"Technology is the Totem of Modern Man" 

"No One Has the Right to Label Warfare" 
- Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in Unrestricted Warfare

"Today oppression is fashionable again; the security state is back, and fundamental freedoms are in retreat in every region of the world." 
- Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein

1. As Secret Pentagon Spending Rises, Defense Firms Cash in
2. How Climate Change Will Help China And Russia Wage Hybrid War
3. Pentagon to Begin Testing 5G at Four Bases
4. On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch
5. Review | Watching Jim Mattis's slow slide into irrelevance
6. Navy lieutenant, wife accused of conspiring to smuggle inflatable boats to China
7. U.S. Soldiers' War Crime Gets Hollywood Treatment (Movie Review)


1. As Secret Pentagon Spending Rises, Defense Firms Cash in
Excerpts:
Part of the reason for the secrecy is that the U.S. has not had a "comprehensive adversary" since the Cold War ended nearly three decades ago, according to Vice Adm. Stuart Munsch, deputy chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy. But the rise of China and Russia as strategic competitors has the Pentagon reviving some of the practices that it used to hide information from the Soviet Union.
"As a result of that, we are restoring some behaviors that used to be second nature to us when we did have have a comprehensive adversary before," Munsch said Sept. 4 at the Defense News conference. "I think increasingly you'll see that we are more guarded in talking about our capabilities and our intentions simply because any revealing of those things is exploited by potential adversary."
But transparency advocates say excessive secrecy hurts Americans, including those charged with protecting them.
"Increasing classification of defense work makes it impossible to make an independent assessment of whether certain avenues of spending make sense," said William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. "This is even more true when the Pentagon budget is nearing its highest levels since World War  II - lots of money is flowing into DoD, and there is a tendency to try to keep projects moving with fewer internal controls than usual. Classification should be used sparingly; otherwise, intentionally or not, it can end up being a cover for ill-advised investments."

As Secret Pentagon Spending Rises, Defense Firms Cash in

Classified spending has edged up faster than overall defense budget requests, and accounts for nearly 11 percent of the $716 billion proposed for 2020.
defenseone.com · by Read bio
The share of Pentagon spending hidden from public view is rising, as are defense contractors' revenues from it.
The  U.S. Defense Department's overall budget request increased nearly 5 percent from 2019 to 2020, but classified spending rose 6 percent, according to the consulting firm Avascent. It accounts for about $76 billion, or almost 11%, of the $718 billion requested for the current fiscal year.
Military officials say they can't talk about classified aircraft, space, and missile projects, lest they cede advantage to America's enemies. (Critics, including House Armed Services Committee Chair Adam Smith, D-Wash.,  say excessive hidden spending hinders oversight, leads to waste, and undermines public trust.)
But there is one group of people talking about classified spending: the executives of America's largest defense firms. In recent months, what defense contractors call "restricted" projects have  become a hot topic on quarterly earnings calls with Wall Street analysts. Firms also tout the increase in classified contracts in annual reports and regulatory filings.
While the executives and corporate reports don't disclose the details of these military projects, they often identify the specific business units receiving the cash.
For example, an uptick in classified deals have Lockheed Martin's missiles and Skunk Works Advanced Development Programs divisions "growing faster than the corporation,"  CFO Ken Possenriede said on a Tuesday conference call with Wall Street analysts.
This year, Lockheed received about $600 million for secret work to develop hypersonic weapon technology and prototypes. Next year, that's expected to grow to "about $1 billion," Possenriede said. And that's just for weapons under development and not yet in serial production.
Possenriede also touted the potential for counter-hypersonic weapon work.
The boost in secret contracts has also shown up in big defense contractors' recent annual reports. For example, Raytheon's 2018  annual report touted "record classified bookings of nearly $7 billion" - up 46 percent in just a year and representing 19 percent of the company's total revenues.
"These increases were largely driven by the need of our domestic customers to address advanced peer threats as outlined in both the National Defense Strategy and the Missile Defense Review," the company said at the time. Raytheon remains well-aligned to both of these documents, which emphasize capabilities such as high-energy lasers, high-power microwaves, space, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, next-generation sensors and cybersecurity."
Northrop Grumman's most recent  annual report attributed part of $1 billion increase in its 2018 Aerospace Systems division revenue to a "higher restricted ... volume" of "manned aircraft" sales. Among its secret weapons portfolio, Northrop is building a new stealth bomber for the  U.S. Air Force. While the Pentagon acknowledges the project's existence and occasionally announces acquisition milestones, the effort is highly classified.
"We do expect that for 2019 and for ... the long run we believe that the restricted portfolio will likely grow faster than the unrestricted portfolio," Northrop  CFO Ken Bedingfield said on an April earnings call.
Secrecy pros and cons
Part of the reason for the secrecy is that the  U.S. has not had a "comprehensive adversary" since the Cold War ended nearly three decades ago, according to Vice Adm. Stuart Munsch, deputy chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy. But the rise of China and Russia as strategic competitors has the Pentagon reviving some of the practices that it used to hide information from the Soviet Union.
"As a result of that, we are restoring some behaviors that used to be second nature to us when we did have have a comprehensive adversary before," Munsch said Sept. 4 at the Defense News conference. "I think increasingly you'll see that we are more guarded in talking about our capabilities and our intentions simply because any revealing of those things is exploited by potential adversary."
But transparency advocates say excessive secrecy hurts Americans, including those charged with protecting them.
"Increasing classification of defense work makes it impossible to make an independent assessment of whether certain avenues of spending make sense," said William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. "This is even more true when the Pentagon budget is nearing its highest levels since World War  II - lots of money is flowing into DoD, and there is a tendency to try to keep projects moving with fewer internal controls than usual. Classification should be used sparingly; otherwise, intentionally or not, it can end up being a cover for ill-advised investments."

2. How Climate Change Will Help China And Russia Wage Hybrid War
Excerpts:

Indeed, China, Russia, and other hostile states can use climate change as a new tool in blended aggression (often called hybrid warfare) against the West. The Horn of Africa offers a taste of things to come. Chinese development projects there are already  displacing rural populations, and displacement leads to  food insecurity - which is, of course, worsened by climate change.
...
Leaders of Bolsonaro's ilk, meanwhile, are already intent on asserting themselves in what they perceive to be an elitist world order that permits Westerners to stick to habits such as frequent air travel and meat consumption at the expense of developing countries. Such leaders offer additional fertile soil for subversive action. It is, of course, easy for the West's adversaries to make the case that no country should feel an obligation to be the lung of the world and thus enable a Westerners to maintain their climate-destroying lifestyle. All of this means that climate change presents a new front for hybrid aggression.
That doesn't mean we should get depressed about our fate. Yes, liberal democracies are vulnerable to attacks against their civil societies - ranging from cyber attacks to election interference - precisely because they are so open. What it does mean is that we should become aware of the additional opportunity that climate change affords our adversaries. And it means that we should treat climate change as the emergency it is. It would have been far more valuable to  U.S. voters to hear how Democratic contenders for the presidency intend to address climate change and its likely effects than to be treated to their reflections on Ellen DeGeneres-George W. Bush-style friendships.

