Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Hyun-chong expresses concerns over Japan's export restrictions against South Korea in a televised national addressing at Cheong Wa Dae, Aug. 28. / Yonhap
By Yi Whan-woo
Is South Korea outspoken when it comes to colliding issues involving other stakeholders in the Korean Peninsula?
The answer appears to be "yes" for its two security partners - the United States and Japan - and "no" for North Korea, China and Russia.
Under the Moon Jae-in administration, the motivations for these answers are often influenced by the political interest of Moon's supporters, who are characterized as pro-China, anti-Japan, and open toward cross-border reconciliation.
Take the cases of economic retaliation from China and Japan for example.
Bejing, Seoul's largest trading partner, targeted South Korean businesses and boycotted their products over the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile system to the South.
True, the THAAD deployment was during the administration of Moon's predecessor Park Geun-hye.
Even so, South Korea has remained relatively remained low key toward China versus the U.S. and Japan, according to Shin Yul, a political science professor at Myongji University.
"This is because anti-Japan campaigns can woo voters in general regardless of the governments," he said. "Anti-U.S. campaigns can be controversial. But they can also work to some extent for progressive-minded voters as long as they do not cross the line."
Japan has been expanding export restrictions on goods to South Korean companies over a dispute on wartime forced labor, apparently exploiting Seoul's 54-year trade deficit with Japan that reflects its reliance on Japanese technology.
South Korea has responded by embracing a tit-for-tat strategy - namely axing Tokyo from its list of trusted trade partners.
Seoul also decided to end a Korea-Japan military intelligence-sharing pact, which the U.S. saw as critical for a three-way security alliance and accordingly, expressed its disappointment repeatedly.
Such disappointment came along with a U.S. move to hike South Korea's payments in upcoming defense cost-sharing talks.
Given the circumstance, Cheong Wa Dae's announcement Aug. 30 to seek the early return of U.S. military bases here was seen as a sign of Seoul's "uneasiness" over their criticism of the dissolution of the Seoul-Tokyo military pact.
Meanwhile, the Moon administration has not been raising its voice against North Korea and Russia over conflicting issues as much as it did to Japan and the U.S. recently.
For instance, Cheong Wa Dae did not lodge a protest to Pyongyang over its latest insults against Moon.
It expressed concern over the North's resumption of rocket launches, but not immediately after the launches resumed in May.
"It is understandable to some extent considering the U.S.-North Korea denuclearization dialogue. But Seoul should have rebuked Pyongyang when the latter insulted Moon. This is against Pyongyang's move to become a normal state," said Park Won-gon, an international relations professor at Handong Global University.
Seoul lodged a complaint with Russia over the latter's airspace intrusion in July. But it did not take any further action when Moscow flipped its words later and denied the intrusion.
