In a new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, Volodymyr Kulyk finds Russia’s massive aggression has led Ukrainians to have more positive perceptions not only of the Ukrainian nation but also of Ukrainian nationalism—the opposite of what Putin had hoped. Elsewhere, Jessica Pisano argues that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s work as a showman prior to his presidency laid the conceptual groundwork for his leadership on national unity.

A second new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, by Julian Alin and coauthors, compares global pressure on multinational corporations to pull out of Russia with boycott movements against Apartheid South Africa and contemporary Israel: they changed corporate behavior a little but did not much affect conflict resolution processes. Konstantin Sonin says Western sanctions have seriously impacted Russia’s economy: Retail trade has fallen 10 percent, real incomes have dropped, and people have been running to buy dollars and euros. And Peter Rutland writes that economic dependence on the West means both elites and ordinary Russians are suffering from the war’s consequences.

A new textbook edited by Susanne Wengle argues the “future of Russian politics will hinge on ... whether Russian citizens will continue to support the Putin government,” though Vladimir Gel’man cautions that Putin’s willingness to negotiate with Ukraine will be driven by the results on the battlefield, not opinion polls. For Samuel Charap, “Russia has already lost” since its military capabilities, international reputation, and economy are all severely damaged.

Putin’s perceived willingness to escalate, though, is preventing domestic resistance in much the same way as his nuclear threats are keeping his international opponents cautious, writes Kirill Rogov. In their recent book, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way find that the 20 autocracies that have risen from social revolutions are more resilient than others. Tomila Lankina locates the Putin regime’s stability at least partly in long-enduring social structures.