Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“A vote is like a rifle: its usefulness depends upon the character of the user.”
- Theodore Roosevelt

“If democratic power-sharing is a potent form of freedom, accepting an election loss may be the ultimate demonstration of how free you want to be. History is littered with fascist leaders who have rigged elections and tortured or killed critics, but their regimes are remarkably short-lived - especially considering the obsession these men usually have with holding power. Many wind up dead or in prison, and almost none leave behind stable regime. Western democracies, on the other hand, are among the most enduring and prosperous political systems in history. They seem to be able to transfer power almost indefinitely, which further bolsters their economies and cements their alliances.”
- Sebastian Junger, Freedom

"Stick to what’s in front of you – idea, action, utterance."
- Marcus Aurelius


                   

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 1 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Taiwan hits out at Hong Kong​'s vanishing freedoms, vows to protect its sovereignty
3. Why Does China Own So Much of Ukraine?
4. Palau slams U.N. for blocking Taiwan delegates from attending Ocean Conference
5. House Republicans push legislation to require Biden administration to detail the status of major arm sales to Taiwan
6. TikTok says it's putting new limits on Chinese workers' access to U.S. user data
7. Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Changes What We Know About State Power
8. How the Russian Media Spread False Claims About Ukrainian Nazis
9. How to win Ukraine’s long war
10. Musk’s tech put to deadly weapon effect in Ukraine
11. The Maritime Counterinsurgency Project Begins
12.  Pentagon too Slow to Recognize Risk and too Fast to Give Away Needed Capability Permanently
13. China lashes out against ‘Asian version of NATO’
14. Taking on Putin through porn: how Russians are finding out the truth about Ukraine
15. China is doubling down on its bid to challenge the dollar's global dominance. Analysts lay out why it's unlikely to succeed.
16. Russia's messages with missiles tell West to back off
17. Meet The Shadowy Ukrainian Unit That Sabotages Targets Inside Russia
18. How a Nation's Social Condition Relates to Its Global Standing
19. James Stejskal: The Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle
20. How to Break Russia’s Black Sea Blockade
21.  None of the US Air Force’s linguists spoke Ukrainian. Then Russia invaded.
22. The Truth About the Evolution of Russian Military Doctrine
23. The 20-Somethings Who Help the 70-Somethings Run Washington



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 1 (PUTIN'S WAR)


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 1
Jul 1, 2022 - Press ISW
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
July 1, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin is likely setting conditions for crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin proposed an amendment to federal laws on Russian Armed Forces supply matters to the Russian State Duma on June 30, that would introduce “special measures in the economic sphere” obliging Russian businesses (regardless of ownership) to supply Russian special military and counterterrorist operations.[1] The amendment would prohibit Russian businesses from refusing to accept state orders for special military operations and allow the Kremlin to change employee contracts and work conditions, such as forcing workers to work during the night or federal holidays. The Kremlin noted in the amendment’s description that the ongoing special military operation in Ukraine exposed supply shortages, specifically materials needed to repair military equipment, and stated that Russian officials need to “concentrate their efforts in certain sectors of the economy." Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely mobilizing the Russian economy and industry to sustain the ongoing war effort, but has not yet taken parallel measures to mobilize Russian manpower on a large scale.
Russian authorities are likely taking measures to integrate the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) directly into the Russian energy system, contradicting previous Russian statements that the Zaporizhzhia NPP would sell electricity to Ukraine. Olga Kosharna, an independent expert on nuclear energy, stated on June 30 that Russia’s Rosatom (Russian state-owned nuclear energy corporation) employees have been taking measures at the Zaporizhzhia NPP to potentially divert its energy to the Russian energy grid.[2] Kosharna added that Russian forces have been working in Chonhard (southern Kherson Oblast) to repair the main energy transmission line that runs into Crimea, which Ukrainian forces had destroyed in 2015 following Russia’s seizure of the transmission line after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Representatives of Ukraine’s Ukrenergo electricity transmission operator had stated as recently as late May that it would be physically impossible for Russia to divert Ukrainian electricity to Russia following the destruction of those transmission lines.[3] Russian forces are likely seeking to ensure physical access to transmission lines in order to support the direct flow of Ukrainian energy into Russia, which may explain some of the military activities observed in recent weeks in the Russian-occupied portions of Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities had indicated on May 18 that while the Zaporizhzhia NPP would work for Russia, it would continue to sell energy to Ukraine, as ISW reported.[4] However, it is becoming increasingly evident that Russian authorities are taking measures to integrate Ukrainian economic assets directly into the Russian economy. Reports that Russian forces may be preparing a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP could be part of this Russian effort--Moscow might use such a false flag attack to accuse Ukrainian authorities of mismanaging nuclear assets and justify taking full control of them and their output.[5]
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Lysychansk and conducted offensive operations to the south and southwest of the city.
  • Russian forces have likely not yet reached the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on the ground but are denying Ukrainian forces use of it by continuing artillery and airstrikes against remaining Ukrainian positions along the road.
  • Russian forces focused on regrouping and improving their tactical positions north of Slovyansk.
  • Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast and continued shelling Ukrainian positions north of Kharkiv City.
  • Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes along the Southern Axis.
  • Russian authorities continue efforts to expand the pool of recruits available to fight in Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
  • Mobilization and force generation efforts;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Click here to enlarge the map.
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to enlarge the map.

Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in settlements south and southwest of Lysychansk in an effort to encircle the city and sever Ukrainian logistics routes on June 1. Head of the Luhansk Oblast Administration Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces continued to launch assaults on the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and secured their positions in the northwestern and southeastern parts of the plant.[6] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces seized the Lysychansk Gelatin Factory, but Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance-in-force against the plant.[7] Russian forces attacked Topolivka, the northern part of Vovchoyarivka, and Maloryazantseve, and are interdicting Ukrainian lines of communication along the Topolivka-Lysychansk road.[8] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that fighting is ongoing in Bila Hora, just southeast of Lysychansk, which if true, would indicate that Ukrainian forces continue to defend the western bank of the Siverskyi Donetsk river.[9] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces established a bridgehead from Synetskyi in the area of the Lysychansk helipad, situated in the northeastern part of the city, and began advancing southwest to the city center.[10] Miroshnik additionally claimed that Russian forces conducted operations near the Lysychansk Rubber Factory in the southeast part of the city. Russian sources continued to issue numerous reports of a successful Russian river crossing near Kreminna, but ISW cannot independently verify such claims with available satellite imagery.[11] Chechen fighters published a video claiming to have seized Pryvillya and reached Novodruzhensk on July 1.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported shelling in Pryvillya, however.[13]
Russian forces maintained artillery fire and launched airstrikes along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway, but have not completely severed the road as of July 1.[14] Haidai reported that Russian forces have not reached the T1302 on the ground, likely due to Ukrainian resistance in settlements along the highway.[15] Both Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces shelled Ukrainian positions in the vicinity of Bakhmut and along the T1302.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to improve their tactical positions to support the advance towards Pokrovske and launched airstrikes on Pokrovske and Klynove.[17] Rybar claimed that Wagner Group forces attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses in the Bakhmut direction, but Ukrainian officials did not report active ground assault east of the city on July 1.[18]
Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations north of Slovyansk on July 1 and instead focused on regrouping troops, maintaining artillery fire, and improving their tactical positions.[19] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov stated that Russian forces are regrouping units, likely in an effort to resume an offensive on Slovyansk.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces intensified unspecified hostilities in the Lyman area and shelled Siversk, likely in an effort to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Siversk area that run to Lysychansk.[21] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Air Force maintenance base near Kunie, situated 22km north of Izyum and adjacent to a connecting road that leads to Russian GLOCs to Izyum.[22] Other geolocated footage also showed separate Ukrainian strikes on Russian supply stockpiles and vehicles in the same area north of Izyum.[23]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions around Kharkiv City and did not conduct offensive operations north or northeast of the city on July 1.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have concentrated units of the Western Military District (WMD) around Kharkiv City to defend previously-occupied positions and maintain systematic artillery fire.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces launched an airstrike on Mospanove, approximately 55km southeast of Kharkiv City, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area.[26] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov stated that Ukrainian forces have not lost any liberated territories around Kharkiv City since their liberation in May. His claim is likely untrue; ISW has assessed that Russian forces recaptured Ternova and Izbytske in June.[27]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes across the Southern Axis on July 1. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian Tu-22 aircraft launched three Kh-22 cruise missiles at the Serhiivka resort village of the Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky district of Odesa Oblast and struck a residential area, killing 16 people and injuring 38.[28] Russian forces also conducted artillery strikes on various areas of Kherson, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[29] Head of the Mykolaiv Oblast Administration Vitaly Kim reported that Russian forces fired 12 missiles at Mykolaiv Oblast over the course of the day on July 1.[30]
Mobilization and force generation efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian military leadership continued efforts to expand the pool of servicemembers available to fight in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian Eastern Military District is conducting an “active conscription campaign” and opened a “recruitment center for the mobilization reserve” at the points of permanent deployment of the 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 5th Combined Arms Army in Vladivostok and Sergeevka.[31] It is unclear whether the Ukrainian General Staff is referring to a volunteer recruitment drive, a call-up of conscripts, or a call-up of reservists. Authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are reportedly collecting recent graduates of the DNR's Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for immediate deployment without requisite documentation.[32] Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov additionally claimed that Syrian troops are stationed in Melitopol alongside Russian occupation elements, which indicates that Russian authorities are continuing to leverage foreign combat reserves.[33]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian authorities continued to set conditions for the economic and legal integration of occupied territories into Russian systems on July 1. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities in occupied Kherson Oblast closed the Kherson branch of Ukrposhta (the Ukrainian national postal service) as part of the overall effort to force Ukrainian enterprises in occupied areas to convert to the ruble.[34] Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov similarly stated that Russian authorities are ”planting” rubles in Melitopol to facilitate economic annexation of businesses.[35] Russian authorities are also continuing ”passportization” measures in Melitopol and Luhansk Oblast.[36]
Russian authorities are also taking measures to streamline cooperation between the Russian legal system and legislative bodies in occupied areas. Russian Federal Penitentiary Service Director Arkady Gostev signed a memorandum of understanding for law enforcement with the Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Roman Vedmedenko, which will facilitate further integration of the LNR into Russia’s criminal law and prison system.[37] Such measures are part of a wider campaign by Russian authorities to set frameworks of cooperation between occupied Ukrainian areas and Russian political elements in order to shape the development of occupied areas in a way that resembles Russian structures and is conducive to direct integration.
[34] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/30/rosiyany-navmysno-stvoryuyut-gumanitarnu-kryzu-na-hersonshhyni-aby-zmusyty-otrymuvaty-ukrayincziv-vorozhi-pasporty/
[36] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/220; https://telegra dot ph/V-Luganske-otkryt-punkt-vydachi-pasportov-Rossijskoj-Federacii-07-01
[37] https://telegra dot ph/Ministerstvo-vnutrennih-del-LNR-i-FSIN-RF-podpisali-memorandum-o-vzaimoponimanii-07-01



2. Taiwan hits out at Hong Kong​'s vanishing freedoms, vows to protect its sovereignty


In terms of the future of the PRC's strategy toward Taiwan, Hong Kong might be viewed as the CCP's major strategic mistake that has led to the hardening of resolve of Taiwan. It is hard to imagine any future Taiwanese political party that would accept one country two systems after what happened to Hong Kong. The CCP's ability to conduct effective subversion in Taiwan has probably been set back for generations.

Taiwan hits out at Hong Kong​'s vanishing freedoms, vows to protect its sovereignty

The country's leaders say China's promise of autonomy for the city under 'one country, two systems' has failed.

By Hwang Chun-mei for RFA Mandarin and Amelia Loi, Cheryl Tung and Wu Hoi Man for RFA Cantonese
2022.07.01

Taiwan's Premier Su Tseng-chang speaks during a session of the parliament in Taipei in this file photo.
AFP
Democratic Taiwan on Friday said freedom had "vanished" in Hong Kong, as concerns were raised internationally over a political crackdown in the city after just 25 years of Chinese rule.

"It's only been 25 years, and in the past the promise was 50 years of no change," Taiwan's premier Su Tseng-chang told journalists as Hong Kong marked the 25th anniversary of the 1997 handover to Chinese rule.

"Freedom and democracy have vanished," he said, adding that Taiwan, which made a peaceful democratic transition in the 1990s after decades of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang (KMT), must protect its own way of life in the face of Chinese territorial claims.

"We also know that we must hold fast to Taiwan's sovereignty, freedom and democracy," Su said, in a reference to Beijing's insistence that the island "unify" with China, despite never having been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and despite widespread public opposition to the idea.

"China's so-called 'one country, two systems' has simply not stood up to the test," Su said of the arrangement touted by Beijing as a success in Hong Kong, and as a possible pathway to a takeover of Taiwan.

Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said CCP rule had led to the end of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong.

In a statement, the council hit out at China's imposition of a draconian national security law "to govern Hong Kong in a coercive manner, restrict the basic human rights of Hong Kong’s people, and to imprison democracy advocates, silencing the news media and prompting the collapse of civil society."

It also said recent changes to the city's electoral system to ensure only "patriots" can hold public office "is even more contrary to goal of universal suffrage and the expectations of Hong Kong citizens."

"Democracy, human rights, freedom, and rule of law have seriously regressed in Hong Kong, compared with 25 years ago," the MAC said, dismissing Beijing's claims that the pro-democracy movement had been instigated by foreign governments.

"Taiwan adheres to a free, democratic and constitutional government, that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, that sovereignty cannot be invaded and annexed, and that the future of the Republic of China and Taiwan must be decided by the people of Taiwan," the statement said.

"Taiwan will continue to safeguard universal values, democratic systems and ways of life, stand side by side with the international community, and firmly defend democracy," it said.

The statements from Taipei came after CCP leader Xi Jinping used the phrase "one country, two systems" more than 20 times during his speech on Friday marking the 25th anniversary of Chinese rule over Hong Kong, saying China's tougher political grip on the city in the wake of the 2019 protest movement had enabled it to "rise again from the ashes."

MAC spokesman Chiu Chui-cheng called on China not to keep deceiving itself about the success of its policies in Hong Kong.

"We solemnly urge [Beijing] to give the people back the democracy, freedoms and human rights that are their due," Chiu said.

Taiwanese political scientist Wu Rwei-ren said Xi wants to package the 25th anniversary as a kind of second handover.

"The legal basis for one country, two systems was the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration [setting out the terms of the handover]," Wu told RFA.

"By 2014, Xi Jinping's regime had declared that it wouldn't recognize [the treaty], saying it was a historical document with no meaning," he said. "In this way, they redefined one country, two systems as a purely internal concept."

"The basis for [Hong Kong's economic and social] achievements was the original political system, which has been destroyed by Xi Jinping," Wu said.

"He's now saying that all sources of chaos have been eradicated, Hong Kong has returned to stability, and that everyone can start working hard to improve the economy," he said. "But the institutional basis for that has been destroyed."

Wu said even the Taiwanese business community, which has typically been happy to overlook the CCP's worst failings in the pursuit of greater profits, is now getting out of China and Hong Kong.

"This isn't about ideology; it's about the very practical aspects of money," Wu said. "These people were once more enthusiastic about making money than they were about their own country."

"They invested huge amounts in China because it was profitable, but now, faced with various deteriorating factors, they are getting out of China fast," he said.

Meanwhile, invitations were circulating overseas for people to attend a "Funeral for Hong Kong's Lost Freedoms" in cities across the U.S., including New York, Washington and San Francisco.

Hong Kong protest rallies were also planned in the U.K., Canada and Japan.

A participant at the New York rally who gave only the nickname A Wai said the protest was over the CCP's failure to deliver on its promises.

"We're only halfway through the 50 years during which Hong Kong was supposedly not going to change, and everyone can now see through the lie that is one country, two systems," A Wai told RFA.

"That's why we chose July 1 to stand up ... Hong Kong people are still angry about the crackdowns on protesters on June 12, 2019, July 21, 2019 and Aug. 31, 2019, and we can express all of that on July 1," he said.

Former 2014 Occupy Central leader Alex Chow said everyone will be wearing black -- the color of the 2019 protest movements, but also the color of mourning in some cultures -- and that protesters would lay funeral wreaths to signal the death of Hong Kong's freedoms.

"The situation in Hong Kong and the mainland is full of turmoil and tears," Chow told RFA. "Behind the facade of prosperity, there is a lot of political in-fighting, and Hong Kong is one of the places where sacrifices are being made."

"That's why Hong Kongers overseas who have enough freedom to do so ... feel the need to come out," he said.

In the U.K., protesters plan to march across several cities over the weekend, with a memorial service planned on Piccadilly Circus on Friday for Leung Kin-fai, who committed suicide after stabbing a police officer non-fatally on July 1, 2021.

Former ruling Conservative Party leader Ian Duncan Smith told the House of Commons that he had called a parliamentary debate on Hong Kong to "commemorate the process and the destruction that has taken place since the original signing of the Joint Declaration."

Shadow foreign affairs minister Fabian Hamilton said the Joint Declaration "is no longer respected by the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities."

"The UK has a moral duty to uphold the treaty, but has not done nearly enough," he said, calling on the British government to follow the U.S.' lead and sanction Hong Kong and Chinese officials linked to the crackdown.

"With the passing of the national security law, the sham so-called election of chief executive John Lee and his promises of further, rather disturbing legislation, we face the reality that Hong Kongers are at the mercy of the long arm of the Chinese state, and have no means to effect real change in their city, or to choose their own leadership, as was always promised," Hamilton said.

Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

3. Why Does China Own So Much of Ukraine?

Interesting geopolitics. I had no idea but this makes sense from China's perspective. Another cautionary tale. Let's recognize Chinese strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it (with information and a superior form of political warfare).


Why Does China Own So Much of Ukraine?
Other countries should be careful about allowing sales of farmland to hostile powers.
By Elisabeth Braw
June 29, 2022 6:40 pm ET






WSJ · by Elisabeth Braw
Other countries should be careful about allowing sales of farmland to hostile powers.
By
Elisabeth Braw
June 29, 2022 6:40 pm ET

An employee stands near a production line that processes pork in Zhengzhou, China, April 13, 2017.
Photo: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is causing global hunger and galloping food prices, and future supply-chain disruptions will bring more such misery. Many countries are realizing that they should grow more food, but they’ve sold much of their best land to China, which uses it to feed its own population. A few years ago, China bought nearly one-tenth of Ukraine’s arable farmland. Countries should start screening those seeking to buy their farmland, as they already do with prospective purchasers of sensitive technology.
“There can be no effective solution to the global food crisis without reintegrating Ukraine’s food production, as well as the food and fertilizer produced by Russia, into world markets,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said on June 24, warning that the world faces multiple famines this year and worse in 2023. But Ukrainian grains and other foods won’t be able to enter the world market any time soon because the sea route remains blocked by Russia. Ukraine is sending some grain to world markets via rail to Poland and Romania, but doing so is laborious and expensive. Before the war, around 90% of Ukraine’s grain was exported via its sea ports.
Over the past few years, Chinese buyers have bought farmland in countries ranging from the U.S. and France to Vietnam. In 2013 Hong Kong-based food giant WH Group bought Smithfield, America’s largest pork producer, and more than 146,000 acres of Missouri farmland. In the same year, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps bought 9% of Ukraine’s famously fertile farmland, equal to 5% of the country’s total territory, with a 50-year lease. (In 2020, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Chinese company over human-rights abuses.) Between 2011 and 2020, China bought nearly seven million hectares of farmland around the world. Firms from the U.K. bought nearly two million hectares, while U.S. and Japanese firms bought less than a million hectares.
“What matters most is what the Chinese do with the land,” said J. Peter Pham, a longtime Africa analyst who served as the Trump administration’s envoy to Africa’s Great Lakes region. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “they got approval from the previous regime to take 100,000 hectares to produce for palm oil,” the cultivation of which causes damaging deforestation. “And in Zimbabwe, they’re producing beef for export back to China, which is neither a sustainable nor wise use of farmland in a country where people go hungry for want of basic staples.”
Loss of arable land is becoming calamitous for countries better-positioned than Zimbabwe. By April, mostly as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale food prices had risen 18% from a year earlier. That’s the largest 12-month increase in nearly five decades, Bloomberg reports. In France, wheat prices have doubled since 2020. And China is likely to want to buy more foreign land. It has 21% of the world’s population but only 7% of productive farmland.
Ukraine’s fate highlights the peril of having another country in charge of a chunk of one’s territory. While Kyiv might be wary of an ally of Russia controlling its land, it also has to worry that China could divest its holdings abruptly, thereby exacerbating Ukraine’s economic woes.
A bill sponsored by Rep. Dan Newhouse (R., Wash.), currently before the House Appropriations Committee, proposes to ban Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean companies from buying American farmland. It follows a bill introduced in 2020 by Republican Sens. Jim Inhofe and Thom Tillis, which would require screening of farmland acquisitions by foreign entities.
Such scrutiny should be accompanied by efforts to buy land back from China and any other strategic rivals. Allowing hostile powers to own farmland has become too risky. Demand for arable land will grow as the climate changes. At the same time, geopolitical confrontation will cause more disrupted food-supply chains. Every hectare counts.
Ms. Braw is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8


4. Palau slams U.N. for blocking Taiwan delegates from attending Ocean Conference


Good for Palau to stand up to the bullies at the UN.   The rest of the international community should follow suit. This is why we have to be aggressive at the UN to prevent the UN from bending to Chinese influence.

