A new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo by Polina Sinovets argues Moscow uses nuclear language to project power, intimidate supporters of Ukraine, and create an umbrella for securing spheres of influence. Robert Orttung thinks Putin will not follow through on his nuclear threats: “even if he’s losing, even if he lost everything in Ukraine.” Peter Rutland says, “a nuclear strike would have a shock effect, but it is unlikely to deter Ukraine, and it would merely serve to unify the West and cause Russian allies like China to back away.”

In another new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, Ryhor Nizhnikau and Arkady Moshes argue Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has complicated survival prospects for Lukashenka’s regime. With conflict reigniting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Alexander Iskandaryan says Armenia cannot count on Russia to defend it, unlike the situation in Kazakhstan earlier this year. Then, Russia-led forces helped Tokayev fend off a challenge from his predecessor, a victory he now seeks to anchor with snap elections, argue Azamat Junisbai and Nargis Kassenova. Chinese leader Xi Jinping recently visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which Kassenova explains marks important shared interests that sometimes bypass Russia. For Elizabeth Wishnick, Russia’s recent war losses increase cross-cutting pressures on Xi.

If the US really wants to counterbalance China and Russia, it needs to improve its energy and image in Central Asia, argues Sebastien Peyrouse. Samuel Charap and Michael Mazarr find Washington has been inching up the degree and sophistication of its security assistance to Ukraine, gradually increasing Kyiv’s military position without provoking a wider war. At the same time, Putin’s Nord Stream 1 shutdown came both too early and too late, writes Pavel Baev: too early to keep Europe from developing alternatives for the coming winter and too late to help Russia’s economy. For Timothy Frye, the odds of Putin losing power are now higher than ever, though still “not a very large number.” Russians, explain Grigore Pop-Eleches, Isabelle DeSisto, and Jacob Tucker on their new Russia Watcher, generally support the war but are worried about its consequences.

One force that appears to be on the rise in Russia is the far right, which Marlene Laruelle argues has been capitalizing on the post-February-24 atmosphere to promote its radical worldviews. The invasion has also woven Russian Cossacks even more tightly into Russian state structures, finds Richard Arnold. That said, Henry Hale draws on LegitRuss data to caution that the appeal of “traditionalist” social values is limited in Russia and does not constitute a reliable or robust source of legitimacy for Putin. More generally, Harris Mylonas explains how conflict and international suspicions lead states to pursue nation-building politics.

Save the date! PONARS Eurasia Annual Fall Policy Conference, Friday, September 30, 2022: Agenda & Registration