How Climate Change Will Help China And Russia Wage Hybrid War

Increased refugee flows, weather threats, and declining food security will deepen tensions already being exploited to divide and weaken the U.S. and its allies.
defenseone.com · by Read bio
Fire officials have warned that they expect more intense and devastating California wildfires due, in part, to climate change.
  • By Elisabeth Braw Associate Fellow, RUSI Read bio
1:43 PM ET
Increased refugee flows, weather threats, and declining food security will deepen tensions already being exploited to divide and weaken the U.S. and its allies.
The Democratic debate on 16 October featured a wide range of questions, including one about Ellen DeGeneres - but none about climate change. That's a critical miss by Anderson Cooper and his fellow debate anchors, because as the irked contender Julián Castro  pointed out after the debate, climate change is an existential threat. Americans and Europeans may not notice that existential threat yet, but they had better pay attention to it. Their adversaries could use climate change as a new front in hybrid warfare.
Consider the devastating fires in the Amazon. Soon after the G7 group offered Brazil $20 million to help fight the fires, Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro  turned it down, accusing them of treating his country "as if it were a colony" and  blaming NGOs for having started the fires. The G7 looked weak, and the fires in the world's green lung kept raging. Bolsonaro appears to have reached his rebellious stance on his own, but outside powers can exploit such grievances in combination with climate change.
"Brutal and Extended Cold Blast could shatter  ALL  RECORDS-Whatever happened to Global Warming?" Donald Trump  tweeted on November 22 last year. What the president of the United States refuses to learn is that the term describing deteriorating climate is climate change, and that it leads not only to extreme heat but also to extreme cold and other perils such as more frequent droughts and extreme-weather events. And while most Europeans and North Americans are not yet experiencing the life-altering effects of climate change, other parts of the world are.
As the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center notes in its  2019 report, "cyclical and protracted displacement [of people] continues to be driven by political instability, chronic poverty and inequality, environmental and climate change". Climate change is  exacerbating already severe droughts in the Horn of Africa. An average  21.8 million people are already forced to leave their homes as a result of climate change - every year. Parts of Southeast Asia risk becoming uninhabitable, the University of Cambridge's Centre for Risk Studies  reports. The Maldives may  disappear altogether.
Here's the thing: people don't lie down and die when their home community becomes uninhabitable. They find an inhabitable place to live. Climate change risks creating enormous population movements in the direction of North America and Europe. Will those refugees collectively flee to Russia or China as well? Unlikely. Most migrants make their way to a neighboring country - which is why Lebanon and Jordan are now home to so many Syrians - or to countries that hold promise of a significantly better future. Today, that is "the West".
"China and Russia are disruptors of the world order, whether by design or not, and climate change is the biggest disruptor of them all," noted Howard Jones,  CEO of the Born Free Foundation, a conservation  NGO. "In several African countries we're already seeing rural settlements disrupted by development projects funded and executed by China. Those projects include altering the flows of entire river systems and putting good land to use for export of food and resources to China. Put this together with climate change and pre-existing poverty and we have a huge problem. And why would China care?"
Indeed, China, Russia, and other hostile states can use climate change as a new tool in blended aggression (often called hybrid warfare) against the West. The Horn of Africa offers a taste of things to come. Chinese development projects there are already  displacing rural populations, and displacement leads to  food insecurity - which is, of course, worsened by climate change.
How will the Western community respond to large new migration flows? The 2015 refugee crisis opened rifts within the European Union that have not gone away - on the contrary. The  EU still hasn't managed to establish a quota system for asylum seekers because some Central and Eastern European countries refuse to participate. The European Commission's new Commissioner position with responsibility for "protecting our European way of life", meanwhile, has been  labeled xenophobic by some  EU parliamentarians. Regardless of who is right or wrong in the debate, large migration flow will further deepen the discord.
Related podcast:
That's exactly what our adversaries want. Today their aim is less to conquer territory than to weaken the cohesion within countries and alliances. "Mass population movements and human emergencies will put Europe under huge pressure, economically, politically, socially, and morally, which China will only benefit from," Jones told me.
To be sure, the whole Earth will be affected by climate change, and China has signed and ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change, as have another  182 countries, while the United States has left it. (Russia has signed the treaty.) Yet which adversary would decline the opportunity to exploit Western vulnerabilities resulting from climate change? Populist leaders like Bolsonaro who are suspicious of Western intentions offer additional fertile soil. Russia seems to have spotted the opportunity. The Libyan government  accuses it of trying influence its elections and elections in other African countries. Western governments estimate that Russia has interfered with 17 different elections in Africa.
Or consider food consumption. Western consumers, accustomed to constant availability of inexpensive food transported to them from all over the world, won't take kindly to the hardship climate change promises to bring. Last year, European wheat production  dropped by four percent as a result of heat-induced poor harvests in France. "We can increase the grain yield by using other varieties that are available in the gene pool, but they're less nutritious," noted Senthold Assang, a professor of agriculture at the University of Florida, who led a recent global investigation into the effects of climate change on wheat. Together with maize and rice, wheat forms the  chief source of human nutrition. Nutritious grains risk becoming a staple only for the wealthy, while others will resort to lesser varieties. Food discontent could be exploited by countries like Russia, which already has formidable malign-influence artillery directed at Europe.
Leaders of Bolsonaro's ilk, meanwhile, are already intent on asserting themselves in what they perceive to be an elitist world order that permits Westerners to stick to habits such as frequent air travel and meat consumption at the expense of developing countries. Such leaders offer additional fertile soil for subversive action. It is, of course, easy for the West's adversaries to make the case that no country should feel an obligation to be the lung of the world and thus enable a Westerners to maintain their climate-destroying lifestyle. All of this means that climate change presents a new front for hybrid aggression.
That doesn't mean we should get depressed about our fate. Yes, liberal democracies are vulnerable to attacks against their civil societies - ranging from cyber attacks to election interference - precisely because they are so open. What it does mean is that we should become aware of the additional opportunity that climate change affords our adversaries. And it means that we should treat climate change as the emergency it is. It would have been far more valuable to  U.S. voters to hear how Democratic contenders for the presidency intend to address climate change and its likely effects than to be treated to their reflections on Ellen DeGeneres-George W. Bush-style friendships.
  • Elisabeth Braw directs the Modern Deterrence program at the Royal United Services Institute and is an adjunct fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. She lives in London and regularly writes about European security for publications including the Wall Street Journal, the Financial ... Full bio


3. Pentagon to Begin Testing 5G at Four Bases

Pentagon to Begin Testing 5G at Four Bases

A test program will test the next-gen networks' usefulness for augmented and virtual reality, smart warehouses, and spectrum-sharing.
defenseone.com · by Nextgov

  • By Jack Corrigan Staff Correspondent, Nextgov Read bio
6:19 PM ET
A test program will test the next-gen networks' usefulness for augmented and virtual reality, smart warehouses, and spectrum-sharing.
The Defense Department will soon begin prototyping and testing 5G technology at a handful of its bases, and it's looking to industry for help.
On Wednesday, the Pentagon announced that in the coming months it will kick off a "large-scale" effort to explore various applications of 5G technology. The program will initially focus on three different 5G use cases and take place across four as-yet-unnamed domestic military installations.
The program will focus on three areas: using 5G to expand the use of augmented and virtual reality systems in training and mission planning, developing smart warehouses to improve logistics, and exploring new strategies for sharing different types of spectrum.
All three research tracks could bring real-world benefits to both the Pentagon and commercial industry, according to Lisa Porter, the department's deputy undersecretary for research and engineering. Officials plan to add new research opportunities every quarter, as long as funding is made available.
"This is really part of a bigger strategic push," Porter said Wednesday on a call with reporters. "We have to acknowledge that together we need to work that out-industry needs access to spectrum,  DOD needs access to spectrum. It's essentially a call to action, saying 'let's get serious about figuring out how to do this together.'"
Pentagon will release a draft request for proposal on Nov. 4 to get feedback from industry, and the final solicitation is expected to come out in December.
The department has already consulted the telecom industry on the initiative, Porter said, and officials used their input to inform the program's initial design.
"We wanted to make sure we understood what the challenges were and how we could collaborate," Porter said during the call. "This is one of those areas where commercial industry is really leading the charge. The [department] wants to be able to work with industry and ... think about how we can influence security, standards and things like that."
  • Jack Corrigan reports on cyber and national security issues. Before joining Nextgov in 2017, he wrote for multiple publications around his hometown of Chicago. Jack graduated from Northwestern University with degrees in journalism and economics. Full bio

4. On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch

On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch

By Ofer Fridman, PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2  / Published Oct. 4, 2019
 
Service members from many nations were represented in the Ukrainian Independence Day parade in Kyiv, Aug. 24.
In August 2018, service members from many nations were represented in the Ukrainian Independence Day parade. Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine has been ongoing since 2015 and seeks to contribute to Ukraine's internal defense capabilities and training capacity. (Tennessee Army National Guard)
Dr. Ofer Fridman is a Lecturer in War Studies and Director of Operations at the Center for Strategic Communications in King's College. Prior to embarking on an academic career, Dr. Fridman served 15 years in the Israel Defense Force.
The first week of March 2019 was very exciting for Western experts on Russian military affairs. On March 2, the Russian Academy of Military Sciences held its annual defense conference with Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, giving the keynote address. Two days later, official Ministry of Defense newspaper  Krasnaya Zvesda published the main outlines of Gerasimov's speech, igniting a new wave of discourse on Russian military affairs among Western experts. 1  The  New York Times' claim that "Russian General Pitches 'Information' Operations as a Form of War" was augmented by an interpretation claiming that Gerasimov had unveiled "Russia's 'strategy of limited actions,'" which was "a new version of the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'" that was to be considered the "semi-official 'doctrine' of the Russian Armed Forces and its General Staff." 2 Interestingly enough, this echo chamber-style interpretation of Gerasimov's speech emphasized only the one small part of it that discussed information/propaganda/subversion/nonmilitary aspects of war. The main question, however, is whether this part deserves such attention-after all, this topic was discussed only in one short paragraph entitled "Struggle in Informational Environment." Was there something in his speech that deserved greater attention? And if so, why was it missed?