Palau slams U.N. for blocking Taiwan delegates from attending Ocean Conference
Reuters · by Reuters
LISBON, July 1 (Reuters) - A representative from the tiny Pacific nation of Palau hit out at the United Nations on Friday for not allowing Taiwanese nationals to be part of its delegation list at the Ocean Conference in Lisbon.
"The U.N. has excluded the 23 million people of Taiwan from the conversation," the delegate said at the conference's closing ceremony. "They were not given badges and were not allowed to be part of our delegation simply because they hold Taiwanese passports.
"We view this as a violation of our sovereign rights...ocean issues are global issues and we call on all of us to work together without discrimination."
Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, is not a member of the U.N. and its citizens are unable to attend U.N. events as representatives of Taiwan, which is largely excluded from international organisations that have China as a member.
A U.S. delegate said it was a "long-standing practice that each member state can decide the composition of its delegation", adding that it was up to Palau and Tuvalu, which also saw its Taiwanese members blocked from attending, to decide whether or not to include people from Taiwan.
"No credential committee should have pressed them to remove those individuals from their delegations," the U.S. delegate said.
Tuvalu Foreign Minister Simon Kofe withdrew from the conference after China challenged the accreditation of three Taiwanese delegates included in Tuvalu's delegation, Radio New Zealand reported on Monday. read more
After Palau's intervention, the Chinese representative said it was "regrettable" the Taiwan "issue" was brought up, adding: "Taiwan is part of China and cannot possibly attend a U.N. conference."
Reporting by Catarina Demony; Editing by David Gregorio
Reuters · by Reuters


5. House Republicans push legislation to require Biden administration to detail the status of major arm sales to Taiwan

Excerpts:

The bill, introduced on Friday by California Rep. Young Kim and Texas Rep. Michael McCaul, comes as members of Congress are looking to understand what the current environment -- particularly the demand for weapons into Ukraine and mounting pressures on US supply chains -- means for the delivery timeline of weapons to Taiwan.
In total there are hundreds of millions of dollars of arms sales to Taiwan that Congress wants updates on. The hope is to "pull back the curtain" on what is contributing to the delay of US arms arriving in Taiwan and come up with solutions to expedite deliveries, one congressional aide explained.


First on CNN: House Republicans push legislation to require Biden administration to detail the status of major arm sales to Taiwan
CNN · by Kylie Atwood, CNN
(CNN)Republican House lawmakers are introducing legislation that would require the Biden administration to provide Congress with a detailed report on the status of major arms sales to Taiwan, an effort that comes as there is a mounting sense of urgency about getting Taiwan the weapons it would need to fend off a potential Chinese invasion.
The bill, introduced on Friday by California Rep. Young Kim and Texas Rep. Michael McCaul, comes as members of Congress are looking to understand what the current environment -- particularly the demand for weapons into Ukraine and mounting pressures on US supply chains -- means for the delivery timeline of weapons to Taiwan.
In total there are hundreds of millions of dollars of arms sales to Taiwan that Congress wants updates on. The hope is to "pull back the curtain" on what is contributing to the delay of US arms arriving in Taiwan and come up with solutions to expedite deliveries, one congressional aide explained.
The Republicans have also grown frustrated by the lack of answers the administration has provided to them when asked about the status of certain deliveries, congressional aides said.
"The Arms Exports Delivery Solutions Act ensures that defense equipment already purchased from the U.S. by Taiwan and other allies in the region are tracked and delivered as efficiently as possible as the Chinese Communist Party eyes further aggression. I will do all I can to ensure the United States remains a leader on the world stage," Kim said.
Read More
McCaul cited pronounced concerns as China has ramped up its aggression in the region, particularly aimed at Taiwan.
"Delayed deliveries of Congressionally-approved sales to Taiwan are undermining our ability to deter an attack from China. This is incredibly concerning as China ramps up its belligerence towards Taiwan," McCaul said.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a new sense of urgency when it comes to getting US weapons to Taiwan and US allies in the region. While State Department officials have said that weapons sales to Taiwan have not been impacted by the war in Ukraine, there are mounting concerns about the pressure that the war is putting on the US defense industrial complex.
"The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a major war, and there are now consequences for production and deliveries and strategic decisions. Weapons don't grow on trees. We are sure the administration is talking about this immense challenge, we need to see what the real facts are and what the decisions are," a second congressional aide said.
The new legislation would require the secretary of defense and the secretary of state to report to congress by March of 2023 with details including: the estimated delivery dates for arms transfer of $25 million or more to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand that have been approved by congress since October 2017, but not yet completed. The departments will also have to explain any delivery delays and lay out how the transfers could be expedited. Finally, the report will be required to describe what the interagency is doing to support the operational capabilities so the systems and specific actions to expedite deliveries to Taiwan.
The reason that the members are looking for an update on arms sales to multiple partners in the region, not just Taiwan, is because they view the US alliance with those countries as being key in shaping how the US would respond to any potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said this week that Chinese President Xi Jinping "quite clearly sees reunification of Taiwan as a goal" and that he is planning for the possibility of taking Taiwan by military force, even if he is not intending to do it that way. Earlier this year Haines said that the threat to Taiwan between now and 2030 is "acute."
Members of Congress recognize that the way the US responded to the Russian invasion into Ukraine could not be replicated if China invaded Taiwan.
"With Ukraine we saw the US government get energized and move at a pace that isn't normally done unless it is an emergency situation, but that may not be the circumstances in a Taiwan scenario. So you need to be thinking before that emergency is underway, it will likely be impossible to resupply Taiwan once an invasion occurs," the second aide said.
While it normally takes years for the arms sales to any country to actually be fulfilled, there is one sale of stingers to Taiwan that was notified to Congress in 2016, but the production of the weapons has not even begun, the first aide said. And just two months ago, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense announced that a delivery of US howitzers was expected to be delayed by years, pushing delivery to 2026 at the earliest.
"Once an arms sale gets approved by Congress, the process is punted back to the State Department, the Pentagon and the defense companies. At that point, it is a tremendous challenge to gain transparency on whether the delivery has actually occurred," the first aide added.
While Republican aides described efforts to get their Democratic colleagues to support their legislation, there were no Democrats who signed on to cosponsor the legislation. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation Ranking Member Steve Chabot of Ohio and Rep. Brian Mast of Florida joined Reps. Kim and McCaul as cosponsors.
CNN · by Kylie Atwood, CNN


6. TikTok says it's putting new limits on Chinese workers' access to U.S. user data

Can we trust Tik Tok (China)?

So some Chinese workers' access will be limited. That does not mean all the data is not still being collected and warehoused and exploited by the Chinese intelligence services.

TikTok says it's putting new limits on Chinese workers' access to U.S. user data
NPR · by Bobby Allyn · July 1, 2022

In a newly public letter, TikTok's top executive, Shou Zi Chew, tried to allay the concerns of several U.S. senators about the Chinese-owned company's data security practices. Kiichiro Sato/AP
TikTok is working on a deal with the Biden administration that would "fully safeguard" the app in the U.S. and quell fears about the Chinese government's accessing Americans' data, according to a letter TikTok sent to nine Republican senators that was released on Friday.
Shou Zi Chew, TikTok's chief executive, wrote that the company is nearing a final agreement with the U.S. government to ensure its data-sharing practices do not raise national security concerns.
As part of that arrangement, TikTok says all U.S. user traffic is now being routed to servers controlled by California-based Oracle, rather than TikTok's own infrastructure. Soon, he said, TikTok hopes to delete all U.S. data from the company's servers and rely completely on Oracle's storage "with access limited only to authorized personnel, pursuant to protocols being developed with the U.S. Government," Chew wrote.
Employees of Beijing-based ByteDance, which owns TikTok, can access data on the app, Chew wrote to the senators. The company has acknowledged before that some employees can gain access to U.S. user data, but the letter added new detail.

For instance, the data foreign employees can view is a "narrow set of non-sensitive TikTok user data," including public videos and comments left on videos, Chew wrote. He said none of that data is shared with Chinese government officials and ByteDance employees can only see Americans' TikTok data after an approval process overseen by the U.S.-based security team.
This system is in place to prevent possible requests from Chinese authorities. TikTok has long said Beijing has never sought Americans' information through TikTok, but the possibility has placed the hugely popular video app in the crosshairs of Washington lawmakers.
Republican senators, including Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, raised new alarms about TikTok following a recent BuzzFeed report detailing the kind of access China-based employees have to Americans' data.
And Federal Communications Commissioner Brendan Carr recently urged Google and Apple to remove TikTok from its app stores for posing a serious national security threat. Carr worries the Chinese Community Party could get its hands on Americans' sensitive personal information.
"In fact, they came out and said that, well, of course, some of the data is accessed there. But it's only on an as-needed basis. And the definition of 'as needed' when it comes to entities beholden to the CCP is very, very different than, I think, what you or I would conceive of in terms of 'as needed,'" Carr said in an interview on Thursday with NPR's Morning Edition.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a group led by the Treasury Department and including top officials such as those from the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, continues to work with TikTok on safeguards that satisfy U.S. authorities.

TikTok, which has more than 1 billion active users around the globe, is the first global social media hit to come out of China. Despite being its largest market, it has had a bumpy ride in the U.S.
The Trump administration launched an all-out war on TikTok, attempting to have the app shut down in the U.S. unless it fully spun off from ByteDance. His administration announced an ownership deal with Oracle and Walmart that would have moved TikTok's headquarters to the U.S., but the deal was ultimately scuttled.
While the Biden White House has not followed its predecessor's scorched-earth approach, the administration has continued national security negotiations with the company to make sure the data of Americans is safe.
Some of the Republicans to whom TikTok addressed the letter were unsatisfied with its contents. Blackburn is calling on TikTok leaders to return to Washington for public testimony before Congress.
"TikTok's response confirms that our fears regarding CCP influence within the company are well-founded," Blackburn said in a statement. "They should have come clean from the start but instead tried to shroud their work in secrecy. Americans need to know that if they are on TikTok, Communist China has their information."
NPR · by Bobby Allyn · July 1, 2022

7. Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Changes What We Know About State Power

Interesting analysis. So what does make a "great power?"

Excerpts:

We need to reconsider—in many ways, entirely reconstruct—how we judge what makes a great power, or what is the most important part of national power. Militaries, perhaps, should be seen more as creations of the underlying economic, technological, and political characteristics of a country. Military power still matters hugely, but in this view reflects its creators, rather than superseding them. A weak, relatively backward, and uninventive economy will struggle to operate a modern military, even if that military has what are considered advanced weapons.
Further, we need to be careful about praising the ability of authoritarian or dictatorial states to wage war. In times of peace, such states can seem decisive and the possessors of well-thought-out plans, but their systemic weaknesses in crushing dissent and encouraging deceptions that appeal to the throne can lead to strategic disasters in both how wars start and how they are conducted. Finally, national power has a basis in commitment and identity that cannot be overlooked.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not been a situation in which a great power assaulted a smaller neighbor. It’s an example of a large, deeply flawed power invading a smaller, but very committed one. The balance of power between the two does still matter—but what makes up that balance needs to be much better understood.


Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Changes What We Know About State Power
Kyiv’s success against Moscow forces us to reexamine our assumptions about what it means to be powerful.
The Atlantic · by Phillips Payson O’Brien · July 1, 2022
In times of peace, much of what anyone says about national power is guesswork. Different claims can be based on hopes, prejudices, or even simple self-interest. Analysts and experts can speak confidently about how some states are undoubtedly great powers while others are weak, that some countries are led by strategic geniuses and others by corrupt incompetents. The statements can sound eminently plausible as facts, even be downright persuasive, because there is no way of knowing the truth.
Until, that is, a war breaks out. The Russia-Ukraine war is now cutting through much of the nonsense that dominated the discussion of international power politics, posing particular challenges to blasé assumptions about what makes a state powerful, and what makes a country’s leadership effective. This reassessment doesn’t just concern the question of debatable prewar military analysis of Russia and Ukraine, or theories of international relations. Instead, it is aimed at the whole way we think about how countries interact with one another, about national power, and about leadership.
The best place to start is the widespread notion going into the war that we were witnessing a clash between a great power controlled by an experienced, savvy—some even said brilliant—leader and a small state weakened by national division and led by a second-rate former comedian. This great power–small power dynamic was accepted practically universally among a group of scholars and analysts who have proclaimed themselves “realists.”
Maybe the most famous realist in the world is Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. secretary of state and a longtime believer in the notion of great leaders and great powers. Kissinger, who met regularly with Vladimir Putin, has been arguing for forcing Kyiv to make concessions such as the handing over of the Crimea, internationally recognized as part of Ukraine but annexed by Moscow in 2014, to the Russians. To Kissinger, it has been important that the United States treat Russia as a “great power” and that it accepted Moscow’s claim to have a special interest in Ukraine.
Academics, too, subscribe to this notion. In lectures, media appearances, and articles in the months before the invasion, well-known figures such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt described the Russia-Ukraine relationship as operating in the well-worn great power–small power framework. In this analysis, Putin was the clever strategist with a strong grasp on what he wanted, while the Ukrainians were weak, and it would be better for the world if their status was determined by the strong. Russia was, in Mearsheimer’s view, one of only “three great powers” in the world, and Putin was a rationalist, just wanting to secure a buffer state on his border, something Ukraine would have to deal with. Meanwhile, as Walt put it, Ukraine would have to accept the oppression and subjugation of its people to Russian interests because “great-power war is worse and brings much more suffering.” Other analysts, such as Samuel Charap, even believed that Russia was so strong, and would crush a weak Ukraine so easily, that the West should provide no support for Kyiv, because it would all be wasted when the Russian steamroller attacked.
This all sounded eminently reasonable, but then Russia invaded Ukraine and the great power–small power dichotomy was revealed to be the opposite of realism. The fundamental problem was that Russia was exposed at the start as not a “great” power at all. Having sent in almost all of its frontline military units, the Russian army has seized only 20 percent of Ukraine—a far cry from its initial efforts to take Kyiv and subjugate the entire country—and is suffering horrific losses in casualties and equipment. It’s already desperately trying to regenerate its forces by finding soldiers wherever it can, even allowing citizens as old as 49 to enlist, while throwing more and more older, second-rate equipment into the fight.
Russian strength has shown itself to be so overrated that it gives us an opportunity to rethink what makes a power “great.” Going into the war, Russia’s military capabilities—including a large nuclear stockpile and what was thought to be one of the biggest and most-advanced armed forces in the world—were pointed to as the reason for its strength. What this war might be showing us, however, is that a military is only as strong as the society, economy, and political structure that assembled it. In this case, Russia was nowhere near a great power, but in fact a deeply flawed, in many ways weakening, state.
From this point of view, indeed, it can be seen as a power in relatively steep decline. Its economy is about the tenth largest in the world, comparable to Brazil’s, but even that masks how remarkably unproductive it is, basing most of its wealth on extracting and selling natural resources, rather than on producing anything advanced. When it comes to technology and innovation, Russia would hardly rank in the top 50 most important countries in the world.
Moreover, the Russian leadership, and most obviously its president—hailed in many quarters as a canny operator—has shown itself to be the head of a disastrously constructed state that fed misperceptions, stifled real debate, and allowed one man to launch this disaster. It’s odd that this is a lesson that we need to learn again and again: Dictatorial regimes tend to decompose the longer they stay in power, because appealing to the source of power becomes a higher priority to officials in all echelons of the state than simply doing a good job. Putin’s state fed his delusions and created an inefficient military, hobbled by corruption and inefficiency.
We must also reevaluate our understanding of the more basic notions of morale and psychological commitment. One of the most surprising things to analysts who perceived Ukraine as a small power, and Russia as a great one, is that the Ukrainian military and people have resisted with extraordinary tenacity while Russian military behavior points toward serious issues with motivation and commitment. The Ukrainians have shown a national wherewithal that has made any idea of a Russian conquest of the whole country, Putin’s original goal, laughable.
We have seen this play out time and time again in modern history, when a smaller country—or parties within a smaller country—with a willingness to fight can wear down a larger power. Be it Afghanistan (twice) or Vietnam (twice), morale and commitment to a fight mean more than which side is the more “powerful.”
We have much to thank the Ukrainians for, but to some extent, one of the most important things they have done is force us to reexamine many of our assumptions about national power and the balance between states.
We need to reconsider—in many ways, entirely reconstruct—how we judge what makes a great power, or what is the most important part of national power. Militaries, perhaps, should be seen more as creations of the underlying economic, technological, and political characteristics of a country. Military power still matters hugely, but in this view reflects its creators, rather than superseding them. A weak, relatively backward, and uninventive economy will struggle to operate a modern military, even if that military has what are considered advanced weapons.
Further, we need to be careful about praising the ability of authoritarian or dictatorial states to wage war. In times of peace, such states can seem decisive and the possessors of well-thought-out plans, but their systemic weaknesses in crushing dissent and encouraging deceptions that appeal to the throne can lead to strategic disasters in both how wars start and how they are conducted. Finally, national power has a basis in commitment and identity that cannot be overlooked.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not been a situation in which a great power assaulted a smaller neighbor. It’s an example of a large, deeply flawed power invading a smaller, but very committed one. The balance of power between the two does still matter—but what makes up that balance needs to be much better understood.
The Atlantic · by Phillips Payson O’Brien · July 1, 2022

8. How the Russian Media Spread False Claims About Ukrainian Nazis



Excerpts:
Russia’s false claim that its invasion of Ukraine is an attempt to “denazify” the country has been criticized by the Anti-Defamation League, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and dozens of scholars of Nazism, among others.
“The current Ukrainian state is not a Nazi state by any stretch of the imaginiation,” Dr. Veidlinger said. “I would argue that what Putin is actually afraid of is the spread of democracy and pluralism from Ukraine to Russia. But he knows that the accusation of Nazism is going to unite his population.”


How the Russian Media Spread False Claims About Ukrainian Nazis
The New York Times · by Charlie Smart · July 2, 2022
In the months since President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia called the invasion of Ukraine a “denazification” mission, the lie that the government and culture of Ukraine are filled with dangerous “Nazis” has become a central theme of Kremlin propaganda about the war.
Russian articles about Ukraine that mention Nazism
A line chart of Russian articles about Ukraine showing the number referencing Nazism increased significantly after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24.

