bid for their first two plants would be a clear win for U.S. nonproliferation policy.
The other
underscored that decreasing U.S. engagement in the Middle East was limiting American influence in the region and driving nations into closer cooperation with Russia and China.
The loss of American influence over the nascent Saudi nuclear program would not guarantee a non-proliferation victory for the U.S. or the global community. It could put the U.S. at a geopolitical disadvantage in relation to Russia and China, both of which have very different standards and political calculations for international nuclear cooperation.
At the heart of the non-proliferation issue is the real value of the “Gold Standard,” a mandatory limit on uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – the pathways to the bomb. The U.S. has included this standard in only two of twenty-three agreements with other nations (Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates). The remaining pacts contain stringent non-proliferation requirements that must be met to allow for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology.
Is the gold standard or an alternative set of limits best applied to Saudi Arabia? The answer is not simple, and its implications are complex and high-stakes.
Secretary of State Pompeo has
told
Congress that the U.S. “wants[s] a gold-standard 123 agreement” with Saudi Arabia. But, Saudi officials have stated that they want to
extract uranium
and
produce nuclear fuel
as part of their nuclear self-sufficiency. More concerning, top Saudi officials have
declared
that they would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran develops that capability. This situation would create a global non-proliferation crisis and must be prevented. Partnering with the U.S. would put a brake on this proliferation potential, but first there has to be a deal.
The Saudis have clearly indicated that they view the U.S. as an
important nuclear partner
and desire its expertise. But, they have expressed a
willingness
to choose a non-U.S. nuclear supplier if an agreement cannot be reached.
It is not clear that Saudi Arabia would be
denied sensitive technologies
under non-binding international limits. However, it is highly unlikely that the U.S., South Korea, or France - three of the five final bidders on the Saudi reactors - would supply uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment to the kingdom. It is not clear that Russia or China would feel similarly restrained. Their civil nuclear industries are state-owned, and their decision-making is linked to national and geopolitical objectives that may not prioritize nonproliferation and nuclear security.
Nuclear geopolitics and non-proliferation do not reside in separate issue silos to be evaluated in isolation. Valuing one over the other will not ensure global security in our intensely interconnected and complex world. Achieving the right balance between them will.
Kenneth Luongo,
President, Partnership for Global Security
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Nuclear Policy, Governance, and Geopolitics
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China has
plans to power the disputed islands in the South China Sea with floating nuclear power plants, which has
raised concerns about China’s growing maritime power in the region.
Russia’s Rosatom
agreed to build a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan, as it seeks to compete with China in the field of nuclear energy.
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corp.
met with Czech officials on August 15th to discuss nuclear cooperation between the two countries, as South Korea looks to expand to Eastern Europe.
South Korean delegates from nuclear related organizations
met with U.S. officials on August 16th as a part of the High Level Bilateral Commission, which focuses on peaceful nuclear cooperation.
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Civil Nuclear Developments
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India's Department of Nuclear Energy reported that India’s nuclear power capacity is expected to rise from 6,780MV to 22,480MV by 2031.
Sweden is asking nuclear plant operators to
develop plans that will shield nuclear reactors from harmful hot weather.
The World Nuclear Association
released its 2018 World Nuclear Performance Report.
Five New England governors released a press release and called for an
evaluation of plans for clean, reliable energy in the region.
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Nuclear Security and Emerging Technologies
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In Gabon, the natural
occurring Oko-reactor has allowed
PNAS scientists to discover what the future of nuclear waste may be.
Featured Video explaining Oko-reactor:
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Renewed efforts into the development of thorium reactors insights debate over safety and security.
NuScale’s design application for its small modular reactors has
passed the first phase of its NRC review, creating hope for Utah and other potential customers.
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The Washington Post, August 14
Science and Health, August 13
The New Times, August 11
Ensia, August 8
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The Partnership for Global Security (PGS) is a recognized international leader and innovator in nuclear and transnational security policy developing actionable responses to 21st century security challenges by engaging international, private sector, and multidisciplinary expert partners to assess policy needs, identify effective strategies, and drive demonstrable results.
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