Did Russia Surprise the West? Or Was the West Surprised by Russia?

Since 2014, Western experts on Russian military affairs have been trying to understand the Russian discourse on the character of war in the 21 st century, as it manifested itself in Ukraine and later in Syria. These attempts produced several terms, such as "Gerasimov Doctrine" and "Russian hybrid warfare." 3 While these terms were initially popular in the professional and academic communities, they failed to endure. After all, Mark Galeotti, who introduced the term "Gerasimov Doctrine," publicly apologized for coining the phrase, and, as Dmitriy Adamsky predicted, an attempt to utilize the Western concept of hybrid warfare to define the Russian approach to war resulted in an inaccurate analysis of Russian modus operandi. 4 This attempt to understand Russian military thought through the Western conceptual prism has had two main interconnected consequences. First, the West has been constantly failing to read the message coming from Moscow. Second, as an outcome of this failure, it has been repeatedly surprised by Russia. Fiona Hill, director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, put it best in 2015: "Why are we constantly surprised? They [Russians] do all these things, and sometimes they do signal quite clearly, but we missed a lot." 5
The Russian reaction to the Ukrainian crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the first main surprise to the Western community. In January 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defence College expert Heidi Reisinger stated that Russian military forces are "neither a threat, nor a partner," claiming that:
Many years of continual reform, underfunding, and the devastating effects of demographic trends have led the Russian armed forces to a situation where even senior military personnel raise doubts about the ability to provide national defence without tactical nuclear weapons. . . . All this makes Russia's military capabilities less efficient and hardly interoperable. 6
Just 10 months later, Reisinger's assessment had entirely changed:
Russia's recent behaviour and actions are often referred to as "Hybrid Warfare." They have been an effective and sometimes surprising mix of military and non-military, conventional and irregular components, and can include all kinds of instruments such as cyber and information operations. None of the single components is new; it is the combination and orchestration of different actions that achieves a surprise effect and creates ambiguity, making an adequate reaction extremely difficult, especially for multinational organisations that operate on the principle of consensus. 7
This surprise gave birth to the ill-fated terms "Gerasimov Doctrine" and "Russian hybrid warfare." 8 While these concepts tried to attribute to Moscow the invention of a new blend of military and nonmilitary (political, diplomatic, economic, informational, cyber and other) means and methods, there was in fact very little conceptual novelty in what the Kremlin did in Crimea. 9 Moreover, an analysis of the conceptual roots of this idea in Russian academic, political, and military discourse "can be easily traced well back to the early 2000s." 10 For some reason, the Western community of Russian experts completely missed this discussion-clear signals of a shift in the conceptual approach to war that were sent from Russia for more than a decade.
In September 2015, Russia surprised the West again when president Vladimir Putin announced Russian intervention in Syria. 11 Why Western politicians and experts were so surprised by the Kremlin's decision to intervene is unclear. On the tactical level, those who closely monitored Russian affairs could see the upcoming signs, since the transfer of military hardware and troops from Russia to Syria had begun already in August and was well reported by different media outlets and social networks. 12 But also on the strategic level, Moscow's desire to play a greater role in international affairs had been signaled to the West since the early 2000s. While many experts refer to President Putin's famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, a better example of how Moscow had communicated this desire can be seen in a comparative analysis of Russian self-definition in its Foreign Policy Concepts. 13 While the 2000 concept cautiously stated that "the Russian Federation has a real potential for ensuring itself a worthy place in the world," the 2008 concept proclaimed Russia as "the largest Euro-Asian power . . . one of the leading States of the world and a permanent member of the [United Nations] Security Council." 14 Тhe 2013 concept already clearly stated that "Russia's foreign policy . . . reflects the unique role our country has been playing over centuries as a counterbalance in international affairs and the development of global civilization." 15 The inability of Western experts to comprehend (or to believe) this transformation in Russia's position on the global arena is probably the main reason why they were surprised when the Kremlin decided to counterbalance the West in Syria in 2015.
While Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria can be considered "strategic surprises," in the past several years the West also found itself surprised many times on the tactical level. One of the best examples was the demonstration of the T-14 Armata, a next-generation Russian main battle tank, during the 2015 Moscow Victory Day parade. The T-14 appears to have caught Western military experts completely unprepared, as if they were unaware of its development-according to a United Kingdom military intelligence assessment, "The tank has caused a sensation." 16 The T-14 was so surprising to the Western militaries that its demonstration was followed by urgent calls to upgrade existing fleets of battle tanks. 17 The main question, however, is why the demonstration of the T-14 during the 2015 parade was so surprising; after all, the Kremlin had never hidden its development. In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense had stopped financing the development of the T-95 in favor of the Armata family of land armored vehicles. 18 In 2011, General Major Yuri Kovalenko, former first deputy of the main automotive-armored directorate of the Ministry of Defense, stated that by 2015, Russia would deploy a new main battle tank titled Armata. 19 In 2012, Aleksander Sukhorukov, the first deputy of the Minister of Defense, promised that vehicles based on the Armata platform "might start first trials a year before the promised deadline." 20 In 2013, Russian deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin announced that the new tank was to be presented in the classified section of the 2013 Russia arms exhibition in Nizhny Tagil. 21 Moreover, since 2012, military-oriented media in Russia had started to speculate about the characteristics of the new T-14 (most of which proved to be right). 22 Why the T-14 was such a big surprise to the Western military is unclear, as the Russians had signaled not only the fact that they had developed a new tank but also its characteristics. It is unclear why the UK military intelligence was so excited about the fact that in the T-14, "a tank crew is embedded within an armored capsule in the hull front," as General Kovalenko openly stated as early as 2012 that "a crew will be separated from the turret." 23
Another "tactical" surprise for the West was Putin's 2018 address to the Federal Assembly in which he declared that Russia had finished the development of hypersonic weapons. 24 It seems inconceivable that Western intelligence agencies had no idea that Russia was developing these armaments, especially considering that for a few years before Putin's speech, the Ministry of Defense was openly stating that the development of hypersonic weapons was in its final stages. 25 It is unclear why Putin's announcement that the multi-billion-dollar U.S. missile defense system is useless against new Russian missiles was so surprising to the Western community.
These are just a few examples from a long series of "surprises" that the Kremlin has sprung upon the West in the past decade, but the reason for their success probably can be explained better by the Western inability to read and interpret (and believe in) the messages being sent by Moscow rather than by Russia's intention to surprise the West. In other words, to answer American foreign affairs specialist Fiona Hill's question, "Why are we constantly surprised?" we need to understand how the West perceives contemporary Russia and whether this perception helps to interpret Russia's signals and allows the West to adequately meet and parry Russian actions.
 