Source: Semantic Visions
A data set of nearly eight million articles about Ukraine collected from more than 8,000 Russian websites since 2014 shows that references to Nazism were relatively flat for eight years and then spiked to unprecedented levels on Feb. 24, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. They have remained high ever since.
The data, provided by Semantic Visions, a defense analytics company, includes major Russian state media outlets in addition to thousands of smaller Russian websites and blogs. It gives a view of Russia’s attempts to justify its attack on Ukraine and maintain domestic support for the ongoing war by falsely portraying Ukraine as being overrun by far-right extremists.
News stories have falsely claimed that Ukrainian Nazis are using noncombatants as human shields, killing Ukrainian civilians and planning a genocide of Russians.
The strategy was most likely intended to justify what the Kremlin hoped would be a quick ouster of the Ukrainian government, said Larissa Doroshenko, a researcher at Northeastern University who studies disinformation. “It would help to explain why they’re establishing this new country in a sense,” Dr. Doroshenko said. “Because the previous government were Nazis, therefore they had to be replaced.”
Multiple experts on the region said the claim that Ukraine is corrupted by Nazis is false. President Volodymyr Zelensky, who received 73 percent of the vote when he was elected in 2019, is Jewish, and all far-right parties combined received only about 2 percent of parliamentary votes in 2019 — short of the 5 percent threshold for representation.
“We tolerate in most Western democracies significantly higher rates of far-right extremism,” said Monika Richter, head of research and analysis at Semantic Visions and a fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council.
The common Russian understanding of Nazism hinges on the notion of Nazi Germany as the antithesis of the Soviet Union rather than on the persecution of Jews specifically said Jeffrey Veidlinger, a professor of history and Judaic studies at the University of Michigan. “That’s why they can call a state that has a Jewish president a Nazi state and it doesn’t seem all that discordant to them,” he said.

A host on Russia’s NTV, which has been under state control since 2001, juxtaposes images of a far-right rally in Ukraine with historic footage of a Nazi rally during a broadcast on April 3.
Despite the lack of evidence that Ukraine is dominated by Nazis, the idea has taken off among many Russians. The false claims about Ukraine may have started on state media but smaller news sites have gone on to amplify the messages.
Social media data provided by Zignal Labs shows a spike in references to Nazism in Russian language tweets that matches the uptick in Russian news media. “You see it on Russian chat groups and in comments Russians are making in newspaper articles,” said Dr. Veidlinger. “I think many Russians actually believe this is a war against Nazism.”
He noted that the success of this propaganda campaign has deep roots in Russian history. “The war against Nazism is really the defining moment of the 20th century for Russia,” Dr. Veidlinger said. “What they’re doing now is in a way a continuation of this great moment of national unity from World War II. Putin is trying to rile up the population in favor of the war.”
Mr. Putin alluded to that history in a speech on May 9 for the Russian holiday commemorating victory over Nazi Germany. “You are fighting for our motherland so that nobody forgets the lessons of World War II,” he said to a parade of thousands of Russian soldiers. “So that there is no place in the world for torturers, death squads and Nazis.”
A key feature of Russian propaganda is its repetitiveness, Ms. Richter said. “You just see a constant regurgitation and repackaging of the same stuff over and over again.” In this case, that means repeating unfounded allegations about Nazism. Since the invasion, 10 to 20 percent of articles about Ukraine have mentioned Nazism, according to the Semantic Visions data.
Share of Russian media articles about Ukraine that mention Nazism
A line chart showing that since Russia invaded Ukraine, a higher percentage of Russian articles about Ukraine have referenced Nazism.

Source: Semantic Visions
Experts say linking Ukraine with Nazism can prevent cognitive dissonance among Russians when news about the war in places like Bucha seeps through. “It helps them justify these atrocities,” Dr. Doroshenko said. “It helps to create this dichotomy of black and white — Nazis are bad, we are good, so we have the moral right.”
The tactic appears to work. Russians’ access to news sources not tied to the Kremlin has been curtailed since the government silenced most independent media outlets after the invasion. During the war, Russian citizens have echoed claims about Nazism in interviews, and in a poll published in May by the Levada Center, an independent Russian pollster, 74 percent expressed support for the war.
A collection of headlines from Russian news websites making false claims about Ukrainian Nazis.

Headlines from Russian news websites TASS, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Vesti and Pravda show examples of false Russian narratives about Ukrainian Nazism.
Part of what makes accusations of Nazism so useful to Russian propagandists is that Ukraine’s past is entangled with Nazi Germany.
“There is a history of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis, and Putin is trying to build upon that history,” Dr. Veidlinger said. “During the Second World War there were parties in Ukraine that sought to collaborate with the Germans, particularly against the Soviets.”
Experts said this history makes it easy for the Russian media to draw connections between real Nazis and modern far-right groups to give the impression that the contemporary groups are larger and more influential than they are.
The Azov Battalion, a regiment of the Ukrainian Army with roots in ultranationalist political groups, has been used by the Russian media since 2014 as an example of far-right support in Ukraine. Analysts said the Russian media’s portrayal of the group exaggerates the extent to which its members hold neo-Nazi views.
Russian television regularly featured segments on the battalion in April when members of the group defended a steel plant in the besieged city of Mariupol.
“For Russia, it was a perfect opportunity,” Dr. Doroshenko said. “It was like, ‘We’ve been smearing them for so long and they’re still there, they’re still fighting, so we can justify our tactics of destroying Mariupol because we need to destroy these Nazis.’”
Russia’s false claim that its invasion of Ukraine is an attempt to “denazify” the country has been criticized by the Anti-Defamation League, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and dozens of scholars of Nazism, among others.
“The current Ukrainian state is not a Nazi state by any stretch of the imaginiation,” Dr. Veidlinger said. “I would argue that what Putin is actually afraid of is the spread of democracy and pluralism from Ukraine to Russia. But he knows that the accusation of Nazism is going to unite his population.”
The New York Times · by Charlie Smart · July 2, 2022


9. How to win Ukraine’s long war

"In war, everything is simple, but even the simplest thing is hard." - Clausewitz.

"...shoring up Ukraine as a viable, sovereign, Western-leaning country" seems simple enough, but...

Easy to say, hard to do. But it is the acceptable durable political arrangement that would serve, protect, and advance the interests of Ukraine, NATO, US and democracy aligned nations of the world.

​Conclusion:

In the long war ordinary Russians will suffer and Ukrainians endure unspeakable pain for Mr Putin’s vanity. To prevail means marshalling resources and shoring up Ukraine as a viable, sovereign, Western-leaning country—an outcome that its defiant people crave. Ukraine and its backers have the men, money and materiel to overcome Mr Putin. Do they all have the will?

How to win Ukraine’s long war
After doing well early in the war, Ukraine is losing ground. What next?
Ukraine won the short war. Mobile and resourceful, its troops inflicted terrible losses and confounded Russian plans to take Kyiv. Now comes the long war. It will drain weapons, lives and money until one side loses the will to fight on. So far, this is a war that Russia is winning.
In recent days its forces have taken the eastern city of Severodonetsk. They are advancing on Lysychansk and may soon control all of Luhansk province. They also threaten Slovyansk, in the north of next-door Donetsk. Ukrainian leaders say they are outgunned and lack ammunition. Their government reckons as many as 200 of its troops are dying each day.
Fortunately for Ukraine, that is not the end. The Russian advance is slow and costly. With nato-calibre weapons, fresh tactics and enough financial aid, Ukraine has every chance of forcing back Russia’s armies. Even if lost territory will be hard to retake, Ukraine can demonstrate the futility of Vladimir Putin’s campaign and emerge as a democratic, Westward-looking state. But to do so it needs enduring support. And that is still in doubt.
On the face of it, a long war suits Russia. Both sides are using huge amounts of ammunition, but Russia has vastly more. The Russian economy is much larger than Ukraine’s and in far better shape. In pursuit of victory, Russia is willing to terrorise and demoralise the Ukrainians by committing war crimes, as it did by striking a shopping mall in Kremenchuk this week. If needs be, Mr Putin will impose grievous suffering on his own people.
However, the long war does not have to be fought on Mr Putin’s terms. Potentially, Ukraine has vast numbers of motivated fighters. It can be supplied by the West’s defence industry. In 2020, before sanctions, the economies of nato were more than ten times bigger than Russia’s.
Ukraine’s turnaround begins on the battlefield, by stopping and reversing the Russian advance. Mr Putin’s generals will continue to have more weapons, but the sophisticated nato systems now arriving have longer range and greater accuracy. By adopting tactics devised in the cold war, when nato too was outnumbered by the Red Army, Ukraine should be able to destroy Russian command posts and supply depots. Ukraine scored a success on June 30th, when it used nato weapons to drive Russian forces off Snake Island, a strategic prize in the Black Sea. It should aim to impose a “hurting stalemate”, in which it takes back similarly symbolically important territory, such as the city of Kherson, imposing a heavy price on Russia.
If Russia starts to lose ground on the battlefield, dissent and infighting may spread in the Kremlin. Western intelligence services believe that Mr Putin is being kept in the dark by his subordinates. He has a habit of replacing his commanders—reportedly including General Alexander Dvornikov, brought in after the invasion’s first chaotic weeks. The West can raise the cost to Russia of a long war by continuing to press sanctions, which threaten lasting harm to Russia’s economy. It can split Russia’s elites from Mr Putin by welcoming dissenters from business and politics, and encouraging them to see that their country should not throw away its future on a pointless and costly campaign.
Will the West stay the course? At a summit on June 23rd, the European Union awarded Ukraine candidate status, promising a deep level of engagement over the next decade. At another summit in Germany this week, the g7 affirmed and strengthened sanctions against Russia. And at a third in Madrid, nato acknowledged the Russian threat by substantially increasing its presence on the alliance’s eastern front.
Yet Ukraine is a heavy burden. Western defence industries are formidable, but struggle to produce large volumes, especially of ammunition. Ukraine’s government has a monthly deficit of $5bn and the country will need rebuilding after the war. Public support for Ukraine in the West will be buffeted by a host of pressures, from inflation to elections—including, as soon as 2023, campaigning in America that may involve a presidential bid by that Ukrainophobic Putin admirer, Donald Trump.
And the global costs of a long war will grow. Mr Putin has been blockading exports of grains and sunflower oil from Ukraine’s ports, which will cause unrest and starvation in poorer importing countries. He seems to be trying to create gas shortages in the eu this winter by preventing members from building stocks over the summer. If unity falls apart over energy, as eu states hoard gas, it will disintegrate over Ukraine, too. To complicate matters further, nato members worry that if Ukraine gains the upper hand, Mr Putin will escalate. That could draw them into a catastrophic war with Russia.
You can see where Mr Putin is heading. He will take as much of Ukraine as he can, declare victory and then call on Western nations to impose his terms on Ukraine. In exchange, he will spare the rest of the world from ruin, hunger, cold and the threat of nuclear Armageddon.
To accept that deal would be a grave miscalculation. Ukraine would face permanent Russian aggression. The more Mr Putin believes he has succeeded in Ukraine, the more belligerent he will become. He set out his ambitions in a speech this month, smirking as he talked about how Peter the Great seized parts of Sweden. He will fight tomorrow with whatever weapons work for him today. That means resorting to war crimes and nuclear threats, starving the world and freezing Europe.
The best way to prevent the next war is to defeat him in this one. Leaders need to explain to their people that they are not only defending an abstract principle in Ukraine, but also their most fundamental interest: their own security. The eu needs to shore up its energy markets so that they do not fracture next winter. Ukraine must have more weapons. The risk of escalation today is real, but if a bad peace is forced on Ukraine Mr Putin’s nuclear threats will not stop. They will only become more dangerous, especially if Russia’s conventional forces are at a disadvantage.
In the long war ordinary Russians will suffer and Ukrainians endure unspeakable pain for Mr Putin’s vanity. To prevail means marshalling resources and shoring up Ukraine as a viable, sovereign, Western-leaning country—an outcome that its defiant people crave. Ukraine and its backers have the men, money and materiel to overcome Mr Putin. Do they all have the will? ■
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10. Musk’s tech put to deadly weapon effect in Ukraine

Is this an important capability for the future of war? (Or capabilities like this?) We really need to look hard at the capability and most importantly what effects it can contribute to achieving. (both in support of our operations but also potentially against us)



Musk’s tech put to deadly weapon effect in Ukraine
Starlink satellite system and GIS Arta software enabling near immediate and highly accurate artillery target identification
asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · July 1, 2022
Two technologies have helped Ukraine fend off a huge Russian onslaught. One of them is imported; the other is homegrown.
Perhaps the more important, overall, is Elon Musk’s Starlink system. Starlink is made up of thousands of satellites in low earth orbit that provide internet service. Last February, Musk initially provided 5,000 receiver sets to Ukraine. Now the number is up to 11,000.
These satellites are crucial for linking Ukrainian drones to shooters (artillery and rocket forces) and are used to keep essential services functioning. Starlink receivers have been provided to hospitals and emergency services and to schools in Ukraine.

While the Russians are able to jam satellite transmissions, so far they have not been able to jam Starlink. Musk has reported that they are trying but so far have not been successful.
The other technology is homegrown and is software known as GIS Arta (GIS stands for geographic information system and Arta stands for artillery).
GIS Arta is an Android app that takes target information from drones, US and NATO intelligence feeds and conventional forward observers, and converts the information to precise coordinates for artillery.
Using indigenously developed GIS Arta, based on Uber software and dubbed by some ‘the Blitzkrieg app,’ Ukrainian soldiers can get in their best shots with weapons such as this howitzer. Photo: ZUMA Press / IMAGO
GIS Arta was developed by a volunteer team of software developers led by Yaroslav Sherstyvk. It bears a resemblance to Uber taxi service software, on which the GIS Arta software is modeled.
Starlink
There have been many attempts to put the internet in the sky but most of them are now dated – and, anyway, they never had the throughput needed to move video and images quickly and efficiently.

Older systems include Globalstar (1991), Inmarsat (1979) and Iridium (2000):
  • Inmarsat, which operates 14 satellites, has a maximum data speed of 492 kbps kilobits per second.
  • Iridium operates 66 satellites and has a data speed of 176 kbps on its older satellites, 704 on its newest.
  • Globalstar, operating 24 low earth satellites, has a speed of 9.6 kbps on its first-generation satellites and up to 704 on its newest.
None of these older systems supports speeds capable of handling imaging or high quality video. In contrast, by last May Starlink was orbiting 2,547 satellites with combined upload and download speeds of 87.5 megabits per second. A minimum speed for video is 3mbps.
Starlink can also quickly replace satellites if any are destroyed or disabled. A conventional satellite takes 7.5 years to be manufactured and ready for launch. Starlink is now manufacturing an astonishing 45 satellites per week.
Finding a space vehicle to launch satellites is another obstacle. However, as Musk also controls SpaceX, his corporate empire includes not only the production of satellites but also of launch vehicles – many of which are also reusable.
Russia knocked out large swaths of Internet service in Ukraine but Starlink is replacing those services for critical needs.

GIS Arta
It is not widely appreciated that Ukraine over the past decade has become a software powerhouse. It is the major outsourcing location for Israel, which is one of the world’s leading software innovators.
In Israel, there is a shortage of software engineers as it tech sector has exploded with a gap of at least 25,000 unfilled jobs. Important Israeli commercial companies, among them the well-known Wix and Fiverr, although based in Israel, maintain important development operations in Ukraine.
Israel has outsourced to Eastern Europe and India but the most productive and important location is Ukraine, where some 15,000 Ukrainians are directly employed and perhaps another 10,000 work part-time.
There are some strong reasons for this success. Language is no barrier partly thanks to the immigration to Israel of around 1.6 million from the former USSR – including Ukraine, which featured a large Jewish population. In addition, English is the language of the global tech community of which many young Ukrainians are fluent.
Employing Ukrainians is also cost-effective since wages are significantly lower than in Israel – or, for that matter, the United States – although before the war wages were climbing in Ukraine’s tech sector because of foreign demand.

Most importantly, development teams can work virtually, making the process efficient and inexpensive in terms of overhead. Israel and Ukraine share the same time zone and, in normal times, country-to-country air travel is just three hours.
Diagram: Twitter
GIS Arta makes it possible to do two things not possible before: Targets can be identified and verified visually almost immediately, and artillery and rocket systems can fire quickly and accurately.
Consider that typically it takes 20 minutes to program coordinates into an artillery piece and fire the weapon. Complicating that is verifying the target; for the US that also includes making sure there isn’t a risk of collateral damage.
The artillery previously used by Ukraine was mainly Russian and its firing system was dated and slow. GIS Arta not only changed that but also significantly improved accuracy.
GIS Arta reduces the time to fire to about 30 to 45 seconds. No Western artillery system is as capable and none apparently has the accuracy offered by GIS Arta. According to reports, Ukrainian artillery can now hit a far-away target with an accuracy of between 18 and 75 meters.
Ukraine has also modified its deployments of artillery, separating units by greater distance to make them more difficult targets for Russian counterfire. That, too, has been enabled by GIS Arta.
The GIS Arta complex also selects which gun or rocket system to use and automatically provides the coordinates to any selected system. In fact, the system is so good that Germany, which has already delivered some of its Panzerhaubitze 2000 tank howitzer 155mm mechanized guns to Ukraine, reportedly has integrated GIS Arta.
China sees a military threat in SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system. Image: Facebook
Clearly, Starlink and GIS Arta are both adding new technology dimensions to warfare that will only gain in importance in the future.
Indeed, the fact that China is deeply concerned about Starlink – to the extent it is looking for ways to track and destroy Musk’s satellites – is a tribute to the success of the system in war fighting. The Pentagon has been impressed with Starlink’s ability to fight off Russian jamming attempts and is looking at the Starlink model for future systems.
But the Pentagon has a tendency to turn an inexpensive and brilliant commercial system into an overly costly, clunky production that takes years to field. Perhaps it would be more sensible for the Pentagon to take both GIS Arta and Starlink as is and use what works.
Follow Stephen Bryen on Twitter at @stevebryen
asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen · July 1, 2022


11. The Maritime Counterinsurgency Project Begins

So, based on this article it seems that China is conducting an insurgency against the rules based international order at sea. Therefore we need to conduct COIN at sea.



