In a new PONARS Eurasia Commentary, Robert Orttung argues that with Russian society unable to check government authority, it is up to the international community to restrict Kremlin power. Yuri Zhukov and others believe Putin would grant himself even greater, unprecedented powers if he officially declares war. For Kelly McMann, faulty democratization lies at the root of Russia’s pervasive corruption. According to Jordan Gans-Morse, oligarchs use donations to charitable Western causes to distract from their ties to the Putin regime. And Kathryn Stoner is amazed that three decades after the Soviet collapse, Russia has regressed to a stalled economy and closed information space.
 
The ongoing conflict is now less kinetic and more like trench warfare, according to Volodymyr Dubovyk. For Dmitry Gorenburg, it is moving towards a stalemate: due to limited resources, any Russian gains on one battlefield mean Ukrainian gains on another. Richard Arnold discerns a division of labor among volunteer Cossacks: “fighters” engage in actual combat while “cheerleaders” maintain morale at home. Pavel Podvig explains how Putin benefits from “madman theory,” the idea that a head of state who hints he is irrational can gain leverage in negotiations. Graeme Robertson and Erik Wibbels find extensive Russian human rights violations through a new data-collection mechanism.
 
Outside Russia and Ukraine, Erica Marat and Johan Engvall find Russia’s invasion has driven many of its former colonies to push back against the idea “brotherly nations.” Kornely Kakachia sees little appetite in Georgia for trying to re-take Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for fear international public opinion would not be on Georgia’s side. Eiki Berg and Martin Mölder find Kremlin discourse on Ukraine and Georgia shifted focus from foreign to domestic policy over 2000-2019. For Elizabeth Wishnick, “China is in a lose-lose situation with respect to Ukraine,” facing negative consequences regardless of which side wins.