BALTIC SEA (April 12, 2016) A Russian Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft makes a low altitude pass by USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) April 12, 2016. Donald Cook, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer forward deployed to Rota, Spain, is conducting a routine patrol in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe. (U.S. Navy photo/Released) 160412-N-ZZ999-007 Join the conversation:
A Russian Sukhoi SU-24 attack aircraft makes a low-altitude pass by the USS Donald Cook. A guided-missile destroyer, the Cook was conducting a routine patrol in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of national security interests in Europe. (U.S. Navy)

(Mis)Understanding Russia

The examples above clearly show that the Kremlin was trying to communicate its intentions to the West long before taking actions. The signals were clearly there. The question is whether there was somebody with sufficient insight to interpret these signals and powerful enough to change the Western perception of Russia as "an over-geared, under-invested, over-securitized, and under-legitimate" state. 26
As the last several years have proven, the perception of Russia as weak does not represent the trend. While many politicians and experts compared the Russian economy to those of Italy and Spain in an attempt to diminish the power of the Kremlin, this comparison is very misleading. 27 After all, with the same budget as Italy or Spain, Russia has one of the most ambitious space programs, the biggest nuclear arsenal, and one of the most powerful militaries in the world. As Michael McFaul, former ambassador to Russia and senior advisor to President Barack Obama on Russian and Eurasian affairs, put it:
The mistake that was made 20 years ago was assuming Russia's a weak power, a declining power. Whether they're a great power or a middling power, we can argue about. But they are a major power, in the top 5 or 10 economies in the world, a top nuclear country in the world and now, given the investment Putin's made in the military, they're one of the major military powers in the world. Those trends are not changing in the next 20 or 30 years. 28
Moreover, the assumption of a weak Russia misleads and creates an unhelpful delusion regarding the state of Russian affairs, preventing the West from understanding the messages that the Kremlin attempts to communicate.
On the one hand, regarding the possibility of understanding Russia, it is difficult not to recall the famous verse written by Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev in 1866:
Russia cannot be known by the mind
Nor measured by the common mile:
Her status is unique, without kind-
Russia can only be believed in. 29
On the other hand, an assumption that Russia "is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" seems to be exaggerated; after making this famous statement, Winston Churchill continued: "But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." 30 George Kennan in his "Long Telegram," wrote:
We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. . . . I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. 31
These words seem as relevant today as they were in 1946, but the reason why the West has been repeatedly surprised by the Kremlin is that Kennan's recommendations were forgotten as soon as the Cold War ended. Since the end of the Cold War, the field of Russian studies has suffered significant losses. The U.S.-based Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) stated in 2015 that "Russian studies within the social sciences are facing a crisis: an unmistakable decline in interest and numbers, in terms of both graduate students and faculty." 32 While ASEEES outlined several different reasons for this decline, the main one was the decreased government funding for Russia-related research, "including cuts of over 50 percent to critical language training, and near complete elimination of advanced research fellowships for Americans on Russia and the region." 33 In conclusion of its analysis, ASEEES stated:
Due both to trends within political science away from area specific knowledge (and in the direction of broader theoretical and comparative studies and more sophisticated quantitative methods) and to a decline in interest on the part of the American public and government in Russia following the end of the Cold War, there are fewer faculty in political science departments who work on Russia than there were even a decade ago and also fewer PhD students. This is the gravest crisis facing the field. 34
It is not surprising, then, that the West has been constantly caught off guard by Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the West has lost interest in Russia, slowly losing the cadre of Russian experts able to understand and interpret signals sent from or actions conducted by the Kremlin.
Resonating Kennan's advice, Ivan Ilyin, a renowned Russian philosopher in exile, wrote in 1944: "Russia, as a nation and culture, still appears to Western Europe as a hidden world, as a problem that cannot be understood, a kind of Sphinx." 35 Unfortunately, this observation seems as relevant today as it was more than 70 years ago. In his book  Should We Fear Russia? Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, concluded that "Russia should not be feared but, rather, always be handled with care." 36 Such "handling," however, requires a deep knowledge of Russia's history, culture, religion, and other aspects that have been shaping its social-political-military behavior since Ivan the Formidable's reign in the 16 th century to the present day. Without such knowledge, it is not only very difficult to stop fearing the unknown Russia, it is also impossible to understand any signals sent from the Kremlin in the form of words (speeches, articles, or doctrines) or deeds (from military interventions to deployment of a new piece of hardware). Without an understanding that Russia is "both strong and weak; authoritarian and lawless; traditionalist and valueless," any analysis of Russia's communications with the West would be too superficial, failing to read between the lines and misunderstanding the message. 37