The Maritime Counterinsurgency Project Begins
By Hunter Stires
July 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/7/1,433
usni.org · July 1, 2022
For all the attention paid to its growing capabilities for a possible future war, China’s decisive line of effort to undo the foundation of the U.S.-led rules-based international order is well underway—and has made grave inroads without firing a shot. Rather than embarking on a costly and hazardous large-scale war of aggression, China is working below the threshold of armed conflict to subjugate the large civilian maritime population of Southeast Asia—more than 3.7 million people—who depend on access to the South China Sea for their daily livelihoods.1
Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia forces steal fishermen’s catches, confiscate radios and navigational equipment essential to safe operations at sea, and pour gasoline into civilians’ drinking water supplies to compel them to return to shore.2 Chinese forces kidnap Vietnamese fishermen and hold them for ransom.3 China has threatened to openly attack Southeast Asian countries on multiple occasions for daring to pursue energy development in their own national exclusive economic zones (EEZs).4 And Chinese maritime militia and coast guard ships fire upon, ram, and sink civilian vessels, often leaving their crews in the water to drown, an outrageous desecration of the most foundational rule governing conduct among mariners.
Regardless of whether China’s systematic maritime barbarism constitutes a form of state piracy, its strategic objective is clear: to overturn the rule of international law that enshrines the longstanding principle of the freedom of the sea, a foundational U.S. national interest. In its place, Beijing seeks to impose its own draconian, self-serving, hierarchical vision of maritime sovereignty, under which it claims distant ocean areas as “blue national soil” to deprive weaker coastal states of their own EEZs and fundamental rights at sea. To realize this, China does not fight conventionally with the U.S. Navy and its regional partners, but rather circumvents them in the “gray zone” to impose its will directly on the civilians who dwell in places Beijing wishes to make its own.
China’s pattern of behavior has a name: insurgency. At their most fundamental level, insurgencies are campaigns that seek to overthrow an established regime or legal order by cumulatively and coercively enforcing a new set of laws on the civilian population that a belligerent seeks to govern, while declining a sequential, force-on-force decisive battle with the military defenders of the incumbent system of authority. This is precisely what China is doing in the South China Sea and elsewhere. While it may strike some as strange to refer to the world’s second largest economy in terms most often applied to non-state actors, the strategic logic of insurgency and counterinsurgency does not depend on the identity of the groups that employ them. China’s coercive strategies and actions against civilian mariners mirror those of insurgent groups throughout time, from the armies of Mao Zedong to the Vietcong to the Taliban. Just because a country is a first-class military power does not mean it will always choose to act like one. Chinese officials themselves refer to Beijing’s approach as “war without gun smoke” and “people’s war at sea”—the latter being a Maoist term most readily translated into U.S. doctrinal language as “maritime insurgency.”5
For most of the past decade, the United States has largely ignored China’s maritime insurgency and allowed it to proceed unchecked, seeing it as a mere shaping operation distracting from the “real” challenge of China’s worrying expansion of its capabilities for all-out kinetic war. Yet China is pursuing a dual-track strategy: simultaneously preparing for state-on-state war while working to “win without fighting” today.6 Since China can prevail by either method, the United States and its allies do not have the luxury of choosing their preferred threat; they must find effective ways to counter both Chinese lines of effort or face defeat. U.S. preparations for high-end conflict will be for naught if the gray zone threat is not stopped. By remaining below the threshold of war, China’s maritime insurgency conceptually outmaneuvers the investments the United States has made in its own warfighting forces.7 The conventional wisdom in Washington might have matters backward: Beijing’s development of high-end military forces may in fact be the shaping operation meant to distract and deter U.S. leaders from countering China’s actual main effort—the gains it is making through maritime insurgency.
Allowing China’s maritime insurgency to succeed would have grave consequences for the United States and free seagoing nations around the globe.8 With civilian mariners forced to submit to Beijing’s dictates, China’s outlandish pretenses to “indisputable sovereignty” over 90 percent of the South China Sea will in time become an accepted fact of customary international law and a precedent for other avaricious countries.9 Freedom of the sea would be replaced by the arbitrary will of continental states with the military power to restrict activity in waters they covet at the expense of neighbors unable to resist. To avoid this dire outcome, it is imperative that the U.S. Sea Services and their partners and allies mobilize their intellectual capital to develop and operationalize an actionable strategy of maritime counterinsurgency to turn the tide.
Enter the U.S. Naval Institute’s Maritime Counterinsurgency Project. Thanks to a visionary grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Maritime Counterinsurgency Project brings together leading minds in maritime strategy to examine this emerging concept and explore how the United States and its allies can effectively implement it. Among the project’s contributors are experts in the field and major players well known in the public discourse, including James Holmes, Geoffrey Till, Bryan Clark, Peter Swartz, Brent Sadler, Steve Wills, and Collin Koh. And the project features thinkers who may be less immediately familiar to readers but whose work inside and outside the lifelines merits wider recognition: Lesley Wilhelm, Gary Lehmann, Greg Lewis, Josh Taylor, Dan Straub, Brian Kerg, and Hali Jilani, to name a few.
This project is several years in the making, beginning with the May 2019 article, “The South China Sea Needs a ‘COIN’ Toss.” Since then, this thinking has sparked intense discussion in the United States and among key partner nations. As the concept has continued to develop and advance through publications, key stakeholder engagements, briefings, workshops, and events, thought leaders inside and outside government have been exploring how maritime COIN can be integrated into strategic documents and doctrine, security cooperation, wargaming, technological innovation, and current operations. Under the combined leadership of Admiral John Aquilino, Vice Admiral William Merz, and Rear Admiral Fred Kacher, a prototype operational implementation of the concept by Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 76 achieved a signal victory in the West Capella standoff between April and July 2020.10 As Brent Sadler writes in his essay, U.S. forces’ visible, persistent presence to support Malaysia against Chinese coercion led three major regional powers to strengthen their stances against China’s aggression in a matter of months—an effect that years of U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) and large-scale warfighting exercises under the legacy standard playbook failed to achieve.
This expanded issue marks the launch of the Maritime COIN Project. Additional articles will come in the months ahead, and the project will include a conference at the Naval Institute’s Jack C. Taylor Center. Your thoughts, ideas, and reactions will be a mark of the project’s success, and they will be essential to its ultimate impact on strategy, operations, tactics, and force structure.
Please send your feedback to [email protected].
1. Gregory Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” Stephenson Ocean Security Project, CSIS, 19 January 2019.
2. Do Thanh Hai, “China’s Maritime Actions Fuel Popular Anger in Vietnam,” Korea Times, 30 March 2019. Ben Kirkvilet, “Vietnamese Fishermen versus China,” New Mandala, 6 July 2016.
3. Elena Bernini, “Chinese Kidnapping of Vietnamese Fishermen in the South China Sea: A Primary Source Analysis,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 14 September 2017.
4. Bill Hayton, “China’s Intimidation Exposes Vietnam’s Lack of Deterrence,” Chatham House, 26 April 2018; Presentation of Bill Hayton, 2018 CSIS South China Sea Conference, 26 July 2018. Drake Long, “New Law Would Let China Coast Guard Use Weapons in South China Sea,” Radio Free Asia, 11 June 2020.
5. Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019). James Holmes, “Here’s How the Philippines Can Win in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, 16 August 2016.
6. See Hunter Stires, “Win Without Fighting,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 146, no. 6 (June 2020): 20–25.
7. Eric Duckworth, “War Without Gun Smoke,” Joint Staff White Paper, May 2022
8. Hunter Stires, “Why We Defend Free Seas,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 145, no. 5 (May 2019).
9. CAPT Daniel Straub, USN, “WEST Theater: A ‘COIN’ Toss in the South China Sea: Defending Free Seas and the Rule of International Law from China’s Maritime Insurgency,” panel comments, U.S. Naval Institute AFCEA WEST Conference, 3 March 2020.
10. Captain Dan Straub, USN and Hunter Stires, “Littoral Combat Ships for Maritime COIN,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 146, no. 1 (January 2021): 18–23.
usni.org · July 1, 2022
12. Pentagon too Slow to Recognize Risk and too Fast to Give Away Needed Capability Permanently

Excerpts:

The entire Department of Defense needs to be at an Operation Warp Speed tempo where urgency and humility are the watchwords, and the armed forces reward speed and fielded capability over compliance or perfection. One officer stated that “entire swaths of the Department are going through the motions”—a preference for process over power. Under a Warp Speed-like posture, the Pentagon can cut development and production times to enable immediate implementation of available tech into the systems the U.S. military possesses today, while gathering data from that implementation to strengthen completely new technologies still in design.

Accepting a unilateral drawdown of trained manpower, capacity, training, and posture throughout the next decade will result in a self-inflicted stasis, in which our weapons and warfighters become more like antiques than armed forces—expensive yet impractical.

The Pentagon and Congress have for three decades delayed modernization critical to the sustainment of credible U.S. combat power. Backs against the wall now, policymakers must not cede American military supremacy to a “dusty death,” but rather revise the pace of productivity by accepting that the armed force cannot survive on “buying time” to gain capability, but rather buying capability to gain time.

Pentagon too Slow to Recognize Risk and too Fast to Give Away Needed Capability Permanently
By Mackenzie Eaglen
July 02, 2022


On the path to ceding a similar fate, Pentagon leaders seem to echo how Macbeth described the perpetuation of his fruitless days, “tomorrow, tomorrow, and tomorrow, Creeps in this petty pace from day to day…The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!”
The U.S. military’s conventional deterrence and global leadership will also extinguish if time is continually wasted on uncertain wishes for an equally uncertain tomorrow. Unlike the financial state or strategic posturing of American military forces, there is one variable of which neither Congress nor the Executive has control—one that burns away irrespective of perception: time.
Not only are we unable to control it, we can rarely anticipate what it may bring. The U.S. entered “brief” missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that resulted in two nearly twenty year conflicts still smoldering. Putin decided to invade Ukraine much earlier than defense planners and leaders anticipated—on his timeline, not ours. Time slips away from war plans, even when there are the people, the funds, and the strategies set to define the actions encompassed by it.
Bureaucracy Lumbers On Rinse and Repeat
The Biden Pentagon outlined a three-Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) approach to resourcing their National Defense Strategy (NDS) across the five-year defense budget and planning cycles totaling 15 years. The first budget window focuses on modernizing the nuclear triad, along with space, cyber and future tech investments. The third five-year tranche will focus on bringing this future technology into the hands of warfighters. And the second, and proven to be most difficult, is fusing new technology with combat-ready equipment or taking the gamble of not.
It only takes looking back over recent administrations to hear the rhythms of history hum the solemn requiem of the Third Offset Strategy. Nine fiscal years later, one could argue the three-FYDP approach met the moment in 2016. But the military balance has shifted too starkly away from the United States in Asia since then, and more urgent action and dramatic change is needed now. The military does not have the luxury of manufactured peace until a time of our choosing later this decade vis-à-vis Taiwan. Advertising that we will be really serious and ready five years from now only invites challengers to act sooner.
From characterizations of effort ranging from “unbelievably slow” to “too late,” the Pentagon cannot seem to break out of neutral and stop playing catch up.
Nearly a decade after first being introduced as a concept, the Pentagon is still in the first budget window. Meanwhile our adversaries have capitalized on the time America has under-exploited. While the Third Offset Strategy and three-FYDP plans have failed to yield meaningful capability changes fielded at scale across the joint force, they did seriously help shape and inform the 2018 defense strategy and shift the defense department’s approach toward great power competition. In that sense, Third Offset proponents have accomplished what they sought and forged bipartisan support for the new mission.
R&D Roads To Nowhere
Instead of banking on and building out these now-luxurious time constructs, decisionmakers need to go all-in on accomplishing their goals by their intended due-date of today. 
As the military enjoys the luxury of manufactured peace until 2027 based on optimistic assumptions, Pentagon leaders are simultaneously giving away permanent combat power and capability today as troops wait for the vaunted tomorrow to bear fruit
Defense planners are moving far too fast in giving away what cannot be clawed back and far too slow in estimating when Beijing might move forcibly against Taiwan. This is both an invitation for aggression and a recipe for failure.
The Administration is relying on having “tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow” to research, buy, and field future technology and concepts. As distance from conflict grows, however, so do the rosy expectations of what can be achieved. Just over 80 years ago, American forces in the Philippines surrendered to the Japanese after old equipment manned by semi-trained personnel who lacked combat experience faced advanced weapons and warfighters. This is the likely long-term trajectory of a repeat three-FYDP approach that continues to shrink and age the fighting force—the same force used for competition and a potential warfight—without similarly redialing or reflecting on the political, budgetary, and security circumstances it actually faces.
Fielding Weapons in 2027 Means Buying Them Today
If the Pentagon is assuming the potential for revolutionized warfare in 2027 then that is a here-and-now problem for this behemoth bureaucracy. From senior leader “thought bubbles” to white sheet planning to internal programming to congressional approving to departmental researching to buying at scale and finally to fielding capability to warfighters is a three to five year process. And that is in only in the best-case scenarios.
You want more Stingers, Javelins, or HIMARs? See you in 24 to 36 months. But, sure, let’s retire battleforce ships that are a mere three years old while being as self-assured of Xi’s timing and intent regarding Taiwan as global elites were about Putin’s in Ukraine. 
The entire Department of Defense needs to be at an Operation Warp Speed tempo where urgency and humility are the watchwords, and the armed forces reward speed and fielded capability over compliance or perfection. One officer stated that “entire swaths of the Department are going through the motions”—a preference for process over power. Under a Warp Speed-like posture, the Pentagon can cut development and production times to enable immediate implementation of available tech into the systems the U.S. military possesses today, while gathering data from that implementation to strengthen completely new technologies still in design.
Accepting a unilateral drawdown of trained manpower, capacity, training, and posture throughout the next decade will result in a self-inflicted stasis, in which our weapons and warfighters become more like antiques than armed forces—expensive yet impractical.
The Pentagon and Congress have for three decades delayed modernization critical to the sustainment of credible U.S. combat power. Backs against the wall now, policymakers must not cede American military supremacy to a “dusty death,” but rather revise the pace of productivity by accepting that the armed force cannot survive on “buying time” to gain capability, but rather buying capability to gain time.
Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. You can follow her on Twitter: @MEaglen.

13. China lashes out against ‘Asian version of NATO’

Not unexpected.

But all true here, except the comments about distorting the truth!

“The so-called NATO’s new Strategic Concept ignores facts, distorts the truth, … vilifies China‘s foreign policy, makes irresponsible statements about China’s natural military development and its national defense policy, promotes confrontation and conflict, [and] is filled with the Cold War mentality and ideological prejudices,” Mr. Zhao said at his regular briefing with reporters Thursday in Beijing.

China lashes out against ‘Asian version of NATO’
​Allied leaders expand focus​ of security threat.

washingtontimes.com · by Guy Taylor

The decision by NATO leaders to highlight the global security threat posed by China for the first time has triggered outrage in Beijing, where the Chinese foreign ministry on Thursday accused the Western military alliance of pushing a narrative that “distorts the truth” and “promotes confrontation” between the West and China.
Beijing‘s accusations came after North Korea‘s authoritarian regime, which is backed by China, hurled similar warnings this week, saying military coordination among the U.S., South Korea and Japan represents a “dangerous prelude to the creation of [an] ‘Asian version of NATO.’”
North Korea‘s official KCNA news service on Thursday reprinted an analysis by a local think tank scholar arguing NATO has “brought disaster” to Eastern Europe and now seeks to do the same thing in the Asia-Pacific region.
“All things considered, there is an ominous sign that dark waves of the North Atlantic will break the silence of the Pacific sooner or later,” wrote Kim Hyo Myong, identified by KCNA as a researcher of the Society for International Politics Study. “NATO is nothing but a perpetrator of the U.S. hegemonic strategy. It is simply a tool for local invasion. … After transforming the Western Hemisphere into the unstable international region of dispute, NATO is turning its sinister eyes to the far-off Eastern Hemisphere this time.”
North Korea‘s warnings came as President Biden met with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the sidelines of the major NATO summit in Madrid, while the Chinese warning was a response to the newly updated “strategic doctrine” that NATO formally endorsed during its summit, which wrapped up Thursday.

While heavily focused on the threat from Russia, the NATO strategy blueprint for the first time in its 75-year history singled out China as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” and condemned Beijing‘s warming ties with Moscow.
“The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests,” the NATO document said.
It reflected frustration among NATO leaders over Chinese military muscle flexing, aggressive maritime territorial claims and support for Russia — frustration that has mounted in recent years and that U.S. and other alliance officials spoke openly about during this week’s summit.
“The relationship that we all have with China is among the most complex and consequential of any relationship that we have with another country and … there are aspects, increasingly, where we have to contest what China is doing,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Wednesday.
Mr. Blinken added that the U.S. and NATO allies are “not looking for conflict, but trying to make sure that together we’re upholding the rules-based international order -– wherever it’s being challenged — and if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.”
Chinese officials were already pushing back and venting frustration Thursday, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian expressing “serious concern and resolute protest” over the NATO rhetoric.
China is gravely concerned and firmly opposed to this,” Mr. Zhao said, according to the state-controlled Xinhua news agency.
“The so-called NATO’s new Strategic Concept ignores facts, distorts the truth, … vilifies China‘s foreign policy, makes irresponsible statements about China’s natural military development and its national defense policy, promotes confrontation and conflict, [and] is filled with the Cold War mentality and ideological prejudices,” Mr. Zhao said at his regular briefing with reporters Thursday in Beijing.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg defended the China passages in the new Strategic Doctrine.
Mr. Stoltenberg reiterated the warnings about China during his own press conference later in the day Thursday in Madrid, telling reporters that heads of state from across the 30-nation alliance discussed Russia and China in tandem during a closing meeting of the NATO summit.
Alliance leaders “addressed how Russia and China continue to seek political, economic and military gain across our southern neighborhood,” Mr. Stoltenberg said, adding that “both Moscow and Beijing are using economic leverage, coercion and hybrid approaches to advance their interests in the region.”
A U.S. push
The reference to China as a “systemic challenge” in NATO‘s updated strategy document, meanwhile, represents something of a victory for the Biden administration, which had been pushing for the inclusion of stronger language targeting Beijing.
While China is a major trading partner of many of NATO‘s member nations and some European allies were hesitant to go as far as Washington in warning about threats posed by Beijing, U.S. officials argue there is plenty in China‘s recent behavior that is of direct concern to the transatlantic alliance.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin endorsed a bilateral relationship “without limits” just weeks before the Kremlin launched its invasion of neighboring Ukraine in late February. China did not endorse the Russian military move and has observed some sanctions imposed on Moscow, but its official press has strongly backed Russia’s version of events in Ukraine and argued that the U.S. and NATO bear the blame for provoking the war.
Earlier this week, Mr. Zhao accused NATO leaders of seeking to move beyond their regional focus and assert influence in the Pacific as well, with the clear goal, he said, of containing China‘s rise.
NATO should stop drawing ideological lines, stoking political confrontation or seeking to start a new Cold War,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Wednesday. “It should discard the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game mindset and stop making enemies. NATO has already disrupted Europe. It should not seek to destabilize Asia and the world.”
President Xi and leading Chinese Communist Party officials have pushed similar “Cold War” warnings in recent years in response to Washington’s efforts to coordinate with the most economically and militarily powerful democracies of the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance Beijing‘s rising influence over the region.
Beijing was most notably critical of the former Trump administration’s push to elevate the so-called “Quad” alignment of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia — a push the Biden administration has run with by holding the first-ever in-person leaders’ summit of the Quad last year.
The summit came roughly a year after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made global headlines by asserting during a tour of several Asian nations that the former Trump administration and its Indo-Pacific strategy had represented “a huge security risk” to the region. According to an October 2020 report by the South China Morning Post, Mr. Yi specifically slammed the Quad as an “Indo-Pacific NATO.”
North Korea‘s authoritarian regime made its own use of that characterization this week, as it fumed ahead of a meeting among Mr. Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of NATO summit, a meeting heavily focused on the problem of Pyongyang.
The presence of Mr. Yoon and Mr. Kishida in Madrid marked the first time that South Korean and Japanese leaders have attended NATO‘s annual summit as observers.
With U.S., South Korean and Japanese forces slated to conduct combined missile detection and tracking drills near Hawaii in August, North Korean state media carried a report this week claiming that Washington “is getting hell-bent on the military cooperation with its stooges in disregard of the primary security demand and concern by Asia-pacific countries.”
“The scheme for formation of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea military alliance, motivated by Japan’s and South Korea’s kowtowing to the U.S., is evidently a dangerous prelude to the creation of ‘Asian version of NATO’,” said the state media report, which, according to Reuters, also accused Washington of fomenting a new Cold War.
A White House readout of Mr. Biden‘s discussion with Mr. Yoon and Mr. Kishida in Madrid, meanwhile, said the three had a “historic trilateral meeting” in which they discussed enhancing their cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific, particularly in regard to “addressing the evolving threat posed by [North Korea’s] unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.”
“President Biden underscored the United States’ unshakable commitment to the defense of both Japan and the Republic of Korea,” the White House said.
• David R. Sands can be reached at [email protected].
• Guy Taylor can be reached at [email protected].
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14. Taking on Putin through porn: how Russians are finding out the truth about Ukraine

Hmmm... interesting method. Have to know your target audience. Purveyors of porn on the internet are some of the most "creative" (and aggressive) people in terms of "information" dissemination.

Lessons?


