In this issue:

• NLRB Decision makes Union Organizing Easier
• Remote Work as an Accommodation
• Federal Protection for Pregnant Workers
• AI In Human Resources
• Seventh Circuit to Reconsider Complaint on Religious Accommodations
• Proud Moments to Share

Remote Work as an Accommodation in the Post-COVID Workplace

By Alan E. Seneczko, Esq.

There was a time in the not too distant past when working from home was generally not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2008). In fact, the Seventh Circuit was quite emphatic in its position on this issue:

“[A]n employer is not required to accommodate a disability by allowing the worker with a disability to work, by himself, without supervision, at home . . . where their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced. . . [I]t would take a very extraordinary case for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the employer’s failure to allow the employee to work at home.”

Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995). However, like so many other things, technology and COVID have changed all that.

Attention Employers: New Federal Law Protects Pregnant Workers

By Anthony J. Caruso, Jr., Esq.

On June 27, 2023, the new federal law, Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) went into effect. 

Who is covered under the new law?

Private and public sector employers with at least 15 employees, Congress, Federal agencies, employment agencies, and labor organizations. Note: employees and job applicants are covered by this law.

What does the law require employers to do?

Covered employers must provide “reasonable accommodations” to a worker’s known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions unless the accommodation will cause the employer an undue hardship.

Does this law replace other federal, state, or local law as to pregnancy?

NO! This law applies only to accommodations. Other laws provide different protections to the pregnant worker (Family and Medical Leave Act) and as to illegal termination and/or discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Americans with Disabilities Act). In fact, more than 30 states and cities have laws that provide accommodations to pregnant workers.

Seventh Circuit Reverses Course In The Case Of A Teacher Fired For Objecting, Based On His Christian Faith, To Using Transexual Student’s Preferred Pronoun

By James B. Sherman, Esq.

Our readers may recall my June 30 E-Alert covering several significant Supreme Court decisions issued that day, including the ruling in Groff v. DeJoy. In Groff, the Court “clarified” (a better term might be “increased”) the burdens employers are required to endure before they may lawfully refuse a request for religious accommodations based on “undue hardship.” Prior to this decision, I wrote in our June 1^st Client Alert about the case of Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Co. Kluge involved a Christian high school teacher in Indiana, who was discharged for refusing, for religious reasons, to address a transsexual student by the student’s preferred pronoun. The trial court dismissed Kluge’s lawsuit, as did the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, initially. However, when the SCOTUS agreed to review the standard to be applied to religious accommodations, in Groff, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered its own decision.  I predicted then that the eventual decision in Groff might well impact the outcome in Kluge’s case. Fast forward to July 28 where the Seventh Circuit reversed its April decision and overturned the trial court’s dismissal order, breathing new life into Kluge’s religious discrimination lawsuit. The case has now been sent back to the trial court to address Kluge’s claims, applying the higher accommodation burdens articulated in Groff.

The Kruge case is drawing national attention because it pits an employee’s religion against the rights of a transexual student. The school had previously convinced the trial court that its objective of providing students with a “safe and welcoming” environment, could not be accomplished without compelling teachers to use students’ preferred pronouns. Therefore, the school argued that accommodating Kruge’s religious objection to being forced to use a pronoun that conflicted with a student’s gender at birth, posed an “undue hardship” that excused its refusal to accommodate his religion. The outcome of this case is as yet undetermined, but under the standard in Groff this much is certain – if the school is going to continue to insist that it cannot accommodate Kruge’s religious beliefs, it will be hard pressed to put forth a solid – more than de minimus – argument as to why it poses an undue hardship. It is notable that before he was forced to resign Kruge had actually worked out a solution mutually agreeable to both the student and school … until a minority of students and faculty objected.