Back to General Gerasimov

In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov published his famous article, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight." 38 By interpreting (or misinterpreting) 39 Gerasimov's article, many Western experts found in this article a conceptual rationale for Russian actions in Ukraine, dubbing it the Gerasimov Doctrine. 40 However, the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine was neither by Gerasimov, nor was it doctrine. First, Gerasimov's article was based on the writings of two Russian officers, Colonel Sergey Chekinov and Lieutenant General Sergey Bogdanov, whose joint publications on the changing nature of contemporary conflicts have played a vital role in shaping the views of the Russian military establishment since the late 2000s. 41 Second, regarding whether it was a doctrine, Mark Galeotti, who was responsible for the popularization of the term "Gerasimov Doctrine," later recanted, saying that "it doesn't exist. And the longer we pretend it does, the longer we misunderstand the-real, but different-challenge Russia poses." 42
Moreover, despite the warnings of scholars who questioned the practicability and conceptual relevance of the Gerasimov Doctrine and the following idea of Russian hybrid warfare, many Western experts preferred to see how Gerasimov "envisions new forms and means of armed combat . . . with the aim of achieving political and strategic objectives under the cover of ambiguity." 43 While trying to explain "why Gerasimov's statement that non-military means are four times as important than military means is relevant," the West seems to have failed to see the forest for the trees; according to Gerasimov:
Regardless of the increasing importance of the non-military means in the resolution of interstate confrontations, the role of the armed forces, in providing the security of a state, is not decreasing, but only growing. Therefore, the requirements from the armed forces capabilities are [also] extending. 44
While Gerasimov's speeches and articles were made and published in the context of Russia's ongoing conceptual discourse on the role of the military in international confrontations, it seems that many Western interpreters of Gerasimov saw more what they wanted to see rather than what Gerasimov wanted to say. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian conceptual debate on the nature of international confrontations was flooded by opinions that promoted the rising importance of nonmilitary means. This trend led many Russian military thinkers, including Gerasimov, to realize that the subsiding status of war as an armed conflict also meant the declining eminence of armed forces. While for most of this period the Russian military had avoided participating in this debate, the rising popularity of nonmilitary means and methods among Russia's political leadership by the end of the 2000s forced the military to intervene. In other words, Gerasimov was not presenting "an expanded theory of modern warfare" 45 or announcing a new Russian "vision of total warfare;" rather, he was outlining the need for adequate investment in the development and modernization of the Russian military, its weapons and capabilities, in the context of an increasing belief among Russian political leadership that conflicts can be fought and won without the military. 46 Therefore, as Charles K. Bartles rightfully points out, Gerasimov decided to publish his articles in the journal  Military-Industrial Courier ( Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier), as his intended audience was not the Russian armed forces, and definitely not the Western audience, but "Russia's senior political leadership." 47 Many Western experts generally failed to put Gerasimov into this context, spending time, money and much ink exploring the nonexistent "Gerasimov Doctrine" and allowing Russia to repeatedly surprise the West with its new hardware and military performance in Ukraine and Syria.
This year, Gerasimov's speech at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences annual defense conference created another wave of attention to the "signature strategy of Russia under President Vladimir V. Putin . . . [that is] a mix of combat, intelligence, and propaganda tools that the Kremlin has deployed in conflicts such as Syria and Ukraine." 48 While this reaction was initiated by a short summary of Gerasimov's speech published by  Krasnaya Zvesda, 49 his full address was published a few days later by  Military-Industrial Courier. 50 A closer examination of this article shows again that what many Western experts preferred to see in Gerasimov's speech was not necessarily what Gerasimov wanted to say.
Summarizing his analysis of the 2013 Gerasimov article, Bartles accurately concluded:
Gerasimov's view of the future operational environment is in many ways very similar to our own. Like us, he envisions less large-scale warfare; increased use of networked command-and-control systems, robotics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importance placed on interagency cooperation; more operations in urban terrain; a melding of offense and defense; and a general decrease in the differences between military activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 51
On the one hand, a summary of the 2019 article would not be much different. On the other, Gerasimov discusses several important details that deserve special attention.
While many in the West interpret Gerasimov's speech as another Russian attempt to pitch information operations as a form of war, Gerasimov, in fact, pays very little attention to this topic. His speech included several references to the increasing role of the information dimension. 52 For example, he stated that:
An analysis of the nature of contemporary wars has showed a significant increase in the importance of informational dimension. A new reality of future wars will also include the transfer of hostilities precisely into this area. Information technology essentially is becoming one of the most promising types of weapons. 53
However, anyone who is interested in the role of information operations (IO) on the battlefields of the 21 st century would find that this understanding is neither new nor particularly Russian. For example, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff share quite a similar view:
As the strategic environment continues to change, so does IO. Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs [information-related capabilities] in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. This revised characterization has led to a reassessment of . . . how IRCs can be effectively integrated into joint operations to create effects and operationally exploitable conditions necessary for achieving the joint force commander's objectives. 54
On the one hand, many Western interpreters of Gerasimov decided to emphasize how "Gerasimov accused the West of covert preparations to instigate mass public protests and so-called 'color revolutions' as well as of using 'soft power' to overthrow objectionable regimes in order to undermine and eventually destroy (break up) undesirable states." 55 On the other, there is nothing new in this Russian rhetoric of the "evil West that tries to undermine Russia," as it has been going for more than two decades. 56 Therefore, the main value of Gerasimov's speech seems to lie not with the repetition of this old narrative, but rather with other important details that may shed some light on the real state of affairs in the Russian military and possible directions of its development in the near future.
The first important detail Gerasimov gave was his call to learn the lessons of Russian involvement in Syria and develop a capability to implement what he calls "a strategy of limited action." In his words:
Syrian experience has an important role in the development of strategy. Its generalization and implementation allowed us to identify a new practical area. This area is the achievement of the aims related to protecting and advancing national interests outside the territory of Russia-a strategy of limited actions. The basis for its implementation is the creation of a self-sufficient group of troops (forces) based on the formations of one of the branches of the Armed Forces, which has high mobility and is able to make the greatest contribution to the achievement of the defined aims. 57
The second interesting fact Gerasimov provided was his assessment of the development and deployment of new Russian high-precision strike systems:
Serial production of new models of armaments and outfitting of the Armed Forces with them have begun. The "Avangard" [hypersonic glide re-entry vehicle] , the "Sarmat" [intercontinental ballistic missile] , and the newest "Peresvet" [laser cannon]  and "Kinzhal" [air-launched hypersonic missile]  weapons have shown their high effectiveness, and the "Poseidon" [autonomous, nuclear-armed torpedo]  and "Burevestnik" [nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile]  complexes are going through successful tests. Scheduled work is proceeding on creation of the "Tsirkon" hypersonic sea-launched cruise missile. 58
He also assured that these modern capabilities are not another case of Russian pokazuha (a staged event for officials, international observers, and/or domestic propaganda), as "the part of modern weapon systems in our nuclear capability has [already] reached 82 percent." 59
Another important statistic given by Gerasimov was regarding the increasing level of professionalism among Russian forces:
Nowadays, we proceed with the fulfillment of the planned program to staff the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with contract servicemen. By the end of 2025, their number will reach 475,000 troops. . . .  Today, the officer corps of the Armed Forces is staffed with trained professional personnel. All commanders of military districts, combined-arms formations, formations of the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as 96 percent of the commanders of combined-arms units have combat experience. 60
Finally, he concludes with the call to continue investment in the modernization of the armed forces, as:
The modern weapons are so complex that it would be unlikely to adjust their production after the start of the hostilities. Therefore, everything necessary should be produced in the required quantity and be deployed already in peacetime. We must, by all means, ensure technical, technological, and organizational superiority over any potential adversary. 61
While these four important observations by Gerasimov may seem to be quite separate, they in fact represent different pieces of one puzzle. There is one message that Gerasimov tries to communicate between the lines of his speech: that Russia needs to create doctrinal and material capability of a highly professional intervention force with the potential to act worldwide, under the protection of a highly effective, modernized nuclear umbrella. Interestingly enough, it seems that while Western experts identified this message, they almost immediately rejected it. For example, interpreting Gerasimov's "strategy of limited actions," Roger McDermott assessed that it "does not represent a declaration to conduct 'power projection' on a global scale, given Russia's economic as well as military obstacles that would limit such ambitions." 62 And translating Gerasimov's call to build and stock modernized weapons systems, Pavel Felgenhauer compared modern Russia to the Soviet Union, forecasting for the former the destiny of the latter:
Building up vast stockpiles of tanks and other hardware in a vain attempt to achieve global military supremacy-as promoted for decades by the Soviet General Staff-pushed the mighty Soviet Union to economic and social ruin and eventual disintegration in 1991. Gerasimov and the Russian Armed Forces are clearly not content to limit their ambitions. . . .  Today, they are boldly challenging the entire world and pledging to build the biggest military they can. The end result may prove as devastating as in 1991. 63
The purpose of this article is not to suggest that Gerasimov's message (or anyone's from the Kremlin) should be taken for granted. But dismissing them as too ambitious for a Russia that is "politically isolated, economically sanctioned and with few options to improve its lot" does not seem right either. Punching above its weight is a sign of strong leadership in the Russian cultural-political-military context. 64 As the past two decades show, the Kremlin has been quite consistent in delivering its promises, especially in the political-military sphere. The West has also been very consistent in dismissing Moscow's promises, finding itself surprised time after time. Unfortunately, in analyzing how Gerasimov's latest promise was discussed in the West, it is likely to follow the same path, and we all will be "surprised" in a few years when Russia will deploy an intervention force to "protect" its interests abroad.

Conclusion: Know Your Enemy

Sun Tzu's famous maxim asserts that "if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." While the topic of "knowing yourself" should be discussed separately, "knowing the enemy" is the very message of this article. During the Cold War, the West constantly overestimated the Soviet Union. The evidence of that was the level of surprise that the end of the Cold War and the following dissolution of the Soviet Union created in the West. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the West has constantly underestimated the Kremlin. As it seems, even today, after Moscow has proven its ability on so many occasions, the West struggles to accept that the Kremlin may deliver what it promises.
This should not be interpreted as a call to return to Cold War practices. An overwhelming overestimation of the enemy also has social, political, and economic prices that nobody in the West wants to (or should) pay. However, it is about time that the West starts taking Russia seriously-or, more precisely, perceiving Russia as it wants to be perceived. After all, as the current state of global affairs shows, Russia's self-perception is not far from the reality. For example, the Kremlin has been talking for years about the restoration of Russia's role as a "counterbalancing factor in international affairs." 65 As the events in Syria and Venezuela show, this factor has been well restored. 66
To truly understand Russia, the West should stop looking east through the prism of the Western worldview. There is no doubt that the Russian political system is different from the Western one, but it does not necessarily mean that it is weaker. During the 20 th century, the Russian people proved twice that when they are truly unhappy with their leadership, they bring it down, regardless of the devastating consequences. Anticipating that the Russian people will soon repeat this exercise is misleading, not only because the current leadership has learned the lessons of 1917 and 1991, but also because the memory of the 1990s is still too fresh in the hearts and minds of the Russian people. The West should accept the fact that Russia is a major power that is going to stay around, with Putin or without, protecting its interests and, most importantly, delivering on its promises. Only through this prism will the West truly understand what messages are coming from the Kremlin and be prepared to beat Russia to the punch.  PRISM