Taking on Putin through porn: how Russians are finding out the truth about Ukraine | Jemimah Steinfeld
Little moderation, huge audiences and biddable owners make porn and gambling sites a safe haven from censors
The Guardian · by Jemimah Steinfeld · July 2, 2022
Six weeks into the invasion of her country, Anastasiya Baydachenko made an emotional plea. She wanted money: not for weapons, not for clothes, but for adverts.
Vladimir Putin had been aggressively turning Russia’s internet into a fortress and, as a CEO at a Ukrainian digital marketing company, Baydachenko knew a way to infiltrate it. The plan was simple: buy ad space across websites in Russia and Belarus and use them to link to independent news on the war in Ukraine. The adverts could be direct, or they could be oblique, even titillating, to conceal their true nature and evade the censors.
At first Baydachenko targeted the usual suspects – Google, YouTube, Facebook and other sites with high traffic. But with each passing day the task became harder. The introduction of Russia’s “fake news” law catapulted the country’s internet into a darker realm. And so Baydachenko moved into a darker one too: the world of online gambling and pornography. These sites were perfect – little moderation, huge audiences and people behind them whose allegiances were with the highest bidder. If all else failed she’d try to take on Putin through porn.
Baydachenko wasn’t a lone ranger. Instead she was part of a bigger network and through this network money began to come in. The operation expanded. Baydachenko reckons that their ads have reached hundreds of millions of Russian internet users. “Informational resistance works,” Baydachenko says with confidence, adding that she believes pushback to the war from mothers of Russian soldiers is partly because of the campaign.
This is just one example in a growing list of people and organisations exploiting digital loopholes in Russia to challenge Putin’s control. Last month alone, hackers have turned the mobile version of news radio station Kommersant FM into a jukebox of Ukrainian anthems and have placed an appeal to end the war on smotrim.ru, the main website for accessing state-run TV channels and radio stations.
Rob Blackie is one of the directors of Free Russia, a campaign to bring independent news about the war to Russians through ads. He spearheaded the campaign (first doing so in 2014 when Crimea was invaded) and now works with Baydachenko. He jokes that from Putin’s perspective he’s running “a criminal spam operation”.
What he and the other people in this space actually operate is a modern-day samizdat network. Samizdat, the Russian word for clandestine material, was highly influential in the USSR, helping spread a mass of protests, banned work and documents. The method was the typewriter, the means people’s hands – now upgraded to the internet and its offshoot of tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and the encrypted apps Telegram and Signal.
Even TikTok was recently used by US-backed news organisation RFE/RL to track the movements of troops across the country as they made their way to the front. RFE/RL – which has suspended operations in Russia after pressure from police and politicians – is still working with journalists there and breaking important stories. Its message is clear: we’ll find ways to get information in and out.
Some are fighting the information war by merging the modern with the old, such as the team behind Zvezda, an independent digital publication. When their site was blocked in early March they began publishing a weekly text edition on their Telegram channel in an A4 format that could be easily printed out. Stepan Khlopov, the editor-in-chief, said he hoped people would leave the newspaper lying around for passersby to pick up.
Resistance isn’t always in the form of hard-hitting news. The Kopilka Project, an online repository of anti-war poetry from over 100 Russian speakers, was launched a few months ago in the form of a live Googledoc to which readers can request access. Kopilka translates from Russian as “piggy bank”, and Julia Nemrovskaya, one of the organisers, told me they consider their efforts to be “throwing a tiny copper coin into a bigger kopilka: the collective effort to defeat Putin”. Kopilka’s aims are twofold: to challenge Putin’s propaganda and to keep the poems safe from the Kremlin’s destructive arms.
At Index on Censorship, where I am editor-in-chief, bad-news stories are our bread and butter. When I stumble on positive stories I embrace them. And even in the middle of this awful war, there is some good. Protest still exists in Russia. It exists in headline-grabbing instances of journalists brandishing anti-war signs on the evening news and thousands taking to Russia’s streets. But it also exists in large-scale, high-impact digital operations, meticulously planned and involving, of course, a hefty dose of bravery.
Putin can ban journalists all he wants – as he did in mid-June when he banned 29 UK journalists from entering Russia, including correspondents from the Guardian. He can saddle protesters with hefty prison terms and fines. He can block independent, critical sites. Yet people are finding ingenious ways to get the non-airbrushed truth out and to pass the message on.
Yes, it’s important not to overstate their role. Today’s dissidents play a high-stakes game. Putin isn’t a man to mess with. His punishment is swift and harsh, and while he might not run as well-oiled an online censorship machine as, say, Xi Jinping does in China, he’s fast catching up. But allow us a moment to rejoice in the image of people in Russia visiting porn sites only to be served the naked truth about the Ukraine war. If anything deserves to be called a “special operation”, it’s surely that.
Jemimah Steinfeld is editor-in-chief of Index on Censorship
The Guardian · by Jemimah Steinfeld · July 2, 2022


15. China is doubling down on its bid to challenge the dollar's global dominance. Analysts lay out why it's unlikely to succeed.


I hope it is unlikely. But we should not be complacent. In my estimation the threat to the dollar as the reserve currency is a grave national security threat to the US.

China is doubling down on its bid to challenge the dollar's global dominance. Analysts lay out why it's unlikely to succeed.
markets.businessinsider.com · by George Glover
  • The BRICS group of countries are brewing up a challenge to dollar dominance with a new reserve currency.
  • But it's unlikely to challenge the dollar, as four of the five currencies are managed against the greenback.
  • "I'd rather be paid in US dollars than rand, real, rubles, rupees or yuans," one analyst told Insider.

China started cooking up fresh challenges to the US dollar's role in international trade in recent days, but the signs are it's unlikely to make much headway.
The BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — plan to develop a new global reserve currency based on a basket of their currencies, President Vladimir Putin said. Meanwhile, China said it will build a fresh yuan reserve alongside Hong Kong, Singapore and three other states, with each contributing around $2.2 billion.
Beijing likely hopes that these moves will threaten the dollar's position as the world's reserve currency, used in contracts to oil international trade. But the greenback has seen off such challenges before.
In 2016, the yuan joined the basket of currencies that make up the International Monetary Fund's international reserve asset, the special drawing rights.
"That was meant to be the gun being fired on the yuan becoming a major international reserve," ING's global head of markets, Chris Turner, told Insider. "But the pick-up in yuan's use as a reserve currency has been quite disappointing."
Only one-quarter of the shift away from dollars has been into the renminbi in recent years, according to the IMF.
Central banks have instead pivoted to holding non-traditional reserve currencies like the Australian dollar, Swedish krona, and South Korean won, and the yuan still accounts for just 2.9% of global reserves.
The yuan is also pegged the dollar via a reference rate, with the Chinese central bank maintaining a broadly seven-to-one ratio to make China's exports more competitive. That means it's unlikely to threaten its American counterpart as a global reserve asset.
"The BRICS reserve currency will be a challenging plan," Oanda senior market analyst Jeff Halley told Insider. "Four out of the five currencies are managed currencies, and in China's case, the yuan is not convertible and is managed against a basket of currencies, of which the US dollar has the largest weighting."
In addition, there's the question of conversion — that is, whether there are restrictions on how a currency is traded on the foreign exchange market. Those who want to trade high amounts of India's rupee, for instance, must get approval first.
So while investors might be concerned about this apparent fresh threat to dollar dominance, these factors suggest the greenback won't face losing its pole position any time soon.
"I hear this story all the time," Halley said. "There is no threat in the foreseeable future to the dominance of the US dollar. It is the currency of the largest economy, used in the largest and deepest capital markets in the world, and is freely convertible."
"None of that applies to the BRICS currencies," he added. "I'd rather be paid in US dollars than rand, real, rubles, rupees, or yuans."
markets.businessinsider.com · by George Glover

16. Russia's messages with missiles tell West to back off

We cannot back down in our support to Ukraine. We must demonstrate strength and resolve.

Russia's messages with missiles tell West to back off
AP · by TAMER FAKAHANY and CARA ANNA · July 2, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The latest in a litany of horrors in Ukraine came this week as Russian firepower rained down on civilians in a busy shopping mall far from the front lines of a war in its fifth month.
The timing was not likely a coincidence.
While much of the attritional war in Ukraine’s east is hidden from sight, the brutality of Russian missile strikes on a mall in the central city of Kremenchuk and on residential buildings in the capital, Kyiv, unfolded in full view of the world and especially of Western leaders gathered for a trio of summits in Europe.
Were the attacks a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin as the West sought to arm Ukraine with more effective weapons to bolster its resistance, and to set Ukraine on the path to joining the European Union?
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko suggested as much when missiles struck the capital on June 26, three days after EU leaders unanimously agreed to make Ukraine a candidate for membership.
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It was “maybe a symbolic attack” as the Group of Seven leading economic powers and then NATO leaders prepared to meet and apply further pressure on Moscow, he said. At least six people were killed in the Kyiv strike, which pummeled an apartment building.
The former commanding general of U.S. Army forces in Europe, retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, went further in connecting the attack and the meetings. “The Russians are humiliating the leaders of the West,” he said.
A day after the Kyiv attack, as G-7 leaders met in Germany to discuss further support for Ukraine during their annual summit, Russia fired missiles at a crowded shopping mall in the central Ukrainian city of Kremenchuk, killing at least 19 people.
The timing of both attacks appeared to be juxtaposed with the European meetings of U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron, all supporters of Ukraine.
Defying the evidence, Putin and his officials deny that Russia hit residential areas. Putin has denied that Russian forces targeted the Kremenchuk mall, saying it was directed at a nearby weapons depot. But Ukrainian officials and witnesses said a missile directly hit the mall.


It was hardly the first time that bursts of violence were widely seen as signals of Moscow’s displeasure. In late April, Russian missiles struck Kyiv barely an hour after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a news conference with visiting U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
“This says a lot about Russia’s true attitude toward global institutions,” Zelenskyy said at the time. Kyiv’s mayor called the attack Putin’s way of giving the “middle finger.”
The Russian president recently warned that Moscow would strike targets it had so far spared if the West supplied Ukraine with weapons that could reach Russia. If Kyiv gets long-range rockets, Russia will “draw appropriate conclusions and use our means of destruction, which we have plenty of,” Putin said.
On Friday, a day after Russian forces made a high-profile retreat from Snake Island near the Black Sea port city of Odesa following what Ukraine called a barrage of artillery and missile strikes, Russia bombarded residential areas in a coastal town near Odesa and killed at least 21 people, including two children.
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While Russia’s messaging can be blunt and devastating, Ukraine’s signals under Zelenskyy have focused daily on seeking to amplify Moscow’s cruelty to a world that day by day risks becoming weary of the war.
If interest fades, the concerted support seen at global summits could fade, too. and with it the urgency to deliver the heavier weapons that Ukraine craves.
Zelenskyy tends to pair pleas for more help with reminders that all of Europe ultimately is at stake.
He described the mall attack as “one of the most daring terrorist attacks in European history.”
For all of Ukraine’s indisputable suffering, it was a bold statement of some hyperbole in the context of extremist attacks with mass deaths in Paris, Nice, Brussels, Madrid and London in this century alone.
For Zelenskyy and Ukraine, the underlying demand cannot be reiterated enough: provide more heavy weapons, and faster, before Russia perhaps makes irreversible gains in the eastern industrial region of the Donbas, where street-by-street fighting grinds on.
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In his nightly public addresses, Zelenskyy also makes sure to capture the traumatic toll on everyday life in Ukraine, appealing well beyond global leaders to the wider world.
This week, he accused Russia of sabotaging “people’s attempts to live a normal life.”
Images of the shopping mall’s smoking debris said the rest.
___
Fakahany reported from London.
___
Follow AP’s coverage of the Ukraine war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by TAMER FAKAHANY and CARA ANNA · July 2, 2022

17. Meet The Shadowy Ukrainian Unit That Sabotages Targets Inside Russia



Meet The Shadowy Ukrainian Unit That Sabotages Targets Inside Russia
Known as the Shaman Battalion, these Ukraine special operations troops infiltrate into Russian territory to strike key targets.
BY
JUL 1, 2022 11:49 AM
thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · July 1, 2022
Sometimes they cross the border by helicopter. Other times, by foot.
But the objective is always the same, says the head of a shadowy Ukraine special operations group known as the Shaman Battalion.
Give the Russians a taste of what Ukrainians have been experiencing since 2014. And especially since Feb. 24.
“You might have heard about the missiles strike at the shopping mall recently,” the man who goes by the callsign 'Shaman' told The War Zone in an exclusive interview Thursday morning. “You've definitely heard about Bucha. You've heard about the missile strike at the railway station with refugees at Kramatorsk. I wish all these special ops actions would happen on Russian soil now. Because I want them to know the feeling that they give to the people of Ukraine.”

Speaking through an interpreter via Zoom, Shaman, the leader of the eponymous group, said the battalion is doing its part to make that happen.
Over the course of Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine, images of attacks inside Russia have appeared on social media. They've been carried out on a wide array of targets, including an ammunition storage facility, an airbase, and what appeared to be a daring raid by Ukrainian Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters in April that crossed low over the border into Russia and struck an oil storage facility in Belgorod.
While declining to offer details about specific locations of these clandestine missions, Shaman smiles when asked about that raid.
“You know that that explosion on the refinery in Belgorod is not the end,” he said. “It’s just the tip of the iceberg.”
The Ukraine Defense Intelligence soldier known by his callsign, Shaman, leads a shadowy team of operators who conduct raids into Russia. via Zoom
Special operations missions into Russia, or Russian-held Ukrainian territory, is not a new phenomenon, Shaman said.
They began not long after Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Donbas in 2014.
“There were previous missions, multiple big numbers of them, into Crimea and other territories,” said Shaman. “We had some operations in Russia long before 2022. Because Russia actually started this war against Ukraine in 2014, not in 2022.”
Those raids, he said, continue.
“And that's nothing unusual,” he said, once again declining to offer specifics. “We're using ordinary tactics of SOF [special operations forces ] units. It's a routine and right thing to do. We're raiding their rear. We’re conducting diversions. So there's nothing really special about it. It's indeed complicated work to do. But we love it and we're doing it with pleasure.”
The work may be complicated, but Shaman says planning the missions is not.
“It's actually it's quite simple to describe,” he said. “Every time when we're doing planning, and we're preparing the mission, it's ordinary preparation that is done by every special forces unit across the globe. And the tactics we use are the same tactics.”
There is one difference, he said, smiling.
“The only thing is that our plans are always ideal. They always work because our main motto is ‘we'll get there and then we'll see.’ So we get there and then we see. That's why it always goes well.”
Making the decision to go on a raid is not easy. But once it’s made, there is an inner peace.
“The first and the hardest thing to do is you need to come to terms with yourself,” said Shaman. “You've got to take that decision. Because you understand that the chances for success most of the times are 50-50 and chances to get back are actually even less than that. But when once the decision is made, it's quite easy. “
Given the long odds, the only people who go on missions are those who want to, Shaman said.
“We always seek only volunteers. We never task people to do something. They're volunteers and they're worth going to Valhalla if they fall in a battle.”
Shaman also heaped tremendous praise on the helicopter pilots who take them on missions.
Shaman said his battalion could not accomplish its missions without the help of Ukraine helicopter pilots. Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
“What is really important is that we have great helicopter pilots. They're the guys who have very precise, very outwritten plans that consider all necessary details. They're super pilots. They're strong, intelligent, and very highly motivated.”
The pilots, said Shaman, actually do the bulk of the work.
“They help us to infiltrate and they also help us to exfiltrate. They actually are doing the biggest part of the job. Our job on the spot is just to kill everyone, and then they get us back. They practically support what we're doing and that requires a lot of skill.”
There is, he said, an exhilaration from taking part in these raids
“You feel the cold of your blood and you feel the rush of adrenaline.”
The missions into Russia are “not a big secret,” said Shaman. “Sometimes it happens on a helicopter. Sometimes we go in by foot. Most of the times we’re able to locate the good entry point to fly in or to walk on foot into Russia and then afterwards, what can I say?”
Again, a slight smile creases his face, which is barely visible from behind an olive drab balaclava that covers most of it.

“I want to send my best regards to Belgorod,” he said, referring to the site of the April refinery raid. “I want to suggest to them to make stocks of fuels, grain, maybe flour, and salt. They might need it in future. And also I'd like to ask them to start thinking what's going on and maybe shake up and start doing something.”
Shaman said his callsign comes from the Ukrainian soothsayers and healers who beat drums as part of their ceremonies.
“There's this saying that hitting on the face is like hitting at this instrument,” he said. “So I'm good at hitting the face.”
The battalion that takes his name was created after Russia launched its full-scale invasion.
“When this war started, I gathered a bunch of old pirates who were willing, had no fear and complaints, and wanted to defend their country,” said Shaman. “People just started asking, ‘who are those people? Those are Shaman’s people.’ That's how they started calling the battalion the Shaman battalion.”
Reporting to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence directorate, the battalion is made up of diverse segments of Ukraine society.
“There are a variety of very different personalities because today in Ukraine there are no shades of grey. There's only black and white - I mean good and evil. So either you're either fighting for your country or working to help those who are fighting. If not, it means you are on the other side."

“That is why the team of people I have are extremely motivated. They are people from various circles and they don't need any extra motivation or influence. I have ex-generals. I actually have an ex-deputy minister from [the] government who's fighting in my team now. They are representatives, if you will, of the elite circles of society. But today they're fighting for this country. With honor, they're doing the right thing. They have no pity [for] themselves [or] the enemy.”
After about a half-hour of talking, Shaman excused himself, but before leaving, introduced one of his men - the ex-deputy minister.
Dressed in camouflage, he introduced himself by his callsign - Sydney.
A former high-ranking Ukrainian government official, "Sydney" now fights Russians with the Shaman battalion. via Zoom
“We've known each other before this outbreak of large-scale Russian aggression against us,” Sydney said. “But on the 24th of February, at about six in the morning, was the first time when I met Shaman as my commander.”
There was no entry training course to join the battalion.
“The primary bar is a personal conversation with the battalion commander,” Sydney said. “But then we're doing polygraphs and it's a quite ordinary procedure. So we take all the necessary steps.”
Shaman battalion members “all have different levels of training,” said Sydney. “We are people of different ages. Beginning from 18 years up to 50 and we even have a few older guys. As our commander once said, we're all members of the crew of the last pirate battleship.”
And that, said Sydney, is what makes this unit so interesting.
“The Shaman battalion is not a standard unit. There is a symbiosis of experience and motivation, and I believe this is the reason why some time after I suppose there will be many stories in books or even in movies.”
But the unit's first mission, to try and secure Antonov Airport in Hostomel near Kyiv, did not go as well as hoped.

“Regretfully there's been lots of strategic mistakes made that cannot be fixed now, but at least we can extract some experience and some lessons learned from those mistake of ours.”
Preparations for resisting the incoming enemy air assault “were not at the highest level possible,” he said.
“A group of Shaman got its orders and started moving to the airfield right after the first missiles struck at the airfield. We actually had trouble getting there because by that time, citizens of Kyiv, a majority of them, were trying to flee using the very same roads. And it was very hard. It was very complicated just in getting there.”
Once there, “the enemy was already overhead and we weren't properly ready for the following action. So definitely from the technical perspective, certain needed preparations were not done.”
Russians were already pounding the airfield with missiles.
A view of the wreckage of the military vehicles, at a hangar after it was destroyed by Russia's attacks on Antonov Airport in Hostomel, Ukraine on May 5, 2022. Dogukan Keskinkilic/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
“There was an impact site of a Tochka-U, which is a big missile,” said Sydney. “Then there were a lot of Sukhoi aircraft that were flying over, dropping stuff.”
After that came the helicopters. Huge waves of them.
“There were over 44 helicopters with air assault troops and our problem on the spot was that we were lacking a means and assets for taking them down in those numbers.”
Sydney then praised the young Ukrainian National Guard troops who stood their ground, firing old Soviet-era man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) at the overwhelming influx of Russia’s vaunted VDV airborne assault troops.