Notes

1 Valery Gerasimov, "Vektory razvitiya voyennoy strategii" [Vectors of Military Strategy Development],  Krasnaya Zvezda, March 4, 2019, . The main bullet points of Gerasimov's speech were published in English on March 2, 2019, in  Sputnik: "Russia's Geopolitical Rivals Preparing for High-Tech Wars in Space-Gen Staff," .
2 Andrew Kramer, "Russian General Pitches 'Information' Operations as a Form of War,"  New York Times, March 2, 2019, ; Roger McDermott, "Gerasimov Unveils Russia's 'Strategy of Limited Actions',"  Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, Issue 31, March 6, 2019, ; Pavel Felgenhauer, "A New Version of 'Gerasimov Doctrine',"  Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, Issue 31, March 6, 2019, .
3 For example, Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, "Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine,"  Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28, Issue 1 (2015): 1-22; Dave Johnson, "Russia's Approach to Conflict: Implications for NATO's Deterrence and Defence," research paper no. 111, NATO Defence College, April 2015; Janis Berzins, "Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense," Policy Paper no. 2, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Centre for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014; Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Back to the Future? Russia's Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold War Comparisons," research paper no. 120, NATO Defence College, October 2015; Mark Galeotti,  Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia's Non-Linear Military Challenge Right (Prague: Mayak Intelligence, 2016).
4 Dmitry Adamsky,  Cross-Domain Coercion:The Current Russian Art of Strategy (Paris: IFRI Security Studies Center, November 2015).
5 Fiona Hill, quoted in Karoun Demirjian, "Lack of Russia Experts Has Some in U.S. Worried,"  Washington Post, December 30, 2015, .
6 Heidi Reisinger, "Does Russia Matters? Purely Political Relations Are Not Enough in Operational Times," NATO Defence College conference report, January 31, 2014, 3.
7 Heidi Reisinger and Aleksandr Golts, "Russian Hybrid Warfare: Waging War Below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence," research paper no. 105, NATO Defence College, November 2014, 3.
8 Fridman,  Russian "Hybrid Warfare," chap. 6.
9 Galeotti, "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'"; Fridman,  Russian "Hybrid Warfare."
1 0 Fridman,  Russian "Hybrid Warfare," 168.
1 1 Vladimir Putin, address to the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 28, 2015, .
1 2 Alec Luhn, "Russia Sends Artillery and Tanks to Syria as Part of Continued Military Buildup,"  The Guardian, September 14, 2015, ; "Russian Troops 'Fighting Alongside Assad's Army against Syrian Rebels',"  The Telegraph, September 2, 2015, .
1 3 Vladimir Putin, 2007 Speech at the Munich Security Conference, ; A. Smirnov, "Kontseptsii vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii: sravnitel'nyy analiz [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation-Comparative Analysis]'," in  Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: teoriya i praktika [The Foreign Policy of Russia: Theory and Practice], ed. S. Smul'skii, O. Abramova, and V. Buyanov (Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 2013), 58-83.
1 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,  The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation-2 000, Moscow, 2000; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,  The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation-2008, Moscow, 2008.
1 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,  The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation-2 013, Moscow, 2013.
1 6 Robert Mendrick, Ben Farmer, and Roland Oliphant, "UK Military Intelligence Issues Warning Over Russian Supertank Threat,"  The Telegraph, November 6, 2016, .
1 7 Marco Giannangeli, "UK Must Prepare for War with Russia: Army Calls for Fleet of Battle Tanks to Take on Putin,"  Express, September 30, 2015, ; Dave Majumdar, "Surprise: Russia's Lethal T-14 Armata Tank Is in Production,"  The National Interest, March 13, 2016, ; Dave Majumdar, "Get Ready, Russia: This European Power Has Plans For a Lethal New Tank,"  The National Interest, February 18, 2016, ; Mendrick, Farmer, and Oliphant, "UK Military Intelligence Issues Warning."
1 8 "Rossiya primet na vooruzheniye novyy tank 'Armada'" [Russia will adopt the new tank "Armada"],  Lenta.ru, April 28, 2011, .
1 9 "Novyy tank 'Armata' mozhet poyavit'sya v rossiyskoy armii v 2015 godu" [New tank "Armata" may appear in the Russian army in 2015],  Ria Novosti, April 28, 2011, .
2 0 "Kakim budet budushchiy rossiyskiy tank 'Armata"' [What will be the future Russian tank "Armata"],  Armeyskii Vestnik, September 19, 2012, .
2 1 "Noveyshiy Tank 'Armata' vpervyye pokazhut rukovodstvu strany v sentyabre" [The newest tank "Armata" will be demonstrated for the first time to country's leadership in September],  Ria Novosti, July 8, 2013, .
2 2 For example, "Kakim budet budushchiy rossiyskiy tank 'Armata'."
2 3 Mendrick, Farmer, and Oliphant, "UK Military Intelligence Issues Warning."; "Novyy tank 'Armata' mozhet poyavit'sya v rossiyskoy armii v 2015 godu."
2 4 Vladimir Putin, 2018 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018, Moscow, .
2 5 For example, "Kakoye giperzvukovoye oruzhiye ozhidayet rossiyskuyu armiyu" [What hypersonic weapons are coming to the Russian military], TASS, February 1, 2017, .
2 6 Galeotti,  Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? 98-99.
2 7 Lindsey Graham, quoted in Lauren Carroll, "Graham: Russia 'has an economy the size of Italy',"  Politifact, July 27 2014, ; Jim Edwards, "Russia's Economy Has Shrunk So Much It's Now Almost the Same Size as Spain," Business Insider, December 2, 2014, .
2 8 Michael McFaul, quoted in Demirjian, "Lack of Russia Experts."
2 9 Fyodor Tyutchev,  Izbrannoe [Favorites] (Rostov-na-Donu: Phenix, 1996).
3 0 Winston Churchill, "The Russian Enigma," BBC Broadcast, London, October 1, 1939, .
3 1 George Kennan, "Telegram: The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," Moscow, February 22, 1946, .
3 2 Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES),  The State of Russian Studies in the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, July 2015), 4.
3 3 Mathew Rojansky, "George F. Kennan, Containment, and the West's Current Russia Problem," research paper no. 127, NATO Defence College, January 2015, 9.
3 4 ASEEES,  The State of Russian Studies, 45.
3 5 Ivan Ilyin,  Sushchnost'i svoyeobraziye Russkoy kul'tury [The Essence and Peculiarity of Russian Culture] (Moscow: Russkaya Kniga-XXI Vek, 2007), 15.
3 6 Dmitri,Trenin,  Should We Fear Russia? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), xiii.
3 7 Ibid, xii.
3 8 Valery Gerasimov, "Tsennost' nauki v predvidenii: Novyye vyzovy trebuyut pereosmyslit' formy i sposoby vedeniya boyevykh deystviy" [The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and of Carrying Out Combat Operations],  Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, no. 8 (2013). The English translation of this article was published by Military Review in 2016, see Valery Gerasimov, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations," trans. Robert Coalson,  Military Review (January-February 2016): 23-29.
3 9 Charles Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right,"  Military Review (January-February 2016): 30-38.
4 0 For example, Jonsson and Seely, "Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict"; Johnson, "Russia's Approach to Conflict"; Berzins, "Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine"; Ruiz Palmer, "Back to the Future?"; Galeotti,  Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina?
4 1 Fridman, Russian  "Hybrid Warfare," 127-136.
4 2 Galeotti, "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'."
4 3 For example, Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, eds., "After 'Hybrid Warfare', What Next? Understanding and Responding to Contemporary Russia," Publications of the Government 's analysis, assessment, and research activities 44/2016, Helsinki, 2016; András Rácz, "Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist,"  FIFA Report, no. 43, June 2015; Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,"  Survival 56, no. 6 (2014): 7-38; Adamsky, "Cross-Domain Coercion"; Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right"; Johnson, "Russia's Approach to Conflict," 5.
4 4 Jonsson and Seely, "Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict," 8; Valery Gerasimov, "Po opytu Sirii: Gibridnaya voyna trebuyet vysokotekhnologichnogo oruzhiya i nauchnogo obosnovaniya" [According to the Experience in Syria: Hybrid War Requires the High-Tech Weaponry and Scientific Foundation],  Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, no. 9, 2016, .
4 5 James Brown, "Japan Woos Russia for Its Own Security,"  Nikkei Asian Review, December 11, 2017, .
4 6 Mckew, Molly, "The Gerasimov Doctrine: It's Russia's New Chaos Theory of Political Warfare. And It's Probably Being Used on You,"  Politico, September/October, 2017, ; Fridman,  Russian "Hybrid Warfare," chap. 7.
4 7 Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right," 31.
4 8 Kramer, "Russian General Pitches 'Information' Operations as a Form of War."
4 9 Gerasimov, "Vektory razvitiya voyennoy strategii."
5 0 Valery Gerasimov, "Genshtab planiruet udary po tzentram prinyatiya reshenii, puskovym ustanovkam i 'pyatoi kolonne"' [The General Staff Plans Strikes on the Centers of Decision-Making, Launchers, and the "Fifth Column"],  Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, no. 9, 2019, .
5 1 Bartles, "Getting Gerasimov Right," 36.
5 2 Kramer, "Russian General Pitches 'Information' Operations as a Form of War."
5 3 Gerasimov, "Genshtab planiruet udary po tzentram prinyatiya reshenii, puskovym ustanovkam i 'pyatoi kolonne'."
5 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-1,  Information Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), I-1.
5 5 Felgenhauer, "A New Version of 'Gerasimov Doctrine'"; see also McDermott, "Gerasimov Unveils Russia's 'Strategy of Limited Actions'."
5 6 Fridman,  Russian "Hybrid Warfare," chap. 7.
5 7 Gerasimov, "Genshtab planiruet udary po tzentram prinyatiya reshenii, puskovym ustanovkam i 'pyatoi kolonne'."
5 8 Ibid.
5 9 Ibid.
6 0 Ibid.
6 1 Ibid.
6 2 McDermott, "Gerasimov Unveils Russia's 'Strategy of Limited Actions'."
6 3 Felgenhauer, "A New Version of 'Gerasimov Doctrine'."
6 4 Galeotti,  Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? 98-99; Trenin,  Should We Fear Russia? 27.
6 5 Sergey Lavrov, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya filosofiya Rossii" [Russian Foreign Policy Philosophy], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', no. 4, 2013, 7.
6 6 Tom Phillips, "Venezuela: Russia Urges U.S. to Abandon 'Irresponsible' Plan to Topple Maduro,"  The Guardian, May 5, 2019, .


5.Review | Watching Jim Mattis's slow slide into irrelevance
Ouch!  This one hurts.

Review | Watching Jim Mattis's slow slide into irrelevance

The Washington Post · by Lara Seligman
Lara Seligman is the Pentagon correspondent for Foreign Policy magazine.
This is the memoir America wishes Jim Mattis had written.
Former Navy fighter pilot Guy Snodgrass's account of his time as Mattis's speechwriter offers an inside look at one of the most scrutinized relationships in Washington: between President Trump and his first defense secretary, the storied ex-Marine Corps general known for his deep military experience and colorful quotes ("Always carry a knife with you, just in case there's cheesecake, or you need to stab someone in the throat"). During his nearly two-year tenure at the helm of the Pentagon, Mattis was said to be one of the "adults in the room" protecting the country from Trump's worst impulses, until he resigned in December 2018.
As a reporter covering the Pentagon during this turbulent time, I was disappointed - though not surprised - to discover that the memoir Mattis actually wrote focused on his 40-plus years in the Marine Corps. In his book, he had no problem excoriating past presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, but Trump's name appeared only four times in the text - all in the prologue. "I don't write about sitting presidents," Mattis said.
In " Holding the Line: Inside Trump's Pentagon With Secretary Mattis," Snodgrass cracks the former general's carefully crafted facade. Full of juicy anecdotes from meetings with the president and key Cabinet members that Snodgrass witnessed, the book reflects Mattis's growing frustration with an erratic boss who won't listen to him, and charts his gradual slide into irrelevance. It shows Trump making shockingly crass statements about issues of global importance behind closed doors. "Seriously, who gives a sh-- about Afghanistan?" is just one of dozens of examples that litter the book.
The portrait of Mattis that emerges is one my colleagues and I in the press corps know well: a defense secretary zealously guarding his public image at the expense of the institution he was tasked with leading. Mattis surrounded himself with current and former military officers who frequently overran the department's career civil servants, eroding the long-held American principle of civilian control of the military. And he disdained the press, directing the military services to limit communications with journalists and encouraging his assistant for public affairs, Dana White, to clamp down on information and access. "Never forget, Bus," White says, using Snodgrass's call sign, a nickname given to military aviators. "The press is the enemy."
The Pentagon press corps felt this chilling effect firsthand. Reporters found planned embeds mysteriously canceled or our names left off the invite lists for important briefings after unflattering coverage. We were frequently booted off trips with Mattis and other senior officials at the last minute. The honest public affairs officers were no longer able to provide us with accurate information; the dishonest ones openly lied. White stopped giving televised briefings - a weekly occurrence in previous administrations - in May 2018, nearly seven months before Mattis resigned.
Members of Mattis's staff, including Snodgrass, also became casualties of his souring relationship with the president. Snodgrass had uprooted his young family and sidetracked his career as a naval aviator to work for Mattis, but he was sidelined after his decision to retire from the Navy. Mattis, who never married, had an "uncompromising view on military service," Snodgrass writes; to him, service came before everything else. Snodgrass ultimately resigned after Kevin Sweeney, Mattis's chief of staff, blocked a job offer he received from another Pentagon office.
Snodgrass's on-the-record, first-person account vindicates reporting about Mattis's waning influence. Starting in the summer of 2018, the defense secretary was indeed iced out: His personal interactions with the president dropped off, and he was blindsided by major announcements like the cancellation of military exercises with South Korea and the creation of a Space Force.
It's telling that the Pentagon delayed the publication of this book by asking for extensive last-minute redactions, prompting Snodgrass to sue the department this summer. His lawyers allege that defense officials were acting out of loyalty to Mattis, who has worked hard to avoid any public conflict with Trump. Longtime officials pushed back on that narrative, telling me it is normal for the Pentagon to protect certain privileged, though not classified, conversations. The Pentagon ultimately backed down, approving the manuscript with just minor redactions in September.
The result is a nuanced, not always flattering account of Mattis's time as defense secretary, from the point of view of someone who was in his inner circle. In one of the most prophetic episodes - a briefing at the Pentagon in July 2017 after a catastrophic trip to NATO when the president refused to reaffirm the mutual defense agreement in Article 5 of the group's founding treaty - Mattis hopes to explain to Trump the value of alliances. But Trump repeatedly interrupts the presentation, exclaiming, "Our trade agreements are criminal!," offering non sequiturs that reflect his latest obsessions ("The USS Ford [the Navy's newest aircraft carrier] is completely out of control with cost overruns!") and expressing his desire for a "Victory Day" military parade.
Most ominously, the president proposes a violent way of dealing with Iran's harassing of U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf: "If surrounded by Iran again, the captain oughta blow them out of the water!" he says. The irony was not lost on me about a year later when Trump called off a retaliatory missile strike after Iran shot down an expensive U.S. drone.
The anecdote could be a metaphor for Mattis's tenure as defense secretary. Over the course of the meeting, Snodgrass sees how his boss begins to shut down, "sitting back in his chair with a distant, defeated look on his face." Mattis took the job convinced that he could make a difference, armed with like-minded allies such as then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-national security adviser H.R. McMaster, all intent on educating the president. But Mattis's early attempts to mold Trump's worldview fell on deaf ears, and his influence faded. The defense secretary became increasingly cut off from the White House, particularly after the departures of Tillerson and McMaster and the arrival of a new set of advisers.
In another revealing anecdote that serves as a bookend, Mattis hosts the new leadership team at the Pentagon on May 11, 2018. Snodgrass describes watching as Mattis gradually loses control of the room. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and then-national security adviser John Bolton continually interrupt the defense secretary mid-sentence. "I fully expected Mattis to say something about it or to reassert himself, but he never did," Snodgrass writes. As the meeting begins to peter out, Mattis thanks everyone for coming, gathers his things and walks out of the room. But when it becomes clear that Pompeo, Bolton and the other attendants have remained behind to continue their conversations, Mattis returns to hover awkwardly in the doorway.
"After another minute, Mattis slowly turned and walked back out again. Alone."
Holding the Line

Inside Trump's Pentagon With Secretary Mattis

By Guy M. Snodgrass
Sentinel. 335 pp. $27


6. Navy lieutenant, wife accused of conspiring to smuggle inflatable boats to China

Navy lieutenant, wife accused of conspiring to smuggle inflatable boats to China

foxnews.com · by Louis Casiano | Fox News

Fox News Flash top headlines for Oct. 22

Fox News Flash top headlines for Oct. 22 are here. Check out what's clicking on Foxnews.com
A  U.S. Navy officer and his wife were arrested last week in  Florida by the  FBI and naval authorities on charges that they conspired to smuggle inflatable military-style boats from the U.S. to  China, authorities said.
Lt. Fan Yang, 34, was assigned to the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Weapons School (MPRWS) at Naval Air Station Jacksonville and held a top-secret security clearance while working in a sensitive anti-submarine warfare unit, according to court documents obtained by Fox News. The documents were filed Oct. 11 in the U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida.
Sailors aboard the guided-missile cruiser USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55) conduct rigid-hull inflatable boat operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Lisa M. Holsberger)
Both are accused of conspiracy to violate federal law, specifically prohibitions on firearm possession by an alien admitted under a nonimmigrant visa and transfer of a firearm to a nonresident.