“I would like to give credit to the young boys. Some of them were 18 and 19 years old. Their mission was to guard the airfield and runway itself. They took down a few helicopters and one Sukhoi fighter jet. Despite the fact that they're people of 18 and 19 years of age, they have balls bigger than many people in this world.”
The attack on the airport was eventually repelled, the biggest in a cascading series of military disasters for Russia that led to their ignominious retreat.
But before they left Antonov Airport, the Russians lashed out, said Sydney, destroying the world’s biggest airplane - the six-engine An-225 cargo jet known worldwide by its nickname Mriya.
The Shaman battalion member named "Sydney" said Russia destroyed the An-225 cargo jet known as Mriya. Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
“Mriya was just burned down,” said Sydney. “I’m pretty sure it was done on purpose. The Russians are very big on symbolism. They like to pick certain dates and places and even Mriya as a phenomenon was a bone up their throats.”
So, Sydney claims, they destroyed it.
The biggest failure at Antonov Airport wasn’t a lack of weapons, Sydney said. It was not being supplied with more advanced systems.
“The problem was not that they didn't have Javelins or Stingers. That was not the case. I know for sure.”
The reason, he said, was that “about a year ago we suggested we host a military exercise in that particular airfield.”
The plan was to train for a potential Russian air assault, like the kind that actually happened.
But that was met with resistance from higher-ups.
“When we suggested that, we were told that we have militaristic views,” said Sydney. “And because those people we were talking to didn't want to believe, or it was hard for them to believe, that Russia may start a large-scale invasion into Ukraine, they didn't believe us.”
He likened the situation to a recent Hollywood movie, starring Leonardo DiCaprio as a scientist whose warnings about impending doom fall on deaf and dismissing ears.
"Don't Look Up shows really well what was going on a year ago here in Ukraine,” he said. “And I believe that to some extent, it will continue.”
Sydney said he can’t talk about any missions into Russia, deferring such discussions to Shaman, his commander.
But overall, the nature of the war has changed.
After their defeat at Antonov Airport, the Russian advance on Kyiv stalled, then fell apart.
As Russian forces retreated north to Belarus, the Shaman battalion was among those Ukrainian forces attacking them on their way out. There was a lot of close-quarters fighting along the way.
“At the very beginning of the conflict, there was a lot of close-fire combat in Moshchun, Irpin, and other small towns next to Kyiv. At that very moment, the Russians didn't have a good understanding of where they got to.”
The nature of the war now is different.
“The only thing today's Russian army is capable of is hitting from a far distance,” said Sydney, referring to the ongoing and somewhat successful massive long-range fires invading forces are launching against Ukraine in the Donbas area in the east of that country. “The only thing they're capable of is bombing shopping malls, striking them with their missiles, killing civilians. causing harm to peaceful people. That's the only thing they are capable of to date.”
So now, with the war a slugfest with neither side making huge gains or suffering catastrophic battlefield defeats, Sydney is prepared for the long haul of what he says may be a generational conflict.
“This war will not stop,” he said. "This war is forever. This war will go on until everything that obstructs us from having our normal simple lives no longer exists.”
And that will take some time.
“I'm sure that our kids will also be fighting,” he said. “And we will get them properly trained. They will be better prepared than we are.”
Contact the author: [email protected]
thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · July 1, 2022

18. How a Nation's Social Condition Relates to Its Global Standing

From my thesis advisor (2003-2004) and faculty mentor (2010-2011) the National War College as well as Georgetown colleague. I have learned a lot from Mike over the years. He has always been on the cutting edge of provocative and controversial ideas and concepts.

The 419 page tome (I mean report) can be downloaded here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA400/RRA499-1/RAND_RRA499-1.pdf. It will be a while before I can digest it.

I previously forwarded Mike's Foreign Affairs article on this topic: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-06-21/what-makes-power-great


How a Nation's Social Condition Relates to Its Global Standing
rand.org · by Michael J. Mazarr
Research Questions
  1. How should societal characteristics and national competitive advantage be defined?
  2. What is the causal relationship between societal characteristics and competitive outcomes?
  3. What are the specific societal characteristics that have been historically associated with national dynamism and competitive position?
  4. What is the United States' standing in those areas?
Nations rise and fall, succeed or fail in rivalries, and enjoy stability or descend into chaos because of a complex web of factors that affect competitive advantage. One critical component is the package of essential social characteristics of a nation. The ultimate story of the Cold War is that the United States was simply a more competitive society than the Soviet Union: more energetic, more vibrant, more innovative, more productive, more legitimate. Through analysis of comparative studies of historical eras and trends, historical case studies, and the findings of issue-specific empirical research, the report explores how seven characteristics of a society determine its competitive standing and distinguish dynamic and competitively successful nations.
If the history surveyed in this report provides an accurate guide to the future, the fate of the United States in today's rivalries will not be determined solely, or even in significant degree, by the numbers of its weapons or amounts of defense spending or how many proxy wars it wins but by the basic characteristics of its society. The author applies the seven leading characteristics that affect national standing to the United States to create a snapshot of where the country stands. That application provides some reason for optimism. The United States continues to reflect many of these characteristics, and the overall synergistic engine, more than any other large country in the world. However, multiple trends are working to weaken traditional U.S. advantages. Several, such as the corruption of the national information space, pose acute risks to the long-term dynamism and competitiveness of the nation, raising the worrying prospect that the United States has begun to display classic patterns of a major power on the far side of its dynamic and vital curve.
Key Findings
Seven leading societal characteristics are associated with national competitive success
  • These are national ambition and will, unified national identity, shared opportunity, an active state, effective institutions, a learning and adapting society, and competitive diversity and pluralism.
  • There is some causal relationship between these seven characteristics and competitive outcomes in most cases studies the authors examined.
A prudent balance within each of these characteristics is important
  • Factors such as national ambition or pluralism can become competitive handicaps when pushed to an extreme.
  • Some of the characteristics harbor greater risk than others in this regard: Excessive national ambition and will is more dangerous than excessive shared opportunity. But all of them carry some danger when thrown out of balance.
A specific set of factors other than societal characteristics helps determine national competitive standing
  • These include membership in networks of trade and exchange of ideas.
  • It is often the interaction of these nonsocietal factors with the qualities of a nation—the ways in which its character matches or falls out of alignment with the demands of the moment—that determines national fates.
Lasting competitive advantage derives from positive-feedback synergies among the seven nominated societal characteristics
  • It is these blended, interactive effects, creating competitive wholes greater than the sum of their parts, that distinguish the strongest and most competitive nations of each era.
  • Nations whose competitive standing deteriorates tend to manifest weakness in many factors that compound: Competitive failure typically results from a negative-feedback loop of some kind, in the same way that success derives from a positive-feedback loop.
One recipe for national competitive advantage was most consistently associated with success, the Renaissance spirit
  • Competitive societies tend to be open, tolerant, full of intellectual energy and commitment to learning; they have a powerful sense of their own role in the world and a sense of mission or will; they almost always benefit from strong public and private institutions, as well as a state apparatus that actively promotes advantage; and they embody a pluralistic clash of ideas and an ability of people from many backgrounds to offer their talents and succeed.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
The Sources of National Competitive Advantage
Chapter Two
Factors Other Than Societal Qualities That Determine Competitive Position
Chapter Three
National Ambition and Will
Chapter Four
Unified National Identity
Chapter Five
Shared Opportunity
Chapter Six
An Active State
Chapter Seven
Effective Institutions
Chapter Eight
A Learning and Adapting Society
Chapter Nine
Competitive Diversity and Pluralism
Chapter Ten
Assessing U.S. Standing in the Characteristics
Chapter Eleven
Findings and Implications
Appendix A
Methodology
Appendix B
Defining Concepts
Research conducted by
This research was sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Document Details
  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 418
  • List Price: $49.95
  • Paperback Price: $39.96
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-0939-3
  • Document Number: RR-A499-1
  • Year: 2022
  • Series: Research Reports
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rand.org · by Michael J. Mazarr


19. James Stejskal: The Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle


Photos at the link.
June 30, 2022
James Stejskal: The Origins of Modern Close Quarter Battle


“The end product of CQB training must be automatic and instantaneous killing.”

About the author
Present at the beginning of U.S. Army Special Forces’ involvement in CT operations, James Stejskal has written both the narrative history Special Forces Berlin and a series of Cold War espionage / special forces novels called “The Snake Eater Chronicles.” His two latest novels, Appointment in Tehran and Direct Legacy, describe what it was like to go through SF Berlin’s and SAS CQB training in the 1970s and 1980s.
  
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Special Forces Berlin and the Beginnings of Counter Terror Ops and CQB in the US Army

The Article
© 2022 by James Stejskal
Close Quarter Battle. CQB.
Just hearing the words brings back memories of hours on the range and in the shooting house practicing everything from basic individual marksmanship to room and building entry dynamics with teams.
Close Quarter Battle is one of those monikers that gets tossed about like a salad.
Everyone has his own version.
Which is a cautionary tale because not all versions work.
But not so long ago, CQB started with a single and consistent methodology.
William Fairbairn: The legendary CQB pioneer

The principal pioneer in the field is, of course, William Ewart Fairbairn.
A former Royal Marine and British colonial policeman, China, Fairbairn joined the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) in 1907.
The SMP was manned by Japanese, British, American, Sikh, and Chinese volunteers. Fairbairn was both a street cop and a trainer—he observed both police and criminal tactics to develop better operational procedures.
Later in his tenure with the SMP, Fairbairn created the Reserve Unit (RU), essentially the first Special Weapons and Tactics unit in the world.
The RU officers were trained in what Fairbairn called ‘Gutter Fighting’ — that is how to take down the hardest criminals of the Triad gangs and their ‘Hatchet-men’ when no backup was to be expected.
Fairbairn learned his “tactics, techniques, and procedures” the hard way — on the streets.
After one nasty encounter and a lengthy medical recovery, he learned Judo from a Japanese instructor.
After that, he picked up various Chinese systems.

Incorporating all that was good in each, he developed his own fighting system called “Defendu.”
It was a complete system of armed and unarmed methodologies that he taught to the SMP and reportedly to the 4th Marines, the “China Marines,” a 1,000-man regiment who served in Shanghai’s International Settlement before World War II.
Fairbairn’s cohort and co-designer of the Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife, Eric Anthony Sykes, the chief of the RU’s sniper section was at his side and co-developed many of their CQB techniques during their time together in China.
Fairbairn returned to England at the onset of WWII and was recruited, along with Sykes, to teach CQB to the operatives of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), the forerunner of the American OSS, as well as commandos and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) also known as MI6.
Additionally, he instructed the Home Guard’s secret Auxiliary Units, who would act as stay-behind forces should Germany invade Britain.
Fairbairn was then detailed to SOEs Special Training School No. 103 aka “Camp X” located near Lake Ontario, Canada.
There he trained Canadian and American operatives in his “quick and dirty fighting” skills ranging from unarmed combat, and knife fighting, to the use of small arms in close quarters. Probably the most important aspect of Fairbairn’s methods was that he sought to instill the mindset to kill an enemy in combat without hesitation.
Likewise, Sykes tried to do the same and ended all his demonstrations with the words, “and then, kick him in the testicles.”
The key to Fairbairn’s methodology was “instinctive fire.”
Instead of carefully aimed shots at fixed targets, trainees went into a crouched position and quickly squeezed off two rounds — a “double tap.”
Kill the enemy before he killed you.
With submachine guns, he encouraged trigger control and the same double-tap method rather than full automatic bursts.

One of his training tools was what he called “the fun house,” an innovative shooting facility his students preferred to call “the house of horrors.”
First used in Shanghai to train SMP officers.
Fairbairn and Sykes built a similar building at SOE’s Lochailort, Scotland training base.
Based on a small cottage that incorporated pop-up targets, trainees entered through the roof to engage targets in darkened rooms filled with smoke, disorienting lights, and soundtracks of gunfire and explosions.
Fairbairn ensured similar training facilities were built at STS 103 and OSS training sites in the United States. These killing houses have since become standard training fare with special operations forces worldwide.
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A brief history of CQB “influencers”

Another influential instructor was American Rex Applegate who learned his basic marksmanship as a youngster in Idaho from professional hunter Gus Peret, his uncle.
At the beginning of World War II, Applegate was developing armed and unarmed fighting courses for the Army when he was recruited for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) by Brigadier General William Donovan specifically to instruct hand-to-hand combat, knife fighting, and pistol marksmanship.
Applegate was sent to England to experience the training being given to British special operatives and commandos and the newly-formed American Ranger formations.
It was here where he came into close contact with Fairbairn from whom he absorbed close quarters combat methods.
Applegate came back to the OSS’s Area B which would become Camp David.
There were many other early practitioners of “quick kill” shooting, such as FBI Agent Jacob Aldolphus Bryce aka “Jelly.”
He was a member of the FBI’s “Gunslingers,” a group of agents who were specifically tasked to engage highly violent criminals to take them down fast.
But Bryce did not pass on his skills.
There are conflicting reports that he instructed at the FBI Academy, but the Academy itself has no record of this.
Another SOE officer, lesser known today but just as formidable, was Colonel Leonard Hector Grant-Taylor, who instructed SOE operatives at a base in Egypt.
In the United States, with the dissolution of the OSS and the Rangers after WWII much of the expertise associated with CQB was lost or subordinated to other, less complicated (and easier to teach) marksmanship training.
On the whole, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts did not require the same close-quarters fighting skills although the Marines and Army kept up “quick-kill” rifle training to some degree.
In 1990, the USMC even re-issued Shooting To Live, a book written by Fairbairn and Sykes in 1942, as a reference publication called FMFRP-12-81, an indication of the considered value of their skills.
The instruction and techniques which Fairbairn, Sykes, and Applegate developed serve as the foundation for modern CQB.

Jeff Cooper is probably the best known of recent “influencers.”
In the 1960s and 1970s, Cooper emerged as the American father of the “modern technique” of shooting.
Cooper, a U.S. Marine, developed a style that included the “Weaver Stance,” a two-handed pistol grip used in competition that differed slightly from Fairbairn’s stance.
Cooper adapted his from that used by California County Deputy Jack Weaver for shooting competitions.
It featured isometric tension through a “push-pull” holding technique.
Cooper’s techniques have been woven into practical pistol instruction and adopted by many police units.
It was the 1970s when CQB began to make its resurgence

It was the 1970s when CQB began to make its resurgence in the U.S. military.
But it had already done so in the United Kingdom, spurred by the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment’s operations in Aden during the mid-1960s.
Fighting an insurgency in urban areas highlighted the need for tactics to eliminate a hostile terrorist threat that might emerge in the middle of an unarmed civilian crowd.
That required being able to eliminate the threat completely without endangering innocent lives.
In 1966, the 22nd SAS Regiment started a CQB course to fill that need.
Its basic requirement was for an undercover operator (in civilian clothing) to draw his weapon and fire six rounds into a playing card at 15 meters.
This was followed by the creation of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Wing, a specialist group of trainers initially created as a response to rising terrorism in Europe and especially the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre in Germany.
The CRW was (and remains) responsible for training the entire cadre of operational SAS soldiers in CQB counterterrorist (CT) tactics, as well as selected troopers for Body Guard (BG) operations.
Once trained the SAS Squadrons would rotate to serve in what was first called “Pagoda Troop” and later the “Special Project Teams” on standby for CT incidents.
It’s first acknowledged mission was the successful 1980 assault of the Iranian Embassy at Princes Gate in London which ended with 19 hostages rescued and 5 of 6 terrorists killed in an 11-minute take-down dubbed “Operation Nimrod.”
Terrorism had begun to make U.S. Government leadership uneasy

In the United States, terrorism had begun to make U.S. Government leadership uneasy.
Slowly efforts were launched to form counterterrorism capable units to combat it.
Quickly ruling out military police units as inappropriate, the task fell to the U.S. Army Special Forces.
In Europe—the epicenter of terrorist incidents against American interests—Special Forces Berlin was tasked to form an “anti-hijacking” capability by the U.S. European Command in 1975.
Close Quarter Battle would form the core of its initial train-up.
Instruction was developed and presented by the unit’s soldiers who had served with the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) in Vietnam along with several who’d served with the 22nd SAS and been trained in CQB and BG tactics.
SF Berlin would be followed by other units trained for the CT mission including the short-lived 5th SF Group’s “Blue Light” program, then in 1978 by SF Operational Detachment Delta, and in 1980 by SEAL Team Six.
Many other nations launched similar programs during that period, Israel, Germany, and France among them.
No matter the origin, it is important to note that CQB techniques have never been fixed in their presentation, but are always adaptable to the situation and the weapons used.
The key to CQB, therefore, is not the instruments used but the spirit behind them.
This attitude is nowhere more eloquently described than in this training guidance issued in the early 1970s.
It is reprinted here without change to its original form.
A legendary CQB training guidance issued in the early 1970s

The aim of CQB training is to guarantee success in killing.
It is much more of a personal affair than ordinary combat.
And it is just not good enough to temporarily put your opponent out of action so that he can live to fight another day.
He must be definitively and quickly killed, so so that you can switch your whole attention onto the next target.
Besides obvious physical abilities, the CQB operator must be cool-headed and above all, remorseless.
Opponents must never be given “gentlemanly” chances.
He must be kicked whilst he is down so that he stays down.
This is imperative.
The pistol and submachine gun are the main weapons used by the CQB operator.
These weapons are generally regarded by the ignorant as”dangerous” and “useless”.
In the hands of a trained. CQB operator, these weapons are extremely lethal.
However, for the CQB operator to maintain a high degree of professionalism he must train continuously in an aggressive manner.
The end product of CQB training must be automatic and instantaneous killing.
The general coverage of CQB is under six headings:
A. Surprise
The operator must gain complete surprise over his opponents in all possible situations.
This is achieved by good intelligence, planning, briefing, method of approach, choice of weapon for the job, choice of footwear, etc.
If these principles are adhered to, they will result in the success of the operation, and also ensure that the operator himself is never surprised.
B. Confidence
Successful CQB is largely a matter of confidence.
Confidence in himself, the situation, and his weapon play a very big part in ensuring the success of an operator.
The confident handling of his weapon makes lethal CQB shooting from almost any angle as easy as punching a drunk on the nose.
C. Concentration
Another abbreviation of close quarter battles could well be CTK (Concentrate to Ki11).
The operator shoots to kill, not hit.
He must build up a clear, defined picture of every aspect of the job at hand.
Nothing must distract him from his purpose of killing in a systematic fashion.
The mind does wander quite easily, but this must not be tolerated in CQB.
It must be emphatically stressed upon from the moment the student starts his training.
A wandering mind is usually detected in training by a fall-off it results and, of course, in the real thing by a vacancy for a new operator arising.
D. Speed
In CQB, contact is over in a matter of split seconds.
Therefore speed is vital but it must be the correct type of speed.
The mad, wild, planless rush is not only foolish but in most cases, catastrophical.
The speed must be of a cool, unruffled deliberate nature.
Accuracy and success go naturally with this speed.
The tempo of all CQB is “Careful Hurry”.
This tempo must be adhered to throughout the training.
Keenness and excitement are natural amongst students, but it does develop the incorrect sort of speed.
It must be stamped out from the word “Go”.
The Battle-crouch with its ensuing good, deft footwork, must be strictly adopted.
An exited student will get himself into the oddest firing positions and so become off balance.
The CQB Operator must never become flustered and stray from the “Careful Hurry”.
E. Teamwork
Individual CQB operators in Special Forces are exceptional and normal operations are carried out by small teams or patrols.
Due to the close proximity and speed of the participants in CQB, the absolute essence of teamwork is of primary importance.
Who goes where and when.
Who kills whom and how.
Synchronized timing, etc. must be spot on.
A team going on an operation must be given all the time possible to study their target and plan its execution.
They must rehearse time and time again, taking into account all the possibilities of target routine change.
After initial CQB training, students should be made to work in pairs, covering each other during tactical approach and withdrawal, etc.
Afterward, add a third and fourth man building up to patrol strength,
F. Offensive Attitude
In CQB from the very start, the gloves are off.
It is a simple matter of “his life, or yours”.
Squeamishness, pity, remorse or mistakes are fatal.
Nothing should be done in self-defense.
All actions must be of an extremely offensive nature.
Operators should develop a hatred and contempt for the opposition, but, never, never, underestimate him.
Students should be edged into this determined and offensive spirit from the commencement of training.
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Photos courtesy by NARA and James Stejskal


​20. How to Break Russia’s Black Sea Blockade

Excerpts:

Difficult as the choices may be, the West cannot simply ignore the problem.
The United States could take a direct approach by registering, or reflagging, merchant vessels as American ships, so that Russia would have to attack U.S. vessels to enforce the blockade. There is a precedent for such a move: the United States reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to provide U.S. naval protection during the Iran-Iraq War in 1987–88 to ensure the continued flow of oil. This is a risky strategy, though; even during the tanker war, these reflagged tankers were subject to sniping and mining, and they needed escorts as a result, regardless of their redesignated nationality. Russia likewise might not be deterred by this tactic.
There are also diplomatic options that could be worth pursuing. Putin, for instance, has stated that Russia would allow shipments from Ukraine under some conditions. One could imagine a ship-for-ship agreement, in which one merchant ship from Ukraine would be allowed to engage in international trade in exchange for one ship from Russia doing so. This tit-for-tat proposal has gained little traction, given that it would provide Russia substantial financial resources and constitute a precedent for lifting sanctions. Still, Western nations have been reluctant to risk military confrontation, and the global food situation will grow increasingly dire. A diplomatic approach might win international support over time.
Countries depending on Ukrainian and Russian grain likely have enough supplies to last for a while, and their stores are being boosted by Western aid in the short term. There are no current reports of hunger. But over the longer term, the status quo will prove untenable. Should the war continue, dwindling supplies will cause shortages and food riots that could lead to social and regime instability. The West will face mounting pressure to act. Global hunger may not be acute yet, but when it hits, it will hit hard. It is the responsibility of NATO and the West to have a plan in place before the shortage becomes a crisis.