Yang's wife is also accused of submitting false and misleading export information and fraudulently trying to export illegal merchandise from the U.S. to China.
Prosecutors alleged that the couple was in contact with two Chinese nationals and were paid $205,000 to smuggle inflatable boats from September 2018 through October of this year, according to the court documents. It is illegal for a foreign national to get a weapon.
Lt. Fan Yang, left demonstrates the systems on board a P-8A Poseidon aircraft to members of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces on March 1, 2018.  (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jakoeb Vandahlen/Navy)
Investigators found more than 400 emails between Yang and Ge Songtao, a Chinese national, over the course of three years, court filings said. Songtao and another Chinese agent were arrested in Louisiana over the weekend.
Prosecutors alleged that Songtao was the chairman of Shanghai Breeze Technology Co., which did business with the Yangs, documents said.
The couple was paid through wire transfers from Shanghai Breeze to BQ Tree, LLC, a company that was run by the couple, according to the filings.
Prosecutors said Yang's wife was listed as a chief consultant for BQ Tree and he was listed as a consultant on business cards for the company. Court documents also alleged that Yang helped get Songtao a gun.
Authorities questioned a 2018 trip the Yangs took to Disney World, which he requested the time off from the Navy for. Investigators alleged that the couple instead flew to Sioux City, Iowa.
Records showed the couple purchased a meal, rented a car and brought a flight for a Chinese national to depart from an airfield in Nebraska, according to investigators.
Yang also lied to about having a foreign bank account, and he lied to the government in order to keep his security clearance, court documents said.

Yang was born in China and immigrated to the U.S. in 1999 as a teenager. He became an American citizen in 2006, according to court filings.
The Yangs are expected to appear in federal court on Wednesday.

7. U.S. Soldiers' War Crime Gets Hollywood Treatment (Movie Review)
Excerpt:
A movie like "The Kill Team" is a risky bet. Audiences haven't embraced the few films of the post-9/11 era that question U.S. military behavior. "Redacted," a 2007 Iraq war film by Brian De Palma loosely based on the Mahmudiyah massacre in which American soldiers raped an Iraqi girl and killed her family, failed to gross even $100,000, according to Box Office Mojo. The 2017 Netflix film "War Machine," starring Brad Pitt and also based on true events, was critical of the engagement in Afghanistan, but took a decidedly comic approach-one that failed to resonate with viewers and critics.
The based-on-true-events inspiration behind "The Kill Team" involves atrocities committed by a U.S. Army unit that in 2010  executed unarmed Afghan civilians for fun. A military court handed out several prison sentences, with the ringleader in the case and highest-ranking soldier charged sent to prison for life.

U.S. Soldiers' War Crime Gets Hollywood Treatment

WSJ · by R.T. Watson and Jessica Donati
Nat Wolff plays a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan considering whether to blow the whistle on his unit in 'The Kill Team.'  Photo: A24
By
R.T. Watson and
Jessica Donati
While the time U.S. soldiers spend serving in America's wars is rarely glamorous, Hollywood's depiction of it often is.
That's been especially true in the narrow canon of Hollywood films that have explored the war in Afghanistan, a conflict that has been raging since the U.S. invaded after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Nearly every big-screen portrayal of the war has celebrated feats of American bravery, like "Lone Survivor," starring Mark Wahlberg and "12 Strong" with Chris Hemsworth.
And although the war is the longest-running U.S. conflict on foreign soil, "The Kill Team," which independent distributor A24 is releasing in select theaters and on demand Friday, stands out as Hollywood's first cinematic recount of the conflict in the style of the Vietnam War films like 1986's "Platoon." Those movies sought to spotlight the brutality U.S. soldiers sometimes inflicted on innocent civilians during the protracted Southeast Asian conflict.
A movie like "The Kill Team" is a risky bet. Audiences haven't embraced the few films of the post-9/11 era that question U.S. military behavior. "Redacted," a 2007 Iraq war film by Brian De Palma loosely based on the Mahmudiyah massacre in which American soldiers raped an Iraqi girl and killed her family,  failed to gross even $100,000, according to Box Office Mojo. The 2017  Netflix film "War Machine," starring Brad Pitt and also based on true events, was critical of the engagement in Afghanistan, but took a decidedly comic approach-one that failed to resonate with  viewers and critics.
The based-on-true-events inspiration behind "The Kill Team" involves atrocities committed by a U.S. Army unit that in 2010  executed unarmed Afghan civilians for fun. A military court handed out several prison sentences, with the ringleader in the case and highest-ranking soldier charged sent to prison for life.
The film's writer and director, Dan Krauss, says his film isn't intended as a criticism of American soldiers or the U.S. military, but an opportunity for honest discussion about what happens under a failure in leadership. The antagonist who orchestrates the killings in "The Kill Team" is a character Mr. Krauss hopes audiences empathize with to some degree. (The filmmaker changed the names of the soldiers from the real-life episode.)
"The soldiers that we send into war are young men and women who are vulnerable to influence and can easily lose their moral bearings," Mr. Krauss says. "I think if we're going to talk about the cost of war in terms of blood and treasure, we should also talk about the cost of war in terms of morality."
"The Kill Team" is primarily told from the point of view of its young protagonist, U.S. Army Pvt. Andrew Briggman, played by Nat Wolff. A moral crisis ensues when his new superior, Sgt. Deeks, played by Alexander Skarsgård, convinces soldiers in the unit in joining him in creating manufactured combat opportunities that help to justify the execution of innocent Afghan civilians.
Pvt. Briggman finds himself torn between loyalty to his unit, the fear of  the reprisal whistleblowing might bring and uncertainty about his own convictions.
Dan Krauss directs Mr. Wolff in the set of 'The Kill Team.'  Photo: A24
"The movie really is designed as a walls-closing-in-style thriller where the tension comes not from combat and warfare and explosions and guns, but from the sideways glances of soldiers on the island of security, the FOB [base], in the middle of this desolate landscape," Mr. Krauss says.
Mr. Krauss was already familiar with the true story behind "The Kill Team." He directed a 2013 documentary of the same name that examined the trials and tribulations faced by the real soldier who would later provide the basis for the Pvt. Briggman character.
The new, fictionalized version is unlike other feature films about the war in Afghanistan, including another recently completed movie, Millennium Films's "The Outpost." That film stars Orlando Bloom and was directed by military veteran Rod Lurie. It tells the real-life story of 53 U.S. soldiers who in 2009 battled 300 to 400 Taliban fighters at the remote Combat Outpost Keating, near the Afghan border with Pakistan.
The most lucrative movies about the war thus far have followed a similar narrative design by zeroing in on extraordinary tales of heroism and camaraderie.
As economics and logistics are paramount considerations when making a movie, producing a pro-military film that celebrates American soldiers' grit can be an easier pitch both to financiers and would-be collaborators in the government. "Lone Survivor" and "12 Strong" also showed these types of films might make more fiscal sense, after delivering decent box office results. The movies respectively grossed $125.1 million and $45.8 million in the U.S. and Canada. They were widely released by major distributors.
Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, Vietnam veteran and professor emeritus at Boston University, says the war in Afghanistan appears to have largely vanished from the collective consciousness of many Americans. (The exception has been spikes of interest surrounding President Trump's occasional discussions of  making a deal with the Taliban, he says.)
The number of soldiers deployed and lost to combat perhaps offers insight into how the American consciousness has been affected differently by Afghanistan and Vietnam. About 3.4 million soldiers went to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, and  some 58,000 died, according to official counts. The war in Afghanistan has produced  more than 2,400 service-member deaths.
Mr. Bacevich doesn't believe the tragic events depicted in "The Kill Team" are anything new. "I have no doubt that probably comparable episodes of misconduct have occurred far more frequently than either we know about or are willing to admit," he says.
Chris Thielenhaus, a platoon leader who served in Iraq at the time of the Mahmudiyah massacre, says Hollywood productions that highlight wrongdoing, when accurate, can power debate about the impact of war and the scars it leaves on those that serve.
"I think you have to draw attention to the dark side of these conflicts," he says. "Otherwise people and policy makers can get lulled into a sense that clean and morally unambiguous wars are possible."
Write to R.T. Watson at  rt.watson@wsj.com and Jessica Donati at  jessica.donati@wsj.com
Copyright ©2019 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ · by R.T. Watson and Jessica Donati

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Phone: 202-573-8647
Web Site:  www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD's new podcast, Foreign Podicy
 
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."