How to Break Russia’s Black Sea Blockade
The World Must Act to Address the Global Food Crisis
July 1, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Mark Cancian · July 1, 2022
The world is facing a global food crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine’s agricultural products are critical for global food security—Russia and Ukraine account for 13 percent and 8.5 percent of the world’s wheat exports, respectively—and sanctions against Russia, as well as Moscow’s naval blockade of Ukraine’s sea ports, have taken these vital exports off the market. As a result, millions of people are at risk of experiencing acute food insecurity, particularly in the developing world. The stakes are high: a food crisis on this scale could lead to catastrophic global hunger, fuel political instability in countries that depend on grain imports, and send shock waves throughout the global economy.
The international community has military and diplomatic options to ease this looming crisis, but all have downsides. NATO could use its formidable navies and extensive air power to escort Ukrainian grain ships. But a treaty known as the Montreux Convention limits the size of the force that can enter the Black Sea, and Russia might oppose convoys with its own naval arsenal, most likely by using mines and submarines. Alternative approaches, such as third-party convoys or shipping grain from non-Ukrainian Black Sea ports, would be less provocative but would still hinge on Russian acquiescence.
There are, in short, no easy fixes to this crisis. But difficult as the choices may be, the West cannot simply ignore the problem. Eventually, should hunger grow widespread and lead to political instability, there will be mounting pressure on the West to act. The United States and its allies must have a plan in place—even an imperfect one—if they wish to avoid a global disaster that could spiral out of control.
BACK TO SHORE
One way of circumventing Russia’s naval blockade and freeing up shipments of Ukraine’s agricultural exports would be to route them overland. With the help of neighboring countries such as Poland and Romania, Ukraine has already turned to roads and railways to ship grain. These methods of transport offer one major advantage: Russia lacks the ability to interdict such movement. Although rail lines are, in theory, vulnerable to attacks by missiles or aircraft, such interdiction is very hard to pull off for an extended period. As the Allies learned in World War II when they attempted to disrupt German and Japanese railways, rail lines are relatively easy to repair—one simply fills in craters and lays new tracks―so attacks must be continual. Russia lacks the means to carry out this approach: the country has depleted its arsenal of high-precision missiles necessary for such an assault, and its air force does not venture deep enough into Ukrainian territory to strike the rail lines bringing grain to European ports.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s rail system lacks the capacity to make up for the loss of sea trade. Moving the entirety of Ukraine’s food exports—estimated at 30 million tons of grain—would require 100 shiploads, compared with a whopping 300,000 rail carloads. Some calculations suggest that it would take 14 months to move all the grain by rail but only four months by sea. Given the scale of the undertaking, a ground-shipment approach is a useful interim measure, but it is not a long-term solution to the developing food crisis.
TROUBLED WATERS
NATO could seek to break Russia’s naval blockade by providing convoys for merchant ships headed to Ukrainian ports, which would provide the rapid flow of food that the world needs. But this strategy would face several obstacles, foremost being Russia’s significant naval forces, which would have the capacity to attack any Western ships that intervene in the conflict. Russia’s Black Sea fleet currently has five frigates, some amphibious ships, dozens of coastal-defense craft, and most important, six new Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. These submarines, the most advanced in the Russian inventory, were constructed with sophisticated quieting measures, incorporate an advanced sonar, and are armed with torpedoes, cruise missiles, and mines. Russia also has antiship missiles based in Crimea with ranges of at least 200 miles, but its recent abandonment of Snake Island opens a lower-risk zone in the west.

Russia’s grip on the Black Sea is not absolute: the loss of the Moskva, Russia’s flagship Black Sea missile cruiser, in April dealt a serious blow to Moscow’s ability to control Ukrainian waters. Although the Moskva had little capability against land targets and could not help with attacks on Ukrainian ground forces and infrastructure, it had 16 massive antiship missiles that would have dominated naval combat in the Black Sea had that occurred. As global attention turns toward Ukraine’s sea ports, the Russian military will feel the loss of the Moskva acutely.
NATO, however, will be limited in its ability to loosen Russia’s grip on the Black Sea because of the Montreux Convention. The1936 agreement regulates maritime traffic in the Turkish straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It allows unrestricted access to merchant vessels, and relatively free passage to Black Sea countries, but limits the size and number of warships that can transit the straits and the length of deployments by non–Black Sea countries. That caps the West’s ability to move forces into the area: non–Black Sea nations are each limited to a maximum weight of 30,000 tons, an aggregate total of 45,000 tons, and a stay of no more than 21 days. The convention also prohibits submarines from non–Black Sea nations, thus sidelining one of NATO’s great naval strengths. The United States is not a signatory to the Montreux Convention, so in theory these rules do not apply to the U.S. Navy. Washington has, nonetheless, complied with the agreement out of consideration for the rules-based international order and in deference to Turkey, a fellow NATO member.

Moscow’s naval blockade of Ukraine’s sea ports has taken Ukraine’s vital food exports off the market.
Ultimately, use of the straits will depend on Ankara, which could, in theory, bend the rules to facilitate a NATO naval buildup. But given Turkey’s relatively neutral stance in the conflict, its reluctance to jeopardize relationships with either Russia or the West, and its historical unwillingness to undermine the convention, the restrictions will likely hold. At most, Turkey might be willing to interpret some provisions flexibly, but such a concession would likely come at a high cost for the West, such as the provision of economic assistance, relief from some sanctions, or turning a blind eye to human rights violations.
NATO could work within the limitations set by the convention, which does permit some force buildup. The 45,000-ton restriction on vessels from external powers would allow about five destroyers. A U.S. DDG-51 class destroyer, an advanced multimission warship, would account for about 9,000 tons; a British Type 45 destroyer, which is also suited for a wide variety of tasks, would account for about 7,350 tons. Given the 30,000-ton cap on a single country’s forces, the United States could send three destroyers, and other countries such as Great Britain or France could send the other two. These five ships could provide a powerful escort for merchant ships carrying Ukrainian grain notwithstanding their limited numbers.
NATO could also bring its considerable air power to bear. Assuming that Romania and Bulgaria cooperate by providing bases and allowing NATO aircraft to fly over their territory, NATO’s airpower would dominate Russian surface forces and air forces in the Black Sea region—and help with the undersea battle.
IF THE SHOOTING BEGINS
If NATO sailed convoys to Ukrainian ports, it might have to contend with a Russian attack. Given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings to NATO to not intervene in the conflict, it seems unlikely that he would let a NATO convoy break Russia’s blockade without taking some kind of action. Russia would also have a strategic advantage in that it would not need to interdict all cargo movement. An attrition rate of even 25 percent would likely be more than NATO and maritime shippers would be willing to tolerate.

Russia would most likely use naval mines and submarines to attack the grain convoys, since these weapons are not only effective but also covert and deniable, which would mitigate the blame assigned for shooting first. Russia has already sown undersea mines in the approaches to Ukrainian ports. Ukraine could try to sweep them, but that would require a slow and painstaking search by small and vulnerable vessels. Further complicating the matter is the fact that Ukraine has also mined its coastline to defend against Russian forces; it would not be difficult for Moscow to point fingers at Kyiv should a mine damage a grain ship.

Russia’s grip on the Black Sea is not absolute.
The six Kilo-class submarines in Russia’s Black Sea fleet would pose the biggest threat to convoys, given that they are quiet and well armed. They could attack with torpedoes, launch cruise missiles from outside the escorts’ effective reach, or lay mines in the path of a convoy. Ground-based antiship missiles from Crimea could snipe at ships, and a major battle would likely erupt as NATO tried to suppress the Russian missile batteries. Other Russian forces would be unlikely to participate in any substantial way. Russia’s weak surface forces would not be a match for even a limited NATO escort. They could try sniping at convoy ships from close to shore, but that would expose them to Ukrainian antiship missiles and NATO airpower. Russia could also use its substantial air forces, but these are fully engaged in the ground war and have performed poorly thus far.
If Russia chose to contest the convoys, the world would likely find out when explosions rocked a grain ship. Russia would deny any involvement, claiming that the ship had hit a Ukrainian mine. NATO could accept Russian denials of involvement and try a different approach, should it wish to avoid further escalation. Alternatively, it could begin a naval campaign to clear mines and defeat Russian submarines. In that case, a naval shooting war would ensue.
Such a war would devolve into a series of convoy battles as NATO worked to push cargo vessels through the Russian blockade. There would be ample opportunity for such skirmishes given that a convoy sailing at a standard 12 knots would take about a day to sail from the port of Odessa to the straits. The outcome of such a battle would be uncertain because there is no modern precedent for a naval engagement between peer competitors. Unlike warfare in the air and on the ground, few naval engagements have occurred since the end of World War II. It is likely that NATO, with its powerful ships and its massive air power advantage, would prevail—perhaps quickly, perhaps after an extended series of convoy battles. But many NATO nations will not have the stomach for a direct military confrontation with Russia and all the risks of escalation that would inevitably bring, even if it could break Moscow’s blockade and relieve the mounting food crisis.
SAFER BETS
A less confrontational option would be to enlist non-NATO countries to provide escorts and cargo ships. A country like Egypt, which depends heavily on imported grain, might be willing to take on the risks a convoy would entail. This indirect approach would avoid a Russian narrative of NATO aggression and lean heavily on the humanitarian argument of relieving hunger. Ultimately, however, this is a diplomatic calculation because these third-party countries likely do not have the military capability to fight Russia effectively.
Ukraine could transport grain by rail to the Romanian port of Costanta, which is only 190 miles from Odessa, and from there, ship it by sea using third-party vessels. This would avoid any direct connection with Ukraine and the war, thus allowing Russia some distance if it wanted to avoid a confrontation. Russia might not be willing to let such a scheme slide, however, in the face of sanctions against its own exports.

Difficult as the choices may be, the West cannot simply ignore the problem.

The United States could take a direct approach by registering, or reflagging, merchant vessels as American ships, so that Russia would have to attack U.S. vessels to enforce the blockade. There is a precedent for such a move: the United States reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to provide U.S. naval protection during the Iran-Iraq War in 1987–88 to ensure the continued flow of oil. This is a risky strategy, though; even during the tanker war, these reflagged tankers were subject to sniping and mining, and they needed escorts as a result, regardless of their redesignated nationality. Russia likewise might not be deterred by this tactic.
There are also diplomatic options that could be worth pursuing. Putin, for instance, has stated that Russia would allow shipments from Ukraine under some conditions. One could imagine a ship-for-ship agreement, in which one merchant ship from Ukraine would be allowed to engage in international trade in exchange for one ship from Russia doing so. This tit-for-tat proposal has gained little traction, given that it would provide Russia substantial financial resources and constitute a precedent for lifting sanctions. Still, Western nations have been reluctant to risk military confrontation, and the global food situation will grow increasingly dire. A diplomatic approach might win international support over time.
Countries depending on Ukrainian and Russian grain likely have enough supplies to last for a while, and their stores are being boosted by Western aid in the short term. There are no current reports of hunger. But over the longer term, the status quo will prove untenable. Should the war continue, dwindling supplies will cause shortages and food riots that could lead to social and regime instability. The West will face mounting pressure to act. Global hunger may not be acute yet, but when it hits, it will hit hard. It is the responsibility of NATO and the West to have a plan in place before the shortage becomes a crisis.

Foreign Affairs · by Mark Cancian · July 1, 2022


​21. None of the US Air Force’s linguists spoke Ukrainian. Then Russia invaded.


Like a SOF truth adapted: you cannot create sufficient competent linguists after emergencies occur. Or can we and did we?


None of the US Air Force’s linguists spoke Ukrainian. Then Russia invaded.
militarytimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · July 1, 2022
The Pentagon knew something was coming in Ukraine.
Air Force reconnaissance planes had flown over eastern Europe for months, staffed with military linguists who could interpret what nearby Russian forces were discussing as they prepared to invade neighboring Ukraine in February. The U.S. had pledged solidarity with Europe’s second-largest country and approved more than $1 billion in military aid.
There was just one problem.
“We have no Ukrainian-specific linguists. We don’t train Ukrainian,” Staff Sgt. Bobby Brown, airborne language analyst program manager, recently told Air Force Times on a visit to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
As the situation along Ukraine’s borders — and eventually, inside them — grew more dire, the Air Force rushed to find troops who could pass the Pentagon’s Ukrainian language proficiency test.
Some with family ties to the country already spoke it, while others with an appetite for languages set out to learn. Airmen who study Russian could help out in a pinch as well, since the two share similar alphabets, grammar and vocabulary.
“The Department of the Air Force has the ability to track language capabilities in the military personnel systems and can quickly identify airmen/guardians with the required language skills, to include Ukrainian,” service spokesperson Laura McAndrews said Friday.
The Air Force “surged to meet emerging requirements” for Russian language analysts at the beginning of the conflict, she added.
McAndrews declined to answer how many Ukrainian and Russian linguists are currently supporting U.S. and NATO operations related to the four-month-old war, citing operational security.
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The aid is part of the $40 billion in security and economic assistance passed last month by Congress.
The Pentagon’s Defense Language Institute trains service members in about a dozen languages, including French, Spanish, Indonesian, Farsi, Russian, Tagalog, Mandarin, Japanese, Korean, Pashto and four Arabic dialects. The most difficult courses can last more than a year.
Those airmen tend to specialize in one of a few key tongues at a time — typically Russian, Mandarin Chinese, Korean and Arabic. But it’s more complicated than knowing how to ask for a bathroom.
Cryptologic language analysts, as they are formally known, intercept the messages and conversations of foreign troops and decision-makers so the U.S. is clued into their possible next steps. That comes in handy for tracking troop movements on the ground in real time as well as longer-term mission planning.
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Military Times reporter and Marine veteran Rachel Nostrant chronicles her time in Ukraine.
“We have our own slang and acronyms and things we talk about that are not conversational language,” said Maj. Eric Armstrong, an RC-135 Rivet Joint pilot who now serves as deputy director of the base reconstruction effort at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, where airborne linguists are first stationed at the 97th Intelligence Squadron.
“They have to understand the mission’s military language … so they can grasp, ‘This type of person is probably talking to this type of person in this role about these things,’” he said.
The intelligence gets routed through organizations like the National Security Agency and shared with countries that work with the U.S. That collaboration has helped Ukrainian troops kill multiple Russian generals and sink a key warship in the Black Sea.
“If it is a threat to our partners, we’re able to tell them that threat,” Armstrong said. “We may not have to give them the whole ‘who, what, why and where,’ but we can tell them that, ‘Hey, there’s something dangerous and watch out.’”
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A Pentagon spokesman said the U.S. does not provide locations of senior Russian military officials to partners in Ukraine.
Service members who are well-versed in other languages can also help train foreign forces.
For example, Air Force Capt. Jordan Garcia stepped in as an interpreter for Ukrainian students at the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, a U.S. Navy program in Mississippi that trains foreign special operations troops in tactics and strategy, earlier this year.
Garcia, who speaks Ukrainian and Russian, was part of the Air Force’s Language-Enabled Airman Program. The initiative offers online classes for active duty airmen and Space Force guardians to gain a working knowledge of a foreign language.
“It was critical to hit the ground running, so there was not a lot of time to get spun up on the technical terminology related to the subjects,” he said in a May 12 release. “My development through LEAP training and eMentor courses helped me be able to adapt and learn at the speed I needed to.”
Garcia spent three weeks with the Ukrainians as they progressed through courses on patrol craft, diesel systems maintenance and international tactical communications. The students were in Mississippi when Russian forces invaded their home country on Feb. 24.
“One of the Ukrainian students was originally working as an interpreter for the other students,” Garcia said. “After shadowing her for a day, I stepped in and did the interpreting for all of the Ukrainian students so she could focus on learning the material.”
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Flight trackers have spotted American Rivet Joint, Global Hawk, Reaper and Joint STARS aircraft, plus allied assets.
In many cases, getting someone up to speed to decipher military chatter in a foreign language — heard over a crackly headset, during a crisis, with little backup — requires squeezing what is typically an 18-month process into a matter of weeks.
The U.S. military dealt with that time crunch firsthand while withdrawing from its two-decade war in Afghanistan last summer.
As of May 2021, the Air Force had just eight linguists who spoke Pashto, one of Afghanistan’s two official languages that is spoken by about half of the population, said Armstrong, who helped manage the withdrawal as an operations director at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, before moving to Offutt.
“That was an absolute nightmare. Between [RC-135 Rivet Joints and EC-130H Compass Calls], we split them up the best we could,” Armstrong told Air Force Times in April. “We brought some folks back who had already gone to other languages, but hadn’t quite become unqualified yet.”
That included two Chinese experts who had previously studied Pashto.
“Trying to spin them up in order to safely get through the Afghanistan withdrawal was challenging,” Armstrong said.
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The EC-130H Compass Call worked behind the scenes for two decades in Afghanistan, from supporting the arrival of special forces, to the bin Laden raid and the Kabul evacuation.
That grew from eight people to about 130 airmen who offered language support during the massive U.S.-led humanitarian evacuation and the domestic resettlement effort, McAndrews said. Those airmen acted as advocates for Afghan evacuees as they tried to piece together a path forward with the U.S. military, federal agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
“For Operation Allies Refuge/Operation Allies Welcome, the linguist teams at the camps were a critical asset. With language and culture expertise, they were injected into every role at every step of the process without any formal training for this type of mission,” McAndrews said.
Despite a constant need for foreign language proficiency in its ranks, the Air Force hasn’t found a way to avoid the last-minute scramble for multilingual airmen in an emergency.
Part of the problem is that the service has to reserve spots at the Defense Language Institute five years in advance. The Army is in charge of training cryptologic language analysts there.
“We have to basically plan for the world’s messes, crises, five years out — can’t really do that. It’s constantly a struggle,” said Brown, who specializes in Chinese.
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Rebuilding Offutt is expected to take about 10 years and more than $1 billion.
He noted that the military has tried ways of quickly retasking its linguists as needed, but it hasn’t gone well.
“They try to, as best as possible, keep everyone going and keep everyone relevant,” Brown said.
McAndrews said the Air Force has started a pilot program, dubbed “Linguist Next,” at the institute in an attempt to fast-track language expertise. The service hopes that more frequent proficiency tests will make that knowledge stick more quickly than in DLI’s usual course.
Contractors also help retrain linguists who need to brush up on a new language, stat, she said.
The military wants additional, more stable funding for its various foreign language education programs for a more stable bench of polyglots. For now, the Air Force is prioritizing languages that fall in line with the National Defense Strategy.
That document positions the United States in military competition with China and Russia, with a lesser emphasis on countering North Korea, Iran and violent insurgencies around the world.
“Language equities across the Air Force are in high demand and are a significant and costly resource to create and maintain,” McAndrews said. “The Air Force works closely with the Department of Defense through a multitude of working groups to strike the right balance of capability to meet the needs of our nation and the service.”
Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.


22. The Truth About the Evolution of Russian Military Doctrine

Excerpts:

After his promotion to Chief of the General Staff in 2012, General Valery Gerasimov has been proclaimed by many Western analysts as the "father" of Russian hybrid warfare, also known as the Gerasimov Doctrine. But Gerasimov has never been a theorist. Instead, he is a pragmatic and practical officer with experience in armored forces, a mindset moderately-rooted in the Soviet operational tradition, and whose most recent model of warfare before he became Chief of the General Staff was the Gulf War. Many Western analysts conflated the ideas he espoused in 2012 with the Western debates on the transformation of war that have been discussed in academic circles since the 1990s. But this was a mistake. What Gerasimov was trying to do was allude to the traditional Russian concept of non-linear warfare—which refers to the use of both regular and irregular forces along with psychological, economic, and diplomatic means—and the traditional concept of deep operation, which is based on a systematic and national effort combining diplomatic, social, and military elements. In fact, in his infamous speech, he cited Isserson and Svechin, although both in reference to general propositions like military combat readiness and preparing for future conflicts.
While the Russian military doctrine of 2014 resembled the Western debates on the transformation of war, Gerasimov has shown that he is more likely to put into practice ideas from the Soviet era, such as nuclear deterrence, the development of hypersonic missiles, and the continuation of a reserve force, rather than to implement the reforms of former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov who attempted to transform the Russian Army from a conscript army to a professional army after the military failures in Georgia. Regarding mobilization, Gerasimov falls more in line with the Brezhnev era than with some kind of new generation of warfare.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that General Gerasimov has exerted a huge influence on the war in Ukraine. So far, the combat environment in Ukraine reflects his experience as an armor officer who firmly supports mechanized warfare, artillery, and the use of missiles and air power to accomplish objectives.




The Truth About the Evolution of Russian Military Doctrine
Today, Russian military doctrine reflects the traditional concepts of non-linear warfare and deep operation.
The National Interest · by Carlo J. V. Caro · July 1, 2022
To understand the nature and shortcomings of the Russian war in Ukraine, it is important to reflect on the nature and evolution of Russian military doctrine. Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, military doctrine provided a guide for defense matters, such as the allocation of resources, the question of command, and the deployment of forces. However, it never indicated a specific response to military conflict, thus always providing officials a large degree of flexibility. Soviet military doctrine was never codified in an official document either and instead came from a variety of sources. The definition of military doctrine did not change until Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership when operational concepts were subordinate to a socio-political dimension. Then in 1993, for the first time in the contemporary history of Russia, a military doctrine was formally approved.
Between the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia defined war as a sociopolitical phenomenon, borrowing terms from Vladimir Lenin's work, whose death had facilitated the elaboration of a military doctrine in the 1920s. After the 1980s, Russian military doctrine began to take a predominantly sociopolitical meaning and with this shift, it sought to address the role of Russia in the world, the role of the armed forces within its governmental system, and its nuclear posture. Post-Soviet Russian military doctrine departed from Gorbachev's proclamation by identifying the military as a purely defensive institution with a legitimate role in internal armed conflicts. The doctrine aimed to resolve the failure and inability of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to confront the uprisings in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Baku, Azerbaijan after which the military was used to violently crackdown on civilian populations. Russia, therefore, sought to legitimize the role of the military within the borders of the former Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was mainly concerned with ideological questions, post-Soviet Russian military doctrine concerned itself more with the "threats" within the borders of the former Soviet Union and its allies, especially after NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia.
Previously, however, Soviet military doctrine was more concerned with operational questions. During the 1920s and 1930s, a group of prominent Soviet military officers revolutionized the study and practice of military affairs. While these officers began their careers in the Imperial Russian Army, their innovative thinking led them to form new conclusions based on the technological and industrial developments of the time. In a new environment that allowed for massive mobilization, these Russian officers articulated a concept that came to be known as operational art, and which sought to fill the gap between strategy and tactics. While not a new concept, as Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri-Jomini, and Helmuth von Moltke had already demonstrated, it had never been developed and delineated with such clarity.
After WWI, these officers concluded that the war’s belligerents had entered the conflict without understanding it or evaluating the changes that occurred. As a result, these nations confronted the war with old methods and procedures. For these Soviet officers, it was essential to find military solutions to the problem of limited mobility and capacity to maneuver on stagnant battlefields.

Vladimir Triandafillov elaborated on the concept of deep operation, which consisted of simultaneous attacks on all enemy defenses by air power and artillery, along with the penetration of enemy territory by armored units to surround and destroy the defenders. Infantry needed to play the main role, supported by all other elements in the pursuit of an objective. For Georgii S. Isserson, the campaign needed to possess sustained and consecutive deep operations, integrated into both space and time, and shift from a linear strategy to a deep strategy. The objective, facilitated by new technology, was to surround and isolate the enemy, depriving it of the necessary logistical support for it to survive.
But when Josef Stalin came to power, he sought to eliminate challenges to his rule and purged the Red Army of the thinkers revolutionizing military theory. Of course, the time of the purges coincided with the start of World War II and threatened the existence of the Soviet Union. Ironically, Nazi Germany's blitzkrieg throughout Europe had many similarities to the military ideas espoused by the purged Soviet officers, including the Soviet concept of deep operation.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Red Army was unable to stop its advances or organize an effective defense of its territory. But the Soviet high command began to issue new regulations and directives based on the military losses the Red Army was suffering. By implementing the concept of deep operation, the Red Army was able to achieve victories in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.
The Red Army achieved those victories by modifying its organization, adapting it to a combined force of mechanized and artillery units, and merging infantry units to achieve a larger offensive capacity on specific fronts and thereby penetrate the enemy’s defensive lines. The objective was to break through tactical and forward enemy defenses and then use fresh shock troops to exploit the interior until mechanized and armored units encircled the enemy. When the Red Army attacked the German Army Group in Byelorussia, it successfully achieved the concept of deep battle and operation, destroying the 4th German Army, inflicting over 400,000 German military casualties, and cutting off another 300,000 German soldiers. It was a catastrophic loss for Nazi Germany, which coincided with the timing of Operation Overlord. It should be noted that regardless of the great success, Soviet losses were substantial during this operation.
After WWII, the introduction of nuclear weapons undermined Clausewitz's conception of war as politics by other means and produced a stark change in Soviet military doctrine. Marshall Vasily Sokolovsky illustrated this best by arguing that future conflicts were going to have a fundamental nuclear character and that nuclear weapons would play a decisive role on the battlefield. Soviet military thinking began to prioritize nuclear weapons over operational maneuvers, forgetting that it had been the application of operational art which enabled the Soviet Union to achieve victory over Nazi Germany. These operational concepts lost relevance as nuclear weapons became the main method to destroy the enemy.
For Soviet military doctrine, nuclear weapons were given a bigger priority in strategic planning while operational concepts were relegated to a minor concern. Thus, operational art became dependent on nuclear warfare. The Soviet Union created the Strategic Rocket Forces and sought to reduce the size of its military personnel, looking to disperse them to make them less vulnerable to a nuclear attack. In the 1980s, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov attempted to return to operational concepts by arguing that nuclear war was not a rational way to achieve political objectives, and instead conventional capabilities needed to be strengthened. Orgakov sought to expand air, mechanized, and armored divisions, believing that a war against NATO could be won through a rapid and surprise conventional attack with conventional weapons that penetrated deep into enemy territory.
Nevertheless, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian military inherited the requirements for nuclear war and its conventional resources were reduced. Questions surrounding Russian military doctrine were unclear, and debates arose between different officials. Those who followed General Vladimir Slipchenko prioritized technology over ground forces while officials who followed General Makhmut Gareev argued that it was impossible to win a war by relying on ballistic missiles and precision-guided weapons.
After his promotion to Chief of the General Staff in 2012, General Valery Gerasimov has been proclaimed by many Western analysts as the "father" of Russian hybrid warfare, also known as the Gerasimov Doctrine. But Gerasimov has never been a theorist. Instead, he is a pragmatic and practical officer with experience in armored forces, a mindset moderately-rooted in the Soviet operational tradition, and whose most recent model of warfare before he became Chief of the General Staff was the Gulf War. Many Western analysts conflated the ideas he espoused in 2012 with the Western debates on the transformation of war that have been discussed in academic circles since the 1990s. But this was a mistake. What Gerasimov was trying to do was allude to the traditional Russian concept of non-linear warfare—which refers to the use of both regular and irregular forces along with psychological, economic, and diplomatic means—and the traditional concept of deep operation, which is based on a systematic and national effort combining diplomatic, social, and military elements. In fact, in his infamous speech, he cited Isserson and Svechin, although both in reference to general propositions like military combat readiness and preparing for future conflicts.
While the Russian military doctrine of 2014 resembled the Western debates on the transformation of war, Gerasimov has shown that he is more likely to put into practice ideas from the Soviet era, such as nuclear deterrence, the development of hypersonic missiles, and the continuation of a reserve force, rather than to implement the reforms of former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov who attempted to transform the Russian Army from a conscript army to a professional army after the military failures in Georgia. Regarding mobilization, Gerasimov falls more in line with the Brezhnev era than with some kind of new generation of warfare.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that General Gerasimov has exerted a huge influence on the war in Ukraine. So far, the combat environment in Ukraine reflects his experience as an armor officer who firmly supports mechanized warfare, artillery, and the use of missiles and air power to accomplish objectives.
Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He has a graduate degree from Columbia University.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Carlo J. V. Caro · July 1, 2022


23. The 20-Somethings Who Help the 70-Somethings Run Washington

​I offer this because of the focus on interns and the young people that actually do a tremendous amount of work keeping the trains running on time. I think we've all known many like her and in positions like hers. I have to say that watching her testimony was quite impressive. There is hope for the future from our young people. Time for us old people to get out of the way. 


The 20-Somethings Who Help the 70-Somethings Run Washington
The New York Times · by Annie Karni · July 1, 2022
Washington memo
The story of Cassidy Hutchinson, who became the first Trump White House aide to testify publicly in the Jan. 6 inquiry, showed the outsize influence of young aides in the nation’s capital.
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Cassidy Hutchinson, now 26, was at the center of the political action as an aide in the Trump White House. “You can get a better job as a 24-year-old in Washington in government than you can in a big company,” said Steve Elmendorf, a lobbyist who was once a congressional aide.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By
July 1, 2022
WASHINGTON — When an alarmed Representative Kevin McCarthy, the minority leader, called the White House on Jan. 6, 2021, demanding to know why the president of the United States had suggested he was coming to the Capitol while Congress met to certify his election defeat, the person on the other end of the line had just turned 25 years old.
“I said, ‘I’ll run the traps on this,’” Cassidy Hutchinson, now 26, testified this week before the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack, recalling what she had told Mr. McCarthy, Republican of California. “I can assure you, we’re not coming to the Capitol.”
Ms. Hutchinson’s two hours of testimony provided a riveting account of President Donald J. Trump’s mind-set and actions the day of the mob attack and situated the young aide — an assistant by title, but a gatekeeper in practice — at the very center of some of the most sensitive conversations and events of that day.
It also pulled back the curtain on a little-acknowledged truth about how Washington works: The capital’s power centers may be helmed largely by the geriatric set, but they are fueled by recent college graduates, often with little to no previous job experience beyond an internship. And while many of those young players rank low on the official food chain, their proximity to the pinnacle of power gives them disproportionate influence, and a front-row seat to critical moments that can define the country.
Sometimes, the interns themselves appear to be running the show.
After the House investigative committee accused Senator Ron Johnson, Republican of Wisconsin, of attempting to hand-deliver to Vice President Mike Pence a slate of false electoral votes for Mr. Trump, Mr. Johnson, 67, blamed the incident on a young underling. He claimed that an unidentified “House intern” had instructed his staff to give the list of fake electors to Mr. Pence.
Other former Trump aides who have appeared in video testimony during the Jan. 6 hearings include Nick Luna, now 35, Mr. Trump’s former body man; Sarah Matthews, now 27, a former deputy White House press secretary; and Ben Williamson, now 29, like Ms. Hutchinson a former aide to Mark Meadows, the final Trump White House chief of staff.
The committee has also featured some of its own young-looking investigators in videos laying out its work.
The relative youth of critical players wielding sway in the government is not a new phenomenon.
Lawrence Higby, who served as a top aide to H.R. Haldeman, President Richard M. Nixon’s chief of staff, was 25 years old when he testified as a key witness during the Watergate hearings.
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s final chief of staff, James R. Jones, was 28 years old when he was appointed to the top job in the White House.
In an interview, Mr. Jones said he was able to rise so high so quickly by following the advice he had received from his boss, W. Marvin Watson, when he joined the White House staff at the ripe old age of 25.
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s final chief of staff, James R. Jones, second from left, was 28 years old when he was appointed.Credit...Yoichi Okamoto, via LBJ Presidential Library
“What I was doing was passing his notes to the president, and he said, ‘You’ll be noticed at the right time. Just do your work now and stay out of the president’s view.’”
Mr. Jones added, “You just had to be at the right place at the right time. I played very low key, I tried to give the credit of successes to others, I didn’t talk to reporters — that’s how I think I made it. I probably would have made a number of key decisions differently with more years on me.”
For the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 assault, relying on junior aides like Ms. Hutchinson — who held internships with Senator Ted Cruz of Texas and Representative Steve Scalise of Louisiana and then at the White House before joining Mr. Trump’s staff — has been a crucial part of its strategy. With many of Mr. Trump’s senior advisers refusing to cooperate, investigators moved down the organizational chart and quietly turned to at least half a dozen lower-level former staff members who provided critical information about their bosses’ activities.
“We are definitely taking advantage of the fact that most senior-level people in Washington depend on a lot of young associates and subordinates to get anything done,” Representative Jamie Raskin, Democrat of Maryland, told Politico last month, claiming that the young people “still have their ethics intact.”
Representative Liz Cheney, Republican of Wyoming and the vice chairwoman of the committee, compared Ms. Hutchinson favorably to the more seasoned officials who have stonewalled the panel.
“Her superiors — men many years older — a number of them are hiding behind executive privilege, anonymity and intimidation,” Ms. Cheney said in a speech this week. (Her father, the former vice president Dick Cheney, became deputy chief of staff in President Gerald R. Ford’s White House at the age of 33.)
John Podesta, a former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton and a former senior adviser to President Barack Obama, said it has always been the case that in the White House, “there are a lot of people in their late 20s and early 30s” coming from campaigns or from Capitol Hill for jobs with considerable responsibilities.
“They’re expected to perform with fealty to the institution and the Constitution,” Mr. Podesta said. “In this case, it seems like the younger people did a better job than the older people on that front.”
They also have longer careers ahead of them, perhaps making them less willing to tie themselves forever to Mr. Trump’s efforts to overturn the election.
For ambitious young people, government jobs in Washington have long offered a jet-fueled rise to power that the private sector, however lucrative, can’t compete with.
Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 Hearings
Card 1 of 7
Making a case against Trump. The House committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack is laying out evidence that could allow prosecutors to indict former President Donald J. Trump, though the path to a criminal trial is uncertain. Here are the main themes that have emerged so far:
An unsettling narrative. During the first hearing, the committee described in vivid detail what it characterized as an attempted coup orchestrated by the former president that culminated in the assault on the Capitol. At the heart of the gripping story were three main players: Mr. Trump, the Proud Boys and a Capitol Police officer.
Creating election lies. In its second hearing, the panel showed how Mr. Trump ignored aides and advisers as he declared victory prematurely and relentlessly pressed claims of fraud he was told were wrong. “He’s become detached from reality if he really believes this stuff,” William P. Barr, the former attorney general, said of Mr. Trump during a videotaped interview.
Pressuring Pence. Mr. Trump continued pressuring Vice President Mike Pence to go along with a plan to overturn his loss even after he was told it was illegal, according to testimony laid out by the panel during the third hearing. The committee showed how Mr. Trump’s actions led his supporters to storm the Capitol, sending Mr. Pence fleeing for his life.
Fake elector plan. The committee used its fourth hearing to detail how Mr. Trump was personally involved in a scheme to put forward fake electors. The panel also presented fresh details on how the former president leaned on state officials to invalidate his defeat, opening them up to violent threats when they refused.
Strong arming the Justice Department. During the fifth hearing, the panel explored Mr. Trump’s wide-ranging and relentless scheme to misuse the Justice Department to keep himself in power. The panel also presented evidence that at least half a dozen Republican members of Congress sought pre-emptive pardons.
The surprise hearing. Cassidy Hutchinson, ​​a former White House aide, delivered explosive testimony during the panel’s sixth session, saying that the president knew the crowd on Jan. 6 was armed, but wanted to loosen security. She also painted Mark Meadows, the White House chief of staff in the Trump administration, as disengaged and unwilling to act as rioters approached the Capitol.
“You can get a better job as a 24-year-old in Washington in government than you can in a big company,” said Steve Elmendorf, a well-connected Washington lobbyist who early in his career worked as a senior adviser to Representative Richard Gephardt, the Democratic leader. “The West Wing is physically so small, the person who is the 24-year-old is sitting right on top of the principals. Young people end up getting a lot of responsibility, because the principals are so busy and so hard to get to.”
That makes the assistants into gatekeepers who become players in their own right.
“If you can’t figure out how to get Ron Klain on the phone,” he said, referring to President Biden’s chief of staff, “figure out the three people who sit outside his office.”
Adding to the post-collegiate feel of Capitol Hill and the West Wing is the issue of who can afford to work in government, and for how long.
The average age of a House staffer is 31, according to the Sunlight Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to transparency in government, which noted in a report that the wage gap between the private and public sector “may encourage staff to seek greener pastures while depriving Congress of experience and expertise.”
A chief of staff on average would earn 40 percent more in the private sector than on Capitol Hill, according to the report, and “ex-staffers who become lobbyists can increase their earnings by many multiples.”
During her time in the Trump administration, Ms. Hutchinson, whose title was special assistant to the president for legislative affairs, earned $72,700, according to White House records. The most senior officials earned up to $180,000.
Still, she was there in the West Wing to witness the ketchup-dripping aftermath when Mr. Trump is said to have thrown his lunch against the wall in a rage that William P. Barr, the attorney general, had said publicly that there had been no widespread fraud in the 2020 election.
It was Ms. Hutchinson to whom the White House counsel, Pat A. Cipollone, turned with a dire warning about what would happen if Mr. Trump followed through with his plan to follow his supporters to the Capitol on Jan. 6. “We’re going to get charged with every crime imaginable,” Ms. Hutchinson said Mr. Cipollone told her.
And Mr. Meadows, who was said to have brought Ms. Hutchinson to virtually every meeting he attended, and Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mr. Trump’s personal lawyer, addressed her familiarly as “Cass” as they spoke freely to her about what they were anticipating on Jan. 6.
As she leaned against the doorway to his office a few days before, she testified, Mr. Meadows confided to Ms. Hutchinson, “Things might get real, real bad on Jan. 6.”
The New York Times · by Annie Karni · July 1, 2022

24.




De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
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Phone: 202-573-8647

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: d[email protected]
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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